1926-
Australian-Professor at the University of Sydney
Armstrong wants to refine behaviorism in his own version of materialism
Armstrong wants to take a scientific approach
Question: what is the advantage-in forming a theory-of using a scientific approach?
Armstrong looking at what he takes to be a consensus among scientists:
137, 1: Complete account of man can be given in purely physico-chemical terms
Armstrong a kind of compatibilist: what kind of view of mind goes along here?
Armstrong: materialist or physicalist account of the mind.
Sciences that support this view: molecular biology and neurophysiology
Scientists who reject this view do so only moral or religious, not scientific grounds
Argument based on consensus among the learned
Question: how valuable is a consensus among the learned?
Armstrong justifies relying on this consensus: after the 17th century-greater development of scientific knowledge
Science gives us a method for settling disputed questions (138,1)
138, 1
Of course such a consensus can be mistaken. Sometimes it has been mistaken. But, granting fallibility, what better authority have we than such a consensus?
Contrasts science with philosophy, literary criticism, morals, religion-no such consensus has been achieved.
138,1
Must we not then attach a peculiar authority to the discipline that can achieve a consensus? And if it presents us with a certain vision of the nature of man, is this not a powerful reason for accepting that vision?
Armstrong: scientific view gives us the best understanding of the nature of man.
Turn in argument: 138, 2 now what kind of physicalist, materialist, physico-chemical doctrine of mind can we have?
Armstrong first looks at J.B. Watson's doctrine of behaviorism.
Remember Ryle's rejection of the Cartesian "ghost in the machine"?
That follows suit with behaviorism.
138, 2 The mind was not something behind the behavior of the body, it was simply part of that physical behavior. My anger with you is not some modification of a spiritual substance which somehow brings about aggressive behavior; rather it is the aggressive behavior itself; my addressing strong words to you, striking you, turning my back on you and so on. Thought is not an inner process that lies behind, and brings about, the words I speak and write: it is my speaking and writing. The mind is not an inner arena, it is an outward act.
Question: what do you think of this behaviorist view of the mind?
Armstrong takes up some problems with this bare bones behaviorism:
One: what if there are mental processes going on with no accompanying behavior?
You are angry-but you don't show it.
Behaviorists tinkering with the theory: introducing things like: a disposition to behave.
If you're angry you are disposed to exhibit anger behavior even if you don't actually exhibit it.
Analogy with brittle glass-it's not in a state of shattering, but if you struck it lightly, it would.
Armstrong: when the dust all settles, it is obvious that there is something going on in me which is my thought.
140, 1 Moves to a critique of behaviorism: Behaviorism is certainly wrong, but not altogether wrong.
Armstrong on mental states: mind = inner cause of certain behavior.
Thought is not speech under suitable circumstances. Rather it is something within the person which, in suitable circumstances, brings about speech.
Question: is this an effective explanation?
Materialist explanation-not Descartes' pineal gland but:
The sole cause of mind-betokening behavior in man and the higher animals is the physic-chemical workings of the central nervous system.
Identification of mental states with central nervous system states.
Analogy with the brittleness of the glass-the brittleness is a certain state of the molecular organization of the glass.
Dispositions = states
Key paragraph: 141, 1
The behaviorists were wrong to identify the mind with behavior. They were not so far off the mark when they tried to deal with cases where mental happenings occur in the absence of behavior by saying that these are dispositions to behave.
But in order to reach a correct view, I am suggesting, they would have to conceive of these dispositions as actual states of the person who has the disposition, states that have actual power to bring about behavior in suitable circumstances.
But to do this is to abandon the central inspiration of behaviorism: that in talking about the mind we do not have to go behind outward behavior to inner states.
Armstrong--ultimately an anti-behaviorist: mind behavior
But--influenced by behavior: a mental state is a state of the person apt for producing certain ranges of behavior.
Dialectic (calls it Hegel--but it's not Hegel's dialectic)
Thesis--original position
Its opposite: antithesis
Put them together = synthesis
Question: What do you think of that dialectic?
Thesis: mind as spirit, ghost in the machine
Antithesis: Behaviorism: no mind, only behavior
Synthesis: 141, 2
Mind is a properly conceived as an inner principle but a principle that is identified in terms of the outward behavior it is apt for bringing about.
Question: What does this mean?
Mind is inner, but we know about it through outer manifestations
Armstrong's project: a materialist theory of mind
Rest of the paper--proposing an objection and then meeting it.
Criticism: looks at inner v. outer, first-person, other-person accounts
Behaviorism works well for other-person accounts
Your own mind is different
Armstrong's approach--fits other-person cases well.
Inner cause--the mind, identifiable by behavior.
What about for us: generally, we appear to be conscious and have experiences
Question: do we ever have a sense of ourselves as automated beings?
Armstrong's example: driving a car for a long time.
Ultimately: consciousness--a perception or awareness of the state of our own mind.
Inner sense: ability to choose among different mental states.
Ultimately here: no bar to identifying inner states with purely physical states of the central nervous system.
143, 2
Consciousness of our own mental state becomes simply the scanning of one part of our central nervous system by another. Consciousness is a self-scanning mechanism in the central nervous system.
Conclusion--hasn't really proven his point. Just shows that physicalism, and his interpretation of it is "an exciting and plausible intellectual option."
Question 3, pg. 144
Suppose the materialist explanation of consciousness is true. What explanation would materialists give for basic human experiences such as being happy, being sad, having a purpose in life, falling in love, being afraid, and so forth? Would all of these experiences be reduced to mere states of the brain? Why or why not? Does materialism offer an adequate explanation of these experiences?
