"Raymond
O'Connor, who came to
That seems to say O'Connor was not based at Royal Air Force Weeton, but was
sent there for two weeks hospitalisation in the 1950's. That would not have
been uncommon if no sick quarters or hospital facilities existed at his own
unit, or if the home base facilities were inadequate for the treatment of his
complaint. There was at least one other RAF unit not far removed from the
Weeton camp. Whatever, two weeks in the camp hospital would not lend
opportunity to familiarise oneself with the layout of what was, in the 1950's,
a sprawling complex. Yet O'Connor seemed to be familiar.
"O'Connor who talked of his Irish patriotism, told Thomas Maguire that
Weeton camp was a base for
To my memory Weeton is about five miles from the bright lights of
"(Mr. Amlot, prosecuting counsel) alleged the man before the court, Thomas
Maguire (27), was a Provisional IRA intelligence officer and a
go-between." (PA) The Irish Times,
Wednesday 17.09.86.
A go-between to the republican movement, yes. An IRA intelligence officer, no
not on my understanding of the word. He seemed not to have the mettle or
experience for that. One notes from O'Connor's account of meetings with the
IRA's inner circle in
Maguire's part was largely that of a facilitator. From the margins he provided
the IRA with juicy morsels of information given by Raymond O'Connor. Thomas
Maguires arrest took place in
Maguire's whereabouts was known. He was under surveillance. A watching brief
that surely entailed an oversight from his stepfather and others. It was clear
he was not involved in IRA activity and nothing incriminating was said to have
been found in his possession.
If the accusation levelled at Maguire at his London trial, being an IRA
intelligence officer, was accurate, his June 1985 and prior presence in
Blackpool, given the April 1983 Lancashire chase-out
of Magee and Murray, could be seen as, at the best, naive, and, at the worst,
foolish. But, then, the same adjectives could apply to the IRA leadership who
bought the Weeton operation. A case of lions led by donkeys?
Does the fact that British and Irish intelligence felt confident of pushing the
Weeton job on the IRA with the prospect of them buying it, tell a story?
Security agencies of fraternal states operate and cooperate in good part in
matters paramilitary as one. The political history of the Maguire family will
have been known. Thomas Maguire's father was said to be a member of Sinn Fein.
Thomas was active in H-Block Hunger Strike protests when a student in the early
nineteen eighties. Such are matters that state security would deem worthy of
record and sharing.
Speaking at the Old Bailey trial, Detective Superintendent Alan Law, head of
Lancashire Special Branch, referring to their use of Raymond O'Connor, said:
"We don't look a gift horse in the mouth...." A metaphor that could
equally apply to O'Connor's stepson. For, unbeknown, Big Brother had plans for Thomas Maguire.
As earlier highlighted, the Weeton camp is not in
Thomas Maguire was probably unaware of the existence of Weeton before it was
brought to his attention by Raymond O'Connor. O'Connor was formerly in the
Royal Air Force and was hospitalised at then Royal Air Force Weeton in the
1950's. He lived in nearby
One has no need to ask if Raymond O'Connor would be disposed to work for the
authorities. He did and likely so for some time prior to that admitted in
court. All the lies, subterfuge and disinformation serves intentionally to
obscure the truth in these matters. What is certain is he did work for the
security services and forces. In respect of Weeton that function was not so
much as an informer but as an agent provocateur. His task was to peddle a story
to make Weeton an inviting target to the IRA. The base would have to possess a
significant
The SAS-RUC element would surely attract an IRA interest. It was the perfect
bait. Too perfect, one could say. But not so some in the IRA.
For O'Connor to employ this deception with purpose and a hoped for return,
maybe four ingredients had to be alive. 1) That O'Connor was acting at the behest
of the authorities. 2) That the selection of the Weeton camp was specific and
relevant to the overall operation. 3) That those behind O'Connor knew of Thomas
Maguire's republican disposition and contacts. 4) Number four
?
The original intention was to promote an attack on the base itself, and not the
nearby public house, which became the IRA's choice of target.
Why Weeton? A camp which on its own merit would not have elicited an IRA
interest any more than countless other prospective targets, so that it had to
be attractively baited in order to generate an interest. Somewhere hidden the
Weeton camp had special significance.
What people would know of the standing of Thomas Maguire, re. his republican
sympathies and contacts? The same people who would know of the significance of
Weeton, the backroom boys, the Security Service (MI5).
The Special Branch, an especially privileged department of the police force, a
force within a force, are deemed to be one arm of the security services. The
Lancashire Special Branch, however, will not have possessed the know-how or the
broader inter-connecting relationships the global picture, that is to
mastermind such an operation.
That convoluted and deadly remit is the property of MI5. O'Connor was their
man. MI5 and Special Branch had a shared responsibility in the control of
O'Connor.
At a point when O'Connor had wormed himself into the IRA's confidence and
advanced their interest in "SAS-RUC training camp" Weeton he would on
orders report the matter to the police. By this slick piece of choreography the
plan of entrapment would come under the auspices of a plausibly accountable
body. The truth of and purpose behind the Weeton sting operation would be hidden. A formula to facilitate
deniability and cover-up.
Thereafter Lancashire CID and Special Branch assumed notional title for
handling O'Connor. Hidden from view and potential scrutiny were the real power
brokers: MI5 manipulators extraordinaire. The plan was their baby. That being
so, they should carry the can. And so they will.
Had the plan met its design intention and the IRA team, incorporating an
ex-Royal Air Force member with a historic connection to Weeton, pursued an
attack on the army base and not the Eagle and Child Inn the IRAs choice of
target, would they have been met by a welcoming committee of, yes, the SAS
called in by MI5 to do their dirty work? Had that been the outcome, the
backroom boys would have rejoiced at the success of their neat little sting. By their lights they would have
pulled off a coup, the killing of two birds with one stone. And without the
later arrests of Thomas Maguire, James Murray and Joseph Calvey, and the
exposure of O'Connor, no one would have been the wiser.
"Ludicrous," isn't it?
Ah, the misery of it all, the man they most wanted, not so much to entrap as to
remove from the scene, remained on location below the
You see, the senior IRA man responsible for planning the Weeton debacle, likely
on instructions from above, the "Gerry Adams look-a-like", is the
same man who called at my west
I think we can put that one down to a failure in communications. Not the first
and not the last. Tragically.
Not to despair. The IRA sent over two big names (that we know of). One was
familiar with the
Magee had been interned in Northern Ireland during the 1970's. His fingerprints
were on police record. Murray's prints were almost certainly available in
possession if not declared. Nearly three years prior to the Weeton operation
British authorities had Dutch police arrest Magee in Holland, soon after his
arrival in autumn 1980, with a view to extraditing him for offences committed
in England in 1978-1979. The process did not proceed and Magee was released
from custody in early January 1981. He returned to Dublin.
The identities of Magee and Murray will have been known before they set foot in Britain. Arrest could have been made at any
time in their two weeks plus stay there.
They weren't touched. One reason why was the priority of capturing Magee was
subordinate to a greater priority called Mount Gabriel. The radar domes were
more important. That was the crunch. Or more prosaically, how best to remove a
body from that west Cork locale without divulging the intent behind the
exercise, that was the point.
As the well planned entrapment did not elicit the desired response, Magee and
Murray were encouraged to take precipitate flight and make their escape. Like
some other supposed great republican escapes, it was bogus.
After the security services had secured a store of intelligence from observing
Magee and Murray (and who else?): who they met; where they went; where they
stayed; the sussing of a prospective future target (the Imperial Hotel); the
removal of explosive from an arms cache; they, at the eleventh hour, engineered
a situation to cause the team to take flight and remove themselves from
Lancashire and Britain.
Matters elsewhere and other considerations obviated against capture.
"On April 12 (O'Connor) was contacted by telephone and met Murray and a
man he called 'the mechanic', who was Magee. O'Connor arranged for them to
visit the Eagle and Child Inn, got them a flat, hired a car, and inquired about
a garage." The Guardian,
Wednesday 17.09.86.
The public record says O'Connor was contacted by telephone on April 12 by
Murray and Magee. What does the private record say? When did Magee and Murray
arrive in Britain? Where did they stay initially: was there a use of different
addresses to begin with (or later)?
One is asking what Magee and Murray's itinerary was before making contact with
and taking up accomodation arranged for them by Raymond O'Connor. What
subsequent breaks were taken from the O'Connor rented flat? For what duration?
Where did they go?
Apart from references at the Thomas Maguire trial, other sources suggest that
while the IRA mission to Blackpool was to bomb the Eagle and Child Inn, near
Weeton, the visit was also put to another use.
Even then there was an IRA interest in the annual Conservative Party
conferences, held alternatively at Blackpool and Brighton. The April 1983 visit
to Blackpool by Magee and Murray was an opportunity, foolish I think, to act on
that interest and gather intelligence.
"Patrick Magee now serving 35 years for the Brighton attack was
photographed by police in Blackpool in April 1983, said Mr. Roy Amlot,
prosecuting. He was certainly there for some terrorist activity, he said. But
the Conservative conference held alternatively in Brighton and Blackpool
was not due to take place at the Imperial Hotel, Blackpool until October 1983,
Mr. Amlot told the jury. On the same day that Magee was seen to arrive in
Blackpool, April 12th, he went to look at what Mr. Amlot said was his real
target the Eagle and Child Inn, near Weeton army camp in Blackpool. Mr Amlot
said there was no evidence to suggest Magee and another man, Patrick Murray,
went to the Lancashire resort to prepare a bomb blast at the Conservative
conference and for defence counsel Mr. Michael Mansfield to suggest it was a
'flight of fancy'". (PA) The Irish
Times, Thursday 02.10.86.
Mr. Mansfield evidently touched a tender nerve. The political-security
implications of the Weeton case are enormous.
My confident belief is that the respective security services were aware the
planning for the Weeton bombing mission was moving to its active phase months
prior to the April 1983 departure of Magee and Murray, an exit from Ireland and
entry into Britain known of from the outset.
When living in west Cork, years before knowing of Weeton events, I concluded
that the authorities had a close down
to prevent a disposal of and departure from my property during the months of
1983 prior to its eventual sale. With the benefit of hindsight I would place
the start of that activity between end year 1982 and end February 1983. It was
about the time that a certain "Mr. Courtney-Bishop" entered and
exited from a supposed interest in my property.
I believe this had connection with the hope that I would become part of the
Weeton bombing mission, an operation that would have ensured a permanent
resolve to the difficulty of my west Cork presence and precluded the
possibility of a (once held) ambition to take up residence in Australia. As
said, Weeton was the prospect of killing a couple of birds with one stone.
The authorities were waiting to see which way the ball bounced, and whichever
way it bounced, they wished to control the bounce.
One aspect of that control and manipulation refers to returns from
advertisements commissioned by me and placed directly or by third parties in
overseas newspapers for the sale of my west Cork property. Returns from two
advertisements entailing not less than two respondents, that I am confident of
one to each advertisement, were directed to view not my property but another unit for sale locally. An advertisement
that should have been placed in end February 1983 was delayed for one month.
(At least one subsequent multi response to the latter advertisement, when
eventually placed, was controlled.)
Quoting from State Murder 1.
Transferring a respondent to a newspaper advertisement for a specific country
residence to another country residence of somewhat different specifications
patently necessitated plausible explanation. Whatever the explanation, it
indicated an authority preference for another game plan, one that history would
inform was destined to run into the sand at the English beach resort of
Blackpool. On the failure of Plan A out of the box of tricks came Plan B (a
controlled property disposal) one that lay ahead. To intrude and manipulate
in the fashion they did the collective state agencies had to know what was
going on, re. my private efforts to sell the property. The finger of suspicion
points to the interception of letters and telephone traffic. Finally, it
required that individuals be suborned.
The owner of the neighbouring property to whom it is believed respondents to
advertisements of mine were directed, when challenged on this, did not demur
from the accuracy of the charge. The cavalier and defensive reply was to say
that it mattered not as my property would soon be bought. That exchange took
place in early April 1983. Before the end of the month my property was indeed
purchased.
Intelligence agency tricks were employed over the latter stage of my west Cork
property ownership. Pressures in those months were insistent. All avenues and
initiatives, at home and abroad, by which a sale might be procured, were in the
crucial final months, I judge, controlled.
I didnt know why it was so.
I was angered by it and repeatedly sought to defy and circumvent it. It was a
surreal attempt to outwit a hidden foe in a chess game with only they knowing all the moves made. I was
fighting a wind I could feel but not touch or see. Ultimately I gave in.
Was it Friday or Saturday night 8 or 9 April 1983 that a detective called on
the house of a Coventry based sister? He asked for me by name, informing it was
on a matter of a "suspicious nature", that I was reported to have
been seen "acting suspiciously". The information he would later
claim came by anonymous telephone call.
Was the detective set up to make mischief because by then the Weeton operation
was on the road and bereft of a hoped for participant, the Security Service
deemed it fit only for interdiction and not arrest?
And so it came to pass, Plan
B entered the frame.
A letter from my Coventry based sister informing me of the detective's call and
his enquiries arrived in west Cork on Tuesday 12 April 1983. It was the same
day that Patrick Magee and Patrick Murray are said to have telephoned Raymond
O'Connor in Blackpool.
Earlier I referred to the pressure I was subject to during my west Cork domicile,
particularly in the latter months. It was heavy pressure. At all times that
pressure was confined to and solely managed by myself. There was no wish that
those concerns should extend to another member of my family. Following receipt
of my sister's letter and a letter from the Irish tax authorities twenty four
hours later, and ongoing tax letters from the Inland Revenue in England, I
decided to call it a day.
On Thursday 14 April 1983 I telephoned the office of one of the many, believed
ten, estate agents in Cork (city) and county with my property on their books
and indicated a reduction of selling price. A precise figure was given to the
secretary, the agent being elsewhere.
The following Monday, 18 April 1983, I once more telephoned the office, speaking
to the agent in person, and reiterated the instruction of the previous Thursday
on the reduction of property price. He asked that I put it in writing. I did
so.
At the end of the same week a United States family called to view the property.
On Monday 25 April 1983 the estate agent verbally informed me the American
family had agreed to buy the property. Purchase was made at the exact sum
indicated days earlier.
The property had been for sale for more than two years.
The next day, Tuesday 26.04.83, "Magee and Murray, in a hired car, became
suspicious and they sped away to Preston followed by four police surveillance
cars." It appears the two men were given a broad hint an offer they
couldnt refuse, and proceeded expeditiously to remove themselves from
Lancashire and Britain.
"Chief Superintendent Norman Finnerty, the head of Lancashire CID, said
yesterday that Scotland Yard only informed him of Magee's identity '(15)
minutes after the escape (on Tuesday 26.04.83).'" The Guardian, Tuesday 08.10.86.
Norman, you were suckered.
See Corroborative Section Items Number 9 & 10
Saturday 22 June 1985
Patrick Magee and other IRA activists are arrested in Glasgow. Security chiefs
were cock-a-hoop at the result. To use a military expression: they were chuffed to NAAFI breaks at the outcome.
The arrests scored 10 out of 10 on media charts.
At least one participant was singularly inappropriate to the IRA operation.
Also, a prudent military planner would not have entertained sending some of his
most elite troops on what was a convoluted series of infantry assignments. It
would be deemed a foolhardy misuse of resources. The risk of loss or capture
should always be weighed against the potential return.
The IRA leadership made a considerable tactical blunder: they walked their
troops on to a sucker punch. The disaster was of their making. The resorts bombing project for which the
IRA team entered Britain was a complex miscellany with long, loose tendrils
flapping all over the place. If a cynic said the origins of the operation were
state, a pup sold to the IRA from within, I would have smiled at the irony of
it.
And Patrick Magee did not have his talisman The Minder with him. Though Patrick Murray was said to have
formerly lived in Glasgow, he was either not detailed for the job or not
arrested. He may have been involved but remained outside the arrest loop.
However, when IRA man Peter Sherry entered the Glasgow net the trap was sprung,
within hours of Magee and Sherry meeting up. Contrast this with the inaction at
Weeton. Maybe the Glasgow arrests were bound up with timing and a narrow window
of opportunity?
Some reports say it was only on Sherrys second visit to Britain in the course
of the resorts project that arrests took place. Was this yet again down to the
authorities playing a game of judicious
management of an IRA operation? The narrow window of opportunity?
At least, in this instance, arrests were made before bombs went off.
Another failure on the part of the IRA was not to have understood better the
other side's use of intelligence and surveillance.
Over the years informers inflicted severe damage on the republican movement.
Ultimately, in some respects at least, the possibility is that they were
influencing the driving of it. Perhaps a corresponding havoc and attrition was
wreaked by bad reading of intelligence and an often poor interpretation of the
other side's use of intelligence and the extent of its application. From within
and without an unseen driving force?
Then there is surveillance a multifarious human, psychological and
technological science. A veritable arsenal at the disposal of the state. If you
can't match them, you may be able to outwit them. The first necessity is a
clean stable. The alternative is murder by state licence.
For much of the time that is what some IRA commands, the England department in
particular, appear to have done. In some part one can put that down to poor
structures, blinkered mindsets, poor manpower management and direction from the
top. Collectively it allowed for the entry and spread of infiltration and
precluded its identification. Indeed, it likely facilitated its promotion; not
least through the depletion it wrought.
Was this due to too much power and influence being reposited in supposed
intellectuals or politicos the fountain pen men? People with sway in matters
of structural management. Creating pivotal points of control which in the wrong
hands spelt disaster. Generals who never soldiered.
In October 1984 the IRA bombed the Grand Hotel in Brighton. They got in under
the British guard. The British learned the lesson. The IRA, not fully
recognising the reason for their success, got carried away. Success made them more
confident, adventurous; impetuous, even.
Not only did the British learn well the lessons of Brighton, they, with the
active and priceless support of their Irish counterparts and their well
placed informers, were adamant that a repeat IRA success would not follow hot
on its heels. It only needed time.
June 1985 saw a return of the pendulum. Arrests made were a culmination of that
determination. Glasgow came about because the IRA used too many high profile
troops of a kind whose loss the state could allow. It was a mission abroad with
too many loose ends.
The tactics of the seventies were out of date in the eighties.
Besides, after Brighton, Magee, and maybe two others, should not have been
used. Their place was on extended furlough.
The application of security procedures can, out of habit, become routine and
functional. Without knowing it complacency slips in. A tried and trusted
routine remains unchanged, unchallenged. Overtaken by events it becomes
obsolete. Unquestioned it carries on.
High level security is not like a changing of the guard ceremony: on the hour,
every hour. Technology and the human dimension determines that all systems have
weaknesses. Who spots it first?
In the approach to the Conservative Party conferences, fixed and widely known
occasions, the British and Irish authorities took to imposing close order
surveillance on specific individuals deemed to pose the greatest threat at
those times.
On such occasions the cranking up of surveillance was a routine practice. It
was something I was familiar with. At the time of the 1984 Brighton
Conservative Party conference I was subject to short string surveillance. My address then was in Kenilworth,
Warwickshire.
As it was for me, I am sure it was so, where circumstances permitted, for a
select band of republican activists in Ireland (and elsewhere?).
This close-order surveillance had a habit of taking up position at about ten
days prior to an event and remained in place for the duration.
By the time the authorities took up their routine positions the IRA team
involved in planting the Brighton Grand Hotel bomb had done their work. By
courtesy of a long delay timer they were out and back before the close-order
dragnet fell.
The British/Irish failure to have pre-knowledge of the Brighton bombing
intention was unlikely due to the holes in the sieve being plugged. Did the IRA
adopt a new approach which had the side effect of blanking some usuals out of
the picture? Did the historic origins of that rethinking derive from events at
Weeton in April 1983? Whatever, in the final analysis a piece of technology,
not new, outsmarted a routine practice.
Very quickly the respective security services knew who was primarily
responsible for the Brighton blast. Brief newspaper reports very shortly
afterwards all but spelt out Patrick Magee's name. Do the IRA not read post
event reports? Do they not collate and analyse. Do they not know how to
interpret and act on conclusions? I'm not surprised they turned to politics.
The authorities, knowing who was responsible for the Brighton bombing, no doubt
concentated on a number of prime targets, Patrick Magee being foremost. All it
needed was another operation, an operation too far, and they were in the bag.
On 22 June 1985, in Glasgow, it came to pass. Into the bag went Patrick Magee,
Peter Sherry, Gerard McDonnell, Martina Anderson, and Ella O'Dwyer. Three days
after the five Glasgow arrests, and the arrest of three others, further arrests
were made in Lancashire.
Consequent of the Lancashire arrests, charges were pressed against Thomas
Maguire for conspiracy to bomb the Eagle and Child Inn, near Weeton, with
Patrick Magee, Patrick Murray and others unknown.
Charges were also preferred against James Murray and Joseph Calvey, who were
accused of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and failing to disclose
information under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, in that they aided the
escape of Patrick Magee and Patrick Murray.
"O'Connor arranged for (Magee and Murray) to visit the Eagle and Child
Inn, got them a flat, hired a car and inquired about a garage." The Guardian, Wednesday 17.09.86.
Raymond
O'Connor, an agent provocateur in the pay of the British, "got them a
flat, hired a car and inquired about a garage (to assemble the bomb)."
The IRA, pitched in unequal battle, made matters worse by being unable to tell
the difference between friend and foe, republican and Special Branch,
sportingly gave away a copy of their battle plan and put Raymond O'Connor in
goal.
In the circumstances it would been a dereliction of duty if the authorities,
one or more of the agencies involved, MI5, Special Branch, Criminal
Investigation Department (CID), did not bug the flat, the car, the garage, and
install a tracking device in the vehicle.
They are not above putting a tracking device in a bicycle, let alone a Cortina
car.
Working in cooperation with their Irish counterparts, the arrival in Britain of
Magee and Murray will have been known and easy to monitor. Many photographs of
them were taken in Lancashire while on the Weeton operation.
Their activities, who they met, where they stayed, will have been observed. The
authorities were well acquainted with both activists. MI5 and London Special
Branch did not require photographs to identify them. In indulging the routine
practice of taking surveillance photographs, the London end of the operation
were hoodwinking the Lancashire police.
"On April 16 pictures were sent to Scotland Yard for identification, Magee
had several times been arrested in Northern Ireland in the seventies and in
1981 the British authorities tried to extradite him from Holland for offences
in England in 1978 and 1979.
"Chief Superintendent Norman Finnerty, the head of Lancashire CID, said
yesterday that Scotland Yard only informed him of Magee's identity '(15)
minutes after the escape (on Tuesday 26 April 1983).' Scotland Yard would not
comment on why it had taken so long." The Guardian, Wednesday 08.10.86.
In respect of the Weeton case there was widespread reluctance to inform
truthfully in court and out of it.
The authorities are reticent in admitting to the monitoring of Magee and Murray
before they made contact, as stated in court, with O'Connor. Questions remain
unanswered on where they went, who did they meet, what other professional
interests did they pursue while in Blackpool. Did they on one or more nights
use separate accomodation? Where did they get the bomb making equipment from?
What happened the explosive after their precipitate departure from Lancashire?
When precisely did they exit from Ireland? Who else was involved in the
operation?
"O'Connor's part in the planned attack on the pub, the Eagle and Child
Inn, involved him in reserving a parking space outside with a hired Cortina.
The car would then be moved, and a van containing the bomb would be parked in
its place. The bombers would escape in the Cortina, O'Connor said.
"But by this time the two men suspected they were being watched and
disappeared for a few days, said Mr. Amlot, prosecuting.
"On April the 25th they reappeared, when the plan to bomb the pub was
almost complete, he added. O'Connor was told to get an old van, where the bomb
assembled by Magee would be placed." (PA) The Irish Times, Wednesday 17.09.86.
"On April 26 Magee and Murray, in a hired car, became suspicious and they
sped away to Preston followed by four police surveillance cars." The Guardian, Wednesday 17.09.86.
Patrick Murray who formerly lived in Lancashire sold republican newspapers
"at the Irish Centre in Preston". The Guardian, Thursday 16.10.86.
He had filial contacts there. During his April 1983 stay in Lancashire for the
Weeton job, he evidently availed of some of those contacts.
All this known to MI5.
"But by this time the two men suspected they were being watched, and
disappeared for a few days, said Mr. Amlot (for the prosecution)."
That lying blether has shades of Evelyn Glenholmes and other cases she
disappeared from view" in it. Patrick Magee and Patrick Murray no more
vanished then than they did at Preston railway station on the night of Tuesday
26 April 1983.
Tracking Magee and Murray will have been a doddle, given their known transfer
from Ireland and because every arrangement made for them by O'Connor was in
cooperation with the authorities. Where they went, what they did, who they met,
etc., will have been known.
Because the truth is so embarrassing the authorities prefer that the rest of
the world should not know.
The basic ingredients for a bomb are primer, timer, detonator, and, of course,
explosive. In all my reading of reports on the Thomas Maguire case there is not
a single mention of these parts. Was that due to reporting restrictions or
other reasons?
Magee and Murray, if you believe the authorities, could disappear and then, hey presto, reappear.
Could they also make a bomb without components?
"On April 25th they reappeared, when the plan to bomb the pub was almost
complete, (Mr. Amlot) added. O'Connor was told to get an old van, where the
bomb assembled by Magee would be placed." (PA) The Irish Times, Wednesday 17.09.86.
So they did have explosive and bomb making equipment.
Here we ask a question: did the bomb making material come from the Pangbourne
cache, the Berkshire hoard which was publicly divulged 24 hours after it was chance found on Wednesday 26.10.83? It
would explain a lot, not least why they are keeping quiet about it.
"On April 26 Magee and Murray, in (the Raymond O'Connor) hired car, became
suspicious and they sped away to Preston followed by four police surveillance
cars. The men had been followed and photographed for nearly two weeks,
abandoned their car at Preston railway station with the doors open, the lights
on, the windscreen wipers going and their luggage still in the boot." The Guardian, Wednesday 17.09.86.
It was the Cortina blocking vehicle the getaway car (fitted with a tracking
device) with "luggage still in the boot, which was followed by a posse
of "four police surveillance cars". The British would have the world
believe that Magee and Murray again disappeared
this time at Preston railway station.
Three days after the arrest of Patrick Magee and others in Glasgow further
arrests were made in Lancashire. Thomas Maguire was one of those arrested. Separately
arrested at that time (June 1985) were James Murray and Joseph Calvey, a
brother and cousin of Patrick Murray. Both were charged with conspiring to
pervert the course of justice and failing to disclose information under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, in that they aided and abetted the escape of
Patrick Magee and Patrick Murray.
The arrests of these people indicated that their whereabouts were known and too
the fact of their having connections with Patrick Murray and Patrick Magee in
April 1983.
The trial of James Murray and Joseph Calvey appears to have begun on Wednesday
08.10.86, just one day following the jury not guilty verdict in the Thomas
Maguire case. It was as if an assembly line system of due process was in place.
Prior to the conclusion of the Calvey-Murray trial, Wednesday 15.10.86 when
the court found both defendants not guilty of the charges, only one newspaper
carried a preliminary hearing report of the trial. That was the Times of Thursday 09.10.86.
The security services well knew who Magee and Murray were and had been sitting
on them for not less than a full fortnight. In that time, who they met, where
they stayed, where they went, and their other professional interests in the
area, and beyond, will have been known.
Patrick Murray had once lived in Lancashire. He had contacts there. His brother
lived in Preston. A cousin lived in nearby Leyland. So when Murray and Magee
left their getaway car with "the doors open, the lights on, the windscreen
wipers going and their luggage still in the boot," they didn't disappear. It appeared they went to
Patrick Murray's brother James' house, who lived in Preston, and from there to
nearby Leyland, the house of the Murray brothers' cousin, Joseph Calvey.
"Mr. Nutting (prosecuting counsel) said they went to Mr. Calvey's house
and at around 10pm that night, with Mr. Calvey and Mr. James Murray to share
the driving, the four set off for Newport in a borrowed car." The Guardian, Thursday 16.10.86.
No doubt with unobtrusive surveillance keeping tabs on them all the way to
Newport, Wales; and, whenever afterwards, by ferry to Ireland for, it seems,
a luggage free journey.
From their first footfall in Britain to their exit by ferry more than a
fortnight later the police had countless opportunities to arrest Patrick Magee
and Patrick Murray. They didn't for the simple reason that it was not policy to
do so.
Had this truth been disclosed at the trial of Thomas Maguire or the trial of
James Murray and Joseph Calvey, grave political consequences would have
resulted from the disclosure. Hence the lies, omissions and eclectic insertions
by the prosecution at the hearings.
Lies, damn lies and state administered justice.
1) After writing the above I looked up the following newspapers: the Irish Press, the Irish Independent, the Irish
Times, the Guardian, and the Times, for days Wednesday, Thursday,
Friday, 27, 28, 29 April 1983, to see if there was a report on the police chase out of the IRA duo from the
Weeton-Blackpool area. No newspaper referred to the event. The respective
authorities maintained an operational silence. They no doubt considered there
was good reason for witholding from the public their success in thwarting an
IRA bombing mission.
2) The IRA were enticed into the Weeton job by Raymond O'Connor carrying tales
about the camp being used to train the SAS and RUC. A proper application of
intelligence would have been for the IRA to independently check out the claim.
It was a lie.
3) Magee and Murray had O'Connor fix them up with a flat, hire a car, rent a
garage. Latterly O'Connor was told to get an old van in which the bomb would be
stored. And O'Connor obliged without complaint. On the face of it he accepted
stoically or in ignorance that he was going to be the fall-guy. Other
considerations apart, that fact alone would give cause to question the motives
of the man. If he had no apparent fear of being caught, as he surely would, for
a bombing that would almost certainly entail loss of life and a resulting life
sentence, there must have been a hidden reason for his equanimity. There was
more the IRA leadership, or some of it, did not see or question.
4) "Patrick Magee and a man called Patrick Murray were both named in the
indictment, but they were not in the dock. The Attorney-General decided that
Magee would not be tried since he is already serving five life sentences for
the bomb attack on the Grand Hotel in Brighton.
"Murray is now living in Dublin and, although there is a warrant out for
his arrest, no attempt has been made to extradite him. In June he was filmed by
the BBC in a Dublin street. The Director of Public Prosecutions has refused to
say why his extradition is not being sought." The Guardian, Wednesday 08.10.86.
5) "Mr. Justice Boreham rejected a defence application for costs,
commenting to Maguire's counsel (Michael Mansfield): 'The less I say about
this, the better.'" The Daily
Telegraph, Wednesday 08.10.86.
A case of what we know about something being worth a lot less than that which
we do not know; and what we do know is what we have been given. For operational intelligence reasons the secret state prefers we
should be kept in the dark about that which we do not know. Thanks to the
silence and acquiescence of our politicians and the media, thats the way it
remains.
If there is a moral to the Weeton story, it is: Like the people of Schull and
the Mizen peninsula, the IRA should beware of Greeks bearing gifts.
The essence of the preceding sections that combine to form the Weeton
compilation are from a June 1994 typing. To the casual reader the newspaper
reports of the Thomas Maguire trial, the core element of this composition, the
court proceedings might appear to have been an honourable and proper execution
of due process. A closer examination of the proceedings, as presented,
establishes that this was not so.
Those of us made cynical by endemic corruption in Britain and Ireland to do
with security matters over the last thirty five years, know that where the
security services, and to a lesser extent security forces, are involved, all is
not what it appears to be. Nothing is as presented.
The ubiquitous and almost all pervading security services possess an
extraordinary capacity for manipulation and corruption. They hold to a deserved
arrogance that their lies will carry without undue challenge. The modus
operandi of lived out non existence necessitates their lies be transmitted
indirectly. In particular their many writer friends are well practised in
putting on record what happened without letting unpalatable truths obtrude.
Herr Goebbels isnt dead, he is alive and well and living in the Free West. And is only a telephone call
away.
When the unseen threats and then the buy-out attempts fail, bring on the truth
assassins and then the character assassins? Having flunked the full monty,
why not?
By the grace of good souls gone to God I am alive to challenge that
criminality, which I do alone, through a series of web presentations, doing so
also for others who have yet to learn the truth of events that overtook them or
their loved ones. It is hoped that those who read this work will help advance
the exposition, not merely on my behalf but for those, living and dead, who
have as yet no voice.
Let your voice be their voice.
