ARGUMENT FOR ETERNAL TORTURE.
BY ALEXANDER CAMPBELL.
President of Bethany College, Professor of “Sacred History,” and “Supervisor of the Reformation.”
A Campbellite paper intitled the ‘Christian Intelligencer,’ is republishing the speculations of the Reverend Alexander Campbell, issued some years ago in a pamphlet called an ‘Extra’ to the Millennial Harbinger. The title of it was ‘Life and Death.’ It exhibited his opinions on ‘Eternal Punishment;’ and his ‘arguments’ against ‘Everlasting Destruction,’ which he prefers to call annihilation; and in favour of the dogma of Eternal Life in Torment by Fire for all ‘Spirits’ continuing impenitent till their separation from their bodies at death. Thus in effect he defines the eternal punishment spoken of in scripture: and in his essay endeavours to prove that it is the ‘Death’ which awaits those who do not attain to the ‘Life’ promised to the righteous; and hence the title of his pamphlet, ‘Life and Death.’ Our obliging friend says, he wrote it in honour of our theory—‘I honoured his theory,’ says he, ‘by an Extra on Life and Death, which as far as I know he has not attempted to answer.’ I quote from memory, not having his paper at hand. He professes to think it an unanswerable performance; and it is so accepted by the 300,000 disciples, whose supervisor he claims to be. Seeing, then, that it is being reproduced in the columns of the Intelligencer, I have thought it might not be altogether unprofitable to present our readers with a specimen of this wonderful treatise—this chef d’oeuvre of logic and criticism, with which its author plumes himself so fantastically, to the admiration of a multitude that cannot think, and will not learn.
He says, ‘it is assumed by some of the advocates of destructionism that an annihilation of personal existence IS misery.’ For myself, I have never read or heard of such an assumption being entertained by any advocate of what Mr. C. styles ‘destructionism.’ Misery implies consciousness; and is defined, ‘Great unhappiness; extreme pain of body or mind.’ Now, I cannot think, that any ‘advocate’ would use the word misery as descriptive of the state of a person whom he regards, when annihilated, as nonentity—mere dust without consciousness. The assumption attributed to such advocates is convertible into the proposition that, When persons are reduced to dust, and cease to know any thing, they are very unhappy, and suffer extreme pain of body and mind. This is the assumption Mr. C. imputes to ‘some of the advocates of destructionism!’ But in this, he is too willing a witness against them, and renders his testimony incredible. He impeaches his own veracity by stultifying his own statements. In stating the views of his opponents, or of those from whom he differs, he is not worthy of belief. The assertion that destructionists assume any such thing, is so palpably false and ridiculous, that Mr. C. is at once convicted of untruth. Look at it! To make destructionists affirm that ‘an annihilation of present existence is misery,’ is equivalent to saying that annihilation is torment, which is the punishment contended for by tormentists, which destructionists deny. If Mr. C. say that destructionists affirm that, ‘the prospect of an annihilation of personal existence is misery,’ he is correct. They do affirm this. But Mr. C’s words will not admit of this construction, though the context seems to intimate it. That ‘an annihilation is misery,’ is tantamount to, misery is an annihilation of existence, or ‘the state of not being is misery.’ ‘An annihilation of personal existence’ is the subject proposed; ‘misery’ is the predicate affirmed of this subject; and ‘is,’ which is a verb indicating a state of being, or what exists, is the copula: hence, being in misery is an annihilation of personal existence, is the unambiguous assumption charged upon some destructionists by Mr. C., which if justly affirmed of them would prove them to be fools; and if not, their accuser any thing but a reputable opponent.
Mr. C’s policy in argument is to impute something to his adversary palpably absurd, as above; and then to argue against the assumption as if he were reasoning against the real thing believed by his opponent, but not expressed or contained in the imputation. This diabolical procedure excites a prejudice against the adverse party, which in itself establishes a sympathy between the prejudicants and himself, which is half the victory, where the debate is to be decided by a vote. He proceeds in this ad captandum vulgus fashion, so peculiarly congenial to his phrenology, in the paper before us, where having uttered the imputation to prejudice the reader, he goes on to argue against the prospect of annihilation being misery, which all (not some only, but all,) destructionists believe. By sophistry, which with him is logic, he makes the prospect happiness rather than misery! He works out this conclusion upon the principle that the prospect of falling down dead without warning is perfect enjoyment to the expectation of being skinned alive; so that a relative negation of suffering with him is positive enjoyment and felicity!
Having then presented the assumption to the reader, we may now introduce Mr. C., that he may speak to him in his own person. He proceeds as follows:
“In the fourth place, I argue against this assumption from the fact that it amounts to an annihilation of the sanctions of the gospel, and directly contradicts the positive declarations of the Saviour concerning eternal punishment. With destructionists there can be no eternal punishment, for with them there is no eternal fire.
“This is truly a very grave charge against any system of doctrine, and requires to be well sustained. What, then, let me inquire, is indicated by the term punishment? It is not mere animal suffering; for then the lamb would be punished for its innocence, and the dove for its meekness. Both these frequently endure great animal sufferings. There must, then, be some other pain than animal sufferings to constitute punishment. There is mental pain as well as physical pain. The martyr at the stake, though enduring much animal pain, suffers no mental agony. There must always be consciousness of guilt, or a sense of crime committed, in order to punishment.
“Punishment, it appears, begins and ends with the feeling of pain inflicted for the commission of crime. If, then, at any time consciousness of guilt, or the feeling of pain, mental or physical, because of sin, should cease, that moment punishment ceases. Punishment begins and ends with the consciousness of pain inflicted because of guilt contracted through the violation of law or the neglect of duty. Now as the destructionists assign an end to the endurance of pain because of sin, they of course incontrovertibly deny ‘everlasting punishment.’ But Jesus Christ says, ‘The wicked,’ at the final judgment, ‘shall go away into everlasting punishment,’ and the righteous ‘into life eternal.’ The same word, aioonios, everlasting, ascertains the continuance of the punishment and of the life. Can any thing, then, be more evident that the destructionists have formed a direct issue with Jesus Christ on the subject of eternal punishment? The Messiah says it is everlasting; the destructionists say it will come to an end at the second death.
“For the sake of a few mere pretenders to sound argumentative discrimination and great logical acumen, I shall give this argument the regular form, that any one disposed to attack it may immediately perceive what he has to encounter! Logically expressed it stands thus: —
“No one dispossessed of conscious guilt can be punished. But persons annihilated are dispossessed of conscious guilt; therefore, no one annihilated can be punished.
“Annihilation, or personal extinction, may, indeed, be an end of punishment, but never the beginning of it. This single argument, unless fairly met and refuted, annihilates the whole theory of destructionism. We build this argument upon no ambiguous premises. We have the word of the Saviour and Judge of the world for it. In giving an account of the final judgment, he says all on his left hand shall depart ‘into everlasting punishment.’ He uses the word kolasis to indicate what sort of punishment he means. The word occurs but twice in the New Testament. In a passage found, 1 John 4: 18, it is translated ‘torment.’ They all go into everlasting torment. How weak or how vicious the head that thence infers that torments are to end in a second death?
“It is worthy of remark that eternal life, as the reward of the righteous, is the contrast with eternal punishment, the reward of the wicked: and that this is infinitely greater than death, we learn from another passage, which we ought to regard as a distinct argument or evidence of the doctrine of everlasting punishment.”
* * *
