All Israel have a share in the World-to-come (as it is said: "All your

people are righteous, they shall eternally inherit the land, the

growth of My planting, My handiwork in which I take great pride".)

The following do not have a share in the World-to-come: one who says

that the resurrection of the dead is not from the Torah, that there is

no Torah from Heaven, and an Epikoros.  Rabbi Akiva says also

[included are] one who reads the Apocrypha and one who recites an

incantation over a wound by saying "All the malaise that I set upon

Egypt I shall not set upon you, for I, the Lord, do heal you."  Abba

Sha'ul says also [included is] one who utters the Divine Name

according to its letters.

EXPLANATIONS:

1:

No, I have not made a mistake!  We would not normally have reached the

above mishnah - at our present rate of progress! - for many a long

month, and one item in it is pivotal for our discussion on modern

Biblical criticism; you will recall that this is an excursus that I

have promised at the request of very many participants.  We shall

leave the detailed study of the above mishnah until we reach Chapter

Ten, for the only item in it that concerns us at this juncture is the

statement of Tanna Kamma: "The following do not have a share in the

World-to-come: one who says ... that there is no Torah from Heaven..."

2:

The Written Torah  states that at Mount Sinai the prophet Moses

delivered Torah to Israel.  This is so basic that it does not even

need a reference.  For the people of Israel, the real importance of

the event at Sinai was the utter conviction of the participants of the

reality of God; and that conviction has been passed on throughout our

generations. The awesomeness of the occasion was impressed upon the

people by a violent electric storm.  The tradition that there was a

torrential downpour on the occasion of the Giving of the Torah is

recurrent in our sources.  Later Biblical books hint at it, especially

in more poetic passages.  For example we can quote the preamble to

Deborah's Song [Judges 5:4] -

    Lord, when You stepped forth from Se'ir, when You marched from the

    fields of Edom, the very earth trembled, the heavens poured down,

    the clouds let loose their water, mountains melted at God's

    approach, yon Sinai at [the approach of] Israel's God.

The idea is also to be found at the very end of the Torah itself:

    God came from Sinai, shone about from Se'ir, appeared from Mount

    Paran, came with myriads of holiness; in His right hand the flame

    of the faith.  [Deuteronomy 33:2]

The prophet Chavakuk also makes reference to this tradition:

    God came from Teman, the Holy One from Mount Paran.  His majesty

    covered the skies, His glory filled the Earth.  There was a

    radiance of light, rays emanating from His hand... [Chavakuk 3:3-

    4].

Psalm 29 is a celebration of Mattan Torah [the Giving of the Torah].

It too is replete with references to God's booming voice resounding

over the flooding waters.  (It is because of the connection of this

psalm to Mattan Torah that its recitation accompanies the conclusion

of the Reading of the Torah every Shabbat.)

    God's voice is over the waters, the glorious Deity thunders; God

    is above mighty waters...  God's voice shatters cedars...  God's

    voice cleaves through tongues of fire, God's voice makes the

    desert quake, makes the desert of Kadesh quake...  God sat above

    the flood... [Psalm 29:3-10]

One of the clearest of references to this tradition is made by Rambam

[Moses Maimonides, North Africa, 12th century CE] in what is surely

still the greatest book of Jewish religious philosophy yet written.

In the Guide for the Perplexed he writes:

    It is well known and commonplace among our people that the day of

    the Giving of the Torah [Ma'amad Har Sinai] was a day of clouds

    and rain [Part Three, Chapter 9],

and he then goes on to quote the passage from judges that we have

already referenced above.

3:

Having thus established, I hope, that the Giving of the Torah was

accompanied by a downpour of rain and a violent electrical storm I

think that we can appreciate that the people were convinced that God

spoke to them in the thunderclaps, and delivered through Moses what

was required of  the people: "Moses would speak and God would match

him with a thunderclap" [Exodus 19:19].  (The Hebrew word "kol" can

mean "voice", "sound", "rumour" or "thunderclap".)  Inspired by the

utter conviction  of the reality of God, through the agency of Moses,

the people apprehended what was mankind's noblest and most sublime

aspiration yet.  This was  cherished  and passed on from one

generation to the next.

4:

It is beyond doubt that the text of the Torah would have the reader

understand that the Torah, as a unitary and non-repeatable

dispensation from God, was given to Israel through the agency of Moses

- either in one fell swoop or in batches throughout the forty years of

wandering in the Sinai desert.  (In the Gemara [Gittin 60a] this is a

matter of dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish: the former

holding that the Torah was given piecemeal [Megillah-Megillah] and the

latter that the Torah was given in one fell swoop [Chatumah].)

5:

However, modern  scholars perceive within the text of the Torah four

separate  recensions, each having a different origin and emphasis, but

all representing Israel's understanding of God's demands of man.  Even

though there has been agreement on this point among academic scholars

of the Bible for nearly two centuries now, there has not always been

complete unanimity as regards the exact periods from which each of the

strands hails. The present consensus is that the earliest recension of

the Torah is an account of the story of Israel's pre-history, the

patriarchal period, Israel in Egypt, the  Exodus, and the  wandering

up to the death of Moses; and that this account was produced in the

southern kingdom of Judah around the middle of the ninth century BCE.

The next recension is very similar in outline to the first, but was

produced (possibly at the shrine at Shilo) in the northern kingdom of

Israel about a century after the Judean account was produced. These

two recensions were amalgamated into one "consolidated" version

sometime after the fall of Samaria in the year 722 BCE. The third

recension is a version produced by the priests of Jerusalem during the

early seventh century BCE. It covers the same history as the previous

recensions, but has a particular interest in the sacrificial rite,

sacerdotal duties and genealogical tables. (Other scholars -

particularly the late Professor Yechezkel Kaufman - think that this

recension dates from the period of the Judges, which would make it the

earliest; others, now fewer and fewer, think that it dates from the

period of the Second Commonwealth, which would make it the latest.)

The fourth recension corresponds to the book of Deuteronomy, and was

produced in late seventh century Jerusalem (possibly by the

descendants of Levitical refugees from the defunct northern kingdom).

All scholars are agreed that these recensions were welded together

into the written Torah that we recognize today under the aegis of Ezra

(and Nehemiah?) in the middle of the fifth century B.C.E. Indeed, it

is all but certain that the ceremonies described in chapters 8-10 of

the book of Nehemiah record the canonization of the Written Torah in

Jerusalem in the year 444 B.C.E.

6:

Obviously such claims must be established with reasons and rationally

acceptable proofs.  Such an undertaking is way beyond the scope of

this excursus - even though, in the next shiur, I shall try to give

some indication of the phenomena that produced what is known as the

"Documentary Hypothesis".  Those who require a much more detailed

exposition will find a fascinating account in the book "Who wrote the

Bible?", by Richard Elliott Friedman, Summit Books, New York, 1987.

To be continued.

July 1st 1998/Tammuz 7th 5758

************************************************************************

TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, CHAPTER TEN, MISHNAH ONE (partial recap):

All Israel have a share in the World-to-come ... The following do not

have a share in the World-to-come: one who says ... that there is no

Torah from Heaven...

EXPLANATIONS (continued):

7:

I think that the textual phenomena - observed and interpreted by

scholars during the past 250 years - that have culminated in what is

loosely called the "Documentary Hypothesis" are very well-known and I

shall not give them too much space here.  Most people know that

scholars have perceived two versions of the Creation story; three

accounts of a Patriarch's wife narrowly escaping impregnation by a man

other than her husband through her being termed sister instead of

wife; and two different accounts of Noah's flood.  And I also think

that most people know that the varying Names of God supplied a clue to

unraveling the "documents".  The number of further examples is legion.

In this week's Torah reading there is an excellent example: the

account of Moses smiting the rock in order to bring forth water

[Numbers 20:1-13] has already been told in its essential details

[Exodus 17:1-7].  And yet there are sufficient differences to suggest

that these are two versions of the same story - or rather, two

traditions: according to Exodus the incident took place in the area of

Refidim (just to the east of what is now the Suez Canal in its

northern sector); according to Numbers it took place at Kadesh in the

North-Western part of the Negev. In the Exodus version Moses acts

alone, whereas in Numbers he acts in concert with Aaron.  In the

Exodus version Moses is the hero of the incident, in Numbers he and

his brother are condemned to the most severe punishment imaginable for

a minor infringement.

8:

Modern scholarship sees in the above example an attempt to preserve

two different traditions of the same incident.  In Exodus we have the

story as told and retold among the faithful in the "Rachel" tribes and

their satellites - Efrayim, Menasheh, Binyamin etc.  In Numbers we

have the same story but as recounted by the Zadokite priesthood of

Jerusalem, with the special emphases and alterations that were

important to them.  The former account probably pre-dates the

establishment of the monarchy, the latter was probably compiled some

350 years later.

9:

The inclusion of two versions of the same story is not seen as being

due to carelessness or bad editing.  It is seen as a deliberate

attempt at inclusivity: not an "either/or" choice of traditions, but

"both are the words of the living God" as it were.  There certainly

are many instances of what might be considered appalling editing; but

they are so obvious that there must have been a deliberate decision to

preserve two versions of even the most insignificant details.  For

instance, in the famous story recounted in Genesis 37, in verses 25-27

his brothers plan to sell Joseph to an Ishmaelite caravan; but verses

28 and 36 speak of Midianite merchants.

10:

Our sages were not ignorant of these "problems", but it never occurred

to the rabbis of the Mishnah and Talmud that the Torah was not

unitary.  Since the Torah is the revealed word of God, every

difference must have a reason, and these observed differences gave

rise to many wonderful Midrashim.  The Mosaic authorship of the Torah

was never challenged because it never occurred to any sage that it

needed to be challenged.  That Moses wrote the five books ascribed to

him was a given fact, an unassailed assumption based upon religious

conviction.  It was not until the Middle Ages that the truth dawned to

at least one great rabbi, but by that time he was only prepared to

make allusions to the problem and to leave the reader to draw his or

her own conclusions.  More of him later.

11:

This understanding of the composite nature of the Torah requires for

the modern Conservative Jew some underpinning, for it presents a view

of Torah that is different from the one naturally assumed by the

sages.  We can now see that the Written Torah [Torah she-bikhetav] is

not so very different from the Unwritten Torah [Torah she-b'al-peh].

Not only does the Written Torah itself represent constant forward

development, but also the Oral Torah is an organic continuation of

the  Written Torah. The  difference is that the Written Torah offers

a new revelation for each new understanding, while the Oral Torah

offers a new interpretation [midrash].

12:

The proceeding of Torah from God to man is called  revelation. What is

the difference between the mechanics of  revelation presented here and

the more traditional view?  For those who have no conceptual problems

with a God that is quasi-human and is really possessed of personality,

there is nothing untoward or problematic in the Deity  having a  will

and informing mankind of that  will. When I play my CD or my VCR too

loudly my neighbour has a will and informs me of it quite clearly. So,

too, for our ancestors in the past and for many contemporaries today,

God may be understood as revealing His will - either by theophany as

at Mount Sinai or by inspiration as with the classical prophets. I

would imagine that most thinking Conservative Jews might find it

difficult to accept such a conceptualization, it being too simplistic.

It is easier to consider man as constantly reaching upward, striving

to understand what the moral, ethical and practical implications of

the very existence of the Deity are for him.  According to this view,

instead of a quasi-human God reaching down to man, man  - constantly

trying  to be  more Godlike  - reaches upwards towards God, trying  to

achieve a more perfect apprehension of the implications of the divine

for man; trying to understand more clearly, more perfectly, what

exactly is being imposed upon us as an absolute "thou shalt". The

former view (in which God leans down from His heaven, as it were, and

announces His will) is theocentric; the latter (in which man tries to

pierce through to make intellectual contact with the divine) is

anthropocentric. In the former the impetus is deemed to come from God,

whereas in the latter the impetus comes from man.  According to this

latter view man has a new perception of what God demands of him, a new

revelation, from time to time. When scholars perceive within the text

of the Torah several recensions, each having a different origin and

emphasis, it is merely a reflection of this concept.

13:

According to this view not all the Torah was produced at once in the

time of Moses, but some of it is the result of several different

'revelations', each at a different time. Such a view, which today is

considered heterodox in some quarters,  was not considered exceptional

in the past.  The great medieval commentator Abraham Ibn-Ezra [Spain

and North Africa, 1089-1164 CE] several times in his classical

commentary  on the Torah makes veiled innuendoes that the text of the

Torah (as opposed to its historical kernel) postdates Moses.  One such

place is his comment on Genesis 12:6.  At this point the Torah has

described how the Patriarch Abraham arrived in Canaan from

Mesopotamia, and traversed the country in a symbolic act of taking

possession, despite the fact that "the Canaanite was then in the

land".   Ibn-Ezra comments:

    'The Canaanite was then in the land' - possibly the land had just

    been conquered by the Canaanite.  If this interpretation is

    incorrect, there is a more correct esoteric one - but it would be

    prudent to leave it unsaid".

What Ibn-Ezra leaves looming in the air, his glossator, Rabbi Yossef

Bonfils [Eretz-Israel, fifteenth century CE] makes explicit:

    How can [the Torah] here say 'then' with its connotation that the

    Canaanite was then in the land but now is not, if Moses wrote the

    Torah and in his day the land was indeed possessed by the

    Canaanites? Obviously, the word 'then' was written at a time when

    the Canaanite was no longer in the land, and we know that they

    were only dislodged subsequent to Moses' death... Thus it would

    seem that Moses did not write this word here, but Joshua or some

    other prophet wrote it.  Since we believe in the prophetic

    tradition, what possible difference can it make whether Moses

    wrote this or some other prophet did, since the words of all of

    them are true and prophetic?"

Please note how simple it was in pre-orthodox ages: if Ibn-Ezra were

writing today he would have been dubbed "Reform"; and who knows what

would have been said about Bonfils.  Thus we have arrived at one of

the most meaningful differences between orthodoxy and Conservative

Judaism.  Orthodoxy sees Torah as a document delivered from Heaven on

a once-only basis whose validity is unchangeable for all time. Some

Conservative Jews share this view.  Many other Conservative Jews see

Torah as a document in which is revealed for us the practical results

of  the ongoing attempt to ascertain the divine behest over a long

period of time.

To be continued.

July 3rd 1998/Tammuz 9th 5758

**************************************************************************

TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, CHAPTER TEN, MISHNAH ONE (partial recap):

All Israel have a share in the World-to-come ... The following do not

have a share in the World-to-come: one who says ... that there is no

Torah from Heaven...

EXPLANATIONS (continued):

14:

We have already noted that in the year 444 BCE, at the very end of the

biblical period, under the religious and political aegis of Ezra and

Nehemiah, the Written Torah [Torah she-bikhetav] in the form in which

we now possess it was contractually accepted by the assembled

representatives of the community of Israel as the statutory instrument

of Israel's government, both public and private. Our commitment to the

Torah today stems both from the contractual nature of its acceptance

then and from our conviction now that it all comes from the Deity. But

the immutable Written Torah is not the rule by which Israel lives: the

Torah, as understood and interpreted by the oral tradition enshrined

in the Unwritten Torah [Torah she-b'al-peh] is Israel's rule of law.

In this way, the Written Torah is constantly being re-understood by

the rabbis, its licensed practitioners.

15:

The Unwritten Torah (rabbinic law) is, in essence, developmental -

dynamic and not static, and is a living continuation of the Written

Torah. Torah she-b'al-peh is the means whereby Torah she-bikhetav is

made constantly relevant. Should rabbis abdicate this duty, Torah is

in grave danger of becoming outdated and irrelevant. This, of course,

is one of the major differences between Conservative Judaism and

Orthodoxy. Sometimes we are so concerned with the primacy of the

Written Torah that we forget that without the Unwritten Torah, the

Oral Tradition whose Mishnah we are studying, the Written Torah would

have no more relevance for us than any other document.  There is

nothing intrinsically holy in the Written Torah: there are many other

books held to be sacred by many other religions, and their adherents

claim them to be sacred.  What gives the Written Torah its sanctity

for Israel is the Unwritten Torah: we accept the Torah as holy and

binding because the sages say it is.

16:

At this point we must elaborate upon this concept. The Written Torah

is the ideological basis of Judaism, but in its details it was never

intended to be a `'once and for all time' statement. Built into the

very mechanism of the Written Torah itself is an assumption, a demand

for interpretation.

    "When any case ... is too difficult for you, go to that place

    which God shall have selected, and approach ... the judge that

    shall be at that time, and ask your question: they will tell you

    what the law is... According to the Torah as they teach it to you

    and according to the law as they tell it to you, so shall you do.

    Do not depart from whatever they tell you to the right or to the

    left." [Deuteronomy 17:8-11]

Here it is quite explicitly stated that the Written Torah is not

exhaustive, but at various times in the future will have to be

supplemented and expanded by "the judge that shall be at that time".

There are many classical rabbinic statements as the true nature of the

Oral Tradition, the "updating" of the Torah by "the judge that shall

be at that time". We shall here examine a very few of them. Firstly a

very apposite quotation from the Talmud of Eretz-Israel [Sanhedrin

22a]:

    Had the Torah been given with no room for development the

    situation would have been impossible. What does 'And the Lord said

    to Moses' mean? - Moses said to God, as it were, 'Dear Lord,

    please tell me what the exact halakhah is'. God replied, 'Follow

    the majority opinion. If the majority [of the rabbis] favour

    permission, then permit; if the majority favour prohibition, then

    prohibit. In this way it will be possible to interpret the Torah

    in up to forty-nine ways for permission and up to forty-nine ways

    for prohibition!'

Even more to the point is the following excerpt from the second

chapter of a Midrashic work called Seder Eliahu Zutta.

    To what may this be compared? Imagine a human king who had two

    servants whom he loved very dearly. To each of them he gave a

    measure of wheat and a stalk of flax. The clever one took the flax

    and wove it into cloth, took the wheat, turned it into flour,

    sifted it, ground it, kneaded it, baked it into bread and laid it

    on the table with the cloth underneath, waiting for the king's

    arrival. The foolish one did nothing with it. Later the king

    returned to his palace. 'My sons,' he said, 'bring me what I gave

    you'. One of them brought out his bread on the table with the

    cloth underneath it; the other produced the measure of wheat in

    its box with the stalk of flax on top. Oh, the shame of it! Which

    one did the king favour more? - You must agree that it was the one

    who brought out his bread on the table with the cloth underneath

    it... In the same way, when God gave Torah to Israel it was only

    as wheat is for making bread and flax for making cloth.

Just one more quotation should suffice to prove what is really self-

evident, that the rabbinic tradition was always intended to "update"

the Written Tradition. This oft-quoted passage comes from the Gemara

[Menachot 29b]:

    When Moses ascended on high he found God busy affixing coronets to

    the letters of the Torah. 'Lord of the Universe,' said Moses, 'why

    is this necessary?' God replied, 'After many generations there

    will come a man, one Akiva ben-Yossef by name, who will expound

    upon each tittle heaps and heaps of laws'.  'Lord of the

    Universe,' said Moses, 'please let me see him'.  God replied,

    'Turn around!' Moses went and took his place at the end of the

    eighth row [of students in Rabbi Akiva's Bet Midrash]. Not being

    able to follow the discussion he was uncomfortable. Soon they came

    to a particular point and the student asked the Master how he knew

    this to be the law; he replied, 'It is the law as given to Moses

    at Sinai'. Now Moses felt better. When he returned to God he said,

    'Lord of the Universe, You have such a man available to you and

    yet You give the Torah through me!?

17:

All this makes it sound as if the Divine law is very human, and to a

certain extent this is true - by design. But Judaism is insistent that

the ultimate source of the moral law is truly God. God is the standard

against which we must measure our behaviour. The practical expression

of this standard is halakhah, which represents the way that this

standard requires us to lead our lives. While it is true that halakhah

is developed by man, this is limited by two main considerations.

Firstly, the concept of Klal Israel requires wide-spread support and

agreement - a general conviction that a proposed development is indeed

Torah, not the personal whim of one sage or the passing fad of one

generation. Secondly, the organic development of halakhah prevents

"revolution", and assumes that all three aspects of time are

represented in the decision - past, present and future. In traditional

Judaism there is no revolution, only evolution - the constant organic

development of Torah as representing God's perceived will.

18:

One of the lynch-pins of rabbinic philosophy is the concept of Torah

Min ha-Shamayim, that Torah (both written and oral) comes from God.

This presents Conservative Judaism with no difficulty. The rabbis

state:

    'For he has denigrated God's word and nullified His command - such

    a person shall be utterly excised and it is his own fault'

    [Numbers 15:31]: this verse refers to a person who claims that

    Torah is not from God. Even if such a person claims that all of

    Torah is from God except that a certain verse originated with

    Moses and not with God - he has denigrated God's word. Even if

    such a person claims that all of Torah is from God, except that a

    certain fine point or a certain academic inference is not - he has

    denigrated God's word [Sifrei ad loc.]

This view, although based upon an earlier conceptualization of

revelation, holds no terrors for Conservative Judaism: for it ardently

maintains that the whole of the Torah (both Written and Unwritten)

comes from God - in the sense already described above, in which God's

will is perceived more perfectly as the human perceptors progress

onward and upward. We insist that man's reaching for God is, indeed, a

reaching for God, and that which is finally accepted into the

tradition has proceeded from God. Even when some element or other is

superseded later on with an improved understanding, it does not mean

that the former teaching was not divine; it merely means that man was

not yet philosophically developed to a degree that would permit him to

understand the full implications of the divine in that particular

matter - very much as we understand our parents more intelligently the

more we grow.

19:

However, matters do not rest here. Rambam [Moses Maimonides, North

Africa, 12th century CE], in the Thirteen Fundamentals that form part

of a long excursus that he inserted into the preamble to his

commentary to the very mishnah we are presently studying, codified

this concept of "Torah Min ha-Shamayim" [Torah from Heaven] in a way

that is problematic for us:

    We believe that the [Written] Torah now in our possession is

    identical to that given to Moses and that all of it comes from

    God. That is to say that all of it came to him from God in a

    manner that may be metaphorically termed "speech". No one but

    Moses can know the true nature of that contact...  There is no

    qualitative difference between a verse like ... "his wife's name

    was Mehetavel, daughter of Matred" [Genesis 36:39] and a verse

    like "I am the Lord your God" [Exodus 20:2] or "Hear, O Israel:

    the Lord is our God, the Lord is One" [Deuteronomy 6:4]. It all

    comes from God and it is all God's perfect, pure and holy Torah of

    truth.

Surely, had Rambam been formulating his principle today he would have

phrased it differently. That which we find problematic in his words is

not to be found in the original Midrash nor is it to be found in our

mishnah; it was added by Rambam. We agree with Rambam that "It all

comes from God and it is all God's perfect, pure and holy Torah of

truth". We disagree with him when he states that "the [Written] Torah

now in our possession is identical to that given to Moses". The

formulation of Rambam is, of course, entirely at odds with the

sentiments implied by Abraham Ibn-Ezra in several places in his

commentary on the Torah; for instance see the quotation brought in our

last shiur, and in particular the gloss on it made by Yossef Bonfils.

Ibn-Ezra surely would have rejected Rambam's extension of the original

Midrash, as we do - and as Rambam himself almost certainly would if he

were alive today.  For Rambam was an ardent proponent of the principle

that we should not permit the literal meaning of Torah to contradict

our verified intellectual perceptions.  Rambam himself faced a dilemma

similar to the one he has unwittingly created for us: he was a devoted

follower of Aristotelian physics, and Aristotle had propounded the

eternity of matter, whereas the Torah teaches that "in the beginning

God created" matter [Chiddush ha-Olam].  Rambam says that he accepts

the view of Torah on creation against the view of his intellectual

hero, because Aristotle had not proven his hypothesis.  If, however,

the eternity of matter had been given a scientific proof "it would be

possible to interpret figuratively the texts [of the Torah] in

accordance with this opinion" [Guide for the Perplexed, Part Two,

Chapter 25]  He does not say that it would be necessary to ignore

clear scientific evidence in order to maintain the verbal integrity of

the Written Torah!

February 9th 2000 / Adar I 3rd 5760

*****************************************************************************

TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, CHAPTER TEN (ELEVEN), MISHNAH THREE:

Rabbinic legislation incurs greater severity than Torah legislation:

[a sage] who says that there is no command of Tefillin, thus negating

a Torah law, is not culpable; whereas [a sage who says that] there are

five compartments [in the Tefillin], thus adding to rabbinic

legislation, is culpable.

EXPLANATIONS:

1:

Our mishnah takes a surprising turn.  It states that if a sage gives

voice to an opinion that seeks to abrogate a mitzvah [commandment]

clearly indicated in the Written Torah he is not to be judged as an

insubordinate sage: he is to be ignored completely, for thereby he

clearly indicates that he is no true sage - and if he is not a sage at

all he cannot be an insubordinate sage!

2:

Let us illustrate, using the example given by our mishnah.  In RMSG of

15th November 1996 I wrote:

    I bring here a translation into modern English of a couple of

    verses of the Shema [Deuteronomy 6:4-9] made about 70 years ago by

    a non-Jew who was completely ignorant of the Oral Torah:

        "These words you must learn by heart, this charge of mine; you

        must impress them on your children, you must talk about them

        when you are sitting at home and when you are on the road,

        when you lie down and when you rise up.  You must tie them on

        your hands as a memento, and wear them on your forehead as a

        badge..."

    An educated Chinaman would probably see this last sentence as

    nothing but a hyperbolic metaphor.  And yet from the very earliest

    times it was understood as requiring certain passages to be

    inscribed on little pieces of parchment and placed in leather

    boxes and bound with black leather thongs to the hand and head:

    Tefillin.  During the third century BCE there was a complete rift

    between the Pharisees (who were the ideological ancestors of

    rabbinic Judaism) and the Sadducees who denied absolutely the

    validity of the Oral tradition and insisted on a literal

    understanding of the Written Torah.  And yet the Sadducees never

    doubted that those words in the Shema were talking about Tefillin.

    The arguments between the two camps were whether the boxes could

    be round or only cubic, whether the 'sign on the hand' was to be

    attached to the biceps or to the wrist, whether 'between the eyes'

    meant on the forehead or on the bridge of the nose.  But that

    Tefillin was the issue was never in the slightest doubt: that had

    been inherited from the remotest origins of the oral Torah that

    are lost in the mists of time.

The mitzvah of Tefillin was never in dispute: the details of how this

mitzvah was to be carried out certainly could be.  Thus, as we have

already said, any person who claimed that the verses from the Shema

did not require the wearing of Tefillin at all could be safely ignored

as a "crackpot".  But a sage who differed from the majority view as

regards the details of the mitzvah of Tefillin and insisted on

teaching his view in defiance of the majority - such a sage was truly

dangerous to the halakhic unity of Israel.  For example, the Tefillah-

shel-Rosh [phylactery that is placed on the head] contains four

compartments each of which contains a small piece of parchment on

which is written one of the four passages in the Torah which contain

this command - Exodus 13:1-10, Exodus 13:11-16, Deuteronomy 6:4-9,

Deuteronomy 11:13-21 (these last two passages form the first two

parashot of Keri'at Shema).  The Tefillah-shel-Yad [phylactery that is

placed on the arm] contains these same four passages, but written on

one piece of parchment.  Both Tefillot (shel-Rosh and shel-Yad) are to

be bound upon each person every workday; the universal custom is to

perform this mitzvah while attending morning worship, though some very

pious sages to this day wear them throughout the daylight hours.

3:

Tefillin belonging to soldiers in the army of Bar-Kokhba, during the

height of the Mishnaic period, have been excavated by archeologists in

Israel.  Thus we have Tefillin which are some nineteen hundred years

old,  The texts on the parchments are exactly the same as those found

in our Tefillin today and the boxes that house them seem the same as

ours today - though they are much smaller than we are used to today.

Tefillin must have boxes that are cubic, straps that are black, texts

written on parchment and so forth.  Should any sage claim that the

containers can be round, or that the straps can be red, or that the

texts could be inscribed on paper - and should he insist and persist

in his claim - then he may be indicted as an 'insubordinate sage'

4:

The sages in the Gemara [Sanhedrin 89a] note that our mishnah gives

Tefillin as an example, and seek to ascertain the parameters they

describe.  The solution is that Tefillin are a mitzvah which is stated

explicitly in the Torah but all of whose details are of rabbinic

origin.  Another example discussed by the Gemara are Tzitzit.  These

are tassels that the Torah orders are to be attached to our clothes.

Here is the translation of the passage in the Torah which ordains

Tzitzit [Numbers 15:37-41] in that same translation by a non-Jew made

some seventy years ago:-

    ... Tell them to put tassels at the corners of their robes,

    attached by a violet thread.  This shall be for all time.  The

    tassel will serve to catch your eye and remind you to obey all the

    commandments...

Now this translation does not reflect several of the details that the

sages attached to the biblical command.  The sages required the

tassels to be attached to any garment, not just a robe; the sages

required the tassels to be attached only to a garment that has four

corners (i.e. a square or an oblong piece of cloth); the sages

required the attached thread to be blue in colour, not violet.  And

there are other non-biblical requirements.  The dye for making the one

white thread into a blue one was extracted from a sea creature and the

technique was gradually lost; thus the Tzitzi'ot gradually became

white only.  (In modern times several scholars believe that they have

identified the creature and the technique of extracting its dye.

Probably the most prominent among them was Rabbi Isaac Herzog, Chief

Rabbi of Ireland and then of Eretz-Israel, and the father of Israel's

late President Chaim Herzog.  Here and there one can see Tzitzi'ot

with a blue thread entwined round the white ones, but the overwhelming

majority of people have not taken up this option.  The rabbis also

required that the threads be attached to the cloth by being pulled

through a hole made a little way from the corner, doubled over and

knotted.  If a sage were to come along who claimed that Tzitzit should

be attached to any garment or that they should be attached by sewing

them on rather than pulling them through a hole in the cloth - that

sage going directly against rabbinically added details to a mitzvah

whose origin is in the Torah.

5:

Another example brought by the Gemara is the Arba-Minim, the four

species that are used during the autumn festival of Sukkot.  The Torah

[Leviticus 23:40] stipulates (using the same translation as before):-

    On the first day you must take what fine trees bear, branches of

    palm trees, boughs of leafy trees, and water willows...

It is rabbinic interpretation that stipulates that "what fine trees

bear" refers to the citron [Etrog], that the 'boughs of leafy trees'

are stalks of myrtle, that the three 'leafy' items must be bound

together (and not just held together).  If someone comes along and

teaches that an orange is as good as a citron or not myrtle leaves but

some other leaf should be used they are going directly against

rabbinically added details to a mitzvah whose origin is in the Torah.

6:

I think that it is one of the tragedies of modern Judaism that the

overwhelming majority of Jews (say, 90%) do not wear Tefillin every

workday, do not wear Tzitzit all the daylight hours and probably do

not provide for themselves a set of the Four Species for Sukkot.

DISCUSSION:

Alfred Sporer has written to me:

In response to Naomi's inquiry regarding the basis of rabbinic

authority you introduce your response to the obvious corollary,

"...the question must arise as to how we have "deteriorated"

from such halakhic unanimity to our modern halakhic pluralism..." You

then quote Rambam's analysis.  But today, when communications,

especially via the internet, is vastly improved compared with Rambam's

time this rule is ignored. Even within a specific branch of Jewish

life, e.g., Conservative, Orthodox, Reform, there is no acceptance of

the rule of the majority of "experts" on Halachah. The JTS, in fact,

has ignored rulings of their "Halachic experts" in favor of the

"majority" rule of the people. Haven't we now, by default, changed the

basic principle of Halachic authority to the rule of "Mora' d'atra"

(the "local" rabbinic authority is supreme)? What is the talmudic

basis for this modern rabbinic authority?

I respond:

I disagree with some of Alfred's examples, but that is unimportant

compared with the main thrust of his question.  What Alfred is

actually saying is that modern communications have made possible the

recreation of the Great Sanhedrin from which "the law proceeds to all

Israel".  He may well be right that it would be technically feasible

to reconstitute the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one sages, an

institution that has been defunct now for 1585 years.  But I also

think that it will not happen for two reasons: people and people.

Rambam, in Mishneh Torah, describes the methodology of reconstituting

the Great Sanhedrin.  All the sages of Eretz-Israel must choose one of

their number to be the President; they must invest him with true

rabbinic authority by the imposition of hands (true "semikhah"); he,

then, in his turn, would invest seventy of them with similar true

rabbinic authority.  Simple?  Only a simpleton would think so!  Some

four hundred years ago such an attempt was actually made.  All the

great sages of Safed, including Rabbi Yosef Karo, the compiler of the

Shulchan Arukh, decided to select Rabbi Ya'akov Berab as the

President, as being the most worthy.  They then sent an emissary to

the community of sages in Jerusalem, inviting them to join in the

venture to make it possible.  The sages of Jerusalem were really

enthusiastic and intimated that they would gladly join in.  Except for

one detail: "We have a better candidate for President," they said - at

that's where the venture ground to a halt.

Alfred, can you imagine Satmar accepting a Lubavitch president?  Can

you see Ashkenazi rabbis accepting a Sefaradi president?  Who would the

rabbis of Israel select as their pre-eminent sage: Ovadya Yosef?

Avraham Shapira? Even more to the point, do you see us Masorti-

Conservative Jews accepting either of them?

Judaism has become far too partisan for such an experiment to succeed

- but it was nice dreaming about it for a moment.

DISCUSSION:

In our last shiur I wrote that in my view "it is one of the tragedies

of modern Judaism that the overwhelming majority of Jews (say, 90%) do

not wear Tefillin every workday, do not wear Tzitzit all the daylight

hours and probably do not provide for themselves a set of the Four

Species for Sukkot."  This must have hit a raw nerve, because two

participants have written to me, concerned at my use of the term

"tragedy".

Juan-Carlos Kiel writes:

Even though we said "Naase venishma" - first we will do and then we

will hear, I can hardly take the lack of wearing Tefilin, Tzitziot or

shaking the Hoshanot as one of the tragedies of modern Judaism. The

tragedy of Judaism nowadays is - in my perception - that the

performing of such rituals does not have any significance to most of

us modern Jews, that the values of which those ritualistic forms were

expresions - do not wake up any echoes in us.  In my view those are

forms that reflect values, I  cry for the lost values. When the values

have significance, the rituals can be performed out of identification.

And Jim Feldman writes:

I don't think that most self-identified Jews, comfortable with their

Judaism, would concur with you. Here we are studying Mishnah

together. Few of us are sages - at least in Judaism - but we retain

the link and "teach it diligently to our children."  But today and at

least in many areas for the last hundred years, we are not driven to

an all or nothing acceptance of any philosophy. While I recognize that

the end of Judges is supposed to be a horror, I read: "There was no

king in Israel and each man did that which was right in his own eyes,"

as the premise upon which freedom, capitalism, and democracy are

based. We need not look back too far to realize what a "tragedy of

modern  Judaism" is. The overuse of superlatives is endemic, but the

most  wonderful example I have seen, and one with a small Jewish twist

is this.  I was at a small dinner of fellow faculty members here in

Boston. Someone mentioned the "Boston Massacre", an event in 1775

which helped precipitate the US revolution against Britain. One of the

guests, Helen Mahut, a Polish Jewish holocaust survivor and way-left

liberal asked: "Boston Massacre? What was that?" A brief explanation

was offered about a squad of Redcoats (English soldiers) cornered on

a Boston street by an angry mob who were throwing snowballs with

rocks at their core. The Redcoats panicked and opened fire. "How many

died?" inquired Helen. The answer was 2 or 3. "Three is a massacre?

To a Jew, three is a massacre?" We all broke up.

I respond:

While I appreciate (and love) the comments of both Juan-Carlos and

Jim, I am unrepentant.  Juan-Carlos is absolutely right, in my view,

when he says that "the tragedy of Judaism nowadays is that the

performing of such rituals does not have any significance to most of

us modern Jews, that the values of which those ritualistic forms were

expresions do not wake up any echoes in us".  I agree and therefore I

wrote what I wrote.

Jim says that "we are studying Mishnah together. Few of us are sages -

at least in Judaism - but we retain the link".  Jim, are "we" part of

the 90% or the 10%?  In Judaism the rituals do not give external,

tangible form to expressed religious truths.  The religious truths

gradually become apparent through the performance of the rituals.  If

the overwhelming majority of Jews today do not perform these rituals

they can not become aware of the religious truths that they enshrine.

To be sure, they can read about other people's experiences, but living

a Jewish life is rather like swimming: we can read books about

swimming from now until the crack of doom, but we will never know how

to swim until we actually get into the water!  When the vast majority

of Jews do not find meaning in, do not evince interest in, certain

basic rituals that is a tragedy - for them and for us.

February 28th 2000 / Adar I 22nd 5760

*****************************************************************************

TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, CHAPTER ELEVEN (TEN), MISHNAH ONE:

All Israel have a share in the next world, as it is said: "All your

people are just, they shall inherit the earth for ever, the shoot of

My planting, the work of My hands for My glorification" [Isaiah

60:21].  The following have no share in the next world: one who says

that the resurrection of the dead is not from the Torah; Torah is not

from Heaven; the Epikoros.  Rabbi Akiva adds someone who reads

heretical books and someone who mutters a spell over a wound by saying

"All the malady that I set upon Egypt I will not set upon you for I,

God, am your Healer" [Exodus 15:26].  Abba Sha'ul adds someone who

pronounces the Name according to its letters.

EXPLANATIONS:

1:

We explained at the beginning of the previous chapter that there is a

discrepancy between the order that the last two chapters of our

tractate appear in the Mishnah manuscripts and how they appear in the

Talmud.  We also explained that we have here preferred the order used

by the Talmud, therefore our present (and last) chapter is marked as

Chapter Eleven.  This chapter is very different from the other

chapters of the tractate - and from most other chapters of the

Mishnah.  Therefore our treatment of this chapter will have to be

slightly different.

2:

After have spent several lengthy chapters expatiating on the four

modes of execution, the first mishnah of this chapter makes a

statement: even though all the miscreants mentioned in the foregoing

chapters were found guilty of a capital offence, by suffering death

they have made amends as it were and their offence has not been great

enough to deny them their share in the next world.  All Israel, even

those killed by the judiciary, have their share in the next world.

Our mishnah then goes on to enumerate three offences which are so

heinous that anyone who is guilty of them has forfeited his share in

the next world.  (Rabbi Akiva holds that the offences are not three in

number but five.  It is not clear whether Abba Sha'ul holds that the

number of such offences is four or six.  We shall return to this much

later.)

3:

The most obvious question that we must ask ourselves is what exactly

is the meaning of the phrase "next world"?  We can give two responses

to this question.  According to one very great authority the term is

synonymous with "afterlife"; according to many other authorities the

term is connected with the resurrection of the dead which is one of

the three items enumerated by Tanna Kamma [the anonymous sage whose

view is amplified by Rabbi Akiva and Abba Sha'ul].  Therefore, it

seems most sensible to hold our discussion of both terms concurrently.

4:

In the Talmud of Eretz-Israel [Berakhot 4c] the following is reported:

    Rabbi Chiyya the Great and Rabbi Yonatan were once accompanying

    [to burial] the bier of Rabbi Shimon bar-Yosse bar-Laconia.  Rabbi

    Yonatan stepped over graves [in the cemetery].  Rabbi Chiyya the

    Great said to him: "Tomorrow we may join them; should we thus

    distress them?"  He replied, "But is it not written [Ecclesiastes

    9:5]: 'The dead know nothing'?"  [Rabbi Chiyya] responded, "You

    know how to quote, but you don't know how to interpret!  [This is

    the whole verse with its interpretation:] 'The living know that

    they will die' - this refers to the righteous who, even when dead,

    are thought of as being alive; and 'the dead know nothing' -

    refers to the wicked who, even while still alive, are thought of

    as [spiritually] dead."

5:

Despite rabbinic attempts to suggest otherwise by midrashic means

which cover several folios of the Gemara on our present mishnah,

actually there is no specific indication in the Biblical text of a

belief in the resurrection of the dead.  The verse that comes

closest to fitting the bill is Daniel 12:2, which teaches that at

the time of future redemption "many of those sleeping in the dusty

ground will awaken to everlasting life and others to humiliation

and eternal contumely".  However, Daniel is a very late

composition, almost certainly contemporary with the conceptual

innovation under discussion.  (Like many of the pseudepigraphic

works in the Tanakh, it may even have been composed to "justify"

the new concept.)  In our modern discourse we tend to obfuscate

the demarcation line between the concept of "the resurrection of

the dead" and the concept of "life after death".  In a hazy manner

the Biblical record assumes "life after death" in some form or

other, but does not explicate or define that which in any case

cannot be explicated or defined in factual terms.  For instance,

while factually recounting the conversation that King Saul had

with the deceased prophet Samuel on the eve of the disastrous

battle of Mount Gilboa (a conversation that took place through the

medium of the Woman of Ein-Dor), no attempt is made to explain the

nature of Samuel's existence at that time or its "geography".

6:

The concept of "the resurrection of the dead" [Techiyyat ha-Metim]

is different - and possibly not directly connected with the

concept of "life after death".  At some time during the epoch of

the Second Bet Mikdash this new belief took root.  Scholars tend

to date the introduction of this new belief to the period that

preceded the Hasmonean uprising against the Syrian Hellenists.

The apostasy that was enforced in Judah under the aegis of

Antiochus Epiphanes during the first quarter of the second century

BCE is graphically (but not necessarily historically) portrayed in

accounts such as the death of Channah and her seven sons.

Incidents such as this one, multiplied many-fold, undermined the

simple belief in direct retribution which teaches that the good

are rewarded and the wicked get their just deserts in this life.

Such a simple belief was now seen to be antagonistic towards the

observed facts of life!  According to the scholars, there now

developed a new theology that would not run counter to the

observed facts.  While it is true that we all die, and that there

is not necessarily justice in the vicissitudes of the life we live

here and now, this will not always be the case: at some time in

the future all the dead will be resurrected (i.e. restored to

physical life) and in this "Next World" [Olam ha-Ba] there would

take place a great judgment in which the righteous would receive

the reward that they did not get "in this life" and the wicked

would receive the punishment that their deeds during their

lifetime require of Divine Justice.  I must emphasize that it was

held - as far as we can tell - that this judgment would not take

place "after death" in a heavenly Tribunal, but on earth at some

time in the future subsequent to a total and general

"resurrection".

7:

That this theology was an innovation we can deduce from the fact

that it was not universally accepted.  Indeed, the breach between

the Sadducees and the Pharisees probably became irreversible

because of this item of Pharisaic creed.  The Sadducees refused to

accept it because, they claimed, it was completely unjustified by

Holy Writ.  (As I suggested above the attempts of the Pharisees to

manipulate the text of the Torah in order to "prove" that "the

resurrection of the dead is taught in the Torah" are - let us say

with a modicum of charity - unconvincing.)  However, this

opposition only made the sages all the more determined to ensure

that that this theology be accepted as a general religious truth.

It was always found that the best way to ensure a certain belief

was to make it a liturgical requirement.  Thus, undetermined by

opposition, the belief in the physical resurrection of the dead

was made the lynch-pin of the second Berakhah of the Amidah.  We

only have to pick up the Siddur [prayer-book] and count the number

of times in this comparatively short paragraph that the concept

"resurrection of the dead" appears to see how strongly this creed

was hammered home.  (The count must be done in Hebrew, since most

modern "translations" of this text are in fact "interpretations"

and, even worse, obfuscations.  The Hebrew "Mechayyeh Metim" might

justly be rendered "injects life into the dead".  Siddur "Sim

Shalom" of the Rabbinical Assembly renders this recurrent phrase

as "give life to the dead", which could just as easily refer to

"life after death" as to "the resurrection of the dead".  The

Artscroll translator has a finer conscience and translates

"resuscitates the dead", which while still being ambiguous is less

so.)

8:

It is important to bear in mind the intentions of the sages in

this second Berakhah of the Amidah in order to correctly interpret

other references that they included.  "Those the sleep in the

dust" is a direct reference to Daniel 12:2 (to which I made

reference above) which teaches that at the time of future

redemption "many of those sleeping in the dusty ground will awaken

to everlasting life and others to humiliation and eternal

contumely".  "King who kills and resurrects" must also not be

misconstrued.  But how it was that "resurrection of the dead"

gradually gave way to "life after death" in a heavenly paradise?

That will be the subject of our next Shiur.

To be continued:

March 1st 2000 / Adar I 24th 5760

*****************************************************************************

TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, CHAPTER ELEVEN (TEN), MISHNAH ONE (recap):

All Israel have a share in the next world, as it is said: "All your

people are just, they shall inherit the earth for ever, the shoot of

My planting, the work of My hands for My glorification" [Isaiah

60:21].  The following have no share in the next world: one who says

that the resurrection of the dead is not from the Torah; Torah is not

from Heaven; the Epikoros.  Rabbi Akiva adds someone who reads

heretical books and someone who mutters a spell over a wound by saying

"All the malady that I set upon Egypt I will not set upon you for I,

God, am your Healer" [Exodus 15:26].  Abba Sha'ul adds someone who

pronounces the Name according to its letters.

EXPLANATIONS (continued):

9:

Of all the great "classical" works in the halakhic repertoire that we

might describe as being 'under-rated' or insufficiently studied, we

must certainly include the great Commentary on the Mishnah by Rambam

[Moses Maimonides, 12th century, North Africa].  In all probability

the only reason that this work did not achieve the renown and

'circulation' of Mishneh Torah is the fact that it was written in

Arabic.  And it was written in Arabic because Rambam wanted it to be a

work for 'Everyman' and not just for scholars.  While this major work

follows closely the text of the mishnayot, the author does not

hesitate to launch into major excursuses - some of very many pages -

when a particular topic requires extraordinary attention.  One such

excursus is the General Introduction; another is the introduction to

Tractate Avot, familiarly known as "The Eight Chapters of Rambam"; and

a third is the commentary on our present mishnah, with its

implications concerning "Olam ha-Ba".  Rambam was hardly the kind of

scholar who would let such a golden opportunity pass him by without

utilizing it, and he launches into a famous discussion on the nature

of "life after death".  (From here until the end of today's shiur is

direct quotation from Rambam):

    Just as a blind man cannot appreciate colour, the deaf man sound,

    the eunuch the pleasure of sexual intercourse - so the physical

    cannot appreciate non-physical pleasure.  Just as a fish cannot

    comprehend fire because its medium is the very opposite of fire,

    so we in this physical world cannot know the pleasure of a non-

    physical world.  This is because in a physical world we can only

    experience physical pleasure.  Non-physical pleasure, on the other

    hand, is constant, and bears no relationship whatsoever to

    physical pleasure.  If we follow the Torah, it would be wrong of

    us to suppose that angels ... do not sense pleasure -

    metaphysicians and philosophers agree with this!  Rather do they

    have a very great pleasure in that they have a greater

    understanding of the Creator, which is for them a constant and

    uninterrupted pleasure.  But they have no physical pleasure: since

    they do not have sense as we do they do not sense as we sense.

    Similarly we, if we were to become ethereal after death and reach

    that rank, we would not comprehend physical pleasure and would not

    desire it.

    If you think carefully about both kinds of pleasure you will soon

    come to realize the baseness of the one and the superiority of the

    other - even in this world!  Most people - perhaps all - will work

    themselves to death in order to achieve greatness or honour,

    neither of which are physical pleasures like eating and drinking.

    Similarly, many people enjoy the feeling of revenge over physical

    pleasures.  There are many who refrain from the greatest of

    physical delights for fear that people will think less highly of

    them or in order to achieve respect.  If this is our situation in

    this physical world, how much more are we likely to appreciate

    spiritual pleasure in the non-physical world which is the

    Afterlife [Olam ha-Ba], where we shall comprehend the Creator as

    non-physical beings.  That is a pleasure that cannot be defined or

    metaphorised.  As the psalmist says [31:20], "How great is Thy

    goodness that Thou hast in store for them that fear Thee, that

    Thou hast made for them that trust in Thee!"  The sages put it

    this way: "In the afterlife there is no eating, no drinking, no

    washing, no combing, and no intercourse; the righteous simply sit

    there with their crowns on their heads enjoying the radiance of

    the Divine Presence" [Gemara Berakhot 17a].  What they meant by

    "their crowns on their heads" is a reference to the soul as a

    discrete intelligence, which philosophers have treated but which

    would take too long to detain us here.  (By the phrase "enjoying

    the radiance of the Divine Presence" they allude to the pleasure

    that they have in what they comprehend of the Creator.)

    The Reward, the ultimate 'objective' is to reach this exalted

    state, to exist in this spiritual form eternally, like the Creator

    who is the cause of that existence which enables the soul to

    comprehend Him.  This is the great and incomparable good, which is

    eternal and has no purpose; how could it be compared to that which

    perishes?  In the Torah [Deuteronomy 22:7] God says "That you may

    have a long and good life"; the sages give the traditional

    interpretation: So that you may have good in the world which is

    absolute good and life in the life that is absolutely long.

    The ultimate punishment is the extinction of the soul, that it

    will perish and cease to exist.  This is the 'excision' mentioned

    in the Torah.  Excision means the utter extinction of the soul.

    In the Torah [Numbers 15:31] we read "that soul shall be

    absolutely cut off", and the rabbis have explained that as meaning

    "cut off in this world, cut off in the next".  Anyone who has sunk

    into physical pleasure to the exclusion of the truth is cut off

    from that attainment and remains excised matter.

Rambam concludes his statement on "Olam ha-Ba" by reiterating the fact

that it is completely severed from all physicality.  He quotes the

prophets:

    The prophet Isaiah has already explained that Olam ha-Ba cannot be

    comprehended through the physical senses.  "No eye, O God, but

    Thine has seen what will be done for him that waits for Thee".  In

    explaining this passage the sages said that wherever the prophets

    deal with this topic they are without exception referring to the

    Messianic Age; as far as Olam ha-Ba is concerned, "No eye, O God,

    but thine has seen it".

To be continued:

DISCUSSION:

The case of the prophet who was eaten by a lion has provoked no little

comment.  Marc Kivel wrote:

I'd only offer the thought, re the death by lion of the prophet who

did not heed instructions: if a person who has heard once from HaShem

and been told to refrain from an act, and then at the word of another

person ignores Heavenly instruction, even if the latter says they are

a prophet, is this person still fit to serve as a navi?  No.  Perhaps

a lesson for Jeroboam, but more certainly a lesson for would be

prophets?

And Mark D. Lehrman wrote:

It seems to me (from the English translation, that is) that the tale

starkly presents the dynamic between two "dueling" prophets, each one

bearing a completely different and contradictory message and therefore

each implicitly claiming a more direct connection to God. Had the

second "prophet" said something like:  "But God has spoken to me and

asked me to tell you that you are now free to eat and drink again ..."

one might conclude that he indeed was a messenger intended to "bring

the word of God" to the first prophet.  However, his message was not

directed at the plight of the first prophet at all, but rather touted

his own "mission" i.e., "God told ME to take you back to MY home to

eat and drink."   As I read it, this response neither directly

addresses nor abrogates God's original command to the first prophet.

I asked Ed Frankel, who had originally raised the moral issue, for his

comments on these suggestions:

I have nothing particularly to add to either. I think what you [i.e.

me - SR] wrote is about as good as one can get. There is one other

peculiarity, too, that neither of us dealt with. The second prophet

knows where to find the real prophet. How? This would seem to reflect

at least as much Divine intervention as the man who pointed Joseph to

his brothers. If indeed this is the case, how could the former prophet

ignore the message? If anything, it makes the text even more

unethical.

Ed has not had the opportunity of reading the following message from

Yitzchok Zlochower:

Ed Frankel raised the question of the justice of a genuine prophet

being killed for not fulfilling a small part of his commission upon

the urging of another prophet.  It would seem that the prophet who

lied about having a message from GOD which contravened the real

message given earlier to the other prophet should have been the one to

die (Deut. 18:20), rather than the prophet who was misled.  The lesson

that we should derive from this incident, it seems to me, is the

obligation to fulfill a direct personal command from GOD without

reservation.  If the prophet from Judea was prepared to risk his life

to confront the king of Israel, Jeroboam, with a calamitous prediction

about his official cult site, then he should also have heeded the

second part of the command with equal valor and determination.  He

should have realized that GOD would not contravene a direct, personal

order by sending a message indirectly through another prophet -

particularly a prophet unknown to him.  The severity of the

punishment, however, is a reflection of the seriousness of the

situation that was the subject of the prophetic mission - as the

Ralbag suggested.  The establishment of cult sites in the Israel

kingdom with priests who were not even Levites, and the abolition of

the tithes given to the Levites caused a wholesale migration of this

more learned segment of the population to Judea.  As a result,

ignorance of  the torah and absorption of pagan ideas and values grew

apace, and lead ultimately to the exile of the inhabitants of Israel.

Under the circumstances, the severity of the message given to the

prophet and the severity of the punishment meted out to him for not

fulfilling it entirely is not surprising.

I ask parenthetically why Yitzchok assumes that the second prophet was

a false prophet.

March 6th 2000 / Adar I 29th 5760

*****************************************************************************

TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, CHAPTER ELEVEN (TEN), MISHNAH ONE (recap):

All Israel have a share in the next world, as it is said: "All your

people are just, they shall inherit the earth for ever, the shoot of

My planting, the work of My hands for My glorification" [Isaiah

60:21].  The following have no share in the next world: one who says

that the resurrection of the dead is not from the Torah; Torah is not

from Heaven; the Epikoros.  Rabbi Akiva adds someone who reads

heretical books and someone who mutters a spell over a wound by saying

"All the malady that I set upon Egypt I will not set upon you for I,

God, am your Healer" [Exodus 15:26].  Abba Sha'ul adds someone who

pronounces the Name according to its letters.

EXPLANATIONS (continued:

10:

Many modern scholars (and not so modern ones too) have tried to guess

why Rambam saw fit to broach this subject at all in his Mishnah

Commentary.  It is clear from his treatment that he is attempting to

make rabbinic and Aristotelian concepts harmonize: he describes

whatever remains of the human psyche after physical death as "discrete

intelligences".  The best guess is that in his Mishnah Commentary he

was not trying to write an in-depth analysis of the position that he

is espousing, but rather that he was attempting to "make the Jewish

world a safe place for philosophers to live in", by indicating that

there was room for maneuver.  One thing is certain: he had every

intention of denigrating the accepted conceptualization of

resurrection.  A couple of pages earlier in the excursus we have been

discussing, he had written that there were people that

    suppose that the reward [for keeping Torah] is the resurrection

    [Techiyyat ha-Metim].  That is, that a person will come to life

    again after their death, together with their relatives and

    friends, will eat, drink and never die again.  The punishment for

    disobedience will be the reverse of the above.  This group derives

    its opinion from various statements in the Bible and from various

    Biblical stories... A fifth group - and they are the majority -

    blend all these previous opinions together to claim that we are

    awaiting the Messiah, who will resurrect the dead, we shall all

    then enter Paradise, where we shall live happily ever after.  Very

    few, on the other hand, are the people who consider that wonderful

    concept "Olam ha-Ba".  very few are there who really ponder the

    question and who ask themselves what all the above ideas really

    mean.  What you will find everyone asking - clergy as well as

    laymen - is whether the dead will be resurrected naked or

    clothed..."

It is in this same excursus that Rambam expounds his Thirteen Basic

Principles - what he considers the essential philosophic bases of

Judaism.  (These principles are better known in two other formats: one

prose and the other verse.  The prose version starts off each

principle with the formula "I believe with perfect faith...": Rambam

would have been horrified.  The verse (or worse?) form is the hymn

known as Yigdal.  Obviously Rambam himself is not responsible for

either of the two later formats.)  The last of his Thirteen Principles

is entitled "Resurrection", and his expounding thereof is limited to

one pithy phrase: "I have already explained all this"!  No doubt this

is the reason why he was accused in his own lifetime of entertaining

the heretical belief that there would not be a physical resurrection

of the dead.  He got so much flack that he had to write another work,

"Ma'amar Techiyyat ha-Metim" [An Essay on Resurrection] in which he

claims that he was misunderstood and grossly calumniated!  He states

quite categorically that resurrection of the dead is an essential part

of Jewish theology and that he who does not accept it is not part of

Israel".  He then manages to set up such a thick screen of verbiage

concerning his own position that more heat is generated than light.

However, his conceptualizations are obvious to those who wish to

understand them.

11:

Thus it is that Judaism seems to have stated "absolutely

categorically" that "Techiyyat ha-Metim" is so important a credal

element that it must be hammered home in the second Berakhah of the

Amidah, for example, so that no one can claim that they do not accept

the idea.  Obviously, the categorical statement of our present mishnah

that "one who says that the resurrection of the dead is not from the

Torah" has no share in the next world is another example of hammering

home this quasi-credal element.  However, no one seems to be able to

agree with anyone else as what is the precise meaning of that which

has been "categorically stated" - except the absolute certainty that

the other person's view must, of course, be heretical!  Thus, in fact,

in Judaism we seem to have found legitimate room for Resurrection,

Afterlife, Transmigration of souls and so forth.  What can be stated

positively is that Rabbinic Judaism teaches that physical death does

not entail spiritual extinction as well.

To be continued:

DISCUSSION:

For the last time we return to the hapless prophet who was devoured by

a lion.  After presenting for you the view of Yitzchok Zlochower, I

wrote "I ask parenthetically why Yitzchok assumes that the second

prophet was a false prophet".  He responds:

>>You asked for proof that the second prophet spoke falsely to the

prophet who came from Judea.  Kings I 13:18 relating the words of the

second prophet remarks "kichesh lo", which seems to mean "lied to

him".<<

Repentant, I add that Yitzchok's reading is also that of our sources

that commented on the verse Yitzchok quotes: Targum Yonatan, Radak,

Ralbag, Metzudat David, and Malbim.

Albert Ringer also has doubts:

As an extra aspect in the discussion on the prophet and the lion, I

wonder how Jonah would fit in with Ed Frankel's interpretation.

Discussion on this topic is now closed.

On a different issue: we learned in Mishnah 4 of the previous chapter

that a recalcitrant sage "must be taken up to the supreme court in

Jerusalem [where] he is kept until the [next] festival and executed

during the festival".

I was quite certain that someone would raise the following question -

and Juan-Carlos Kiel did not "disappoint" me!  He writes:

This is roughly what the Evangelist describes about Jesus. Could it be

he was executed as an "unrepentant" sage?

I respond:

I think not.  The Christian scriptures make it absolutely clear that

Jesus was executed by the Romans and not by the Sanhedrin.  On the

contrary, a few weeks later, when Jesus' students began to propagate

their teachings in Jerusalem, they were arrested and brought before

the Sanhedrin.  The president, Rabban Gamliel, recommended their

release and his recommendation was accepted [Acts 5:33-40].

Adam Porter raises what seem to me to be two very important issues:

RMSG of 28 Feb raised two questions in my mind that I hope you can

clarify:

1) You note that scholars have argued that a theological innovation

seems to have occurred before the Maccabean revolt: people observed

that the "retribution theology" (bad people will suffer ill and good

people will be blessed) does not always take place. So they moved the

"reward and punishment" into the "world to come."  This explanation,

although it fits the data, has always struck me as rather weak: surely

people noticed there were Jobs, who suffered without obvious sin, long

before the Hellenistic or Persian periods! Perhaps this it is

impossible for a modern to see the world through the eyes of the

Deuteronomistic historian, but the idea that bad people are punished

but good are blessed seems hopelessly naive and simplistic; it is

almost impossible for me to believe that people would ever have

believed this. What other explanations do you think are possible?

I respond:

The Biblical record shows dynamics in the philosophical issue that

Adam has raised.  It is generally accepted that when Israel's economy

was agricultural and the concomitant social structure was tribal that

the predominant philosophy was that there was no individual reward and

punishment, but that what happens to an individual may well be the

result of association: a son may pay for the misdeeds of his father, a

tribe may suffer for the misdeeds of one of its members and one

generation may pay the price for the activities of a previous

generation.  Conversely, of course, I might be rewarded for someone

else's good deeds even though I myself am undeserving.  One of the

clearest statements if this philosophy is to be found in the Ten

Commandments [Exodus 20:5-6] where God warns that He is "a jealous

God, requiting the sins of the fathers upon the sons even to the third

or fourth generation ... and repaying with kindness even to the

thousandth generation..."

Two phenomena contributed to the growth of a different philosophy,

that of personal responsibility.  Urbanization and the gradual

breakdown of the tribal system was one contributing factor and the

destruction of the Judean state and the exile to Babylon was the

other.  Thus we find the prophet Ezekiel [18:1-4] roundly

remonstrating with his exiled contemporaries, who explained their

plight as having been caused by the previous generation:

    How come that you are quoting the old proverb concerning the land

    of Israel? - that 'the fathers eat the unripe fruit but it is the

    teeth of the children that shudder'... The soul that sins is the

    soul that shall die!

I run the risk of making this Shiur overly long, so let me say just

this.  It is obviously the later philosophy that, when taken

literally, does not agree with the observed facts of life.  I believe

that since Freud we can accept with greater equanimity the idea of

"collective responsibility" in which "everything I do that's wrong is

someone else's fault".  We need to development a new philosophy that

is an amalgam of the two: what happens to us is often caused by

circumstances beyond our control, but this fact of life does not

remove from us the moral responsibility for our own actions - it just

makes it more difficult.

Adam's second point:

2) You note that Daniel has perhaps the only reference to resurrection

in the Biblical canon, but that it is a very late pseudepigraphic text.

You seem perfectly comfortable using historical explanations to

understand the Tanakh (noting that the Pharisees and Sadducees

disagreed on resurrection, so it was a "late" theological concept),

but this is not the way early Rabbis would have understood these texts

is it? They would have thought Daniel dated to the Persian period and

perhaps not seen "resurrection" as a relatively late development. My

question: when it is kosher to explain things "historically" rather

than "Biblically"? Does knowing the historical setting change the way

we interpret the texts or affect halakhah? Or is it "interesting but

irrelevant" in deciding proper conduct?

I respond:

Conservative Judaism developed from the teachings of Zechariah Frankel

[Germany, 1801-1875] who founded the Positive-Historical approach to

Judaism.  "Positive" meant a positive attitude towards observance;

"Historical" meant a critical attitude towards texts.  Our approach is

an amalgam of both.  We do no revamp an observance or a philosophy

unless it is obvious to our critical apparatus (which is God-given)

that something does not fit the facts.  This approach is by  no means

either modern or heretical.  In the greatest work on Jewish philosophy

ever written, A Guide for the Confused [Moreh Nevukhim] Rambam was

faced with a contradiction between his religious beliefs and the views

of his scientific mentor, Aristotle: Aristotle taught that matter was

eternal, the Torah teaches that everything was created.  In Part Two,

Chapter 25, Rambam boldly states that the reason he does not accept

Aristotle's view is because it was only an unproven theory, not an

observed fact.  Thus it is easy for him to accept the teaching of the

Torah on this matter.  However, he adds, if Aristotle's teaching were

a proven law then we would have to "interpret" the Torah text

according to the best human knowledge - and "the gates of

interpretation are not closed" to us.

Both of these responses are admittedly insufficient answers to Adam's

questions, but there is a limit that I must set to the length of each of

these Shiurim!

March 10th 2000 / Adar 3rd 5760

*****************************************************************************

TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, CHAPTER ELEVEN (TEN), MISHNAH ONE (recap):

All Israel have a share in the next world, as it is said: "All your

people are just, they shall inherit the earth for ever, the shoot of

My planting, the work of My hands for My glorification" [Isaiah

60:21].  The following have no share in the next world: one who says

that the resurrection of the dead is not from the Torah; Torah is not

from Heaven; the Epikoros.  Rabbi Akiva adds someone who reads

heretical books and someone who mutters a spell over a wound by saying

"All the malady that I set upon Egypt I will not set upon you for I,

God, am your Healer" [Exodus 15:26].  Abba Sha'ul adds someone who

pronounces the Name according to its letters.

EXPLANATIONS (continued:

12:

So far in our study of this mishnah we have investigated the topic of

"resurrection of the dead".  We found great confusion as to the

precise implications of this term as reflected subsequently in our

classical sources.  That turning this concept into a belief is

meaningless from the practical point of view is demonstrated by the

logistics of our mishnah: who are those who will not be resurrected? -

those who say there is no resurrection!  To my mind this is very

similar to "proving" that Jacob wore a hat by reference to the verse

[Genesis 28:10] which tells that "Jacob went out from Beersheva and

went to Charan" - and is it conceivable that the patriarch would go

out without a hat on his head!?

13:

The second item in the catechism of our mishnah is not really any

different.  It is easy to state categorically that there will be no

resurrection (however understood) for those who deny that the Torah is

from heaven; it is more problematic to perceive a consensus in our

classical sources as to the catechismal meaning of the concept of

"Torah from Heaven".  And here, once again, it seems that the

confusion is caused by Rambam, and again in his commentary on this

very mishnah.

14:

When it comes to amplifying the implications of our mishnah the Gemara

[Sanhedrin 99a] simply quotes a series of Baraitot.  (The Gemara dates

from the period of the Amoraim, 200-500 CE, whereas a Baraita is a

source from the period immediately preceding, the era of the creation

of the Mishnah, considered by the Amoraim to be more authoritative.)

The Baraitot seem to imply that there is a biblical source for the

teaching of our mishnah:

    Any person who acts haughtily ... is insulting God and that soul

    shall be excised from its people.  For having despised the word of

    God and negating His commandment that soul shall be excised,

    excised bearing its own sin [Numbers 15:30-31]

On this biblical text there is an exposition in a Baraita (quoted

directly from Sifrei on the above verses):

    "For having despised the word of God" - this refers to one who

    claims that Torah is not from Heaven.  Even if he were to claim

    that the whole Torah is from Heaven but that one particular verse

    was not uttered by God but was a personal invention of Moses -

    [such a person is guilty of] "having despised the word of God".

    Even if he were to claim that the whole Torah is from Heaven with

    the exception of one particular rabbinic textual nicety, one

    inference from minor to major, one contextual inference - [such a

    person is guilty of] "having despised the word of God".

It is clear from this Baraita that the concept of "Torah from Heaven"

is not being understood as implying verbal dictation since the term

"Torah" is here clearly being understood in its wider meaning,

including the "Unwritten Torah", Torah she-be-al Peh, the oral

tradition which embraces the rabbinic exegesis and amplification of

the "Written Torah", Torah she-bikhtav.  What the Baraita is implying

is that the whole of the Torah is divinely inspired; it is not

speaking at all about the means by which the Torah has reached us.

(This latter issue was one that I have already dealt with in a series

of Shiurim [RMSG of March 13th 1998 and June 29th - July 3rd 1998].  I

repeat here only the culmination, which is directly concerned with the

way Rambam handled this item in our mishnah:-

    One of the lynch-pins of rabbinic philosophy is the concept of

    Torah Min ha-Shamayim, that Torah (both written and oral) comes

    from God. This presents Conservative Judaism with no difficulty.

    The rabbis state [here were quoted the Baraita expounded earlier].

    This view, although based upon an earlier conceptualization of

    revelation, holds no terrors for Conservative Judaism: for it

    ardently maintains that the whole of the Torah (both Written and

    Unwritten) comes from God - in the sense already described above,

    in which God's will is perceived more perfectly as the human

    perceptors progress onward and upward. We insist that man's

    reaching for God is, indeed, a reaching for God, and that which is

    finally accepted into the tradition has proceeded from God. Even

    when some element or other is superseded later on with an improved

    understanding, it does not mean that the former teaching was not

    divine; it merely means that man was not yet philosophically

    developed to a degree that would permit him to understand the full

    implications of the divine in that particular matter - very much

    as we understand our parents more intelligently the more we grow.

    However, matters do not rest here. Rambam [Moses Maimonides, North

    Africa, 12th century CE], in the Thirteen Fundamentals that form

    part of a long excursus that he inserted into the preamble to his

    commentary to the very mishnah we are presently studying, codified

    this concept of "Torah Min ha-Shamayim" [Torah from Heaven] in a

    way that is problematic for us:

         We believe that the [Written] Torah now in our possession is

        identical to that given to Moses and that all of it comes from

        God. That is to say that all of it came to him from God in a

        manner that may be metaphorically termed "speech". No one but

        Moses can know the true nature of that contact...  There is no

        qualitative difference between a verse like ... "his wife's

        name was Mehetavel, daughter of Matred" [Genesis 36:39] and a

        verse like "I am the Lord your God" [Exodus 20:2] or "Hear, O

        Israel: the Lord is our God, the Lord is One" [Deuteronomy

        6:4]. It all comes from God and it is all God's perfect, pure

        and holy Torah of truth.

    Surely, had Rambam been formulating his principle today he would

    have phrased it differently. That which we find problematic in his

    words is not to be found in the original Midrash nor is it to be

    found in our mishnah; it was added by Rambam. We agree with Rambam

    that "It all comes from God and it is all God's perfect, pure and

    holy Torah of truth". We disagree with him when he states that

    "the [Written] Torah now in our possession is identical to that

    given to Moses". The formulation of Rambam is, of course, entirely

    at odds with the sentiments implied by Abraham Ibn-Ezra in several

    places in his commentary on the Torah; for instance see the

    quotation brought in our last shiur [July 1st 1998 - SR], and in

    particular the gloss on it made by Yossef Bonfils. Ibn-Ezra surely

    would have rejected Rambam's extension of the original Midrash, as

    we do - and as Rambam himself almost certainly would if he were

    alive today.  For Rambam was an ardent proponent of the principle

    that we should not permit the literal meaning of Torah to

    contradict our verified intellectual perceptions.  Rambam himself

    faced a dilemma similar to the one he has unwittingly created for

    us: he was a devoted follower of Aristotelian physics, and

    Aristotle had propounded the eternity of matter, whereas the Torah

    teaches that "in the beginning God created" matter [Chiddush ha-

    Olam].  Rambam says that he accepts the view of Torah on creation

    against the view of his intellectual hero, because Aristotle had

    not proven his hypothesis.  If, however, the eternity of matter

    had been given a scientific proof "it would be possible to

    interpret figuratively the texts [of the Torah] in accordance with

    this opinion" [Guide for the Perplexed, Part Two, Chapter 25]  He

    does not say that it would be necessary to ignore clear scientific

    evidence in order to maintain the verbal integrity of the Written

    Torah!

To be continued:

DISCUSSION:

In our Shiur of March 1st I quoted (extensively) from Rambam's

commentary on the mishnah we are currently studying:

>>The ultimate punishment is the extinction of the soul, that it will

perish and cease to exist.  This is the 'excision' mentioned in the

Torah.  Excision means the utter extinction of the soul. In the Torah

[Numbers 15:31] we read "that soul shall be absolutely cut off", and

the rabbis have explained that as meaning "cut off in this world, cut

off in the next".  Anyone who has sunk into physical pleasure to the

exclusion of the truth is cut off from that attainment and remains

excised matter.<<

Cheryl Birkner Mack writes:

This may be an unrelated question, but I've wondered for a while about

the term "karet". I believe it is used in several cases in the Tora.

In every case does it mean what you've described? And is there no

possibility of teshuva for these offenses?

I respond:

There is no sin so great that it cannot be atoned for by sincere

resentence.  We have already noted that even those executed by a human

court are not denied their "share in the World to Come" if their death

was preceded by sincere repentance.  What Rambam does say (in Mishneh

Torah, Laws on Repentance) is that the crimes of certain people are so

heinous that if they do not repent in time God will intervene and keep

them on their chosen path until they reach their own destruction

unrepentant.  This is how he (Rambam)  explains the hardening of

Pharaoh's heart by God in the Exodus story.

Ed Frankel writes concerning the concept of resurrection:

Several years ago working at the Ramah camps a colleague gave a new

explanation of techiyat hametim that made sense to him. He saw it as a

poetic term akin in some measure to the substance of Modeh Ani that we

recite each time we wake in the morning.  He went on to say that he

saw techiyat hametim as God who resurrects those who are as good as

dead. His example came from real life. He had fallen asleep at the

wheel of his car and went off the road. Somehow his foot came off the

gas and the incline stopped the car safely while he dozed. He realized

when he awoke what had happened and was henceforth able to say the

bracha in the amidah with renewed fervor.

I respond:

I would have thought that Ed's colleague would have told this anecdote

in order to bolster the concept of "Hashgachah Peratit", that God

"watches out" for every single individual.  The anecdote is, of

course, "far out" from the rabbinic point of view as an example of

"Techiyyat ha-Metim".  As regards the concept of Techiyyat ha-Metim in

the second Berakhah of the Amidah I have heard an interpretation that

approaches the idea of "God who resurrects those who are as good as

dead".  This second berakhah of the Amidah is termed "Gevurot", which

might be rendered into English as "Divine Power".  In this berakhah

the immense power of the Deity is focused on two topics.  These topics

are seen by the Rabbinic mind as being intertwined, different aspects

of the same phenomenon.  Our modern sensibilities, having been

nurtured in a different mindset, would probably see these two aspects

as being discrete rather than connected.  This berakhah describes

God's power as being manifested in the weather and in the resurrection

of the dead.  Perhaps the rabbinic concept will become more apparent

if we think of this berakhah as affirming God as the ultimate Arbiter

of Life and Death.  In the agricultural economy of Eretz-Israel in

Biblical and Talmudic times the falling of the rain at the appropriate

time (and, of course, its not falling at inappropriate times) were

quite literally matters of life and death.  In our comparatively more

sophisticated times (?), every winter now we in Israel are gripped by

the fear that this year would be a year of drought, and even when rain

does fall the agonizing question that dominates the weather reports

always boils down to "by how many centimetres has the Sea of Kinneret,

our National Reservoir, risen above the imaginary 'red line'?"  We can

now understand the comment of a famous sage, reported in the Talmud of

Eretz-Israel [Ta'anit 63d] that "the rains falling at the appropriate

time are welcome as [being] the resurrection of the dead".  Without

them there can be no life and death is inevitable.  Therefore, in this

second berakhah, when we celebrate the Deity as "causing the wind to

blow and the rain to fall" this is no childish innocence: this is God

as Arbiter of Life and Death, Wielder of the Ultimate and most Supreme

Power.  It thus becomes apparent that the other element that is

intertwined with the weather in this berakhah, the resurrection of the

dead, is not really so discrete from it.

Shabbat Shalom to everybody.

March 14th 2000 / Adar 7th 5760

*****************************************************************************

TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, CHAPTER ELEVEN (TEN), MISHNAH ONE (recap):

All Israel have a share in the next world, as it is said: "All your

people are just, they shall inherit the earth for ever, the shoot of

My planting, the work of My hands for My glorification" [Isaiah

60:21].  The following have no share in the next world: one who says

that the resurrection of the dead is not from the Torah; Torah is not

from Heaven; the Epikoros.  Rabbi Akiva adds someone who reads

heretical books and someone who mutters a spell over a wound by saying

"All the malady that I set upon Egypt I will not set upon you for I,

God, am your Healer" [Exodus 15:26].  Abba Sha'ul adds someone who

pronounces the Name according to its letters.

EXPLANATIONS (continued:

15:

The third person who forfeits his share in the next world, according

to Tanna Kamma, is the Epikoros.  There is no doubt that the origin of

this term is in the name of the Greek philosopher Epicurus [Greece,

beginning of 3rd century BCE].  His original teaching was that the

highest aim of man is in attaining the happiness of practicing virtue.

Gradually the "practicing virtue" bit was lopped off and later

Epicureans maintained that the attainment of pleasure was the greatest

virtue.  This eventually degenerated into the mocking dictum "eat

drink and be merry for tomorrow we die", "gather ye rosebuds while ye

may" etc.  Later Epicureans, who would no doubt have been disowned by

the philosopher himself, saw no value in anything that took life too

seriously.  It is perhaps this last (and admittedly dubious)

characteristic that leads us to the meaning of Epikoros in the

language of the sages.  They use the term to describe someone who

holds the sages in low esteem, mocks them, scoffs at their teaching.

The Gemara [Sanhedrin 99b onwards] offers several definitions, ranging

from one who ridicules a sage to one who uses Torah learning itself in

order to denigrate it.  Thus, it seems, that the term Epikoros

gradually came to mean a scholar - possibly even a Torah scholar - who

denigrated the sages and their traditions, twisting the teachings to

mean something that they were never intended to mean simply in order

to bring them and their teachers into ridicule.  I describe just one

example from the many given by the Gemara, because it amuses me to

think that the sages, so long ago, often had to face the same kind of

hurtful badinage as their modern, humble, counterparts.

    ...Like the members of the household of Doctor Benjamin [a

    physician] who ask what use the sages are seeing that they have

    never permitted us a raven or forbidden us a pigeon [i.e. they

    have never changed the basic laws of Kashrut].  Whenever one of

    the Benjamin household would bring [the great Babylonian Amora]

    Rava a animal [for inspection to decide whether it was kasher or

    Treif], if he saw that he could permit the meat he would say to

    them "Please note that I am permitting you a raven"; and when he

    saw that he would have to forbid the meat he would say, "Please

    note that I am forbidding you a pigeon".

16:

To the list of Tanna Kamma Rabbi Akiva adds the reading of heretical

books and the mumbling of incantations intended to cure diseases.  The

"heretical books" that Rabbi Akiva would ostracize on pain of

forfeiting the next world are almost certainly the books which we now

call the Apocrypha.  During the last couple of centuries BCE and

during the first century CE many books were being written about which

there was no general agreement as to whether they should be part of

Israel's scriptural heritage or not.  Some of these were of a very

high standard and much admired by the sages: they sometimes quote, for

example, from "The Wisdom of Ben-Sirah" with the same reverence

accorded biblical works.  However, the vast majority of these books

were propaganda at best and downright mendacious as worst.  For

example, the Second book of the Maccabees is a work of political

propaganda on behalf of the Hasmonean King Yochanan Hyrkanos I.  Most

of these works are what we call Pseudepigraphic.  That means that

their authors, in order to get these books a wider circulation and

acceptance, would ascribe their work to some ancient sage - the

"Wisdom of Solomon", for example.  There were probably two reasons

why, towards the end of the first century CE, the sages at Yavneh

decided to canonize those books that they accepted as scripture and to

outlaw all the rest.  The first reason was obviously the upheaval

caused by the great war against the Romans and the destruction of the

Bet Mikdash in the year 70 CE.  The other reason was doubtless the

publication of the first of the gospels - we must remember that the

earliest Christians were Jews active within the Jewish community.  The

main contenders for scriptural canonicity were considered one by one

by the Sanhedrin under Rabban Gamliel and voted upon.  A tantalizing

glimpse into these discussions can be had from reading of some of the

mishnayot of Tractate Yadayim: there was no unanimity concerning

Ecclesiastes [Kohelet] and there seemed to be a majority in favour of

excluding the Song of Songs [Shir ha-Shirim]; it was only because of

the tireless insistence of the same Rabbi Akiva of our present mishnah

that Shir ha-Shirim was eventually accepted into the canon of sacred

scripture - Ecclesiastes too.  The list of "authorized' sacred

writings was finalized and now forms the third section of our

tripartite Tanakh.  All the "failed candidates" were secreted away

from the eyes of the curious and only survived into modern times (in

Greek translations) because the Church accepted them as Holy Writ.  (A

part of the Hebrew original of Ben-Sirah was discovered by Solomon

Schechter in the Cairo Genizah.)

17:

Halakhah recognizes seven terms for the Deity which are so holy that

they may not be erased [see Rambam, Yesodei ha-Torah 6:2].  I shall

quote them in transliteration since it is only in their Hebrew format

that they are considered ineradicable: El, Elo'ah, Elohim, Elohei,

Shaddai, Tzeva'ot and the Tetragrammaton - the four Hebrew letters

Yod-He-Vav-He, which is nowadays uttered as "Adonai".  Of all these

seven on the last is considered so holy that using it in an

imprecation constitutes sacrilege.  (I would like here to point out an

egregious error.  The original pronunciation of the Tetragrammaton has

been irretrievably lost for nearly two millennia.  Whenever the term

is used in the Bible or Prayer-Book we substitute for it the surrogate

term "Adonai" [Lord].  The Massoretes, who were responsible for

transmitting the Biblical text to us in its present format, added the

vocalization of the word "Adonai" to the letters of the Tetragrammaton

in order to remind the reader to read the term "Adonai".  When non-

Jews read the Hebrew text they misunderstood, and started construing

this term as if it were a real word, thus creating the nonsensical

proper noun "Jehovah".  This word has no basis whatsoever in Jewish

tradition.)  Abba Sha'ul adds to the list of Tanna Kamma "someone who

pronounces the Name according to its letters".

DISCUSSION:

Yiftach Shapir writes:

Let me add some comments to our discussion of Tehiyat ha-Metim. First,

most of the discussion was based on Rambam's understanding of the

issue. I agree, that of all the other views I have read, Rambam's is

the one that seems to our modern, westernized approach the most

appropriate. But I think it would be just fair to mention that within

the various streams of thought in Judaism there are other, even

contradicting views: Rabbi Sa'adia Gaon discusses the issue of Tehiyat

ha-Metim in detail and dwells on various questins like "would the dead

be dressed or nude".

I respond:

This "contribution" of Sa'adyah Ga'on is hardly original.  All he does

really is to bring direct quotes from the Gemara.

    Queen Cleopatra discussed with Rabbi Meir: "I know that the dead

    will die" [and she quotes from the prophets] "but when they are

    resurrected will they naked or clothed?"  He replied, "Make an

    inference from minor to major: wheat is buried naked but sprouts

    up in many a garb; the righteous are buried in their shrouds, and

    is it not all the more logical that they will be clothed?"

Rabbi Meir [Eretz Israel, end of 2nd century CE] here seems to sense

that Cleopatra's question is based on her knowledge of the "Eleusinian

mysteries".

Yiftach continues:

A third view in Judaism is that of the Kabbala. I am not an expert but

it seems to me that the Kabbala believes not in resurrection but in

some kind of reincarnation and "Gilgul Neshamot".

I respond:

I am blissfully ignorant of the teachings of Kabbalah!

March 17th 2000 / Adar 10th 5760

*****************************************************************************

TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, CHAPTER ELEVEN (TEN), MISHNAH ONE (recap):

All Israel have a share in the next world, as it is said: "All your

people are just, they shall inherit the earth for ever, the shoot of

My planting, the work of My hands for My glorification" [Isaiah

60:21].  The following have no share in the next world: one who says

that the resurrection of the dead is not from the Torah; Torah is not

from Heaven; the Epikoros.  Rabbi Akiva adds someone who reads

heretical books and someone who mutters a spell over a wound by saying

"All the malady that I set upon Egypt I will not set upon you for I,

God, am your Healer" [Exodus 15:26].  Abba Sha'ul adds someone who

pronounces the Name according to its letters.

DISCUSSION:

Before we move on to the next mishnayot in our present chapter I must

present before you some of the rather considerable mail that has been

accumulating.

Albert Ringer writes that I pointed out that Rambam's view on the

coming into being of Torah might be more problematic to us. He

continues:

However it seems to me that one could interpret Maimonides words to

mean that the way torah reached us is beyond history ("No one but

Moses can know the true nature of that contact").

I respond:

When Rambam writes that "no one but Moses can know the true nature of

that contact" he is referring to the verbal content of Torah.  He has

stated that God dictated, as it were, the whole Torah to Moses.  Since

this statement involves a gross anthropomorphism Rambam is quick to

point out that he did not mean thereby to indicate that God "spoke"

the words to Moses - i.e. that God is possessed of a throat, voice

box, vocal cords etc.  What he means (he says) is that God

"communicated" the verbal content of the Torah to Moses through some

form of "contact".  But, "no one but Moses can know the true nature of

that contact" - and therefore it is futile to speculate.  Thus far

Rambam.  Contrary to what Albert is suggesting to us, Rambam is quite

clearly advocating a view that the verbal content of the Torah - each

individual word as such - was communicated to Moses by God.  It is not

concerning the nature of the content of the Torah that he is uncertain

but concerning the means of communication of that content.  For anyone

who accepts the so-called "documentary hypothesis" in any form

whatsoever Rambam's view of "Torah min ha-Shamayim" creates a

difficulty.  The view of the overwhelming majority of Conservative

Jews who are knowledgeable on this topic and have made their views

known to the general public in writing is anchored to the "documentary

hypothesis" in some way or other.  That is why I wrote that "Rambam's

view on the coming into being of Torah might be problematic to us".

Albert Ringer continues:

The point Rambam seems to make might be that there is no difference in

Torah between the more abstract parts, open for philosophical

inspection, and the more material oriented parts, they each come from

God:

    There is no qualitative difference between a verse like ... "his

    wife's name was Mehetavel, daughter of Matred" [Genesis 36:39] and

    a   verse like "I am the Lord your God" [Exodus 20:2] or "Hear, O

    Israel: the Lord is our God, the Lord is One" [Deuteronomy 6:4].

I respond:

I am in complete agreement with Albert here: since Rambam accepts that

the verbal content of Torah has been communicated to us from God

through the agency of Moses, for him "there is no qualitative

difference between a verse" whose content seems to be mundane and a

verse whose content seems to be theologically sublime: "it all comes

from God and it is all God's perfect, pure and holy Torah of truth".

However, I do not understand how Albert thinks that this view of

Rambam will solve the problem of "Torah min ha-Shamayim" that Rambam

has created for us.

Albert concludes:

A large part of Maimonides writings have as their subject the problems

of interpretation of the more 'basic' language of Tanakh. Speaking of

God's limbs is perplexing to the student of classical philosophy.

I respond:

"Speaking of God's limbs is perplexing to the student of classical

philosophy" - and that is why Rambam devotes the greater part of the

first section of Moreh Nevukhim (The Guide for the Perplexed) to

"explaining" that the anthropomorphic content of the bible must not be

understood literally.

Zackary Berger writes:

It seems that you are inconsistent in your use of the Rambam. When he

conceives of tekhies hameysim solely in terms of spiritual

resurrection (in the Guide) you're with him, and you bring him as

support for such a view; but his later espousal of bodily resurrection

(in the Shmone Perakim) you term a response to contemporary critics.

However, when the Rambam brings literal transcription a condition for

Torah min hashomayim, you reject it out of hand as extra-Talmudic. But

so is any claim of (solely) spiritual resurrection, right? It seems we

Conservatives only follow Rambam's shito when it serves our

purposes...

I respond:

I am sorry if I gave the impression that I was "using" Rambam.  He is

probably the most illustrious rabbinic personality in post biblical

times and therefore, when his statements differ significantly with

classical Jewish thought or have engendered a significant development,

it seems necessary to elucidate.  It just so happens that Rambam's

view on "Olam ha-Ba" is the one that has influenced all succeeding

generations, including Conservative Jewish thought, even though it is

the complete opposite of what seems to be Talmudic thinking on this

topic.  However, I was not "recommending" his view: I was only trying

to be a teacher whose task it is to bring to the notice of the

students important and significant statements.  Whether I (or you)

agree with them or not is immaterial to this purpose.

Zackary's message contains a factual inaccuracy that I feel I should

point out less someone interpret my polite silence as endorsement.

Rambam's response to the criticism of his contemporaries as regards

his views concerning "Olam ha-Ba" is to be found in his "Essay on

Resurrection" [Ma'amar Techiyyat ha-Metim] (and not as Zachary wrote).

The criticism was vociferous and hardly couched in polite academic

language!  Rambam was excoriated for having introduced a completely

new philosophy of the afterlife which was directly contrary to

accepted teachings up to that point.  This essay has always been very

embarrassing for me to read: despite the fighting words, Rambam does

in fact try an elegant extrication of the kind we are so familiar with

today from politicians when caught out by the communications media in

some inconsistency: "My words have been misunderstood", "I have been

quoted out of context", and so forth.  "How can you possibly say that

I think thus when I have explicitly said the opposite?" is a recurring

theme - which did not succeed in pulling the wool of obfuscation over

the eagle eyes of his critics.  Anyone reading Ma'amar Techiyyat ha-

Metim will be no more certain of Rambam's true views than he was

before!

It is precisely because Rambam is so illustrious a rabbinic

personality that i feel that it is incumbent upon me to point out any

of his teachings that seem to create a difficulty for Conservative

thought, since this study forum is dedicated to "study in the climate

of Masorti (Conservative) Judaism".

Lest I be misunderstood let me clarify that Rambam is one of my few

great rabbinic "heroes" - but that does not prevent me sometimes

disagreeing with him!

John Wekselblatt writes:

With regard to the resurrection of the dead; an orthodox reb tells me

that for him the bones will take on flesh (and I guess be clothed)

according to the Gemara.  He also indicates that, again for him the

Ramchal, on this point is as interesting as the Rambam.  What does the

Ramchal say?

I respond:

The orthodox rabbi that you have quoted is following the pre-

Maimonidean take on this (as I explained in the original Shi'ur).

While the Talmudic statements are clear their meaning is not always

so.  I do not think that we would be very wrong if we were to guess

(as Sa'adyah Ga'on states explicitly) that the pre-Maimonidean view

was that people remain dead in their graves, but that at some

unidentified time in the future the dead will be physically

resurrected for final judgment, when some will be consigned to hell

and others to paradise.

Ramchal is the sobriquet of Rabbi Moshe Chayyim Luzzatto [Italy, 18th

century CE].  He was a prolific writer on many topics of Jewish

esotericism - he even claimed that some of his kabbalistic writings

were dictated to him by a "voice"!  His most famous work is "Mesillat

Yesharim" [The Path of the Upright], which is a moralistic treatise -

an exhortatory guide to people who wish to reach moral perfection from

the Jewish point of view.  John does not relate to which of Luzzatto's

many writings the rabbi was referring, so I cannot explain.  Since I

guess that the rabbi was probably referring to Mesillat Yesharim, I am

at a greater loss, since Ramchal's only reference there to Techiyyat

ha-Metim is in Chapter 26 where he explains that leading a life of

holiness leads to Resurrection.

Discussion on these topics is now closed.  Next week we shall continue

with the next mishnah of our chapter.

Shabbat Shalom to everybody.