Charles Campbell, (1897-1974), professor at the University of Glasgow.
Campbell looking at moral freedom.
Campbell starts out with good philosophical advisory:
When you try to solve a philosophical problem-make sure you know what you're talking about
Carefully formulate the problem to get it down to size
Question: how would we do that here?
For Campbell-the kind of freedom of the will he is concerned with is the one that is a precondition for moral responsibility.
So: what kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility.
Question: why is freedom necessary for moral responsibility?
Campbell's focus: look at acts where we can and cannot attribute moral praise or blame to agents.
Question: what does it mean to choose something freely?
Campbell's emphasis is on Inner Acts--mental acts!
If you intend to do wrong, but circumstances keep you from doing wrong-your actions are morally blameworthy.
Question: does the concept of "moral luck" make sense to you?
To count here: The individual is the sole author of the act.
We're only praise or blameworthy for actions to the degree that we are responsible for the act.
Also: We did the action though we "could have acted otherwise"
If we can't help but do it, we're not really to blame!
Question: can we "choose otherwise" than we do?-key to having free will!
Campbell wants this ability to be Categorical: not: we could have chosen differently under different circumstances, but we could have chosen differently in this particular situation.
The kind of freedom required to justify moral responsibility: It is that a man can be said to exercise free will in a morally significant sense only insofar as his chosen act is one of which he is the sole cause or author, and only if-in the straightforward, categorical sense of the phrase-he 'could have chosen otherwise.'
Question: do you see how Campbell tries to clarify the nature of the problem before he attempts to answer the question?
Mutatis mutandis -the things needing to be changed have been changed
If we are able to resist temptation--that's evidence of free will.
Campbell wants a phenomenological analysis-how does it appear to our own consciousness
Question: what might be a problem with a phenomenological analysis?
It appears to us when we make a choice that we are exercising our own free will.
Externally, we may be convinced of determinism, but internally, it looks like we are freely making choices.
Question: What are potential problems with this claim?
Campbell wants to shift the burden of proof:
Instead of the libertarian having to prove she is right in the face of overwhelming deterministic evidence, the determinist ought to have to prove he is right.
Problem: we can't eliminate a feeling of free will from our own "inner experience."
Is that just an illusion?
Campbell looks at two claims:
One, that everything is predictability and
Two: it is meaningless (27,1) to talk about free will.
Predictability: idea that everything is predictable, hence determined.
We look at our friends: we can more or less predict what they're going to do.
Our teetotaling friend isn't likely to turn into a drunk.
Our wives aren't going to pass up the hat store.
You would be surprised if things turned out unexpectedly.
Question: What about a sporting event: we know the team the experts predict to win will generally win?
Campbell looking at cases where we ought to do A, but feel like doing B
Freedom of the agent is the freedom to pick A over B or not.
Campbell argues that most situations are highly predictable: we can make judgments about what someone will do based upon what we understand to be their character, but that doesn't overrule his theory.
Question: what is character? What is it to act "in character"?
What about those rare situations that call for free will:
Campbell not looking at a "freedom of caprice"-anything goes, you could do anything.
Campbell wants a third alternative between: either everything is determined, or some things are purely a matter of chance
Is it intelligible to talk about free will?
> unintelligibility: another philosophical ploy: say I just can't understand your position.
What you say is meaningless.
Some say: the concept of free will is unintelligible.
Campbell argues that free will is a sensible concept if you view it not from the standpoint of an external observer but from the point of view of inner experience. (29,1)
The Inner experience of the practical consciousness in its actual functioning.
We observe ourselves making decisions.
There is no difficult understanding what this means.
For example: The act of moral decision in the fact of moral temptation.
Campbell says that the self is more than just its character 29, 2--its tendency to act in certain ways.
29,2 30-1 & 2 Campbell closes introducing a new term: creative activity, according to which, nothing determines that act save the agent's doing of it …
Discussion Questions
1. What is moral effort?
2. What is inner experience?
3. Does it make sense to talk about this creative activity?
