Former professor at Princeton University
1952 book: Religion and the Modern Mind
Problem of Free Will
Argument for Determinism:
Because all natural events are caused and thus, in principle, predictable
And, all human choices are natural events
Therefore: all human choices are caused and thus in principle predictable
Determinism: since they are predictable than, in principle, we can know in advance the actions of any individual, given sufficient information
Therefore, we do not freely choose our actions.
Question: what do you think of this argument?
Key Problem with Determinism: if all our actions a determined by prior causes:
Are we responsible for any good or bad actions we do?
Stace’s view: compatibilism or soft determinism
All our actions have prior causes, however, we still have a sensible capacity for free will.
Opens talking about rise of Scientific Naturalism: every event has a cause
253: The old religious foundations have largely crumbled away, and it may well be thought that the edifice build upon them by generations of men is in danger of total collapse.
Question: typical mistake here:
determinism = naturalism
free will = religious outlook
What’s wrong with this equation?
Naturalism: every event has a natural cause
Theism: an omniscient and omnipotent being knows and controls all
How does the second view give us free will?
Predestination–Calvin and Luther: Protestant Reformation: no free will!
Stace’s focus: morality
If we have no freedom, then how can we do anything different?
How can we be held morally responsible for our actions?
How does this work in actual practice.
Ask a determined determinist if he or she is free for dinner.
Stace: free will v. determinism debate is a verbal dispute
A question of semantics
Question: what are semantics?
Verbal dispute: if you say: the definition of man is a five-legged animal
Look around: no five-legged animals.
Therefore man does not exist!
Problem here: wrong definition.
253: Problem of free will is verbal in the same way
We are assuming an incorrect definition of free will.
There’s nothing in the world that answers to that description
So we say: there’s no free will.
Problem: assumption the free will and determinism are mutually exclusive
We either have one, or the other.
Free will incorrectly defined as indeterminism.
There is a certain amount of indeterminism in current physics–quantum mechanics
But that doesn’t apply to this question.
Question: why not?
Stace goes through a list of cases where we see someone acting freely and someone not:
Case 1: Going without food:
Unfree:
Go without food because lost in a desert
Case 2 Stealing
Taking someone under a threat of a beating
Case 3 Signing a confession
Police beat the confession out of him
Case 4 Leaving the Office
Because forcibly removed
Free:
Gandhi fasting to free India
Stealing bread because hungry
Signing the confession because he wanted to tell the truth
Because Smith wanted to get lunch
256: What is the difference between the acts which are freely done and those which are not
Acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent. Acts not freely done are those whose immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent.
Question: what does this mean?
Stace says it is nonsense to deny free will, so described
Is Stace really describing free will?
Aristotle: what about in-between cases, are they coerced or not
Question: could you give an example?
Free will is a condition for moral responsibility
Stace says he gives a sufficient basis for both.
Can’t punish people for what they couldn’t have done otherwise.
on the other hand: 257
You do not excuse a man for doing a wrong act because, knowing his character, you felt certain beforehand that he would do it. Nor do you deprive a man of a reward or prize because, knowing his goodness or his capabilities, you felt certain beforehand that he would win it.
Question of the justification of punishment
Remember: Skinner thinks punishment is worthless!
Stace: punishment is only justified either if it will correct the wrong doers own character or deter other people from doing similar acts.
Example: giving a child a mild beating for telling a lie.
Why: to influence his personality
Supply a missing cause or motive in the shape of pain or the fear of future pain if he repeats his untruthful behavior.
257 You assume that his actions are determined by causes, but that the usual causes of truth-telling do not in him produce their usual effects. You therefore supply him with an artificially injected motive, pain and fear, which you think in the future will cause him to speak truthfully.
Question: what do you think about this?
Stace compares this with fertilizing roses to produce larger blooms.
Conclusion: moral responsibility is not only consistent with determinism, but requires it
Our behavior has to be causally determined for any punishment to be justified.
257 If human actions and volitions were uncaused, it would be useless either to punish or reward, or indeed to do anything else to correct people’s bad behavior.
If they are behaving randomly nothing would influence them.
Question: what does the word “capricious” mean?
Do you agree or disagree with Stace?
