“The historic fact remains, and must be judged in the after-time, that the decision whether or not to use the atomic bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never even an issue. There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement around our table; nor did I ever hear the slightest suggestion that we should do otherwise.”
“We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans.”
“We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.”
"...only the atomic bomb could have achieved {Japan's surrender} without years of 'decisive battle' or mass starvation. For the unbearable was (barely) accepted only when the Emperior spoke up, and that moment came only after Nagasaki. The terrifying atomic devastation prompted his startling intervention, then tipped the balance among military commanders in favor of obedience."
"The Battle of Okinawa was the...most brutal military engagement between American and Japanese forces in the war...The immense cost of capturing the island, in human and material terms, did undoubtedly have a considerable influence on the decision to use atomic weapons. American leaders were left in no doubt that the losses in American lives increased dramatically the closer they came to the Japanese homeland. The experience of Okinawa convinced them that invasion was too high a price to pay."
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From the beginning President Truman saw the use of this unprecedented force as a means of shortening the war and of saving the lives of American soldiers. This belief was born in an atmosphere of how deadly the Pacific War had become in 1945. While in Europe it was clearly only a matter of time, it was thought by General Douglas MacArthur and others that the war against Japan, even with Soviet intervention, would last at least into 1947.
The weight of the Battles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa on the mind of the President, Prime Minister Churchill and other western leaders cannot be overemphasized. Given the harsh reality of those bloody operations and the fact that there was virtually no sign of surrender in the Japanese military mindset, the prevailing feeling at the time was that the Pacific War was just heating up as Europe was winding down. Operation Olympic, the initial invasion of the Japanese home islands slated for November 1, 1945, was going to be the largest amphibious operation ever attempted.
These are the facts upon which Truman made his final decision:
1) The Bushido Warrior Code of Japanese Culture.
As the Potsdam Conference opened, Winston Churchill captured the perspective that largely shaped the American decision to use the bombs. “I had in my mind the spectacle of Okinawa island, where many thousands of Japanese, rather than surrender, had drawn up in a line and destroyed themselves by hand-grenades after their leaders had solemnly performed the rite of harakiri.” (Gilbert, page 707)
Iwo Jima and Okinawa had been sobering blows to America, in spite of the fact that they were victories. Virtually no Japanese were taken prisoner. Horrendous casualties were incurred in fighting over comparatively tiny pieces of territory...certainly tiny compared with the vast Japanese home islands. The primary reason for this was the 800 year warrior tradition known as bushido. This was the basis for the infamous banzai (or "human wave") attacks by the Japanese and for various suicidal operations such as human torpedoes and the kamikazes, which caused terrific damage to the American Navy at Okinawa...more damage than ever before in American history. All things considered, the Pacific War was getting hotter and victory seemed years away.
Bushido ultimately translated into a rigid intolerance by the Japanese power structure (dominated by the military) for the Potsdam demand for "unconditional surrender." In response to the Potsdam declaration, Premier Kantaro Suzuki stated: "As for the Government, it does not find any important value in it, and there is no other recourse but to ignore it entirely, and resolutely fight for the successful conclusion of the war." (Weintraub, p.289)
It is most interesting to note that the Japanese word used in Suzuki's response (which was intercepted by MAGIC and well known to the American government) for "ignore it entirely" was mokusatsu which more literally means "to kill with silence" or to "treat with silent contempt." Such was the pronounced attitude of the Japanese Government. The peace movement in Japan was clearly of minor importance in Japanese politics in 1945. It had virtually no power and no influence on events until after the atomic bombs were dropped.
2) The murder of captured Americans.
President Truman and others were appalled by the Japanese treatment of American prisoners. According to Sidney Moody: “The Japanese had agreed to the Geneva Convention regarding prisoners of war in 1929, but the Diet never ratified it. This helps explain why 40 percent of Americans in Japanese POW camps died. Only 1 percent of U.S. captives in German stalags did. But brutality extended beyond mere indifference to human suffering. The Japanese rarely shot their victims, preferring to behead them, use them for bayonet practice, or bury them alive.”
Fresh on everyone’s mind in August 1945 was the fact that virtually all Americans captured on Okinawa were executed. This harsh historical truth shadowed the thoughts of American policymakers as they considered the use of the atomic bomb. George Feifer writes: "Scores of wounded GIs and Marines played dead when enemy soldiers after dark to check bodies and strip them of wristwatches and rations. Those who lived to tell the tale endured kicks to their gaping wounds, fingers poked straight into their eyes and booted jumps on their testicles. Almost all who failed such tests with a gasp or moan were bayoneted or shot to death."(page 389) Examples:
"Twenty-eight-year-old Lieutenant Tebo, a high school teacher before the war, and twenty-year-old Sergent Taggle had been so badly beaten they couldn't walk. Dragged toward the holes, they were bound, blindfolded and gagged. A Captain Makuta, proud of his beheading skill acquired in China, swung his sword the moment Tebo was pushed to his knees. His body tumbled into the hole.
"The second swordsman won the priviledge of being executioner after losing three of his men in the previous day's air raid, then spent hours proudly informing his men he'd been chosen. He managed to cut through only half of Sergeant Taggle's neck, but sailors kicked the body into his hole. Then a second truck arrived with Sergeant Lloyd, for whom a less honorable end had been decreed because of his unwillingness to answer during his interrogation.
"Lloyd too was beaten, then tied to a stake. About thirty men of a howitzer platoon watched, so large a number because their officer had ordered them all to be there. Two sergeants used sticks to beat the bound captive in the stomach. About a dozen more men followed suit, until the order was given to switch to bayonets. Some 50 men practiced on Lloyd for a half an hour under the supervision officers who demonstrated the proper technique." (page 389)
3) The extent of Japanese preparations to counter Operation Olympic.
The Japanese defense of the home islands was codenamed Ketsu-Go. They had stockpile 9,000 – 10,000 aircraft (half of which are designated for kamikaze missions) along with 13 million gallons of fuel and amassed a trained mainland armed force of more than 2,000,000 troops in anticipation of an American invasion of their homeland. Included in this army were hundreds of “Sherman Carpets”, children trained to throw themselves at American tanks with dynamite strapped to their bodies. Also included were hundreds of Shinyo (suicide boats) and kaitens (human torpedos).
Sidney Morris knew the extent of the danger poised against America: “The Japanese had stockpiled 5,350 kamikaze planes, had correctly guessed the three beaches chosen for Olympic and would actually have outnumbered the invaders. Their pre-targeted guns would have turned the valleys leading inland into shooting galleries.” (page 168)
Even Gar Alperovitz indicates that the Japanese had undertaken precisely what General MacArthur had feared: “During the Strategic Bombing Survey interrogations, for instance, Imperial Envoy Prince Konoye recalled that the ‘army had dug themselves in the mountains and their idea…was fighting from every little hole or rock in the mountains.” It was precisely this situation that General MacArthur stated would take one million men ten years to overcome.
Beyond these conventional defensive measure and the kamikazes, Japan was prepared to fight a style of war fare that America would later encounter fully in a place called Viet Nam. “In preparation for an American amphibious landing on Kyushu,” writes Martin Gilbert, ”the Japanese had trained considerable numbers of kamikaze suicide pilots, kaiten suicide human torpedoes and fukurya suicide divers. By August 1945, as many as 1,200 suicide divers had been trained, with a further 2,800 under training. Their task would be to position themselves off shore, in underwater concrete shelters with iron hatches, ready to emerge as the landing craft arrived, and to fix their mines on the hulls. The landing craft, their men and tanks, and the diver, would then be blown up together.” (page 712)
Moreover, the Japanese military was prepared to literally sacrafice the entire nation in hopes of defeating the American invasion.
Clearly President Truman and his advisors worried about the prospects of such prepartaions, though he could not have known their exact nature at the time. Had he known, however, his decision to use the atomic bomb might have been an EASIER one to make.
4) Casualty estimates for operations against the Japanese homeland.
It was widely held at the time the decision to drop the atomic bombs was made that the conventional bombing campaign and naval blockade against Japan would be insufficient to win the War. John Toland writes: "Truman called for opinions from each beginning with (General George C.) Marshall. The Army Chief of Staff insisted that there was no choice but to invade the main islands. The initial landing, on the island of Kyushu on November 1, would involve 766,700 troops. Losses would be heavy, but air power alone, he said, was simply not enough to conquer Japan."(page 944)
Marshall estimated for the President that during the first 30 days of Operation Olympic America could expect to sustain around 31,000 casualties. Admiral Leahy added that those numbers could be conservative as they reflected losses proportionally lower than what was actually sustained during the invasion of Okinawa. President Truman made the statement that the entire invasion effort could be “an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other.”
With respect to General Marshall’s perspective on the matter, John Toland writes: ”There was no question in General Marshall’s mind that the bomb should be used to end the war quickly and save American lives.” (page 941) Sidney Morris further clarifies the input that Truman was receiving: “The Army later estimated...100,000 being killed in the two (Operations Olympic and Coronet) landings alone. Estimates of civilian Japanese dead were put at 20 million. MacArthur figured if the Japanese took to the mountains to wage guerrilla warfare, the campaign could take a million men 10 years.” (page 168)
5) President Truman was advised to use the bombs militarily to end the War.
There were many advisors who agreed with General Marshall’s assessment that dropping the bomb was necessary to end the War. As mentioned above, the Interim Committee of scientists officially recommended such usage. Churchill urged the bombs be deployed against Japan. Perhaps the most passionate advocates were American politicians in the State Department, particularly Secretary of State Byrnes and Assistant Secretaries Acheson and MacLiesh. Akira Iriye wrote in “Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War 1941 – 1945” of "the growing influence within the State Department of men like Byrnes, Acheson, and MacLeish...and the president’s tendency to listen to them rather than to Grew and other experts.” (page 255-256)
Regarding the critical discussion over the retention of the Emperor clause in the Potsdam Proclamation, Gerhard Weinberg wrote: “Secretary of War Stimson and Under-Secretary of State Joseph Grew, who has served as ambassador to Japan, urged a concession on the issue. The new Secretary of State, James Byrnes, and Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson as well as most of the more liberal members of the administration were opposed. Public opinion in the United States was in general also opposed, as were the articulate organizations of the American left who wanted no concessions to the old order in Japan and urged the dropping of additional bombs instead. The imperial system had produced war before and it might again.” (page 890)
So, while it is clear there was not universal consent among President Truman’s advisors, it is equally clear that he received favorable advise for dropping the bombs from politicians, military officials, and scientists involved with the development of the weapons. Such advice was a powerful force coming from respected individuals at many levels within and outside of the U.S. Government.
6) The American Public Opinion and the Issue of Unconditional Surrender.
"Unconditional surrender" was a concept developed by President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca in 1943. It was a general term that could be interpreted in a variety of ways, but essentially it meant surrender completely on the conditions of the victors, not on those of the defeated. It was precisely these terms that were offered (and accepted) by Germany. President Truman opted to handle Japan in exactly the same fashion, refusing any specific concession regarding the future status of the Emperor or anything else unique to Japanese culture.
With respect to this, Stanley Weintraub wrote: "Weakening the Allied position on unconditional surrender, {retired Secretary of State} Cordell Hull had warned in his cable {to Secretary Byrnes}, might suggest to the militarists in Tokyo a weakening of resolve - that their kamikaze posture was paying off."(page 90) It is clear that the established precedent of unconditional surrender was being strongly advocated with solid reasoning and without compromise to Presdient Truman from the State Department.
This had the widespread support of the American public. According to “The Last Act” Smithsonian Institute script: “To most Americans, Hirohito was a hated symbol of Japanese military aggression. Many wanted him executed or at least imprisoned or exiled.” In this environment, making any concessions to the Japanese that were not offered to the Germans would have been publicly intolerable. John Toland quantifies this American hatred: “In a recent Gallup poll one third had favored executing Hirohito, and 37 percent wanted him put on trial, imprisoned for life or executed. Only 7 percent believed he should be left alone or used as a puppet.” (page 946)
Sidney Moody makes this interesting point regarding the American soldier’s mindset at the time: “On an Army psychological test, 48 percent answered yes to: ‘I would really like to kill a Japanese soldier.’ Only between 5 percent and 9 percent said the same of the Germans.” (page 77)
Politicians not only make decisions based upon public opinion, they take advice from such opinion. President Truman placed the public’s mind and the soldier’s perspective alongside the other advice he received in support of dropping the bomb. While not universal, it is clear that Americans did not want to “bargain” with Japan and (in the wake of Iwo Jima and Okinawa) wanted a quick, decisive end to the War.
Stanley Weintraub reports that: "A Gallop poll on June 1 asked, 'Japan may offer to surrender and call her soldiers home provided we agree not to send an army of occupation to her home islands. Do you think we should accept such a peace offer if we get the chance, or fight on until we have completely beaten her on the Japanese homeland?' Continuing the war to a decisive victory received overwhelming approval, nine to one."(page 54)
7) Strategic bombing and logistical isolation did not equal lesser resistance.
As already mentioned, the fighting was becoming more intense in the Pacific as the level of strategic bombing escalated. By the summer of 1945, Japan’s overall industrial production was at 40% of its capacity. The general feeling was that all industrial targets would have been wiped out by November 1945. Yet, the Japanese soldiers dug themselves in and stockpiled supplies to the point where logistics were never an issue on Iwo Jima or Okinawa. This stockpiling was accomplished on a more massive scale on the Japanese home islands. Though Truman could only suspect the extent of such preparations, it was obvious that the purpose of strategic bombing (to destroy the enemy’s logistical capability) did not translate into less resistance. Okinawa was almost completely isolated logistically, yet the results spoke for themselves. Victory, but at a price America feared would multiply proportionally as it undertook Operation Olympic.
8) The Japanese were attempting to have a conditioned surrender.
The hopeless overtures Japan made to Moscow were clearly an attempt at a conditioned peace. The Japanese Army, in fact, was looking for a way out of the War without having to “surrender.” This is obvious in a full reading of the MAGIC message intercepts in July 1945. This was unacceptable to everyone concerned. The famous MAGIC intercept of July 25, where Japan acknowledges that it is willing to consider surrender based upon terms outlined in the Atlantic Charter goes on to read: "'The difficult point is the attitude of the enemy, who continues to insist on the formality of unconditional surrender.' Under such conditions, {Togo} insisted, there was no recourse 'other than for us to hold out until complete collapse because of this point alone.'"(Weintraub, page 232)
As late as August 9, the Japanese continued to insist upon conditions for peace. Weintraub writes of a meeting of the Emperor with his six top advisors at the Imperial Palace on that day: "All six quickly agreed that retaining the imperial house was 'the indispensible condition of acceptance {of Potsdam}.' Short of that they would fight to the bitter end. War Minister Anami and the two chiefs of staff laid down additional terms, described by Togo as 'specifically, that the occupation of Japan should if possible be avoided, or, if inescapable, should be on a small scale and should not include such points as Tokyo; and that (our) disarmamnet should be carried out on our own responsibility; and that war criminals should be dealt with by Japan.'"
This is a fair representation of the attitude of the military that completely dominated Japanese politics. It is also fair to say that such a immovable view was completely out of step with the political and military realities of Japan's situation. It was later at this very meeting that word of the Nagasaki bomb was reported. Shortly thereafter, Emperor Hirohito intervened and asked that the Potsdam Declaration be accepted unconditionally.
Now consider the uncertainties facing Truman that made the bomb option worth attempting...
Among the other questions that are clear to us today but were unpredictable variables in the reality with which President Truman struggled are: What would be the effects of the Soviet invasion? Would the Japanese military respond favorably to “threats” of using atomic weapons? Would a prior public demonstration of America’s atomic capability be seen as elaborate propaganda by Japan’s leadership? What was the extent of the peace movement inside Japan? Truman knew the answers to none of these questions.
Sidney Morris concluded his analysis of this dark chapter in America’s history this way: ”Norris Bradbury, who succeeded (Robert) Oppenheimer at Los Alamos, was asked many years later if wayfarers ever made their way up to the mesa to visit the little museum where a copy of Little Boy is exhibited. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘some do.’ Do they thank him, thank him for the atomic bomb? ‘Yes. Some do.’ (Harold) Agnew, who succeeded Bradbury, was giving a talk once at Denison University in Ohio. A Japanese man came up and thanked him, too, for the bomb. ‘Without it, I wouldn’t have been here.’ Every year on August 6 Agnew would get a call from Luis Alvarez, designer of Little Boy’s detonator and an observer at Hiroshima. ‘Luis would ask me if I had any regrets, and I’d say no. He’d say he didn’t either.” (page 173)
Copyright © W. Keith Beason, 2011
Version 1.2
