Essay Test on Part I

-What is the nature of the empirical basis of scientific knowledge?
 
 

"It is part of my thesis that all our knowledge grows only through the correcting of our mistakes" (Karl Popper, 1965)
 
 

The philosophers Popper, Hanson, Shapin, and Oakley’s are all answering the same question: "What is the empirical basis of scientific knowledge?" Each philosopher has approached the question from a different perspective: logical, psychological, social, and cultural. The different perspectives are not compatible with each other; therefore, modification of the some in light of others is needed to relate them to each other.

Popper’s logical perspective does not deny that observation can give us "knowledge concerning facts and that we can become aware of the facts only by observation" (Kourany, p. 76). Popper rejected the way other philosophers proposed the question about the nature of the empirical basis of scientific knowledge "what does our knowledge rest on?" (p. 76). According to Popper the perception of the personal experience of the observation is "now a thing of the past" (p. 76). Popper concluded that observational statements enter justification in relation with other basic statements and not by direct observation. Poppers’ rejection and attack of inductivism, subjectivism, and idealism may have contributed to his view of the observation.

According to Hanson, the observer is "the man who sees in familiar objects what no one else has seen before" (p. 97). Hanson’s view of the observation as a personal perception ignored the validity and the basis of establishing statements. If Hanson was right then how can we explain and differentiate between what a mentally hallucinating person and a well person is seeing? On the other hand, Popper saw the basis and the validity of the statement but not the perception of the observation. Popper's clear focus on the justification of statements had led him to lose other sides of the perception of observation. Furthermore, Hanson's view leads to many worlds of different realities and truths.

According to Shapin's social perspective, the statements of scientific knowledge result only from carefully constructed and confidently expressed reports. Shapin states that "speech about natural reality is a means of generating knowledge about reality" (p. 100). In his article, "Pump and circumstance: Robert Boyle’s Literary Technology," Shapin did not mention anything about scientific reliability or validity. Shapin’s non-justified and well-expressed reports will not survive so long in the scientific world because it will not be testable, beneficial, or replicable.

Oakley’s cultural perspective of the nature of scientific knowledge dealt with masculine bias of the scientific method and cultural sensitivities (which may include political point of view, race, and ethnicity). At the same time, she did not provide any other reliable method other than the interview. Oakley ignored many pieces of literature about interviewing techniques that did not match her personal view. The interview technique of deep friendship will result in statements that may not be testable or reliable.

Popper and Hanson agreed on the important role that observation plays in scientific knowledge, but when they analyzed their logical and psychological perspectives they argued about the role of the direct observation, the justification, and testability of the observation. Hanson’s direct observation was justified by the observer’s unique perception and experience, while Oakley’s interview technique was based on deep relationship and honest communication. Both Hanson's and Oakely's perspectives will result in scientific observational data, which may not correspond to other scientists’ observational data. Shapin did not care where the observation came from or what theoretical background it had; All he saw was the communication of the observation. "The use of . . . public language was, in Boyle’s work, essential to the creation of both the knowledge and the social solidarity of the experimental community" (p. 115). On the other hand, Hanson was concerned with the origin of the observation, which is the direct observation according to the personal experience and knowledge. Shapin’s view of the observation would not cope with Hanson’s view.

Inspired and Modified

From:

Hanson
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Popper
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Oakley
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Shapin
 
 
 
 
 
 

Popper, Hanson, Shapin, and Oakley all looked at human scientific knowledge, but every one of them saw something different. Is there any perfect scientist who could see every thing in one glance? Is there completeness of any thing except God? Is there any scientist who gained the whole scientific knowledge of all the disciplines or of one discipline? If they were so different and incompatible, then how could we read and understand them under one title "the empirical basis of scientific knowledge?"

Looking at the work of all these scientists and modifying it from a holistic approach, we can develop a comprehensive model of the nature of scientific knowledge (Figure-1). The process of knowledge development begins with the direct OBSERVATION. Then the OBSERVATION is processed by the LOGICAL testing. If the OBSERVATION meets all the requirements of the LOGICAL testing then it goes to the "COMMUNICATION AND PRESENTATION OF KNOWLEDGE". All these steps are influenced by WITHIN CULTURE NORMS. This model represents the natural way of generating scientific knowledge.

First, the reports of observation must present direct observations, and it must not go beyond the direct observation. There is no doubt that the observation will reflect the personal knowledge, experience, and perception of the observer. This part is modified from Hanson. Secondly, the observation has to go to the logical testing of reliability and validity. It also needs to be accepted by the scientific community and has to survive over periods of time. As Popper suggested all knowledge should be questioned to prevent the infinite regress.

Third, the logical observation is communicated to the scientific community. Everybody knows that the world is full of scientific knowledge. If that knowledge is not will presented literary, materially, and socially as Shapin suggested it well not be considered a useful knowledge because no one will know about it, test it, question it, or replicate it. Finally, the observation is generated within the culture of men and women all contributing to the body of knowledge. In addition, the community and the culture will influence every step of the Holistic Model of the nature of scientific knowledge.

Essay Test on Part II

-Defending justification as a validation method of scientific knowledge?
 
 

"Poppers final position is that he acknowledge that it is impossible to discriminate science from non-science on the basis of the falsifibility of the scientific statement alone" (Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1999)

The Philosophy of science has been trying to distinguish between valid science and non-valid science. This paper will discuss different approaches to the validation of science: falsificationism; conventialism; and the methodology of scientific research programes; against Rudolf Carnap’s Justification.It will be shown that Carnap’s theory of validation of the scientific knowledge(degree of confirmation) is consistenet and preferable than the others.

First, science can be validated by follow Carnap’s justificationism which will drive us to a conclusion of a probably true science. Carnap linked non-direct observation to direct observation and theory. Carnap looked at the product of science which the observation. Justification went beyond Popper’s falsification to see the other side, which is justification or the degree of confirmation theory. Carnap’s approach resembles the endless human struggle in searching for a confirmed (probable) truth.

Carnap distinguish between empirical terms and theoretical terms. Empirical laws can receive a direct confirmation by empirical observations, while the theoretical laws are indirectly justified. The scientist tests the empirical laws that are consequences of the empirical law. Carnap focused on the probability as a degree of confirmation. According to Carnap the probability of a statement is the degree of confirmation the empirical evidence gives us to the statements using an inductive logic to test the statement using an inductive logic to test the relation between statements and evidence. By doing so Carnap solve the problem raised by David Hume’s analysis of induction?????. In justificationism we can compare alternative theories by evaluating its degree of confirmation. The limitations of justificationism are that a single negative observation would falsify the theory.

Popper viewed each theory as prohibitive, which means that it forbids particular events of occurrences. Then the theory can be tested and falsified, but it will never be verified or proven. A theory that withstand rigorous testing for however time will receive a high measure of corroboration. This theory will be kept until it is falsified or surpassed by a better theory. Popper uses deductive testing and denies inductive logic. In addition, Popper’s distinguishes between the logic and the applied methodology of falsifibility. Logically, a one cpunter-instant is enough to falsify the whole theory, while practically a single counter-instance is never enough methodologically to falsify a theory.

Here Popper accepts the limitation of his theory, instead of leaving to critics, he does it, and then he just accepts it.

Popper’s rejection of the observation as a report of registered sensation has created a problem to his theory. If the observation is theory laden and it only means a description of what observed as interpreted by the observer according to the observer theoretical framework or logic. Poppor’s propose that the observation can not be confirmed or verified by the experience. Here there is a problem of consistency of Popper’s theory. To test a theory, it should be determined if the basic statement (proposition) were true, falsify it, are in fact true or false (meaning whether the falsifiers are actual falsifiers). Then how it could be known, If such basic statement can not be verified by experience? According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ""Popper'’ final position is that he acknowledge that it is impossible to discriminate science from non-science on the basis of the falsifiability of the scientific statements alone.... Hence his final concern is to outline conditions which indicate when such modification is genuinely scientific, and it is merely ad hoc." This is a big shift in Popper’s own position and is an indicator that his falsificationism is no better than verificationism in the final analysis. In fact, there are doubts that his final modifications were ad hoc and not scientific ones.

Popper denied the observation definition of Carnap’s and the logical positivists and he goes on to propose that the start of science be with a problem rather than an observation. This has led to the view of his Falsificationism theory as a problem solving technique rather than a theory of scientific method theory. Following on the above discussion about Popper’s view of the observation (which contradict Carnap’s and that he used in the fasification process), We can see that what Popper did is that he proposed something then could not use it, so he finds away that allow him to say "we need to start from some where" instead of saying there is some thing wrong with my view, In a Popperian thinking this will lead to an infinte regress and we need to start from some where. Popper view of the observation had caused falsificationism itself to be already false.

Carnap was preferable because his view the observation as meaningful and it can be proved by ways of the experience was used through his theory. Carnap view of the degree of confirmation was consistenet with all his other views and his analysis of the inductive logic. Carnap’s rule or statement was applied in real practice and used in meta-mathematical research. While Popper himself admitted that his falsificationism will not work as mentioned above.

Because Pierre Duhem and Imre Lakatos are historians and share their views about the process of validating science, the pros and cons of each will be presented first followed by the dialogue of Carnap versus Duhem and Lakatos.

According to Duhem’s conventionalism, theories are not purely chosen on empirical grounds. Rather, theories are chosen on convention, based on some characteristics as simplicity. The hypothesis is tested in the context of a whole system of accepted theories. He did not go to decide what is the observation (the product) but he goes on to the process of the observation of facts and the interpretation of observed facts. It is also hypothesized that it can not rule out all possibilities of theories because there are no crucial experiments. The choice of theories is based on their good sense.

Duhemian science seems to be loose because it starts with unclear concept of the observation and ends with a non clear good sense. The observation is not clear, what is it. How we view the observation, direct and indirect? (Knowing the product before the process).

Lakatos’s research programme proposes that theories have a hard core and it is surrounded by a protective belt that can be altered and changed. The plan of changing the belt is the positive heuristic. The alteration may be novel prediction (progressive) or degenerative. The changes involve always a group of theories. The problem here is the novel predictions, is it valuable in and of it self or as a mean of achieving other goals? It seem that the novel predictions are important in it self which will lead to a science of arbitraness. Another question to Lakatos is how to group theories into respective research programme?

Popper in his book "The poverty of Historicism" argues strongly the failure of historicists to recognize the different between scientific laws and trends. "The habit of confusing trends with laws, together with the initiative observation of trends such as technical progress, inspired the central doctrines of …historicism" (The poverty of Historicism, P. 116).

Duhem’s and Lakatos’s view does not value the logic or the contents of the theory. It is all a social process and it ends with the unclear good sense or novel prediction. Duhem’s and Lakats’s view makes the scientific method so loose, moody, blind, and has nothing to do with the truth. How could we discuss the process of a product with out having any value of the product, then what it is all about, what would be our results and conclusions if the product were simply any thing?

Carnap was more preferable because he draw a clear picture of his degree of confirmation. Carnap described the logic of how we judge theories taking in consideration its contents and statements relationships, whether it is a scientific theory or not.

It is obvious when looking to the literature that Popper view has been dealt with in amore broad discussions than carnap’s theory. However, this is not due to the weakness of Carnap’s position but it has to do with Popper strong style of writing. Also Popper died in 1994 where he published other books to defend and refine his theory through many Publications as "Realism and the Aim of Science, 1983; The Open Universe post script to the logic of scientific discovery, 1988; Poppers famous book Conjectures and Refutations came out in 1963.

Carnap was more realistic than other philosophers and he lived in his time and searched for the probable truth and the degree of proof which help us all deal with day to day need of science and knowledge. Carnap was the first empiricist to use a semantic method to explain theories. Carnap was working on the theory of inductive logic when he died in 1970. Jaakko Hintikka used carnap’s inductive method. In Carnap’s logic, the probability of every universal law is always zero. Hintikka was able to carry Carnap’s work on and succeeded in formulating an inductive logic that obtained positive degree of confirmation for universal laws. It should be stressed here that the Omega-rule (Carnap’s Rule) is still widespreadly used in metamathematical research.
 

Dec.,17,1999- 2:26 AM
Ramadan, 11th, 1420