The Origins of the Second World War, by A. J. P. Taylor, is a book that stirred up controversy after it was published in 1961. Taylor’s unorthodox views with regard to the course of European politics between World War I and World War II, and especially Hitler’s role in these events, brought him under fire from critics and advocates of popular views of the day. Being a well-informed scholar, Taylor chose not to repudiate his claims, but to write a preface called “Second Thoughts”, which clarifies his reason for writing the book in the first place - “to understand what happened, and why it happened” (Taylor xi). The preface also defends his reasoning while critiquing the reasoning of his detractors. The man, Alan John Percivale Taylor was born in Birkdale, Lancashire, England on March 25th, 1906. He died on September 7th, 1990 in London. He was a historian who graduated with honors from Oxford in 1927. By 1934 he had his first book out. His second book came out in 1948. After that, he was a tutor at Oxford until 1963, as well as a research fellow there until 1976. In 1950, he became a panelist on a BBC version of 60 Minutes. He eventually published over 30 works, including Volume I of The Oxford History of Modern Europe. His most widely read and controversial book remains The Origins of the Second World War.(2)
The content of this book deals with event from the signing of the Treaty of Versailles to the declaration of war on September 3rd, 1939. Large topics covered include: the legacy of the first world war, the post-World War I decade, the end of Versailles, the Abyssinian affair and the end of Lacarno, the relative peace of 1936-8, the Austrian Anschluss, the Czechoslovakian Crisis, the six-month peace over the winter of 1938-9, the ensuing War of Nerves, and finally, the War for Danzig.
This book sets out to prove the point that “…Great Britain and France dithered between resistance and appeasement, and so helped to make war more likely.” (Taylor ix). Taylor proves it effectively, pointing out numerous occasions where all Hitler had to do was sit back and wait as British and French policies did much of the work of restoring Germany to Great Power status, while transforming Hitler from a nationalistic leader to a shield against Communism in Europe to a European conqueror. Taylor says that, “[Hitler’s] aim was change, the overthrow of the existing European order; his method was patience.” (Taylor 71). He goes on to say that, “[Hitler] did not ‘seize’ power. He waited for it to be thrust upon him by the men who had previously tried to keep him out” (Taylor 71), and that “Hitler did not make precise demands. He announced that he was dissatisfied; and then waited for the concessions to pour into his lap, merely holding out his hand for more.” (Taylor 71)
Taylor proves this point in a manner uncommon to most historians I have read. While other books condemn historical losers (see: the appeasers) as ignorant cowards fumbling around for a solution to their problems and eventually picking the wrong one, Taylor refrains from this. He chooses not to take advantage of his 20/20 hindsight by making himself seem smarter than the appeasers. Instead, he seeks “to understand the ‘appeasers’, not to vindicate or condemn them.” (Taylor xxvi) It is said that the victors write history, but Taylor has given the losers (which often includes the truth) a chance to have their story told in an unbiased manner. Taylor’s purely objective viewpoint lends to the credibility of his arguments, making the reader want to believe his views no matter how unorthodox they may be.
As a non-historian, it’s impossible for me to tell which of his views were controversial at the time the book was published, but the one comment that may have pushed his critics over the edge is where he calls the events covered in the book “… a story without heroes; and perhaps even without villains.” (Taylor 17). It is possible to deal with the fact that Hitler was a relatively normal diplomat (even taking into account his anti-Semitism) between 1933 and 1938 (when Chamberlain declared, “Peace in our time”), but after the Sudeten Germans were “liberated”, he ceased being a diplomat and became a conqueror. Since this book’s timeline extends beyond the winter peace of 1938-9, it can be implied that Taylor did not regard the conquering Hitler as a villain, which many would take offense to.
Besides this one flaw, there seems to be no chink in the author’s persuasive armor. He highlights the many ways in which French and British policy propagated the second world war throughout the book. First off, Hitler’s position of power in Germany was a product of many circumstances, but mainly of German resentment for the Treaty of Versailles. This initial product of British and French policy gave Hitler the perfect platform to carry out his plan of restoring Germany to Great Power status. We see this in the chapter titled “Legacy of the First World War.” Secondly, with regards to the League of Nations, British and French aims again differed. The British came to believe that World War I had been a mistake and they wanted to use the League as a tool to conciliate Germany. France, however, still believed that Germany had caused the first world war, and thus the two proceeded to pretend to compromise with each other, while waiting for time to prove one side wrong. Thus, efforts of conciliation of Germany failed. A good example of conflicting views on Versailles is the subject of reparations. British efforts to decrease German payment obligations and French resistance to these efforts led to a general “resentment, suspicion, and international hostility” (Taylor 44) among the German people. Reparations were blamed for the inflation of 1923 and the depression of 1929. Thirdly, the Disarmament Conference of 1932, called by the British, was a political stabilizer that failed when France declared it would “‘…henceforth assure her security by her own means.’” (Taylor 77). This touched off the arms race. Fourthly, a mutual limitation on battleships was accepted in London in 1930, but, again, conflicting French views concerning Italy’s fleet began the French-Italian estrangement, which eventually led to Italy siding with the Germans. Fifthly, in 1934, Mussolini decided to invade Abyssinia and got no sign of disapproval from Britain, even though Abyssinia was in the League of Nations. The League took so long to decide on action, due to internal conflict, that by the time they got around to telling Mussolini to stop in 1936, he had already become Emperor of Abyssinia. The failure of 52 nations to come together to stop one aggressor undermined the League’s purpose, and rendered it useless. Internal bickering had made the League prestige-less and powerless, while it left non-members Germany and Japan (and Italy after 1937) unaffected. Another instance of poor French policy was when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland in 1936. France was too scared to go to war over what they had been adamant about defending until it was actually invaded. Their policy of resistance to German attacks on the Treaty of Versailles was seen to be nothing but a façade, making Hitler all the more confident. Taylor cites many more examples of how France and Great Britain gave Hitler everything he wanted – so many that it would take up more than the allotted five pages. The policies of these two countries turned Hitler from a nationalistic chancellor to a European figurehead on a mission to fend off the Red menace with Germany’s renewed power, and finally into an opportunistic conqueror whom they saw as a Hun in a tank instead of a horse. What they failed to see was that he was of their own making. In the end, it was France and Great Britain who declared war on their creation, not vice versa. Their mutual, self-inflicted downfall would have been almost certain had Germany not moronically declared war on the US and USSR.
Taylor is very effective in his argument, as he cites at least one major British/French political blunder per chapter. It was generally easy to follow, although he did throw around some names I didn’t know, like Metternich. The book also exposed the selfish, weak, and hypocritical maneuverings of governments and the reasons why their peoples hate them when they must fight a war that is neither by them nor for them. I didn’t find this book controversial, but rather enlightening. I used to think World War II was all Hitler’s fault, but now I know it wasn’t. One thing I did notice was that it tended to be pro-British and anti-French. Maybe this is because Taylor’s a Brit, or maybe it was mainly France’s fault. Whatever the circumstance, I found this book to be informative, interesting, and a good read.
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