© A. Scott Piraino

The United states has two armies. Today we take this for granted, and don’t question the reasons for funding both the United States Army, and the United states Marine Corps. But it wasn’t always this way.

There were no Marines in the Continental Army that won the Revolutionary War. During the Civil War, Congress authorized less than  3,200 men for the Marine Corps, this while the Union Armies totaled nearly one million men. The fact is, for most of their history the United States Marine Corps was little more than a security force for the Navy.

The myth of the Marine Corps as a second army began in WW I. When the United states entered the war in 1917, over two million U.S. Army soldiers were deployed to France along with one brigade of marines, about ten thousand strong.  Despite being a tiny fraction of the American forces fighting in WW I, the Marines managed to make a name for themselves at the U.S. Army’s expense.

General Pershing, the Commander of all U.S. Forces in France, had ordered a news blackout that prevented reporters from mentioning specific units in their dispatches. The purpose of the order was obvious; to prevent German intelligence from learning about American troop movements. But one reporter circumvented the order, a war correspondent for the Chicago Tribune named Floyd Gibbons.

After Mr. Gibbons was severely wounded at the battle of Belleau Wood, the press corps passed on his dispatches without the approval of Army censors.  The result was a storm of press coverage in the US claiming that the Huns were being defeated with "the Help of God and a few Marines". No mention was made of the thousands of Army soldiers who were fighting and dying with equal valor.

Floyd Gibbons made no secret of his "friendship and admiration for the U.S. Marines". There is no proof that his writings created the mythology of the Marine Corps, but we do know he wrote a biography of Baron von Richthofen, more popularly known as the Red Baron. His description of the German aviator reads as propaganda, not journalism, and his other works were probably embellished as well.

Today all Marines  in basic training are taught that German soldiers in WW I referred to them as “Devil Dogs”. H.L. Mencken, an American writing in 1921, clearly states that; “The Germans, during the war, had no opprobrious nicknames for their foes…Teufelhunde (devil-dogs), for the American marines, was invented by an American correspondent; the Germans never used it.”

In addition, there is the legend of “Bulldog Fountain”, where the U.S. Marine’s mascot originated. This fountain is located in the village of Belleau, not the wood of the same name. Although the Marines fought in Belleau Wood, the US Army’s 26th division liberated  the village, three weeks after the Marines had left the area.

There is no documented evidence that Germans ever referred to Marines as “Devil dogs”, and the Marines never captured the village of Belleau with its “Bulldog Fountain”. It is not clear exactly where these stories come from, but their source is most likely Floyd Gibbons. Perhaps the Marines knew this, because they made him an honorary Marine posthumously in 1941.

Floyd Gibbons helped enhance the image of the Marines, but the United States Marine Corps as we know it today came of age in WW II. Most Americans believe that the Marine Corps won the war in the Pacific, while the US Army fought in Europe. In fact our Pacific operations were hampered by a conflict between the Army and the Navy, that split the theatre in two.

The Navy adamantly refused to place their fleet, (and their Marines), under the command of the Army. After five weeks of bureaucratic wrangling, General MacArthur was given command of the Southwest Pacific theatre, while Admiral Nimitz had jurisdiction over the remainder of the Pacific ocean. The result, in Macarthur’s own words, was a “divided effort, the… duplication of force (and) undue extension of the war with added casualties and cost”.

The US Army fought the main force of the Japanese Imperial Army in New Guinea and the Philippines. The Navy and Marines carried out an “island hopping” strategy that involved amphibious assaults on islands such as Guadalcanal and Saipan. General Macarthur complained bitterly to the President that “these frontal attacks by the Navy, as at Tarawa, are tragic and unnecessary massacres of American lives“.

By way of comparison, General Macarthur’s Army killed, captured, or stranded over a quarter of a million Japanese troops during the New Guinea campaign, at a cost of only 33,000 US casualties. The Navy and Marines suffered over 28,000 casualties to kill roughly 20,000 Japanese on Iwo Jima. Even then, the Army played a greater role than Marines like to admit; the Army had more divisions assaulting Okinawa than the Marines.

The famous image of Marines raising the US flag on Mount Suribachi is actually a photograph of the second, staged flag-raising ceremony. The Marines raised the flag a second time to replace the original, smaller flag, and to provide the press corps with a better photo opportunity. That photograph has become one of the most enduring images of WW II, and served as the model for the Marine Corps Memorial statue.   

The Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, was on Iwo Jima that morning in 1945, and when he saw the Stars and Stripes go up he declared; 'The raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years!"

In fact the Marine Corps was nearly legislated out of existence two years later. After the bureaucratic infighting that characterized inter-service relations during WW II, there was a strong desire among military professionals to unify the military commands. President Truman agreed, and in 1946 his administration proposed a bill to unify the separate service bureaucracies.

Having one budgetary authority for the Armed Forces, and one chain of command each for land forces, ships, and aircraft makes sense. But this would have placed the US Navy at a distinct disadvantage. The Navy had their own air wings aboard their carriers, and their own army, the Marine Corps.

The Navy and Marine Corps were determined to scuttle this legislation. Marine generals created a secret office code named the Chowder Society to lobby behind the scenes, (in opposition to their President and Commander in Chief), and thwart the unification bill before Congress. The Commandant of the Marine Corps even made an impassioned speech before Congress to plead for his separate service.

It worked. Congress rejected the Truman administration’s unification bill, and instead passed the National Security Act of 1947. This Act guaranteed separate services, with their own independent budgets, and was a victory for the Navy and Marine Corps.

In addition, the Marines succeeded in having their separate force structure written into the language of the legislation. It is very unusual for Congress to dictate the actual composition of a military service. Yet the National Security Act mandates that the Marines Corps must maintain “not less than three combat divisions and three aircraft wings and such land combat, aviation, and other services as necessary to support them“. 

President Truman was furious, and military professionals were appalled. General Eisenhower characterized the Marines as "being so unsure of their value to their country that they insisted on writing into the law a complete set of rules and specifications for their future operations and duties. Such freezing of detail...is silly, even vicious."

The war between the Army and Marines would get more vicious in Korea. On November 27th, 1950 a division of Marines 25,000 strong, was ordered to proceed along the west side of the Chosin reservoir, while a much smaller task force of 2500 Army troops went up the eastern side. Waiting for them were 120,000 troops of the Chinese Communist 9th Army Group.

And there is an article by Major Randall A. Hodge USMC

"Can Too Much 'Jointness' Disjoint The Marine Corps"
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/HRA.htm
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"Can Too Much "Jointness" Disjoint The Marine Corps
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
                      EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:   Can Too Much 'Jointness' Disjoint The Marine Corps?
Author:  Major Randall A. Hodge, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:  The Marine Corps' current focus on 'MEF
Warfighting' and 'Service Componency' in joint operations
poses a threat to the continued survivability of the Corps
as an independent military service.
Background:  U.S. Marines have one of the finest 'warrior'
reputations in the world, yet the Corps has struggled for
more than two centuries to maintain its relevance in the
U.S. national defense.  History clearly attributes the
Marine Corps' survival to its naval and expeditionary
character, coupled with its unique application of combined-
arms tactics.  Marines have enjoyed unparalleled battlefield
success during major U.S. wars at the tactical level under
the operational command of Navy and Army forces.  Over
the past several years, the Marines have 'crept' into the
realm of operational level warfighting.  Marine forces
are routinely participating in Joint Task Force (JTF)
operations around the globe and in many cases have assumed
JTF leadership.  The excitement of playing in the 'Big
League' has thrust the Corps' warfighting philosophy beyond
its capability to function effectively and efficiently
as a tactical warfighting organization.  As the Marine
Corps prepares itself for the 21st century, it is training
more like an Army Corps than an integral element of the
Navy-Marine team.
Recommendation:   To survive as an institution, the Marine
Corps must remain faithful to its traditional roles in
the U.S. national defense.  America still needs a force
in readiness that is naval in character and expeditionary
in nature..."
"Conclusions - Enduring or Dying Corps
    As we enter into the 21st century, we must shed
ourselves of the notion that the survival of the Corps
is somehow linked to our competitiveness in the 'big league'
of service componency.  Historically, the survival of the
U.S. Marine Corps as an institution is attributable to
our faithful association with the U.S. Navy and our unique
combined-arms style of warfighting at the tactical level
of war.  If we continue to lobby for service component
equality around the joint forces table, we are certain
to lose that peculiar identity which has for many years
distinguished us from the U.S. Army.  When called upon
to participate in our nation's wars, the Marines can best
serve a CinC by providing a complementary capability to
the sea, air, and land 'functional' components.
    "In deciding the future role for the Marine
Expeditionary Force, the Marine Corps should stick to what
it does best -- amphibious and expeditionary warfare in
the world's littoral regions."27  To this end, our training,
education, and procurement focus must remain on amphibious
and expeditionary warfare.  If we continue to emphasize
sustained land combat training (MEF warfighting) ahead
of amphibious and expeditionary warfare (...From the Sea),
the Marine Corps will find itself headed down a path of
self destruction.  America desperately needs a force capable
of "Warfighting...From the Sea", but it does not need and
will not pay for a second land army...."

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