Franco Kickboxing Webpage Sample
The first page would be an example of an opening movie or intro perhaps, pictures and the like could easially be added, captivating photos combined with photoshop could add dramatic flare and cool effects. The second website I was thinking about proposing to Hapdosool before my old instructor, Ivan Lee, sold the buisness to a student of his. If it were to be finished, many links would be added, as well as a nicer way to lay out text. The top 'home' button links to another page and has a decent transition if you care to check it out.
I hope you like what you see.
Regards,
Marc Hazel
mkhazel@hotmail.com
(1) Popular forces can win a war against the army.
(2) It is not necessary to wait for until all the conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.
(3) In underdeveloped Latin America, the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.1
Point (2) represents a major break from conventional Marxist theory, whereby the proletariat must build class-consciousness through the development of advanced capitalism, revolutionary solidarity through the collective experience of class oppression, and then finally a revolution by the proletariat.
2advocating instead for immediate action initiated by an elite few.(do i agree?)
It is Guevara’s contention that the existence of a guerrilla foco can pose a threat to the legitimacy of a government’s right to rule and its exclusive monopoly over violence.
Guevara’s third point. Rather than waiting for a working class to emerge and gain revolutionary ideals, rural peasants can be elicited by the guerrilla foco for support, first by hiding and informing the fighters, then joining the foco in militant action.4
The ends of a guerrilla foco are significantly altered, where initially content to focus on liberating peasants from a national autocracy, Guevara has taken on the much larger, and decisively socialist, goal of liberating the whole of Latin America from the perceived colonialism of American capitalism.
Beginning in the Sierra Maestra Mountains in 1956, Castro, with the support of Guevara, built a small band of revolutionary fighters to challenge the military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista.11 Establishing their primary support amongst the rural peasantry by promising agrarian reform, the revolutionary movement succeeded in growing throughout both the rural and urban regions of the entire country, ultimately allowing for a successful general strike against Batista in 1959, and bringing Castro to power.12 Jose Moreno describes the effect of Castro’s foco in sparking revolution: “By setting up a guerrilla foco, Castro and his men affected the revolutionary situation in two ways: first, they helped accelerate the spread of social disintegration of the old structure to the whole system, and second, they made people aware of such a situation.”1Moreno, 129.
Edward Friedman describes the greatest failure of the ELN, which was its inability to attract new recruits:
Revolutionary ambushes succeed because some people sacrifice their lives to entrap the enemy. The revolution continues and grows because more people run forward to replace the dead. Che never sufficiently answers the question of what will make people willing to fight and die.25
Guevara acknowledges that when a government has been popularly elected, and legal outlets for political dissent exist, a revolution cannot be inspired. Rather, in these cases, peaceful action can replace the need for guerrilla tactics in affecting desired change.7
Barrientos waited until this battalion had finished their specialized training before deploying them against Guevara’s forces, ensuring that the militant component of his counter-insurgency strategy did not suffer from the random indulgences of violence that had characterized Batista’s army in Cuba.29 Further, Barrientos was well aware of the crucial role that peasants could play, and thus spent nearly half his time in rural areas, opening schools and minor public works projects to better his image in these areas.30It is here that Guevara’s foco theory takes one of its major blows, as the Bolivian case demonstrates that peasants cannot always be compelled to join on the side of the guerrillas.
While looking at Ernesto Che Guevara, numerous lessons may be drawn from his life, ranging from his literary works and life experiences. Specializing in guerrilla warfare, and writing multiple titles on the topic which were popularly received. From a historical viewpoint however, Guevara’s message remains only an echo beside popular predecessors such as Clausewitz, Lawrence (of Arabia), and out-done by individuals such as Castro and Mao. The course of this essay will draw parallels to texts pre-dating Guevara’s own, and draw reference to these writings in analyzing Guevara’s ultimate failure which cost him his life.
When analyzing Ernesto “Che” Guevara, one might ask what lessons can we learn from the Argentinean’s life? Guevara’s contribution to military history is derived from an accumulation of his writing in addition to his revolutionary and militaristic actions. Uniquely Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare philosophy was utilized in separate revolutions, one succeeding and one failing. With this juxtaposed success and failure, historical factors and preconditions can be isolated, yielding factors conducive and detrimental to a successful revolution. This isolation allows researchers to use Guevara’s philosophy, and Guevara himself as a control, to derive which preconditioned factors are conducive and detrimental to generating a successful revolution. The content herein isolates specific ideologies to its predecessors, and is analysed to conclude which of Guevara’s methodologies were effective. Interestingly, many theories have evolved from Guevara’s contribution; holding historical significance and insight to the progression of modern warfare.
Scholarly thought with which Guevara laced his texts can be found in publications by those such as sixth century BCE Sun Tzu, and more recent nineteenth century scholars such as Clausewitz, Lawrence, or Mazzini.
Guevara’s first of two revolutions launched July 26 1953 in conjunction with the plans of Fidel Castro, the revolution ended successfully January 2nd 1959. Previous to this revolution, Guerrilla Warfare was popularly thought to be only a strategically component of an army, or a supplementary tactic - not a fundamental monogamous tactic. Individuals such as [names] held essentially that small bands of guerrillas were ineffective, and could not conquer an entire army, contrary to the thought of thinkers such as Che and [other names]. The Cuban revolution was one of the first major successes for guerrilla warfare. The Guevara refined the definition of Guerrilla Warfare and was among the first to utilize Guerrilla Warfare as a successful military philosophy on a large scale when succeeding alongside Castro in the Cuban Revolution. The term Guerrilla Warfare dates back to Napoleonic times, largely utilized in the Peninsular War which begun in 1807, conceptually however modern Guerrilla warfare was still in its developmental phases. July 26th 1953 was the beginning of the Cuban revolution, Guevara’s first. The French Army was fighting a war of positions in Vietnam concurrently, soon to withdraw in ‘54, the war would be continued by the Americans. Major conflict still being fought with the War of Positions methodology , Revolutionists such as Mao Zedong categorised warfare into three unique categories, Positional Warfare, Mobile Warfare, and Guerrilla Warfare. Guevara’s philosophy holds the guerrilla fighter must be stealthy, highly mobile, and utilize the element of surprise. Zedong’s army however was much too large for this [how many, and source] and thus re-defined his tactics not as guerrilla tactics, but as Mobile Warfare tactics, moving and evading until he was ready to assault.
Up until the Cuban Revolution, Guerrilla Warfare had been utilized with limited success and different approaches.
Ironically, Guevara, utilizing the same set of principles came to different ends when conducting his two major revolutions. The first revolution Guevara alongside Castro succeeded, overthrowing the Cuban government. Guevara’s second attempt failed while conducting his own revolution in Bolivia. Che’s philosophy is founded on three primary ideas:
(1) Popular forces can win a war against the army.
(2) It is not necessary to wait for until all the conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.
(3) In underdeveloped Latin America, the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.
Guevara’s texts; Guerrilla Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare: A Method, and, A Message to the Tricontinental provided readers with Guevara’s theories, ideologies and tactics one should incorporate to carry out a successful revolution. Whether these texts were his own ideas or an amalgamation of lessons from Guevara’s predecessors such as Marx, Clausewitz, Mazzini, Garibaldi, we will not know; but in Guevara’s time Guerrilla Warfare was not a new concept.
Ironically, when put into practice Guevara’s result would prove to be somewhat paradoxical. Guevara sought to cause a revolution in Bolivia; his efforts resulted in a revolution stamped out by the Bolivian government which was assisted by the American CIA. who executed Guevara in 1967. The official defeat of Guevara’s National Liberation Army (ELN) occurred in 1969; Che’s legacy hardly ended on what one would consider a success. Guevara also had very strong points with regard to his military career. Teamed up with Fidel Castro, Guevara played a key role in overthrowing the Cuban government. Shortly thereafter he began writing his texts on Guerrilla Warfare.
Clausewitz http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege2/BK1ch01.html
Book one chapter one
4.-The aim is to disarm the enemy.
If our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him
in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which
we demand;
worst position in which a belligerent can be placed is that of being
completely disarmed or placed in such a position that he is threatened
with it according to probability.
As long as the enemy is not defeated, I have to apprehend that he may
defeat me, then I shall be no longer my own master, but he will dictate
the law to me as I did to him. This is the second reciprocal action and
leads to a second extreme (second reciprocal action).
Guevara holds this is true. Guevara relies on this fact and
utilizes propaganda, in addition to GW influence and persuasion in an
attempt to generate organized support, whether it be covert in the sense
of intelligence and denying the enemy that same knowledge of the GF; or
overt support such as providing individuals to assist in ambushes, or
other malicious acts such as sabotage or espionage
