Kevin Winters

                        PHI 105

                        February 25, 2002

 

Objections to Anthropomorphism:
An LDS Answer

 

The LDS conception of God is unique within the Christian world in that they posit an anthropomorphic being: one of body, parts, and passions. This view has been attacked on many grounds. We will consider three: God in man’s image, limitation of God, and classical dualism/nature of matter.

God in man’s image – starting with the pre-Socratic philosopher, Xenophanes, there has been the contention that man forces his image on God.[1] This was considered of the greatest hubris, for man to exalt himself to such a degree as to force his image on God.[2] With this objection came the advent, and outright acceptance, of Xenophanes’ God: “There is one god, among gods and men the greatest, not at all like mortals in body or mind.”[3] Thus we come to the conception of God as the “wholly other,” transcendent, timeless, immutable, omnipresent, etc., with man as impotent, imperfect/sinful, time-laden, wholly finite, etc. We can see, then, that not only is God exalted above man, but man is demoted below God.

There are a few avenues of answering these objections: God placed His image on us, not the other way around. This is most explicitly stated in Genesis 9:6 – “Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image [Heb. – tselem] of God made he man.”[4] Thus, man as theomorphic rather than God being anthropomorphic is used as an argument against killing. For the argument against God’s Being and glory being antithetical to embodiment, we have Christ, “Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image [Greek – charakter] of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high.”[5] In Christ, we have the example of God, embodied and yet fully divine, showing in the least that physical embodiment does not need to be a delimiter to God’s attributes.

Limitations of God – it is imagined, in the classical Christian world, that considering God embodied, temporal, and passable constitute limitations and weaknesses inconsistent with the character of God. This presents itself primarily in relation to the limitations of space-time and limitations of physical laws.

In the former, one will argue that God’s being within space and time poses limitations on God that interfere with His classical notions of omnipotence. For example: stating that God’s omnipresence stems directly from His omnipotence. This, of course, depends on the view of omnipresence one has. If God is seen as physically present, in His Being, in the universe, then we can see that God’s omnipotence necessitates omnipresence.[6] But, if we were to take the philosophically prevailing view, that God is omnipresent in that He immediately comprehends all that happens and can immediately produce an affect in the physical world, then notions of spatio-temporal relations create no inherent contradictions and even allows for a centralized consciousness.[7] If God is not wholly present in Being, and if this is not a barrier to omniscience and interactive power in the world, then the concept of physical location have no bearing on the argument.

In the latter, one would argue, as Beckwith and Parrish have, that “if God is limited in time and space, regardless of whether his brain is in any way like our’s, it would be impossible for him to know everything instantly and simultaneously without transcending time and space.”[8] This, of course, rests on the assumption that light stands as the limit of speed, whether in thought or otherwise. Recent (within the last two decades) experiments in quantum mechanics has nearly decimated this conception. In the quantum world we have the principle of non-locality: “the essence of non-locality is unmediated action-at-a-distance. A non-local interaction jumps from body A to body B without touching anything in between.”[9] Thus, the necessity of an unextended, immaterial substance for immediate comprehension or interaction is no longer necessary.

In the Book of Moses, we find that “Moses cast his eyes and beheld the earth, yea, even all of it; and there was not a particle of it which he did not behold, discerning it by the Spirit of God.”[10] Thus, through sensitivity to the Spirit even a mortal man may perceive all particles of the earth simultaneously. With a perfected brain/mind, God would be more sensitive to the information the Spirit gives, making Him even more susceptible to this means of knowing. One could propose that in a perfected, exalted body one may direct their consciousness to more than one mental act simultaneously, thereby greatly expanding the possibilities for simultaneous comprehension.[11] Therefore, being within the limitations of time and space does not necessitate that there are no other means to know immediately that which occurs in the cosmos.[12]

Classical dualism/nature of matter – the classical conception of matter, in relation to purity and ontological reality, appears to stem from Plato: “And here too the soul of the philosopher very greatly despises the body, and flies from it, and seeks to be alone by herself.”[13] With this conception, the material world is inherently evil, confused, and inhibiting to one’s advancement. The most advanced and pure form is purely spiritual, immaterial, non-extended, etc.

There are a few answers to this objection: first, an objection addressed by the early Gnostics, is that God is the creator of the physical world. Thus, God brought the physical world into being.[14] Second, one could point to the resurrection and God’s goodness: if disembodiment is a perfected state, as opposed to connection with a physical body, then why would God literally curse us with an eternal physical existence? Thirdly, if one were to propose that Christ would forever remain embodied then we must propose, likewise, that Christ is tainted and God, being disembodied, is necessarily and ontologically superior. If disembodiment is a “great making property” and Christ lacks that, could he then coherently be said to be God given the (anthropomorphic) limitations that he would then be bound with?

There are other issues that could adversely affect one’s acceptance of a non-anthropomorphic deity. We could have discussed the epistemological rift placed between God and man,[15] the increase of intimacy with God and man with an anthropomorphic Being, among others. We can see, in the least, that the arguments of man projecting his image on God, limitations inherent in anthropomorphism being inconsistent with God’s attributes, and the classical dualism inherited from Platonic and Neo-Platonic thought fall short in their attempt to defeat the anthropomorphic concept of God. In the least, the above does not necessitate that one posit God to be anthropomorphic, though it does open up the possibility of doing so without disastrous theological/logical consequences.

Bibliography

 

 

Baird, Forrest E. and Walter Kaufmann, Ancient Philosophy, 3^rd Ed. New Jersey:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2000.

 

Beckwith, Francis J. and Stephen E. Parrish, The Mormon Concept of God: A Philosophical Analysis. Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen Press, Ltd., 1991.

 

Christensen, Kit R., Philosophy and Choice: Selected Readings From Around the World. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1999.

 

Herbert, Nick, Quantum Reality: Beyond the New Physics (New York: Anchor Books, 1987 [1985])

 

Paulsen, David, “Must God Be Incorporeal?” Faith and Philosophy 6/1: 76-87.

 

Wigram's Englishman's Greek Concordance (1839/1903). Online. http://www.blueletterbible.org/index.html.

 

Winters, Kevin, “Kant’s Unknowable God: A Musing,” Online. https://www.angelfire.com/az3/LDC/kants_unknowable_god.htm.

Outline

I.                    Introduction

II.                 God in man’s image

a.      Xenophanes as primary introduction to non-anthropomorphic deity

                                                               i.      Hubris for man to project his image on God

b.      Biblical texts explicitly state it is man in God’s image

c.      Christ stands as God embodied, yet fully divine

III.               Limitations of God

a.      Limitations of Space-Time

                                                               i.      God within time threatens His omnipresence

                                                             ii.      On generally accepted view, this is true

                                                            iii.      Given the most common philosophical conception of omnipresence embodiment may be allowed

1.      Omnipresence does not necessitate non-anthropomorphism

b.      Limitations of Physical Laws

                                                               i.      Impossible for God to know cosmos immediately without transcending space and time

1.      Under assumption that light is the limit of speed

                                                             ii.      Moses was able to see and comprehend, through the Spirit, the earth and every particle of it

1.      Not incontestable to propose that God’s perfect, exalted body is capable of more

IV.              Classical dualism/nature of matter

a.      Matter is inherently evil and to connect God with it is to lessen Him

b.      Got created the physical world, which would be below Him given this conception

                                                               i.      One may claim that the original creation was perfect, but then one contradicted himself in the evil nature of matter

c.      Resurrection proves an argument against this view

                                                               i.      Would God literally curse us with a body for eternity if we would be better off without one?

d.      Christ stands as fully God yet tainted with a physical body

                                                               i.      One would have to propose a stringent subordinationist view to hold to the above conception

V.                 Conclusion

a.      In the least, the attributing of anthropomorphic embodiment to God does not pose disastrous theological consequences