CONTENTS

2. CIVIL WAR IN ETHIOPIA

1. SUDAN.

HISTORY. Located in western Sudan, Darfur’s inhabitants consisted of two different groups of Muslims: non-Arab black peoples such as the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa -- and Arab tribes collectively termed Baggara. They settled the region beginning in the 13th century.Before the 20th century, the Furs regularly clashed with the Baggara, particularly the Rizeigat. Darfur was a center for slave trade where Fur slavers competed with Arab traders to raid nearby towns to obtain slaves for the coastal regions. The two groups also have differing economic needs, which has led to clashes: the Fur and Masalit were primarily sedentary farmers, while the Arabs and Zaghawa were nomadic herdsmen, which brought them into conflict over access to land and water resources.Darfur was traditionally ignored by the Arabs and before that by the British who held power in the capital of Khartoum. British colonial rulers deliberately restricted education in Darfur to the sons of chiefs, so as not to produce dissidents who might challenge their authority. As a result, in 1935, all of Darfur had only one full-fledged elementary school. There was no maternity clinic until the 1940s, and at independence in 1956 Darfur had fewer hospital beds than any other part of Sudan. (Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A Short History of a Long War)

The government of Sudan had a strongly Arab character since the country’s independence in 1956. It was a military dictatorship since 1958. The First Sudanese Civil War, between 1955 and 1972, was fought between the Muslim government and the mostly non-Muslim population of the southern Sudan.

Intermarriages between Arab and African tribes made the racial element in Darfur confusing. Almost everyone looked “black.” The rift between the Janjaweed and their victims tended to be threefold:

First, the Janjaweed and Sudanese government leaders were Arabs, and their victims in Darfur were members of several non-Arab African tribes, particularly the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit.

Second, the killers were frequently lighter-skinned, and they routinely use racial epithets about the “blacks” they were killing and raping.

Third, the Janjaweed were often nomadic herdsmen, and the tribes they attacked were usually settled farmers. Thus, the conflict also reflects the age-old tension between herders and farmers. The leader of the Janjaweed, whom the Sudanese government entrusted with the initial waves of slaughter in Darfur, was Musa Hilal, the chief of an Arab nomadic tribe. (Gérard Prunier's Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide)

After independence, Sudan’s own leaders continued to neglect their constituents. One result was the Darfur famine of 1984 and 1985. The famine was the result not just of drought, but also of mismanagement and indifference in the Sudanese government. It led to massive starvation. (Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A Short History of a Long War)

Civil war in neighboring Chad in the 1980s spilled over into Darfur and led some Arab tribes to adopt a supremacist ideology. At the same time, the spread of the Sahara desert intensified the competition between Arab and non-Arab tribes for water and food. (Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A Short History of a Long War)

CIVIL WAR. The Sudanese civil war erupted in 1983 when the president declared Shari’a law in the south. The government supported militias by providing them with military intelligence and air attacks primarily in three regions: Bahr el Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains in 1992–95, and the Upper Nile. The miltias carried out a “scorched earth” policy” that included massacres, pillages, and rapes. (Nicholas Kristof, Genocide in Slow Motion)

In the mid-1990s, the Janjaweed was responsible for the slaughter of at least two thousand members of the Masalit tribe. In 2001 and 2002, there were brutal attacks on villages belonging to the Fur and Zaghawa tribes. (Gérard Prunier's Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide)

Because of the mass murders of the three major non-Arab tribes in Darfur, militants began to organize an armed movement against the Sudanese government. In June 2002, they attacked a police station. The beginning of their rebellion was usually dated to early in 2003, when they burned government garrisons and destroyed military aircraft at an air base. (Nicholas Kristof, Genocide in Slow Motion)

As the rebellion began to grow, President Omar el-Bashir launched a scorched-earth counterinsurgency campaign, involving the slaughter of large numbers of people in Darfur. But many soldiers in the regular army were members of African tribes from Darfur, and they were unwilling to fight civilians from their own tribes. Initially, the Sudanese government did not attempt to hide its attacks. President Omar el-Bashir publicly proclaimed the government’s intention was to stop the rebellion. (Nicholas Kristof, Genocide in Slow Motion)

The mass murders in Darfur were not a case of religious persecution, since the killers as well as the victims of this genocide were Muslim. (Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A Short History of a Long War) Instead, the conflict was part of a long-running internal political battle between Sudanese President Omar Hassan Bashir and radical Islamic cleric Hassan al-Turabi. A former college professor and the former speaker of parliament, Turabi had long been one of Bashir's main political rivals and an influential figure in Sudan. The United Nations and human rights experts accused Turabi of backing one of Darfur’s key rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement, in which some of his top former students were leaders. (Washington Post, April 23, 2006)

A cease-fire was declared in 2002, and the following year, an agreement was reached. State revenues -- oil money in particular -- would be shared between the government and the southern rebel groups.

In early 2003, JEM and SLA rebels attacked government forces and installations. The government retaliated with air and ground attacks that were carried out by the Janjaweed consisting of local tribesmen armed by the government. The Janjaweed were accused of torching dozens of mosques and destroying copies of the Koran. Both sides have been accused of committing human rights violations, including mass killing, looting, and rapes of the civilian population. However, the better-armed Janjaweed quickly gained the upper hand.

By the spring of 2004, several thousand people -- mostly from the non-Arab population -- were killed and as many as a million more were driven from their homes, causing a major humanitarian crisis in the region. Over 100,000 refugees poured into neighboring Chad, as they were pursued by Janjaweed militiamen who clashed with Chadian government forces along the border.

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that the risk of genocide was “frighteningly real” in Darfur. The scale of the Janjaweed campaign could be compared to the Rwanda genocide.

In July 2004, Annan and Secretary of State Powell visited Sudan and the Darfur region, and urged the Sudanese government to stop supporting the Janjaweed militias. That same month, the African Union and European Union sent officials to monitor the cease-fire signed three months earlier. However, the fighting continued.

Also in July, Congress passed a joint resolution declaring the armed conflict in Darfur to be genocide and called on the Bush administration to lead an international effort to put a stop to it. On July 30, the United Nations gave the Sudanese government 30 days to disarm and bring to justice the Janjaweed. The fighting continued.

In August 2004, the African Union sent 150 Rwandan troops in to protect the cease-fire monitors. But their mandate did not include the protection of civilians. They were joined by 150 Nigerian troops later that month.

After the United Nations’ 30-day deadline expired, Annan reported that the situation “has resulted in some improvements on the ground but remains limited overall.” In particular, he noted that the Janjaweed militias remained armed and continued to attack civilians. He also said that the Sudanese government’s commitments regarding their own armed forces had been only partially implemented, with refugees reporting attacks involving government forces.

On September 9, Powell declared to the Senate that genocide was being carried out in Darfur, for which he blamed the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed. This position was strongly rejected by the Sudanese government.

Also in September, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated 50,000 deaths in Darfur since the conflict’s beginning, mostly by starvation. In October, the WHO estimated that 70,000 people had died of disease and malnutrition in Darfur since March.

The WHO also reported that 6,000 and 10,000 people were dying each month in Darfur. Many were related to diarrhea, but the most significant cause of death was violent death for those aged between 15 and 49. The Darfur mortality rates were significantly higher than the emergency threshold, and were from three to six times higher than the normal African death rates.

Between March and October 2004, an estimated 71,000 people died by starvation and disease alone. A British Parliamentary Report estimated that over 300,000 people had already died by the end of 2005. The United Nations estimated that 180,000 died in the 18 months of the conflict. More than 1.8 million people had been displaced from their homes. Some 200,000 fled to neighboring Chad.

In September, the United Nations passed Resolution 1564 threatening Sudan with sanctions on its oil industry in the event of continued noncompliance with Resolution 1556 or refusal to accept the expansion of African Union peacekeepers. Resolution 1564 also established an International Commission of Inquiry to look into human rights violations and to determine whether genocide was occurring.

In October, the United Nations pledged $100 million dollars to support the force, about half of the $221 million cost to keep them deployed for a year. The European Union contributed the remainder, an additional 80 million Euros.

The Abuja peace talks between Sudan and Darfur rebels began in late October. The talks included the discussion of a no-fly zone over Darfur, a land truce, and the disarmament of the militias. But within weeks, Sudanese troops raided the Abu Sharif and Otash refugee camps in Darfur, moving a number of inhabitants and denying aid agencies access to the remaining inhabitants inside.

A cease-fire was signed on November 4. But the peace deal lasted just one hour before Sudanese police arrived at a battered camp in the middle of the night in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur. They beat residents with wooden poles and began bulldozing and burning

The JEM and SLA factions eventually agreed to a no-fly zone, a measure designed to end the Sudanese military’s bombing of rebel villages in the region. The second accord granted international humanitarian aid agencies unrestricted access to the Darfur region.

In November, Sudanese troops raided the Abu Sharif and Otash refugee camps in Darfur, moving a number of inhabitants and denying aid agencies access to the remaining inhabitants inside. The Sudanese military conducted attacks on Darfur refugee villages in plain sight of United Nations and African Union observers. In late November, the government charged that Janjaweed members had refused to pay for livestock in the town market of Tawila in Northern Darfur, and rebels attacked the town’s government-controlled police stations. T he Sudanese military retaliated by bombing the town.

In January 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur concluded that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed were responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law. The commission said, however, that the government had not pursued a policy of genocide in Darfur. In March, Annan asked for United Nations peacekeepers be increased by 10,000 to support the 2,000 African Union troops already deployed Security Council Resolution 1591 was passed 11–0, strengthening the arms embargo and imposing an asset freeze and travel ban on those deemed responsible for the atrocities in Darfur. It was agreed that war criminals would be tried by the International Criminal Court. The United Nations estimated 180,000 had died as a result of illness and malnutrition in the 18 months of the conflict.

By the end of 2005, 2.5 million people in Darfur had been driven from their homes. As many as 400,000 had died. (American Progress Action, May 1, 2006)

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

In 2003, the Bush administration took the lead in approving several Security Council resolutions deploring the violence and authorizing the African Union mission, But it took a rather passive role.(Amnesty International, “Sudan Human Rights Concerns;” National Organization for Women,” “Violence Against Women in Sudan Reveals Common Weapon of War, December 3, 2004)

Finally, in early 2005, the Bush administration declared that genocide was unfolding in Darfur and sent large amounts of aid -- but it refused to do anything more. (Nicholas Kristof, Genocide in Slow Motion)

With China holding a permanent seat on the Security Council, the United Nations was basically ineffectual. Yet the United Nations called the atrocities in Darfur the “world’s greatest humanitarian crisis.” (VOA News, March 20, 2006)

China and Chad played key roles in the Darfur conflict. In 1990, Chad’s Idriss Deby came to power by launching a military blitzkrieg from Darfur and overthrowing President Hissan Habre. Deby came from the elite Zaghawa tribe, which made up one of the Darfur rebel groups trying to topple the government. When the conflict broke out, Deby had to decide whether to support Sudan or his tribe. He eventually chose his tribe. (Washington Post, April 23, 2006)

Sudan was China’s fourth-biggest supplier of imported oil. China, with veto power in the United Nations Security Council, said it will stand by Sudan against United States efforts to slap sanctions on the country and in the battle to force Sudan to replace the African Union peacekeepers with a larger United Nations presence. China built highways and factories in Khartoum, even erecting the Friendship Conference Hall, the city’s largest public meeting place. (Washington Post, April 23, 2006)

In the spring of 2006, the Security Council, voting 15-to-0, threatened sanctions against anyone who impeded peace process in Sudan. The Council also expedited the timetable to transition the African force of 7,000 troops to a much larger United Nations mission of 20,000 international peacekeepers. (Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2006)

In May 2006, the government of Sudan and the largest Darfur rebel faction signed a peace deal. This came after three years of bloody conflict that left tens of thousands of people dead and two million homeless. (Washington Post, May 5, 2006)

For nine months, Bush declared that ongoing violence in Darfur constituted “genocide.” The administration refused to react. Then 80 prominent national organizations and leadership figures, representing millions of Americans, urged Bush to do more to protect innocent civilians in Darfur.

In the summer of 2006, the Security Council voted 12-0 -- with Russian, China, and Qatar abstaining -- to approve “a long-sought resolution that would place an expanded peacekeeping force in Darfur. However, Sudan’s president, General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, immediately rejected the resolution. (Washington Post, August 31, 2006)

Conditions in Darfur continued to worsen. Since 2003, over 400,000 people died in Sudan, and 2.5 million were driven from their homes. (Genocide Intervention Center) In May 2006, the United States pushed hard for a peace agreement that was eventually signed by one rebel group and the Sudanese government, although it failed to halt the fighting.

The Sudanese government continued to ally itself with the Janjaweed Arab militias while refusing to allow United Nations peacekeepers into the country and to help to relieve the undermanned 7,200-member African Union force. (London’s The Telegraph, October 24, 2006)

THE BUSH - BIN LADEN CONNECTION – AND SUDAN. The Sudan government once welcomed Osama Bin Laden, even though Sudan continued to receive harsh United States and international criticism for human rights violations. Sudan provided access to terrorism suspects and shared intelligence data with the United States. (Los Angeles Times, April 29, 2005)

In the 1990s, Bin Laden and al Qaeda were based in the capital city of Khartoum. After they left for Afghanistan, the regime of Sudanese strongman General Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir retained ties with other groups the United States accused of terrorism. (Los Angeles Times, April 29, 2005)

Sudan was a valuable ally of the CIA. Sudan’s Mukhabarat, its version of the CIA, detained al Qaeda suspects for interrogation by United States agents. The Sudanese intelligence agency seized and turned over to the FBI evidence recovered in raids on suspected terrorists’ homes, including fake passports. Sudan expelled extremists, putting them into the hands of Arab intelligence agencies working closely with the CIA. Sudan was credited with foiling attacks against American targets by detaining foreign militants moving through Sudan on their way to join forces with Iraqi insurgents. (Los Angeles Times, April 29, 2005)

CIVIL WAR IN ETHIOPIA . The Anuak minority lives in the southwest portion of Ethiopia which had ethnic and language ties with southern Sudan. In the 1980s, the communist regime in Ethiopia destroyed much of Anuak indigenous culture, as thousands of famine victims have been assimilated in their territory. Refugees from the civil war in Sudan have been housed by the government and the United Nations in large camps. (www.ww3report.com, April 9, 2004)

In December 2003, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Defense Front (EPRDF), the ruling military, massacred 400 Anuak tribe members. Subsequently, this broadened into widespread attacks in the southwest part of the country. Ethiopian troops attacked over one dozen Anuak villages in the province of Gambella. (Rochester Post-Bulletin of Rochester, Minnesota, May 6, 2004)

Between January and April 2004, the Ethiopian military carried out scorched-earth raids that destroyed one dozen Anuak villages in Gambella. The raids drove out more than 10,000 Anuak into refugee camps in neighboring Sudan and Kenya. The military focused on killing women, murdering children, burning Anuak homes and fields, and raping dozens of girls and women.

The Ethiopian government blamed the deaths on the rivalry between the Anuak and the Nuer. However, the EPRDF and settlers from the Ethiopian highlands initiated the massacres that targeted the Anuak. (Rochester Post-Bulletin of Rochester, Minnesota, May 6, 2004)

ETHIOPIA’S RESOURCES. The goal of multinational corporations was to exploit Ethiopia's Gambella region. This gave central Ethiopian authorities powerful economic incentives to seek control of these resources. Petroleum, water, tungsten, platinum, and gold were the principal resources in the Gambella region. (Keith Harmon Snow, State Terror against Indigenous Peoples in Ethiopia -- Another Secret War for Oil)

The Anuak situation grew worse since oil was discovered under Anuak lands by the Gambella Petroleum Corporation, a subsidiary of Pinewood Resources Ltd. of Canada. In 2001, Pinewood signed a concession agreement with the Ethiopian government in 2001. In May, however, Pinewood announced that it had relinquished all rights to the Gambella oil concession. (Keith Harmon Snow, State Terror against Indigenous Peoples in Ethiopia -- Another Secret War for Oil)

On June 13, 2003, Malaysia’s state-owned oil company Petronas announced the signing of a 25-year exploration and production sharing agreement with the EPRDF government to exploit the Ogaden Basin in Ethiopia’s east and the “Gambella Block”-- a 15,356 square kilometer concession. (Keith Harmon Snow, State Terror against Indigenous Peoples in Ethiopia -- Another Secret War for Oil)

In February 2004, the Ethiopian Minister of Mines announced that the Malaysian company would launch a natural gas exploration project in the Gambella region. The China National Petroleum Corporation might have signed contracts with the EPRDF for a stake in Gambella’s oil. (Keith Harmon Snow, State Terror against Indigenous Peoples in Ethiopia -- Another Secret War for Oil)

Petronas and the China National Petroleum Corporation provided cover for their respective governments to ship arms and military equipment to Sudan in exchange for oil concessions granted by Khartoum. In 2000, the Texas-based Sicor Inc. signed a $1.4 billion dollar deal with Ethiopia for the “Gazoil” joint venture exploiting oil and gas in the southeast Ogaden Basin. (Keith Harmon Snow, State Terror against Indigenous Peoples in Ethiopia -- Another Secret War for Oil)

Hunt Oil Company of Dallas was also involved in the Ogaden Basin through their subsidiary Ethiopia Hunt Oil Company. Hunt Oil’s chairman of the board and CEO Ray L. Hunt was a director of Halliburton Company. (Keith Harmon Snow, State Terror against Indigenous Peoples in Ethiopia -- Another Secret War for Oil)

United States Cal Tech International Corporation negotiated a joint venture with the China National Petroleum Corporation to operate in the same regions. Petronas operated in Sudan in partnership with the Canadian-Swedish Lundin Group. Swedish financier Adolph Lundin, who oversaw Lundin Group was a long-time associate of George Herbert Bush. African Confidential reported in 1997 that the former president telephoned then-dictator Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire on behalf of Lundin after Mobutu had threatened to terminate a mining contract. (Keith Harmon Snow, State Terror against Indigenous Peoples in Ethiopia -- Another Secret War for Oil)