Among the hasty comparisons that have abounded post-Sept. 11 is the one likening Hamas and Islamic Jihad to the Taleban and the Al-Qaeda organization. They all bear the fundamentalist label that marks the emergent enemy, and they are all implicated in acts of attackism that target civilians. So there is no question of treating them differently, and the international coalition in Afghanistan ­ goals, methods and modus operandi included ­ is one and the same as in Palestine. In this case it is not so much the devil, but the truth, which is in the detail. Failure to discern the differences between these groups would give a blurred vision of Sept. 11. Here is an initial checklist of distinctions separating Hamas and Islamic Jihad from the Taleban and Al-Qaeda.

1. The two Palestinian groups do not disavow the national question. This is no mere detail, because other “jihadist” organizations ­ in Algeria for example, or Afghanistan, or in some extreme Egyptian circles ­ do. Talking about the national question means talking about land, occupation and liberation, and defining the activities and relationships that are needed to achieve a specific task. The two groups in Afghanistan are well known to have set no store by such considerations, especially in recent years. The importance of this point may stem from the fact that the Palestinian branch of fundamentalism underwent a radical transformation with the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987, from calling for the Islamization of society first, to seeking to liberate the Occupied Territories primarily.

2. Hamas and Jihad do not presume to be establishing the Islamic Caliphate on Earth, nor calling or compelling non-Muslims to enter into the faith. That doesn’t mean they do not wish for it, but it does mean that it doesn’t figure in their long-term program. They are thus able to live with the world as it is, provided they can secure their people’s national rights from it. This obviously bears no relation to the paranoia that seized Mullah Mohammed Omar and Osama bin Laden and pushed them into the insane adventure whose events, and especially outcome, are well known.

3. Both Hamas and Jihad maintain a dialogue, rowdy or calm, with the Palestinian Authority (PA). When that dialogue degenerates into violence (at the Authority’s instigation), it is not because of disputes of a religious nature or charges that Yasser Arafat does not enforce Sharia law. Politics is always the reason, the disputes invariably being about negotiations-related issues, methods of operating, and assessments of the possibility of putting pressure on “Israel” outside the constraints imposed by the agreements. Hamas and Jihad may criticize corrupt aspects of the behavior of the PA’s people, but they don’t, for example, call for the introduction of an Islamic economy, wage war on the Jericho casino, or do anything to suggest they give issues of belief ­ including as they relate to day-to-day living ­ precedence over national issues.

4. Consequentially, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have no qualms about making alliances with Palestinian Marxist, or at least secular, groups. There have been joint operations with the Popular Front, while ties with Fatah’s Tanzim are in the best of shape. One need only know the basics of Taleban thinking to appreciate that the behavior of their Palestinian counterparts is utter heresy whose perpetrators are doomed to hellfire.

5. It is no secret that Hamas has ties, albeit unpublicized, to extremely moderate Arab regimes. It listens to their advice, and they evaluate things together. Jihad for its part makes no secret of its special relationship with Shiite Iran. Those cognizant of the confessional background of the antipathy between Iran and the Taleban, and of Mullah Omar’s and Osama bin Laden’s opinions of Shiites, appreciate that placing all in a single fundamentalist basket is inaccurate.

6. The storm unleashed by the New York and Washington attacks, and the undercurrent of Arab and Islamic empathy with those implicated in them, prevented Hamas and Jihad from saying what they honestly think of the Taleban and Al-Qaeda. Those privy to some of their thoughts can be certain that Hamas and Jihad leaders view Mullah Omar and bin Laden with disdain. They consider them to be intellectually worthless and unaffiliated to any ancient tradition, and to have been led by their lack of touch with reality into outlandish behavior that veiled itself, in its final stage, in the name of Palestine.

7. Hamas and Jihad express a genuine popular condition. The Palestinians have always lived strewn between a relatively pragmatic nationalist current represented by Fatah (and at one stage the Democratic Front), and a rejectionist current that cannot sanction the casual abandonment of historic rights in all of Palestine. The Popular Front used to be the symbol of this current, a status inherited by Palestinian fundamentalism as part of the broader process by which its counterparts in the Arab world inherited ideas from the Arab Left. But this legacy also included a willingness to come to settlements even with “Israel” itself, to distinguish within Fatah between Arafat and some members of his entourage, and to foster ties with circles not ideologically affiliated to political Islam.

8. Hamas and Jihad do not raise the issue of power within the Occupied Territories, i.e. they acquiesce to the existing leadership, refuse to contest it, and demand that it treat them like the Lebanese state treats Hizbullah ­ sponsorship and divisions of roles.

9. Hamas and Jihad are careful to avoid any Palestinian infighting even when the PA takes the first step in harassing them. One could say that Arafat and a broad swathe of Fatah feel the same way they do. Recent days have shown that Palestinian Islamist leaders know how to retreat, understand the pressures the PA is under, and share its bitterness at the weakness of the Arab position. Here, we are light years away from the behavior of Al-Qaeda and the Taleban.

10. For these and other reasons, Hamas could announce a halt to martyrdom operations and Jihad could follow suit, even without formally saying so. This testifies to a sense of realism lacked by the Afghan brethren who thought, for a while, that they had reached the stage of all-out assault on the “Crusaders and Jews.” Incidentally, both Hamas and Jihad show concern for relations with Palestinian and Arab Christians, and do not share the Taleban’s and Al-Qaeda’s attitude to this component of their society which is engaged alongside them in the same struggle. We could add to the above that the historical circumstance in which Hamas and Islamic Jihad find themselves is different. They are in the position of resisting an occupation, and if their actions take them too far, that does not warrant making erroneous and rash comparisons.

Joseph Samaha, editor-in-chief of the Beirut daily As-Safir, wrote this commentary for The Daily Star