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The decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan did not take place in a vacuum. Yet, both sides of the debate want you to believe otherwise. The conventional history boasts simply that President Truman wanted to avoid the horrific casualties that would have resulted from Operation Olympic. The challenging perspective wants you to think of nothing but the poor Japanese civilians victimized and vaporized by Little Boy and Fat Man.
Both sides are myopic in their respective approaches.
First of all, as the evidence presented in this site’s Timeline clearly indicates, there was at least as much consternation over the Soviet Union’s diplomatic initiatives in Europe and potential Soviet conquests in the Far East as there was about ending the war with Japan. Churchill makes it especially clear that the atomic bomb would send a message to the Soviets that would lead to a balancing of power as the Soviet sphere of influence moved well into central Europe while American troops were largely pulling out of the theater.
The Soviets held all the cards. They had the largest army in the world, controlling vast agricultural regions of Europe without which the western portion of Germany would have starved. Agreements and appeasement were absolutely necessary just to make it through the coming winter. At the same time, the Soviets were aggressively seeking the dismantling or redistribution of large sections of western European industrial centers as reparations for the destruction they had suffered at the hands of four years of war with Nazi Germany. Moreover, there were serious Communist movements in France and Italy. The entire region was highly unstable just as millions of Americans were returning home.
The vast destructive power of the atomic bomb would serve (as artillery has always served the military) as the great equalizer against further Soviet aggression. The use of the bombs upon Japan would certainly be useful as a weapon against Operation Ketsu-Go, but it is inaccurate to say that was President Truman’s only concern in using the bombs. Considering the stakes in Europe in the summer of 1945, it might even be a stretch to say that the military relevance of the weapons against Japan was the primary concern in their deployment. At the very least, the bombs not only saved American lives but they protected American global political interests as well.
Also, by the time Truman became President, the Manhattan Project had become a bloated military-industrial system with more or less a mind of its own. It had only one objective, to produce a unique weapon that could be used in a military operation. The atomic bomb was not designed as just a demonstration of power. It was meant to be a physical destructive reality. Otherwise, its value would always be theoretical and untested.
With the war ending in Europe and with the intensity of the conflict accelerating in the Pacific Theater despite the overwhelming odds against the Japanese nation, it was never seriously questioned what to do with the results of the Manhattan Project. The possibility of not dropping the product of the $2 billion endeavor could not be politically considered. Deployment of the bombs was inevitable as long as the Japanese failed to unconditionally surrender.
As the Timeline shows, and as revisionists have documented, key British officials, members of the State Department, and the Project leadership were unanimous in their agreement to drop the bombs. While Japan could have theoretically saved itself by accepting its inevitable defeat unconditionally (something it did anyway after the bombs were dropped) the creators of the Potsdam Proclamation were conscious of the fact that Japan’s surrender should not be a special case. Despite its cultural differences with Germany, essentially the concept of unconditional surrender was applied the same way in Japan as in Europe.
The primary motivation for this heavy handedness seems to lie in the hope that the bombs could be used in a military situation. A major force driving this desire, in addition to serving notice to the Soviets, minimizing their gains in the Far East, and avoiding the necessity of Operation Olympic, was the momentum of the Manhattan Project itself. Essentially, it was a groundbreaking human endeavor, gobbling up almost unprecedented government resources where the option of NOT using the end result simply didn’t exist.
So, the traditional perspective that the bombs saved the lives of thousands of Americans by avoiding the collision of Operation Olympic with Operation Ketsu-Go, while valid on a certain level, is clearly not the whole story. By focusing on just the saving of American lives the horrendous act of dropping the bombs was made publicly more acceptable while failing to give a full accounting of the action.
The same can be said of the challenging perspective, though the elements are slightly different. Here, the astigmatic focus is entirely upon the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki without any mention of the Soviets or of Europe or of the fact that World War Two was the most destructive civilian war in human history. Within the context of that pre-Vietnam mentality, the devastation of two Japanese cities by atomic bombs is really nothing special beyond the technological achievement itself.
Cold? Certainly by today’s standards. But using post-Vietnam standards of interpretation is precisely what makes the challenging perspective a castle made of sand. Things were much different in the summer of 1945. The revisionist argument used by Doug Long on his web site, for example, is that war should be waged and victory should be won with the fewest possible civilian casualties. That is as old an argument as the Hood and Sherman debates when Sherman ordered the bombardment of Atlanta in 1864. To paraphrase Sherman, “War is war. Don’t whine.” Victory is to be won at any cost in war. It is thinking like Mr. Long’s that leads to all sorts of military confusion, especially if you are trying to understand history in its proper context.
The challengers argue that the bombs could have been deployed differently. A public demonstration could have been attempted. Advanced warning could have been given to the Japanese to evacuate the target areas. Both contentions are so focused on saving lives that they fail to give the slightest credence to the factors that were genuinely on the table at the time these decisions were made.
As the Timeline documents, the bombs were untested. The potential for success was unknown. Several key military officials like Admiral Leahy did not even believe they would work. A public dud would have been a remarkable catalyst toward strengthening Japanese resistance. Moreover, millions of leaflets serving advanced notice were dropped over Japan during conventional bombing raids and before the Nagasaki blast. Virtually no Japanese responded to the calls for evacuation.
The military contingent of the challengers asserts that the bombs were unnecessary, that Japan was defeated anyway, that Soviet intervention actually brought about the surrender, and that, given enough time, the blockade and strategic bombing of Japan would have brought about surrender even without the Soviets. There are several problems with this reasoning.
First of all, this viewpoint largely comes from the “honorable” warriors who feel that wars should be won in “honorable” ways. That is, by conventional fighting methods, such as were used in Europe, as opposed to technological advances that renders all concept of ground war strategy and tactics obsolete. The atomic bombs were in no sense “honorable” weapons. They were strictly the application of pure science into a political situation, threatening traditional military methodology. So, the perspective is a bit “romantic” and prejudiced to begin with.
Beyond this, however, while it is perhaps true that Japan could have been defeated by the more traditional military means of strategic bombing and economic blockade, the time required for such a policy to work (best guess is at least until the end of 1945) made such an option politically unacceptable. The entrance of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War in August necessitated a rapid conclusion to the war. Otherwise the Soviets would have had ample time to move their massive army into most of the non-Chinese Far East. Korea, for example, would have become just as much a Soviet puppet state as Poland.
The point that it was the Soviet intervention that brought about the surrender of Japan is, once again, the pipe dream of traditional military strategists on both sides. The truth of the matter, as the Timeline shows, is that the Emperor broke the deadlock among his key advisors, ONLY AFTER NEWS OF NAGASAKI ARRIVED. Other than interviews conducted after the surrender had taken place, there is absolutely no evidence that the Soviet intervention resulted in Japan’s surrender. That is a story concocted after the fact. No one has demonstrated how the Soviet attack had any affect on the strategy or preparations of Ketsu-Go. Only the atomic bombs were a contributing factor in the mind of Emperor Hirohito.
The challengers claim a sort of moral high ground with the contention that Japan would have surrendered if the Potsdam Proclamation would have clearly protected the Emperor’s position within Japanese society. This is largely based upon the fact that the Japanese military used this as an excuse to continue the war. If fails to take into account that the same military leaders would have easily found some other excuse to avoid surrender even with assurances in the Potsdam document.
The Japanese military was undeniably in charge of Japan’s government. The Timeline documents over and over again how abhorrent the idea of surrender was to the basic nature of the military leadership. Even after the Emperor insisted upon surrender there was an almost successful coup to avoid surrender. The military continued to lash out at American naval vessels, even after the official surrender was announced.
Every key military leader in Japan opposed surrender, even a conditional one. Faith in the success of Operation Ketsu-Go was abundant and there is no evidence other than revisionist speculation that Potsdam had any affect whatsoever on Japan’s conduct of the war. Therefore, there is absolutely no reason for the Potsdam Proclamation to make concessions to the Japanese that were not made to the Germans. The concept of unconditional surrender was established at the Casablanca Conference long before the atomic bombs were a reality.
The American public, the State Department, and most American allies were opposed to any special considerations to the Japanese. It is not the fault of American diplomats that Japan did not have the cultural will to accept its inevitable defeat. There is not moral high ground to be claimed in trying to appease a culture that was simply out of step with the realities of the moment.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the decision to drop the atomic bombs is seriously questioned because two entire cities were destroyed with some 200,000 related deaths due to the unleashing of what is today referred to as weapons of mass destruction. Once again, this attitude is developed in a vacuum that fails to take a hard look at the way the world was in the summer of 1945.
As I mentioned before, World War Two saw millions of civilian deaths, a pervasiveness of destruction that is unthinkable today. What you must remember is that is was COMPLETELY thinkable then. As the Timeline shows, cities were routinely bombed throughout the war. Tens of thousands died in raids on Britain, Hamburg, Dresden, Berlin, Tokyo, and other major Japanese cities. Tragically, such actions were routine.
The only thing unique about Hiroshima and Nagasaki is that all that destruction was wrought by two bombs. The amount of destruction, the number of deaths (including those as a direct result of radiation) was not extraordinary. Far more people were killed in conventional bombing raids in Europe and Japan. Far more civilians were killed in traditional military operations on Okinawa than in either atomic bomb blast.
This criticism is simply out of step with the accepted reality of the time. To judge the destructiveness of the atomic bombs through strictly modern eyes is a common mistake. It is placing the criteria of social criticism above that of historical understanding. And it is poor social criticism anyway, because the events were not exceptional by the standards of the times. Only the technology was.
All in all, both the conventional and challenging perspectives leave much to be desired. They concentrate only upon the facts that support their respective prejudiced views. One proclaims the bombs as salvation, as shortening the war. These are true enough. The other damns the bombs as the manifestation of twisted, inhumane military and political standards that failed to look for solutions “outside the box” as we say today. This, too, has the ring of truth.
But, when the broader perspective is taken into account, President Truman’s decision in the summer of 1945 seems more solid than any of the criticism leveled against it. That the proponents of the bombs never fully disclosed the reasoning behind their decision might provide ample fuel for revisionist criticism, but it hardly validates such criticism, especially when the critics perspective is housed in a greater vacuum than that of the traditionalists.
Copyright © W. Keith Beason, 2011
Version 1.2
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