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EU Integration. 1


First attaempts toward Integration. 1

Establishment of Coal and Steel Community. 2

The Project For A Political Community. 3

The Rome Treaties. 3

UK`s attitudes at the periphery of Rome Treaties. 4

The Early Years of EC – New Applicants Empty Chair Crisis. 5

11 MAY 1967. 6

Ending of Cold War and new Impetus of Enlargement 6

Post Soviet CEEC at the gate of enlargement of the Community. 7


EU Integration


The term Integration can be defined with a variety of meanings. It must be carefully instilled with significanse. For in connection with the European Unification process, at least three levels of `Integration` can be distinguished in the 1950s.

Firstly, it used to mean the process of regional economic integration in the narrower sence, normally as following an upward path. Here, the process of economic integration beginning at the stage of `commercial integration, that is, the allowedexchange of goods across regional or national frontiers. It is followed with free movement of the production factors labour and capital. Finally at the third stage comes integration of the economic and financial policies in Nation States, which in its turn constitutes a preliminary stage to general  political integration – say on the model of the supranational federation. Integration in this sense belonged among the central themes of the European unification movement in the late 1940s.

However, the concept of `Integration`, specifically in connection with the peactice objectives of the supranational European Coal and Steal Community, took on functional significance in the process of overcoming the Nation State principle and strenghtening European sovereignty. In Talcot Parsons` sense, `Integration` thus become, a `mode of relationship between the units of a system in virtue` of which these units work together in such a way as to prevent the systems decay and loss of capacity to maintain its stability, and promote its functioning as a unity.[1]

Both European politicians in the early days, and supporters of the functionalist theory many years later, argue on the card of functional, in a sense subversive, federalism, which would, starting with small initial steps, ultimately reach the goal of European sovereignty. The creation of ECSC was accordingly followed by the drafts of the further plans for scetoral integration of European agriculture, transport and energy.


First attaempts toward Integration

The post-war understanding of 1939-1945 is one strand of civic life which denotes Europeanness. Whether forgetting or remembering, we might expect that Europeans would be culturally identifiable through any attitudes they share towards history. This collective past is potentially an important marker of European identity. The thinking behind this approach suggests that one might locate Europe and that within it there have been common reactions to a heritage of violent conflict. But "It ishard to demonstrate that the return of memory (either before or after 1989) has contributed to the creation of a European cultural climate in which the rhetoric of nationalism has been re-legitimated. The fact that more Europeans were interested in issues related to the wartime past than ever before does not translate to a revival of the idea of the nation-state. Likewise it is tendentious to associate this shift in politics of memory with a decline in support of the EU."[2]

 The original impetus for the founding of (what was later to become) the European Union was the desire to repair Europe after the disastrous events of World War II, and to prevent Europe from ever again falling victim to the scourge of war. The EU has evolved from a trade body into an economic and political partnership.[3]


Immediately after post war period by the governments of the Western Europe were forced to draw closer together by the to try to find solutions for the problems of huge hollocusts remaining after war. The United States, whose support proved to be indispensable, made its help conditional upon a joint effort on the part of the part of the Europeans. The governments, however did not wish to go beyond cooperation between sovereign states.

So in order to benefit from the Marshall Plan the countries of Western Europe established the Organization  for Economic Co-operation(OEEC) in Paris on the 16 Aprill 1948. The OEEC did not, however, have the poer to harmonize the reconstruction plans which were implemented by each country independently from its partners.

In the diplomatic/military  sphere, the development of the cold war also led the countries of Western Countries to draw closer in order to benefit from American protection. Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary denounced the threat from Soviet Union and stated that: `the free nations of Western Europe must now draw closely together` . The Brussels Pact of 17 March 1948, signed by the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Nederlands and Luxemburg, chiefly entailed a promise of automatic mutual assistance should there be armed agression in Europe. Brussels Pact was not only a military  alliance but also, at the request of Benelux, the origin of regional organization. American participation was indispensable: It was requested by France and UK as soon as Brussels Pact was signed. The Standing Committe prepared a preliminary draft treaty which was then discussed with the Americans. The Atlantic Alliance of the 4 Aprill 1949 comprised, as well as  the USA and Canada, not only the Five of the Brussels Pact but also Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy and Portugal. Greece and Turkey, already recieving aid from the Americans, joined in 1952.

Thus, the organizations set up in the immediate post-war years under the pressure of necessity to deal with the serious problems of economic recunstruction and defence in Western Europe did not organizations relied essentially on intergovernmental cooperation.


Establishment of Coal and Steel Community


The organization of Europe in the sense of unification was indispensable. It could only be achieved within a new political structure. In this way states would more readlyagree to delegate some of their competence and powers in specific sectors. This was the solution chosen by Robert Schuman, Minister of Foreign Affairs, inspired by Jean Monnet, which he made  public on behalf of the French Government on 9 May 1950. He proposed to put `the whole Franco-German coal steel production under a single joint High Authority in an organization open  to the participation of the other countries of Europe`. Six countries signified their acceptance: France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Nederlands and Luxemburg. But the UK declined.

So it was a Community of Six which was established by the Treaty of Paris of 18 April 1951. The central body of ECSC was the High Authority, independent of the governments, instructed to implement the Treaty and directly exerting its powers over coal and steel undertakings. The States remained present on an account of the existence of alıcılar contact was maintained  between the two sectorsof coal and steel entrusted to the High Authority and the remainder of the economic activities of the member states.

In the opinion of Monnet and Schuman, the process was alıcılar progressive one: by creating de facto solidarities, sectoral integration would spread to an increasing number of economic and technical fields and would prepare the ground for the establishment of the future federation, but time would be needed to modify behaviour and change attitudes.


The Project For A Political Community


In 1952, only shortly after the ECSC Treaty came into force, a new idea arose; the creation of a joint European defence through the integration of national armed forces. The agreement to establish the European Defence Community based onthe institutional model of ECSC was signed at the end of May 1952 by six governments of the ECSC member states.[4]  Under the establishment of EDC laid France`s dilemma against German rearmament. Within EDC German army units would br integrated with those of other European nations. The plan for a joint European army clearly implied a measure of supranational authority and, therefore, a surrender of national sovereignty. Britain refused to countenance that. However, after a period of time Belgian Foreign Minister Eden made a plan which, Britain could play a part in these latter communities without being comitted to the obligations of memebership by restrucuting the Council of Europe the parent body for the Coal and Steel and Defence Communities.

With the Draft Treaty on 10 March 1953 the Community was to take over the power and Competence of the ECSC and EDC within a period  of two years from the constitution of the People`s Chamber. The French government now advocated merely a coordination of ECSC and EDC with much more limited democratic control than envisaged in the Draft Treaty or by other member states. Thus EDC was going to defeat gradually.




The Rome Treaties


When the creating the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community came into force on January 1 1958, this marked as the biggest success to date for the many attempts at the unification of western Europe       

The failure of the EDC Treaty in 1954 caused the crisis in the movement for European unification. In this emergence period three political personalities were behind the initatives for the continuation of the discussion on integration. They pursued different aims and methods.

One of the driving forces was Jean Monnet. Together with his staff he had worked out plan that envisaged extending unification in the field of atomic energy and placing it under High Authority.  This idea of involving the new technology of the time in the process of integration. Consequently on May 20, 1955, the benelux countries proposed to the other members of the ECSC to create on the one hand a European atomic organization, on the other hand a customs union.

The conference of foreign ministers at Messina began in unfavourable circumstances. `MessinaResolution` tried to do justice to all the strands of integration but it could not eliminate  the real differences of opinion and interest regarding further steps towards integration. At the end of conference there were 4 names considering to lead intergovernmental comittee. The former president of the High Authority, Jean Monnet; Paul Van Zeeland, Belgium`seyahat acentası foreign secretary untill April 1954, the former Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Pella and Paul-Henry Spaak, who had been engaged in the integration process since end of the war. The six governments finally chose Spaak for leading the comittee.

The Intergovernmental negotiations were officially opened on June 26, 1956, in Brussels under the chairmanship Spaak. The crucial points were set by the debate on Euratom in the French National Assembly in July 1956.

A further significant step towards the signing of the Treaty of Rome was the debate on the Common Market in the French National Assembly in January 1957. 25 March 1957 the Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) are signed by the Six Member States. [5]

The Political concept of economic integration underlying the EEC Treaty was developed independently from ECSC Treaty. The contents of the EEC Treaty were influenced basically by three different economic concepts:


1.                 The Liberal, free trade concept that aimed at freeing markets from protectionism

2.                 The German market economy concept that envisaged free competition at internal market

3.                 The French version of the market economy concept, which has got to a  strong element of possibility  for government intervention


The situation was similar for some other areas like regional policy. In general it became apparent that the more sensitive an area was for the national states, the more difficult it was to agree common policies.[6]


          UK`s attitudes at the periphery of Rome Treaties


      The unsuccessful attempt of the Six to include the British in the process of the integration after the Conferences of Messina. British Government had found its way to send a `representative` to Brussels in July 1955. The end came at the beginning of November 1955 in the first session of the expert group. Spaak challanged the British delegate to express the clear support of his government to participation in the customs union. British representative, Brethertont was unable to give an answer owing to the ambivalent attitude in London. Therefore, Spaak made it absolutely clear that in future only those states should take part in the discussions who were prepared to accept the prposal for acustoms union.

      After this withdrawal the British Goverment was faced, in the event of a market of this Six becoming a reality, with the alternative of being economically isolated from the rest of Western Europe or having to make sacrifices in the area of foreign trade in order to come to some arrangement with the Six. Neverthless, in the meantime Britain, using the OEEC as alıcılar forum, introduced the proposal for a European Free Trade Area into the discussion in July 1956.


          The Early Years of EC – New Applicants Empty Chair Crisis


      General De Gaulle was the prominent person in the strands of further development in the EC. His proposal for a `Union of States` was an important episode in the building of the Europe.

      The international situstion between 1958 and `61 was marked by growing tension in Europe following Soviet threats to Berlin and lack of certainty in American policy. On the other hand, the success of the EEC was becoming more assured. First step in the freeing of trade had been taken on 1 January 1959, and on 12 May the decision was taken to speed up the application of the Treaty of Rome. Moreover, the foundations of a common agricultural policy were agreed after difficult negotiations and the first regulations adopted on 14 January 1962.

      Britain, which had not originally wished to join  the Six, set up the European Free Trade Association to counterbalance them ,but then applied to join the EEC in July 1961.

      Coming back to De Gaull`s ideas on Europe, had been critical of the Community method. He deemed it indispensable for the building of  Europe to begin with politics and not economics. De Gaulle wanted to build a `European Europe`, less bound to the United States, and would be able to defend its own interest in NATO. He had already decided to set up  a French nuclear force in order to refuse stocking of American nuclear arms. However, the attitudes of France`s partners were quite different in the formation of further structural integration. Italy and Benelux countries were in favor of instutional system which offered them guarantees. They wanted more federationist system in  EC institutios. Therefore they all gave absolute prority to the NATO.

      On the other hand in taking account Germany, seemed closest to Gaulist thought, by virtue of Chancellor Adenauer. He concerned about US and UK uncertainity in the face of Soviet menace. He wished that France and Germany consolidate their point of view across within the framework of NATO.

Thus the beginning of failure emerged. Political Union was, then, probably not achivable because of the fundamentally opposed ideas of the member states regarding Europe`s structure, direction, and dimensions. It was at this time that De Gaulle, eager to reach a conclusion and fearing that the concessions made by French diplomatsmight ruin his plan, decided to put his partners on the spot by hardeninig his position. On 18 January a new text was communicated to the Preparatory Committee by its chairman, Christioan Fouchet. This text was scrutinized and corrected by de Gaulle himself. It was proposed that the scope of the Union should be extended tp the economic field but without any guarantee of the respect for the existing treaties.

      The basic problem, however, remained the precondition of British participation, on which the Nederlands and Belgium continued to insist. If a supranational Europe could not be achieved, a Europe of states with Great Britain would be preferable to one without her.

If to sum up, causes of Failure were fundamentally opposed ideas of the Member Statesregarding Europe`seyahat acentası structure, directions and dimensions. In the case of results, the failure of the project for Union States meant that was no political co-operation in the Communities throughout the whole of the 60s. There were no more summits (apart from alıcılar very formal one in Rome in 1967) and the periodic meetings of Foreign Ministers.

      The necessity of political cooperation was recognized at the Hague Summit in 1969. This was becoming possible because Britain`s entry had been accepted and defence issues set to one side.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

      In the 1960s, informal integration could be equated in alıcılar fairly way with the mobility of people, capital and, more importantly, goods. Though the Treaty of Rome included alıcılar full chapter on services, European economic integration in the 60s  was, the firs foremost, about creating a `Common Market` for goods.[7]

First Enlargement Successes


11 MAY 1967

            The United Kingdom re-applied to join the Community. It was followed by Ireland and Denmark and, a little later, by Norway.[8] London`s application reflected the reorientation of British policy towrds the continent. Various factors were working in that direction: the evolution of trading patterns showed a decline in trade with the Commonwealthy; on the strategic level, a relative aloofness towards the US had come about.


          Ending of Cold War and new Impetus of Enlargement


German reunification

The first spectacular effect of the 1989 revolutions was to coming down of the Berlin Wall and the fast re unification of Germany. German re-unification involved instant, automatic enlargement of the Community to include former GDR. However, the lowering of wage rate differentials between West and East Germany, levied to Germany problems in terms of labour and wage markets. Thus transfer from West to East Germany amounted 79$ bn in 1991 and some 105$ in 1992. The German lesson is the high cost of economic and monetary union between regions characterised by different development levels; unification had to be quick due to fears-totally unwarranted as it turned out. Three main issues can perhaps be isolated from the often confused debateon the question of the new Germany in Europe:

·        Does the larger Germany fundamentally unbalance a Community that to a large extent had been based on the image of equality between France and Germany?

·        Are Germany`seyahat acentası economic problems and the cost of unification too great to allow the Community to develop positively?

·        Is there a danger that Germany, considering the mounting domestic problems that have followed the unification process, will turn its back on the project of EuropeanUnion as envisaged by Maastricht?


Post Soviet CEEC at the gate of enlargement of the Community


The end of cold war, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the peaceful revolutions in the Central and Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, but also outbreak of war in the Middle East and on the Balkans fall into this period. The turmoil in the world  politics the turn of the decade  affected the Communitys and its Member states immediately and directly institutions.[9] Collapsingrmer Soviet Union in 1991 – the European Union is confronted with geopolitical challenges requiring the development of new policies, and instruments, towards a group of countries. On this occasion, it must respond by offering a perspective of integration, based on a progressive approach adapted to the situation of the specific countries.

The European Union has a particular interest in the region, because of its geographic proximity to Member States and candidate countries. This interest will be even higher following the future enlargements of the European Union, which will bring these countries even closer to the our borders. Stabilization of the region would bring real benefits both to the region and to the EU. Instability is very costly for all concerned. The EU has spent enormous sums on repairing the results of instability - over 7bn$ since 1991 (details at Annex I) without counting the cost of refugees within EU Member States or of other operations (UN, OSCE, NATO…) - a bill which is continuing to rise in the present circumstances. It is clearly more in the interest of the countries of the region, and of the European Union to which they will ultimately belong, that even a fraction of these sums should be spent instead on their political and economic development.

Countries of South-Eastern Europe have, for the last decade, enjoyed a great deal of support from the international community in general and the European Union in particular. Despite this, they have continued to suffer from inter-ethnic tensions and conflict. There has been a lack of substantial political or economic development. Despite major efforts to stabilise individual countries and the region as a whole, the progress made has been fragile. This is clear from the degree to which it has been jeopardised by the current conflict in Kosovo. The region is now at a turning point. A new approach to peace and stability in the wider region, involving both the countries of the wider region and the European Union, is urgently needed. At this time of tremendous upheaval and uncertainty in the region, the EU has a responsibility to contribute to the resolution both of the immediate instability and, in the longer term, to the general stabilisation and development of the region.[10]

A substantial period of transiton is also required for what is the second major obstacle towards enlargement, namely the possible damaging effects on the economies of the current Community members of the accessionn of CEE. There are three aspects to this problem. The first is competition from the East; immigration is another issue; finally, the West will have to make substantial transfers to the East if its help is to be significant.

While economic worries are large and are at least in part openly mentioned as obstacles to accession of CEE to the Community






1.                  Stephen. Martin, The Construction of Europe. Essays in Honour of Emile Noel,             Werner, Abelshauser, `Integration a la Carte The Primacy of Politics and the   Economic Integration of Western Europe in the 1950s`, Kluwer Academic Publishers,    1994

2.                   Roy Roys, `The Dynamics of European Union`, Pierre Gerbert, The Origins: Early        Attempts And The Emergence of the Six (1945-1952) , 1987, Trans-European Policy       Studies Association

3.                  Martin Westlake, The European Union beyond Amsterdam: New Concepts of European Integration, London: Routledge, 1998

4.                  William Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration, The Royal Institute if   International Affairs, 1992

5.                  Stephen. Martin, The Construction of Europe. Essays in Honour of Emile Noel,Roger    Morgan, Thomas, Christiansen; The New Germany and European Union after       Maastricht: The Difficult Way of Ahead, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994

6.                  Globalisation, European Integration and the Persistence of European Social Models, C.             Hay,       M. Watson and D. Wincott, Working Paper 3/99, 02/07/2002

7.         Baldwin, R., Francois, J. & Portes, R. (1997), ‘The costs and benefits of eastern

            enlargement: the impact on the EU and central Europe’, Economic Policy, vol.24

8.  14.11.2002


9.  2.12.2002




11. 2/12/2002


12. - 21.11.02


13. 03/12/2002



14. 17.11.2002



15. 17/11/2002




[1] Stephen. Martin, The Construction of Europe. Essays in Honour of Emile Noel, Werner.

Abelshauser, `Integration a la Carte The Primacy of Politics and the Economic Integration of Western Europe in the 1950s`, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, p. 4.

[2] Roy Roys, `The Dynamics of European Union`, Pierre Gerbert, The Origins: Early Attempts And The Emergence of the Six (1945-1952) , 1987, Trans-European Policy Studies Association

[3] , 14.11.2002

[4] Martin Westlake, The European Union beyond Amsterdam: New Concepts of European Integration, London: Routledge, 1998

[5]  2/12/2002

[6] Hanns Jürgen Küsters, The Treaties of Rome(1955-1957), pp 92





[7] William Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration, The Royal Institute if International Affairs, p 33

[8] 2/12/2002



[9] Stephen. Martin, The Construction of Europe. Essays in Honour of Emile Noel,Roger Morgan, Thomas Christiansen; The New Germany and European Union after Maastricht: The Difficult Way of Ahead, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, p.114


[10] 17.11.2002