“The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war over Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender…”
“Arnold’s view was that it was unnecessary. He said he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military’s job to question it.”
“The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb had nothing to do with end of the war at all.”
“The President in giving his approval for these attacks appeared to believe that many thousands of American troops would be killed in invading Japan, and in this he was entirely correct; but (I) felt…that the dilemma was an unnecessary one, for had we been willing to wait, the effective blockade would, in course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials.”
“I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to (Secretary of War Stimson) my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives…”
[Back to the Atomic Bomb Controversy Page]
The decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan was heavily criticized almost immediately. Through the years an increasing number of scholars, politicians, activists, members of the military and others have challenged President Truman’s conduct in the matter. Among their primary arguments are:
1) President Truman did not use all the options available to him and thus condemned 200,000 innocent civilians to a needless death.
Revisionist historian Gar Alperovitz in his book “The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb” proposes that a “two-step” policy was under consideration by President Truman and his top advisors in the summer of 1945. The first step was to secure Soviet cooperation to attack Japan soon after the defeat of Nazi Germany. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the surrender terms offered the Japanese should specifically spell out that the Emperor would be allowed to remain in power upon Japan’s acceptance of the terms.
Alperovitz writes that the Joint Intelligence Committee informed the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that “a Russian decision to join with U.S. and Britain in the war against Japan would have enormous force – and would dramatically alter the equation: ‘The entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war would, together with the foregoing factors, convince most Japanese at once of the inevitability of complete defeat.’ It went on (step two): ‘If…the Japanese people, as well as their leaders, were persuaded both that absolute defeat was inevitable and that unconditional surrender did not imply national annihilation, surrender might follow very quickly.’”
Doug Long on his web site writes: “Historian and former Naval officer Martin Sherwin has summarized the situation, stating, ‘The choice in the summer of 1945 was not between a conventional invasion or a nuclear war. It was a choice between various forms of diplomacy and warfare.’”
The challenging position clearly believes that the use of the atomic bombs was unnecessary because there was a military and political reality in the Pacific that would have brought about Japan’s surrender without the tragedies at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This contention is “fleshed out” as follows:
Atomic force did not play a part in Japan’s decision to surrender. Rather, the intervention by the Soviets tipped the Emperor’s hand.
The important point made here is that President Truman allegedly knew this before he made the final decision to drop the bombs. In July 1945, the U.S.-British Combined Intelligence Committee completed a formal ‘Estimate of the Enemy Situation’ which stated: “An entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat.” Later, at the critical Potsdam Conference, Britain’s General Hastings Ismay, chief of staff to the minister of defense made the following comment to Prime Minister Winston Churchill: “…When Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor.”
Alperovitz writes: “Since it was fully understood that Japan was attempting to approach Moscow to negotiate an end to the war – that, indeed, keeping Russia neutral represented Japan’s last frail hope – it was obvious that once Russia simply made its position known this ALONE would have enormous impact.”
Japan would have surrendered without further loss of life anyway by the end of 1945 as their country would have been strangled by the effects of blockade and the strategic bombing of their industry.
Doug Long highlights the infamous quote from “The United States Strategic Bombing Survey” written in July 1946: “Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.”
This is a rather bold assertion that I will return to in my critique of this challenging perspective. Nevertheless, the point is made that the effects of the naval blockade of Japan along with the continued strategic bombing of military, industrial, and other non-civilian targets throughout the months of August, September and October would have made a powerful impact on Japan’s ability and, more importantly, her willpower to continue the war effort.
It should also be pointed out that other supporters of this position within the U.S. government at the time argued that even if the bombs were used, they should have been deployed differently than by being simply dropped without warning upon the Japanese people. Their concerns run along these lines: the unprecedented power of the atomic bombs should have been publicly demonstrated and this information should have been used to threaten Japan into accepting surrender. Also, others contended that the Japanese should have been warned that the bomb was going to dropped at a specific point in their territory and asked to evacuate the area prior to deployment of the weapon. These measures would have allowed for the use of the weapons and yet minimized the number of civilian deaths.
2) The Japanese sent messages to their ambassador in Moscow stating that they were seeking peace and were, in fact, interested in pursuing the American offer of surrender under the terms of the Atlantic Charter. The Americans were aware of this at the time.
The U.S. had long since broken the Japanese code for sending messages in an operation known as MAGIC. In July, 1945 MAGIC intercepted numerous messages between Tokyo and Moscow dealing with the subject of peace. One from July 25, 1945 read in part: “The fact that the Americans alluded to the Atlantic Charter is particularly worthy of attention at this time. It is impossible to accept an unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we would like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter.”
Doug Long writes: “The Japanese messages intercepted by the U.S. in July showed the Japanese government’s view toward the war had changed. However, the U.S. didn’t keep up with this change, and the advantage of combining diplomatic methods with military methods was largely missed.”
The opportunity for peace hovered over the situation, but it was not seized upon by either the Americans, the British or the Soviets even though all knew that the possibility existed.
3) The Final Draft of the Potsdam Proclamation intentionally did not mention that Japan would be allowed to retain its Emperor if it surrendered and used language that could be interpreted as threatening to the Emperor. A variation of this theme is that the U.S. deliberately left the Soviet signature out of the Proclamation so as not to send a “clear signal” to the Japanese.
This is, perhaps, the strongest argument put forth by the challenging perspective. Doug Long points out that the three most important factors regarding Japanese surrender were the retention of the Emperor, the threat of Soviet invasion and the threat of atomic attack, yet none of these were mentioned in the Potsdam Proclamation broadcast to the Japanese government in late July, 1945.
Further, according to Long, the declaration’s wording was potentially threatening in nature. In part the Proclamation read: “There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest." It stated that “stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals."
Japan’s Prime Minister Suzuki announced on June 9, 1945 that “should the emperor system be abolished, they (the Japanese people) would lose all reason for existence. ‘Unconditional surrender’, therefore, means death to hundred million: it leaves us no choice but to go on fighting to the last man.” It was, therefore, abundantly clear to the Allies that the Japanese interpretation of the “unconditional surrender” clause was key to their willingness to fight on with intensity.
Gar Alperovitz summarizes that “throughout the Truman administration there was a very clear understanding (and the President was so advised) of one major NEGATIVE point – namely that the war would go on if he did NOT alter the terms.” But, more importantly, “We also know – contrary to judgment – that President Truman (on the advice of Secretary of State Byrnes) eliminated the recommended language of paragraph 12 of the Potsdam Proclamation which would have provided Japan assurances concerning the Emperor.” Alperovitz emphasizes that many of Truman’s top military advisors recommended paragraph 12 remain in the final document and he goes on to suggest that Truman knew that the Proclamation would be unacceptable to the Japanese. Alperovitz is also critical of the decision to eliminate the Soviets as one of the signers of the Proclamation. He argues that President Truman reached this decision after the successful Trinity test of Gadget. The document was thereby weakened, resulting in confusion on the part of the Japanese as to the Soviet’s intentions.
4) The U.S. policy was blinded (to the point of placing politics above morality) by the belief that the bombs were inherently necessary to bring the War to a rapid conclusion. A variation of this argument is that the U.S. specifically attempted to slow the Russian attack on Japan because they KNEW such an attack would be THE decisive factor in their surrender (and wanted to use the bombs first).
Leon Signal in “Fighting to the Finish” writes that: “…it could be argued that the United States behaved as if the objective of inducing Japan to surrender was subordinate to another objective – in Stimson’s words, that of exerting ‘maximum force with maximum speed.’ American policy was guided by an implicit assumption that only the escalation of military pressure could bring the war to a rapid conclusion."
Alperovitz is particularly adamant that the U.S. wanted to stall the Soviet invasion because they feared it would bring the war to a close BEFORE the bombs could be used. “We also now know that AFTER the bomb was successfully tested, the United States actively attempted to stall – rather than encourage – the Russian attack. In other words, even though it was understood that the Russian attack would have a devastating impact on the Japanese, at the last minute U.S. policy-makers attempted to hold this action back. As noted, they also had previously stricken the other main element of the two-step strategy from the Potsdam Proclamation (assurances to the Emperor). As Martin Sherwin has written, the use of the atomic bomb was ‘preferred.’”
This position is best summed up by Leo Szilard, a scientist who worked on the Manhattan Project and actively sought to stop the bombings upon Japan: “The only conclusion we can draw is that governments acting in a crisis are guided by questions of expediency, and moral considerations are given very little weight, and that America is no different from any other nation is this respect.”
Copyright © W. Keith Beason, 2011
Version 1.2
