BODY, TEXT, IDENTITY

THE ISLAMIST DISCOURSE OF AUTHENTICITY

IN MODERN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

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IN MODERN TURKEY

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This thesis attempts to gain an understanding of the ways in which body, text and identity constitute the discourse of authenticity in the case of Islamism of Modern Turkey. It takes on itself at least three tasks. Firstly, it concerns with the general treatment of body and the discourses and strategies of embodiment within the limits of Islamic religion. For locating this problem within a sociological context it deals with the relevance of body and text in the sociological context. Body is a complicated concept at the core of several issues in sociology. Here, it is referred ultimately in order to represent social change in general; in its relationship with text, which represent culture, ideology, jurisprudence and doctrinaire scriptures. And text is treated as functioning as a social actor. This task, thus, brings the study to the problem of change and authenticity within Islam.

Secondly, it takes the abolishment of the caliphate as a point of departure, and tends to be a history of a diaspora characerising, perhaps determining, a postcaliphate condition for the Islamists in Turkey. The reactions of an early generation, represented by İskilipli Akif, Mehmed Akif and Elmalılı Hamdi, of the Islamists, to decaliphatisation is characterized by the vocabulary of (dis)embodiment. It is argued that their reaction was characteristic in constituting the identity of the Turkish Islamism in terms of a vocabulary of a diaspora. Then, a second generation of diaspora, beginning from Eşref Edip to İsmet Özel, is specified in terms of the disputes on overcoming or maintaining the diaspora. It is suggested that the recent developments in the political life in association with democratization have diminished the sense and discourse of diaspora.

Thirdly, regarding both issues, the thesis tries to find the channels wherein the discourses of authenticity flow. The discourse of authenticity is analyzed and its relevance with the trinity of the thesis (body, text, identity) is tried to be found. Indeed, like the state of diaspora, the discourse of authenticity too, is a modern discourse common to almost all experiences of the constitutions of political identities. While the problem can be outlined in this general framework, as "modernity makes everybody live in diaspora and seek for an authentic existence," it is shown that in Islam the problem has deeper origins, considering its outline of body, text and identity.

Keywords: Embodiment, Disembodiment, Diaspora, Decaliphatisation, Postcaliphate Condition, Habitus, Body Politic, Politics of Body, Accommodation, Body without Organs.

ÖZ

BEDEN, METİN, KİMLİK
MODERN TÜRKİYE'DE ISLAMCI OTANTİSİTE SÖYLEMİ

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Bu tez modern Türkiye örneğinde beden, metin ve kimliğin, sahihlik söylemini oluşturma biçimlerini anlamayı sağlamayı hedeflemiştir. Üzerine üç görev almıştır. Birincisi, İslâm'da genel olarak bedenin nasıl ele alındığı ve tebeddün (bedenlenme) söylem ve stratejilerinin ne olduğuyla ilgilenmektedir. Bu sorunu sosyolojik bir bağlama oturtabilmek için beden ve metnin sosyolojik konum ve münasebetini açığa çıkarmaya çalışmaktadır. Göründüğü kadarıyla beden çeşitli sosyolojik konuların tam merkezindeki bir çok komplikasyona sahip bir konudur. Burada, en geniş anlamıyla toplumsal değişimi; bunun kültür, ideoloji, fıkıh ve doktrin kitaplarını temsil eden metinle olan ilişkisini kastetmek üzere kullanılmaktadır. Metin ise toplumsal eylem sürecinde bir aktör olarak ele alınmaktadır. Böylece bu görev çalışmayı, İslâm'da değişim ve sahihlik sorunuyla ilgili kılmaktadır.

İkincisi, tez, halifeliğin kaldırılmasını kalkış noktası yaparak Türkiye İslâmcılığı için bir çeşit halife-sonrası durumu niteleyen bir diasporanın tarihi olmaya yöneliktir. İskilipli Atıf, Mehmed Akif ve Elmalılı Hamdi gibi figürlerce temsil edilen bir ilk kuşağın halifesizleşmeye karşı sergiledikleri tutum, bir çeşit beden(siz)lenme vokabularisiyle ifade edilmektedir. Bunların tavrının sonraki Türk İslâmcılığının siyasal kimliğinin oluşumunda bir diaspora vokabularisi nitelemesiyle karakteristik olduğu savunulmaktadır. Daha sonra, sözkonusu diasporanın sürmesi veya üstesinden gelinmesi çabaları bağlamında, Eşref Edip'ten başlayıp İsmet Özel'e uzanan bir ikinci kuşak ayırdedilmekte; son zamanlarda siyasal hayattaki gelişmeler paralelinde, demokratikleşme ölçüsünde diaspora algısı veya söyleminin azaldığı savunulmaktadır.

Üçüncüsü, her iki konuyu gözönünde bulundurarak, tez sahihlik söyleminin aktığı kanalları bulup ortaya çıkarmayı denemektedir. Sahihlik söylemi çözümlenmekte, tezimizin üçlemesiyle (beden, metin, kimlik) münasebetleri ortaya konulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Aslında, disapora söylemi gibi, sahihlik söylemi de neredeyse tüm siyasal kimliklerin oluşum deneyimlerinde ortak olan modern bir söylemdir. Her ne kadar sorun bu geniş çerçevede, yani, "modernlik herkesi bir diasporada yaşatmakta ve sahih bir varoluş arayışına sürüklemekte", şeklinde ortaya konulabilse de, İslâm'da sorunun, beden, metin ve kimlik tasarımları gözönünde bulundurulduğunuda daha derin kökleri olduğu gösterilmeye çalışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Tebeddün (bedenlenme), Bedensizleşme, Diaspora, Halifesizleşme, Halife-sonrası Durum, Habitus, Siyasal Beden, Beden Siyaseti, Uyum, Organsız Beden.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Diaspora, Modernity and Turkish Islamism

Modernity has been characterized by a series of profound developments in the ease with which people cross from one state to another. The social and geographical, cultural and structural, vertical and horizontal motilities have almost made modernity what it is, so that it has been very difficult to talk on a native position for any one element or subject in modern times. Notwithstanding who the native is and where the home is in modern times, has been the main focus of the attempts to cultivate political identities, and at the heart of these questions lies the quest for authenticity. This study concerns itself with the conception and experience of this journey by the Turkish Islamism that is to be characterized by a very special experience of diaspora.

Given the fact that Islam is, or provides, a blueprint of a social order, questioning its present existence in the Turkish social life would manifest that it is not at a position corresponding to this role. Because, it is also one of the most prominent facts that Islam has withdrawn from its position of determining the social life and has been confined to almost mere individual sphere. There is a strong revivalist movement, however, claiming a restoration of the social life to fit Islamic ideals. As a point of departure, we should admit that Islam is not unique in this respect. All religious or ideological movements in our time have been charged with a notion of migration, diaspora and a nostalgic idealization of some "homecoming". Inasmuch as modernity is characterized by the high degree of mobility, it would be accompanied by discourses of diaspora pronounced by several ideologies and by quests for identity and authenticity.

In this thesis, we will distinguish the uniqueness of this experience in the Turkish case which has experienced modernity in all its corresponding institutions. I hope, this will provide an appropriate access to conceptualize

the special interrelationships of the trinity of "body, text, identity", which altogether constitute the nature and determine the direction of modernity everywhere. But the composition of all these elements in the process of Turkish modernization includes some additional aspects to be analyzed here. In this respect, I will focus on certain complications of individual and communitarian processes of embodiment in claim of authenticity based on correspondence to texts (of religious, ideological or doctrinaire kinds) with the process of modernization. The complications in question are resulted by the fact that modernization too is embodied through nation-states at political level, which requires some strategies of governing the individual bodies in association with some symbols, certain kinds of wardrobes and manners. The body, then, becomes a site of struggle between modernization realized through a nation-state and the quest of the religious men for loyalty to the content of the texts. This tense struggle results in a serious sense of identity accompanied by a strong discourse of authenticity. While all these are almost common in all experiences of modernization, I will proceed showing its bolder lines in the Turkish case. The boldness of this aspect in Turkey, particularly in the identity problem which would be identified in a strong discourse of *diaspora* and authenticity among the Islamists, is to be sought for in the special routes of Turkey to/through modernity. This thesis will, thus, concern itself with a descriptive analysis of the formation of an Islamist identity at the tense interrelationships of the body and the Islamic texts which bring about the elaboration of a discourse of authenticity. A strong theme of *diaspora* among the Islamists of Turkey, leading themselves to conceptualize the existing political power as a foreign element in their sense of body politic, and then, making them feel themselves as exiled in their own land, provides very rich materials to illustrate certain aspects of the discourse of authenticity at the core of the constitution of an identity.

In this respect, I will try to reconstruct the Turkish history of the Republic in terms of the abolishment of the caliphate (which I will choose to call as "decaliphatisation" or a post-caliphate condition), for, this has played an important role in the formation of the Islamist consciousness at this period. This history will include the early responses of the Islamists to the abolishment of the caliphate and the establishment of the Republic. I will argue that this rupture has had some immediate impacts on the individual conceptions of body, for it has had to be realized through some

operations on the individual bodies. Apart from the Revolutions which attempted to penetrate into all details of life, the Republic has created a new notion of "embodiment" as a crucial aspect of the new identity. Therefore, I will propose an alternative conceptualization of this struggle in terms of the quest of identities for embodiment. That requires a conceptualization of the Republic and the Caliphate through the body as metaphor, of course applying the rich accumulation of the "body politic" discourses by the political scholarship. The early responses of the Turkish Islamists will be, thus, illustrated by the personal and textual analysis of the writings of Mehmed Akif Ersoy, İskilipli Atıf Hoca, Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır and Said Nursi. I will try to show that, those figures have all conceived the establishment of the Republic as an immediate attack on their own individual bodies, just because, their conception of body politic was closely connected with the individual embodiment. The depiction of their responses, however, should not lead the reader to be inspired by a claim of authenticity on behalf of the caliphate. This depiction is not to provide a defense of the caliphate as an ideal organ of the "Muslim community" but to identify it as an element in the constitution of the Islamist consciousness. It will be quite meaningful to show that, therefore, with the abolishment of the caliphate, they suddenly felt themselves as exiled in their own land, even though they all had been also critical against it (caliphate). In practice, the consequences of this feeling appeared in Mehmed Akif as a migration from his land (to Egypt), and as a poetical silence; in İskilipli as a resistance against a delivery to the political embodiment of the Republican government, which would result in his execution; in Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır as a seclusion which was a way of escaping from the penetration of the political power into his body, which bring about a new language that would be characterized by the "man who grows roses"; and in Said Nursi as a quest for restoration of the Islamic body politic to/through some communitarian practices. All these figures, thus, manifested their response in such a way that elaborated a strong sense of diaspora in the Islamist consciousness. It will be shown that the early periods of the post-caliphate condition were determined by this discourse and by some corresponding (a)political practices. By the special history proposed for the depiction of the Turkish Republic in this thesis, I will also try to show that the Islamist identity has realized some shifts in terms of the sense of diaspora in parallel with the process of Turkish democratization. It will be argued that

beginning from the early fifties, with the government of the Democratic Party, up to the rise of the Islamist Parties through the National Salvation Party, Motherland Party led by Turgut Özal and the Welfare Party, Turkish Islamism has gradually come to be reengaged with the existing body politic. One of the major arguments of this thesis will be, however, that this reengagement has not been occurring by way of complete self-negation but through some strategies corresponding to the so-called postmodern political condition, such as dislocation, deconstruction and, thereby, appropriation of the existing symbolic capital. In this respect, once followed through its major lines, the process makes one think that the Islamist movement started with a *diaspora* and arrived at a welfare condition. Undoubtedly, it was easier to affirm such a statement until the heydays of the government of the Welfare Party which was dissolved under the pressures of the dynamic forces of the state. At that time, the thesis had already been completed; therefore, these new developments could not be included. But the arguments suggested in the thesis are not falsified by such developments. Since, they just claimed to be a descriptive analysis and history of the formation of an Islamist identity in relation with the religious texts and their individual and communitarian embodiment. Of course, all this history in question is also part of the general process of modernization. As I mentioned above, the trinity of body, text and identity, in all possible compositions come together to form the content of the modern problem of authenticity. Apart from the religious quest for the true meaning of the text and for obedience to its content, the discourse of authenticity usually appears as part of nostalgic responses to modernity which is commonly conceived as an exile from original situations. Thus, neither the discourse of diaspora nor the quest for authenticity will be considered as exclusively characteristics of the Turkish Islamism. Here, the Turkish route to/through modernity will be distinguished as a specific path.

Indeed, it is usually indicated that the Turkish route to/through modernity has not followed, and couldn't follow, the same path as the Western societies did. Thus, modernity hasn't recurred in the same course in Turkey and in the lands having being called "developing" or "underdeveloped". These countries have followed a dependent route to/through modernity, as indicated by Therborn (1994), being realized through an imposition of the modern institutions over the society by a westernist governing elite. Therefore, modernization process has taken

place in these societies through acute struggles between several groups, between the old governing cadres and the new elites, between the political embodiment of a new ideology and the disembodiment of the former body politic. In this thesis I will try to find the consequences of this process and its reflections on embodiment and the conception of embodiment. I initially intended to make a general study of the Islamic politics of body in its relation with the religious texts such as the Qur'an, *sunnah* and *fiqh* (jurisprudence), and of the historical course of this relation. In this context, I wished to remain within the limits of the sociology of body. In so doing, I hoped to conceptualize a unique manifestation of the relationship of body and text in the Muslim society, in the context with the hermeneutic discussions of this relationship. This would help us to understand the nature of the Islamic attitudes towards changes faced throughout its several experiences of civilization. This attitude has been the focus of a considerable literature, from inside or from outside, particularly within the orientalist circles, asking the true nature of this attitude: challenging or accommodating the social reality and change? The answer favoring the accommodating aspect of Islam would have to explain, then, what is the role of a calling, of speaking, of a religion embodied through a text and a community? Did they attempt just to accommodate the ongoing reality? Were they part of that reality? Is a text, having spoken centuries ago and functioned through a history, a passive receiver of the reading of the ongoing reality or has it have any agency role to play? To put it in reverse, favoring the challenging aspect of Islam, we have to be faced with the question of what the limits of the changing reality are and where the meaning-content of a text is determined. Is there a textual violence in question against the ongoing reality that may hinder novelty? What are the problems which arise from a logocentric reading of a religious text? Etc.

The arguments advanced in answering these questions in the case of Islam have split into two. Some have decided that Islamic jurisprudence has been constituted through a logocentric connection of the text and reality, so that the latter has been hold under the boring pressure of the former. Others have noted the accommodative nature of religion, from its emergence to its various formations throughout history. The Islamic law has been characterized by an arbitrariness of the *qadi*-justice, a stereotype which possibly owes to Max Weber, and the everyday jurisprudence was considered as the celebration of bodily desires, that is, hedonism. The

sociological studies range between these two poles. Therefore, opposing each other and falsifying their empirical conclusions, they have been taking place at the same time to embody an orientalist interest in Islam. Indeed, ironically, a criticism of orientalism can put these two positions side by side without making any additional word. That is, depending on the supreme values determining the scientific interest of the observer, both positions are potentially appropriate to a service for and against orientalism.

In this thesis, however, my objective is not to go into a detailed criticism of some orientalist notions, even though they are usually mentioned and criticized several times in the following chapters. Instead, this thesis concerns itself with anatomizing the modern or postmodern situation of the connection between the religious text and the body in the case of the Turkish Islamism in the period of the Republic. In this connection, the religious text is conceived as a potential for governing the body, exercising violence against the possible resistance of the body, while the body is used to imply all desires, changes and developments, not necessarily limited to individual levels. The body is also the site of life, of continuous production of new desires; in short time it becomes dissatisfied with the old ways, manners, cultural conducts, legal codifications etc. This statement requires the clarification of certain relevances, at least, of the text and of the body.

The Relevance of the Text as a Social Injunction

If a text is not endowed with a capacity to satisfy the needs and desires of the body, then, a violence caused by attack by the text and an acute resistance by the body would be inevitable. But what does it mean "a capacity of the text to satisfy the desires?" Being invoked by a Derridean position, such a question is posited only to be replied negatively. Indeed, most of the questions concerning the nature of the relationships between the text and reality or body[1] are mostly invoked by criticisms of logocentrism which has been represented best by Derrida. That is not to say that a

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[1] Throughout the thesis the 'body' and the 'ongoing reality' or 'change' are to be used interchangebly inasmuch as the specific relationships of the texts with change and reality are in question.

Derridean position, that is, a poststructuralist deconstructionist path will be followed here in understanding the issues under consideration. This study will even represent a critical approach to that position for having preferred an explanatory position to an interpretative *(verstehende)* one. Since, such a position would have to treat all texts as actually divorced of any predetermined meaning and all meaning content which are thought to be attributed by the readers who are determined by a variety of social, historical and intellectual factors. The text never says anything but it just stands there, for the reflection of the readers. The Qur'anic text could not constitute an exception to this, and it would be read as a constituted, passive product of the reading activity which is embedded within several biographical conditions. Therefore, the problem of authenticity at hand is not but a metaphysical question that should be rejected at the outset. The Derridean position tells us to reject all considerations of the problem of authenticity for their having been rooted in metaphysics; not because of a decision that they fall outside the limits of a scientific study, but because they are essentially "wrong". A position which can not hold an authentic position, thus, is advocated to decide to the wrongness of an entire domain. Then, that position will constitute an extremist emphasis in underestimation of the role of the text in a social action. The considerations of the text, however, are not limited with that position; they constitute a rich hermeneutical tradition which might satisfy properly the relevance of the text in social action.

In this thesis, I treat the text as an active social injunction in the course of social action. While that may seem just to oppose a Derridean treatment of the text, it wishes to be in dialogue also with such criticism of logocentrism. A complete adoption of a way of deconstruction, however, would lead to a mere self-denial, a way from which Derrida and most of the poststructuralists could not escape. What happens if we see the text as a social actor? Indeed that is an idea inspired by Ricour's treatment of the process of social action as a text and applying to it his hermeneutical procedure (1980). No doubt, if we reverse the procedure and treat the text as a social actor, there arise some problems. The most important one is caused by the definition of a social action. We know from Max Weber that "sociology is a science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects" (Weber, 1978: 4). This conception of sociology requires in the

definition of social 'action' all human behavior when and insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it. Therefore, the social action has to take account of the behavior of the others, and is thereby oriented in its course. As Turner (1974: 41) points, this explicitly excludes the subjective behavior of a solitary actor and the subjective behavior of individuals, or an individual to animals and to inanimate objects. Indeed, it can be said that the classical sociology has almost always necessitated a dyadic point of view to the definition of social action. That is why they almost commonly thought that religious behavior is not social if it is simply a matter of contemplation or of solitary prayer. Bryan S. Turner indicates a considerable sociological literature on the relationships with God, some activities taking account of only the existence of God who do not reply socially at all. The question is whether such actions should or could be considered as social.

The text may be thought to find its sociological relevance in a similar way. The problem begins not just with the solitary nature of the reading activity, but with adopting a deconstructionist approach to a text. At first sight, one could appreciate that there would be no problem in the case of reading commonly and agreeing with a group of people on the meaning content of a text. The action is undoubtedly social, although the role of the text here is still ambiguous. Here, again, the role of the text as a social actor, acting by attributing some meanings to the social phenomena in which it participates, is not guaranteed. The group may realize a social action of their own, and their appeal to the text may occur just as a behavior to an inanimate object, passive by its nature which can not reply to this behavior. This position of the text during the social action would make us exclude it from the sociological interest.

However, I do not adopt such a conception of the text in a sociological procedure. My contention in this thesis will be that all observations about the place of the text in social action could be interpreted on behalf of considering it an independent social factor. Indeed, what is at the heart of the discourses of authenticity in religious experience, above all, is the true understanding of a text addressed to the subjects of social action. While some observations may prove that a reader attributes any idea he wishes to the text (an observation that may be applied to all histories of the texts), this can not prove the inductionism at all in sociology concerning the text, thanks to Popper. And here, the Derridean approach to the text seems to be

very simplistic in reducing all relations of the text to a mere construction of the reader. An exaggerating critic of logocentrism seems to feel difficulty in explaining why a text is required in a social action? Why do men apply to the texts and has the text not any thing to do in response to this appeal? Is it so inanimate that it can not have any influence on the process of social action? If there takes place such an influence, on the account of whom should it be carried, of the text or of the actor interpreting the text?

Undoubtedly this is to a large extent a hermeneutic discussion, ranging from a point of full determinism of the meaning content of the text, that is, the logocentrist treatment of it, to the point of the determinism of the reading actor. The poststructuralist and postmodernist approaches to the text represent the latter, while the former is thought to be represented by a metaphysics of presence shared by religions and by Cartesian positivism which is considered but a mere inheritor of the legacy of the Western religious tradition. In this thesis I hope to be able to indicate that neither a logocentric nor deconstructionist approach could be applied for understanding the true role of the religious text in the social actions of an Islamic society. If needed, a Heideggerian or Gadamerian treatment of the text on the ground of an ontological dialogue can be more appropriate to be applied in understanding the relevance of the text as a social factor in an Islamic social action. As well-known and mentioned in this thesis, both Heidegger and Gadamer have recognized the possibility of truth and put it at the core of the problem of authenticity. Heidegger's formulation of authenticity is discussed in the Conclusion. Following his path of ontological hermeneutics, his student, Gadamer, insisted that this truth which was put forth as the unconcealment of the thing in itself, *aletheia*, is not realized through a series of methodological procedures. It is, rather, related with a practical goodness, of life, of ontological position etc. For a textual hermeneutic, however, he elaborated the nature of a text very curiously without crediting any nihiliation of the textual existence of the text itself. Then, while criticizing the positivist approaches to the text which, he thinks, exaggerated the method in the realization of truth, he doesn't seem to lead to a relativisation of it, as many have thought, such as Gellner (1992). His ontological and dialogical hermeneutics, thus, may provide some possibilities for formulating the text as an active element within the process of reading, in particular, and social action in general. For, he belongs to a tradition letting the art work speak on its own.

In this thesis the relevance of the text is not elaborated more directly. In taking account of the role of modernity or postmodernity, which are thought to make "all that is solid melts into air" (Marx, 1955), on the possibility of authenticity, we will try to give a panorama of the situation of the Islamic Juridical activity which is the most sensitive domain to the changing relationships of the text and reality. The Second and Third Chapters should be read considering the points made above. Since one of the aims of this thesis is to make a sociological analysis of the religious discourse of authenticity in relation with its course through modernity, the text become relevant in terms of its potentiality or possibility of agency. As we will see in the following chapters wherever a claim or a discourse of authenticity is in question, there emerges also some political and intellectual ideas and identities dedicated to a text. Of course the analysis of such discourses would require more than a search of literary correspondence and coherence. The relevance of the text, thus, being described, a considerable part of the relevance of the body might be clarified. But we still need to elaborate on some significations on the relevance of body in a sociological study.

The Relevance of the Body in a Sociological Study

In the beginning, it should be noted that the body as a sociological interest is usually applied here to imply more than its own existence. The body sometimes will be used as a metaphor carrying the implications of the social change, development, desires and even the history itself. Undoubtedly, what motivated the constitution of a sociology of body concerns us. Behind this interest lies the ever ignored domain of knowledge. The body has been neglected, because it has been considered, even in the sociological discipline, as a derivation of mind, once considered as the centre of agency. It is, however, the body that determines the direction of a social agency. All social agents are carried by some bodies diverged as man, woman, child, girl, boy, king, father, mother, priest, leader, worker etc. The embodiment of each social actor follows its own characteristic path and it takes a painful and long-term processes to make a transition between the corresponding bodies, if needed. Nevertheless what motivated the constitution of a sociological interest on body as a scientific discipline has suggested that no sociological interest can be accomplished without taking the embodiment

into account. Indeed, this thesis, included the discussion of the body, in one sense, to compensate this disciplinary neglect.

Although a sociology of body as a discipline has recently been formed, and the boundaries of the disciplined area are still to be modified and discussed, the body has never been far from the sociological interest. But this interest is rather to be identified as a matter of the sociology of the discipline, rather than as an accumulation of knowledge on the body. I mean, it would be difficult to distinguish a body of knowledge produced on the relationship of the new-emergent and growing types of power with body in the early sociological texts, except that the concern of sociology, together with other human sciences, has had much to do with the body. If the nature of the interest of power on body has realized some radical transformations during the periods within which the human scientific disciplines have emerged, these disciplines should have a great influence on the transformations. Then it would be quite meaningful to take into consideration the nature of the disciplines as new disciplining strategies of the body, as Foucault would say (Foucault, 1977).

In his analysis on the capitalist society and the role of state apparatus in organizing and pressing the body of the workers, Marx, and more truly the Marxists, identified a strong tension between the struggling bodies. The working body in this identification was always pictured as an object of oppression reduced to an actor producing the surplus value. Capitalist society has encompassed it from all sides, and precluded any formation of true consciousness that would make its carrier aware of his body. The body of the worker was alienated and rendered an organ of the body of the capital. This analysis has led the Marxists to make an outline of organization contrary to the capitalist state apparatus. Such an organization should be so strong and detailed that it could not only overcome the negative effects of the capitalist society on body, but it would also constitute the basic element of the body of revolution. As it seems in all its quests for overcoming the present apparatus and establishing a new one, the focus of Marxism has, again, been on the organization and the government of the body either through a revolutionary ethics or concrete measures taken during its representations at political levels.

In Marx, universal human nature is defined in terms of the fact that men, in the generic sense, labor collectively on nature to satisfy their needs and in the process transform themselves into sensuous, practical, conscious

agents. Nature exists as an independent reality, but it is constantly transformed and appropriated by human labor with the result that "nature" too becomes a social product. Marx avoids a relativist position by suggesting that what is universal to the human species is the need to satisfy their needs through the appropriation of nature, and what we all share in common is the transformative potential of praxis. Thus, in Marx, the body is both the vehicle and the site of labor; it exists but it is constantly transformed by human agency (Turner, 1984: 5).

In his sociological studies, Émile Durkheim resembled the society to an organism and, thus, he participated into a bio-sociological discourse which dressed the body metaphor to society. Through this metaphor, the individuality was to be conceived as the organic functionality of the societal body. The analysis of the society as something rapidly transforming into an industrial and complex entity, together with all its negative and positive effects as *anomie* and as division of labor, coincided with various processes occurring on body. This was the process of passing from, so to say, a "body without organs", with all its totality and unity as a result of its simplicity, to a body as an organ. Moreover, such a metaphor has had a constitutive effect on the body. The body of the division of labor has been divided into itself according to the role it takes into the societal division of labor, i.e., social body, so that it participates in solidarity with other bodies in some ways. This result, however, is preceded by the temporary disharmony of the organs among themselves which was to be conceptualized with the term *anomie*. Hence the society passing from the *anomia* state is a sick body, a patient of the social scientist.

Weber, too, treated the religious asceticism, bureaucracy and the military as a regulation of the body. Especially where rationality is institutionalized in bureaucracy and administration, it is embodied as a regulation of the body. It can even be said that Weber is the most systematic sociologist of the body regarding its relations with the new emergent social institutions of modernity. His application of the "iron cage" metaphor characterizes the consequences of rational regulations of society under bureaucratic institutions. And his analysis paved the way before Foucault's analysis of the modern disciplines as the government of the body, which, by itself, is merely a product of the discourse.

Foucault was concerned with the long term rationalization and management of the body and how the body arises as the main target of

contemporary politics. It was the problem of the body, for him, which lied behind his medical histories, the analysis of sexuality and his general concern with the question of disciplines. Foucault's interest in the body was related to his concern for dissent and resistance, since in Foucault's theory the body is a site of social struggle. His analysis of discipline implied a sociology of the body which would be compatible with Weber's theme of rationalization and the metaphor of the iron cage.... Throughout his work (he) regarded the body as the effect of discourses and as the outcome of institutional -administrative practices; just as Weber treated religious asceticism, bureaucracy and discipline as a government of the body (Turner & Stauth, 1991: 191). For Turner, Foucault's treatment of rationality, especially where that rationality is institutionalized in bureaucracy and administration, is arguable. The government of the body is consequently the basis for a government of society. Such a conceptualization of the body, however, leads to certain problems which is best expressed in the structuralist conception. The body could not be a site of resistance, but merely the construct of the anatomical and juridical map. It is an abstract entity, the constructed effect of historical discourses.

The relevance of the body with the sociological interest may be clarified in this way. To summarize it, a sociology of body seeks to make clear the mechanism of the politics of body in any society, of constituting the organs of the body during a socialization process. By its very definition, it could not take the body as a natural but as a discursive product. But it is definitely not less important to emphasize that, following Foucault's analysis of the discipline as a dimension of any scientific interest, the impact of such a sociological interest, too, would have a profound influence on the process of the constitution of body.

At that point, before passing to the relevance of body in the sociological study of Islam we have to make two more points. From the above remarks we can deduce that the conventional frame of sociology, including the materialist direction has been determined by the tacit presumption that we, the Men, *have* bodies to be governed rather than we *are* bodies or we are *doing* bodies. The immediate implication of this assumption lies in its origins in the Cartesian legacy which produces a duality of mind and body. The paradoxical aspect of this point is that this view of embodiment, idealistic by nature, is shared by the positivist and materialist doctrines as well as the religious and idealist ones. This

perception of the body necessarily presupposes a self-conscious and self-sufficient sovereign Subject. The body, as well as many other worldly things, is at the disposal of this Subject. In such a conception, neither material forces nor any other factor could ultimately determine the deeds of this subject. The result of this conception of the body, as it seems, is at least twofold. On the one hand the body is conceived as a pure device of the Cartesian Subject, probably the most important part of the stock and standing-reserve army at His disposal. Then the body would be treated as a technological devise apart from the individual subject himself. The body in this case would be an arena of the technological operations, or the unfolding of the Being itself, in Heideggerian sense. The body, is treated here just as the man treats the nature, through which the technology's unconcealment becomes apparent (Heidegger, 1977: 14). That is, supposing to *have* a body results in reducing the body to a mere machine (Synnot, 1993: 7) that belongs to a more different time and being than the time and existence of its carrier.

On the other hand, such a line of criticism towards the conventional conceptions of the body might create a reverse direction of the duality on behalf of the materialist consideration of the body. At the beginning of the study, we should remind that there is a clear problematic in studying the course of embodiment and the constitution of self-identity from the religious point of view. Because, as indicated by Foucault, "the body is the crucial debate for materialistic theory" (Foucault, 1980) and so it would also be of a materialistic function to focus on body. Foucault wonders "whether before one poses the question of ideology, it wouldn't be more materialistic to study first the question of the body and the effects of power on it" (Foucault, 1980: 58). An Islamic politics of body, however, is usually supposed to run by focusing on the word, on what opposes the body as a material entity. Indeed, this supposition is to run a reductionism about religions as they have to be idealist by their very nature. While that is not to say Islam includes higher degree of a materialist tendency than one can appreciate, it is to say at least that Islamic politics of body has a very strong emphasis on embodiment. The famous tradition of the Prophet advises the believers to act as they believe, otherwise, he warns, they would come to believe as they act. That is in fact the very affirmation of the action of the material embodiment on mind, belief and ideology.

On Methodology

I have already been profoundly influenced by several criticisms against following rigorously certain methodological procedures in a scientific study. Especially, in social sciences, the shortcomings of such a pure loyalty to a single line of methodology are more problematic, of course, at least because of the very nature of the *geistessvissenchaften.* Notwithstanding this, a study in social science has not to be free from every charge of consistency. Even it must determine and declare its own rules and obey to them during the study. Thus, considering the declaration of a line of methodology necessary, I can say that, what I do mostly corresponded to what Maurice Duverger called as "documentary observation" (Duverger, 1964), and to some extent, to an ontological hermeneutic of the facticity of the object of the study. Because, the data collected for analysis depended mostly on historical texts in as much as they have been thought to carry and reflect the traces of some social facts.

Doubtless that the derivations that would be made from texts could never get rid itself completely of logocentric reading of the history. Even the least possibility of remaining in the metaphysics of text-centrist analysis is disabled with the universal subjectivism prevailing in the readings of all historical texts. Furthermore, the reading of the historical cases usually goes hand in hand with an assumption of a teleology. The teleology in history, as a result of a historical reading, is not but to be constructed. Indeed, this thesis has not a claim to avoid this shortcoming of the documentary observation in history, as well as in relatively actual cases. Rather, I will try to find out a historiography not from an exhaustive position but from *one* human point of view, which would have to focus on its objects in similar way of the determination of human interests during the appropriation of knowledge (Habermas, 1971). This will inescapably reconstruct a direction in, and attribute unity to, history in order to establish its own teleology. As Foucault and many critics of historiography have warned us, the history is something to be written over and over again, at every moment. Because, the history is not the science of searching what really has taken place in the past, but the matter of reflection on our time. Thus, I think, our time requires a self-reflexive approach to us as observers of the documents, texts, social actions and facts. Therefore, I have chosen to call what I wanted to do as "ontological hermeneutic of facticity", for, this would help me pave

composed of systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures. One of the arguments discussed in this context is that modernity, as a grand effect making all that is solid melt into air, and secularism do not dominate at cognitive or mental levels but through set of practices organizing the material, social and cultural life, that is, *habitus*, in accordance with its own cosmology, so that the religious ones become irrelevant in this new world. This argument will be affirmed to a certain extent, but it would be added that the religious aspiration is not something to be reduced even to such a level, while it will also be shown that the religious *habitus* is much more durable than what those who exaggerate the power of modernization might think. Consequently we hope it would be seen that a study has not to be tied with a materialistic position for not being caught up by an idealism, or vice versa. Thus, in any way, any focus on body from an Islamic point of view will have to be faced with this problem.

In Chapter III, I will try to find out several compositions of our trinity of body, text and identity during the Islamic history through some selected texts belonging to the Islamic tradition of jurisprudence. In these texts, I tried to find out the employment of the body as metaphor carrying something outside itself. The major findings exhibited here are as follows: in Islamic history of jurisprudence we see a great emphasis on manners and individual embodiment. This emphasis has tended to treat the body as metaphor implying (carrying) the power of the God and of the Islamic community. I will try to show that, once treated as metaphor, the body works to imply and operate a mechanism of making cultural identity and difference. In this respect, by the empirical data presented here, firstly, following Norbert Elias, I will try to make a comparison between the development of a *Court Society* through the civilizing process of the Western society and the early Islamic formation of Madinah. I will try to show that there is strong tendency toward civilization in the everyday practices appeared in Madinah. For example, all these practices included a strong emphasis on empathy which is usually referred to characterize the modern urban condition. Subsequently I will concentrate on Ibn Taymiyyah's famous study in which he defines the borders of the straight path. Here, it will be shown that, the notion of the "straight path" which played a crucial role in the constitution of Islamic identity included also a strong mechanism of making difference from "others". In addition, I will

introduce the special regulations of foods and eating in the Islamic
jurisprudence, which were mainly concerned again with making identity
and difference. In this respect, I distinguished what one can call "an
ontology of flesh", which regulated the rules of the lawful and unlawful in
eating, in accordance with the religious-nationality of that who consecrated
the animals. As a good illustration of the nature of the conditions for
authenticity in Islam, it appeared that the "Name of the God" plays very
crucial role in rendering an action, even an ordinary action, Islamic or
unislamic. As a matter of fact, apparently, it is really very difficult to
distinguish the Islamic action from the nonislamic one, and that is also to
constitute a high potential of the text for accommodating the ongoing
realities. That is, of course, by no means to decide on the goodness or
badness and the authenticity or inauthenticity of that accommodation.

Chapter IV will deal with another application of the body as metaphor
in the political sciences, to suggest a special historiography for the
establishment of the Republic and the abolishment of the caliphate in terms
of the circulation of the body politic. As mentioned before, one of the main
motives guiding the sociological interest on body is the assumption that the
body is not a natural attribute given to man but it is but a consequence of
social and cultural constructions. Following this assumption, we would have
to think of nothing as "given" by our nature but as attributed by social
processes which are responsible of the existing power relations. The
extreme point of this view is represented by the so-called postmodernist or
poststructuralist thinkers such as Foucault, Baudrillard, Deleuze, Guattari
and Derrida. Here, their views are described just to indicate the boundaries
of the discourses on the origin of the body. Their observations and
evaluations on the constitution of body as carrier of the self, however, will
be considered and taken into account as elements of a reflexive sociology.
Furthermore, some concepts and approaches developed by them are adapted
in accordance with our purposes. For example, to imply that all body is a
product of social processes, Deleuze and Guattari have appealed to Antonin
Artaud's famous metaphor of "Body without Organs" as a project of
liberating the body, by which they thought that all organs are attached to
body by being defined and charged with some social and cultural roles.
From here, a radical program of liberating body can be inferred to owe to be
without organs, indeed as they pronounce explicitly. Here it is not analyzed
and discussed in detail whether they really believe in the emancipating

potential of such a program or in the possibility of its realization, but rather, just catching the connotation it invokes, I try to apply it to explanation of Turkish Islamists, given the basic elements of the existing political situation. In this term, the basic element of the Turkish Islamism is indicated as its disembodiment due to the dis-organ-isation of its community.

We should remind that, here, we know from Aristotle through most of the political thinkers of the East and the West onwards, that the functioning of the political apparatus resembles the functioning of the body. The phrase "body politic" has therefore been immediately taken to mean the state apparatus itself to imply this connection. Thus, I go further in Chapter IV and find some connections between the individual embodiment and the political embodiment. Given that all nation-states are embodied through a direct control of the individual bodies which were rendered "citizens", and the emphasis made by Islamic Jurisprudence on the bodily existence and appearance of a Muslim, the boundaries of a possible antagonism could be appreciated. In this respect, I try to discover all possible antagonisms which now the Islamists try to promote in the connections between the political embodiment of the Republic in expense of the political disembodiment of the Muslim community. This connection has been defining a conceivable condition for the Islamists that would be characterized as a postcaliphatic one. The dominant mood of this condition is experienced as a diaspora.

In Chapters V, VI and VII, I will try to give a story of this experience of diaspora. Indeed, it should be added here, as mentioned above, that the experience of diaspora is a common one produced by the higher degree of mobility, a characteristic of modernization. But that experience, inasmuch as it is on the focus of sociological interest, is usually produced by the spontaneous and internal development of modernity. In the Turkish case, however, the development of the experience of diaspora goes hand in hand with the way modernization has taken place. Thus, correspondingly, diaspora has been imposed, and this has been a very important constituent element of the political identity of the Turkish Islamism. Indeed, it can be said that it is this discourse of diaspora that has led us to find out its connections within the conceptions of individual and political embodiment and the religious texts. In these three chapters, thus, I will try to analyze the discourse of diaspora in a chronological order. Thus, we begin with Mehmed Akif Ersoy, İskilipli Atıf Hoca and Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, as the

first generation who felt suddenly disembodied and manifested their reactions through some characteristic ways. These ways are outlined in the relevant chapters. It is indicated that in all their attitudes there are some common elements that would have much to do with their conception of political and individual embodiments. For example, the political disembodiment has created serious problems in the realization of the major part of the jurisprudence, which is considered the major scene of the religious embodiment. This has rendered almost all of their participations in the public sphere suspicious and irrelevant. Therefore, they felt all existing spaces as "nowhere" because, apart from being undefined by the juridical codification, these spaces became charged with the role of embodying a foreign will, the will and body of the "other", and nullified the content of the jurisprudence. Because, in all their writings and attitudes, in companion with the corresponding religious dictums also, they knew that what makes a major part of religious jurisprudence possible is the political embodiment itself. That is, in one sense, because Islam is inseparable from the political or any other sphere of life. Therefore, conceiving the outside as "nowhere", they had to seclude themselves, growing rose, actually escaping or resisting against the counter-embodiment. We will show that, by so doing, they transferred a large legacy of attitudes to their sons and grandchildren, who are exampled by Necip Fazıl, Nuri Pakdil, Sezai Karakoç and İsmet Özel. They are mentioned as a second and third generations of the diaspora, following the corresponding historical course of developments in Turkish political life. Those too are studied in terms of their common features in their secluded and heavy personalities as a manifestation of the undeclared diaspora. We try to extract and infer some elements of diaspora from their writings and attitudes, and to discover some traces of their differentiations.

One conclusion of these chapters is that what characterized the diaspora of all those figures was alienation to the political and social life, and the conception of the body politic as an alien entity, albeit with some degree of differentiations. In Chapter VII, however, I try to identify cross-roads in the political experience of the Welfare Party and Fethullah Hoca. With all their activities they, on the one hand, have made manifest another coin of the diaspora, that is, a double-speaking in the way of camouflage, referring to a state of distorted communication, in Habermasian terms. On the other hand, speaking or acting under the camouflaging manners, they have come to be assimilated within the existing body politic, appropriating its problems, its glories and its destiny. By so doing, they can be said to have found some

new ways of transforming the existing body politic in, so to say, postmodern ways of politics, such as deconstructing and appropriating the symbolic capital of it, in Derridean and Bourdieuean senses. In any way the result of this story can be briefly stated in these words that the Turkish Islamism started to an experience of diaspora in the early years of the Republic, and reached in the Welfare through integration within the Turkish parliamentary democracy. In the following relevant chapters, the details of this story are presented.

In Chapter VIII, I try to find out the relevance of the problem of authenticity in the contemporary sociological and philosophical circles in regard to the problem of identity, as a conclusion for this thesis. To repeat, my aim in thematizing the issue of authenticity is not to make a decision on (in)authenticity of a human position. Rather, I want to argue that a sociological study can not decide about truth or falsity of a claim of authenticity, except being in service of a political or ideological stand. I will mention some interpretations including such evaluations on the (in)authenticity of certain tendencies within Islam, from outside, and I will try to demonstrate that all these interpretations serve to some political stands. Among the contemporary sociologists of Islam, the most prominent one is that which makes distinction between ideological, political, intellectual or "minded" Islam and the popular, spontaneous, apolitical Islam. A rich philosophical and intellectual literature and discourse accompany this preference and help one decide that the "minded" Islam represent an obvious deviance from an authentic point of view. While my contention is to argue that any possibility of producing any understanding or interpretation of the religion can not be eliminated, I will also try to show that the decisions made in such a way serve to strengthen certain ideological and political positions, which are sustained by the present conjuncture. Consequently, I will try to anatomize the proliferation of the conception of authenticity through the analyses of the discourse of self-identity and diaspora given the post-caliphatic condition of the contemporary Islamism. Considering the problem of authenticity which would have to arise in such conditions as I will outline in this thesis, I will refrain from giving an absolute role of determination to the process of modernization. Because, the religious discourse of authenticity has its own measures; the decision of what is true or what is false or what is authentic and what is not should lie in the inner logic of the general frame of religion.

In short, we should repeat that the aim of this study is three fold. On the one side it is concerned with the general treatment of body and the discourses and strategies of embodiment within the limits of Islamic

religion. On the other side, especially while choosing to observe as a historical case the manifestation of this treatment in Turkey from the abolishment of the caliphate onwards, it tends to be a history of a diaspora characterizing, perhaps determining, a postcaliphate condition for the Islamists in Turkey. And, thirdly, regarding both issues it tries to find the channels wherein the discourses of authenticity flow. These three approaches go hand in hand within the thesis, requiring the explanations of each other, so that it would be not so easy to appreciate which interest has been the original one. But I have chosen to put on the main focus the analysis of the "Islamist discourse of authenticity in modern Turkey". For, in fact, all we will try to do in this thesis can be read in terms of the attempt to explain the religious quest for authenticity in a modern society.

Transliteration: Any English study that draws upon materials in Arabic, Persian and Turkish poses considerable problems of transliteration, especially as we must incorporate colloquial as well as literary usages. For minimizing these problems, I tried to employ a consistent system for consonants in pronunciation as much as it is possible. According to this choice diacritic are omitted; the plural of words in languages that have "broken" plurals is formed by adding "s" to the singular, the Arabic 'hamza' and 'ayn' are indicated by (') at the midword, as it is in Qur'an and without distinction at the beginning of the word. When persons, writers or some famous words are known to have a preferred spelling of their name in a European language, I generally use this form.

CHAPTER II

THE RESISTING BODY, *HABITUS*
AND MODERNITY

Sunnah, Jurisprudence and *Habitus*

One of the conventional views on the sociology of body with regards to religion relies on the assumption that religion has no ultimate goal other than being situated in and dominating the believers' experience of physical and physiological reality. For being situated in the physical reality of the individual, each religion has its own strategies or manners for establishing a control over the body through regulating the behaviors and practices of the everyday life. Because, in the religious ideas, it is assumed that the special manner of regulating the everyday life constitutes the body that would, by each action, function as a metaphor referring to an event in the spiritual/divine world. Such an insight in the sociology of body, however, reveals at least two problems in the study of religious discourses or processes of embodiment. One is caused by the possible requirement of a materialistic perspective in any sociological focus on embodiment. At first sight, this might be expected to contradict with the presumption that religion entails an idealistic or transcendental perspective even in the study of body. That is because the body, in religion, is conceived as a metaphor of the spiritual beings. In religions, the body is conventionally seen as a mere function of the spirit. It has, therefore, no any ultimate value other than being a carrier of the divine will. No doubt, it may be argued that this relationship of the body and the spirit in the religions is only one kind among the others that had prevailed in the history of religions. That is, there may be found some versions of this relationship that may favor the material embodment against the spirit. Even such a proliferation may be seen within the same religion as well as in between different religions. In the history of a religion, this may be represented by an internal binary opposition such as that occurred within the Islamic history as a dispute on the possibility of the

Subject: Is the wo/man a creator of his/her actions or not? In other words, what is the role of the wo/man during the constitution of his/her action, considering the ultimate role of the God? That is the famous discussion occurred between the Mutazilate and the Asharite schools of the early Islamic history (Watt, 1948: 62 ff.). Even in this opposition, however, it doesn't matter taking part in favoring the man as the creator of his action or in favoring the God as the ultimate determinate of the action. In any way, what is promoted here is a transcendental Subject as an ultimate desicion-maker on the bodily action, which would charge on the body a burden of carrying the divine will. Then, to insist on the material dimension of the embodiment as constituting the self-identity or the ideological world of the religious men would necessarily conflict with the conventional religious arguments.

That would also be the source of the second problem, that is, to run the risk of imposing explanations on the process of social action, ignoring the definitions of the social actor. It is fairly obvious that this would challenge the Weberian conception of action, which requires taking into consideration the actor's definition of his own action. As a matter of fact, Weber has demonstrated the shortcomings of the reductionist approaches of the economist, idealist, or more generally of the positivist kinds, which imposed their own explanations/theories on the action without taking into consideration the actor's definitions or self-images (Weber, 1978: 66 ff.; Turner, 1974: 4).

The sociology focusing on the process of embodiment and on outlining some laws ruling on this process, however, would have to precede the constraining factors rather than the agency factors in understanding the constitution of the self. Having aimed to find some relevances of the *sunnah*, as a collection of the codes for Muslim's everyday practices, with Bourdieu's conceptualisation of *habitus*, I suggest this as a starting point for some comparative remarks. Because, as I will try to show in the following, the Islamic emphasis on the manner of individual embodiment is stronger than a sociological attempt of mapping the body. The very common indicator of this point lies in the definition of the religious commitment which necessitates the practices as well as the faith. Furthermore, the very conventional notion based on a Tradition of the Prophet asserts that "if one doesn't act as he believes he begins to believe as he acts". Added to this is the intensive debate made on the causal relationship between action and

belief where the major school of the Sunni Islam (that is the Ash'arite) already decided that "the action is an inseparable part *(cüz)* of the belief". Actually the other school (that is the Maturidi one) never denied the significance of the action; but rather, it stressed that one who committed a sin may not necessarily be charged with a mental affirmation of this sin (Izutsu, 1984; Ibn Taymiyyah, 1985). That is to say, the causality suggested in the Muslim conception of the practice is not more spiritually determined than it is materially determined. As a matter of fact, this religious affirmation of the material forces led the religion to improve and apply some strategies for certain fashions of embodiment. And that has perhaps been why Islamic religion has had a strong emphasis and effort on detailing and proliferating the body, and codifying its all movements.

Above all, in the etymology of the word *Islam*, that derives from the original letters of *s l m,* which means commitment, delivery and peace, there lies the interest of looking for and submitting oneself to the divine will. The divine will is manifested in the Qur'an and in the Prophetic news *(ahadith)*, about all details of mental, spiritual and bodily practices. While the interpretative disciplines such as jurisprudence and exegesis had not been constituted and established yet, the predecessors of the Muslims, the *salaf,* i.e., the early generations of Muslim society, have taken all details of actions and practices of the prophet, as a model for regulating their everyday practices. Apart from the ultimate authority to codify the bodily actions, gestures, thoughts and beliefs, all the actions and doings of the Prophet were conceived as the best interpretation that could be made for, and the clearest manifestation of, the Qur'an.

The word *sunnah* in Arabic means habitual practice, customary procedure or action, norm and usage being sanctioned by the tradition. The special word *sunnat An-nabiy* means the *Sunnah* of the Prophet, i.e., his sayings and doings, later established as legally binding precedents (in addition to the Law established by the Qur'an) (Wehr, 1974: 433).

The word is employed in the Qur'an to refer to the general manner or the will of God in as much as it is manifested through history, in the destiny of the circulation of the societies. That meaning of the word is the one inclined Ibn Khaldun (1967) to deduce a general philosophy of history which has commonly been accepted as the prototype of (infrastructural) deterministic approach in sociology. As Özsoy informs us (Özsoy, 1994), in the Qur'an, the word is used, as *sunnah*, to refer on the one hand to the

"ways of the previous, ancient or predecessor communities" (5/38; 15/13; 17/77; 35/43) and on the other hand to the way of God's ruling over the destiny of the worlds as well as of the circulation of the *dawla*, the body politic, among the communities (17/77; 18/55; 33/37; 33/62; 35/43; 47/23). Here, the word is applied to declare that those (communities) that do not follow the appropriate way for salvation (Islam) are destined to the *sunnah* of the God, that is, they will have to decline. People can not escape from this destiny which is, in fact, somehow a natural consequence of their own total actions. This is a *sunnah* in which "no change and no turning off' can men find (35/43).

The meaning of the *sunnah* differs in the definitions of various Islamic disciplines such as the *Hadith*, Exegesis *(tefsir)* and Jurisprudence *(fiqh)*. For the *Hadith* discipline the *sunnah* is composed of the occurrences taking form in the life and character of the Prophet appeared as words, deeds and affirmations (of some ideas or actions) (Sibai, 1989: 49). For the *fuqaha* it meant all words, deeds and affirmations attributed to the Prophet. What should be mentioned in these definitions is the qoutational feature of the *sunnah* which is almost identical with the *hadith* itself. Notwithstanding the literary meaning of the word as mentioned above the definitions given by muhaddithîn and fuqaha are found more appropriate for the actual meaning of the *sunnah*. In his *Islamic Methodology in History* Fazlur Rahman, for example, insists on the repeated or repeatable aspect of a behavior as a condition for being a part of *sunnah:*

> *Sunnah* is a behavioral concept —whether applied to physical or mental acts— and, further, denotes not merely a single act as such but in so far as this act is actually repeated or potentially repeatable (Rahman, 1984: 1).

Thus, a *sunnah* is a law of behavior whether instanced once or often. Because, the behavior in question is that of conscious agents who can "own" their acts, a *sunnah* is not just a law of behavior (as laws of natural objects) but a normative moral law. Hence, Rahman thinks of the element of moral "ought" as an inseparable part of the meaning of the concept *Sunnah*. Indeed, the English equivalent of the term reveal some important aspect of *sunnah*, that is the tradition aspect. Therefore, as Rahman insists, the actually repeated or potentially repeatability feature is immanent in a *sunnah*. Notwithstanding, he tries thereby to deduce a kind of natural

selection law for the prophetic behaviors in order to exclude some behaviors of the Prophet from the binding domain of the *sunnah*. What would be distinctive in *sunnah* in this sense is its dependence on a voluntary intervention. That is because of the etymological sense of the word which entails a road opened or habit introduced by someone. As a matter of fact, when the famous *hadith* declared that "whoever introduces a good *sunnah* will be rewarded ... and whoever introduces a bad *sunnah* will be punished...", the meaning of the word was manifested and it was thought that a *sunnah* is a constructing behavior, but can be regulated quite voluntarily. In another *hadith* quoted from the Prophet, he says: "you will follow all *sunnah* of your predecessors (that is, the Jews and the Christians)". Following all these implications of the literal meaning of the word, Hayri Kırbaşoğlu deduced that all that is included in the content of the concept can be equated with the concept of Islam itself. Then, in one sense, Islam is the *sunnah* of the prophet whose all life was composed of the best possible application of the Qur'an —a *sunnah* consisting the detailed elaboration of the life as a whole (Kırbaşoğlu, 1993).

This conception of *sunnah* have some implications in terms of the structuration theory into which the conception of *habitus* is involved. Especially in Bourdieu's solution for the problematic of the structuration approach, this conception of *sunnah* is very relevant because of the immanent emphasis on agency whose role is admitted during the constitution of action, and on the interaction of the action (body) with the belief (spirit). The constitutive/structuring function of a *sunnah* relies on the idea that an action has an immediate correspondence with the movements of the heart. The heart follows the movements of the body. Therefore, every moment of the body is reported in accordance with the unity of the religious theology and cosmology. In this idea, the influence of the material embodiment on the general conception of the worldly and other-worldly affairs is admitted, but it is also recognized that introducing a *sunnah* is an open alternative before the wo/men. Beyond any doubt, Wo/man can be active in the constitution of the established *sunnah*, once thought as a *habitus*, but one can usually not appreciate where s/he would be moved through such an intervention. That is to point the usefulness of Bourdieu's *habitus* in conceptualizing the Islamic practices, the *sunnah* of the prophet, and thereby in the explanation of the tension occurring during the discussions of Islamic reformations. In the conventional Islamic *doxa*, it is

believed that the religious domain, the boundary lines of the sacred and profane spheres are/could be determined only by the will of the God excluding any other authority. Because, following the lines of argumentation on *habitus* as consisting of unconsciously processing, structuring and structured structures, God, is the only one who could appreciate the structuring results of an intervention to those spheres.

This modelling practice had been added to the structuring process of an *habitus*, but with the primary agency of the Prophet relying on the dispatches from God. Because of the habitual character I will suggest of the *sunnah*, the early Muslims didn't experience such a problem of accuracy of the news as those who now are problematized by some orientalists and some Muslim researchers who participate in these discourses (Rodinson, 1973: 144 ff.; Watt, 1983; Rahman, 1984: 29 ff.; Öztürk, 1996). Since the volume of the *hadith* collection was composed of such a structured *sunnah* which was structuring the judging reason as well, there were no such serious requirements for constructing a series of measurement for asking the accuracy of a news *(hadith)*. Therefore, I think, while those researchers problematize the accuracy of the prophetic news, because of the fact that they were reported after two centuries of the death of the Prophet, they seem to have not appreciated sufficiently the habitual character of the *sunnah,* which was also ruling as a reason of judgment and thereby as the best criterion to decide about the accuracy of a news. Probably as a covering memorandum for every gesture or particular action there was sought for an *hadith*, but this would have to be just a justification of and so following the current actions. Thus, the historical reliability or validity of those words was not relying solely on the personal capabilities of their narrators, namely on their justness, deep memories, and righteous, or on the ensured continuity of the narration in terms of the unity of meaning. The most significant guarantee, as it seems, relied on the *habitus* of the early Muslims, which initiated in front of their eyes and through their own process of embodiment. This *habitus*, as a structured tradition of certain practices, seems to have constituted a source for, at least, the hermeneutically convenient appropriation of the *ahadith*. Indeed, all this is an issue related with the problem of authenticity which I want to discuss in the eight chapters in terms of the religious and social scientific discourses. Here I want to suffice just with mentioning the relevance of Bourdieuan *habitus* in deciding the factual authenticity of a news.

The Islamic *sunnah* had been structured initially through the immediate regulation or intervention of the Prophet, while *habitus*, as described by Bourdieu, was constituted in practice and was always oriented towards practical functions. Then it is composed of

> systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organising action of a conductor (Bourdieu, 1990: 53).

Here, the overall references to *habitus,* as conceptualized by Bourdieu as essentially the product of history (p: 54), are not made to say that it coincides the *sunnah,* as rightly identified with the Islamic religion as a whole by Hayri Kırbaşoğlu (1993), in all aspects. Undoubtedly, much of the features Bourdieu attached to the *habitus* could be adapted to most deeds of the prophet as once experienced and reported. However, it should not be forgotten that Bourdieu's *habitus* serves in its own paradigm to its own theoretical goals. In his theory of practice, for example, Bourdieu tries to overcome the problem of structure and agency problem within the limits of the structuration theory. Compared with Giddens in this same circle of structuration, who has been engaged with the legacy of classical sociology as mediated through Parsons, Bourdieu attempts to transform various traditions of French structuralism. His difference with Giddens is that 'if Giddens has understated the nature of objective constraints in the structuring of action, then Bourdieu has understated the autonomy of action in his structured account of the *habitus*' (Turner, 1993: 90). This is notwithstanding their common insistence on the reflexivity of the self. Thus, in his theory of practice, Bourdieu, trying to overcome the agency/structure dichotomy, arrives at an almost reflexive theory, which has much to do with Giddens's insistence on the reflexivity of the modern self. And perhaps that latter pair of words, i.e., the 'modern self', might be indicated as the additional difference of the two structuratist theorists. That is, while Giddens treats the reflexivity as a good merit attributable only to the modern man in terms of 'self-monitoring' or 'self-controlling', for Bourdieu, the

stress on reflexivity encompasses his general theory of action of all
societies, without being limited to modern societies. All human practices are
reflected or embedded within the *habitus*, which works on the one hand in a
spontaneity without consciousness or will, but on the other hand 'opposed as
much to the mechanical necessity of things without history in mechanistic
theories as it is to the reflexive freedom of subjects 'without inertia' in
rationalist theories' (Bourdieu, 1990: 56).

What Bourdieu tries to tell through his conceptualization of *habitus* is
that wo/men changed with a series of remaining tendencies which bring
about some sort of practices. Since individuals act in accordance with such
internalized systems in society, which are called by Bourdieu as cultural
unconsciousness, we can explain how the individual action are regulated
and become facile. For, the individual actions do not always consist of a
conscious obedience to the rules. Human actions can achieve some unity
and consistency owing to such structured tendencies without appealing to
some conscious intentions. Then we reproduce some norms and values
imbedded and located within the spontaneity of our behaviors based on
habitus. Bourdieu requires a sociology of the body as part of his more
general ideas about *habitus* and practice. Body in his work appears as a site
on which is inscribed the cultural practices of the various classes. Training
for any kind of these practices (as sport, dancing, working etc. each of
whom belong to a consumption of a class) thus, presents Bourdieu with a
powerful illustration of the relationship between social membership,
regulation and embodiment. Thus,

> bodily discipline is the instrument par excellence of every kind of
> "domestication": it is well known how the pedagogy of the Jesuits made use of
> dancing ... The gesture ... reinforces the feeling which reinforces the gesture.
> Thus is explained the place that all totalitarian regimes give to collective bodily
> practices (Bourdieu, 1990a: 167 [quoted by Turner, 1993: 91]).

Bourdieu's theory is a carrier of dispositions which are themselves the
conduits of interests within the *habitus* or life-world of the actors. As Turner
distinguishes it, although the *habitus* is a practical logic and is therefore
vague and indeterminate, Bourdieu writes about the *habitus* in a very
deterministic fashion. The *habitus* is a system of dispositions with reference
to a given place, which produces the regularities in modes of behaviour. In

this respect Bourdieu appears to retain a deterministic and structuralist logic in which the body is primarily the bearer of cultural codes so that there remains little room in his work for some phenomenological understanding of the 'lived-body' as an essential aspect of action and intention.

The theory of practice and *habitus,* thus*,* has much to do with the problem of authenticity in the transmutation of religious actions and words. In this special case, the relevance of *habitus* with the practices advised or established by the deeds or words of the Prophet, namely his *sunnah,* through its interpretation, might be very functional in various respects; above all, as mentioned above, in respect of accounting various efforts of testing a word of the prophet in terms of its historical authenticiy. It seems that a valuable criterion for accounting an historical 'presence', in Derridean sense, of the word can be reproached by the hermeneutics of the *habitus*, alongside with its possibilities of authenticity. Since we shall return to the problem of authenticity, it is needless here to go on further details. But it should be indicated here that, as it seems, the problem of historical truth of the words of the Prophet can not be treated without referring to the nature of authenticity, which have much to do with the ongoing *habitus* established by the prophet and maintained through a sacredly-motivated sensibility of the early generation of the Muslims. So, the reliability of a news or a tradition did not depend on the factual measurement of whether this word occurred or not, but rather on the practical (habitual) state of the word, rendered plausible and valid by the agents of the *habitus*.

Habitus, History and Modernity

The religious discourses of change and reformation are perhaps not taken less maliciously in any religion than they are in Islam. Notwithstanding, the discourse on the place of change and reformation in Islam is quite sophisticated. Apart from the juridical system of ijtihad which has encountered the novelties, and interpreted them in correspondance with the original texts, there has been also a strong tendency that has constituted the religious world as constant as it is conceived in its cosmology. Under the influence of this tendency the novelties are at best considered as *bid'ah*, that correspond to the religious deviance. Indeed some of these *bid'ah* are considered good ones, namely *Bid'at-ı haseneh.* But just because of the

negative mark of the term, *bid'ah* can not be a creative, but only
accommodative (legitimative) element of the religious action. It can not
easily get rid of its lower connotations. For, there is a statement by the
Prophet, usually referred to in this context and quoted by most of the *hadith*
collections, saying that: "All *bid'ah* is deviance, and all deviance leads to
the hell" (Muslim, Cum'ah: 43; Abu Dawood, Sunnah: 5; Nesai, Iydayn: 22;
Ibn Majah, Muqaddimah: 7; Dârımî, Muqaddimah: 12, 23). The word,
however, has led to controversies in terms of the scope it corresponds, so
that it necessitates a duality of the religious and non-religious affairs
regarding the novelties. The word has been applied by some to all novelties,
even to those which emerged in the details of the life as tools, technologies
and manners. Undoubtedly, distinguishing some of them as *bid'at-ı hasanah*
has been functional in overcoming the religious will to resist against the
natural demands of the life. Therefore, it has been affirmed that if the
novelty is in religious sphere it is an absolute *bid'ah* which has been
forbidden by the Prophet. If it is in the non-religious sphere, then it should
just be asked whether it clearly neglects a religious rule or not to be allowed
or not. Considering that it has been claimed that using iron spoon is *bid'ah*,
so it has been forbidden, one can understand the role of such a distinction.
As for the novelties in religious domain, here too, the views have been
differentiated. We know that, in the time of the Prophet, there was no
minaret, prayer beads *(tesbih)* etc. Furthermore, the prayer of *Tarawih*,
performed at *Ramadhan*, was not performed within the community. It was
decided first by Omer, the second caliph, after the death of the Prophet, to
perform the *tarawih* within the community. These are by definition to be
considered as *bid'ah*. But their positive function in the performance of the
religious affairs has led the fuqaha to open the gate before the category of
the good *bid'ah* against the bad *bid'ah* even in the religious sphere
(Davudoğlu, 1977).

It is often argued, however, that the early Islamic texts are deprived of
any historical notion or emphasis just because of the constant nature of the
Islamic thought. In this respect, Montgomarry Watt's recent study *Islamic
Fundamentalism and Modernity* is a very good example to be mentioned
here, so that just looking at the titles of the chapters in the book, we can find
some simple reductionisms of the Islamic conceptions of time, change and
history. Obviously he characterizes the Islamic thought in these titles as
having an 'unchanging static world' because of 'the claim of finality' and

'self-sufficiency' 'based on the idealization of Mohammed and early Islam' etc. (Watt, 1989: 1-23). For Watt, those essential features of the Islamic world are the most important factors in the underdevelopment of the historical consciousness of the Muslims.

Indeed, Elisabeth Özdalga, referring to the criticisms of Watt who attributes lack of any notion of historicity or historicity to Islam, has tried to show the positive Islamic responses to novelty and the European character of the notion of history. Thus, she has drawn attention to the fact that to adopt 'modern' or Western conceptions of history is not simply a question of changing intellectual, and/or academic perspective, but something that challenges the deepest roots of religious faith itself. History for Özdalga,

> is much more tightly knit to our deepest existential concerns than thinkers like Watt, really seem to be aware of... His contention is in itself controversial... (but) rather than dismissing his thesis all together it seems wiser to draw attention to the ambivalence and undecidedness in Islamic circles today in relation to historicism.
> ...The crucial point is that to the extent that Watt is right, rejection of history constitutes an interesting and thought-provoking, rather than simply reprehensible aspect of modern Islam. One challenging trend within Islam is exactly represented by the efforts spent in conquering and overcoming history. Denial of history is obviously an important part of an Islamic struggle against the dominance of the West, for a cosmology and identity of its own. The struggle against history may therefore be interpreted as a struggle for the maintenance of faith based on a theocentric cosmology. The whole problem is closely related to the question of how to keep the myths, the absolute truths alive in a disenchanted world. So instead of simply condemning the lack of historical perspectives within Islam, one should try to deepen the understanding of the religious motives behind the attitude (Özdalga, 1996).

Özdalga, thus, hermeneutically trying to deepen in understanding the religious motives behind the resistance of the Muslims against change, anarchy or history in general, refrains from falling into a historicist reductionism. Her considerations of the religious practices as embedded within a coinciding theological cosmology show that an operation into the religious practices could not be achieved in, so to say, a sterilized state of being. Just as Bourdieu's *habitus,* they are organically interrelated with a time-space conception or cosmological and theological theories. Any intervention to the Islamic *habitus*, the everyday practices which has much

to do with the daily-weekly-monthly-annual time circle of the Muslim conception would have to create a deviance from the projected style of mental or practical life of the Muslims. That must be why the origin of the regulation of the limits of the sacred and the profane have always been considered as a divine affair. Nobody can interfere in this domain; so that, any interference is considered *shirk*, that is a claim for taking a share from the exclusively Divine authority. In several religious discourses there are a strong emphasis on the point that "the finite human mind couldn't understand the true hikmah (wisdom, reason) behind the commands of the God." It is also why some methodological debates on searching for the "goals of the commands of the Holy Law" called *maqasid al-shariah* (Şatıbî, 1990) has always existed with certain kind of resistance in the history of Islamic jurisprudence.

In spite of all these negative discourses about change, history and novelty, which are identified with somehow orientalist orientation, and which are also shared by many Islamic modernist approaches, there is indeed another, almost opposite, tendency in Islam, usually pointed out by the same orientalist reasoning, in terms of accommodation (Weber, 1978: 604 ff.). The problem of novelty is overcome through some interpretative techniques generally gathered under the name, *ijtihad*. It has always been accepted that the human understanding would change as the generations pass, and that these changes would create the need for interpretation and adaptation of the religious premises to new conditions. Apart from, and alongside with, this expectation there is a "much-cited tradition *(hadith)* which ascribes to the Prophet Mohammed acknowledgement of the periodic need for regeneration *(tajdid)*, and for men who will appear as regenerators or renovators *(mujaddiddun)* in the Prophetic mould, albeit without the Prophetic label or authority" (Lawrence, 1984: 70). Undoubtedly, this Tradition presupposes (or is understood to presuppose) that the reference point for accommodation will occur within the boundaries of the Muslim community. The paradox of the employment of opposite arguments in accordance with the same tendency, namely orientalism, became apparent here. While the lack of the notion of history, change and reformation is so stressed to show the place of the Islamic society in a stagnant position that works without history, the religious discourses of change are explained in terms of the incapability of the Islamic religion to shape and regulate the conditions, and, then, of its inclination to surrendering the conditions. The

theme of the essentially accommodative character of Islam is much-pronounced by the orientalists. In the sociological tradition this theme is reproduced and settled especially by the treatment of Max Weber of the early formation period of Islam (Turner, 1974). Weber, referred to the fact that Islam took the major concepts of tribal humanism —generosity, courage, loyalty and veracity— and gave them a new religious content and that Islam, by its very accommodation to the sexual and economical conditions of the Mecca or Yasrib cities. Indeed, by doing so, he reproduced the nineteenth century orientalist notions about the sexuality of Mohammed and the idea that Islamic religion was not but a derivative of the old religions. Bryan S. Turner, in one of his early studies examining the interpretations of Max Weber on Islam, indicates Weber's approaches to Islam in many respects as the polar opposite of Puritanism. For Weber, Islam accepts a purely hedonist spirit, especially towards women, luxuries and property. For Weber:

> Given the *accommodating ethic of the Qur'an,* there was no ascetic ethic of world-mastery could emerge in Islam... It was the needs of warriors as a status group which determined the Islamic world-view and not a psychological attitude or a social value which shaped Islam [Italics mine] (Turner, 1974: 13).

Turner, tries to show that Weber was wrong empirically to regard Arab warriors as the social carriers of Islam, and that the ignorance of the motivations of the Islamic texts would mislead any sociological interpretation of the early Muslims. Turner's arguments warns us not to be tempted to think of the Islamic politics of regulation of everyday practices from the point of view of the classical texts of sociology, which are essentially motivated by some orientalist-based ideological presumptions. By doing this, relying on the interpretative *(verstehen)* sociology which was developed by Max Weber as a result of a chain of criticisms against the positivist tradition in sociology which, Weber thought, ignored the actor's own conception of his action during the social action, he substitutes the early religious texts, in order to understand the understanding of the early actors about their actions, for the explanatory approaches.

This creates, however, another problem in terms of an appropriate understanding of the facts. That would also be recognized and admitted by Turner himself, in his later studies, especially in his study by which he tried

to identify and eliminate the orientalist tendencies in Marx's studies (Turner, 1978), and in his recent study by which he reviewed his biographical course towards orientalism (Turner, 1994). In his *Marx and the End of Orientalism* he had recognized that his approach mentioned above, of going to the earlier texts to understand the actor's understanding and thereby the attributes he gave to the early nature of Islamic society were essentialist. Essentialism, as the essential character of orientalism, he means, had caught his anti-orientalist approaches. As a result of his way to poststructuralism he, then, has come to the point that he found his earlier approaches in loyalty to logocentrism, because they took the texts as objects of study and inferred from the texts the essential characteristics of the Islamic society.

The Destiny of Religious *Habitus* in the Postmodern Condition

The Bourdieuean concept of *habitus,* with much of its implications, might be functional in understanding and explaining the true position of a religious existence through embodiment of its followers in the modern and global society. Modern society, especially in its late stages which is sometimes referred to as 'postmodern', 'cultural logic of late capitalism', 'radical modernist', 'mass consumer' etc., renders the circulation of the habitual elements very fast. So that the values, cultural elements, beliefs etc., become subject to production-consumption process at global levels, which run at the highest speed. If appropriate, the *habitus* could be conceived as Marx's solid(s) which had to 'melt into air' in the process of modernization (Marx, 1955: 13).

It was this rapidly changing character of the modern or postmodern society that led Baudrillard to conceptualize the all on-going realities in terms of simulations. In contrast to all arguments that claimed the state of uncompleted project of the Enlightenment on behalf of modernity, he asserts that we are in the time of hyper-realization of the ideals of the Enlightenment. Thus, while identifying the Transparent character of the evil, he writes *An Essay On the Extreme Phenomena* (Baudrillard, 1993). Using medical terms, especially the oncological ones, he thinks that the problem of simulatory character of the reality does not arise from the lack of the true reality but comes from the plenitude of the reality, so that we experience the hyper-reality. In such a conception, all practices, beliefs and

values embodied through the *habitus* are to be reduced to mere illusions. Indeed, one is tempted to think of whether the habitual structurations which are structured in terms of sexuality, economy and aesthetics and their limits could maintain under the conditions described by Baudrillard as trans-sexualism, trans-economism and trans-aestheticism.

One implication of Baudrillard's depiction of the, so to say, late modern or postmodern condition may be combined with the depictions of the consumer character of the same condition. That is, while no any religion could survive without some habitual elements, the so-called modernization or postmodernization makes it very difficult for a religious *habitus* to survive. As it is usually argued (Turner, 1994: 186; Featherstone, 1991), the everyday organization of the consumer society makes any practical (habitual) structuration almost irrelevant, if not impossible. The high level of social and cultural mobility precludes the settlement and the solidification of any idea, value and cultural element. However, it doesn't do so through creating or motivating an atheistic wave of resistance against the movements of such elements in the modern society. But instead it is sustained by the manner of the organization of the everyday life throughout which the religious rituals and *habitus* giving to the believes and values their volume became speedily consumed. In this case the survival of a religious *habitus* become really very difficult:

> ..I do not want to suggest that the secularization of the faith takes place at this merely cognitive or intellectual level. It is not the case that people stop believing in God when religious belief is eroded by transformations of everyday life which make belief either irrelevant or impossible ... The multiplication of religious faiths in a multicultural society has in this everyday world a profoundly relativizing effect. This relativism is not of the old aesthetic type about which Ernest Gellner ... (1992) has written ... [T]he relativism of postmodern cultures is more to do with the daily experience of consumerism in a context of global diversity and difference" (Turner, 1994: 186).

For Turner, postmodernism, in contrast to Gellner who attempted to reduce it to a crude relativism, should be examined in terms of the impact of consumerism and cultural diversity on everyday experience and practice. He thinks that fundamentalism should be regarded as "a religious response to globalization, multiculturalism and postmodern pluralism. Western consumerism, Turner says, erodes the foundation of traditional life-styles,

and therefore corrodes the foundation of traditional religious practices not at the level of consciousness but just at the level of what Bourdieu has called the *habitus*.

Notwithstanding, it should be noticed that such emphases on the impossibility of the survival of something like *habitus* in the modern or postmodern societies miss an important point. That is the widespread phenomena which is referred to as the 'resurgence', 'revival' or the 'uplight' of 'political Islam', 'radical Islam' or the so called 'fundamentalist Islam'. Would it be really so easy, as mentioned in reference to Turner's analysis, to reduce the Islamic or any other kind of fundamentalism to the mere religious response to globalization, multiculturalism and postmodern pluralism? Undoubtedly besides its much explanatory power as well as available situations through which it could be verified, such an approach would have serious empirical problems. Above all, there is a clear reductionism: it is claimed that the current diversification in the Islamic movements could be reduced to a reaction against globalization and multiculturalism. Next, the Islamic movements are observed to resurge especially in and against the uniculturalist conditions maintained by the nation-states of the post-colonial periods rather than being a response to multiculturalism. That is perhaps why they mostly insist on democracy and human rights, especially on those that would be acknowledged for themselves by the central authority. Furthermore, it is now well-known that, in Turkey and in many other Islamic countries the discourse on civil society and the projects of "living together of the various ethnic and religious groups" are pioneered by the Islamic groups. One of these projects has recently been popular under the name *"Medine Vesikası"* (the Contract of Madinah) (Bulaç, 1994). This refers to the contract signed by various religious groups in Madinah, namely, Jews, Christians and Muslims. It includes the idea that nobody should interfere to the legally and socio-religiously segmented groups. Each group should have the right to live in accordance with its beliefs, ideas and *habitus* etc.

Finally, the above significations fail to encompass the contingent character of the religious development. It is quite well-known that the religious development had occurred in almost full spite of the modernization theories, falsified them, and as it seems it will remain to do so. For, they were predicting that the more modernization, as an irreversible and universal process, is realized, the more religious phenomena would have to

withdraw. The recent decades have satisfactorily shown that the religious withdrawal was irrelevant with cognitive-scientific developments, and now its revival is irrelevant with both the cognitive or argumentative demonstration of its justification and its proven higher capacity to solve the problems arisen by modernity. As Ahmet Çiğdem says, the religious resurgence, and the Islamic resurgence in particular have not anything to do with the problem-solving capacity of Islam, and its return does not mean that Islam has given appropriate responses to the modern problems (Çiğdem, 1992). Anyhow, the religious development is still going-on, probably, verifying the contingent character of social reality, a character which was recently acknowledged and given the liable attention by the so called post-Marxists (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). The contingent character is a way out of dialectic reductionism in social science, whose achievement goes beyond some Marxist origins which relied on the dialectic construction of reality and on the hopes of revolutions predicted from within the horizons bounded by this dialectic in question. So, the increasing upraise of the religion can not be reduced to some single or double causalities, which in any case would have to fail to catch the complex, interwoven and contingent character of the social reality.

Consequently, it can be said that the observations of the so called postmodernist social scientists on the place of religious *habitus* seem to have been conducted in special social cases of modernity. And here the organization of the everyday life really seems not to incorporate in any harmonious way the religious practices which entail an organization of time and space of its own. It is clear that they fail to explain, for example, the Ramadan fasting together with the *teravih* prayer and its associated enthusiasm which go on throughout a month; a month which constructs the yearly timing conception as well as practice of the society. Ramadan is accepted as the Sultan of the remaining eleven months, and its fulfilment, by time, is shared increasingly by almost the whole participation of the society, albeit depending on the varying religious levels of the individuals. Some may participate only into fasting which is of course performed individually but in the sense of simultaneity with all other believers. Some, in addition to this individual religious necessity, participate into the *teravih* prayers. Even those who don't fast, with several respects, become forced to be subject to the everyday, monthly and even yearly time-cycling of the Ramadan. For example, the time of breaking the fast at evening is so socially-determined

that nobody would insist on going on working or organizing his/her time in his special program, except in very limited circles living in their own socially or locally segmented areas. One evening of Ramadan, watching the street at about the time of breaking the fast would be enough to see how the religious clock is cycling. There is even an anecdote that caricaturizes the massive participation in the fasting: A man who, indeed didn't fast but also didn't miss the meal before down *(sahur)* was asked whether this was not a contradiction. He replies: "Well we may not be doing what is necessary *(farz)*, but we are not so cruel *(gâvur)* who would also miss all that is advised (by the prophet, namely) *sunnah*".

Other important observations can be indicated as to the five-time prayers of the Muslims, which divides the day into five parts and strongly govern the cycling of the day. Moreover, the Friday prayer which gives a start to a weekly time and the two months *(Rajab and Shaban)* preceding the Ramadan, which are favored in sacred ways over the remaining nine months constitute the monthly conception of the religious time. Furthermore the two great festivals, one following the Ramadan and the other coinciding with the time of pilgrimage to Mecca *(Hajj)*, and their including rituals and practices such as the festival prayers and the Sacrifice *(qurban)* altogether encompass all the time of the Muslim world, structurate the everyday life as well as the yearly life in a way perhaps more than what Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* allows us to conceive. In his study of Algerian Kabyle, Bourdieu has tried to show the logic of practice in their time-dividing strategies which coincides with both the cosmological conception, and the gender and working positions of the Kabyle. Furthermore, behind all these coincidences Bourdieu has found a very complex and interrelated system which worked on oppositions prevailed the everyday life symbols.

> ...all the oppositions constituting the system are linked to all others, but through longer or shorter pathways .... every opposition can be linked to several other in different respects by relationships of varying intensity and meaning (for example, spiced/bland can be connected directly to male/female and hot/cold and more indirectly to strong/weak or empty/full, through —in the last case— male/female and dry /wet, which are themselves interconnected) (Bourdieu, 1990: 269).

All these constitute, of course, the *habitus* which was composed of "structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures."

They can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organising action of a conductor. Undoubtedly the data that were observed by Bourdieu, in order to identify the *habitus*, were collected from yet a traditional community of Algeria. Now the problem is whether this *habitus* could survive in spite of the consumer effect of the global-modern-postmodern society. To repeat, what we have witnessed in especially the recent decades is that, the correlation which inspires a one-sided causality of modernization or globalization and the prediction of the withdrawal of the *habitus* (especially of the religious ones) is now completely inefficient in explaining the on-going situation in the everyday practices of the religious men.

What should also be mentioned in those rituals and the daily practices of the Muslims is that they play a very creative role as the mediators of the sacred and profane, the ideal and the real of the Muslim world. The role of the sacred as very exhaustively indicated by Eliade is played by those Islamic practices even in the modern world so that they, at least, preclude the full penetration of secularization into individual and, to some extent, social life, if not exclusively predominate all the public life. The role of the sacred in Eliade was to construct the reality in terms of the religious world, whatever this reality may include. They were constituting the reality, attributing it a cosmic order, which was otherwise not but of a chaotic nature (Eliade, 1991). The prayers, the festivals and the fasts and all other religious rituals, each one playing a unique role of its own, represent and correspond to the creation of the world by God. Each specific action during the prayer represents the positions of the creation before the God. Various verses in the Qur'an and the Traditions of the Prophet establish the notion that everything in the world worship the God by submission to His commands. The sun rises and sets, the rain falls, the fire burns, and all the animals and matters play their appointed roles in the cosmos so that they altogether harmonize according to a divine law and order called in Greek as GAIA connections. Then, the prostrating himself *(sajda)* is not but the participation of the believers to the harmony of the suggested cosmic order of the natural world.

Eliade's remarks depend heavily on some religions whose distinctions between the sacred and profane seems very sharp, but the borderline between the sacred and profane in Islamic religion would be highly more uncertain. As it is accepted by many Muslims and orientalists, the Islamic

religion is a "blueprint of the social order" (Gellner, 1981: 1) so that there is not some fields in the social life that were defined as exclusively profane. Of course, to what extent the contemporary forms of religious rituals and *habitus* display their functions in the penetration of the sacred meaning of the religious cosmology into modern world is still an inexhaustible question because of the contingent character of the social world. In the following chapters I shall attempt to give a relatively detailed profile of the Islamic constitution of the world and action through the sacred, ritual and what is called *habitus*. Here what remains to be said in this respect is that the Islamic modernist dispute which underestimates the role of the daily practices constructed through the sacred and profane conceptions, indeed irritate the cosmological order of the Muslim world. It would be probably in such a case that the organization of life in secular ways catch the religious *habitus* out of defense. Then, the religious thinking and practicing would become irrelevant in the mainstream organization of life. And all this may provide the superficial data required by Turner's depictions, who anticipates that the process of secularization would occur, albeit not as a result of cognitive or argumentative steps, but of the disembeddedment of the boundaries of the sacred and the profane. It appears that, in the modernist dispute the symbolic strategies of the sacred are inclined to be accepted as decipherable codes. That is, the intentions of God can be psycho-analyzed. That would, of course be reported as a shift from the religious attitude of the religious experience to the Cartesian-objectivist conception and treatment of it.

Indeed, further examples from other religions such as the Hashidins of Israel and the religious fundamentalists in USA and the European countries may also be reviewed under the light of this argument. As Kepel has very provocatively called the *Revenge of the God* (1992), they do not seem to be just a response to the multiculturalism of the postmodern society, but they have different motivations and dynamics, either in Islamic countries or in Western societies. Nor the decline and the resurgence of religion is to be subjected to the level of cognitive accumulation. This correlation was based on the crude presumptions and historical predictions of modernism and now its falsification is very well fulfilled.

The Body as a Site of Resistance

So far we tried to indicate the role of the religious texts in encoding the human action which appeared at next stage in some formations as *habitus* and the strategies of defining the sacred and profane spheres. By this way we aimed at arriving at a frame of reference to think the fate of these formations under modern or postmodern conditions. The underlying presumption of our argumentation, as stated in the beginning, is that the body as a site of struggles of various ideologies, political or cultural powers can be conceptualized as a space of resistance. In other words, the body is conceived as a potential of desires that would resist against the encoding powers. On the other hand, its potential of ethical submission renders it an arena of the competition for desires and religious, scientific, ideological or political powers.

**From Cultural to Poststructuralist Constraining of Body:
Foucault and Derrida**

Indeed, the conceptualization of body as a site of resistance and struggles derives from the Derridean-Foucaultean line of Nietzschean tradition which has already seen the body as a completely constructed product of culture. Derrida and Foucault, albeit each in different ways, have tried to show various technologies of constituting the self in social processes. In particular, Foucault has insisted on the elaboration of the relationship of power with body and the government of bodies as a way of making the self. His special emphasis has been on the etymological relationship between the discipline in terms of controlling and educating and the discipline in terms of defining the limits of certain objects that would be subject to a specific kind of knowledge i.e., scientific disciplines. He has found that the disciplines in the latter sense had always worked at epistemic level to produce the former kind of discipline that is identified with government and domination (Foucault, 1977; 1980). Power is produced and distributed in this case not from top of the government apparatus, namely the state, but from below. It is produced and maintained at the level of discourse. Discourse determines and encodes the marks and the values of the sects of

the body. It decides what bodily action is useful, normal, healthy and what is not. It divides the body into very few stereo-types and then unites all the bodies into those bodily spaces as citizenship, nationhood or just a Man (with a capital "M"). In all these categories the Man is a male, and is composed of the violent reduction of the very rich fragmentation and differentiation of the body. The uniqueness of the bodies is completely ignored in this case and so on:

> Foucault was concerned with the long term rationalization and management of the body and how the body arises as the main target of contemporary politics. It was the problem of the body, for him, which lied behind his medical histories, the analysis of sexuality and his general concern with the question of disciplines. Foucault's interest in the body was related to his concern for dissent and resistance, since in Foucault's theory of the body is a site of social struggle. His analysis of discipline implied a sociology of the body which would be compatible with Weber's theme of rationalization and the metaphor of the iron cage.... throughout his work (he) regarded the body as the effect of discourses and as the outcome of institutional -administrative practices. Just as Weber treated religious asceticism, bureaucracy and discipline as a government of the body (Turner & Stauth, 1988: 191).

Derrida, on the other hand, is the best example of those who would treat the body in terms of textualization. Thinking with his terms, logocentric reading of the texts should be seen as the basic source of violence towards the body. Because such a reading presumes some determined definitions of actions. Derrida thinks that, before the constraining of the body, what should be noticed in this case is the constraining of the text which, in fact, does not enforce any one to understand itself in any single way. Moreover, there is a complete undecidebility in the nature of the text that never requires a predetermined kind of reading. This undecidebility comes also from the nature of the language which necessarily employs concepts which attribute a structure to the world and reality, and which are in fact essentially ungrounded. Language, necessarily involves the use of metaphors, many of which we do not recognize, thus rendering all texts fundamentally ambiguous. He holds that there are many possible ways to read and understand a text, that a text outruns the intentions of its author, and that a full account of a text must offer multiple understandings at the same time. Thus, Derrida aims to "liberate the body" through "liberating the text", for, the text itself is constrained and dominated before the body is.

The domination of a text is realized by running a singular official meaning which might be given to it by the hegemonic culture or the institutional structures defining the discursive formations (Derrida, 1978: 80 ff.; Culler, 1982: 180 ff.; Binder, 1988: 90 ff.; Göka, Topçuoğlu and Aktay, 1996: 201-218). Then, the liberation of the text could be the reverse of this, that is, to liberate it from those singular official meanings.

For Derrida, the text should be liberated, otherwise its violence-producing effects could not be eliminated. Because of the centralized and favored concepts that claim a construction of reality which is chaotic in essence, each text or each reading of a text is in fact a violence-producer. The violence begins at the point that a reading of the text tends to cram all the reality in these presupposed order of things, in this hierarchy of the concepts, through which a logocentric kind of metaphysics is reproduced. For Derrida, the Western metaphysics has always relied on the claim of presence of meaning, which presumed the temporal and spatial presence (now and here), i.e., the realization of meaning. The claim of coincidence of textual sign and the signified (in the case of the sociology of body, the text and the actions) is the foundation of the metaphysics of presence. Derrida's criticism of the metaphysics of presence lies on the presumption that like all metaphysics, this too, is a textually constructed false consciousness that should be deconstructed. There is, in fact, according to Derrida, no such a presence in the nature of the text. There is not but a clear *différance* of the sign (textual encoding of the action) and the signified (the action which is at each sort bodily). Like all metaphysics, Derrida says, the logocentrist reading of the religious text that would create a jurisprudential encoding of the action would necessarily produce violence on the body. The body, then, should be liberated by deconstructing the text, which is also the way of liberating the text.

But would not it be also a metaphysics to claim any kind of liberation? Undoubtedly Derrida's main goal is to refrain from any kind of metaphysics that would in any way create its central metaphors, concepts and thereby their hierarchies. In this respect, to be coherent, even the deconstruction of the textual hierarchies should not be constructed around the ideal of any sort of liberation or solution. Probably it may be a good way out to remember that Derrida has no any goal towards being coherent, as he responds to Gadamer's attempt to achieve a dialogue with himself or to understand himself (Gadamer, 1989: 54 ff.; Derrida, 1989: 58 ff.). But there remains a

considerable effort, though Derrida doesn't find it as part of his coherence (indeed because of his very quest for coherence), in Derrida's work to refrain from producing central concepts or hierarchies that would lead us into metaphysics. Derrida's major and final argument is that there is no way out of metaphysics. Any attempt to talk automatically leads us to metaphysics. Any kind of talking about metaphysics, especially in order to be liberated from it, necessarily finds its origins within metaphysics (an aphorism derived from Heidegger's famous questioning of metaphysics, cf., Heidegger, 1991: 24).

Among these remarks on Derrida, the two should be distinguished. First, it seems not difficult to deduce the results of an application of his approach to the Islamic case of which tradition includes the most detailed and the highest level of encoding of the human actions. In Islamic jurisprudence the embodiment of the self is encompassed by a series of codes marking the kinds, levels, values of the actions. Some actions are forbidden *(haram)*, some are lawful *(halal)*, some are free *(mubah* and *caiz)*, some are abominable *(makruh,* which in itself has other levels as *tanzîhan* and *tahrimen),* some are good *(müstehab* and *sevab)* etc. One is inclined to think that not any single action remain in emptiness. Furthermore the organs of the body have been encoded in accordance with the performed actions. Virtullay all actions have already been rooted in the model of the prophet whose traditions *(ahadith)* and practical tradition *(sunnah)* define all possible actions in these terms. To act in accordance with the Prophet's deeds, words and affirmations is generally called *sunnah* and it is always beyond the preferability a burden on Muslims. It is quite verifiable that in most of Islamic societies, most of the on-going *habitus*, archetypes and symbols have their origins in the Prophetic tradition *(sunnah),* although they might have been digressed from the authentic (a word which, of course, doesn't make any sense to Derrida) origin of this tradition.

Secondly, Derrida in his journey through the criticism of metaphysics seems not to recognize any way for salvation, even in his emphases or efforts on deconstruction or *différance*. He deliberately and persistently escapes from any way that would imply an exit or a salvation from metaphysics. In one sense, he thinks we are doomed into metaphysics. Then, in fact, in Derrida's approach, as well as in that of Foucault, there is no genuine possibility of resistance on behalf of the body. Instead they

seem, in structuralist or poststructuralist motivations, to perceive the body as a passive receiver of culture, ideology or discourse. To remind Foucault's position, his treatment of discipline, especially where that rationality is institutionalized in bureaucracy and administration, is a contemporary version of Weber's analysis of rationality. The government of the body is consequently the basis for a government of society. Such a conceptualization of the body, however, leads to certain problems which is best expressed in the structuralist conception. Thereby it would be quite difficult, if not impossible, to see the body as a site of resistance, but merely as the construct of the anatomical and juridical map. It is an abstract entity, a constructed effect of historical discourses.

> Foucault was an anti-naturalistic in regarding nature, which corresponded to the naturalistic conceptions of body, as the product of human subjectivity. He did not celebrate even the joys of instinctual pleasures, because he rejected any notion of a natural order. It is assumed that some aspects of Foucault's anti naturalist perspective as well as Derrida's decentralizationizm on the body were derived from Antonin Artaud's irrationalism ... While Artaud had regarded the body as the seat of emotions through which life can be realised, he came to hate the body, whose unity was destroyed by its organs. Artaud asserted that human freedom and autonomy could only be achieved once man had been given a *body without organs* (Turner & Stauth, 1991: 105).

As we mentioned before, the metaphor of *body without organs* as applied by Artaud as such, qualified the analysis of Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze on body. Their investigations on the experiences of the hypochondriacs, paranoids, schizoids, masochists and the drug users to understand how the organs are tried to be eliminated in such experiences through defunctionalizing and emptying them from their socially and historically constructed fashions. The underlying idea of the metaphor in question is that the organs are socially attached to the body as well as they divide the unity of the body. Their assertion is fairly similar to Artaud's, which was handsomely stated in his declaration of war on the organs:

> *To be done with the judgement of God,* "for you can tie me up if you wish, but there is nothing more useless than an organ." (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 150).

Thus, following the above declaration in November 28, 1947, they ask "How do you Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?", by which they

deconstruct the given structuration of the organistic body, and which indeed also can not refrain itself from suggesting an alternative politics of body.

The Body of the Will to Power: Nietzsche

A conclusion to be derived from the above citations is that the cultural and sociological traditions of the body have always been inclined to see the body as a product of the social and economical processes. Even in its Cartesian nest, which promotes the subjectivity, it has been seen as a thing appropriated by the objective Subject which has to be created through an illusion of self-sufficiency, and sovereignty. As we have seen above, in classical sociological approaches, the body has been conceived in terms of its dichotomy with mind and as a mere function of the mind. It was at the disposal of the social actor who had a mind as a command centre of his body. While this was the legacy of the Enlightenment, the classical sociology which was embedded in the works of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, took this legacy further and elaborated it in such a way that made Nietzsche think that the body was completely despised.

Apart from his early period, which indeed has been considered by structuralists or Althusserean Marxists to be quite ideological, in his mature works, which was considered by the same groups as dominated by a scientific character, Marx has abandoned the humanist position and this diversion was effectively accompanied by despising of body. Because, having considered the man as a mere constitution of his history, all potential of resisting against this history was to be eliminated. In Marx, clearly, the body is both the vehicle and the site of labor. While its existence is acknowledged, it is assumed that it is constantly transformed by human agency.

Similarly, situating the body problem in relation with his dichotomy of the individual and society, which worked favoring the latter, Durkheim too has in fact seen the body as a function of the society. His application of the organism as a metaphor conveying the understanding of the society, clearly is filled with the legitimization of the totalitarian regulations of the body, for the sake of keeping the organic harmony of the society. In turn, Durkheim's treatment of the body has turned around a clear societal determinism which didn't allow any field of resistance for the body. On the other side, Weber's

metaphor of the "iron cage" as a metaphor conveying the meaning of the consequences of rational regulations of society under bureaucratic institutions has already been an important resort to be passed in the study of the body as a passive product of culture or society. As we mentioned in the first chapter, by his analysis Weber is usually referred as to has opened the way before Foucault's analysis of the modern discipline as the government of the body which by itself is not but a product of the discourse. Foucault worked against the foundation of structuralism which thought of the body in terms of the dichotomy of agency and structure, which was always to operate on behalf of the latter. The body in the context of the structuralist debate was completely determined by the structure. The body was almost completely despised in parallel with its dimension of agency. However, in spite of all his rejection to the claims of being a structuralist, Foucault, like all other poststructuralists, has drawn a very pessimistic picture in terms of the conception of the body as a potential of resistance. While they have very successfully identified the underlying power relationships in the existing situation or process of embodiment, they also closed all the doors before any emancipating attempt, claiming that all such attempts have to be subordinated to produce power which in turn would produce new definitions of the body. Thus, the problem with Foucault's analysis is that the body is simply the passive recipient of social processes and the product of knowledge/power. That is, Foucault's approach is far from fulfilling the need for a theory of bodily resistance and the resilience of embodiment to social regulation and control.

Indeed such a theory of fulfilling the need of a theory of resistance is the ideal of Deleuze and Guattari, which was mentioned in terms of the implications of the metaphor of the body without organs. Following Nietzsche and Marleau-Ponty, they attempted to develop the idea of a body without organs since they wished to emphasize the importance of phenomenology of the body as against material interpretations of biological reality. Thus, our bodies and our experience on them are focused around the question of desire, and it is through this notion that Deleuze was able to develop certain ideas about resistance and opposition to institutionalized control. Against Foucault's implicit view of the passive body, Deleuze emphasized the importance of the forces of desire (Turner & Stauth, 1988: 10). The conception of the emancipation of body in terms of its state without organs, however, has had to participate in a discourse of the

complete determination of the discourse. Because, the only possible way leading to the emancipation seems a mere schizophrenia realized through some masochist experiences. Therefore, here too, at an analytical level, no possibility of resistance on behalf of the body is recognized.

All these ideas trying to explain the relationships of the body with culture, society, ideology, discourse, habitus and structure, thus, have almost sustained a convention that the body is a passive product resulted by the functioning of those factors. Notwithstanding, in the social sciences there have still been a potential of distinguishing the potential of resistance within the body in Nietzsche's philosophy which celebrated the will to power it included. By the embodiment as a site of the will to power, Nietzsche means the 'little things' through which the body tries to fulfil its desires, against the general will of the institutions, including religions, governments, cultures and arts to regulate the embodiment process. According to Nietzsche, the everyday world is prior to the societal world of institutions. "This everyday world is constructed by socialized individuals who are embodied and who are involved in the ongoing world of reciprocity of symbols, feelings and objects This is the everyday world of what Nietzsche called 'the little things', namely the world of taste, feeling, exchange, experience and becoming" (Turner & Stauth, 1988: 90). Without giving any way to a dualism of cognition and experience it is admitted that the cognitive constructions are secondary to the world of experience or at least that the cognitive world is a reflection upon experience, exchanges, feelings and moods that belongs to the domain of 'little things'. Of course some parallels or clues of those 'little things' can be found in Bourdieu's *habitus*. What will be emphasized here, however, are not those parallelisms, but instead the resistance between the space of the generations of those 'little things' and the disciplining will of the established codes of the religious texts. As we mentioned before, religion, through a variety of ritual practices, regulates and constraints the body in the interests of spiritual existence and the coherence of social order. Religion by its nature is already there to bind together and regulates the body in order to create a sacred body (corpus) of people as a moral order *(nomos)*.

What is, here, that creates resistance? If a religious regulation accommodates the bodily desires and works almost as their legitimative element, then, what creates a resistance in the space of embodiment? Before this, it should, of course, be asked whether such a religious course would be

possible. Because, at the outset, religion seems not to suffice with a constrained space for itself which doesn't intervene in the embodiment space of the self. Principally none of the religions can stand on the ground of full accommodation of the bodily desires and embodiment process. On the other side Turner and Stauth, following Nietzschean conception of body as an origin of the will to power, argue that, apart from being constructed and determined by structural elements, the human subjectivity is a basis for opposition and resistance, for, the mental functions which are necessary for following and understanding an order are also the means which are necessary for misunderstanding, disobedience and misconduct. In short, knowledge is always pliable and ambiguous, thereby being the basis for obedience and disobedience simultaneously:

> To follow a rule presupposes the capacity for not following rules, and indeed, the very nature of a rule or an order is that it would be possible for a knowledgeable actor to disobey it. By a parallel argument, the consciousness necessary for obeying an ideological demand also produces the capacity or ability for avoiding or misunderstanding such forms of cultural domination. The capacity for interpellation within social systems thereby implies the presence of dis-interpellation as a basis for resistance (Turner & Stauth, 1991: 92).

For Nietzsche, this also represents the explanation of the potential of the resisting body as a possibility of emancipation, in contrast to the sociological and biological traditions which perceive the body as a mere function of the culture.

Islamic strategies for Overcoming the Resistance:
The Celebration of Body?

Having arrived at a formulation that the body and the text, as once presumed as an autonomous actor in the process of social action, are potentially interrelated with each other in terms of domination and resistance, now we have to apply it to the Islamic case, for, this study is mainly concerned with the special relationships of the body and text in terms of the constitution of political identity in the case of Islam in general and the Turkish Islamism in what we will call post-caliphate condition in particular. At a first glance,

one may expect to find a similar kind of resistance between the body and the Islamic texts of jurisprudence which usually tend to encode all details of the bodily actions. Then, what creates resistance here is, firstly, immediately the religious will to regulate and the bodily will to power in Nietzschean terms.

The particular contention in this chapter, however, is to situate the case of Islam in this context and to look for the possibilities of the ways such a resistance and the tension it brings about are overcome. This requires an overall examination of the usual ways of overcoming the problem in the religions; for, at least in Islam, indeed, as well as in all religions, this resistance is relieved by various promises, especially for the masses, such as achieving the Heaven after death, worldly and other-worldly salvation etc., which have certain implications on calculative exchanges. But apart from the masses, in a deeper religious course, the resistance completely disappear through the notion of the "love of God", rather than of the "fear of God", come into place. A large extent of some ethical or mystical discourses about the regulation of body through various techniques of education of the soul requires, however, further evaluation of the sociologically constructed relationships of discipline, power and the process of embodiment.

A second element that would create a resistance, therefore, would be sought for in the course of history, culture in general and the modernization in particular. The body, then, would not be the origin of resistance to any religious, ideological, political, scientific or aesthetic will to regulate but instead it would be the object(ive) of the struggle of dominance over the body among themselves. Here the body is to be seen as Bourdieu has seen the society as an organization of different fields which are the sites (similarly the body is the site) of individual and group struggles over the production and consumption of the symbolic capital goods (Bourdieu, 1990: 112-121). Taking his theory of practice, *habitus*, and his adaptations of the Marxist-economical terminology together, the vision of Bourdieu's theory of practice becomes more functional and usable in understanding the position of the Islamic embodiment in modern societies, which occur as a site of struggle and resistance between the textual will to code and the site's bodily desires, and between the believes, ideologies and cultures in their struggle for domination over and through that site.

Indeed, this aspect of the Islamic approach to body has been congratulated by Nietzsche as a good attitude celebrating the body. In his radical criticisms towards Christianity because of its despising the body and

exercising an oppressive power on the body, Nietzsche has appealed comparatively to the Islamic treatment of body: He rejected Christianity looking towards Islam as the carrier of fundamental passions which were compatible with man as a being of feeling and strength. He also accused Christianity of destroying the harvest of the classical world and through the crusades of destroying Islamic virtues, and he wrote that:

> I call Christianity the *one* great curse, the *one* great intrinsic depravity, the *one* great instinct for revenge for which no expedient is sufficiently poisonous, secret, subterranean, *petty* —I call it the *one* immortal blemish of mankind (Nietzsche, 1995: 100 / Section: 62)

> The wonderful Moorish cultural world of Spain, more closely related to us at bottom, speaking more directly to our senses and taste, that Greece and Rome was *trumpled* down ... why? Because it was noble, because it owed its origins to manly instincts, because it said Yes to life even in the rare and exquisite treasures of Moorish life (ibid.: 96 / Section: 60)

An Orientalist Dichotomy: Hedonism or Accommodation?

Indeed, by so doing, Nietzsche talked against an orientalist ground of the nineteenth century thinkers who referred to the same aspect of Islamic religion and Mohammed's personality in accusation of having been subordinated to a kind of hedonism. Apart from the image of Islam as a pagan religion which had no unique contribution to the history of religions at all, this aspect had played a crucial role in shaping the Islamic religion in the Christian mind. The orientalist theme has been turning around the presumption that Islam was not an original religion but it was merely a "derivative" (Hussain, 1987; Pruett, 1987) of the old religions and it has accommodated to the hedonist desires of the Arabic Peninsula, of the warrior morality and booty economy of the Bedouins and the merchants (Weber, 1978). For the orientalist studies, the formation of Islam, clearly, had taken place with the determination of those factors. To them, Islam never constituted fundamental principles and never advocated them without compromising, but it always accommodated the existing conditions. That view is represented in most of the orientalist approaches as an essential attribute to Islam. In this respect, the well-known emphases of the Islamic

jurisprudence on commercial relations are to be considered as an accommodation to the merchant class of the Arabs. The Islamic approval of polygamy, and personally the Prophet's several marriages as well as his rich discourses on sexuality are all to be considered as a manifestation of the accommodative nature of Islam. Thus, while those aspects of Islam are considered by Nietzsche as celebration of the body and are welcome, they are depreciated by the orientalists as manifesting the hedonist tendency of Islam. And as Turner has very successfully shown, this theme has been shared by the majority of the social scientists, even by Weber. For example, Weber argued that the Prophet's world view became socially significant only after it had been accepted and re-fashioned by Bedouin tribesmen in line with their life-style and economic interests. Weber also implicitly suggested that Mohammed was an opportunist and that the original adherents to Islam were motivated solely in terms of the prospects of booty and conquest (Turner, 1974: 23). Furthermore, when Weber accused Muhammed for his active sexual life, he has been motivated by the Christian idea that a religion as such should eliminate the sexual orgy. On the other side, his stock of information was obviously relying on the rich literature of orientalism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries on the sexual life of Mohammed, which worked with frequent references to the *Arabian Nights*. Thus, for Weber, whereas Christianity contained a "hero-ethic" which regulated the sexual life, Islam was the 'average ethic' which accommodated to sexuality rather than challenging it. Again, Islam represented such values as male domination and sexual freedom which were inimical to the "hero-ethic" (Turner, 1974: 183).

Indeed, the dispute of the accommodative and hedonist nature of Islam refers to a more sophisticated domain in Islam than the boundaries of this debate signify. As will be mentioned in the next chapter, Grunebaum, the famous orientalist-Islamist who followed the culturalist path of Krober in his studying Islam, clearly pictured the God of Islam as "having changed his mind a certain number of times abrogating specific injunctions given to his prophet and replacing them by "equally good or better ones" (Grunebaum, 1966: 142). While Grunebaum is rather inclined to think that the dominant nature of Allah's word among the Muslims lies in its finality, as the most important factor in the stagnancy of the Islamic society, another orientalist theme had insisted on quite the opposite possibility. Hence, it is from this

"changing his mind" that the later themes on the arbitrariness of the *qadi* justice (Weber, 1978: 115 ff.) have found their connections.

Undoubtedly, looking well at the empirical facts of the early years of Islam, reading the biographical texts of Mohammed and his friends and the Qur'an itself, it would be very difficult to conclude that Islam has accommodated to the economical interests and even the to hedonist tendencies of the social circumstances it emerged in. It is a very known fact that Islam experienced very intensive conflicts and antagonisms during its process of formation. Far from having accommodated to the interests of various social groups or the sexual morality of the society it succeeded very well in establishing new patterns of life, new social groups and new order of appropriation. After establishing a series of manners, it constituted as such a model for the later generations. Therefore, the Prophet has left some fundamental texts behind himself consisting of the Qur'an and the *ahadith* together with the rules regulating how should they be read or understood. While the formation of the religious texts was a dynamic process included also the influence of the world; or, in Hasan Hanefi's words, while it also emerged from below rather than merely being descended from the heavens (Hanafi, 1988), it was to be textualised after the death of the Prophet. Then, the existence of the text as a social actor in the later development of the jurisprudence constituted also a potential for a resistance of the body and the textualised *habitus* inherited from the Golden Age.

The presumed dichotomy between the text and the body gives the interpretative action of the *fuqaha* its all volume, in their efforts to accommodate the new conditions. Having defined the relationship of the body and the text in terms of a resistance of the former against the constraining influences of the codifications of the bodily deeds by the latter, the history of Islamic jurisprudence *(fiqh)* is to be read under new light. Then, the new definition of the juridical activity would be identified by its very character of disciplining the body. The problem of modernity in terms of the response of religion to modernity are to be reconsidered under this light in the context of authenticity. For, once established through such codifications of the details of the life as jurisprudence, there would be no harder problem than that of authenticity.

Regarding the accommodative dimension which is usually a problem on the head of juridical activity which has to overcome the actual resistance of the life before the textual penetration, the jurist is in the position of

deciding what is the genuine requirement of religion and to what extent novelties can be allowed in accordance with the limits of the textual codes. For, in principle no text can encompass all contingencies of the life. A text may be flexible to encounter with high extent of contingencies, and it may include some rules of being extended without loosing most of its essential requirements, but one way or another, it has to withdraw to some relative limits where it should deliver a place to the resisting body, to the 'little things' of the everyday life which is always subjected to the novelties. Undoubtedly it can be said that Islam juridically has various strategies for overcoming such resistance in what Nietzsche identified as the celebration of the body and the orientalist as accommodation. Apart from the acknowledgement and celebration of the bodily desires several techniques of *ijtihad*, including the allegory *(qiyas),* public interest *(Mesâlih-i Mürsele),* good preferences *(istihsan),* customary law *(örf–i hukuk)* etc., should be considered here as appropriate strategies for encountering the resistance which is embodied through change and modernization. But all those strategies would have to go hand in hand with the risk of the distortion of the religious existence. In this respect, while the jurist is immediately concerned with the authenticity of his decision, he would be quite disarmed against the hermeneutic or deconstructive criticisms whose primary target is the Cartesian objectivism in interpretation.

In such a sociological thesis, however, it would be impossible to decide what is authentic as well as what is inauthentic on the part of a religious practice. Our study, therefore, will be bound with a descriptive analysis of the discourses of authenticity in terms of the constitution of political identity having carried by body as a metaphor.

CHAPTER III

THE METAPHOR BODY:
SOME HISTORICAL-JURISPRUDENCIAL CASES

The main question in the treatment of the body as a focus of sociological interest turns around considering it as body in itself or as a metaphor referring to something outside itself. Undoubtedly as we have mentioned before and as it is a common knowledge of the body, in the religion, the body constituted a site of the intersections of references to the religious sovereignty or to the God himself. More generally, in the premodern periods, the body always represented the spirit. Considering the metaphor in its etymological sense as a "carrier", the body has always been seen as a carrier of the spirit in this world, which is by its nature belonging to the other world. It can be said that the body did not suffice with making reference solely to its own existence but it always constituted some metaphors for the existence and for the representation of the beings outside itself until the modern ages where it began to represent solely itself. In almost all religions, the body is therefore taken seriously in terms of realizing the sovereignty or the embodiment of the religious ideals. Therefore, all religions have their special politics of body through which they socially and politically try to be embodied, and which are composed of a set of rules regulating the bodily gesture in everyday life.

Notwithstanding, they all don't follow the same path in making the body carry the spiritual and the divine dispatches. Naturally, the religions differ in their ways of situating the body within the ontological and cosmological order of the world. Foucault has successfully drawn our attention to the proliferation of the body in terms of the treatment it encounters in different cultures and religions. Beginning from the Greeks to modernity through Christianity, he tried to identify a history of the techniques of disciplining the body in its relation with the spirit and with some other referents such as the constitution of the self. For example, in Greeks, the treatment of body and thereby the experience of sexuality is

seen completely as a problem of "aesthetics of existence". According to Foucault, the Greek problem with the body was shaped around the question, "what kind of a *techne* shall I apply that I would have to live in a good way?" (Foucault, 1987: 17). This quest for *techne* has constituted the characteristic feature of the Greek technology of selfhood. For the Greek citizen, living in the fifth and sixth centuries BC, this *techne* was consisting of sparing his site and his compatriots. For Seneca, however, this *techne* was to be interested with himself. And, in Plato, the man has to be interested with himself because he is who will govern the site. In any way the *Bios*, that is, the biological entity of the body is considered as a carrier of an artistic activity which has not to be obeyed to other-worldly ethical disciplines, and the body is celebrated as a potential of desires provided that these desire are not fulfilled in extreme (hubris) way.

Indeed, such a historiography of Greeks is required for signifying the despises of the body in the times of the religions. Inasmuch as it is considered as a metaphor of the spirit, or of the divine rule, it has been denied or ignored. Apart from Taoism wherein the body as a part of the nature should be treated in quite another way, in the Eastern mystical traditions the ultimate goals of religions are realized through going beyond the body. This realization always requires some series of painful, vexatious and hard experiences. That is not only because the body is seen as a metaphor as a carrier of the spiritual being, but also because it is also seen as an obstacle in the way of realizing the unification with God(s), such as in the way going to Nirvana. The desires of the body are always potentially tempting man to remove himself from the way to realizing the goals of the religion. The body as an origin of the tempting desire is also potentially seen as a rival of the self which is the representative of the spirit. The metaphoric character of the body, thus, becomes rather problematic, because the realization of the religious goal is conditioned by defusing or eliminating the body, rather than charging it with any ultimate goal. In any way, all those religions include some strategies for oppressing and going beyond the body.

Similarly, in Christianity, the body is seen as a potential of tempting men from the way of the God. The Christian narrative of the adventure of human-being in this world begins with the temptation of the man (Adam) by his wife (Eve). It is believed that this caused their exclusion from the heaven which initiated the worldly existence. Thus, the worldly existence is

burdened with an original sin which is the basic conviction of Christianity. That sin has taken place as a result of a bodily desire —the desire for eating an apple, indeed for removing a curiosity about the unknown or for replying to the attraction of the 'forbidden'— and with the temptation of a woman. As it would be seen, here, the female body is encoded as both weaker than that of the man and also equipped with a potential of temptation. More importantly, the Christian distinction of the sexual bodies is originally determined by the connotations of this narrative. Because of the role of the bodily desire especially that of the woman, the body, in general, and the female body in particular, is extremely despised. All discourses of sexuality, therefore, has been shaped under the influence of this narrative. The life is completely seen as a compensation or as an atonement to be paid in exchange to the original sin. The characteristic experience of asceticism, elaborated religiously, provided the concrete volume for this atonement. That is also what motivated the anti-hedonistic tendency in Christianity. As Turner has pointed out in his study on Max Weber (Turner, 1974), it is this anti-hedonist element that motivated the eighteenth and nineteenth century orientalists for making frequent references to the Prophet Mohammed and to the early Islam to be promoting hedonism for accommodating the existing ethic of the Bedouin warriors of Mecca and Medina. In his celebration of the body as a site of the will to power, Nietzsche declared a radical attack on Christianity because of its despising of the bodily desire. For Nietzsche, this discourse of anti-hedonism associates some behaviors elaborating such illnesses as humility and inferiority which are by their nature nothing but the manifestation of a hypocrisy.

Again, Foucault shows very well that, in the development of the modern sciences as well as the modern self through some discourses of sexuality, this Christian notion of the original sin played a major role. Having associated the semi-ritual practices of confession, the notion of the original sin transformed into the extreme unconcealment of the sexuality. Furthermore, having created a notion of a Victorian age of sexual pressure, the modern sciences promoted themselves as the consequences of sexual liberty. Foucault's falsification of this Victorian image, and his argument that the present extreme increase in the discourses on sexuality doesn't indicate its liberty but has much more to do with considering it still a sin to be confessed, have been considered as a turning point in the historiography of sexuality. Foucault tried to point out the relationship between the body

and the constitution of the self, the body and power, the discipline and the knowledge etc.

As a sociologist of the postmodern age, Baudrillard indicated the body of the postmodern age as having been divorced of representing any thing other than itself. Referring to the images of Madonna, Michael Jackson and Ciciolina, he deduces that "with their erotic appearances concealing the ambiguities in terms of their gender, all are genetically changeable creations and baroque products" (Baudrillard, 1995: 25). For Baudrillard the body, from the postmodern ages onwards is no longer to be considered a metaphor, because it doesn't refer to any thing other than itself. However, the empirical examples he brings out, indicate the repetition of the representative function of the body. Because, all bodies of the imaginative figures mentioned above have, indeed, some common denominators. For example all are white, and one who is not white by origin, that is Michael Jackson, represents a quite painful way for reaching an ideal body which is represented in that of the white man. A plastic body is continuously reproduced not to indicate the body itself but to constitute an "extreme phenomenon" of the postmodern body. Considering that the body which is continuously produced through the plastic simulation refers to a young man without moustache and perspiration, the old and moustached people are excluded from the referential sphere of this body. But, in fact, while the body in the religious world was representing the other-worldly beings, it is still too early to say that it no longer represents anything outside itself, as Baudrillard and most of the postmodernists would say. Now the body, having represented the mortality of the man, and therefore been closed on itself to maximize the desire, has been charged with other metaphors; not to refer to transcendental sphere of being but to this sphere of mortality. It has a crucial role in constituting a heavenly sphere in this world of constructions and simulations, in Baudrillard's sense. What is remaining the same is the negation of the body. While this was done for the sake of transcendental existence in the world of religions, it is not negated for the sake of the immanent, this-worldly constructions. I am not to go on with further details of the description of how this process is taking place in the modern world, I just wish to remind the total practices and sectors of beauty and the regimes of diet associating the idealization of the model measures of body. Nobody can claim that the diet practices, the cosmetic consumptions, the gymnastic activities for catching measures of body idealized through the transsexual

simulations, in Baudrillard's sense, are less painful and vexatious than the ascetic experiences of the religions.

Of course, all those religious or semi-religious practices have much to do with the constitution of the self and self-identity in each period. Perhaps the most important by-product of the metaphoric aspect of the body is its carrying of a self-identity by a series of practices corresponding the religion's imagination of either itself or other cultures. What I want to do here, however, is not to give a detailed profile of this relationship in all religions within the limits of this study, but to give some empirical data to illustrate the case in Islam. Here, the encoding manners of the body and bodily practices through the religious jurisprudence, the manners of civilization embodied in the ways of eating and wearing are considered to constitute a self-identity in the Muslim consciousness. That is either to constitute a reciprocal manner of behavior as a part of the civilizing process or as a part of making difference with the 'Other' cultures and peoples. Thus, in this chapter I want to make some illustrations of the logic of practice as elaborated within the Islamic jurisprudence, *sunnah,* together with the corresponding organs.

The Development of a *Court Society* through Jurisprudence as a Politics of Body

The phrase "Court Society" in the title evokes two fields of reference. One is the study of Norbert Elias within which he analyses the development of the civilized norms and individual conducts during the process of the constitution of the bourgeois class as a substitute for Aristocracy. But rather than being an ordinary history of the replacement in terms of social and economic domination, his study very comprehensively seeks to show the transformations of the manners of eating and wearing and conducting. The second is the large literature of Islamic ethics and jurisprudence that involve a detailed elaboration of a civilized community.

While Elias' study involved an attempt to comprehend the transformation of land-owning warlords into a court elite under the control of a centralized monarchy, and, thus, the erosion of the life-style of this elite by the long term encroachment of professional, merchant and bourgeois status groups within the state apparatus of European societies, the study of

the coincidence of this process in Islamic society is not only for comparison. Such a study has of course much to do with understanding the basic logic of practice in Islamic society.

When Gellner identified the compatibility of the Islamic orthodoxy with the general course of modernization, in contrast to the mainstream social scientific conviction, his emphasis was just on the rationality it included, which favored scripturalism, centralism etc. Gellner's arguments had not so much to do with the existing circulation of the manners, of the conducts of the everyday world in the so called late-modern or postmodern society. In his suggestions favoring the so called "higher Islam", there seemed no sufficient clues to infer his awareness of the significance of the rapidly changing manners which had much more to do with the mind of the Muslim and any member committed to any religion. Just from the scriptural-oriented mental analysis of the Muslim society, which in fact did not require any participant observation in the Muslim society, as was criticized by Said (1993) and his fellows, he tried to deduce a compatibility of the modernization with the Islamic way of life. Obviously, he can be criticized for having failed to understand the nature of this compatibility in terms of the relationships between fundamentalism, globalization, multiculturalism and postmodern pluralism. The Western consumerism erodes the foundation of traditional life-styles, and therefore corrodes traditional religious practices not at the level of consciousness, as Gellner is more inclined to try to observe, but at the level of what Pierre Bourdieu has called the *habitus*. As we tried to show in the second chapter the problem of all religions in general, and of Islam in particular, with modernity, or in other words, the challenge of modernity, is less cognitive one than a practical one. That is, modernity has been embodied through the details of the everyday world, of the ways of conduct, eating and wearing in the expense of rendering the old ones irrelevant. Various aspects of this process of modernization and/or postmodernization are described in this study. The compatibility with modernization or the validity against the modern conditions, therefore, should be sought for in the potential of the religion to sustain the corresponding forms of life without being distorted. That is, of course, neither to justify a naive apologetism declaring a victory that had been attained in the Golden Ages of its history nor to claim an authenticity for any kind of interpretation of the religion in its contemporary forms. In this part, my contention is simply to refer to the origins of the Islamic

habitus in comparative way with the civilizing process of the Western society.

In his two-volume study on the *Civilising Process* (Volume I: *The History of Manners,* 1978; Volume II: *State Formation & Civilization,* 1982) Norbert Elias provides very comprehensive analysis of the development of the civilized norms and individual conduct. His analysis of civilization is about the eventual replacement of feudal classes, the development of political absolutism from the conflicts between the forces of centralization and decentralization, and finally, the social evolution of patrimonial powers within the king's household. As Turner and Stauth (1988) also drew attention, in his above books and especially in *The Court Society* (1983) Elias very comprehensively tried to show how the society as a whole become in turn a court society through the appropriation of the manners of conduct of the court settlers, of the Aristocracy by the masses through the bourgeoisie. Thus, Elias tries

> to give a historical depiction of the civilization process which converts men who fight, eat and sleep on horseback, into cultivated members of the court who are primarily concerned with individualized manners at table and with the refinement of taste within the household. In terms of artifacts, this is the study of how the table replaced the saddle and of the emergence of the fork as a symbol of personal conduct. In still more subtle terms, the civilizing process is about the transformation of the crude and lusty emotions and feelings of the aristocracy into the more refined, constrained and individualized behavior of the bourgeoisie. According to Elias, civilization is about the transformation of savage joys, the uninhibited sexual pleasures of the aristocracy and the violent hatred for enemies and outsiders; this culture of violence gives way to the more precise, detailed and disciplined regulation of modern man. Just as people cultivate nature by subordinating it to human ends, so civilization is the cultivation of the human body through the imposition of social manners and regulations. To civilize the body is to rationalize emotion, and therefore, the process of civilization identified by Elias can be seen as a special version of the rationalization process described by Weber as the master trend of modern societies. Both rationalization and civilization can be seen as a general process of the formalization of manners involving the collapse of external constraints in favor of self-restraints (Turner & Stauth, 1988: 83-84).

Undoubtedly one consequence, as well as the motivation, of the constitution of something like a court society is individualization as the insurance of the personal rights of the 'others'. Just as it led to a development of the autonomous law which should have to guarantee the rights of the bourgeois individual in the market, it also led to the

constitution of the rights of personality. The civilizing process, thus, has also much to do with the sterilized, protected and esteemed personality who would have his own characteristics and autonomous decision in the market place. The modernization as a cultural process may be said to have gone hand in hand with this civilizing process which promoted the new kind of personality, the mobile personality, who can rearrange his identity to meet the challenge of new situations in a rapidly changing world. Daniel Lerner, trying to identify the basic characteristics of the modern society compared with the traditional society, in his *The Passing of Traditional Society,* argues that such a person is not bound by tradition, and does not feel guilty in adopting new ideas, loyalties and activities. For Lerner, the essential mechanism for psychic mobility that the modern society requires is empathy, that is, the ability to identify with new attitudes and the capacity to take over new social roles, or the ability to take the role of the other (Lerner, 1964: 70 ff.). In the general process of embodiment, this is the manifestation of social reciprocity in Nietzschean terms (Turner & Stauth, 1988).

As for the Islamic case regarding the civilizing process, if the initial favor of the civic life to the rural life should be remembered, then, there would be found the similar quest for the constitution of a personality, of a self. That is, the believer should be so autonomous and freed from every kind of traditional ties that, he could make his choice with his free will. Because the Islamic religion has a strong emphasis on personal responsibility.

While Ibn Khaldun, as if making us recall Rousseau's favor of the state of nature, has found some authentic possibilities in the Bedouin communities, and saw a higher dynamism in their *asabiyya*, it can very easily be said that the Islamic texts have always favored the civic state. Apart from the fact that the constitution and survival of an orthodoxy has been provided by and also required a constitution of central, rational and scriptural authority, the texts are filled with some statements favoring the urban life. For example, the following verse from the Qur'an makes an obvious comparison between the urban and desert peoples:

> The desert Arabs surpass the town-dwellers in unbelief and hypocrisy, and have more cause to be ignorant of the laws which Allah has revealed to His apostle. But Allah is wise and all-knowing (IX: 97).

Indeed, what is significant here is the affirmation of the material influences on the general trends of popular believes. But isn't this a paradox? Because the mainstream notion of religion is dominated by the presumption that the natural state of being is more akin to religious mood. Many pastoral idealizations even have been made for the sake of religious concerns. But as we see in the quotation from the Qur'an, Islam has promoted the civic life against the rural or Bedouin life. Apart from the above verse, there are many other traditions attributed to the prophet which advised the believers to dwell in the cities. It is very important to report here that the city of the Prophet that is known Medina was originally named was in fact *Yathrib*. It was transformed into Medina by the Prophet to imply the place where the Bedouin life, the indifference of the nomadic life, end, and the individual responsibility for his actions and taking into account the personal rights of the others begin.

Furthermore, throughout all his life in Medina, the Prophet elaborated all details of the everyday life, teleologicallly to reach and realize perfect personalities whose basic characteristic would lie in their civic aspects. Therefore, the Qur'an and the traditions of the prophet are filled with some ethical advises for being worried about the rights of the neighbors, the partners, the parents and sons/daughters, or more generally of the 'others'. This required a transformation of a Bedouin strata into a civilized one through the establishment of a radically new logic of practice, of a *habitus,* as mentioned in the second chapter, which determined the ways of thinking and behaving.

This study has to be bound with textual data regarding the depictions of the early Islam. Therefore, it is needed to be mentioned that, of course, all the quotations from these texts are not to say that they have already been realized in perfect sense as advised through the texts. In fact, historically, we have no much chance to examine this knowledge exactly, except taking the clues that can be caught in the texts as given. Notwithstanding, one has still to be awaken against the possibility of the disharmony of the text and the on-going reality. Then, in this respect, we can make the point that there were constituted a large literature on ethics whose major concern was to elaborate the manner of the believers —the manners of acting and behaving towards the others in the society as well as towards the divine entities. For example, the famous book on ethics by el Mâwardi, the Shafi'î jurist and theologian, is titled as *Adab al-Danyâ wa'l-Dîn.* It included the rules of

religious conduct, of mundane conduct and of personal conducts together *(adaba'l nafs)*. The treatment of all together sustains the idea of monotheism which implies unity every where. The part dealing with 'mundane conduct' develops along essentially similar otherworldly lines, the theme of man's frailty and insufficiency. Thanks to this frailty and insufficiency, man is guarded against arrogance and compelled to turn to God, both four guidance and the actual satisfaction of his needs, such satisfaction being achieved through the use of his reason and common sense, but only to the extent God has decreed and piety will permit. The general rule here too is not to cling to this world and neglect the other, but rather to satisfy one's mundane needs in moderation and never to lose sight of the otherworldly felicity which is in store for the virtuous (Fakhry, 1991: 163).

The third part of al-Mawardi's book deals with 'personal' conduct', and may be said to be concerned with the analysis of the individual virtues of humility, good manners, modesty, self-control, truthfulness, and freedom from envy, as well as a series of social virtues, such as the rules of speaking and keeping confidence and decorum. This analysis abounds, like the rest of this treatise, with acute psychological observations and reflections, supported with copious quotations from the Qur'an and the Traditions, the sayings of the Caliphs, especially Ali, the poets and the philosophers. The key moral concept for Al-Mawardi is nobility of character *(muruvvah)*, a fundamental concept in Arabic morality which appears to antedate the Islamic period (Fakhry, 1991: 165). Likewise, Al-Raghib al-Isfahanî (D. CA. 1108) talks directly on religious nobility, worship and civilisation in his books. In his *Dharî'ah ilâ Makârim al Shari'ah,* he tries to find out the means to "Noble Religious Trait". While the major part of his books is related with his dispute with the mutazilites on some theological issues in the context of ethical responsibility of the individual for his actions, as most books of ethics are, his books also include the bodily strategies for arriving at a good or noble personality. In similar ways, Ibn Ishaq Al-Kindî, (d. ca. 866), Fakhraddîn Al-Râzî (d. ca. 925), Al-Fârâbî (d. 950), Ibn Sîna (d. 1037), Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), Yahya b. Adî (d. 974), Ahmad Ibn M. Miskawayh (d. 1030), Nâsır Al-Dîn Al-Tûsî (1274), Jalal Al-Dîn Al-Dawani (d. 1501), A. Ibn Ahmed Ibn Hazm (o. 1064) and, of course, Al-Ghazzali (d. 1111) who occupies a very special place because of his relatively unique combination of Islamic sciences with a detailed elaboration of a civic and religious personality in his "Reconstruction of the

Religious Science" *(Ihyâ-u 'Ulûmu'd-Dîn),* all have written on both ethical problem in terms of its theological implications, each corresponding to his own position in the disputes, and the special strategies of constituting a good personality with good behaviours and conduct. The strategies mainly were based on the interpretation of a wide accumulation of the Qur'anic and Prophetic Traditional advises.

Similarly, the collections of the traditions consisting of the words, deeds, and affirmations of the Prophet have all reserved important chapters to the elaboration of an Islamic personality whose basic characteristics is his empty, civility and responsibility, modelled through the personality of the Prophet himself. The content of those chapters of the collection (which according to some classifications is composed of six authentic books including *Bukhari, Müslim, Tirmizi, Ebu Dawud, Ibn Mace* and *Nesai* —all named with the editor of the book— and for some other classifications it arrives at nine books with addition of Imam Malik's *Muwatta,* Ibn Hanbal's *Müsned* —both are also from he Imams of the four sects of *Ahl Sunnah*— and *Sünen-i Dârımî)* is too long to be quoted or analyzed in terms of the issues in question. My aim for making reference to them is just for illustration. Therefore, I want to chose one of them randomly and try to show some examples for the elaboration of a manners which later constituted a *habitus* for the believers through certain channels of spread, such as through the preachers of mosque imams, the civil preachers of the orders etc.

The text is Ibn Majeh's collection of traditions, *Sunen-i Ibn Majeh* which has passed from his examination procedure as authentic. In the chapter on food, titled as *Kitabu'l Et'imeh,* and reads

> It is narrated by Abdullah Ibn Ömer that the Prophet said: Increase the salutation and feed the poors and be brothers as the God has advised you (Ibn Majeh: 3252).

The special effort to spread salutation among people has always taken an important place in the civilization process. This recall George Simmel's suggestion that, in modern social life many people, most of the time, interact with others who are strangers to them, and the meaning of the term "stranger" changes with the coming of modernity. In premodern cultures, where the local community always remains the basis of wider social

organization, the "stranger" refers to a "whole person" —someone who comes from the outside and who is potentially suspect (Simmel, 1969). In his adaptation of this suggestion of Simmel, Anthony Giddens argues that in contrast to the pre-modern society where a person moving into a small community from elsewhere fails to receive the trust of the insiders, even perhaps after living in that community for many years, in the modern societies, we do not characteristically interact with strangers as "whole people" in the same way. Particularly in many urban settings, we interact more or less continuously with others whom we either do not know well or have never met before —but this interaction takes the form of relatively fleeting contacts (Giddens, 1990: 80):

> The variety of encounters that make up day-to-day life in the anonymous settings of modern social activity are sustained in the first instance by what Goffman has called "civil inattention".... Two people approach and pass one another on a city sidewalk. What could be more trivial and uninteresting?

According to Goffman this "inattention" displayed by two persons who pass one another is not an indifference. Rather, it is a carefully monitored demonstration of what might be called "polite estrangement". As the two people approach one another, each rapidly scans the face of the other, looking away as they pass. The glance accords recognition of the other as an agent and as a potential acquaintance. Holding the gaze of the other only briefly, then looking ahead as each passes the other couples such an attitude with an implicit reassurance of lack of hostile intent.

What is important here is that the maintenance of civil inattention seems to be a very general presupposition of the trust presumed in regular encounters with strangers in public places. Giddens observes that civil inattention is the most basic type of framework commitment involved in encounters with strangers in circumstances of modernity. It involves not just the use of the face itself, but the subtle employment of bodily posture and positioning which gives off the message "you may trust me to be without hostile intent". It is also trust as "background noise", again Goffman's term, not as a random collection of sounds, but as carefully restrained and controlled social rhythms. It is characteristic of "unfocused interaction" (Giddens, 1990: 81-82). In trying to explain the passing of traditional society and the development and the consequences of modernity, Giddens

seems to be trapped to producing a mirror-image of modernity for a description of the traditional society. His explanation of the transformation of the notion of "stranger" seems to be based on the presumption that in the traditional societies people were potentially hostile against all who were unknown to themselves. So that, the modernization created a relative trust to the stranger, albeit still with some suspect.

Given the conditions of the Arabic society characterized by the breakdown of the traditional morality, aggressive individualism and normlessness at the early years of Islam, the Prophetic advise to increase and spread the salutation *(selâm)* was part of his project to create such a society, so that from Yemen to the boundaries of the Byzantine a woman could travel in safety and security. The salutation was to overcome any disadvantage or distrustness of the stranger. It was to declare that "be sure that, any damage will not be resulted from my hands, my tongue and my waist against you". While the salute is strongly advisable to the strangers who are appreciated to be Muslims, the reply to the salute and being tied with the declaration the salutation includes is obligatory. While the meaning of the salutation includes an enthusiastic reciprocal calling for peace, it may be enhanced by desiring God's blessing and *barakah*. For this one may say "*Es-Selâmu Aleyküm ve Rahmetullahi ve Berekâtuhu"* (Peace be on you, and God's Blessing and His *Barakah* too". Another tradition attributed to the Prophet says that "it is one of the indicators of the closing of the *qıyamah* that people begin to salute merely to whom they know". Then, to salute appeared as very influential way in overcoming the unreliability of the strangeness. It is, however, an indication of being Muslim (the word 'Muslim' etimologically already includes the meanings 'saluted' or 'saluting') and it has conventionally been understood that only the Muslims are saluted, for only themselves are aware of the responsibility resulted by the salutation and so on.

We continue reading from Ibn Majeh:

> A believer eats for feeding his one stomach. It is the disbeliever who eat to fill in his seven intestines (3256).

The *hadith* implies many things from the ignorantly love of this-world in expense of forgetting the other-world to the extreme ambition to get the interests of the world, but it also applies to the manner of eating; not to eat

so much that exceed the requirement of the body, not to be fast in eating etc. Therefore, it is reproached to eat fast, to eat or drink standing etc. It is considered in many *hadiths* as ungratefulness, or at least as indifference, to the blessings of the God.

> Whoever desires from the God the increasing of the goodness and *barakah* of his house, should wash his hands before and after eating (3260).
> I don't eat while sitting tailor-fashion on the ground (3262-3263).

The latter *hadith* includes an advice to be grateful towards the blessings of God, the food created by Him etc. That is, the form of eating, the behaviors during eating are encoded and charged with some significations. While the eating and drinking from the good foods are completely allowed and please has been desired for the subjects, to use the foods as an occasion to pride and to forget his mortality is disapproved.

> O believers! Eat with your right hand, drink with your right hand, take with the right hand and give with the right hand. Verily the Satan eats with his left hand, drinks with his left hand, gives with his left hand and takes with his left hand (2366).

> Narrated From Ömer b. Seleme saying "I was under the patronage of the Prophet. When I was eating my hand was turning throughout the plate. Then the Prophet said: "When you begin to eat first say 'With the name of the God', use your right hand, take from where its is closer to you" (3268).

What is the significance of using the right hand in some actions? It is certainly not so clear. Some think that it is for hygienic purposes. It is though that it is the left hand that one uses to wash himself in the toilet. Therefore, it is presumed that the left hand is never cleaned completely. It always includes some dirt. For some others, it is just because of the regulation of the conduct in a certain manner, and there is no any emphasis on any hygienic or another reason for using the right hand. When the Prophet decides to command anything, our share is not but just to obey without questioning the 'why' of his commands. Notwithstanding, throughout history, a wide literature has been shaped around the genuine reasons for using the right and excluding the left hand in eating and drinking. As for eating from the nearer side, obviously the plates were not

separated, which is an indicator of civil manner. There seems no any hygienic concern in eating together. Even, on the contrary, eating together from the same plate, but emphatically taking into account the partner(s)' rights during the launch is encouraged through various occasions (3266-68). By so doing the communal ties might be strengthened. There are several versions of this tradition, for example:

> When you eat from a plate together don't eat from the middle, each of you eat from what is nearer to yourself, for the *barakah* is alighted in the middle of the plate (3277).

> Ibn Abbas narrated that the Prophet has never blowed upon the foods or drinks he would eat or drink, and he hadn't been insinuating himself inwards the plate of the meal (3288).

> When your servant brings your meal share it with him/her, invite him/her eating and drinking with you (3289).

> Enes said that "I never seen the Prophet eating at the table" (3293).

> When the dining-table is put on the ground, let nobody stand up before his friends become satiated; even if one has been satiated let him don't lift his hand from the plate until his friends too be satiated. Continue eating (or doing as if you eating) until your friends be satiated. For, otherwise you may make your friends ashamed from eating while they are in fact not satiated (3295).

The traditions continue to elaborate the details of every conducts of eating, drinking, behaving with one another etc. As I said before they are too wide to be exhausted here from any point of view. but open to be studied in more detail. What I wanted to do by these quotations is not to try to prove the prototype of the civilizing process began centuries ago in the Islamic society, probably with similar reasons of constituting an individual personality. That may be relatively true. Because, as might be seen through such regulations of the behaviors what is sought for is an individual personality to be freed from the traditional and tribal ties, the religions of his ancestors, to be able to make his decisions in choosing the way advised to him by the God. The religion has defined itself in terms of its this-worldly project as an ideal of ensuring five securities of the individual: the security of life, of property, of reproductive generation *(nesil),* of personal honor and

of religion. All these projects define a civic individual personality having his own rights and responsibilities in a society. The Muslim diaspora, which will be mentioned and described in the fifth and sixth chapters, in fact, begins with the breaking of any one of those securities which altogether constitute the conditions of emancipation of the self in the Islamic theory of "human rights". The application of the daily practices formed in Medina, however, are still at the target of all believers for constituting their embodiment even in diaspora conditions.

Medina as a civilized city has constituted a model for various Islamic scholars as well as for the ordinary believers. In the Islamic jurisprudence, the practice of the dwellers of Medina is a reliable and valid category to decide authenticity of a tradition. For example, Imam Malik, founder of one of the four major sects of Sunnism, apart from the authentic Sunnah, favored the practices of the citizens of Medina to the consensus *(ijma),* comparison *(qiyas)* and his opinions. Moreover, Ibn Khaldun, in his *Muqaddimah* (1967) tried to depict a model of government which was characterized by justice and ultimate merits shared by the citizens of the country, based on the Medina model. And, Al-Farabi, in his *Madinatu'l-Fâdılah,* which is considered as an adaptation of the *State* of Plato, again, tried to give a description of a perfect city within which all people were happy and their interrelationships were based on love, justice and freedom (Al-Farabi, 1985). In any way Medina is not a court society but the city of the prophet which later inspired the idealizations of the cities of God.

Making Identity and Difference Through *Sırat-ı Mustaqîm*

Ibn Taymiyyah, the leading figure of the Hanbalite sect, perhaps a more profound scholar than his predecessor Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, can be considered as the first to formulate the problem of religious and cultural self-identity in a systematic way. He lived at the cross-roads of the cultures and philosophies which altogether constituted a threat in degenerating the authenticity of the Islamic culture. In his time the Sufism went to the extreme with its formulations of the Unity of Being *(Vahdet-i Vujûd)* of Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi and Hallaj-i Mansur. The Islamic society was in contact with various other societies and cultures from all sides —in the East with Indian culture where mysticism was prominent; in North with Persia

which was dominated by a Magianist mysticism which later transformed very easily into Shiism and fed at least to a certain extent into the Anatolian Sufism; in the West the Greek philosophy and pantheism etc. The plurality of cultures and religious motives was so proliferated that it was to influence the self-images of the Muslims according to Ibn Taymiyyah as well as most of the Ulema. Against the claim of the novelty of the challenge of modernity or postmodernity in terms of the cultural plurality which is thought to be threating the absolutist claim of Islam as a religion, I think, the efforts of Ibn Taymiyyah represents an obvious falsification. For, Ibn Taymiyyah is perhaps the first who encountered the problem of cultural plurality in terms of the problem of authenticity in self-identification. While the cultural plurality and heterogeneity did not create any problem juridically in the body social of Islam, since the juridical mechanism of encoding was already prepared and adjusted to accord to such a condition, the development of multi-culturalism in the Islamic society actually associated a problem of degeneration in the Muslim consciousness of commitment and self-identity. Furthermore, it was also accompanied by the Mongol invasion which was thought by Ibn Taymiyyah to be the punishment of God to the Muslims for forgetting the superiority of their identity, for having imitated and appropriated the customs and manners of non-Muslims, Christians, Jews, Magians and others, and for having revived the old fashioned rituals of the pagans in new forms as adapted to and synthesized with some Islamic ones, such as creating mediators between God and his creation in praying rituals, making and attributing some sacred marks around their personalities, building tombs, burning candles as a form of desire, immolating some animals for them etc. In response to this process which was seen by Ibn Taymiyyah as degeneration, he wrote a book where he tried to explain the process from an authentic Islamic point of view based on textual evidences, to formulate the genuine boundaries of the cultural and religious commitment, and to stimulate an authentic self-identity. He titled the book as *Sırat-ı Mustaqîm* .

Sırat means a path or a road. As an eschatological Islamic term, it also refers to the extremely sensitive and tiny way of examination or the last stage of the series of examinations in the other-world, which would judge who has lived a true life and who has not. Those who have succeeded in their life on this world would go to heaven through this way; and those who failed to succeed in the examination which will be concluded in the

hereafter will go to the hell which is situated just under the *sırat*. As for the *mustaqîm*, it is derived from the root *q w m*. Originally, it means to get up; to stand up, stand erect; to rise and so on. The word *mustaqîm* is the active voice of the word *istiqâmah* with the prefix *i s t,* which functions grammatically as a voice of desire. While the word *istiqâmah* means straightness, sincerity, uprightness, rectitude, integrity, probity, honesty, rightness, soundness and correctness, the word *mustaqîm* carries the adjective significations of the word: upright, erect, straight, dead straight, straight as a die, directed straight ahead, correct, right, sound, proper, in order, even, regular, symmetrical, proportionate, harmonious, honest, straightforward, righteous, honourable etc. (Wehr, 1980).

The idea of *Sırat-ı Mustaqîm,* however, goes beyond these etymological significations, albeit being sustained by their implications, and relies rather on its usage in the first surah of the Qur'an, namely the *Fatiha*. In this *surah Sırat-ı Mustaqîm* is used to refer to the straight path, to which the believers wish from God to be guided. But that is not the all encompassing definition of this path. Even the cornerstones of this path comes in the following words: "The path of those whom You (the God) have favoured." That is the immediate definition and the positive signification of the path. That is determined by the positive manner of guidance to the path. But a path has to be defined in terms of the limits it should not go beyond. That is the negative definition of a path. Especially drawing the line of the straight path, that is, the *Sırat-ı Mustaqîm* is accomplished by signifying this negative aspect, which would correspond to the "Other" of the passengers of this path. The "others" are "those who have incurred Your (God's) wrath" and "those who have gone astray". The believers read this *surah* at least seventeen times a day, because it is required in each standing at the prayer. They address to God through this *surah* that:

> Praise be to Allah, Lord of the Creation, the Compassionate, the Merciful, King of the Last Judgement! You alone we worship, and to You alone we pray for help.
> Guide us to the straight path, the path of those whom You have favoured, not of those who have incurred Your wrath, nor of those who have gone astray (Translation by Dawood, 1966: 15).

Ibn Taymiyyah draw attention, especially, to the negative aspect of this statement which is very functional in constituting a religious-cultural self-

identity. Therefore, he concentrates on this aspect of self-identification which requires the negation of the possibility of being the "other". Following most of his predecessors from the *ulema*, Ibn Taymiyyah thinks that those "others" mentioned in the *surah*, i.e., those "who have incurred God's wrath" and "who have gone astray" are Christians and Jews. But that is not an essential character to be attributed to those religious groups. That is just because of the characteristic actions to which they usually had attended. To illustrate the former, Christians are characterized by an unconscious imitation of their ancestors or their clergies, and so by being guided to the false path. Referring to some other verses from the Qur'an depicting the religious features of Christians, Ibn Taymiyyah concludes that the Christians have deviated because they trusted on their ancestors and their clergy men, so that they accepted and delivered to whatever the clergy commanded them. Such unconditional obedience to anyone without questioning or reasoning was the basic fault of Christians, which characterized their deviance from the straight path. On the other hand, the Jews were characterized by an opposite extremism. That is, they have trusted on their reason and given a central place to the rational thinking so that they missed the religious state of existence. The rationality as a characteristic feature of Jews, which is negated from the point of view of the religion, is not rationality as such, but is that which, and inasmuch as, operates against the religious reasoning. Ibn Taymiyyah refers to various cases to illustrate the Jewish type of reasoning from the Qur'anic narrations. For example, it is told in the Qur'an that when they were obliged not to hunt fish on Saturdays, they have cast their net from the Fridays and taken it out on Sundays. Thus, they thought they would both abide by God's command and not miss the harvest/hunting. This is a characteristic way of interpreting the religious commands or texts, which is to be negated from a pure religious stand. Indeed, in the Islamic history of ideas, Ibn Taymiyyah represents the part of those who do not tolerate interpretation of the religious text, accepting unconditionally the literal content of its meaning. He seems to explain the motivations for interpreting the religious texts in terms of the quest for legitimating the worldly affairs. The Islamic history of law and jurisprudence produced a counterpart of such kind of reasoning by means of a type of law known as the *hiyal* literature. *Hila* (plural *hiyal)* means legal dodge in Arabic, in other words, a way of circumventing a legal norm by legal means. While the Islamic *Shariah*, for example, prohibits the

charging of interest, the *hiyal* literature led to legal ways of circumventing this prohibition. *Hiyal* is by its very nature producing a dogma that is unlimited in its validity (Tibi, 1990: 65). And according to Ibn Taymiyyah, that was not but one of the two main reasons for distortion of the religious authenticity. One represented by Christians who have underestimated the importance of reasoning, and the other represented by Jews who have distorted the straight path of the religion by favouring the rational reasoning and interpretation over the divine opinion. The latter occurs, especially, when the interpretation is motivated by the universal will to disobedience with respect to the divine authority, whatever its reason may be.

The thing that should be noticed here is that it is the fundamental idea underlying the mechanism of exclusion of a possibility in drawing the lines of the straight path, and of making identity and difference. That is the rejection of the possibility of being the other, where the other is represented by Christians and Jews, not because of their essential character but of their practices which may be imitated by Muslims too. Then, the possibility of being the other lies in a series of actions defined by Islam in terms of following the straight path or the wrong one. Indeed, in both oral and literate societies, the community is not a 'thing' in itself but a way of speaking, and thinking, about others who are 'like us'. People create communities rhetorically through thinking that some people are 'like' themselves while others are 'unlike' them. In this respect, demographic contiguity is only one element among many that can be drawn upon in stressing similitude and difference. Processes of conceiving likeness and unlikeness change, however, with changes in the media of communication which bring knowledge of others to mind (Bowman, 1994: 140). In the Islamic jurisprudence of the everyday life, there is a rich literature stressing the importance of, and creating such notions of, differences and similitudes.

Ibn Taymiyyah's *Sırat-ı Mustaqîm* is the best example of this kind of literature having some important and additional features. Above all it has been formulated against a background of cultural and religious plurality through which the so-called Islamic identity could be be distorted and degenerated. This background recalls the postmodern cultural plurality which is to render the validity of the religious habitus irrelevant or at best to subordinate it to global consumerism. Having considered the time of Ibn Taymiyyah as dominated by the penetration of a kind of Hermetism over the Islamic world, which had brought about a revival of the pre-Islamic paganist

notions in a custom of Islamic mysticism, this would help us to understand the case at hand in a better way. The Hermetist movement had been rooted in a cross-religious way within Christianity, Hellenism and Judaism. It exercised its influence with differing extent in shaping the Islamic mysticism, theology and (Aristotelian) philosophy (Jâbirî, 1991: 155 ff.). Ibn Taymiyyah thought that the authenticity of Islamic religion was damaged because of the double trend of taking the models of the others i.e., Christians and Jews. Indeed, Ibn Taymiyyah suggested that, because there is no clear reference to Christians and Jews, and these references were inferred just from the social and historical context of the early Islam, the Islamic history of religions and deviances may be formulated according to this verse in question. Therefore, the Islamic approach to the history of religions should be based on the claim that there are two major tendencies in the historical distortion or degeneration of religions, which also give to the attempts to restore the old religions to their directions. One can think this in terms of a pendulum or an oscillation theory which determined the approaches of David Hume and Ibn Khaldun to the religious diversification in history (Gellner, 1981: 7 ff.). Undoubtedly, Hume thinks of a model of oscillation taking place over time within the same religion between monotheist and polytheist tendencies. He observed that apart from relatively global history of religions there was such considerable tendency almost inside all religions. All religions experience a flux and reflux movement of a monotheist emphasis within its own history. Hume makes an additional observation on the nature of this movement, and suggests that the motivation of this movement is not rational but irrational. By so doing, "...Hume comes to abandon the idea of progress, of continuous unilinear change in one direction, and he replaces it by a far more intriguing and important oscillation theory. Men do indeed change from polytheism to monotheism, but not for rational motives" (ibid: 9). Gellner considers this as a really valuable theory which is to be found in Hume making reference to his conceptualization as 'flux and reflux' of polytheism and theism:

> It is remarkable that the principles of religion have a kind of flux and reflux in the human mind, and that men have a natural tendency to rise from idolatry to theism, and to sink again from theism to idolatry... This oscillation of opinion, as one might expect, has nothing to do with reason; it has to do with the politics of fear, uncertainty, deference and hierarchy (ibid).

In his studies on *Muslim Society,* Gellner tried to identify a similar flux and reflux of the monotheist, orthodox, central, scripturalist and rational faith against the mystic, heterodox, peripheral, oral and irrational faith within the Islamic society (Gellner, 1981; 1992). Apart from the possible shortcomings of such a formulation, because of its essentialist perspective, what matters here is that it may fit to one aspect of Ibn Taymiyyah's place within the Islamic history as the flux of the monotheist faith. That is where Ibn Taymiyyah thought that Islam had been drawn to a line of polytheism, a line from which Christians and the Arabic speaking people had passed before. Because they didn't give to the reason its own right, and unconditionally imitated their ancestors and their clergymen, *ghaflah*, on the one hand, and to a line of rationalism, which substituted in one sense, so to say, a kind of instrumental and pragmatist reason for the divine authority, on the other hand. The latter line had been passed by Jews before, and it was represented also by some idolaters of Mecca at the time of the Prophet. But, as it seems in Ibn Taymiyyah, and in a possible Islamic theory of religions, inasmuch as relying on the conceptualization of the "straight path", there is an oscillation between the two extreme tendencies, none of which is to be considered as religiously authentic. Therefore, oscillation is pictured as to turn between not two but three points. It should be added here that the straight path very often is thought to be a moderated way between the two extreme paths, that is between scripturalism and illiteracy, orthodoxy and heterodoxy, centralism and peripheralism etc. Even in modern times this has been conceived as a midway of capitalism and communism, materialism and idealism, voluntarism and determinism, economism and moralism, objectivism and subjectivism, and wherever such dualisms take place.

According to Ibn Taymiyyah and the early theoreticians of the *sırât-ı mustaqîm,* however, the straight path functioned as a system of commitment through mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion rather than such a synthetism. What is important here is that the paths of those who had incurred God's wrath (the Christians) and those who had gone astray (Jews) were not closed eternally and they would never be, for, they would always represent the universal tendencies of deviation before the *ummah*. That is why there is no references by name to those religious groups. If Muslims would not be circumspect, enough it would be their inescapable destiny to follow the same paths, before which Christians and Jews had passed.

Therefore, a series of practices, a certain kind of way of life should be defined to show the negative limits of the straight path. Ibn Taymiyyah tries to deduce some general principles of not to deviate to the path which would incur God's wrath and the path within which one would have to go astray. The basic assumption underlying all of his studies is that Islam had come with a radically different manner, custom and tradition. The prophet had abolished the customs, traditions and manners of the time of jahiliyyah and set up radically new *habitus*. All those were not casual practices by the Prophet, but all aimed to construct a radically new world corresponding to a new conception of cosmology and a sense of the sacred and profane. By so doing, the Prophet also aimed at constructing a community through excluding it clearly from which it had to emerge. Obviously the Islamic community had to emerge from the jahiliyyah society, owing to the disembodiment of that society, as we will discuss in the next chapters, and its components of all religious identity should be based on the negation of the ghost of that body social of the jahiliyyah. Thus, there were at least three religio-social groups that determined the negative limits of the Muslim identity according to Ibn Taymiyyah's formulation of the straight path. He refers to the following verses from the Qur'an which depicts some characteristics of the Jews as the exegesis of the *sırât-ı mustaqîm* verse as follows:

> Some Jews take words out of their context... (5: 46; Dawood, 1981: 362)

> ... And there are some among them who misquote the Scriptures, so that you may think that what they say is from the Scriptures, whereas it is not. They say: 'This is from Allah,' whereas it is not. Thus they knowingly ascribe a falsehood to Allah (Qur'an, 3: 78; Dawood, 1981: 403).

As it seems the most prominent feature of Jews lies in their resistance against the religious text, appealing to their interpretative capabilities. They receive the divine revelation, if they are by any way disabled to reject it, but they don't want to deliver unconditionally to its content. Therefore, they interpret it and distort its meaning content, so that they take the words out of their context and make themselves free from the charge of the divine words. Ibn Taymiyyah refers to the literal distortion of the Scriptures which was made mostly by Christians before, and distinguishes this kind of distortion. He is sure that there is no such a danger as literal distortion of the Qur'an,

for, it had been guaranteed by God that the Qur'anic text would be saved. As for the Traditions of the Prophet *(ahadith),* there may be such danger, because of the rich historical experience of *hadith* invention; but this too is to be saved, as it had been, eliminated through the professional hermeneutic efforts of the *hadith* scholars (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1983: 76). Christians, who had taken the major part as their share from literal distortion of the Scripture were hard to constitute a model for Muslims. But Jews, on the contrary, were at the point of constituting a strong attractive model to be followed by the Muslims too. That is the way of distortion of the meaning of the words through various techniques, such as taking the words out of their context, ironizing the messages, deconstructing the meaning context, and applying hermeneutic ways in such a way that leads to relativize the text etc. The reasons of being deviated to such ways of distortion is mostly like that of Jews who were examined through the real conditions. It had been forbidden for them to hunt fish at their holiday *Sabbath*. But they were also examined in such a way that, its narration in the Qur'an is to give very important clues about the nature of the conception of the relationships of the religious text and the reality, or speaking with our terms in this study, of the text and the body. There is another factor, namely God, the examining will of God, in the process of the interaction of the body and the text. Speaking on the historical examination of Jews, Ibn Taymiyyah quotes, the Qur'an tells:

> Ask them about the city which overlooked the sea and what befell its people when they broke the Sabbath (Saturday). Each Sabbath the fish used to appear before them floating on the water, but on week-days they never came near them. Thus we tempted the people because they had done wrong (7: 163; Dawood: 254).

It may be said that the conclusions Ibn Taymiyyah derives from this anecdote about Jews determined and shaped his position in the dispute on the Qur'anic hermeneutics. He violently struggled against any kind of interpretation of the Qur'anic verses and advocated the literal acceptance of their content. He, therefore, was accused for having fallen into an anthropomorphism *(mushabbiha)*. That is because of the traditional interpretation of some verses in the Qur'an talking about God himself attributing to Him some human organs such as the "hand of God", the "face of God" or some bodily actions such as in the following verse "It was Allah

who raised the heavens without visible pillars. He ascended His throne ... " (13: 2; Dawood: 140) etc. All those statements have been interpreted in metaphorical terms, because their literal understanding was in contradiction with the conventional Sunni creed which excluded any kind of anthropomorphism violently. And Ibn Taymiyyah's stance in this dispute was characterized by his advocacy of a kind of extreme logocentrism, which in turn had to accept a kind of anthropomorphism (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1988: 11-77).

In *Sırât-ı Mustaqîm,* Ibn Taymiyyah puts forth this appeal to metaphor as a way leading to the path passed by those who had gone astray (the Jews). Notwithstanding, that was not an essential character of Jews, but an open path that might be followed by any one lacking circumspection. Of course, this might invoke various implications on the issue in question here, such as the resistance of the body against the logocentric reading of the text, of change and dogma etc. Furthermore, considerable part of this approach is not unique to Ibn Taymiyyah himself but it is a significant tendency always referable in Islamic panorama of thought and jurisprudence. Now we should remember our task in this chapter and turn to Ibn Taymiyyah's elaboration of a cultural-political identity from the idea of *Sırat-ı Mustaqîm.*

The second group which draws the negative limits for the straight path consists of Christians, those who have incurred God's wrath because of their somnolence, sleepiness and fanaticism in their religion. Ibn Taymiyyah makes references to more detailed depictions of this group in the Qur'an:

> People of the Book, do not transgress the bounds of your religion. Speak nothing, but the truth about Allah. The Messiah, Jesus the son of Mary, was no more than Allah's apostle and His Word which He cast to Mary; a spirit from Him. So believe in Allah and His apostles and do not say 'Three'. Forbear, and it shall be better for you. Allah is but one God. Allah forbid that He should have a son! His is all that the heavens and the earth contain. Allah is the all-sufficient Protector. The Messiah does not disdain to be a servant of Allah, nor do the angels who are nearest to Him. Those who through arrogance disdain His service shall all be brought before Him (3: 171; Dawood: 373-74).

> They take their priests and their anchorites to be their lords in derogation of God, and (they take as their Lord) Christ the son of Mary; yet they were commanded to worship but one God: There is no God but He. Praise and glory to Him: (Far is he) from having the partners they associate with Him (IX: 31).

Here, Ibn Taymiyyah reminds the well-known *hadith* which directly touches upon this verse. Once, when the Prophet was reading this verse from the Qur'an, Adiy b. Khatem who had been still a Christian at the time, was at the door of the Prophet waiting for permission to enter and request from him to allow his sister taken as war booty by the friends of the Prophet, heard the verse and objected to the Prophet: "no we don't worship to our priests". Then the Prophet asked him whether they submit to their priests without any question when they declare something as lawful and some other as unlawful. By taking the answer "yes", the Prophet said that "that is just your worship to them" (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1994: 77 ff.). Throughout his work, Ibn Taymiyyah tries to reconstruct all these practices not just as something unique or essential to Christians and Jews, but as universal human tendencies constituting threats to the authentic Islamic existence as well. In this verse, for example, he substituted the Islamic *ulema* or the *sheikhs* who were to be followed fanatically without interrogation, without seeking proof from the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*. That was already widespread throughout the Islamic world. As we will see in the fifth chapter, this verse together with its interpretation by the *hadith* has constituted a strong reference for the contemporary radical Islamism in the writings of Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, Sayyid Qutb and Abu'l-Ala al-Mawdudi, who substituted political leaders for the Christian or Jewish clergy, the priests and anchorites to be their lords in derogation of God.

Ibn Taymiyyah emphasizes another important aspect of the people of book as a negative mark of the straight path in the following verse:

> As for monasticism, they instituted it themselves (for We had not enjoined it on them), seeking thereby to please Allah; but they did not observe it faithfully. We rewarded only those who were true believers; for many of them were evil-doers (57: 27: Dawood: 108).

In his *Sırat-ı Mustaqîm* and in other studies, he declares some relevances between the content of this verse and the Islamic stand against the innovation or human initiative in religious sphere alongside with the value of coherence of the word and the deed. For him, the boundaries of the religious sphere are drawn exclusively by God through some ways embodied as *fıqh,* codified through various ways as *Qur'an, sunnah, qıyas* (allegory) and *ijma* (consensus). However, this aspect of the people of book

was open before Muslims and there was always a possibility of deviating to the path of those who have incurred God's wrath and who have gone astray. Ibn Taymiyyah frequently refers to the following tradition to provide a support to his insistence on the formulation of the straight path from negative point of departure.

> "You will follow the tradition of your predecessors (that is, Jews and Christians), so that if the will enter into a hole of ordinary lizard you will follow them from behind"

I think the importance of Ibn Taymiyyah's work alongside with the rich literature on the *sırat-ı mustaqîm,* regarding the issues in question here, lies in the concentration on the strategies of exclusion inspired by the conventional references to Christians and Jews. Because, while the references occurred to idealize some mood of existence that would coincide with, so to say, authenticity, they turned to function as motives for exclusion through a series of cultural symbols and practices. Those symbols and practices were associated with the idea of *sırat-ı mustaqîm*, and there developed a considerable literature on the importance of not resembling to those who have gone astray and who have incurred God's wrath. One can see that in some cases the emphasis has been shifted from why some have incurred God's wrath and some have gone astray to the depiction of the negative aspects of Christians and Jews as the "others". Thus, the early measurements, taken not to fall into the mistakes they had done, transformed into some exclusive practices. Those practices included manners, styles of life, wearing, festivals, rituals etc. To keep themselves in the straight path, the early Muslims, Ibn Taymiyyah observes, were very curious not to resemble Jews, Christians and pagans in all these practices.

Ibn Taymiyyah saw a clear verification of the prediction by the *hadith* mentioned above in the situation of Islamic *ummah* at his time. Because of the rapid increase in conquests, there emerged a plurality of cultures and societies, and dense interactions were taking place between Muslims and those cultures. Ibn Taymiyyah's observations and proposals relied on his observation of such developments in Islamic society. In that sense, Ibn Taymiyyah may be considered the first observer and analyst of the Muslim society in a modern society which would be defined in terms of the consequences of cultural and social pluralities mostly arisen out of social

mobility. He felt a danger of assimilation of the Islamic identity because of
the underestimation of the exclusive practices and conducts of Muslims in
their everyday life. Then, he decided to write his book on *Sırat-ı Mustaqîm*
in order to purify the external appearance of the Muslim in accordance with
the *sunnah*. He reminded that the Prophet himself elaborated such an
exclusive constitution of the action in very occasions. For example, the
anecdote called on the early formation of the calling for prayer *(ezan)* is
very characteristic. He reminded that all other possibilities were excluded
just because they were characterizing the traditions of the other religions
(such as ringing bell, trumpet etc.) (1994: 315).

Then, Ibn Taymiyyah attempts to find out and report specific cases
which required a clear discrimination of religious groups in the Muslim
society either from the words and deeds of the Prophet or from the practices
of his successors. Among those cases, those which were realized by Omer,
the second Caliph, have an important place. Ibn Taymiyyah, tries to draw
attention initially to the verses of the Qur'an mentioning the people of
Books, and to deduce from those verses their essential features in order to
picture a negative set of practices to advise the Muslims not to resemble
Christians and Jews, so that to keep in the path of those "whom God have
favored, not of those who have incurred His wrath, nor of those who have
gone astray." Then he goes on telling the historical cases which are too long
to be told here in detail. We will just mention some illustrative cases.

Ibn Taymiyyah reports that Omer, had issued several circulars to
various places of the Islamic lands to warn Muslims not to be confused with
non-Muslims, not to imitate and resemble them in their appearances.
Furthermore, these warnings included also another aspect as not to allow
non-Muslims imitating Muslims and resembling them in their appearances.
This is, indeed, very interesting point, because we, the moderns, are usually
inclined to think that every religious or ideological movement should be
contented with embodiment even through such minimum activities. Because
as we are familiar, modernization or *national*ization usually occurs through
radical change in the everyday *habitus*, rather than the radical changes in the
consciousness. Then it seems very surprising the rejection of any attempt of
the "others" to try to resemble to Muslims in their appearance (Ibn
Taymiyyah, 1994: 326-327). Notwithstanding, this, in fact, constitutes a
genuine problematic for the contemporary Islamic scholars in terms of the
dichotomy between keeping the unique way of cultural identification and

the requirements of coping with modern or postmodern globalism which renders the solidification of any kind of *habitus* in a postmodern cultural pluralism almost impossible, except those which are at a moment under the circulation of the global consumerism. Under this light, let us read a circular issued by Omar in order to regulate the interrelation of Muslims and non-Muslims in Islamic society. He regulated this text and sent it to all provinces of the Caliphate. In this declaration he said:

> The *Zımmis* will be respectful to Muslims; they will present places to Muslims in the circles of conversation; they will not try to imitate and resemble Muslims in terms of their turban, conical hats, shoes, and hair-shave; when talking among themselves they will not use some words which are unique to Muslims; they will not use some patronymics which are unique to Muslims; they will not saddle their horses as Muslims do; and not engrave Arabic seals on their rings; they will shave the top of their head; they will always obey to their own fashions everywhere; they will tie *zünnar* around their waists; they will not comb separating the tuft of their hairs into two sides etc. (ibid.).

In another version of this quotation it is reported that Omer declared that "be just to the *zımmis*, but don't try to resemble them, nor allow themselves resemble you. Don't let their women tie girdle around their waists and make them hold their dresses over their heels so that they should be distinguished very easily from the Muslim women. If they do not obey to these rules, make them be converted into Islam (for one has to be coherent with his appearance without pure imitation)". As it seems most of these differentiations were insisted on in order to keep a notion of the superiority of Muslims or of being Muslim over the others. For example holding one's dress over his heels signifies a humility, while its reverse, that is, letting the dress go freely and rub on the grounds reflects a mood of superiority. Ibn Taymiyyah very interestingly stresses that apart from any obligation to be veiled, non-Muslims are not allowed to be veiled, for, only Muslims and those who have been commanded to do so by their religion can be veiled. That is because the veil was put as a mark of freedom and respectfulness. And only Muslims and somewhere the people of books were deserving respect.

Ibn Taymiyyah points out a question in all this respect and asks: "are they the religious minorities who have to change their customs and traditions or if they do not approximate to change their customs should we

change our own customs to be distinguished from them?" He admits that this is a disputable question, although there is a consensus memorandum *(ijma)* on the necessity of separation from non-Muslims by appearance as well as by quality. He illustrate also the emphasis made by the practices of the prophet on this separation. For example, he quotes from the prophet that he has said

> Whoever tries to resemble to those who are not from amongst us, actually he is not from amongst us. Don't try to resemble to the Christians and the Jews. Know that the Jews salute with each other beckoning with their fingers, and the Christians with the palm of their hands (240 ff.).

> May Allah damn the Jews and the Christians, for they have rendered the tombs of their prophets temple... Don't be like the Jews and the Christians; they made the prophets' tombs temples and worshipped to them. You suffice with saluting me, for, wherever you may be your salute will reach me (296-303).

> Keep the graves with the level of the ground. Don't be like the Christians and the Jews who heightened their graves over the ground (347)

These examples may be enriched more. Ibn Taymiyyah's book is filled with such examples insisting on the prophetic regulations and strategies for making religious, cultural and political identity and difference. To repeat, however, while making Muslims refrain from resembling the "other", the emphases are always made on the very possibility of being the "other". This should be understood under the light of the Islamic claim for being the last successor (ring) of the great chain of the divine religions. In spite of the very pretentious content of its messages, Islam may be considered very humble in that sense. It contained no claim for originality or innovation in this chain, so that the prophet himself said that he was not but a successor of his ancestors, Adam, Jacob, Isaac, Abraham, Solomon, David, Moses, Jesus etc., all whom Judaism and Christianity relied on. Muhammed was just the last verifier of all those prophets, and the Qur'an was not but the verifier of those messages and books they had conveyed to their people before, so that in some orientalist discourses, there was elaborated a strong image of Islam as a simple derivation of the old religions, especially of Christianity and Judaism (Hussain, 1987). At the outset this claim had not any thing to do with the original claims of Islamic religion. Even Islam claimed a continuity

with other religions. Indeed, by so doing, the Islamic politics of identity and difference has turned around a certain kind of morality rather than around some essentialist attributions. Thus, the Prophet, following the Qur'anic messages accused Christians and Jews for deviating from the straight path, and his claim to prophecy included also the calling for a restoration of this path to its original line. This line, at that time, would be represented by Islamic religion and embodied through the Islamic *Shariah*. Then, sensitivity against the possibility of being the "other" or like the "other", initially constituted a source of existential anxiety for the possibility of forgetting the requisites of being the genuine passenger of the straight path. It simply reminded and advised that "those who lived before you, who have been succeeded by your contemporaries, had forgotten the requisites of being a passenger of the straight path and becoming amongst those who have incurred God's wrath, and those who have gone astray".

While this point of view has always provided and sustained a notion of superiority, it also has been considered as a gesture facilitating the dialogue with Christians. In fact they have been distinguished from the all-over conception of the "other" which consisted of all non-Muslims, and have been considered as the People of the Books. This is a special category which required the lawfulness of eating animals they sacrifice and marrying with their women.

All that give some clues for understanding the Islamic way of making identity and difference, and its possible transformations within history. Undoubtedly the situation of such a consciousness within modernity or post or late modernity, considering the inescapable and irreversible pluralization of cultures, globalization of consumerism which affect also profoundly the circulation manners and ideas, life-styles should be a matter of a wider concern. It seems not so difficult to see the major difficulty of Islamic religion in modern times lies in a plausible conciliation of its traditional strategies for making identity and difference with global consumerism. Because, as it seems, globalization process has subordinated most of the political, cultural and religious symbols to a mass consumerism which in turn has emptied their meaning and made them irrelevant. Furthermore, as a religion, it should somehow keep its claim of authenticity.

Undoubtedly, another important consequence of the idea of *sırat-ı mustaqîm* and the ways it was established invoke some other implications in terms of the conception of body as a site of resistance and of struggle. Here,

the identity and difference as means of religious embodiment is realised owing to certain actions and wardrobes of the body. Then, it would be more easy to understand the nature of the struggle that now take place on the veil which is known as turban in the universities. It is just because of the conception of the body as a capital which is invaded by symbols. The Republic, too, had tried to be embodied through a wardrobe and a series of bodily symbols of its own. As it will be clarified in the next chapter, this has taken place at the cost of a disembodiment of the religious authority, which of course in turn required a resistance, so that this resistance has not disappeared yet.

Making Identity and Difference through an Ontology of Flesh

Strategies of making identity and difference involves a strong emphasis on the foods, on the way of obtaining and eating the foods. At first sight this can be understood in terms of the Islamic claim for penetrating into all details of the life without excluding any moment. Undoubtedly a religion regulating the ways of salutation of its clients, of their sexual intercourses, of all manners and patterns of everyday life might be expected to establish its influence also in the regulations of the foods and of the manners of nourishing. Thus, there are some verses touching directly upon this issue, deconstructing the old manners of the Meccan poligamists and of the people of the Books, and establishing new manners. These verses either rendered some kinds of these manners lawful, which were being considered by the Meccan people as unlawful, or forbidden some other kinds which were the normal foods of the idolaters.

Notwithstanding, apart from the Islamic claim for regulating all details of the everyday life, through which they functioned as a means for the embodiment of the divine authority, those regulations functioned also as quite influencive ways of making religious and cultural identity and difference. Considering some key verses from the Qur'an, in this part, I want just to give some fragmentations from the juridical debates on these verses in order to be able to show a good illustrative moment of the formation of the Islamic strategies of making identity.

A verse revealed in Mecca had informed the prophet that the God has "assigned for every prophet an enemy: the devils among men and the jinn,

who inspire one another with vain and varnished falsehoods.." (6: 112). Then, in the following verses the God commanded to the prophet and the believers to eat only of such fleshes which have been consecrated in His name, if they truly believe in His revelations: "And why should you not eat of such flesh when He has already made plain to you what is forbidden, except when you are constrained? Many are those that are misled through ignorance by their appetites: but your Lord best knows the transgressors. Sin neither openly nor in secret. Those that commit sin shall be punished for their sins. Do not eat of any flesh that has not been consecrated in the name of Allah; for that is sinful. The devils will teach their votaries to argue with you. If you obey them, you shall yourselves become idolaters" (6: 118-121; Dawood: 424).

In these verses at least three points concern us. First lies in locating the attitude taken toward the commands of the God as an announcement of hostility to the Satan/devil who is represented in the world by human subjects. As it is reported by most of the commentators regarding these verses, the idolaters of Mecca were trying to tempt the Muslims about their practices in obtaining the fleshes, rationalizing their actions and demonstrating the irrational aspect of the newly-suggested way of the Muslims for slaughtering. It is reported that they have said to the Muslims "you are eating those fleshes slaughtered by your own hands and forbid those which have been slaughtered by the God Himself". Thereby, they were trying to justify eating the flesh of the dead animals. In speaking against their arguments, the Qur'an declares their position as "having located among the satans." From such kind of Qur'anic argumentations one can deduce some results in terms of the evaluation of reasoning *(ta'aqqul),* allegory *(qiyas)* and their unique limitations in Islam, which is not the central matter of our study here.

The second point lies in the style applied in the Qur'an regarding the formation of Islamic law or jurisprudence that will be appreciated again in the following pages in terms of the unique nature of the interrelationship of the Qur'anic text and the reality. These verses are very good examples of this Qur'anic style. That style is resulted by the dialogic aspect of the occasions of revelation. As it is seen in this case, the Qur'anic verses have appeared as a divine participation into or intervention to a human dialogue taking place between the Muslims and the Meccan idolaters. Indeed, the major part of the Qur'an as a source of Islamic jurisprudence consists of

such dialogues and the Qur'anic response to them. We will return to this point in trying to appreciate the nature of the Islamic texts below. As for the third point, it is to draw attention to the emphasis made on the "consecrating in the name of Allah" and the juridical implications of this emphasis. After these verses which were revealed at early times of the Meccan period of Islam, it is known that all fleshes had been forbidden, except those which were consecrated by the Muslims in the name of Allah. That is, not only the "consecration in the name of Allah" but also the "consecration by the Muslims" has been required as a consequence of this verse. Therefore, the foods of those who had been given scriptures had been forbidden until the late period of the revelation, while they were "consecrating in the name of Allah." That is, in one sense the God has thereby, so to say with Grunebaum's terms, changed his mind. He first included the foods of the Jews and the Christians in the totality of those which were forbidden, then He decided an exception for them. In the following these verses are quoted, which also exhibit the final form of the regulations of the foods and social/civil relationships with the "others":

> You are forbidden the flesh of animals that die a natural death, blood, and pig's meat; also any flesh dedicated to any other than Allah. You are forbidden the flesh of strangled animals and of those beaten or gored to death; of those killed by a fall or mangled by beasts of prey (unless you make it clean by giving the death-stroke yourselves); also of animals sacrificed to idols. You are forbidden to settle disputes by consulting the Arrows. That is a vicious practice. The unbelievers have this day abandoned all hope of vanquishing your religion. Have no fear o them: Fear Me. This day I have perfected your religion for you and completed My favour to you. I have chosen Islam to be your Faith.[2] He that is constrained by hunger to eat of what is forbidden, not intending to commit sin, will find Allah forgiving and merciful.

> They ask you what is lawful to them. Say: "All good things are lawful to you, as well as that which you have taught the birds and beasts of prey to catch, training them as Allah has taught you. Eat of what they catch for you, pronouncing upon it the name of Allah. And have fear of Allah: swift is Allah's reckoning.

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[2] In the translation of Dawood, the word "faith" is offered as a translation of the word *"din",* which is usually corresponded by the word "religion" in common translations. Because of the cultural identity dimension of the religion, which is more likely to be referred in the verse, I find it important to warn the reader.

> All good things have this day been made lawful to you. The food of those to whom the Scriptures were given[3] is lawful to you, and yours to them. Lawful to you are the believing women and the free women from among those who were given Scriptures before you, provided that you give them their dowries and live in honor with them, neither committing fornication nor taking them as mistresses (5: 3-5; Dawood: 376-77) .

As it is very easily seen in these verses too the points made above on the nature of Qur'anic speaking can be repeated. They seems to have taken place as very immediate response to the ongoing dialogues, problems and demands of the Muslims. Furthermore, a very strong inseparability of the spheres of life is exhibited through this way of speaking. Even the most this-worldly affairs are located within the wider cosmological hierarchy, including the seen *(shahadah)* and the unseen *(ghaib),* governed by the God. The religious, ethical, economical, sexual, social and political spheres, all are interwoven within each other. For example, while speaking an economical issue, the matter suddenly turns into a metaphysical/other-worldly issue; a theme on the magnificence of the God suddenly turns into a suggestion to regulate the sexual or economical life, being relied on the very idea that only that who is the magnificent may suggest the best judgment on the/men, and so on. The Qur'anic speaking, thus, gives an impression of lacking systematic order. Some modernist thinkers, like Fazlur Rahman and his followers think that it is just because of the old-fashioned character of the discourse which gives this impression of unsystematicity. Therefore, he has attempted to open the way of systematizing the themes of the Qur'an and thereby to overcome this shortcoming. Since I will return to this issue in the following pages it would be needless to go further in this point. As for the above quotations, I want to give some lines of a very meaningful discussion taken place between the early *ulema* which might concern us in respect of what I've chosen to call an ontology of flesh.

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[3]Very interestingly, the translator of the Qur'an into the English, namely N. J. Dawood, makes here a footnote and infered from this statement just "The jews, but not the Christians. I don't know what is his support in so doing, but it is well-known that this statement refers to the Christians as well as the Jews. Even, this category has been widened by some commentators of the Qur'an to some other religious groups such as the Mandeans and the Magians, cf. Razi's interpretation of the relevant verses, 1993.

The discussion has been carried on the weight of the importance of pronouncing the name of Allah while consecrating, compared with the importance of the religious identity of that who consecrates. As Ibn Kathîr informs us, the opinion of the leading imams of the sects have been divided into three regarding the verse saying that "do not eat of any flesh that has not been consecrated in the name of Allah; for that is sinful" (5: 121). The first group, insisting on the literal meaning of the verse, argues that it is definitely forbidden to eat those fleshes even if they are consecrated by a Muslim having forgotten to pronounce the name of Allah. This view is represented especially by the leading imam of the Hanbelite sect, namely Ahmed Ibn Hanbal. His sensitivity can be said to rely on the grammatical preference in analyzing the verse. He has decided that the pronoun "that" in the verse "that is sinful" refers to the action itself and thereby the carrier of the action would be sinful.

For the opinion of the second group, which is represented by Imam Malik, Abu Hanifa and by another version of the view of Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, it would be not unlawful not to pronounce the name of Allah because of a simple forgetfulness. They have drawn attention to the previous statement of this verse saying that "why should you not eat of such flesh when He has already made plain to you what is forbidden" and deduced a difficulty in deciding an unlawfulness for a food.

The third opinion is the most interesting in terms of the ontology of the flesh which is applied as a strong way of making identity and difference. That is Imam Shafii's opinion. For Shafiî, the only condition of the lawfulness of a flesh is its consecration by a Muslim, no matter whether he pronounces the name of Allah or not and more strikingly no matter whether the Muslim neglect it because of a forgetfulness or by intention. In any way, provided that being consecrated by a Muslim, for Shafii the flesh become lawful without any doubt. Ibn Kathir thinks that Shafiî relies on the argument that by the verse saying "do not eat of any flesh that has not been consecrated in the name of Allah; for that is sinful" (5: 121) what is meant is those which have been consecrated in the names of other than Allah. But as it seems Shafiî's view relates the "pronouncing the name of Allah" with the religious identity, and declares that potentially only the Muslims can pronounce the name of Allah, Therefore, if an idolater consecrates in the name of Allah this flesh does not become lawful but forbidden. However, if a Muslim neglects pronouncing the name of Allah, even if it occurs

deliberately, this flesh could be eaten as a lawful one, for, the Muslim has no potential to carry another name than that of Allah, and he is ontologically a carrier of the name of only Allah. Therefore, the distinction of the flesh could easily be determined by a reduced questioning of whether it is consecrated by a Muslim or not (Ibn Kathir, 1989: volume VI: 2808-2816).

For Shafiî, a Muslim always carries ontologically a name of Allah, because, he is supposed to have been "guided by the God to a straight path, to an upright religion, to the faith of saintly Abraham", for he had already pronounced that "my prayers and my devotions, my life and my death, are all for Allah, Lord of the Creation: He has no peer. Thus I am commanded, being the first of the Muslims" (Qur'an: 6/161-162). The commentators of the Qur'an draw attention to the fact that "being the first of the Muslims" is commanded to all Muslims, provided that his prayers and his devotions, his life and his death would be all for Allah. If any Muslim has to be charged with such attributes, then, a Muslim, according to Shafii, has not to pronounce the name of Allah literally while consecrating. That is to be attached to an ontology of flesh (animal as well as human) which is conditioned alongside with the name of Allah.

Modernization, Disembodiment and Jurisprudence:
From *Mecelle* to the Jurisprudence of the Post-Caliphate Condition

"If one has to name the Islamic civilization in any way", says Muhammed Abid Al-Jabirî, "it is the best to call it 'the civilization of jurisprudence'". For Jabirî, just as the Greek civilization has been characterized by "philosophy", and the contemporary Western civilization by "science and technology", the Islamic civilization can be characterized with "jurisprudence". Really, looking at intellectual accumulation of the Islamic civilization, we would not see more important product, either by quality or quantity, than the *fiqh*. There has been a huge collection, so that it would be impossible to have a detailed analysis of it. From the Oceans to the Gulf in Asia and Africa, almost in all Islamic society, it would be very hard to find a house without containing a book of jurisprudence (Jâbirî, 1991: 96). In Turkey, such book as to fulfil the everyday needs of the believers for religious knowledge is called *İlmihal*, a distorted form of the *Ilmu'l-hâl* in Arabic that means the knowledge of the situation. It is really very

widespread throughout the country to fulfil the needs of knowledge without the mediation of any class of clergy. Therefore, it could be said that the jurisprudence is the most equally allocated property among the Muslims. Therefore, just as the *habitus*, the jurisprudence exercises an influence not just on the practical disciplines and activities of the individuals as well as the communities, but it also determines the rational disciplines and ways of thinking.

Similarly, comparing Islam with Christianity, Bassam Tibi observes that "in contrast to Christianity, in Islam jurisprudence not theology takes precedence; not the *kelam*, but the *fiqh* was regarded as the core of "Islamic knowledge" per se. Unlike Christianity, Islam is not an ecclesiastical, but an organic religious system; it offers regulations for all spheres of life as an organic whole. Islamic law corresponds to this, embracing both the sphere of public worship, *ibadat* and of business dealings, *mu'amalat*. Its essence is the regulation of what is permitted, *halal*, and what is forbidden, *haram* (Tibi, 1991: 40-41). Tibi, also argues that although the pre-Islamic Arabs had a written language, they had no written law: The most important pre-Islamic legal norm was the vendetta. In view of the absence of a central state power structure with legal norms at its disposal, the fear of blood revenge served as an equivalent for the directive function of law. Tibi argues that the founding of the Islamic religion may be interpreted as the spread of an urban culture, for, pre-Islamic society was familiar with two relatively developed urban centers of trade, Mecca and Medina, and Islam emerged out of these centers:

> ...neither in the nomadic nor in the urban component of pre-Islamic Arab culture was there a tradition of written law; the prevailing law was the primitive customary law ... among the acephalous tribes; in the two urban centers of Mecca and Medina social life was regulated by more developed forms of customary law (Tibi, 1991: 64).

Turning to the point made above on the unsystematicity of the themes of the Qur'an we have to begin with asking: is it a disadvantage or an advantage to have such a dialogical text, in terms of being able to cope with the changing reality? Such questions as the latter, in fact, is invoked by a modernist mentality which is forced to seek for a systematic construction of the text as a mirror of the reality, which is already assumed to be systematic

by its very nature. And as an important dimension or product of this mentality, the orientalist interest in Qur'an has approached to the Qur'an with the assumption of such a deficiency in the Qur'an. In this part we will review briefly some assumptions on the relationships between jurisprudence and development or modernity, especially in the case of Turkey. What does it mean to have such an intensive concern with jurisprudence? What is the meaning of jurisprudence? A systematic constraining of the body or the embodiment of a body social?

As we mentioned earlier, observing a lacking of a notion of history or chronology in Islam particularly, and in the Qur'an particularly, W. Montgomery Watt (1988) was, in fact, in search for such a systematicity. Furthermore, as Bryan S. Turner explains, a considerable part of the orientalist discourse concentrated around the theme of *qadi* justice, as a typology of the arbitrary unstable and personal law. This theme is elaborated to emphasize the unsystematicity of the Islamic law. Actually, it was thought that a serious codification of the law system had not been accomplished until Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's attempt to codify the Islamic law under the frame of *Mecelle*. According to this same picture of the Islamic law the *qadi* had been equipped with almost a limitless authority without being submitted to a binding autonomous law (Turner, 1974: 107 ff.). While drawing attentions to the incoherence of Max Weber in terms of neglecting his own *verstehende* principle in studying the emergence and the development of Islam, Turner explains that Weber regarded the legal 'hunches' of the Muslim *qadi* judge as the best example of substantively irrational law; the decisions of the *qadis* are 'informal judgments rendered in terms of concrete ethical or other practical valuations... *qadi*-justice knows no rational "rules of decision" *(Urteilsgründe)* whatever' (quoted from Weber by Turner, 1974: 109). For Turner, in his discussion of Islamic law, Weber brought into focus two important issues, the inflexible content of the *Shari'a* and the subjective instability of *qadi* legal decisions. For Weber, neither the Qur'an nor the *sunna* by themselves were the bases of the law. The *Shari'a* is better understood as the 'product of the speculative labors of the *faqih*, the legal specialists who eventually formed four great law schools. The result was a gap between the law as an ideal and social reality (Turner, 1974: 110-11). Weber claimed that this hiatus was closed by arbitrary, unsystematic techniques: "However, the universalism which was claimed by the sacred tradition resulted in the fact that inevitable

innovations were often necessary and these had been to be supported either by a *fatwa*, which could almost always be obtained in a particular case, sometimes in good faith and sometimes through trickery, or by the disputatious casuistry of the several competing orthodox schools" (Weber, 1978: 821). Because, the sacred law could not be disregarded; nor could it, despite many adaptations, be really carried out in practice. For Weber, the opinions of the *muftis* are authoritative, but they also vary from person to person; like the opinions of oracles, they are given without any statement of rational reasons. Thus, they actually increase the irrationality of the sacred law rather than contribute, however slightly, to its rationalization (ibid.).

Turner finds out that the sociological 'ideal types' of capitalism necessitated including an autonomous law system just with orientalist motivations to make an emphasis on the absence of such an institution in the Eastern society. And, indeed, it was this character of orientalism that had led the Western social scientific studies to search for the absence of civil society, revolutions, a city including a market and rationalism versus patrimonial domination of a prebendel feudalism, stagnation, unstable settlement, *qadi* justice and irrationalism. For Turner, the truth of this search was not but the reflection of the corresponding problems of the Western society on an Eastern typology which consisted of a mere caricature of the West:

> The debate(s) ... took place in the context of uncertainty about enlightened despotism and monarchy in Europe. The orientalist discourse on the absence of the civil society in Islam was a reflection of basic political anxieties about the state of political freedom in the West. In this sense, the problem of orientalism was not the Orient but the Occident. These problems and anxieties were consequently transferred onto the Orient which became, not a representation of the East, but a caricature of the West. Oriental despotism was simply Western monarchy writ large (Turner, 1994: 34).

The problems of the Islamic law in terms of its paradox between the inflexibility of the Shariah and the authority of the *faqih*, however, is still an important problem in terms of coping with the changing reality in its very claim of authenticity. Weber's analyses on Islamic law have had another implication. For Weber, under the patriarchal and patrimonial circumstances, the legal judges were the administrative officials of the court and hence served the political goals of the prince rather than the abstract

principles of law. Under these circumstances, the creation of systematic law and the growth of an autonomous legal profession were sociological rarities. For Weber the *qadi*-justice was the very opposite of the legal stability which characterized formal rational law and Occidental legal administration, so that wherever *qadi*-justice was predominant, capitalist (or in larger sense, modern) development was retarded (Turner, 1974: 111-12; Weber 1978: 822-23).

Apart from the motivations of such portrayal of the Islamic law, it has been thought that the attempts to codify the general rules and principles hadn't been accomplished until *Mecelle*. And indeed, the attempts for codifying the Islamic law under the frame of *Mecelle* were being determined by this same assumption. In that sense, there were a clear parallelism between the orientalist evaluations of the Islamic law and the Ottoman anxiety to codify the Islamic law in terms of their notion of the relationship between law and development. In the covering memorandum of the *Mecelle (Esbâb-ı Mûcîbe Mazbatası)* it was declared that there were an urgent necessity for codifying the basic principles of the law, because there were an extreme multiplication in the volume of the *fatwas* (the opinions of the *muftis)* about the details of the life and it had almost been impossible to deduce an appropriate decision for a specific issue from this inaccessible collection.

> ... the *fatwa* books consist of works including *fatwas* produced as application of juridical rules to the facts, while it is needless to mention the difficulty of collecting all *fatwas* given by the Hanafi *ulama* for centuries *(Mecelle Esbâb-ı Mûcibe Mazbatası:* 9).

Then, the Islamic collection of law was inaccessible not just because of its size but also of the nature of the *fatwa* which was a response of the *mufti* to his (community's) experiences. Indeed, all these responses were valid and perhaps good responses in their context but, considered as included in the volume of the collection of law, they stayed there to be noticed by the successor *mufti*. Given also the difficulty of communication among the *muftis*, there were a clear manifestation of an authority of the *mufti* giving a right impression of arbitrariness. The covering memorandum of the *Mecelle* was clearly relying on the necessity of fulfilling the requirements of the rapidly changing reality on the one hand, and of codifying the general

principles of the Islamic law to overcome the chaos arisen out of the widespread arbitrariness in legal sphere, on the other hand.

Undoubtedly, a sufficient study of *Mecelle* would require more than locating it in our specific context. Really, there is no considerable works touching upon the sociological aspects and consequences of *Mecelle*. However, in this study we could not go on further in giving a detailed analysis of the *Mecelle*. Notwithstanding, there are some points to be made regarding our frame of argumentations.

First, *Mecelle* has appeared as the most important response of the Islamic society in legal sphere to modernization. I didn't say "changing reality' but 'modernization', because, the Ottoman society was already a sufficiently mobile society because of its plural structure. It was dominated by the conjuncture of various religious or ethnic groups, attempting successfully to keep peace and harmony among them. Given the fact that those groups were potentially in competition with each other, to keep such a mosaic in one society required a strong notion of law. Undoubtedly, it would be quite simplistic to deduce all this notion and the legal activities it produced to a stereotype of *qadi*-justice. Therefore, as it seems, and as it is also argued by Ortaylı, codification activity can not be considered as a progress in law. Ortaylı adds that law doesn't resemble physics, medicine or some other science wherever a visible progress could be reported. Like history and philosophy, the content of law, as well as the idea of law, is out of progress. Law carries the spirit of its time. It is not merely composed of a textual work. As a matter of fact, Cevdet Pasha's work has not been a radical innovation in Islamic law, but it was merely a codification of the already existing materials of law (Ülken, 1992: 71). Moreover, in the introduction chapter of the *Mecelle*, which constituted the basic principles of methodology of jurisprudence it was declared that "an ijtihad doesn't falsify an ijtihad" *(İctihad ile ictihad nakzolunmaz* see Appendix I, Article: 16). That meant every *ijtihad* is valid by its own right. Then, an *ijtihad* in the *Mecelle* would not be final but a product of the reason based on the fundamentals of Islamic jurisprudence. For this reason, *Mecelle* has contained several rules that was thought to be able to encounter all contingencies of the ongoing reality. For example, it contained the very general principles such as "the changes in rules in accordance with the changing times can not be denied" *(Ezmanın teğayyuru ile ahkâmın teğayyuru inkâr olunamaz:* 39); "when a business becomes narrowed, it is

dilated" *(Bir iş zîk oldukta müttesi' olur:* 18); "necessities legitimate the unlawful" *(Zaruretler memnu' olan şeyleri mübah kılar:* 21) etc. This list can be increased more. The introduction chapter of *Mecelle* contains very illustrative statements in terms of the conception of text and reality, as well as the measurements taken for keeping the authenticity of the *Sharî'a*. Besides all these examples which make the flexible interpretation of the law possible, it contains also some rules taking care of maintaining the meaning content of the legal texts. For example it contains such rules as: "certainty doesn't disappear because of a doubt" *(şek ile yakîn zail olmaz:* 4); "what is essential in the word is its true meaning" *(kelâmda asl olan ma'nâyı hakîkîdir:* 12) "there remains no place for *ijtihad*, where a dogma takes place" *(Mevrid-i nasda ictihada mesağ yoktur:* 14). Thus, *Mecelle* seems to codify the already existing material of the Islamic law trying to reconcile the requirements of change and the textual will to objectivity.

Our second point is to recall again the question we asked above: Really, where is the genuine advantage: in having such a dialogical text with the changing reality or in a logocentric reading of the legal texts in their codified and extremely textualised form? So far we often referred to Islamic law and jurisprudence in terms of its very tendency to encode almost all human actions in detail, so that we become to justify identifying a special interrelationships between the text, as a source of violence, and body as the source of life and change, and as a site of resistance. Here, the orientalist approaches find out an arbitrariness and unsystematicity in Islamic law which might be favoured by a deconstructionist point of view which, notwithstanding, characterises all legal activities as well as, even especially, the Islamic jurisprudence as the central activities of textual violence on the bodies. Therefore, Islamic theory of jurisprudence has to encounter with both tendencies and find a way beyond. Indeed, what made the orientalist focus on the unsystematic character of the Islamic jurisprudence, and have an impression of arbitrariness (of the *qadi* justice) might be considered as a richness and advantage in encountering the contingency of the reality. Given also the inflexible volume of the *Shari'a*, such an easiness might be considered as very convenient legal equipment which is required by change and development.

If so, on can ask why capitalism or modernization retarded in the Islamic society? Undoubtedly, at first sight this question seems to depend on presuming a positive and deterministic relationship between law and

development. What I have to do, apart from trying to exhaust this argumentation in all sides, in this case is to insist on the falsehood of this presumption. Especially in Islamic society it is very easy to see that what precluded the development of capitalism was certainly not the Islamic jurisprudence, for, it has always contained sufficient ways out for fulfilling the requirements of the contingency of reality. In one sense, the unsystematicity of the Islamic jurisprudence was resulted by the nature of the Islamic religious texts which had been constituted within a dialogue with the addressee of a revelation throughout 23 years. Indeed, this would then be taken as the very characteristic of most of the classical texts, a way that would be favoured by an ontological hermeneutics of Gadamer. For, he formulated the dialogue as a foundation of the hermeneutics. In this respect, having made reference to Plato's underlying idea of the Great Dialogues, he said that "a limitation of the Greek models of thought can be detected here, one that was persuasively pointed out by the Old Testament, Saint Paul, Luther, and their modern reinterpreter. It is a dimension of dialogue that still does not come into conceptual consciousness even with the celebrated discovery of Socratic dialogue as the basic form of thought" (Gadamer, 1987: 27).

Nevertheless, what motivated Cevdet Pasha, and the Ottoman Empire, to codify the Islamic law was not to put end to this advantage of open-endedness of the jurisprudence, although any codification activity might have to fall into a solidification of a legal material to submit certain content of law to the distortive effects of time. We should think this, especially, under the light of the given that modern times are those wherein all that is solid melts into air. *Mecelle* is an attempt to codify the Islamic jurisprudence to overcome a possible chaotic conditions in law. This was really a retarded task of the Ottoman society which was dominantly Hanefite in juridical sect. The Shafiî school, however, had already fulfilled this task at the early times. It is a well-known fact that Shafiî had codified the Islamic jurisprudence to get rid of it from the extreme rationalists who promoted the human opinion on the one hand, and from the esoterists who favoured an extreme interpretation and thereby relativisation of the religious texts on the other hand. In his outlining the fundamental elements of the structure of what he has called "Arabic Reason", Jabirî has accounted the consequences of Shafiî's effort as a constituent element of this structure. For Jabirî, Shafiî has not only made jurisprudence but also put the

methodological rules to which any juridical activity would have to submit. Moreover, it corresponds to a conception of reality outlined in a mathematical way. The grammar of the Arabic, which is the first codified language in the world, worked in such a way that submitted linguistics to a mathematical construction of the reality. And the jurisprudencial effort of Shafiî was to restore this mathematical construction of the reality in the juridical thought.

As Jabirî illustrates, Arabic language was codified at the first century of the emergence of Islam in order to keep the language within which the Qur'an had been revealed authentic/constant. The linguistic studies, thus, in order to reach to the origins of he language have gone to the Bedouins. But this has had at least some important negative consequences. Above all, the vocabulary of the Bedouin was very limited and depicting only the concrete reality. It was not so convenient to an abstract thought, to a conceptual production. The purity of the language of the Bedouins was being idealized but this didn't mean it was a sufficient language in any way. Indeed, the Qur'an and the *hadith* literature have contained very foreign words, because they were speaking to the urban settlers. The urban places were considered to distort the language, but the distortion of language in another sense is appearance of the dynamism of any language. While distorted, the Arabic used in Mecca and Medina was also convenient for representing some abstract things and complex relationships which the Bedouin Arabic could not do. On the other hand, the purity of the Bedouin Arabic was taken for granted; it was almost a mere mental construction. That is, a purity of the Bedouin language was initially idealized in minds together with the rules such a language would have to submit. Jabirî argues that the grammar of the Arabic language has not been codified departing from the actually spoken language, but it was formed in the tables of the linguists and was imposed on the existing Arabic. That is why the irregular cases in the language are almost not less than the regular ones. He demonstrates how mathematical way of thinking was applied in determining these rules. Thus he reports that the letters of the alphabet were multiplied in a way of mathematical permutation and combination to constitute words consisting 2-6 letters. Because it was thought that the Arabic words originally contained at least two and at maximum six letters. It is after this procedure that the products obtained were examined, whether they had been used in the Bedouin tribes or not. As for the grammatical forms, there have been constituted some

structures for producing convenient words for tools, adjectives, space, subject, object etc. Thus, the Arabic grammar has been constituted as an excellent product of the mind on the one hand, and it relied on producing meanings from the movements of sounds (phonetics) on the other hand.

Jabirî indicated this as manifestation of the Arabic reason *('aql al-'arabî)*. And in what follows, he finds out a similar manifestation of this reason in the jurisprudence, in the codification of methodology of jurisprudence by Abu İdris Al-Shafiî. The author of *Er-Risâle,* for Jabirî has constituted the frame of all juridical activities of his successors. The significance of the rules, Shafiî has established, in the constitution of the Arabic-Islamic reason are certainly not less than what Descartes' "rules of method" have played in the French thought in particular, and in modern Western Rationalism in general (Jabirî, 1991: 100 ff.).

Now, what matters us in mentioning the importance of Shafiî in the Islamic history of jurisprudence, while we were concerned with Cevdet Pasha's *Mecelle?* Here, it should be reported that while Shafiî's efforts to codify the basic rules of the logic of jurisprudence was very progressive at his time, he has also been criticised for having claimed to encompass all reality within a mental product, so that *Er-Risale* has contained a very claim that it could exhaust all contingencies of the reality. In one sense the criticisms made on Descartes by the postmodernists, poststructuralists and the hermeneuticians for having exhausted all reality within a mathematical construction of the objective Subject, have been reproduced for Shafiî too, by the (paradoxically) modernist Islamists, such as Fazlur Rahman (1984; 1987: 18, 26), Nasır Hamid Abu Zeyd (1992) and Jabirî (1991). Even, Shafiî sometimes has been accused for causing an inflexibility by his attempt to codify the Islamic law, wherein he reserved a crucial place to the prophetic tradition. *Mecelle*, however, belongs to a Hanefite tradition which had no codified methodology of jurisprudence of its own. Indeed, Shafii's work has tacitly penetrated into all juridical activities regardless their sects. Thus, the Hanefite mentality of deducing jurisprudence from the principles has relied on the way Shafiî has opened in the *Er-Risale.* In any way, the criticisms of both Shafiî, for his logocentric establishment of the jurisprudence, and the Islamic jurisprudence for its convenience to support arbitrariness, can be falsified through the empirical facts in context of the relationship between law and development.

Then, *Mecelle* should be treated in its own social and historical context where we need to make another point. Indeed, the author of *Mecelle* has had a very strong notion of social sciences. His work has been immediately been relevant with the social contract ideas, while we know he had not known French to read Rousseau (Ortaylı, 1997: 381). His position is comparable with that of the French philosophers of social contract and sociologists such as Durkheim. Durkheim had been concerned with developing an idea of functionalism to be functional in keeping the European body social which was to be characterized by anomie. Similarly Cevdet Pasha was concerned with the social order problem and the survival of the Ottoman society. He had translated Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddimah* which was to be considered as the best sociological model for explaining the decline of the Ottoman Empire (Ülken: 1992: 73).

Consequently, the major task of Cevdet Pasha was, in fact, to fill in the blanks, the *Tanzimat* has created, rather than being advocated to make a contribution to the Islamic jurisprudence. Actually, while his work has constituted a very good case for a conceptualization of the problems of jurisprudence, his contribution was an indirect one, and it should be treated more heavily in the context of the Turkish modernızation.

Because of some reasons we will try to introduce in the next chapter, namely because of the consequences of the post-caliphate conditions, the major part of the Islamic jurisprudence, now, is out of function. There are many Muslims or Islamists, however, whose major problem is their depriving of political frame that might make the juridical activity meaningful. Those people have for a long time chosen to be passive even where they had to be in active relation with their juridical necessities; they have participated in the commercial, political or any other social activity in a shyness just because of the difficulty in making those activities relevant with their jurisprudence. Thus, they have experienced a kind of diaspora through a passive resistance. Partly with the rise of the Welfare Party, however, it can be said that this passive resistance has been broken. Especially in economical sphere a new capitalist group has emerged to be called as "Anatolian Tigers" because of they have heavily relied on the Anatolian capital. This group has, especially recently been carried to the current because of their contribution to the Islamism in general ground. In fact, they emerged out of some rational politics of Turgut Özal, the eighth president of Turkey, as part of a larger project to draw some passive

accumulation of capital to the market which was lying under the pillows. It was lying, because there were no any juridically definable sphere to be introduced to the circulation of capital. Turgut Özal supplied this service by importing the Arabic financial institutions claiming a money investment without interest which is violently forbidden in Islam. Moreover, it can be said that the Islamists after the eighties have discovered a very unique way of investment and finance. They gathered together and organized large scale investments in Anatolia where the large capital of the center hadn't taken courage to go. Thus, now they came to a point to compete with this central capital in several areas of investment.

What I want to say in this occasion is to tell an anecdote taken place with a representative of one of these entrepreneurs in Konya which have much to do with understanding a contribution of *Mecelle*. One of this entrepreneurs, namely Kombassan Holding, has organized a symposium in Konya through which major commercial, financial and labor problems of the Islamic entrepreneurs were discussed in terms of Islamic jurisprudence. Thus, the relationships of the Islamist commercial part with banks, laborers, unions, financial movements, bourse, other entrepreneurs, state and government, all were discussed and tried to be defined juridically. Thus, the activities of the Islamist entrepreneurs were to be made meaningful, and get rid of irrelevance because of what we would call a disembodiment process in the post-caliphate condition. Of course, here they would have to suppose tacitly an Islamic social or political body existent. No matter what might be the national or religious identity of this body, but it is a fact that, presupposing an Islamic embodiment by those juridical activities has gone hand in hand with economical growth of such a part. At the end of the symposium a declaration was published. I quote the all text of this declaration at the Appendix B.

In this occasion, the man we met has explained the rapid growth of these Islamic holdings in comparison with the position of *Mecelle*. According to his explanation, until *Mecelle* the Islamic jurisprudence was dominantly treated from negative point of view. What had been asked was "what is lawful". That means everything is essentially unlawful and we should know the exceptions. The *Mecelle*, however, has declared that what is essential is the freedom from obligation, *(Beraati zimmet asıldır: 8); and* unless a man is proven as a guilt he has a freedom of obligation. *Mecelle* found out that it is freedom of obligation that is essential in the things and

liberated the Islamic references of the lawfulness in the essence of the things, thus it can be said that by so doing the law has played its part in the way of development. The entrepreneur continued making comparisons with our times. He said, until recently, our notion of Jurisprudence worked in accordance with this basic principle. We all thought that what was essential was the unlawful and we should have made exceptions from the totality of the jurisprudence. We didn't do more than just a shifting in this logic. Now we believe that the things in themselves are essentially lawful but there are some exceptions. For this man, indeed, we do not need an external reference for achieving such a shift except what the Qur'an itself contains. Really, such a logic can very easily be deduced from several verses of the Qur'an. To illustrate, the verse mentioned above can be read again:

> They ask you what is lawful to them. Say: "All good things are lawful to you .
> All good things have this day been made lawful to you. (5: 4-5; Dawood: 376-
> 77) .

Indeed, it is lawfulness in the essence of the things, provided that they are treated in the name of Allah. Looking at the content of the Islamic jurisprudence, for example of the content of the declaration of the First Declaration of the First International Islamic Congress of Commercial Law, it can bee seen that the most important condition making a juridical activity Islamic is its existence in the name of Allah. Otherwise, one can not see radical differences in the specific content of this juridical activity except the major themes. As a matter of fact, in this congress what have been declared as Islamic or lawful, are all innovations emerged out of modern social relationships. Modern institutions and actions are submitted to the jurisprudence and marked with the terms of jurisprudence. Indeed, one can appreciate that the production and adoption of such activities may stabilize a political identity and establish a way of permanent living together with the socio-political body of the "other", which in fact ontologically makes the existence of the Islamic embodiment impossible, just because of the inescapable struggle taking place over the body. And this process may lead to a disappearance of the feeling of what we have chosen to call diaspora. In addition, as we illustrated it with the name of an ontology of flesh, here, the Islamic identity and the name of Allah are the fundamental constituents of Islamic action. That is, indeed, the key for the question concerning

authenticity of the religious action even in the modern times. Moreover, that is also the initial and principle step to perform an Islamic embodiment, that is, to live and to act in the name of the God. Now, we will try to give the parameters of the disembodiment of the Islamic identity in the post-caliphate conditions which will be characterised by a Muslim diaspora. It will be shown that the Islamic jurisprudence is made possible by a social embodiment of the Islamic ideals.

CHAPTER IV

A CONCEPTUALISATION OF BODY POLITIC
IN THE POST-CALIPHATE TURKEY

From the Body Without Organs to a Disembodiment

When Antonin Artoud said that human freedom and autonomy could only be achieved once man had been given a body without organs, he clearly relied on a conception of body that insisted that the body is completely socially constructed. The organs are attributed by culture to the body. Metaphorically, the organs represent the defined and encoded actions as normal or abnormal, good or bad. So, we come to assume that we are not walking on our hands but only on our feet, eating not with our heads but through our hands, not through the left hand but the right one etc. Thus, it seems that Artoud represented the extremist part of the theories of the constitution of body. For him the body is something to be made, rather than being at one's disposal. Here, the body as a carrier of the organs which are burdened with socially defined roles, is conceived as a constraining factor in the human agency. That is, as we tried to show in the previous chapter, he belongs to the tradition which completely ignore the role of the agent in the process of action. We know that the later representatives of this tradition were the structuralists or even the poststructuralists like Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari. They altogether, as we have seen before, agree in that the body is socially constructed and is divided by the organs which are also socially tied to body. The body and the organs of the body clearly are conceived as constraining and hindering entities before the emancipation of the self.

We see that the way of emancipation or liberation is conceived in a quite unusual way, for, while the body without organs is idealised as a state of emancipation, any bodily action which aims to subject to the will to act has to be thought as reproducing a pre-definition of the organ. We are

inclined to think, however, that if we want to write we need a hand; to walk, we need feet, to smile we need mouth, to talk we need tongue etc. If any attempt to use these organs is accepted as a reproduction of the social-construction of the body and not anything else, then there seems no way out for the predestination of action.

In this chapter, however, I do not aim to go further in the discussion of this conception. Rather, my aim is to convert the metaphor of the body without organs into a means for conceptualising the situation of the contemporary Islamic body-politic. What characterises the situation of the Islamic body politic, here, is the ways of self-imagination or self-definition of contemporary Islamists who are engaged with the so-called 'political Islamism'. And with the contemporariness I mean the course which began with the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the subsequent abolition of the Caliphate which is thought as a head which brings in body its existence. It is such a body that the Muslim's bodily existence is thought to be possible only under its organism. Then, considering all implications of the body without organs as a metaphor it will be applied to the situation of this organism during the period I've chosen to call as "post-caliphatic". I shall try to conceptualize this situation in terms of the associated meanings of body as a potential of emancipation.

As might be realized, here I use at least two terms in accordance with my specific aims with a redefinition of them. First, I use the term or the metaphor "body without organs" in a meaning quite different from that of Deleuze and Guattari. They employed it to refer to the possibility of liberating the body from the organs which are thought to be attached by culture and are essentially of a constraining nature. On he contrary, in the case of the analysis of Islamic political identification, I see the organization is seen as an obvious means of liberation. To be without organs is a constraining situation. That difference, however, doesn't stem from our different positions taken towards the same issue, but from our employing the same metaphor for different issues. This is for the accomplishment of our second dislocation, in Laclauean term, of the metaphor "body politic". As I will try to show, the metaphor of body has always been employed by the classical political thinkers from the Greeks to the Islamic philosophers or scholars in order to refer to the political apparatus. The "body politic" then has been meaning both the political apparatus itself and the analysis of the life-cycle of such apparatus in parallel with the data of the anatomy of

body. The best example of such an analysis is Ibn Khaldun's on the laws of the circulation of the *dawla* from hand to hand by generations during the history. He has very strikingly found affinities between the history of holding a *dawla* by a specific group and the human body which is destined to live in accordance with the biological laws, almost independent of subjective agencies. The term has gained by time the meaning of the political science as a whole (Lewis, 1992). For the mainstream application of the term, it included a

> "claim that the body politic is constituted by a creative act, by a work of art or artifice, that uses the human body as its image, model or metaphor. The background to this claim is provided by certain seventeenth and nineteenth century social contract theorists who argued in favour of the conventionality or artificiality of monarchical political authority… The way the metaphor of the body functions here is by analogy. Just as man can be understood as a representation of God's creative power, so the political body can be understood as a representation of man's creative power" (Gatens, 1996: 21).

The use of 'representation', of course, concerns the way in which this image affects who is represented by the body politic. The seventeenth century texts of the social contract theories are filled with the detailed correspondence between the parts and functions of the human body and the parts and functions of the political body. Correspondingly, those who are represented by the metaphor of the body politic vary depended on the author of the text. In Rousseau's text an egalitarian president of a Republic is imagined through the political body. While the motivation for constituting a body politic coincides with position of man in the civilized society, which has had to be distorted and produced inequalities and some illnesses, the body politic is imagined at least a temporary solution for overcoming this alienation. In Hobbes' text the political body is embodied through the Leviathan whose motivation behind the creation of the artificial man is the 'protection' or 'defense' of natural man. The following passage from *Leviathan* is very characteristic of this kind:

> by art is created that great *leviathan* called a commonwealth, or state, in Latin *civitas*, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength

than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the *sovereignty* is an artificial *soul*, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the *magistrates*, and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial *joints; reward* and *punishment*, by which fastened to the seat of sovereignty every joint and member is moved to perform his duty, are the *nerves* that do the same in the body natural; and *wealth* and *riches* of all the particular members are the *strength; salus populi,* the people's safety, its *business*; counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the *memory; equity* and *laws*, an artificial *reason* and *will; concord, health; sedition, sickness;* and civil war, death. Lastly the *pacts* and *covenants*, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that *fiat*, or the *let us make man,* pronounced by God in the creation (Hobbes, 1968: 82-83, quoted by Gatens, 1996: 21-2).

One may well wonder, as Gatens does, from whom or what natural man requires protection. Hobbes' answer is that he requires protection from other men and from nature. Man, in a state of nature, he tells us, is in 'continual fear' and in 'danger of violent death' and the quality of his life is summed up with the words 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short' (Gatens, 1995: 22).

In this context of the implications of the metaphor, we need to make some points clear.

1. Above all the common application of the metaphor always runs the risk of falling into an obvious essentialism. As we tried to illustrate from the social contract theories which attributed their imaginations to the nature — even consider it with the fact that they constructed an entity called 'nature'— as objective realities and tried to deduce from there certain laws in claim of being "natural". Needless to say, inasmuch as the natural quality of the law could be demonstrated, the law would have to be accepted as an absolute judgment. It might be said that there lies the origin of orientalism and ethnocentrism which once considered itself as the Enlightened by the light of the nature.

2. By the same motivations the orientalist studies of Islam tried to discover a body politic inasmuch as they were inspired by the absolutism of the natural feature of the body. The conception of the Islamic society through the metaphor is just another way of conceptualizing it as stagnant, ahistorical and stable society. The orientalist studies of the Islamic society are filled with such descriptions of the Islamic society. While it is not my

primary aim to insist on this aspect, I want to refer one of the elaborations of this theme by Gustave E. von Grunebaum.

Two chapters of the work by the great Orientalist and Islamicist Gustave E. von Grunebaum *Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation,* are titled as "The Body Politic: Law and State" and "The Body Politic: The Social Order". His analysis on the Medieval Islam looks for an outline of the organic constituents of the Muslim society. According to this outline, Muslim society is depicted as a body, and its all parts are considered as organs managed by the complementary mind of that body. The society's parts are as harmonious with each other as the organs of the body are.

The Islamic society is a community of Allah Who is the living truth to which it owes its life. He is the reason for the state's existence, he is the principle of unity, the *Staatgedanke*, which both upholds and justifies the continuance of the commonwealth. This makes the Muslim Army "the Army of Allah", the Muslim treasury, "the Treasury of Allah." What is more, it places the life of community in its entirety as well as the private lives of the individual members under his direct legislative and supervisory power. The burden of lawmaking rests on Allah's shoulders. His ordinances may vary in scope but not in stringency. Every order issuing from him carries the same compulsion. It is not for man to grade his rulings as more or less important. Nor is there any differential to separate the sphere of his direct interference from a neutral or purely human zone.

> By its very nature Allah's word must be considered final. He is known to have changed his mind a certain number of times abrogating specific injunctions given his prophet and replacing them by "equally good or better ones" (Koran 2:100). The death of the Prophet ended this means of organic, or opportunistic change (Grunebaum, 1966: 142).

This is the point where the Islamic culture and society has began to hesitate, and its adaptability to new conditions ended. For, by the death of the Prophet the constitution of the frame of the Islamic society has ended, and thereby the limitless process of encoding the worldly and daily affairs according to the text begun. Thus, the depiction of a Muslim body or the analysis of an Islamic politic of body is burdened, in Grunebaum's work, with an intense interest in distinguishing the decline of the Islamic society,

beginning from the death of the Prophet. Then any difference in institutional order of the society, any disharmonious position realized between the on-going reality and the encoding norm of the text, is equated to a phase in the distortion of the body of society.

3. The claims included by the metaphor are problematized and examined by the feminist circles. Indeed, the recent studies on the issue have been brought into question by feminist studies such as Moira Gatens' *Imaginary Bodies*. After mentioning various conceptions of the political bodies, from the Greeks to the social contract theories, she argues that in political theory, the metaphor of the unified body politic has functioned to achieve two important effects. First, the artificial man incorporates and controls and regulates women's bodies in a manner which does not undermine his claim to autonomy, since her contributions are neither visible nor acknowledged. Second, insofar as he can maintain this apparent unity through incorporation, he is not required to acknowledge difference. The metaphor functions to restrict our political vocabulary to *one* voice only; a voice that can speak of *only* one body, *one* reason, and *one* ethic (Gatens, 1995: 23). In the following there is a good adaptation of the metaphor in the explanation of the patriarchal origins of the foundation of the Turkish body politic, by Carol Delaney.

In this study, however, I will try not to be tied with those implications of the metaphor. Instead, I will use the term for its implications on the strategies of individual body and on the relationships of the political apparatus and the individual embodiment. Therefore, the literal meaning of the term has usually been preferred to refer to this relationship which is thought to be very significant in outlining the nature of the political self-identification, without excluding, again, the usual terminological meaning. In the following, further reasons and implications of applying this metaphor are told.

Islamic *Siyasah* as a Process of Political Embodiment

Indeed, one of the earliest analogies for the body has been that between the political organization of society and the anatomy of body, that is the underlying idea of the term 'body politic'. In Aristotle and in medieval

writers, the structure and function of political institutions were typically compared with the organs and functions of the body. In the history of social philosophy biological metaphors for society have been equally persistent. The balance of the human body provided a metaphor for the balance of political life, while disturbances in political institutions were also thought to produce disease in the human body (Turner, 1992: 182; 1993: 141). Indeed, as O'Neill warns us, every political community has to find a symbolic expression of its beliefs concerning the sources, sustenance and potential threats to the orderly conduct of its members. Thus, the image of the body politic resumes our reflections on the nature of order and disorder in the human community (O'Neill, 1985: 67).

In Islamic tradition of political scholarship too, the usage of the body as a metaphor of the political existence of the society has been widespread. The name of the politics in Arabic is *siyasah* which derives from the metaphor of educating and disciplining the horse. The politics is completely conceived as the government of the social body, which should be disciplined and educated in the similar way of the *seyis* (horseman) of a horse. The great tradition of Islamic politics has produced great names such as Ibn Ebi'r-Rebi', al-Farabi, Maverdi, Nizamu'l-Mulk, Al-Ghazzali, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Khaldun etc. In all these names the body politic relied on the analogy between the political organization of society and the anatomy of body. Al-Ghazzali for example, in his *Kimya-ı Saadet,* illustrates this analogy in these words:

"O fellows, think of the *dawlah* (site) as a body, the arts and the crafts as its hands and feeds, the administrators as its desires, the passion as its police, the sultan as its heart and the minister as its common sense. The sultan demands the help of these organs in order to execute his jobs. But the desire which is represented by the official and the judges may sometimes fall in error and exaggerations. It may act in opposition with the common sense which is represented by the minister. The desire wants to appropriate everything in the state as income. The passion, that is the police, has a rigid and stubborn nature. It always wants to kill or at least injure others. The custom of the Sultan is always to hold a consultation with his prime minister, that is the common sense, and to hold his stubborn officials under his control. ..The Sultan, the heart, holds consultation with the prime minister, the common sense. If the heart by so doing can control the desire and the passion, then, and only then the *dawlah* as well as the body, would be administrated well. On the contrary, if the desire and passion can imprison the common sense, then all these people

who have been gathered together under this administration would be destroyed and the heart would experience a bad period" (Al-Ghazzali, 1986: 18-19).

Ghazzali's employment of the body as a metaphor for the politic is complementary with his detailed mystical and jurisprudencial analysis and suggestions for the regulation of body. He is perhaps the champion of constructing relationships and correspondences between social actions and some bodily fluctuations. In his attempt to revive the religious knowledge, namely *Ihya-u Ulûmuddîn,* he tries to elaborate in this light all possible everyday actions of the believers in different position of the social-organic division of labor. The religious correspondences of the embodiment of a teacher, of a leader, of a student, of a father, of a mother, of a daughter/son etc. all are defined in their own spheres, and are associated with body political and individual reflections (Al-Ghazzali, 1980).

Without going on further examples, I want to just mention El-Farabi, the so-called Second Teacher of the Aristotelian Islamic philosophers. It is well-known that in his depiction of the Perfect City *(Medinetu'l Fâdhıla)* he employs the individual embodiment to a large extent as an ideal model for the embodiment of this constituting will of the perfect city (Al-Farabi, 1985).

They all thought the caliph as the head of the body which was the carrier of the Caliphate of the God himself, for, the Sovereignty was exclusively of the God, and the Caliph was not but the executor of this sovereignty. The indicator of the health of the social body was the obedience of the people to the caliph who was *emîr al-muminîn.* The obedience to the rules was an obedience to the God. The society and the ruling law were, therefore, indirectly the functions of the body of God Himself. Any disobedience to the rules of law is also to the God. Many verses in the Qur'an sustained this coincidence of the body of the society and the essence of the God. One verse from the surah about women commands that:

O believers, obey Allah and the Apostle and those in *authority among you.* Should you disagree about anything refer it to Allah and the Apostle, if you truly believe in Allah and the Last Day. The will in the end be better and more just (IV/59, [Dawood, 1966: 363]).

In one of the subsequent verses of the same surah the representativeness of Allah and the Apostle and the authority are made more clear:

> He that obeys the Apostle obeys Allah Himself. As for those that pay no heed to you, know then that We have not sent you to be their keeper (IV/80 [Dawood, 1966: 365]).

This representation of God by the body of the prophet and then by the caliph of the prophet and in the subsequent levels the community itself might be considered as the ordinary way of thinking of the ancient regimes where the king's body is identified with the social order itself. Undoubtedly there could be found many parallelisms, but in the case of Islamic conceptions of the body politic, there is an unignorable emphasis on the correspondence of the body of the King and the social body.

In the above quotation the most important phrase to be attended is the words *"authority among you"*. This has been the focus of the debates on the nature of the political authority in Islamic society. Who is who will be considered "among you"? That is the major question, that I think have not counterparts with an approximate weight in the so called Ancient Regime. Following the relevant discussions of the words "among you" in the Islamic tradition of politics whose master names were mentioned above, may give us a quite unique manner of the constitution of the political body in Muslim society. One important aspect of this discussion is to distinguish between the identity and the function of the King, that is the caliph or in the widespread phrase, *amîr al-muminîn*. Is it referring to the tribal identity that is to the Quraysh, or to the religious commitment? Is this religious commitment to be considered as an ascribed mark or an achieved one? And if it is to be achieved, then what are the means for achieving it?

It should be reported here that the mainstream tendency in Islamic political scholarship had preferred the statement "among you" in terms of the religious functional commitment, that is of believing and acting in accordance with the Prophetic tradition as well as committing in political attitudes of the Muslims in general. But there also has been a considerable debate on the tribal identity of the ones who would share the same level of religious commitment. Here, the question is whether the caliph would belong to the Quraysh. The early debates about the features of the caliph were dominated by this question and it seemed to be resolved in behalf of

the affirmation of the tribal commitment of the caliph who was required to be from among the Quraysh. It should be remembered here that the early Caliphs were all from the Quraysh. The later discussion of the caliphate was shaped around the permanence of this belonging. Would it be eternally belonging to the Quraysh? This is, now, thought to be a kind of first racism in the early history of Islam (Hatipoğlu, 1978).

Following Ibn Khaldun, however, we became inclined to treat such an explanation as a simplification of the problem of leadership in society, a tendency likely to have been borrowed from a modernist conception of history. Although recent explanations of the problem asserted that such a specification of the caliphate would be contrary to the spirit of Islam which would be universalist in its all discourses and directions, for Ibn Khaldun, there is nothing here contradictory to the universalist claims of Islam. Just on the contrary, this shows its realism which, as a base of general principle, is much inclined to cope with the universal problems. In turn, Ibn Khaldun explain the principle of attributing the Caliphate to the Quraysh, applying his general theory of *asabiyyah*. Then, he derives from, or deduces, the general rule of leadership: "Whosoever *asabiyyah* is stronger, then the leadership belongs to his tribe." Ibn Khaldun observed that in the early Muslim society the Quraysh tribe was stronger in terms of *asabiyyah*, that is the group loyalty. For, they were the first generation who became converted to and who carried the most difficulties of the Islamic Calling. That is, in one sense, they paid a higher substitute for their faiths. By such an explanation, Ibn Khaldun insisted on the historicism of the principle in question. Then, it would be possible to think of the cyclical nature of the *dawlah*, in his terms, which has its own course of turning throughout the history. Undoubtedly, Ibn Khaldun owes his much formulations to his successful reading and affirming the Qur'an and the early experiences of the Muslims, as well as to his rich observations on the cycle and course of the *dawlah* throughout the generations of Arabic-Maghrebean societies. His approach to the problem of the Caliphate should be considered the best one to legitimate the transferring of the institution to other societies, namely the Ottomans.

Then, the one "among us" was not but that who would apply the rules of the God, which have been embodied through the prophetic tradition and reported in the Qur'an. It is perhaps just because of this that one becomes inclined to think that the counterpart of the Christ, as the embodiment of the

God in the world, in the Islamic system of theology is not Mohammed but the Qur'an itself (Smith, 1964). The problem of the legitimacy of authority has been based on whether it is represented by any one who is from 'among us' or not. The minimum limits of being 'among us' or at least the minimum level of not rebelling against the existing authority has almost conventionally been accepted as to open the way before the embodiment of the Islamic laws, to apply the rules of the God, to acknowledge the limits put by the God *(hududullah)*. One important condition for a land to be saved from being *daru'l-harb,* is to apply there the Islamic law. Whether the application of the Islamic law is carried out by the hands of a non-muslim is to be accepted or not has been a disputable issue (Özel, 1988). Anyhow, the existence of a head which organise the implementation of the rules of the God brings in the religious existence its volume, its way of embodment. Then, the body politic is a vulnerable component of any politics of body (apart from the term 'body politic') in terms of the self-identity of Muslims. The absence of a legitimate authority from 'among the Muslims' renders the embodment of the God, therefore, of the Islamic society almost impossible. In this case, the application of the most significant part of the Qur'an, as a means of, so to say, the embodment of the God in the World, becomes impossible. This situation, from the possibility of Islamic jurisprudence as the interpretative choices of the Islamic action arrives at some very vital cross-roads. The total attribute of the social existence is transformed and the Islamic action become almost irrelevant. That is why, perhaps, the discussions on the necessity of Islamic leadership have begun from the point of the tradition that "whoever dies without having carried the tie of commitment *(bey'ah)* he would have to choose a death from amongst the deaths of ignorance *(jahiliyyah)."* This can explain the potential in the Political Islamic resurgence which motivates the Muslims to acquire a body which would provide a tie that would bring in the Islamic action meaningful relevances.

The reflection of the connections between everyday Islamic life and the existence of an Islamic state can be very clearly traced back to the course of the caliphate in the early history of Islamic society. It is well-known that after the first four caliphs who have always been idealized in the memory of, at least Sunni Muslims, the legitimacy of authority has played an important role in the Islamic political life. The *khulefa-i rashidîn* were the successors of the Prophet whose authority was unquestionable. And they

were inheriting some of this almost unconditional authority in their actions. But their authority was an executive one and they have faced the first opposition movements towards their choices after the Prophet. Especially, beginning with the third (Osman) and the fourth Caliph (Ali), the early harmonious consensus began to disappear. Yet their authority had still to be remarked by their religious inheritance which was being characterized by their relations (Kinship) with the Prophet. The first two caliphs were fathers-in-law and the second two were sons-in low of the Prophet. They were the first generation of the Islamic formation, and they were being included in the ten men who were heralded by the prophet to be in the heaven *(Ashere-i Mübesshere)*. There were numerous anecdotes about their experiences with the prophet, as well as some references in the Qur'an, and so on.

Therefore, there was no serious opposition movements to an extent to destroy the consensus completely. The authority in the times of the four good caliphs could not be yet characterized with a crisis of legitimation. After these ones, however, the legitimation crisis has encompassed the caliphate and the early serious debates on the quality of the caliph arisen so as to bring about a legitimation crisis and a chaos in the everyday Islamic life. In the mainstream juridical literature of the ulema it was declared that almost all the social regimes after Muaviyah (who came after the fourth caliph Ali and who was not declared as sinful because of his contemporariness, and fellowship to the Prophet, yet who couldn't be considered as a good *—Rashid—* caliph) were incoherent with the Islamic ideals and that none of these regimes could be considered as model for an Islamic political life. They could be tolerated only in the cases that their alternative might have been anarchy and chaos. It was even declared that if any way of revolting against these regimes without shedding blood would be possible they should be overthrown (Mawdudi, H S).

As I mentioned before, this situation has brought about a sense of irrelevance in the believer's everyday life. Because, the Islamic state is immediately functional in producing or reproducing the everyday life. It makes most of the daily practices possible such as collecting and distributing the religious tax, namely *zekah*, going to the religious war *(jihad)*, commanding the good and interdicting the bed *(amr bi'l-ma'rû ve nahy 'ani'l-münker)*, that encompasses the whole daily life, praying with the community, especially praying the Friday prayer etc. The first case of

secularization of the everyday life was perhaps experienced through this rupture of the legitimation of the state. In reply to the advice of the ulema, people began to rent their bodies to the government without affirming its legitimacy. Just refraining from anarchy and chaos was actually bringing about the social affirmation of the Christian principle that gave to Caesar that which was of him in Muslim society. This affirmation, however was not unconditional. The substitute paid for the order has had another condition as the application of the Islamic law and the fulfilling of the minimum Islamic ideals, at least those which were mentioned above.

Abdulvahap El-Efendi, in his *Who Needs an Islamic State?* depicts the relevance of the political authority and the constitution of Islamic everyday actions through a historical sociology of the caliphate and point out the realism of the Islamic ulema in reconciliation of the existing political conditions with making jurisprudence which would made the everyday Islamic practice possible. Otherwise, there would be only two alternatives under the authority once accepted to be illegitimate: upraise rebel without considering the real power of the Islamic community or to live with a full sense of a diaspora. Diaspora, as the historically essentialised, or at least appropriated, character of Jews would transform the colours of the everyday practices. But at least until the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924, it can easily be said that this sense of diaspora has never dominated most part of the Islamic society, excluding the Shiite formation whose public practice was based on camouflage of the identity, namely *taqiyyah*. As a matter of fact as El-Efendi observed as a formulation to escape from this paradox:

> ... there was improved a criterion to measure the rashidness of the authority: If the administrator guarantees the application of the Holy Law and acts in accordance with the Islamic norms, then, his regime would be considered legitimate and he would be obeyed. If an administrator had acted in any way contrast with the Shariah, then, he should be overthrown through a plausible way (El-Efendi, 1994: 50).

Thus, as it seems, a political body which would make possible, so to say, the action of the God, the realization and the emancipation of the delivery *(teslimiyah)* to God has constituted a major concern in Islamic consciousness. The existence of the political authority which would guarantee the application of the Islamic ideals is a *sine qua non* of an Islamic jurisprudence. The descriptions of the lands and spaces have relied

basically on the existence and operation of such an authority. If there is an authority that applies the Islamic rules, the land is to be called *dar al-Islam* (Özel, 1988: 77-78).[4] In case of the absence of such an authority what is in question is *Dar al-harb. Dar al-harb,* in one sense is a diaspora of the Muslims rather than always being a land where an Islamic believer have to struggle. Most of the everyday life become reduced to the unusual conditions. Therefore, the time dimension of the *dar al-harb* is also transformed. It is conceived as a temporary duration. So the praxis is adjusted as to be ended at a near, but very often unknown, future. The *dar al-harb,* the diaspora of the Muslims, thus, becomes to be conceived as a temporary station to be passed, or as a break with the normal spatial and temporal beings that should be exceeded. It is a state of being believer without organs as well as without body. Here, I want to reserve a point in terms of the quest of the Islamists of the post-caliphate period. That is, especially for the Hanafi school of Islamic Jurisprudence, in a country where the Islamic laws are applied by Muslim (or arguably non-Muslim) authorities the population have not to be Muslim in order to be counted as *Daru'l-Islam.* Likewise, if there is a non-Muslim authority with the absence of the application of Islamic laws, then, even in case of the full population of Muslim people, there is no way to call this place *dar al-Islam* but *dar al-harb.* Thus, it clearly appears that the existence of an authority "among the Muslim believers" implies the existence of a body which is at the disposal of an Islamic will. That is the will to represent the God, which is somehow conventionally attributed meaning in the Qur'anic usage of the term caliphate:[5] the successor of the God, who is distinguished from the other beings by the will and potential to rebel, to resist against the divine destiny.

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[4] Undoubtedly the spatial distinctions in terms of country are more proliferated than this dualism. For various jurisprudencial purposes there have been improved further distinctions such as, *dar al-adl / dar al-baghy, daru'z-zimmah / dar al-muvaddaa, dar al-küfr, dar al-zulm, dar al-riddah* etc. All these distinctions were serving to correspond to specific discussions on some juridical feature of a situation which was creating dificulties in case of being classified in the primary frame. For the details cf. Özel, 1988.

[5] It is really conventional and attributed, because in the original root of the word there is no necessary reference to such a meaning. As will be mentioned later, indeed there can be told about the "caliphatic" nature of man in general in terms of his being situated in history and society as having inherited most things from his predecessors, rather than being a representative of the God.

Then, we come to the point of connecting our story of the Islamic body politic with the analogy of the body without organs which was in fact an ideal of the state of extreme emancipation. From this analogy we should deduce the question of whether being without organs is really liberating. Undoubtedly, there is a risk of confusing the contexts in such a question, for, the analogy of body without organs suggests that we, the wo/men, are completely constructed through the definitions and attributions of the organs, in such processes as Norbert Elias called "civilising" (Elias, 1978; 1982), to our bodies. That is, the emphasis in the analogy serves to make a radical criticism of the origins of our actions, whereas the body politic without body suggests that a political will could be emancipated only through embodiment, through the formation and functioning of its organs, no matter how these organs were hanged on our bodies in the processes of social or political embodiment.

The line of my argumentation entails the demonstration of the coincidences of the Islamic body politic and the politics of body. The latter is more likely to be related with the logic of everyday practices, whereas the former, as conventionally has been understood, implies the social and political formation of a religion or political ideology. It has always a risk, even necessity, to fall in an essentialist perception of a culture in general. The works of many orientalists, as well as of many Muslim historians, about the characteristics of the Muslim society have been criticised for falling into an essentialist position. One of the major criticisms of Abdullah Laroui (1974) about Gustave von Grunebaum, who applied the culturalist perspective of Krober, is his attribution to Islamic society some essential and constant organs, a body politic whose all limits are closed-ended. Furthermore, Gellner's characterisation of Muslim society with the binary oppositions, all which in turn were to be reduced to high and low Islams, had been violently criticised for its high loyalty to orientalist essentialism by Edward Said and his coworkers. Postponing this discussion to one of the next chapters, we should remember here the risk of being caught by an essentialist conception in trying to give a profile of the body politic of Islam. Then, some measure should be taken, which is in fact not but the reminder of the dominant contention of my study: by the narration of any body politic I don't mean to exhaust all proliferations by such a conception under the name of "the Islamic view of the caliphate".

Well, most of the observations on which I rely are historical ones which are reported in historical texts. Doubtless that the derivations that would be made from these texts could never get rid itself completely of logocentric reading of the history. Even the least possibility of remaining in the metaphysics of text-centrist analysis are disabled with the universal subjectivism prevailing the readings of all historical texts. Notwithstanding this doesn't entail a conscious delivery to any kind of reductionism for my analyses in this study. Therefore, I should remind that the caliphate is a historical choice of the early Sunni Muslims. The leadership style the Shiite sect had produced was imamate which was based on the descent rule of the prophet. This, too, however, was proliferated so that the Shiite school in a short time reached fifteen sects. At least after the first generation of the Islamic society the consensual state of the caliphate was degenerated so that the legitimacy of the existing authorities had played an important role in the formation of Islamic society. What I wanted to do by giving a brief narration of this story was not to ignore all the proliferations occurred in popular or intellectual conceptions of body politic, but rather, to underline the denominator of all groupings in Muslim society. This was the sense of body politic which made all Islamic practices meaningful, even possible. For the purpose of the construction of this story, I need to insist on pointing out the ontological requirement of (political) body by the believer, without which the time/space conception and the everyday practices of a Muslim believer would be dislocated.

In this chapter I hope, on the one hand, to point out the coincidences and connections between the conceptions of body politic and the individual embodiment of Islamic society, and on the other hand, to apply the view of the ruling tension between the text and historical embodiment of this kind. Although the so called "Islamic society" may be generalised because of the very character of the connections in question, I will refer to the Turkish genealogy of Islamic conception of body politic, which should be traced back to the Umayyad and Abbasi Dynasties to the time of Prophet and the early caliphs. All these will serve, in my attempt, to conceptualise the historical course of Islamic political self-identities of the post-caliphate period.

In contemporary body politic of Islam, the foundation of the Republic in 1923 and the subsequent abolishment of the caliphate in 1924 is an important turning point. Furthermore, since this time, at least for the

Muslims whose self-identities were constituted in reference to the body politic of early Islam, the new political character of the land was completely transformed.

By the 'Muslims whose self-identities were constituted in reference to the body politic of early Islam' I mean, at least for the mainstream classification which had been widespread in the late Ottoman period, one important movement among the tree. According to the classification in question, in the late Ottoman period there were the Nationalists who were best represented by Ziya Gökalp, the Westernists who were represented by the Young Turks and the Islamists, or, in some classifications, Ottomanists represented by some intellectuals such as Namık Kemal (Akşit, 1991; Türköne, 1991), Said Halim Pasha, Mehmed Akif (Ersoy) etc. These three movements, were also competing in determining the direction of the Ottoman society at the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The classification of those tendencies, however, were different. They were, for example, described and called by Yusuf Akçura as 'three manner of politics', namely pan-Turkism, Ottomanism and Westernism *(Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset,* 1994), and by Ziya Gökalp as three orientations, namely Turkificaton, Islamisation and Modernization (Gökalp, 19), to be synthesised for the future of the Ottoman society.

Notwithstanding, at least three points should be mentioned about this proliferation of the manners or orientations of the Ottoman politics. Firstly, the traces of this proliferation was resulted by the high contact with, and the challenge of, the Western modernity and would transmute in the general political, intellectual and cultural profile of the course of the country.

Secondly, in spite of the additional endavours to arrive at a compromise between all tendencies for a restructuration of the Empire, they were shaped through the conditions of an antagonism, so that the competence was determined by teleological will to eliminate the influence of the others, probably by each one. As it seems, we have witnessed the realization of only one of the possible alternatives. That is the exclusive domination of the pan-Turkist movement which included in significant extent the Westernist one, over the others. In one sense, it can be said that the cultural and political resistance which now is felt as a dichotomy of laicism and anti-laicism has a continuum with, or its origins in, the early course of this struggle.

Thirdly, while as an ideology it was the name of only one of these trends, as a religion Islam and as a body politic the caliphate were still the dominant components of all of them. It is very important to note that originally, none of them were idealising such abolishment of the Caliphate, or, substituting western civil manners for the Islamic ones as the Kemalists have done. Even Ziya Gökalp, who was the ideological architect of Kemalism, had never realised and desired that the Caliphate would/should be abolished (Rustow, 1957). Then whatever happened during the construction of the Republic were really constituting a revolution.

The Embodiment of a Nation: The Body Politic of the Republic

The revolution was very rapidly cutting the organs of a political body perhaps without attaching new ones to it; even tending to abolish the body itself. After the abolishment of the Caliphate it gave up protecting the Ottoman legacy as an element of its political identity. The references onto which the new Republic were based were of Turkish origins. The influences of Islamic religion has been seen as an obstacle for establishing a new notion of nation, a new imagined community which would imagine itself, as was described by Anderson (1983), as the essence of the constitution of a nation. Therefore, its imbedded traces, its structured structures through its own *habitus* throughout the whole society were tried to be diminished by way of the well-known revolutions. But the underlying strategy chosen in diminishing the influences of Islam also was noteworthy. Islam was not rejected or forbidden completely, but it was tried to be modified, both because of the possible legitimation crisis that would have arisen with such a total rejection, and of the expected facilities of modified religion such as that it would be functional in the applied social project (Aktay, 1993: 30). In any way the reforms, such as the acceptance of the new (of course Western) calendar, of new units of measurement, of new wearings (especially of the hat) were much to do with destroying the Islamic *habitus*, the structuring structures which were functioning to constitute the overall time-cycling (that is, the daily, weekly, monthly and yearly), the everyday practices and thereby the self-identity of the Turkish society.

No doubt the acceptance of the surname application (1935) has aimed at resolving the traditional ties which were in turn connected to the Ottoman

imagination of body. It was functional in creating the new citizen who was got rid of every kind of traditional ties and subjected exclusively to the Republic as a citizen-individual, no matter to what kind of ethnical or religious community or social strata even of gender he belonged. The citizen was defined as Turk (because of his residence in the boundaries of the *Misak-ı Milli),* male (not because of any unique reason but of the modern character of the national power) and Sunni. This last preference might have appeared as contradictory because of the essential tension of the Islamic culture with the new orientation of the Republic. But it should be noticed that Islamic traces are not abolished completely but rendered functional in the operation of the Republican organism. Then, the Sunni Islam is preferred because of its compatibility with a national ideology due to its inclusion of a genius of high culture which entails literacy, rationalism etc. These elements as Gellner has pointed out in his analysis of *Muslim Society* (1981), and *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion* (1992) had been quite compatible with the Sunni Islam and not with the Sufi or Alevite Islam. By the reformation of the wearing styles which is in fact a matter of individual preference it was intended to rescue the appearance of the public everyday life from the demonstrations of the alternative ethnical, religious, cultural and sexual definitions of the individual which was thought to be the micro-constituent of the Republican body whose constitution was, not surprisingly, through the immediate exercise of power on the individual body.

The religious reformations were associated with the other reformations, especially with the reformations of language,[6] history and geography which were eliminating all Arabic and Persian elements from the Neo-Turkish identity. This can be conceived as the reconstitution of the national virginity of a political identity which was embodied in the limits of the *Misak-ı Milli* and which was originated from the central Asia. Of course, the deconstruction of the previous body was the necessary conclusion and need of the reconstruction of the new body. And for such a new conception of

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[6] I see it needless to go into more details of the narration of these reformations and the history of the Republic. That has been made much before by many well-known Turkish or Turkologist historians of the Turkish revolution such as Bernard Lewis, 1991; Smith, 1959; Jäschke, 1972; Allen, 1935; Eroğlu, 1977, and some other numerous works Therefore I presume the details of the Republic's story known and just mention to some points of this story in as much as it help to derive some conclusions in respect of the issues under consideration here.

body politic, which was declared in the last meeting of the Ottoman Assembly *(Osmanlı Meclis-i Mebusânı)* as 'national oath' *(Mîsâk-ı Millî)* and accepted literally in the first meeting of the new Grand National Assembly in April 23, 1923, the Anatolia was constituted as a space of the national embodiment.

The conceptualisation of the body politic of the new Republic in coincidences with the sexual embodiment is very good illustrated by Carol L. Delaney's provocative study *Seed and Soil: Symbols of Procreation—Creation of a World* in which she found almost literal coincidences between the Turkish nationalism and Turkish conceptions of sexuality. Delaney, indicates, or rather outlines, the *Harem* experiences of the Muslims as the patriarchal monopolistic protection of women. The cover is the way of drawing boundaries around the protected field *(tarla)* that would be cultivated by men in any way they would desire in reference to the verses of the Baqara Surah from the Qur'an. For Delaney, the cultivation of a field requires a monopolistic protection of that field that culturally had deep origins in the monotheistic conception of cultivation. The cultivation of the field should be protected from the foreign hands which might disturb the purity of the production. The owner of a field hedges it so that no other body could sow his seed and claim a share in its harvest. That story is applied to the allegory of the mono-gamist husband, as the representative of the monotheistic God, who closes his wife's body with a cover and exercises a monopolistic power over woman who is thought as a counterpart of the field that is passive under the sowing activity of the male. The security of the seed is very important. It is ensured by the closing of women. Delaney conceive of removing the girls from education as part of the series of measurement taken for ensuring the security and the purity of the genealogy of the seed. No other body than the future husband could sow any idea into the head of the growing girl. A walking and reading girl is 'open' to other ideas, then, to tolerating the entrance of other bodies into the field which is her body which is not her own but an entrusted object of her husband. That is, if the woman's body is not her own self then the body is entrusted to her.

Delaney finds in this allegory also the origin of the idea underlying the application of *Misak-ı Milli* by Mustafa Kemal who later has taken the surname 'Atatürk', the grandfather of the Turks. For Delaney, the *Misak-ı Milli* boundaries are the hedges fenced around the Anatolia. Taking into consideration the fact that Anatolia means "filled with mothers", namely

"Ana dolu", it is suggested to be thought as a mother as an whole (p: 17-19). Given the monopolistic character of the revolutions, which could be thought as seeds of the monopolistic nation-state, it can be seen that the republic has attached very importance to the harvest-products, that is the citizens, of the sowing activities. This was ensured by the unification of the educational institutions which were not aiming to exclude only the Arabic elements from the minds of the students but also the Western elements. In spite of all its ideal of Westernization, or namely to arrive at the contemporary level of civilisation *('Muasır Medeniyetler Seviyesi'* or in the later purified i.e., Turkified terminology *'Çağdaş Uygarlık Düzeyi'),* even the schools of the minorities, those which were financed and directed by the Western countries were also either abolished or their schedules were adjusted in accordance with the homogenous Turkish-secular-nationalist educational program.

Furthermore, taking into account the monopartial (a term adapted from Feroz Ahmad, pp: 273) policy of Mustafa Kemal during his life, Delaney strengthen the connections she found in the charismatic character of Mustafa Kemal as the monogamist husband of the Anatolia, the mother wife, who was already been hedged by the *Misak-ı Milli* and was educated by a unified education in such a way that she would not include any foreign genius in her body. Indeed, Delaney applies all these metaphors as the profile of the unconsciousness of the Turkish villagers. What kind of elements in what ways constitute the sexual roles in Turkish villages? That is the underlying question under her search for symbols of procreation-creation of a world. Thus she argues:

> The fact that they (the villagers) attribute current problems to the *ata* points to something far more important and can only be partially understood in terms of specific people. The ideology of descent speaks not only to origins but also to the legitimation of present orientation. What this points to is a severe identity crisis. They are confused about where they came from and where they are going, and I believe the same problem exists at the national level.
>
> It has been called a problem of 'dual legitimacy', but what is often not noted is that this involves a problem of 'dual descent' which is in the village view impossible. There is only one principle of descent (and legitimacy) and it is based on the theory of conception in which only the male (ata-father, founder) gives a child. Dual descent would imply that there is another principle of descent that is of equal value, and given their understanding of conception that cannot be (Delaney, 1984: 276).

Turning back to the origins of the struggle between the three or four groups, manners or tendencies of politics during the establishment of the Turkish Republic, there is an absolute victory of the pan-Turkist and Westernist tendencies against the others. The history of the Turkish Republic in this respect can be read as the series of strategies of keeping this victory against the rest, who could never be completely eliminated, and of the others to take a revenge of their defeat in this specific point of history. Especially after the period when the domination of the revolutionist Kemalism was undebateable, the beginning of the introduction of multipartial election system has been usually taken the point where the other groups or tendencies have taken beneath. It is in this time that the religious right and liberation began to be a matter of exchange value corresponding to the votes. This is also the starting point of the paradoxical relations of secularism and democracy in Turkey. That is, the more democracy flourishes the more religious demands increase; which in turn, dream of the collapse of the secularist policies applied by the early Republic (Aktay, 1993: 56).

Applying the above remarks to the transition to multiparty regime, of course, the body politic of Turkey would take quiet different situation. Above all, the unification and the harmony of the country gradually begins to disappear and the Turkish state from this time onward become to be characterised by various interwoven stratifications whose basis, I think, can be traced back to the diversity of manners mentioned above. In another and related respect, especially with setting the Arabic Calling *(ezan)* and reading free, reopening the religious institutions such as İmam-Hatip Schools and Faculties of Divinity, it might be thought that the minds of the Anatolian people were opened to foreign planting, albeit under the pressure of the exchange economy of democracy.

The characteristics of the Turkish Republic and the later development of Turkish democracy are of course of another importance. In some respects it can be argued that the essential characters of the state have never been transformed, or even changed, throughout these apparent processes. Thus, it might be argued that there are essential continuities between the Ottoman style of politics and that of the Republic. Notwithstanding my contention here is not to go into the analysis of these continuities, or to give an account of the early period of the Republic and its later development —a task which

has already been made sufficiently. My contention in this thesis is, rather, to give the other side of this story, of the establishment of the Republic, which had created a very different sense of 'nation', 'country' and 'body politic'. In order to achieve a convenient sociological analysis of the present position of the so-called Islamic resurgence, especially that which is embodied with the movements as Welfare Party and Fethullah Hoca, and to understand their historical origins, I will suggest a genealogy which would pass through the classification mentioned above as illustrated by Ziya Gökalp or Yusuf Akçura as Islamists. I have chosen Mehmed Akif Ersoy, İskilipli Atıf Hoca, Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır and Bediüzzaman Said Nursi as my examples to see how the other side of the story occurred or how it appeared in their eyes, for, all these names have reacted against the revolutions. Furthermore, their reactions have included a good combination of the sense of body politic and a new wardrobe. All have seen in the imposition of a wardrobe a clear imposition of cutting the organs of the body they imagined they had belonged. Then, through a reading of their responses, we could ask the question whether being a body without organs is really a liberating state of existence? And what does it mean to be without body for a Muslim? What does it mean for a believer who thinks of himself as a successor of God, the magnificent Agent, to be without body, which was already ascribed to him to realise the goals of his Predecessor? Of course this question would deliberately miss the emphasis of Artaud who thinks of the organs completely as attachments of the culture or, in Focaultean term, of discourse.

CHAPTER V

THE RELIGIO-POLITICAL DISEMBODIMENT AND THE QUEST FOR EMBODIMENT: THE HISTORY OF A DIASPORA

Having named the mainstream response to modernization in reference to Islamic foundations as Islamism (İslâmcılık), some of their features can be discerned as follows:

Firstly, they were suggesting to return to the origins, in other words, the fundamentals of Islam. They were arguing that the current backwardness was not resulted by religion as many modernists and nationalists asserted, but by neglecting the religion and replacing it by religious ignorance. The religious ignorance had opened the gates of superstitions in the name of religion. The higher ideals of the religion were represented by the superstitions. The name of the reformation, therefore was not relied on radical criticism and modification of the religious origins but on the restoration of its authenticity.

Secondly, as a way of restoration of authenticity or of returning to the origins, the institution of *Ijtihad* whose gates had been known to be closed since the time of Al-Ghazzali was put in question with a different tendency by each one. For example, while Akif, Rıdha, Iqbal etc. were insisting on the absolute opening of the gate, some others like Said Nursi whose views of *ijtihad* will be mentioned in the following pages had some hesitations about the restoration of the institution. As will be mentioned, Said's hesitation was because of the existing state of the body politic of Turkish Islamic society which was to be characterised by the absence of its organs, namely by its laicity. The institution of *ijtihad* was at best conceived as a spontaneous response to change and development. The Islamic society had long been deprived of this organ, and it should be reattached to the Islamic body politic.

Third, the calling for opening the gate of *ijtihad* required also a strong appeal to the themes of eliminating the differences between various sects

(medhahib) of Islamic jurisprudence. The sects which were important constituents of the Islamic society in terms of popular practices were (and still are) considered as insurmountable boundaries of the tradition. The theme of unifying the Islamic sects through conciliation of the matters of dispute (that was called *telfîq* by Rashid Rıdha, 1974) was faced with strong reactions. But it was almost an unescapable part of the attempts to restore the authenticity by opening the gate of *ijtihiad*. Then, the Islamism was relying on a notion of authenticity that would be discovered in the modern times through the interpretation of and reconciliation with the modern conditions.

Fourthly, the underlying idea of the need in *ijtihad* was the tacit acknowledgement of the western notion of development, and the goal of this thematisation was to catch the speed of this development. However, the notion of the superiority of Islamic religion over the rest, in this case over the Christianity, has never disappeared. This was a source of the paradox, because the actual balance was on behalf of the Western side. This paradox has been explained in the following terms: The Western societies, that is the Christians, developed because they didn't follow the Christian teachings, while the Islamic societies couldn't developed because they didn't follow the Islamic principles. As Turner argues they thought that:

> In order to become 'really Muslim', it is necessary to rid Islam of the irrational accretions of custom and foreign influence in order to rediscover original, pure Islam which is seen by the reformers to be completely compatible with science and industrial civilisation (Turner, 1974: 145).

No doubt, there can be found many parallelisms between the Islamism of the time and the Reformists of Christianity who brought about the rise of Protestantism. But it is not what matters here. I want to give a few clues of the intellectual atmosphere under which Akif, together with the other names, had lived.

Fifthly, a strong emphasis on the unity of Islam throughout the world, that is the Caliphate, had also associated the all-over ideas of the Islamists in question. The idea known as *İttihad-ı İslâm* was the utopia of the Islamists. The caliphate, as an institution was under the focus of this idea, of course with a wide variety of approaches (Türköne, 1991: 246 ff.). Some, have thought it as a pure-religious unity of the Muslim World, while some

others considered the reality of the world which had been characterised by nationalism raised by the organizations of nation-states. In this respect, while for many Islamists such as Mehmed Akif, Muhammed Iqbal, Hasan Al-Banna etc. the emphasis on the unity of Islamic world was to exclude any kind of nationalism, Jamaladdin Afghani was tolerating (of course without encouragement) the nationalisms in Islamic world. That was because of his acknowledgement of nationalism as an uprising value and reality in the modern world. He thought that such a naive internationalism would be a mere utopianism that, by its very nature, could not be achieved. Instead he tried to influence the real-politic of the Islamic world, which required a recognition of balances. He concluded that every nation could constitute their local Islamic states in associations with their national, that is racial, identities. For him, this would have been the minimum condition of the later integration of the Islamic society, that is *Ittihad-ı Islam* (Keddie, 1969), a prototype, perhaps, like he socialist internationalism.

It would be interesting to report here that the nation for Afghani is akin to a body. A nation consists of estates analogous to parts of a body, or of individuals whose organic unity is that of the parts of a vital organism. This organism is infused with a vital force like that which permeates its individual organs, and the power of this individual vitality is directly proportional to that in the whole organism. According to Aziz el-Azmeh "this organismic, vitalist paradigm has its major notions -if not its object, a socio-political order- in medieval Islamic natural philosophy. Equally important is that it invites comparison with Herder's notion of *Kräfte* as inner sources of vitality and dynamic principles for the continued existence of nations" (El-Azmeh, 1993: 44-45).

Finally, Islamism, at political and intellectual level, could be treated as the reflection of an illness or disturbance of the social organism or the body politic of Islamic society. It corresponded as a whole to the period of the decline of the Islamic society in terms of its life cycle. Before this there hadn't been an Islamism as such but mere faith as a part of the unity of the world of believers. The penetration of the West into the Islamic world and the challenge of the Western life styles to the Islamic life styles (in one sense westoxication), which had been supported by the strong political, industrial and military achievements, was creating a real resistance which in turn created an ideological discourse called Islamism (Türköne, 1991). From the point of the metaphor of social organism, that is to say that the

Islamist movement appeared when the Islamic body was felt ill. It derives from the very principle that the healthiness of a society is felt by the forgetting of the body. We generally begin to feel our bodies in case of a pain over an organ of the body. Unless an organ does not fall in a pain we forget the body. Then, the pains and illnesses are the means making us feel our bodies. It is exactly why one tends to feel his body in the schiso-masochist experiences (Lash, 1990). But as Antonin Artoud has referenced, one can find a way through which the body is experienced without organs. I think, that is not because of the emancipatory sense that might have been achieved by the disorganisation, but because of the confusion of the senses. In any case what is important here is that the body is forgotten in its normal process of functioning (Göka, 1995: 97-98). And just as Heidegger has warned us, it is the fogetfulness of language that make understanding possible, for where we remember it, there should be a problem in understanding (Gadamer, 1989). The ideologization of the religions, too, might be expected to occur as a result of the challenges against the religious bodies. To apply these to the case of the constitution of Islamist discourse in the second part of the nineteenth century, we can see that Islamism as an ideological discourse or as a socio-political movement is a spontaneous response to the challenge of the western modernity. The religious world of meaning had been functioning, exerting its influence over the believers until then so that the commitment was being forgotten. The ulema, as an important organ of the Islamic society were producing and reproducing the theological and cosmological world of the believers through the very traditionalised ways and institutions such as the meetings in the mosques five times a day, and once a week at the Friday Prayer. The Ramadan was (as is now among the common people) a festival throughout a month where people were sharing a dense senses of feeling in the same world of religion which was transmitted from the ancestors with the insurance of the living ulema as their spontaneous successors and so on. Briefly the constitution of religious consciousness had not been relying solely on ideological processes such as the so called Islamism. The ideological formulation of the religion is a reminder of the religious commitment because there is serious problems in the health of the religiously embodied politic.

The Diaspora and Homecoming of a Poet: M. Akif Ersoy

> *Vatan cüda değilim, fakat fırakıyla*
> *muhacirâne gezer ağlarım öz diyarımda*
>
> ....
> *Bu diyarın, hani sahipleri dersin, cinler,*
> *Hani sahipleri der, karşıki dağdan bu sefer.*

The national poet, the poet of the Turkish national anthen *(İstiklal Marşı)*, Mehmed Akif was born in 1873 at Fatih region of İstanbul. His father was Mehmed Tâhir Efendi (1826-1888) who was an instructor *(müderris)* in Fatih Medresesi. He had come from Albania for education and settled in İstanbul. At early years of his life, Mehmed Akif learned the fundamental Islamic knowledge as well as Arabic and Persian. In his years of middle school *(ruşdiye)* he was interested deeply with poetry, reading initially *Leyla and Mejnun* of the Ottoman poets like Fuzuli. When his father died in 1888, he was enforced to attend the Veterinary School after his education at Mülkiye because of economical reasons. His interest with poem associated with a high concern with the political, intellectual and religious situation of the Islamic society increasingly remained and was shaped during his education at veterinary school . From all biographical studies about Akif we know that he had very enthusiastic, religious and artistic sensitivity towards the political issues as well as the everyday practices. Very interesting and modelling anecdotes are told on his faithful loyalty to his individual or religious principles concerning the everyday practices of social reciprocities such as his loyalty to his promises which arrived at a level of religious asceticism (For the details of his biography cf. Düzdağ, 1989; Karakoç, 1974; Cemal, 1990; Erişirgil, 1986).

Mehmed Akif published seven books of poetry during his life, which later were collected under the name of the most important one of them, *Safahat.* What is apparent in all these poems is a high level of enthusiasm, emotions, rhetoric and religious calling. The religious and national (that is never to be understood as racial) anxiety dominant in his poetry is so high that he has been criticised for not being a good poetry but a narrator (Polat, 1982). The reservation of the latter word implies that Akif's lines, in fact do not need to be ordered from above to below but they can be ordered side by side just as a prose. For, they have not to do with poem except their fitting the forms of *aruz*, the meter of the Divan poem. That might be right, but for

Akif, the meaning of the poem can not be isolated from the religious identity and enthusiasms of the poet. Even if poetry could be conceived as representing only itself, without aiming at carrying another meaning, then the poetry of a Muslim and of a non-Muslim would have to differ because of the existential differences. Then, Mehmed Akif do not seem to accept the poetry as a carrier of only itself but as a carrier of the ideals, enthusiasms and the emotions of the poet himself, who is ontologically engaged to a life-style or identity. Akif's poetry, however, still seems to carry the meaning of a discourse more than such an ontological self-representativeness. If poetry is akin to the philo-sophia, that is the love of *sophia* in Heideggerean terms, then, Mehmed Akif would appear a good poet. For the love of sophia had dominated the activity of philosophy which is possible only through the language (Heidegger, 1968). And language in turn is made possible, for Heidegger, through poetry. To ask what initiates the philosophy, Heidegger answers that it is astonishment that had given a start to philosophia and which dominated it over-time (Heidegger, 1990). If so, Mehmed Akif should be considered the virtuous of astonishment, for it can easily be seen in his poems that, one of the most important features of his crying out is his astonishment. My aim in this study is not to give a detailed analysis of the poetical dimension of Akif, but rather, to catch some clues of his conception of political self-identity in terms of body politic, especially because of his well-known predecessorship of the existing Islamist discourse of politics. At this point, however, it should be noted that he is apparently astonished because of what he sees. He never accepted a sense of establishment in the human activities that would create a status quo in behalf of the Muslims. For example he hears the saying "history is a repetition" and with a quite high tone of astonishment replies "would it be repeating, if convenient lessons were taken" *(Tarih-i Tekerrür diye tarif ediyorlar/ Hiç ibret alınsaydı tekerrür eder miydi?* Ersoy, 1989: 456).

Akif insisted on the fact that Muslims had been caught by a very dark ignorance that could not be exceeded except by embracing the Islamic principles with love and fear of the God associated with a reformation of the Islamic institutions in accordance with the fundamentals of Islam, that is, Qur'an and Sunnah. His suggestion of reformation was conditioned by the extend that these fundamentals would allow. His models of Islamic reformations were Cemaleddin Afghani and Muhammed Abduh. In his long poem *Asım* he tells and suggest to his imagined hero, that is, Asım, that:

Mısır'ın en muhteşem üstâdı Muhammed Abdu,
Konuşurken neye dairse Cemaleddin'le;
Der ki tilmizine Afgan'lı:
"Muhammed Dinle!
inkılâp istiyorum, başka değil, hem çabucak,
Naazariyyyat ile bir şeyler olur zannetme...
O berâhini de artık yetişir dinletme!
Çünkü muhtâc-ı tezâhür değil isti'dâdın..."
"-Şüphe yok, hakk-ı semûileri var Üstadın...
Gidelim bir yere, hatâ şu bizim Sûdân'a;
Yeni bir medrese te'sis edelim urbâna.
Daha üç beş de faziletli mücâhid bulalım,
Nesli tehzîb ile, i"lâ ile meşgul olalım.
Çıkarıp gönderelim, hâsılı, Şeyhim, yer yer,
Oradan âlem-i İslâm'a Cemâleddin'ler."
"-Bu, fakat, yirmi yıl ister ki kolay görmüyorum...
Yirmi günlük işe bak sen!"
"—Kulunuz ma'zûrum."

Kıssadan hisse çıkarsak mı, ne dersin Asım!
Anlıyorsun ya, zarar yok, daha iy' anlaşalım:
İnkılâb istiyorum ben de, fakat Abdu gibi... (Ersoy, 1989: 405)

The most magnificent virtuous of Egypt, Muhammed Abdu;
Speaking with Jemaladdin on whatever;
The Afghanian said to his student:
"Listen to me Muhammad
I would like a revolution, not at another time, now,
                    immediately;
Unless (we) leading the way and raising Islam;
Don't think that it would be anything with theorisations;
It's enough don't make (people) listen those proofs any more!;
For your ability isn't in need of appearance."
"—No doubt the master is right..
Let's go to somewhere, even to our Sudanese;
To establish a new school for the urbân;
Let's also find a few more meritorious mujahid;
 Be occupied with adorning the generation and raising the
        Word (Lâilahaillallah).
Thereby, my dear, growing there;
And sending to the World of Islam Jemaladdins."
"—But this need twenty years, at least, I don't see it so easy..

Look, instead at jobs of twenty days"
"—Your subject. I'm Sorry"

Shall we take our moral from the story Asım!
You've already understand, but no matter, let us go further in
      understanding each other.
I, too, want a revolution, but like Abduh..."

These lines reflect the dreams of Akif regarding the restoration of the strong and magnificent state of the Islamic civilisation. Undoubtedly his views are just an illustration of the Islamist tendency which was represented by such names as Said Halim Pasha, Shaikhulislâm Musa Kâzım, Elmalılı Ahmed Hamdi Yazır, Said Nursi, etc. They were all constituting the typical illustrations of the new-emergent ulema of the late Ottoman Islamic society. They were also in one sense the product of the encounter with the Western modernity. This encounter had, of course very akin aspects with the similar countries whereby such names as El-Afghani, Ali Abdu'razıq, Rashid Rıza, Muhammed Abduh, Muhammed Iqbal, Ebu'l Kalam Ahmed Azad and Hasan Al-Banna have grown. As a result of this historical encounter with Western modernity the mainstream response of Islamic intellectuals was typical.

Now, the above quotation from Mehmed Akif reflects all these features of the Islamism of the time. He attempted to formulate, or share in the present formulations of the meaning of the Islamic identity, tradition, authenticity and representation. Politically he idealised the boundaries of the Islamic unity as a means of spreading the peace to the world and of catching again the good old days of the Islamic civilisation. As his contemporaries, he thought that this could be achieved only by the restoration of some Islamic conceptions. Although he wouldn't be considered as a pure opponent of the sectarian structure of the Islamic jurisprudence in as much as to be called sectless *(mezhepsiz),* the widespread way of negating the reformist attempts by the traditionalists, he was suggesting the historical character of the *mujtehids* and the origins to which their *ijtihad*s were subjected. From the same origins we should have deduce another interpretation that would put an end to the sectarianist reactionism. That implied the reopening of the gate of the *ijtihad* institution.

An important aspect of Akif's conception of religious authenticity is that it was strongly associated by his, so to say, aesthetic dimension. He

never thought that Islam as such was an inherited legacy of a national group. The truth content of the religious feeling was to be reproduced over time. This theme is important, because he was observing the disappearance of the religious identity in parallel with the process of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The aesthetic dimension in the religious thinking requires an anti-essentialist conception of the religious identity. The religious identity and reward should be engraved by a right way and by a dynamic concern of oneself's anxiety of his final end, namely *aqibeh*. Therefore, one is inclined to think that the infidelity as well as the faith is not something to be seen in an ethnic group or society (in this case in the West). But it also may be seen wherever men, including the Muslims, live —of course by 'being Muslim' here an ethnic-like identity is implied rather than a dynamic state of existence. The aesthetic dimension would best be exemplified by Sayyid Qutb who formulated the Islamic practices completely in circular character, and attached infidelity even to the Islamic societies because of their unislamic references of life politic (Qutb, 1980).

Indeed, in Akif's appeal to *ijtihad* one can very easily see the aesthetic conception of religious authenticity which does not necessitate a religious essentialism to jurisprudencial interpretations and their agents. In one of his poems he said: "It has been the turbaned group, who are the misfortune of the ummah" *(Sarıklı milletidir, milletin başına belâ)*. In other lines he said:

> *Mevzun düşürür bir saçma adam var*
> *Manzûm sayıklar gibi manzûme sayıklar*
> *Zannım mütekait şuerâdan olacak ki,*
> *Hiç bir yenilik yok, herifin herşeyi eski*
> *Hâlâ ne sakaldan geçebilmiş ne bıyıktan*
> *Asârı da memnun görünür köhne kılıktan.*
> *Hicrî Kamerî ayları ezber sayar amâ,*
> *Yirminci asır zihnine sığmaz ne muammâ!*
> *(Mehmed Akif, 1989: Bir Ariza)*

An absurd man, talks the absurd within a measure;
Talks poetically as if he talks verses in his sleep;
I think he might have been from amongst the retired poems, so that,
He has no any novelty; all of his properties are old;
He hasn't been given up neither the beard nor the moustache;
His works too, seem delighted by his wearing.
He can count the lunar months of the Hegira by heart

Can not fit the Twentieth Century into his mind, what a paradox!

These lines show the limits of the meaning Akif attributed to the everyday practices. Personally he was bearded and moustached, but of course he didn't attribute any essential significance to these bodily appearances, although he didn't underestimated the role of the bodily practices in the living potential of a religion. His concern was formulated around the debate on the dichotomy between the form and essence. Akif's general tendency was, probably, inclined to give up from some bodily symbols for the sake of the compatibility with the changing customs, but he never gave up from the inseparability of the form from the essence. His emphasis in the above lines is on the well-known Islamic discourse, as Şerif Mardin has distinguished as a language of a given religious group (Mardin, 1989: 4-5) on the intention *(niyet)* behind the action *(amel)*. Any Islamic movement towards revising the distorted meanings of the authentic religion has had an appeal to the verse which has declared that "all actions are measured by the underlying intentions" *(Innema'l 'a'mâlu bi'n-niyât)*.

His writings in *Sırat-ı Mustaqim* and *Sebilur Reshad* were in line with the *salafî* scripturalist/fundamentalist calling of the time represented by İsmail Hakkı (Manastırlı), İsmail Hakkı (Bereketzade), Mardinizâde Ebülüla etc., who suggested to experience the religion as was practised by the early Muslims, the fellows of the Prophet, the *Salaf*. As Mardin points, these two journals were the forums where some common people alongside with the ulema were pronouncing their views and declaring their agreement with the Salafism of Mohammed Abdu. 'One of the leaders of this group was the poet Mehmed Akif, whose epic *Safahat* had aspects of a program of socio-religious reform' (Mardin, 1989: 144).

Akif's appeal to *ijtihad* was, as we saw above, a consequence of his engagement with the organic response of contemporary Islamist intellectuals to the western influence which created an infection[7] within the Islamic social body. The infection was a medical term which always has to imply an intervention of a Subject. This subject is not but the new-emergent

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[7]This infection would be called as "Westoxication" by some social analysts in Pre-Revolutionary period of Iran to imply the influence of the West over the body of the Islamic society and the response of the Islamic intellectuals such as Jalal Al-i Ahmad *(Garbzedei)*, Ali Sheriati etc.

Islamic intellectuals. In this sense the Islamism from its beginnings have had origins rooted in modernity which was projected in the Enlightenment. By the nature of ideology from which the Islamists too couldn't escape, Akif has always thought of the constitution of a Subject (with the capital 'S') who would have the same capabilities of the Enlightened one. Therefore by his hero, *Asım*, he tries to represent the Islamist subject who would be the pioneer of the development of the Islamic society. His application of the *Sırat-ı Mustaqîm,* that is the Qur'anic phrase which commonly means "the true way", has had to be subjected to its popular translation as "moderate way". This moderation, although I don't think was affirmed by Akif himself, appeared in his project of overcoming the backwardness of the Islamic civilisation. The way that Akif found out of this backwardness would be an obvious eclecticism. Therefore his project of synthesising the Islamic culture with the Western technology had an underlying idea that they could be separated, and that technology doesn't necessitate a culture of its own before a consciously believing and acting Muslim. For Akif, Asım is the prototype agent of this free selection. He advises Asım to "Take the science of the West, take its art... / Let your face turn to only its science/ Work together with those children over-time / Quickly, acquire the science accumulated through three centuries / Get the fountain trickling eternally in the land of science" *(Alınız, ilmini Garbın, alınız sanatını... / Sade, Garbın yalnız ilmine dönsün yüzünüz / O çocuklarla beraber gece gündüz didinin / Giden üç yüz senelik ilmi tez elden edinin / Fen diyârında sızan nâmütenâhi pınarı)* (Mehmed Akif, 1989:).

Thus, one can say that Mehmed Akif's views on the on-going modernization and westernization of Islamic society and his specific appeal to Islamism as a response to the process might have not been unique, compared with his contemporaries. Furthermore, in one sense his contribution to that discourse has been through his charismatic, poetic and honest personality. But such an account would certainly miss the weight of a poet and other elements in the personal composition of Mehmed Akif. From the point of view of our study, Mehmed Akif's all these personal features are completed with his, so to say, diaspora and the leading circumstances that made him feel exiled. Moreover, I will try to make some remarks on the reflection of the meaning of this biographical element on the formation of political identities of his successors.

Mehmed Akif has participated in the National Forces *(Kuvayı Milliye)* during the War of Liberation (İstiklal Harbi) at various levels. By his epic discourse of poetry he motivated numerous masses, applying the Islamic discourses of martyrdom *(shahadah)* and *ghazi,*[8] to go to the war of liberation. The discourse he used in this process is a matter of a wide analysis. I suffice here to mention his contribution by his personal charisma and appeal. Furthermore, he participated actively in the war and in the process of founding the new administration as a substitute for the disfunctioned one in İstanbul. Then, he wrote a poem of the Liberation in which very strikingly epic elements are employed in a quite dense level of emotions. His poetry had always functioned in raising the morality of the people in the process of national mobilisation for war.

Very tragically, however, his discourses would also be applied in similar ways to the new emergent conditions after the so called liberation. Immediately, he realised that the Republic has to function in such a way that the values and institutions for which he mobilised people to war by his artistic abilities, would be abolished by the hands of the leading staff of the war. That was, in fact, the case of many other intellectuals, like himself, in the face of the abolition of the caliphate and the beginning of the reformations to abolish almost all traces of Islam throughout the social life. The Caliphate was abolished, the Islamic elements of social life became to be eliminated literally by regulations, wearing hat was rendered compulsory; the people were obligated to wearing like the "civilised societies", all educational institutions were unified and so on. During these days Mehmed Akif seems to had felt that the living atmosphere for a Muslim became disappearing. The Muslims initially became a body without head by the abolition of the Caliphate, which was to render an Islamic social and even individual life very difficult if not impossible. He also seems to have felt by the organization of the new state, a substitution of the political authority for the authority of God. Then he thought that it would be very difficult to live in the new Turkey in a self-respecting way and so he decided to go to Egypt, from where he had taken some offers to study (Karakoç, 1974). Of course by his first journey to Egypt, Akif didn't intend to leave Turkey completely but simply to stay there temporarily. That was

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[8]A term which applied to those who are fought in a religious war and survived alive, cf. Mardin, 1989: 5-6.

because all the extensions of the revolutions hadn't appeared yet. By time, however, it seemed that the political body inherited from the Islamic identity was being transformed into an opposite one. Then, he decided ultimately to stay in Egypt. During his stay in Egypt, Turkey has passed through a very radical passage. The Arabic alphabet was replaced by the Latin alphabet (1928), all Arabic readings even in religious ceremonies were forbidden, the Islamist opposition was oppressed and a new national identity was set up through very radical policies of language, history and secularisation. His journal *Sebilürreşad* was closed with the establishment of a code known as *Takrîr-i Sükûn Kanunu* for the reason of the rebellion of Sheikh Said in 1925. By the same reasons the Progressive Republican Party, the first attempt of Mustafa Kemal to establish a democratic political life, was closed and most of their members were arrested and sent to the "Liberation Courts" known as *İstiklal Mahkemeleri.* The journal *Sebilürreşad* would begin to be published again by Eşref Edib 23 years later in the early years of the multiparty system. It was issued by him until February 1966 and reached its 641. issue (Düzdağ, 1989: XXXVI-XXXVII).

The content of the second period of the journal is very important here in terms of the discursive coincidence with Akif's poems he had written under the mood brought about by the occupation of the country by foreign armies. His famous poem *Bülbül* which was written under the influence of emotions caused by the news coming from Bursa that it had been occupied by the Greeks. The date of its publication is 7 May 1921. But the content of the poem would then be applied also to the conditions created by the revolutions. The atmosphere of the country under the occupation of the enemies is depicted in the highest level of a drama. The poet addressing the nightingale, which in Turkish Islamic literary symbolises the lover of the rose with a ceaseless longing, and therefore singing by crying out for her love. Akif depict himself, as one who had been deprived of his body through which he worships his God, establishes order and justice in the earth. This state of being is not but a diaspora which is depicted by himself as *"Bugün bir hânümânsız serseriyim öz diyârımda".* Nothing can explain better the self-definitions of the post-caliphate Islamists of Turkey than this statement does. As a matter of fact the symbolism of nightingale is intensively employed in the journal *Sebilürreşad* and in most of the Islamist discourses improved in the post-caliphate period. For example

Necip Fazıl, the other famous Islamist poem whose star has shined just before the transition to multiparty system in 1945, has employed this theme of diaspora in one's own country in an epic way. He said in his highly epic poem *Sakarya Türküsü,* which has been the manifesto of the Islamist-Turkist youth, that *"Öz yurdunda garibsin, öz vatanında parya"* (You are stranger in your own land, a pariah in your own country). As it seems the implications of the poem about the occupiers had been translated as the existing authority which had made the Muslims deprived of their political bodies. In this respect the poem *Bülbül* from the beginning to the end includes very rich material and many implications about the issues discussed here. Therefore, I quote it as a whole without translation in the apendix C. He makes there a poetical and dramatical depiction of the country under the invasion of the enemies. Making reference to several golden moments and some heroic personalities of the Ottoman history, such as Mehmed II, Selahaddin Ayyubi, he depicts a very pessimistic picture of the situation. Comparing this with the problem of the nightingale continuously crying out for its platonic distance from the flowing rose, he tries to prove poetically that it is his, not its, right to cry out and to mourn. He argues that even the land of the nightingale is far from being invased by any one, then, its situation is much more better than his conditions:

> *Eşin var, âşiyânın var, bahârın var, ki beklerdin;*
> *Kıyametler koparmak neydi, ey bülbül, nedir derdin?*
> *O zümrüd tahta kondun, bir semâvî saltanat kurdun;*
> *Cihânın yurdu hep çiğnense, çiğnenmez senin yurdun.*
> *.....*
> *Dolaşsın, sonra, İslâm'ın harem-gâhında nâ-mahrem...*
> *Benim hakkım, sus ey bülbül, senin hakkın değil mâtem!*
> *(Mehmed Akif, 1989: 435-436).*

> You have a partner, a nest, a spring to be waited for;
> Why is this uproar, o nightingale, what is paining you
> You ascended an emerald throne, founded a divine kingdom
> Your land won't be invaded even if all lands in the world are invaded.
> .....
> While the strangers (nâ-mahrem) walking on the intimate places of Islam
> Silent o nightingale! It is mine, not yours, the right to mourn.

Obviously Akif has taken his analogy with *Bülbül* very seriously so that in his days of Egypt he has slowed down singing if not qieted completely. Mehmed Akif in the early days of 1925 wrote his very pessimistic poem called *Hicran* (suppuration). The word was derived from the name of the historical migration of the Prophet i.e., *hicrah*, but has been transferred into the Turkish-ottoman literary through the Persian. In turn, the word was beginning to name the actual state of diaspora in one's own country, which seemed to Akif more insufferable than living outside the country. He asked his God:

> *İlâhî! Pek bunaldım, nerde nûrun? Nerde gufrânın?*
> *Cehennem gezdirip dursun mu âfâkımda hicrânım?*
> *Evet, gafletti sun'um, lakin insan gaflet etmez mi?*
> *Yıkandım bir ömürdür döktüğüm, yaşlarla, yetmez mi?*
> *Gel artık, mâsivâ yok, şimdi yurdum Tanrı yurdumdur:*
> *Tüten hücremde îmânım, yatan, yer yer, sücûdumdur,*
> *Ne irfânımda bir iz var, ne vicdânımda ey Yezdan,*
> *O seccâdeyle kandilden sinen bigâne rûhundan.*
> *(M. Akif, 1989: 452).*

> I's stupefied, o God! where is your light, where is your blessing?
> Should my suppuration make a hell walks on my horizons?
> Well, it was a sleepiness that I did, but is not it a human action to sleep
> I have been washed with my tears for centuries, isn't enough?
> Come on! No sin any more, my land is the land of God
> What is going on fume in my home is my faith;
> that who lies is my prostration,
> Neither in my knowledge nor in my conscience a trace, o God!
> Of your stranger spirit, crouched down through the prayer rug or lamp.

One more thing that should be noticed here is the individual experience of the diaspora. There are a number of personal personal lessons he appears to have deriven from the social and political situation the country was passing. The connections of the changing world with the God, turn around the personal anxieties of the poet. The poet is the centre of everything that is occurring in the world, but not in the sense that he is a super Subject (with capital 'S'). Just on the contrary he is reflected here as a subject to the divine administration of the history. Al history is displayed before the eyes and the ears of the poet to give him some lessons about his personal sin. The poem is in the state of full-delivery to his God.

This delivery of the poet is originates from the mystical elements which directed the considerable part of the action of the believers. Many constitutive figures of Islam have had decided to take some very vital historical actions on the grounds of some completely personal mystical references. Therefore the action of the Islamists havecouldn't been separated completely as being modern and rational. Many people among the Muslims still decide to take vital actions according to some lights they think they take through their dreams or inspirations. If such a light is not already seen and if it is needed, it is called by a special praying called *istikhare*. It is reported in the history of *hadith* that Ömer the second caliph had made a strong collection of the traditions of the prophet but he suddenly decided to burn them because of a vision appeared to him as a result of his praying of *istikhare*. Obviously, Mehmed Akif seems to have been under the mood of the immediate relation with God. His decision in burning his Turkish translation of the Qur'an is also important in this respect. The government had given him the task of translating the Qur'an. At the beginning he accepted the task and translated most of its parts, but toward the end of translation he was stimulated by some anxieties that made him stop the translation. He was in a state of suspicion about the legitimation of the activity because of the political goals behind its being ordered (Kara, 1986: 312). He was, on the other hand, believing in the importance of the understandability of the Holy Book by people. He lived in Egypt until his days of final returning to Turkey in 1936. He had trusted the translated parts to his friend İhsan Efendi and bequeathed him burning them in case of not homecoming (Düzdağ, 1989: XXXVIII).

Mehmed Akif home-came in June 1936 and died eight months after his homecoming, in 27 December, 1936. His funeral ceremony was organised and understood as a protest meeting by the Islamists in Bayezıd Mosque in İstanbul with a large participation of people and university students. Then he remained in the memory of Turkish Islamism as an unforgettable figure together with his attitudes towards the political authority which has been characterised by seclusion as only alternative in a state of diaspora.

This study, of course could not include a more detailed analysis of the poetry and political dimension of Mehmed Akif. I tried to draw attention just on some poetical employment of Islamic discourses in the formation of the political identity in the post-caliphate period Islamism. The importance of this lies in understanding the course of the development of the social and

political actions of the Islamists regarding the society established on secular foundations. The meaning of the Caliphate in the embodiment of Muslims is needed to be explored for understanding whether being without organs could be considered a state of emancipation or not. As it seems in our first case, such a state had been conceived as constraining rather than emancipating. Although Mehmed Akif sometimes has criticised the existing organization of the political body of Ottoman empire, he never thought that its restoration would be through its radical abolishment, the killing of the body. Now, let's look at the other cases.

The Martyr in the Way of Islamic Embodiment: İskilipli Atıf Hoca

The movie *Kelebekler Sonsuza Uçar* was shown at the cinemas in 1993-1994. It's subject matter was divided diachronically. There was a lawyer, secular even leftist by character, living in the recent times. The story turned around his personal fluctuations associated with his relationship with his fiancée and his searching for the true story of a sentence issued about an old man by the Liberation Court in the early years of the Republic. That old man was İskilipli Atıf Hoca who was executed for encouraging people to rebel against the regulation of wearing. The lawyer searches for the true reasons why he has been executed and insists for restoring his credit *(iâde-i i'tibâr)*. Indeed the phrase "restoration of Atıf Hoca's credit" would have referred to a turning point which associated with some other recent shiftings in the meaning of body politic, the state, the political identity and some other concepts in terms of the legitimation and appropriation of the existing state by the political Islamists. The film ends with a declaration made by the Great National Assembly that "restores the credit of Atıf Hoca". That construction appears as the final goal of the film. The shifting in question lies in the acknowledgement of the state by the Islamists, to be asked for a credit, for a restoration of a credit to an anti-revolutionist, while the mark of incredibility by such a state had been considered the source of an absolute credit for decades.

The movie on İskilipli Atıf Hoca was watched by a large number of people. This was of course because that he has had a deep place in the memory of the political Islamists before, as a wronged, martyr figure who resisted against the domination of an unislamic power at the level of

wearing, that is the embodiment. This means that Atıf Hoca was the most important figure who had conceived of the relationship between a specific manner of civilising process which ruled on individual embodiment and the commitment to a political body. Indeed, all important figures chosen here to illustrate the formation of political identity in the post-caliphate period are in agreement with insisting on the relationship between the process of embodiment and the religious commitment, between the functioning of a body politic and the reflection of its power on individual practice of the body. All understood that wearing the hat or other wearings as imposed by the Republic as a way of modernization was an operation exercised on a social body onto which the existing Muslims had been thinking to be organised. This operation was conceived as to render the Islamic society as embodied through the caliphate and penetrated into everyday civil life vacant. All these figures have declared their attitudes by some means. But, among them the most characteristic views specifically on the subject of wearing were declared by İskilipli Atıf Hoca. Therefore he has paid a vital substitute for his declaration. Now I want to go on making further remarks on his declaration and his other related views .

Atıf was born in İskilip, a district of Çorum in 1876. He was graduated from the Faculty of Theology of Darulfünûn in 1905 and was appointed at the same year to Kabataş Lisesi where he taught Arabic. At that time he gave lectures at the mosque of Fatih as a *dersiâm*. His articles were published in *Sırat-ı Mustakîm* and *Sebilürreşâd*. He was appointed as an inspector to the madrasas in 1910. The Unitarists *(İttihat ve Terakki Partisi)* who were thenat the government blamed him for supporting the rebellion known as 31 March in Turkish history. But later he was appointed to the general directorate of the *Daru'l Hilafetu'l-Aliyye Medresesi,* and he gave lectures at the Faculty of Law *(Madrasatu'l-Kudat)*. Then he founded the Association of instructors *(Müderissler Cemiyeti)* together with Mustafa Sabri, the last Sheikhulislâm of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Saffet and Said Nursi. Then he became the president of the next Association of Raising Islam, which was a continuation of the former one. His works are: *Nazar-ı Şeriatte Berriye ve Bahriyenin Ehemmiyeti* (1910), *Mir'atu'l İslâm* (1911), *İslâm Yolu* (1919), *Dîn-i İslâm'da Men-i Müskirat* (1920), *Tesettür-i Şer'î* (1920), *Muinu'Talebe* (1920), *Medeniyet-i Şeriyye ve Terakkiyât-ı Diniyye* (1920) (Kara, 1986: 243-244). The work which was taken as a reason for taking him to the court *Frenk Mukallitliği ve Şapka* was indeed published

about two years before the regulation of wearing was announced (1924). What is worthy of attention about his works is their emphasis on the little things of the everyday life, namely on the religious meaning of the choices made about wearing, eating and drinking.

As for his book *Frenk Mukallitliği ve Şapka* (1340/1924), he begins with the definition of Islamic judgement about imitation *(taqlid)*. Taqlid is to obey, to accommodate, to imitate and to resemble one in belief, word, action and appearance without any proof about its rightness. For the İskilipli, imitation is certainly not allowed in Islam. Nobody can be in a position to be imitated absolutely but the Prophet. The allowance of the imitating the prophet is because of the command of the God who rendered Him as a model for us. People who could not search for the details of the references of their commanded actions also are compulsorily allowed to imitate the mujtehids, that is the great imams or ulema of the jurisprudence. But obedience to the ulema is not absolute, it is allowed in as much as they don't contradict with the words of God and His Prophet. The principle reference of this is the verse from the Qur'an mentioned above as the "authority among you". Otherwise, in the case of any contradiction with these references nobody is obeyed.

Apart from such clear obedience, to resemble one's word, attitude and action is a part of the imitation. For a religion claiming an authority over all details of life, such as Islam, there is almost no field to resemble others any other manner. Atıf Hoca, makes a quotation from the Prophet saying "Whoever try to resemble any group, he would be considered from among that group, he is not from among us". He make a generalisation that there is a major relationship between the religious commitments of the nations and their wearing, especially the head-wearing, that is , headgear, turban etc. They signify one's religious and national identity. Here the identity is conceived as an affirmation of a power which is ruled through the wearing in particular, and the total manner of civilisation in general:

> Essentially, by the prohibition of resembling to the non-Muslims in wearing the Prophet's goal and intention was to establish the Islamic commitment and nationality between the Muslims. The ground of the Islamic nationality is to be far from some symbols, customs and attitudes unique to the infidel nations and to not to resemble them ... Then if those who have not remained any relevance with affirmation by tongue and bodily obedience and who almost couldn't be distinguished from the non-muslims except with their manners of wearing,

begin to resemble the non-muslims by their wearing, then what would have remain to represent the existence of commitment of those people to the body of ummah. Then, such people would be included in the volume referred by the Prophet in his tradition: "whoever tries to resemble a group, he would be considered from among them" (Atıf Hoca, 1340: 29).

İskilipli Atıf gives some trade-marks through which peoples' commitment might be inferred. Although he accept that these trade -mark might have differed historically the convention had been constituted in such a way that: the in tradition is a remark to distinguish the Muslims from the non-muslims. He gives an illustrative list of some manner of dressings as the countersigns of infidelity as he called: *Şiâr-ı küfür:*

> *Gayyar* is a trade-mark of the *zımmis* (the non-muslim citizens of an Islamic country) by which they were distinguished from the Muslims .... they were sewing over the chest of the surface of their clothing a part like a ribbon. But the trade-mark was not the same everywhere. There was a different trade-mark everywhere. For example somewhere the colour of the turban was conceived as a trade-mark. The blue colour was referring to the Christians, Yellow to the Jews and white to the Muslims.
> *Zünnâr* was a kind of girdle made of silk used as a trade-mark of infidelity by the Christians and the Magians.
> *Kustiç* was another kind of girdle again for distinguishing the same groups.
> *Gaslî* was the trade-mark of the Jews, a yellow jacket (Atıf Hoca, 1340: 23-24).

Considering the development of the conceptions of body, here it is very easily seen that the body does not represent its own self. It is a representation of the power of the state. As for the state, in Islamic society is also the representation of the ruling of God. Thus, the body is still a metaphor of something outside itself. But whether it is exclusively representation is not so unproblematic. Perhaps it would be better to say that what is apparent here is its representative dimension. As a matter of fact, Atıf Hoca, in these lines concluded that wearing hat would undoubtedly be considered as infidel *(küfr)*. Whoever wore the hat would have exited from the gate of religion. This conclusion was to be taken as a reason for his trial after two years. Again, the mutual coincidences work on this level. The very character of Islam is manifested here. That is the obvious involution of several levels with each other. The involution of the political will with the individual sentiments, of the cultural and symbolical level with the

economical level etc. No doubt this very character is manifested at best in the discourse of the Prophet and in the Qur'an. There is no any systematic spaces of interpassages between different levels. It is very usual in the style o the Qur'an that, while anything said about the family relations the subject suddenly is turned into another very different issue, let me say for example into the subject of the taxation. The love and the anger are one inside the other. So are the tidings comfort and joy and the frightening for the final end of man. The style of the all religious texts is deprived of a systematicity in the modern sense, but that is not to attach them a deficiency; quite on the contrary to refer to their nature corresponding the complexity of life as a whole.[9] No part of life can be separated from the other one. The great tradition of Islam, especially for not falling into an essentialism, has not been so appropriate for making any systematic division so that the inseparability of the domains has been the characteristic feature of it. The political or public sphere is also conceived as religious as well as all actions in the private spaces. The sexual sphere has coincidences in the divine sphere and the economy is completely expressed by divine words an so on. This is expressed in the unity (tawhid) principle, and such an interpretation of tawhid has been the base of many attempts to restore the true meaning of the religion throughout the Islamic history. That is to say that apart from the ideological applicability, the Islamic history is filled with examples of returning to the roots of the scriptural meaning. This is, however the matter of the next chapters.

The Law of Hat was issued in the last days of the year 1925. It declared that "every civil Turk would wear a hat, which is the trade-remark of being civil man". İskilipli Atıf Hoca was arrested blamed for provoking people to revolve against the law, because of his book *Frenk Mukallitliği* which had been written sixteenth mouths before the law. He was sent to Giresun to be

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[9]Indeed this might have been taken as the very characteristics of most of the classical texts, especially the religious scriptures. This dimension lies at the base of Gadamerean formulation of the dialogue as a foundation of the hermeneutics. In this respect, having made reference to Plato's underlying idea of the Great Dialogues Gadamer follows that:

"A limitation of the Greek models of thought can be detected here, one that was persuasively pointed out by the Old Testament, Saint Paul, Luther, and their modern reinterpreter. It is a dimension of dialogue that still does not come into conceptual consciousness even with the celebrated discovery of Socratic dialogue as the basic form of thought" (Gadamer, 1987: 27).

questioned, but the chronology of the isusing of the law and the publishing of the book was noticed and he was acquitted there. Then he was returned to İstanbul. But he was arrested here again and was sent to Ankara to be tried in the Liberation Court. At this time some rebels against the law of hat had taken place around Giresun, Erzurum, Rize and Sivas. The court claimed that İskilipli Atıf Hoca had an immediate influence in the occurring of these rebels. Therefore it demanded for him, together with his friends, a fifteen years condemnation to the galleys. But the judge decided to postpone the court to the next day for decision and for a last right of plead of the accuseds. This was the last chance before Atıf Hoca. He began to think and write a staement of plead for the acquisition. From this point onward is very important in terms of the accomplishment of the story now at the collective memory of the contemporary Islamists. That is, after finishing writing his plead Hoca slept and saw a dream in which he saw the Prophet Mohammed saying "Why do you so resist to meet with me, o Atıf?". Then he suddenly wakes up and made his decision of tearing his papers of defence (Kısakürek, 1970: 69-71). As a result, he was condemned for execution in the third Wednesday of February 1926 and was executed next day at morning. The importance of such an action lies in its potential of constituting a base for the actions of contemporary Islamists. It also illustrates the tradition mentioned above which also directed Mehmed Akif's attitude of looking for non-rational (divinely driven) bases of action. Furthermore Atıf Hoca, with his courage towards applying the sign he took from the absolute source of knowledge[10] acquires the Divine references and guarantees of the Divine speaking as a moral support in the sense of diaspora. He also motivates the discourse of martyrdom *(shehadah)* in the terminology of struggle against the Republic which is now defined as the absolute "Other", by constituting the most important prototype of martyrdom in the post-caliphate period through his flesh.

Considering his position among his contemporary Islamist fellows in the reformation of Islam and the place of the restoration of the Ijtihad

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[10] A famous tradition attached to the prophet says that "If you see me in your dreams it is absolutely right *(rüya-yı sadıqa)*. Because the Satan can not take my guise, while he has an ability to take the guise of everybody" *(Sahih-i Muslim,* 1981, Babu'r-Rü'ya: 1775). Although in jurisprudencial operations one's dream can not be taken as proof it is commonly accepted that the vision of the prophet in the dream is a strong proof for the dreamer.

institution, Atıf Hoca seems to be rather conservative. But his conservatism is not because of his opposition to opening the gate of the institution but of the timing of such an operation. In his article "İctihad ve İlmî Seviyenin Düşüşü" (The Decline of the Scholarship Level and Ijtihad, Atıf Hoca, 1986) he argued that there hadn't been grown sufficiently capable scholars to undertake the responsibility of *ijtihad* for many centuries. The closing of the gate was not *in principio* but *de facto*. That was because of the actual situation of the Islamic society which had not brought about the growing of capable *mujtehids*. Most of the daily life was already embraced (so to say encoded) by the *ijtihad*s of the predecessors. In one sense there had not remained much need to make *ijtihad*, that is there had not been experienced so different things to enforce the gate of the *ijtihad* and to feed the growing process of the *mujtahid*. When such a need was felt the time had become too late. Indeed, this last sentence is not a phrasing with which Atıf Hoca would agree. Rather he thought that even the boundaries of the jurisprudence as accomplished by the predecessors who were absolute *mujtehids (mutlak müctehid),* were by their interpretative potentiality encompassing the existing life situations. But his article does not ignore the possibility of the changes which might not be contained into the existing Islamic jurisprudencial collection of codes. His article is already an analysis of the history of the decline of the circumstance which made the growing of *mujtehids* actually impossible. This analysis would be introduced to the administrators as a warning to be taken into account.

The Man Who Grows Rose: Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır

The man who grows rose is a product of the Republic. The hero of the novel by Rasim Özdenören, one of the most important figures of the second generation Muslim intellectuals, *Gül Yetiştiren Adam* (1979) represents the situation of the Muslim intellectuals/ulema of the first generation in the post caliphate country. He retired into seclusion because of the transformation of all the public space into "nowhere", for, going out of his home necessarily gets him into sin. The foundation of the Republic as a substitute for the caliphate had rendered all spaces nowhere for the *Gül Yetiştiren Adam*. There had remained no where to live without being an organ of the sinful body. As though, he had lost his body. He was a man without a living space.

What he felt outside his home was but a sense of complete emptiness. Therefore he has secluded himself from the "nowhere" into his home, the only space where he felt confident. The more frequently he went out of his home the more he becomes enforced to deliver his body to the exercise of power by the "others" of "those among us". Of course, the manifestation of this power is the wearing of the hat, from which nobody can escape in public spheres. He felt he could protect himself against the hat conceived as an attack on his body whose existence has no other meaning than being a metaphor of his submission to the God, only by sitting in his home. The man who secluded himself because of the unbreathable atmosphere of the outside tries to create his own atmosphere, to witness the overtime recreation of the God. He sets up a good dialogue with the roses and tries to transmit his anxiety, his wisdom to a child.

This is the story of the residues of the Caliphate, of the old social body of the Muslims, who now feel themselves in an irrelevant position in social life. They seclude themselves and grow roses. They come to speak the language of the roses. For, the language they could speak with people has been lost. The communication was once distorted. Only the roses can understand them, and they can understand only the roses.

Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır is one of the most important figures who are characterised by the "man who grows roses". He was born in Elmalılı district of Antalya in 1878 as a son of the chief secretary of the Şeriyye Court *(Şeriyye Mahkemesi)* known as Hoca Numan Efendi from Yazır village of Burdur. Hamdi Yazır was educated in special ways. He took lessons from the most important scholars of his time. He was graduated from the *Mekteb-i Nuvvab* as a champion and become *qadi* in 1905. He gave lectures in various schools and was chosen as a deputy from his region i.e., Antalya after the declaration of the Second Constitution *(Meşrutiyet)*. During his deputy service he wrote a *fatwa* for dismissing Abdulhamid the Second. Then, he was appointed to the membership of *Daru'l Hikmetu'l-Islamiyye* in 1918 and to the presidency of this institution in 1919. In the first and the second cabinets of Damat Ferid Pasha he undertook the ministry of Foundations *(Evkaf Nazırlığı)*. Then, in the September of 1919 he was appointed to membership of Senate until the foundation of the Great National Assembly in Ankara (1920) (Kara, 1986: 409).

Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır was an instructor of Logic in the School of Professionals *(Madrasatu'l Mutahassisîn)* during the formation of the

Republic. After the abolishment of the Caliphate he was arrested and tried at the Liberation Court, in Ankara, for having opposed the National Struggle *(Milli Mücadele)*. He was demanded of execution, but in the end was acquitted. Then he returned to İstanbul and secluded himself into his home until his death (Kara, 1986: 410: Bulaç, 1992: 10). He became "a man who grows rose".

During his life of seclusion Elmalılı took an order from the government to engage in a project of preparing the true exegesis of the Qur'an. This was the first part of a larger project which included also the translation of the Qur'an into Turkish by Mehmed Akif Ersoy. As was mentioned above, Mehmed Akif, having fallen into hesitation between his idea of the necessity of making the Qur'an understandable by the masses and the possible political conclusion of such a translation in terms of its serviceability for the secular Republic. Akif had saw that the Turkish Republic was to substitute a Turkish-Nationalised Islam for the traditional one. While Akif, too, had some criticism about the traditional Islam prevailing in the Ottoman society, the Ottoman was yet characterised by an Islamic body politic. In such a place the institutions such as *ijtihad*, reformations etc. were arguable affairs, because there was a body, albeit an ill body, which made such hygienic operations meaningful. In this case, however, there remained no possibility of getting rid of the body. Such operations would not but rehabilitate the substituting body for the Islamic one. In other words, the action which would normally be thought to be necessary for the religion was then thought to be harmful. Akif hadn't felt himself belonging to this new-emergent body, moreover, he conceived of the constitutive will of the Republic as the "other". Therefore, he decided not to accomplish the translation and left the job half-finished. Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, however, didn't show the attitude Mehmed Akif had shown, although he had been sharing the same anxieties with Mehmed Akif and opposed to participate in the public spaces of the new republic by a meaningful passive resistance. Instead, he accepted the task, and begun to study on the Exegesis that was named as *Hak Dini Kur'an Dili* consisting of nine volumes published in 1935-1939. Despite the dependence of this activity to the political decision, however, Yazır has never refrained from making some contrasting points against the structure of the new regime. Furthermore, through his exegesis he tried to adapt the basic concepts of the Qur'an, which constituted the grounds for the identity of the "self" and the "other" such as *Satan*, *Tağut, Bel'am, Firavn, İbadah,*

Shirk, etc., to the new realities of politics. By his interpretation of these concepts he created some theoretical, or in Laclauean term dislocational (Laclau, 1990: 42) opportunities, for a new technology of constituting political identity. The following are some of his special exegesis of certain verses in he Qur'an.

In his exegesis of the verse 31 of the *Tawba* surah, Elmalılı identifies the role of clergy which is rejected in Qur'an because it functioned as creating polytheism with the role of the parliamentary of the democratic societies. For him, both the clergy and the parliamentary are common in sharing the role of conducting a tutelage over people other than that of the God, which determines the boundaries of the moral *(helal)* and the immoral *(haram)*. Because in Islamic convictions the right of determining those boundaries exclusively belongs to the God. He derives this idea from the verse saying that:

> They take their priests and their anchorites to be their lords in derogation of God, and (they take as their Lord) Christ the son of Mary; yet they were commanded to worship but one God: There is no God but He. Praise and glory to Him: (Far is he) from having the partners they associate with Him (IX: 31).

He also reminds the well known *hadith* directly relevant to this verse. Once, when the Prophet was reading this verse from the Qur'an, Adiy b. Khatem who had been still a Christian was at the door of the Prophet waiting for permission to enter and request from him to allow his sister taken as war ether by the friends of the Prophet, heard the verse and objected to the Prophet: "no we don't worship to our priests". Then the Prophet asked him whether they submit to their priests without any question when they declare something as lawful and some other as unlawful. By taking the answer "yes" the Prophet said that "that is just your worship to them." (Yazır, 1992: IV/ 214-215). Thus, accepting someone as a deity, Elmalılı says, one is not required to say "that is my god". The attribute and the function ascribed to him/it is enough for being considered his falling into polytheism. Indeed these ideas are the prototypes of the later comments pronounced by the most prominent Islamists such as Ebu'l A'la el Mawdudi (1978) and Sayyid Qutb (1980).

In his exegesis of the verse 256 of the *Baqara* Surah, Elmalılı defines the term *tağut* in such a way that differs from the traditional interpretations.

The latters had rendered the meaning of the term very afunctional because it has had no place in the everyday life of the Muslims. It was associated with the inanimate pagans or the Satan in its most abstract sense. As many later Islamists would repeat, Elmalılı defined the term *tağut*, which is translated into English as idol-worship (Dawood, 1966: 352), in terms of its anthropomorphic sense:

> There shall be no compulsion in religion. True guidance is now distinct from error. He that *renounces idol-worship* and puts his faith in Allah shall grasp a firm handle that will never break. Allah hears all and knows all (Italics mine, II/256).

Elmalılı defines the *tağut* in terms of the human action in reference to the etymological meaning of the word. That is, to exceed, to go beyond one's limits. He that goes beyond his appointed limits (mission) could well be a human-being, and not necessarilyan inanimate or animal being. For, the word needs an active participation in such an action whereas inanimate beings can not do anything but can only be imagined to be doing so. The limits of the man had already been drawn by the God and his Prophet. Within these limits, he has no authority to be a source of ruling. He is supposed to apply the rules God had advised to him. When he forgets the limits and undertakes the role of ruling his action becomes a kind of *tuğyan*. Elmalılı continues:

> From the meaning of the *tuğyan* it is understood that the (inanimate) pagans are secondary *tağuts*. Indeed, they should even not be considered *tağut*, for they can not act against the God... They can be not but the means of *tuğyan* which is found by the furious. The pagans are produced by the imaginations of male or female *tağuts*. Therefore, the pagans are not the *tağuts* but their representations.... All these are the explanations of the basic principle of Islam that is *Tawhid*. The verse is a relatively long expression of the principle. It entails renouncing, negating the *tağut*, that is the lord alternative to the God. Then for being a believer in the Unity of God one has at first to negate all tyrants, furious despots and dictators who claim a power on social and individual body in contradiction with the limits of God *(hududullah)* (Yazır, 1992: II/136-145).

The interpretation of the Opening surah, namely *Fatiha*, is also very illustrative in understanding Elmalılı's approach to the social and political

embodiment. Drawing attention to the pronouns (*we* and *us*) used in the surah "You alone *we* worship, and You alone *we* pray for help. Guide *us* to the straight path" he argues that there is a signification of the importance of praying together with the community. Since, while the praying can also be fulfilled individually and while its channel is completely individual, the using of the second personal pronoun is not casual. There is a sign for praying together with the community, that doesn't disappear even in the individual praying. Because the Exordium (Fatiha) is read in every standing during the prayer.

For praying together with the community, however, Elmalılı suggests, a community should have already been constituted. For Elmalılı, a community, which is identified with the Subject that would worship the God, is not composed of a crowd of a randomly meeting individuals. There is a constitutive will which makes a gathering together, a community. The *jama'ah* is an ordered community which has been constituted by the individuals who move in accordance with a single spirit. It's constitution is conditioned by a spirit and by a conscious social contract. However, for Elmalılı, there was no such an organised and socially contracted community (Yazır, 1992: II/114-115). Or, the once existed one had already been disorganised by the establishment of the Republic. Very interestingly, Elmalılı politicises, or refers to the political aspect of, the most religious ritual and mobilises it to the constitution of a will to constitute the Islamic body politic. That is to say that the body politic is so important to him that, in its absence even the most important ritual of the Muslims would become hardly relevant.

The constitution of the Islamic society, Elmalılı insists, is an individual duty. Because the sense or the feeling of togetherness first emerges within individual heart. In depicting the process of the emergence of such a feeling, Elmalılı applies all the mystical accumulations of Islamic tradition of brotherhood, of the vertical relations with the God, the underlying values behind the obedience to the God etc. In turn, he insists on the constitutive initiative and says that its genius lies deep inside the individual conscience. Individual heart carry all of the community conscience before its formation. After the individual conscience as the seed of the communal spirit is sown in heart, the individual becomes attached to a universal body of the community as an organ (Yazır, 1992: II/115). Thus the themes in Yazır's exegesis turn

around the constitution of the self and the "Other". He seems to have felt like an organ which has lost the body he belongs.

Undoubtedly it is possible to illustrate more examples of Yazır's fearless and stingy interpretation of the Qur'anic verses by which the then existing governments were being declared as strictly illegitimate from the Qur'anic point of view. By this way he derived very strong identifications of the existing governors with the bad types of the Qur'an. Each one of these figures violently and characteristically opposed the prophetic movement of their times and their actions basically were characterised with the state of *tuğyan* -the action which made them *tağut*, who went too far beyond his mission because of the rejection or ignorance of the boundaries drawn by the God. Thus, the state was being indicated as religiously illegitimate in an Exegesis ordered to constitute an official interpretation of the Qur'an the part of a more comprehensive cultural project..

Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır has a very rich and deep philosophical background. His philosophical depth is very striking in his remarks on many issues is in question. This feature of his insight manifests itself in the general appearance of his exegesis as well as his other works. His exegesis therefore include a high level of philosophical and hermeneutical reflexivity. His analysis of the nature of relationship between the words and the things, between the interpreter and the text, the true nature of understanding and the aesthetic dimension etc. has given his exegesis a unique position among the contemporary ones.

As for his views on the place of *ijtihad* in the existing situation of the Islamic society, he manifested again his deep insight. He makes a distinction between the proved jurisprudencial rules *(nass)* and those which were induced from the texts by reasoning and by considering the changing conditions, namely *ijtihad*. The former relied on the universal principles such as the equality principle which relied on the verse "the superiority among you, in Allah's discretion is judged according to your piety" (49/13), and the liberty principle which relied on the verse "he Who appointed you as His successors" (35/39). The conclusions and the applications of such verses are universally and eternally valid. They do not need any revision for the values and the ground they refer are universal. As for the latter, they may change in accordance with the ethnical, historical and social conditions, a lesson derived from the fact that the prophets who were sent to different societies were also bringing different laws which were corresponding the

needs of their societies. This also had been the underlying idea of the codification of the *Mecelle* which was declaring that "it is undeniable that with the cycling of times there may be changes in the judgements" *(Ezmanın tağayyuru ile ahkâmın tağayyuru inkâr olunamaz)*. Elmalılı goes on saying that:

> Therefore, in the methodology of Islamic Jurisprudence *(Fıkıh usûlü)* which is also the Islamic philosophy of Law, we witness a great tradition with its depth and extension that provided a sophisticated philosophy which included also the extent and the ways through which the judgements would change by the changing of time. It includes the rules of how the possible changes would occur. It has so exhaustive frame that it includes the rules that would be applied in the case of the possible changes which had not taken place yet. Therefore there is no any possibility for even the modern conditions to be able to exit from such an exhaustive frame. Those who says that Shariah doesn't encompass everything are those who don't know the true nature of the Shariah. But of course it entails somehow trained men, hard-working and elaboration (Yazır, 1986: 433).

His argumentation on the *ijtihad*, too, centrally revolve around the significance of a political will, in rendering such discussions meaningful. In this article he is at a position of agency in operation on and/or with the political body which had gave the jurisprudence its volume. Here, his remarks on a very sensitive issue, namely, the unification of the sects, concludes with an emphasis on the significance of a Caliph in putting an end to the discussions on some particular issues which are already matters of contradiction between the sects, for example between the Shafii and the Hanefi schools. He reminds that the preference of an Imam in such a case would make the obedience compulsory *(vacip)*.

Elmalılı's exegesis has been read by large numbers of Muslim intellectuals for fifty years. He has settled in the collective memory of a generation as a "man who grows roses", which characterised his attitude towards the Republican regime. This attitude has been included in the total references of the Islamists' political attitudes and self-identities. Furthermore his intellectual depth has been acknowledged and trusted as a good potential for possible theoretical efforts. Especially after the two additional -revised and simplified- versions began to be published in 1992 onward he has been read by larger masses. Meanwhile it has been quite striking that *Zaman Gazetesi,* the newspaper of the group led by Fethullah Hoca, who is himself

a client of Said Nursi, carried out a campaign to sell the newspaper with promotion of *Hak Dini Kur'an Dili,* which and declared the book as "the exegesis of the era". What is striking here is that the followers of Said Nursi had never compromised from their claims that Bediüzzaman's is the most appropriate exegesis of the era.

Bediüzzaman Said-i Nursi Phenomenon

If phenomenology is to be defined as the study of the world/fact/reality as it is available to the human consciousness, then, given the plurality of figures attached to Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, the best expression of his existence becomes a phenomenological one. For, today there is at least four or five major groups, apart from the marginal ones, who think they follow the teachings of Said Nursi in association with corresponding definitions of himself. Indeed each one of these groups have various interesting points to be connected with my line of argumentation regarding the constitution of a political identity in the post-caliphate period of Turkey in relation with the new formation of the state and society as a body politic.

Said Nursi's Facile Face: "Fethullahçı" and "Nesilci" Groups

The followers of Said Nursi are called *Nurcu* but they call themselves "Risale-i Nur Talebeleri". The usual vision of a *nurcu* has been characterised with his very orderly clothing of suit with necktie, daily shaved face, almond moustache (badem bıyık) and short and orderly cut hair. It is very rarely possible, if not impossible, to see a nurcu smoking, or eating or drinking at spaces or positions of fast-food, sitting at the coffee-houses etc. Such a figure of nurcu makes one think of him as if he has been passed from a military disciplin. All regulations on the body of a nurcu make references to, or rather is charged with a message of, his loyalty to the order of existing power, albeit in its genius, there has always been a deep sense of camouflage *(taqiyye)* — a camouflage of reserving his or their political intentions, which are in fact no longer in demand of sharing the political apparatus of power, but of being protected against legislation about the tekkes and the zawiyes. Indeed, the motivations of such a camouflage

are not to be reduced to such a reason alone. At least for a few decades the nurcu movement has been in confidence in terms of the political oppression, while this tactic of camouflage is remaining. One of the most important reasons for this that, I think, should be pointed out here is the efficiency of carrying on the discourse of the wrongedness. This creates a very closed construction of an identity which relied on the protection of the imagined "Other", who is the guardian of the regime. Undoubtedly, added to this, have been the nurcu strategies to penetrate into various institutions of the state apparatus, especially the educational ones. Considering that, the numbers of the military staff, each year dismissed from the army by the decision of the Higher Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Şura) are mostly nurcu, the motivations and mood of the wrongedness would be understood better among the nurcus. Especially the groups known as "Fethullahçı" and the "Nesilci", competing in getting steps in such a way, have had very characteristic military-like discipline on their clients. They have represented the championship of social and individual order in terms of their everyday life, clothing and discipline. Thus, they have also produced a portrait of Said Nursi who is anti-anarchist, very loyal to the state, completely apolitical and accommodating the most important values of modernity such as scientism, humanism, rationalism, civilisation, enlightenment etc.

A definition of the personality of Said Nursi can be found out especially in his biographical anecdotes illustrating his very apolitical, other-worldly and loyal character. For example, the narration of his attitude toward the well-known rebellion of Sheikh Said against the Republic because of the abolition of the Caliphate is very interesting. Sheikh Said, the Naqshibendi sheikh whose influence had been very strong throughout the Eastern Anatolia, especially among the Kurds, declared to the staff of the Republic that "everything that was tying us with you hitherto was the Caliphate that you are abolishing. In addition, you have declared that the state you established is a Turkish Republic. This means that we, the Kurds, are excluded from this establishment. Then what kind of tie do you think has remained between us". That was the declared reason of the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925. This declaration was questioning the foundation of the Republic on an ethnic ground. For, the caliphate under the administration of the Ottoman had been relying on religious ties. It was representing all Muslims on the claim of equality principle. The declaration of the new state as a "Turkish" one associated with the absence of the religious (caliphate)

aspect was by its nature an excluding factor for the other components of the society, albeit the new definition of the "Turkship" was made by Mustafa Kemal as "whoever says I am Turk". Indeed, this was a shift from the international legitimating base of the Republic. Because, the foundation of the Turkish Republic, as was acknowledged by the international contracts, especially in the Lozan Negotiations of Peace, had been conditioned by the definitions of the minority and majority in terms of religious ties. That is, the Kurds were not accepted as minority because they were Muslims, while the Armenians and the Turkish Greeks were minorities because of their religious difference. For this definition Turkish Republic should have remain in maintaining its Islamic identity that would recognise the Kurds as Kurds, but perhaps again as citizens of the same Republic.

Sheikh Said had recruited a considerable number of people for his rebellion and it is rumourd that he has invited Said Nursi who was then very influential throughout the Van and Bitlis regions. To this calling for an uprise, the reply of Said Nursi had been very characteristic in terms of the reference for a loyal and anti-anarchist and apolitical figure of Said Nursi: "I don't want to draw a sword and pour the blood of brothers who have been the standard-bearers of Islam for centuries" These words were quoted by Said Nursi as expressed in a court blaming him for making a Kurdist propaganda. Then, he would repeat this expression for proving his opposition against giving any credit to Kurdish racism, anarchy and politics *(Tarihçe-i Hayat)*. Given the fact that the less participation in and also opposition to the movement of Sheikh Said has occurred in the region of Van (and Varto, a district of Muş, probably because of its Alevite population), it can be thought that Said Nursi's attitude towards the upraise has been very influential in its failure.

It is also very often told that Said Nursi has said that *"E'uzu billahi min eş-şeytani'r-racîm ve min es-siyaseh"*. Said Nursi's attitude toward political participation has usually been identified with this statement. But while this has closed the doors for participating in the parliamentary political life, it has in fact never hindered the nurcus completely from the political participation. Rather, this constraining statement has forced some other doors and created its own channels of influencing the political life. The attempts to penetrate into various levels of educational and military-bureaucratic institutions, as was mentioned above, are some of these channels. Added to this, had been the support they gave to the major rightist

parties of Turkish political life. Indeed this tradition has begun a preference or attitude against the monoparty regime as was characterised with M. Kemal and İsmet İnönü. If any opponent character would be sought in the genius of such sects of the nurcu movement, this might be found in the monoparty-period life of Said Nursi. This part of his life begins with his obvious attitude against Mustafa Kemal and his preferences in the constitution of the Republic in behalf of a secular direction. Among very famous anecdotes told among the Nurcus about his dialogue with Mustafa Kemal, is his first reaction against the absence of a small mosque in the Building of the Assembly. To his asking for a small mosque to pray, and to his long speech delivered in the Grand National Assembly about the importance of praying and his concerning about the underestimation of prayer, it is told that, Mustafa Kemal has said to him: "We need some hero hocas like you; we invited you hoping to be informed and advised by your higher scholarship. But you came and above all, were interested with some little things like prayer and brought about disarray among us." Then, Said Nursi replied to him angrily: "Pasha! Pasha! the most important truth after the faith is the prayer. He who doesn't perform prayer is treacherous, the judgement for a treacherous is "rejection" (BSN, 1987: 140).

For Şerif Mardin, Bediüzzaman then still believed and declared that the Turks should make use of the forces of Islam throughout the world. But this was just before the government's move toward secularisation of March 3 rd, 1924, which abolished the caliphate. His speech in the Grand National Assembly is famous, which was warning the members of the Assembly that he feared a dangerous wave of destructive secularism would submerge Turkey:

> The instrument of your victory and the body which recognise your services are one, they are the community of believers, and in particular the lower classes who are solid Muslims. ... And it is therefore incumbent upon you to act in accordance with Qur'anic injunctions. To prefer the pitiable, rootless (milliyetsiz + nationless), Europe-Worshipping imitators of Frankish customs who are detaching themselves from Islam to the masses of the Muslim people (avam) is against Islamic custom and will lead the world of Islam to direct its gaze in another direction and request assistance from others *(BSN,* 1987: 139; the translation by Mardin, 1989: 95).

The developments occurred to cause such appreciations by Said Nursi estranged him to the social life in Ankara. Like his contemporaries described above such as Mehmed Akif, İskilipli Atıf Hoca, Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır and many other figures not mentioned here, he chose to escape from Ankara, where he felt himself very bored. In this respect, we witness the beginnings of the same reaction with those other names. Thus he returned to Van in the Spring of 1923 to seclude himself into his home. He stayed there until the upraise of Sheikh Said (1925).

In spite of his popularised reply to Sheikh Said's calling for upraising, he was accused of having responsibility in the rebellion and was arrested, tried and exiled to Isparta through Antalya and Burdur. His early experiences with the Republic, thus, occurred through his relationships with the personality of Mustafa Kemal himself, and with his life of exile. As Şerif Mardin has pointed out his life in Isparta has been very fruitful in the formation of his ideas as well as their spread as a movement, because of the unique cultural and educational position of Isparta. Mardin, here, stresses on the scarcity or the loose tissue of madrasas, the folk character of the religious life, albeit its intensive resonances, which had created an important gap, especially with the abolition of the old institutions, in the feeding channels of the popular culture.

> The many madrasas and tekkes scattered throughout the province were the institutional base of this specialisation. But the province differed from the Eastern regions of Anatolia in that the network of Islamic education was much looser, less pervasive. Said Nursi's work was to fill in these interstices. ... The religious life of the masses in he province was centered on visits to tombs of prominent âlims who had originated in the province and who had acquired the status of holy men. About 30 to 40 madrasas continued to provide religious training in the 1870s (Mardin, 1989: 152-153).

Said Nursi's very elective and appropriate combination of the elements of the popular culture, mystical discourses, orthodox Islam and science and rationality, for Mardin, has fitted with the situation, beginning of course from Isparta, and made it very easy to spread throughout the country. Undoubtedly the abolition of the madrasas by the Law of Unification of Educational Institutions (1924) and the closing of tekkes and zawiyes (1925), has closed the channels of feeding the cognitive-religious needs of people, which in turn has created an illegal market for them. In addition

many other orders and religious groups, Said Nursi has had a strong access to this market during the mono-party regime. He has written various books in Isparta and recruited a large number of clients who acted in spreading his books and ideas. These days have been reported as the days of secrecy or camouflage which would then have settled in the social actions of the nurcus. Said Nursi has been arrested several times and questioned for some of his ideas, exiled to various places (Eskişehir, Barla) and tried for his activities in these years. The earlier disciples and also the most important carriers of the nurcu movement have been grown during these years. I think the nurcu social action has been characteristically influenced by this mood of diaspora and wrongedness.

The details of the legal and security investigations on the writings of Said Nursi and the nurcus are today well-known, which I think are needless to be repeated here (cf. Mardin, 1989; Şahiner, 1978; BSN, 1987, Nursî, 1979). What is worth mentioning about these years is to understand their place and influence in the minds and discourses of the nurcus today and the process of their involvement into the existing political life as a legitimate category. We know in 1945 the transition to a multiparty regime happened and in 1950 the Democratic Party (DP) won the election and took over the government with the votes of especially those who demanded religious liberation. DP constituted a hope for the religious men from the beginning forward. Its allowing reading the calling *(ezan)* and the Qur'an in Arabic, somehow brought about a relative ease to the religious men. The secularisation program of the Democratic Party was quite different from that of the Popular Republican Party but was still maintaining the boundaries of the great secularisation project of the Turkish Republic. The Law of Protecting Atatürk was laid down in the days of DP, and meanwhile the Tomb of Atatürk was constructed in Ankara. While the ritual and symbolic rigging of Kemalism as an ideology had not been accomplished in the times of Mustafa Kemal, they had in the time of Adnan Menderes, The President of the Democratic Party cabinet. Indeed it would be quite striking to note that in the time of İsmet İnönü, the "second man" of the Republican Turkey, the most prominent successor of Mustafa Kemal, the influence of Mustafa Kemal was tried to be diminished; his pictures were abolished from the surface of money and replaced by İnönü's. In one sense, the relative restoration of the religious power by the Democratic Party has meant also the restoration and the strengthening of Mustafa Kemal's position. However,

for Said Nursi, the activities of Adnan Menderes were sufficient to be considered "among us", a Muslim, honest leader to be obeyed and supported without participating actively in politics. Therefore, he has supported him, and expected from him some other steps to be taken in the restoration of the Islamic education, tolerating at least the reading of his books and to take measures against the communist-atheist propaganda. He had addressed Adnan Menderes as the "leader of the Islamic society", in several times *(Beyanat ve Tenvirler).* Said Nursi died in the same year but just before the overthrowing of Menderes in 1960. His flesh was stolen by the military personnel and concealed in fear of being later a symbolic centre for the reactionist movements. After his death and he overthrowing of Menderes the nurcus who were supporting Menderes in hope of a soft Islamisation have found a continuum of his political line in the Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel. A statement attached to Said Nursi said "There will be grown a man from the İslâmköy of Isparta" was thought to be referring to Demirel. Then Demirel's existence in the political arena has been considered as a sufficient support for the relative disappearance of the mood of diaspora among the nurcus. This meant, for more sceptical followers of Said Nursi, a complete delivery to the secular state and a conspiracy of the politicians of Justice Party. Even after the revolution of 12 September 1980, which closed all parties as well as the Justice Party, the nurcus initially supporting Motherland Party of Turgut Özal as a substitute for the Right Way Party, which was led by Hüsamettin Cindoruk, denied to participate in the elections of 1983. But after a while, they returned to the Right Way Party which was thought as the true heir of the Justice Party. During these times the nurcus have been successful in settling in various levels of educational and bureaucratic institutions, albeit they failed to do the same in the military level, through this way they recruited a large number of students from the high schools and universities, they opened and sustained their own-characteristic madrasa-like houses around the country and made very good money at the business level. They have never demanded more than extending their share in the allocation of some "relative goods" by the state. They don't seem to have, for example, some demands that would require changing the state apparatus. A characteristic nurcu statement, here illustrated by Hekimoğlu İsmail and Fethullah Hoca's speeches in *Zaman Gazetesi,* think of the Islamic practices as a whole and 99 % of these practices to be possible to be exercised even in the absence of any relevant

state. The rest 1 % might depend on the existence of a relevant political apparatus, but they would certainly not be considered an essential part of Islam so that the conservation of the social order would always be preferred to their realization, for the anarchy and chaos might have made even the realization of much of the major activities impossible. No doubt, here the classical and conventional preferences of order to chaos, even in some cases where the justice principle could not be not fulfilled, by the political theories of the ulema, as might be illustrated by *Ahkamu's-Sultaniyye* of el-Mawerdi or *Siyasetu'ş-Şer'iyyah* of Ibn Taymiyyah, is employed. Thus, we see almost a certain appropriation of the political apparatus by the nurcu movement which has developed through the lines of the Nesilci group and Fethullah Hoca, albeit the two are in competition with each other.

After the death of Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel was chosen as president and left his party to his successor Tansu Çiller. Çiller won the leadership of the party at the 1994 congress and then she strengthened her position by the successes in 199 elections. During the election campaign for elections her stronger opponent was the Welfare Party. The increasing support for the Welfare Party (WP) whose political programme has relied on the religious liberation, made Çiller improving her own discourses and policies against the WP. She very intensively elaborated the secularist principle of the state, she criticised the WP on the base of the constitutive principles of the Republic and declared that the WP was an anti-systemic party whose contention is not but to replace the regime with a theocratic one. On the other hand she didn't refrain from searching some support of various religious leaders she might have thought to be an alternative to the religiosity of the Welfare Party. For Çiller, the WP was a radically different party which aimed to make a revolution, so to constitute a threat to the establishment of the regime. The Party's interpretation of the religiosity was a distortion of its true meaning, while it was possible to support a different interpretation of the religion that might be employed in the service of the existing regime. In this respect Çiller is said to have made a series of negotiations with Fethullah Hoca. During her negotiations Fethullah Hoca became very popularised on the mass media organs. He began to appear at various societal meetings of the social, political bureaucratic and economical elites. He was introduced in these meetings as an enlightened, deep, modern, gentleman, open-minded and very humble person, a completely other-worldly man, who is not interested in politics at alland

who is very loyal to his state, nation and country. This was the portrait of a traditional learned, restored to accommodate the modern conditions. The modern conditions for a learned religiousman in the case of Turkey required to represent the religion, of course the Islamic one in this case, just as a moral support for any political or social position of the country. This was the introduced portrait, of course. But everybody has understood that such a portrait was filled with political will. This will was manifested in the fact that he was to be an alternative to Necmeddin Erbakan.

From among the most important mediatic indicators of the conflict between the two Hocas, a few should be mentioned here. First occurred in their different attitudes against the unity of customs between Turkey and the EEC. While Erbakan Hoca was a radical opponent to this decision of participating in the EEC, Fethullah Hoca defended it. Second, the struggle for liberty of veiling at the universities has always been one of the central themes of the Welfare Party. However, Fethullah Hoca, in these days said that the "veiling is just a particular detail considering the major goals of Islam" (*Yeni Yüzyıl,* 11 November, 1996). These apparent differences has been very pragmatically evaluated by some mass mediatic organs associated with central-leftist and rightist political parties altogether inasmuch as they were mobilised to hinder the Welfare Party to increase its votes. Especially the ever-decreasing vote-ground of the central-rightist parties were in trend of flowing towards the Welfare Party.

Such a figure of Fethullah Hoca as a moderate, enlightened, free of almost every kind of political will or profit, learned religiousman, in this circumstance, would be very useful to be employed against the political religiosity mobilised and very effectively-dangerously used by Erbakan Hoca. Therefore these diferences were extremely exaggerated during the election campaign through higher mediatic technologies. Notwithstanding, what was striking during the campaign is that the difference between the two hocas was mostly a mediatic construction so that neither Erbakan nor Fethullah Hoca made any word against each other, while they were being polarised. Indeed, in the run up to the general elections, Turkish social-political scene has been witnessing a strict polarisation of the secularists and the anti-secularists. It arrived at such a point that neither word can be placed at the mid world of the polarity. The possibility of being neutral on this issue became very difficult, if not completely impossible. In such a situation the silence of Fethullah Hoca before the attempts which tended to

exploit him in a campaign against the Welfare Party didn't mean but an affirmation of this company. For Ömer Laçiner (1995a) Fethullah Hoca didn't resist against these efforts which put him against the Welfare Party, albeit he didn't make also any apparently affirmative action, because there was a latent competition between the two Hocas' in terms of attaining the power apparatus. Laçiner argues that the difference between the two lies at deeper level, in respect of their target masses. That is to be reconstructed between Fethullah Hoca's elitism against Erbakan Hoca's populism. Having made a quotation from one of Fethullah Hoca's speeches to the journalists saying that "before trying to change the state, you will be asked whether yo have a sufficient preparation to substitute a new one for it. Otherwise it wolud be replaced by chaos that could be never preferred to any kind of state" (From *Sabah Gazetesi,* 26 January, 1995).

As was mentioned before this preference has underlying references in the traditional attitudes of the ulema towards the preference between justice and stability. In the line of the search for body politic, the necessity felt for a state organization in order to apply the Islamic rules, to make an Islamic existence possible, to render the Islamic practices relevant, no doubt, Fethullah Hoca's as well as most of the Nurcu communities' approaches represent a radical difference. Although they have a long term target of attaining the political apparatus, in the period of transition they overcome the everyday problem of religious embodiment. Having tied only 1 % of the Islamic practices as conditioned by the existence of an Islamic state they become very comfortably to accommodate with the existing governments. The only condition hat would made their overall practices relevant would be the toleration of he state towards their educational activities that are in search of an elite society. Then it should be asked what might have been the loose of a government in tolerating such activities? There are advantages on the contrary, I think. For, having considered the notion of the state as the appropriation of all potentials of the country, it would be seen that, activities such as Fethullah Hoca's are facilitating various governmental programmes of education and financing. Especially the organizations and general efforts of the community outside the country throughout all of the Central Asian Republics is a helping hand for the Turkish state. They open the horizons of a state which should be reminded that it is the heir of an Empire.

It can be thought that all these efforts are incorporated and defined just roles to be played into a larger programme of the state. As a matter of fact,

Cengiz Çandar reports that, just before his death, Turgut Özal had said to him about the communities going to the Central Asian countries "they are our vanguard/pioneer forces of conquest". Such definition of the community has resolved the problem of its legitimation and incorporated or articulated it into the body of the existing politic. Then the most important part of the nurcu movement which had separated itself from the major body blaming them to be deviating from the authentic line of Said Nursi, now has become to be identified with (an) organ(s) of the existing body politic itself.

Of course, a detailed comparison of Fethullah Hoca and Erbakan Hoca in terms of their political and intellectual discourses and strategies would be very useful that I hope I will turn later. But by this short periphrases around the current politics was intended only to show the development of one of the lines attached to Said Nursi. In this respect, onother important point should be noticed that, in the case of its development through the community of Fethullah Hoca, Said Nursi seem to be gradually disappearing and being replaced by the charismatic figure of Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi. In contrast to other sects of the nurcu community the figure of Said Nursi seems relatively of secondary place. Instead, the books and video-tapings of the Hoca are more important in lecturing the clients. Although there is not any obvious action against Said Nursi, some steps are to be interpreted in this way. One of these steps is the opening of the educational schedule to other intellectual sources such as the books of the Arabic Islamists, namely Sayyid Qutb, Mohammed Qutb, Hasan Al-Bannah, Mawdudi etc. Another step is the motto employed in the campaign of selling the newspaper *Zaman* with a promotion of the Exegesis by Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır. As I mentioned above this Exegesis was introduced during the campaign as "The Exegesis of the Century: *Hak Dini Kur'an Dili"*. What is important here is that, hitherto, neither any nurcu would give a compromise from the acceptance that not any other but *"Risale-i Nûr"* of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi is the exegesis of the century."

In all this story of the line I tried to illustrate the development of Said Nursi in such a way as being appropriated in the secular regime of the Republic. This has, of course, occurred during a process within which the Republican regime, too, had to reconstitute its own definitions. But all this is to mention the radically different line developed during the same process. That line, proliferated again in itself, has produced another portrait of Said Nursi, and today blamed the rest of the Nurcu movements, including the

Fethullahçı and the Nesilci ones, for deviating from the true path of Said Nursi.

A More Radical Reading of Said Nursi

Above all there is a radical reading of Said Nursi, which doesn't attach itself to his clientship but accept him as belonging to the same tradition of the political Islamism which entails not to appropriate the existing body politic. The so called radical Islamist journal, *Girişim*, (1987) for example had entered into a polemic with the nurcus blaming them for distorting the authenticity of Said Nursi. For *Girişim,* Said Nursi has never compromised with the Republican policies. He was an indisputable opponent of the existing state. As it seems in the general discourse of the journal, the basic criteron for evaluating a man is his locating himself in terms of the state and people dichotomy. For, the state is thought to has been constructed against the popular will. Having been influenced deeply by some contemporary Islamist thinkers such as Ali Şeriati, for the writers of *Girişim* the "God" and the "People" were interchangeable in discourse. In an ideal Islamic society the political apparatus is the manifestation of the Divine will which is mediated by the popular will.

In their polemic with the nurcus, the writers of *Girişim* tried to show that some anti-Republicanist statements have been discarded from the authentic texts, in order to produce an apolitical, conservative and legal/official figure of Bediüzzaman. On the contrary, *Girişim* tried to prove the "anarchist", "revolutionist", "uncompromising" figure of him. The indicator of his "Anarchism", for *Girişim* is immediately Said Nursi's style of life; his clothing, his seclusion, his fearless statements against various statesmen. In fact, in their attempt to prove a radically different portrait of Said Nursi, it would be hard to say *Girişim* has been succesful. The data, the journal has brought have not gone beyond some differences mostly resulted from operations of redaction. Very few points could be accepted in behalf of their claims, which couldn't be expected to put forward a radically different portrait.

Ajzmendy Language of the Body

Furthermore there are other branches whose clients attaches themselves to Said Nursi and who rely on his quite different portraits. He is, for example, a Sheikh of an order for the Ajzmendis who have been appearing in the Turkish mass mediatic scene through their appearance by long hair and beards, black turban and, again, black or dark robe, all completed with long and thick sceptres. This wearing of an Ajzmendy is almost his inseparable part which, altogether represent a reaction against camouflaging himself through *taqıyye* strategies. In one of the series of speeches in the televisions, their leader Müslüm Gündüz declared that they wanted to follow the path referred by Said Nursi without any kind of interpretation that might create a deviating effect. For Gündüz, there was very obvious references in Bediüzzaman's teachings, either in his writings or in verbally transmitted tradition, to renouncing secularism radically. The Ajzmendis see their bodies as completely the site of struggle of powers. A believer in God, by his free will, naturally takes his place on the side of the God in this struggle and declares God's absolute domination on his body through a strictly disciplined strategies of embodiment. Apart from the appearance of the body, an Ajzmendy has an intensive programme for regulating his body through some worshipping activities such as praying more than the compulsory five times a day, contemplative mediation, state of ecstasies etc. The day of an Ajzmendy is almost filled with such activities. The body, as it seems here, becomes completely a metaphor; a metaphor of obeying the God or the enemies of the God. Any bodily activity would, thus, have a metaphorical meaning signifying the relationships with the God Himself, notwithstanding the religious and the political intermingle with each other. Therefore the bodily regulations as the manifestations of the religious will, also have mostly intensive political references. They are burdened with a challenge to the regime which was accomplished by the domination on the body. The Ajzmendis have affirmed the Kemalist sensitivity towards the body and accepted the struggle on this site. Although at political level they feel themselves deprived of body (politic), they ensure, at least, the existence of their individual bodies which would be the beginning of the political embodiment.

As a reaction against the other nurcu groups, especially the Ajzmendis, by their discourses and their practices, declare that the camouflage which is

applied by the other branches and which relies on postponing the Islamic practices renders its agent subordinating to the powers determining such kind of embodiment. For, every kind of embodiment is, by its nature, a metaphor of domination of a power. The clothing, the practices and the belief are inseparable. One necessarily thinks as he acts, wears, eats, drinks, etc. Indeed the Ajzmendis here appeal and mobilise some traditional notions of Islamic mysticism which has insisted on the mutually determinist relationships between idea and practice, spirit and body, belief and action. As a matter of fact the eternal dichotomy of form and essence has never gained a considerable relevance except in the modern times. The form has mostly been accepted as the inseparable part of the essence which has no chance of occurring except through the form, that might be seen as the structured structure of the cosmology of the believer, *habitus* of Bourdieu. Even the historical trinity of *Shariah, tariqah* and *haqiqah*, which was mostly employed by the Islamist suphis hasn't given up the insistence on form, that is *shariah* whose boundaries are determined in detail by the Traditions of the Prophet.

The Ajzmendis, however, remind one asking whether the inseparability of the form includes wearing and acting in such a way. Actually, people might have been enforced to leave the clothing they were advised by their religious authorities to wear, and therefore habituated to see their actual embodiment in a normal way. But really, does an engagement to an alternative imagination of a community, that is an ummah or a city of God, require to take off his clothes one has hitherto been wearing? The Ajzmendis' answer is "yes". Because, their view of authenticity requires a complete imitation of the Prophet. Their clothing, thus, is modelled by the Prophet, that is sunnah. As an ideal, "living in accordance with the sunnah" is realised through such declaration of his own body as an exclusive means of the manifestation of the absolute divine will.

In fact, in doing so, the Ajzmendis are not the unique examples to illustrate a trend in Islamic societies which requires a certain form of embodiment for the realization of an authentic Islamic life. Even today many orders, such as the İsmailağa Dergahı or Mahmud Hoca Cemaati, too, represent this trend, albeit their suggestions for the form of embodiment differ. Through a study of any one of these orders one can illustrate this trend from various respects. The underlying idea of those insistence upon the external appearance, upon the bodily practices, is burdened with an

accusation of the employment of interpretation itself by the rest of the Muslims. Especially, in the case of the Ajzmendis, what is being condemned is the interpretative activity itself, in favour of the accommodated reality which necessarily is determined and marked by power relations. The accusation of the Ajzmendis for the rest of the nurcus is twofold. They think that the nurcus distort the meaning of the early texts, that is the Qur'an and the Sunnah on the one hand, in accommodative reaction, and the texts written by and experienced by Said Nursi himself on the other hand, in fear of the existing political authority. By so doing they, appeal to and revitalise, in fact one of the early trends in Islamic history, which had condemned every kind of interpretative activity toward the religious texts, such as the Harijism, Hanbelism, or Salafism. The accusation of the rest of the Muslims for escaping from the difficulty of Islamic life, however, has to do much with the role of interpretation in the process of producing appropriate responses to the changing reality. For this traditional trend the interpretation as such is a distortion of authenticity in action. Therefore, the resistance to wearing in accordance with Islamic texts, or wittingly or unwittingly accepting the penetration of other styles into his body allows no way out except sinfulness before the believer. The attempts to legitimise those actions are to be rejected for refraining from the obedience to the ruling power, which holds the apparatus of enforcement of allocation of goods etc.

The Ajzmendy language of the body includes the rejection of employing metaphor that would conceal the reality which is seen with naked eyes. Although mass mediatically it is located into or subjected to the general flow of globalisation which renders any radical movement a reproductive motivation for itself, this language speaks from a point where the truth claim is exclusively central, that is more akin to a modern conception. In addition, this language incorporate the male population of contemporary Islamism into the struggle of embodiment which has hitherto been carried by the türban of the Islamist women. So that, all resistance of Islamısm against Westernization has been understood as a natural patriarchal reaction to dissolve the intimacy and to allow women get out her intimate sphere, which in turn, was feared of destroying the society. This is a widespread identification that reduced all reactions, of the Islamists to the westernization/modernization process at civil level, to their immanent patriarchal sensitivity. For example, conceptualising the türban struggle of

the Islamist women at the universities with the resistance between what is "modern", that is the public sphere and what is "intimate", that is the private sphere, Nilüfer Göle illustrated this kind of reductionism. For Göle, the Islamists as well as the Westernists thought that the permanence of an established power depended almost solely on the appropriate regulation of woman body.

> Just as the for the Westernists women's opening their veil and going outside their homes is the precondition of "civilisation", women's clothing and acting in accordance with Islamic ethic is the guarantee of saving the "social" life, the traditions. For both, how to define the sexual identity and social position of the woman was essential . This political struggle which was shaped on the woman problem, was showing that the everlasting difference between the Western Civilisation and Eastern Islam stems from the social modes of organizations and differentitations between the sexes. The boundaries of the inside/outside, intimate/nonintimate spheres were being drawn on the woman body, by the invisibility of the woman. The place of woman between the intimate and nonintimate circles was determining the trajectory on which the society would run" (Göle, 1991: 32-33).

This depicts the place of woman body during the formation of Islamism as an ideology against the challenge of modernity, including the Kemalist branch. Analysing the actual movement of Türban, Göle argues that the struggle runs with the same language. She claims that the veiling of woman is the symbol of Islamist movements, and this refers to the involution of the political ideology and the power relation between the sexes. Women, by veiling, on the one hand, performs a propaganda against the Western modernity, but, on the other hand, she also makes an affirmation of patriarchal sovereignty over her body, through being imprisoned into invisibility of herself and intimate spheres (Göle, 1991: 135).

In he case of the Ajzmendis or some other groups, however, we see the male body, too, at the focus of the same politic. It may represent a development towards the equality of man and woman in his respect. The clothing of the male clients may make reference to the transcendence of the body as a metaphor of the gender power relations, and may also be useful in deconstructing such formulations linking and reducing the political ideology with a patriarchal power relations.

So far, I tried to describe Said Nursi's portrait departing from the proliferation of his readings. By so doing I wanted to illustrate the

occurrence of different claims for authenticity regarding the same texts. - Furthermore neither one of these readings relies on the claim of the right to stand in its own position. Neither one rely on the debate of legitimating the proliferation of readings. Each one claims an exclusive form of truth. The implications of the claims of authenticity will be discussed in the chapter on the "Religious Discourse of Authenticity and Modernity" later. So, I will be contented here with mentioning a few aspects of this proliferation. Above all, I think, it can be said that, Said Nursi himself, through his continuous revolving between the "old" and "new" "Saids", has brought about and allowed such a proliferation. The "old Said" is an anarchist, impulsive exited and agitative one, while the "new Said" is described with maturity, moderation, conservative and rationality attributes. Although his ultimate preference has been in behalf of the "new" one, he sometimes has not refrained from appealing to the "old" one. Those two alternatives has characterised somehow the origin of a duality between the Nurcus: The Old or the New Said? Those who were involved into political life and appropriated conservatist, rightist and liberalist (?) values (such as the Fethullahçı and the Nesilci groups) have relied on the New one, while the radical groups (such as the Ajzmendy and Tenvir groups of the nurcus) and radical readings (such as that of the *Girişim)* have had an appeal mostly to the "old" one. The appeal to the old Said also included liberating the Kurd and Tariqah leadership aspects of Said Nursi which are thought to be concealed by the rest.

Said Nursi's incorporation in this illustrative analysis of the early generation of the post-caliphate condition Turkish Islamism, thus, gains its significance in this respect. Just as his fellows mentioned above, he existed throughout the tensious condition of the relationships between text, body and politic. He, too, conceived of the political body as the condition of his (or the Muslim's) individual embodiment. The absence of a political body or the infection of it by outside-enfoced elements made his public actions completely irrelevant. Therefore, he couldn't found any way except the seclusion. Now, he is considered a strong source of inspiration by large masses in Turkey, in determining their political identity as well as their everyday actions. As I tried to show, this inspiration has a serious problem of authenticity, which creates a relatively heterogeneous socialisation of the readings. But as a name, as a figure and as a symbolic practices a relatively common structures seems to have been structured to structure the meaning

world of people, as *habitus* have done. The relevant point in his seclusion is the mood generated during this period and transmitted through various stages (even transformations) to our times. This mood has been referred from the beginning, to a connotation of the Jewish diaspora, which I think has profound influences on the social and political action. The most important influence of diaspora, for example, is *taqiyye* which at best can be described by Habermasean terms as the distortion of communication. Democratisation, however, to some extent, by removing the oppressions on talking and acting made nurcus talk with their own languages, then, the texts become, at least politically, emancipated and its various readings become possible. although the sense of diaspora stems from being deprived of organs (political body), rather than the absence of liberal rights, the democratisation makes at least the clear pronunciation of this diaspora possible.

Added to this actual proliferation of the portrait of Said Nursi, is the academicians' such as Şerif Mardin's approach analysing him from various aspects. An important implication of Mardin's study is that Said Nursi is perhaps the best allied of the Turkish modernization, if not Kemalism, is in fact Said Nursi himself and his teachings and students. Because they altogether provide the religious (Weberean) impulse for attaining technology, science as well as economical entrepreneurship. They also provide the conditions for a large institutionalisation of charity which a modern capitalist society requires. For much of Mardin's conclusions his observations on Said Nursi's good combination of the orthodoxy, mysticism and folk Islamic elements with the modern values such as science, rationalism, technology etc. play a significant role (Mardin, 1989).

Since the proliferation of this portrait arrived at a point more important than what Said Nursi really is, consequently I found it more useful to begin with an analysis of the current visions of Said Nursi through various readings, then to go to him again to take some of his views about the issues in question here. Especially his view on the restoration of *ijtihad* institution which was characteristic of his fellows mentioned above is worth to mention here.

Said Nursi's Approach to Ijtihad: Opening the Windows to the Storm?

Like many of his contemporary Islamists, Said Nursi, too, thought about the restoration of the *ijtihad* institution conditionally. On the contrary to the view that had been prevalent among the *ulema*, Said Nursi thought that the gate of *ijtihad* was open. But in turn this openness was theoretical. Because, according to him, there were six obstacles to enter from the gates into this sphere:

1. Just as the small gaps are filled in Winters when the storms are taking place violently, and as opening new gates before the storms is not very rational, and as in an attack of a huge torrent, making some holes in order to repair the boat is equal to sinking, at this time of ignorance of the proliferation of the negative innovations *(bidah)* of the distortion by several deviances under the occupations of foreign customs it would be a crime against Islam to make holes under the name of *ijtihad* on the walls of the house of Islam and thereby to be a means for the flow of distorting effects (Said Nursi, 1994: 212).

This metaphorical argumentation was quite new in the explanations of the resistance against the interpretation. Said Nursi employs the metaphor of "house" before the "storm" instead of, for example, a "body" under "infection". The storm is modernity and the political authority. Especially if the house has not a settling population, or household, such an operation in the Islamic jurisprudence would be completely irrelevant. In the case of the Republic, as a matter of fact, the household have been deprived of their houses. Then any operation on the imagined house would be of double irrelevance for Said Nursi. Indeed, this attitude is not unique to Said Nursi. As I tried to show in the former three Islamists, in almost all of these names there can be a rupture in emphasising the restoration of *ijtihad* before and after the caliphate.

2- The indispensabilities of the religion are clear cut things and the *ijtihad* is not involved into them. Now that the very foundations of the religion are under attack, and the essential necessity is to defend the basic principles, being occupied with some details as *ijtihad* is not rational and, indeed, is treason.

3- The development of urbanisation of the division of labor, of the proliferation in occupations with worldly affairs and with hedonism, and consequently the development of specialism has brought about a mental

break into overall human-being. This is a hard time to find a convenient way for *ijtihad* which necessarily requires a holistic insight (Said Nursi, 1994: 212-213).

4- In every body there is a trend towards extension. This trend is a n accomplishment because it stems from inside of the body. But if this trend to extension occurs from outside toward the body it becomes to tear the skin, to distort its nature, it would not be an extension. Then, if there is a trend to extension and a will to *ijtihad* which is involved through the gate of excellent fear of God and of the representation of religious necessities such as the Right Predecessors *(Selef-i Sâlihîn),* then it is an accomplishment, a perfection. Otherwise, the trend of extension and the will to *ijtihad* which comes from those who abandone the religious indispensabilities and prefer the worldly life to the other-worldly life and become inclined to materialist philosophy, wouldn't it be but a means of distorting the Islamic body and of deserting the believers' the chain of commitment to the *Shariah* (Said Nursi, 1994: 213).

5- Some point of views render the *ijtihad* temporary and invalidates its divine character. However, the Shariah is a divine fact; and even the *ijtihad*s which are performed in accordance with the Shariah are pertinent to the divine beings, for they reveal the concealed judgements of the divine.

6- The last reason for the invalidation of a restoration attempt for the *ijtihad*, in Said Nursi, seems to be his sensitivity against a rapid change, the proliferation of the market of truth, or in other words, of the subordination of the truth of Islam to the market conditions which is increasingly determined by a consumer culture. For Said Nursi, the distinction between falsehood and truth has been blurred in our time, so that they have come shoulder to shoulder. The transmission to blundering from the rightness is very easy. Even a lie can be preferred, owing to political propaganda, to the truth. Thus, if every best thing is sold in the same shop with the same price of the truth, of course, the brilliance of the rightness and truth would not be bought relying on the words and knowledge of the shopkeeper.

According to Said Nursi the holy laws may change from time to time. It is a fact that there have come different laws and prophets to different societies, even in the same period. But because the Great Law of the God has encompassed all periods and societies after the last prophet, there remained no requirement for new laws. Notwithstanding, there is still a requirement for diversity of sects in the particulars of the religious practices.

Said Nursi thinks of the emergence and permanence of the sects in terms of the necessity of changing the dresses by the changes in seasons, and using different medicine for different illnesses. Likewise the laws differ depending on the centuries, and on the aptitudes of nations. For, the details of the holy law look upon he human conditions; are revealed in accordance with them, and become medicine for them. Said Nursi follows a dialogical way of speaking and assumes one asking:

If you ask how can such proliferation of the truth between four or twelve sects' be righteous and how all caontents of their differentiated jurisprudences may be true, given the principle that the Truth must be single:

My answer would be as follows: It is just about the water taking five different marks (or functions) in accordance with five ills of different illnesses: For the first one water is medicine because of his illness; so, for him water is medically a task *(vacip)*. For the next, water is very harmful as a poison; then for him it is medically forbidden *(haram)*. For a third individual it is a little harmful; then it is medically abominable *(mekruh)* for him. To a fourth, water may have only a utility without any damage; then it would be a tradition *(sünnet)* for him. For the last one it gives neither damage nor utility; then, let him drink it with a good appetite, it is unreserved for him *(mubah)*. Actually you can say all these five positions are true. But, can you say "water is not but a medicine or a compulsory thing"?

Similarly the holy rules *(ahkâm-ı Şer'iyye)* may differ in accordance with the obedients of different sects with divine wisdom. Furthermore they change as truth, each one becomes truth and a *maslaha*" (Said Nursi, 1994: 215).

Thus, we see the aesthetic interpretation of jurisprudence by Said Nursi, in order to provide a conservative framework, at least during the period all Islamist thought to be a transitory one. What is important, in the study of Said Nursi, here, is his definition of a state of being where the juridical interpretations have to be postponed. I noticed this sensitivity in all Islamists of this time as a sense of diaspora that meant either a going away from the public life or improving a language for the distorted communication. The legacy remained to the second and next generations would be a distance between the public life and the community or private life. This problem is to be treated also in terms of the problem of social or political legitimacy inasmuch as the populations constructing their political

self-identity in reference to those figures is on increase. At least since the late sixties and early seventies the so called Islamist Revivalism through some community or party organizations as the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi), National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi), Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and the Fethullahçı or Nesilci groups, should and can be treated in terms of the history of this antagonism. In this relatively long chapter I tried to show the short-term origins, that is in the formation period of the post-caliphatism, of the existing so called Islamic revivalism which is thought to be the source of a tension in the religious legitimacy, or health, of the existing political body. I identified the early years of the Republic as well as the abolition of the caliphate as the formation period of post-caliphatism which has brought about some common sensitivities on the Islamists whom I tried to illustrate by four famous figures. The selection of those figures have not been randomly, but relying on the fact that they left behind a theoretical, imaginary or symbolic legacies for the present Islamist generations, if the present state of affairs are taken into consideration. Really, today a considerable amount of Islamist population have a significant symbolic capital, in Bourdieuean sense, whose traces could be followed back to this formation period. For my aim primarily is to give a good analysis of the present situation, my appeal to or my construction of such formation period is to be explained by a case of historiography, which always follows the present conditions.

The Emancipation of Body: With or without Organs?

I tried to conceptualise the responses of these early figures in terms of the body political metaphors. And I tried to pave the way for a question whether being without organs or without body (here the two phrasings were used in the same meaning) is an emancipatory factor or not.

We are inspired by Artoud and by some other poststructuralist thinkers that the organs are attached to the body by culture, which constrain the emancipation of the agent. We have seen that some of those thinkers such us Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari haven't left behind any way for escaping from these constraining organs. Whoever is born and grown in a society, whoever learns a language and whoever begins to listen or to talk, begins also to be subordinated to the process of embodiment which attaches

organs to his/her body. To say that "human freedom and autonomy could only be achieved once man had been given a body without organs", in fact, implies the declaration of the nihiliation of emancipation. We tried to show in the chapter III that Nietzsche, who is in fact the founder of the tradition all these names belong to, has had a radical formulation rendering the emancipation of body possible. For Nietzsche the body is filled with a will to power which made itself a resistance space against the definitive powers of texts, religions, political authorities, traditions, customs and all other centres of attacks on body. Then, probably the body might have been seen as a construction of the culture, in parallel with the successors of this tradition, but I don't think that its emancipation would be conditioned by the "discharging of organs" in Nietzsche. For, he has seen the body as a site of resistance against all kind of constraining powers. Such resistance might have been possible through using or (re)producing the organs.

The metaphor of "body without organs" in this chapter, however, is applied to characterise the situation of the Islamists in the post-caliphate period and to attempt to conceptualise their own definitions of their political positions or self-identities. It appeared that the absence of a political will in the personality of the caliphate has created a sense of being deprived of a body in the believers of the religion, and that apart from having an emancipotary aspect, such a sense has verified the very fact that being without organs is not but a constraining effect. In other words the political Islamists have very clearly realised that no matter how they might have been attached to the body, the organs are not constraining, but emancipating means for the body.

Here we open the gate before another crucial question. If Artoud is somehow right in his diagnosis that the organs are attached by cultures or ideologies, then, can it be applied to the case of the political or cultural body of Islam in general? That is, is not the fact that the Islamic tradition had been filled with the residues of historical processes, with some magic and inauthentic elements? As it is obvious, these questions imply that the Islamic body, social or political, has been associated with some organs which originally were not of this body. For instance the Sultan is not an Islamic figure, while the caliphate has no other function than surviving or legitimating the authority of the Sultan. Furthermore the distinction between the religious authority and the political authority which had been running throughout the history of the caliphate was not a distinction derived from

the Prophetic or Raşid Caliphatic model. These are the politically additional organs to the authentic Islamic body. There remained the cultural ones so that the Islamic tradition has been marked by a constellation works in itself between folk, superstitious, peripheral, heterodox etc. and high elements as scripturalism, rationalism, etc. (Gellner, 1981). What has created such a tension in Islam is the strong scripturally based indispensabilities of the religion which renounce new developments as novelties *(bid'ah)*. The long period of practices has attached to the Islamic social and cultural life various stranger elements which has constituted a very important place in the reformist discourses of the early Islamism. As I tried to illustrate above, Mehmed Akif, Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır and İskilipli Atıf Hoca altogether had insisted on the distortion of the authentic Islamic existence through the incorporation of various additional beliefs and practices all of which have attached their corresponding organs to the Islamic body. These were to be considered as infections on a healthy body, which would pave the way for its paralysis or death.

    Indeed, to a certain extent, it can be said that it was because of this emphasis on the calling for authenticity or demythologisation of the religion by the Islamists that made the radical secularist reformations by the Republic easier. As a matter of fact, now we are appealing to the famous paradox in the relationships of Protestantism and secularisation. That is, on the one hand, the Protestantism is in claim of being a calling for returning to the roots of religion, and on the one hand, it has been considered to be the most important component of the process of modernization. Having been applied to the case of the Islamic reformation, there can be and is found similar relationships. The Islamic reformers have always been blamed for bringing about modernization consequently, because of their emphasis on reason, scripture, voluntarism and individual responsibility, which altogether constituted the basic elements of modernity (Geertz, 1968; Abaza & Stauth, 1990). Undoubtedly to suffice with emphasising only this possible conclusion of any attempt of reformation would mislead one in understanding the true nature of Protestantism or Reformation (in terms of scripturalism or fundamentalism). Because, just as Protestant Reformation could be regarded as not only one source of modernization, but also a defence against magic, superstition, witchcraft or mysticism (Turner, 1991: xvii), the Islamic movements towards fundamentalism or scripturalism had

not only modernising conclusions. They also tend to purify the religion from some magical, mystical and superstitious residues.

Ernest Gellner's approach to Muslim society which is characterised by the binary opposition working in Muslim society between the high and low elements of Islam might be a good occasion for an illustration of this paradox in question, albeit Gellner's binarism is charged with essentialism. For Gellner there can be seen a Great Tradition in Muslim society versus the folk one. This major opposition was being manifested between the orthodox centre and deviant error, knowledge and ignorance, political order and anarchy, civilisation and barbarism, town and tribe, where the former elements of this pairs represented the Great Tradition of high Islam while the latters represented the folk one. An important conclusion of Gellner's analysis is that Islam, and it alone, will survive, among some other world religions, in spite of the distorting impacts of modernization and without giving up of its essential features. That is to mean that Islam, and only Islam, is compatible with modernization by its very nature. But for Gellner this compatibility is conditioned by the accomplishment of the struggle essential to the Muslim society between the high and low Islams, in favour of the former. This may imply that, the modernization process, is already oriented to select such features in Islam. It allows only some scriptural, somehow ideological-labelled, orthodox and civil dimensions to live. Following Gellner, hence, one is inclined to appreciate that the mystical, heterodox and peripheral elements in Islam would have disappeared. For, the disenchantment of the world, as an inevitable consequence of modernization, would not allow such mythological elements to live. Thus there may be identified a convergence between the ideals of the Islamists and the reformation programme of the Turkish Republic. Now, can this situation be translated into the question of whether the disembodiment would be emancipating or not?

Similarly, another important case of the residual tradition, as was mentioned above, was the political structure itself which had been shaped throughout the history. It had been argued that discerning the essential elements of this political structure became almost impossible. As a matter of fact, when Mustafa Kemal decided to abolish the caliphate, he appealed to and was supported by various religious discourses of some Islamists. While abolishing the caliphate he didn't make it in such a way as to declare struggle whith religious political embodiment. Probably for legitimating

concerns, but he argued that the caliphate is invalid in representing the embodiment of Islamic political will. Thus he relied on a claim of more authentic reference for the style of Islamic political embodiment. For Mustafa Kemal caliphate as an institution, itself, was an historical phenomenon and was confused with the indispensabilities of the religion. Indeed, the caliphate had not been transferred from the Egyptians by Yavuz Selim who conquered during his conquering Egypt, but he had actually put an end to it. That is why, for Mustafa Kemal, the Sultans of the Ottoman had not attributed the name of caliph to themselves until Abddülhamid the Second, who applied it for his pan-Islamist policies. The abolishment of the caliphate was also justified by appealing to the discourse of 'misuse of it by some dividing movements" (Öke, 1991: 105-119: Dumont, 1994: 1115-119). During the negotiations in the Great Assembly, very violent discussions have occurred. In one of the sessions, the İzmir delegate Sayyid Bey, an Instructor of the faculty of law at the Darül-Fünûn, had a quite long speech on the status of the caliphate according to the *Shariah*. Seyyid's speech was highly filled with rich references from Islamic history. His all proofs were organised very authoritatively to demonstrate the dispensability, even the heedlessness of the caliphate for any Islamic life. According to him, the caliphate was neither a religious compulsion imposed by the God or his Prophets' nor an indispensable institution in terms of the realization of Islamic ideals. Drawing attention to the contingent aspect in the formation of early Islamic politics, that is to the empirical cases of the selections of the first four caliphs, he concluded that there was no any compulsory principle to be binded in the Islamic political theory. The first four caliphs, as it is known, were chosen in different ways: The first one, Ebu Bakir was proposed by Ömer and acknowledged (bey'ah) primarily by the present part and later by the whole part of the ummah; the second, Omar, was appointed by the first caliph and acknowledged by the umma; the third, Osman, was selected by a commission composed of seven important figures, appointed by the second caliph, with the directorship of one of them, Abdurrahman B. Avf who made a questionnaire among all parts of people, including women and children, to ask their votes between Ali and Osman; the fourth, Ali, was chosen through an offering of a group and again with an acknowledgement, but without an unproblematic consensus of the ummah as a whole. From the fifth caliph onwards, the nature of the caliphate has already completely transformed into a

patrimonial domination. For Seyyid Bey and for Mustafa Kemal, all these examples have shown one thing that the caliphate had not got a religious, but a political aspect that was bound by its historical conditions. It had lost its historical functions so that it become invalidated in terms of overcoming the conditions of the new international relationships.

Indeed, all these ideas were being uttered among the Islamists as part of the discussion of reformation of Islam and purifying it from the traditional and historical residues of superstitious, magical and additional *(bid'ah)* elements. For example, the famous Egyptian scholar Ali Abd al-Razıq, whose book was translated into Turkish by Ömer Rıza Doğrul (1927) and whose ideas seems to have influenced the framework through which the Republic ideology tried to legitimate itself, argued that Islam has not to do with the state, and hence cannot legitimise any form of government. Since government is a matter of reason or human presence and not revelation, any form of government can only be based on a natural ground. Abd al-Razıq argues that:

> It is reasonable for the whole world to have one religion, and for all of humanity to be organised in a religious unity, but for all of the world to be held by a single government and to be organised under a composite political unit, that would almost exceed human nature and would not accord with the will of God. That sort of thing is an earthly goal which Allah has left to our reason. He has left humanity free to order their affairs according to whatever their reason and knowledge and interest and wishes and inclinations direct. The judgement of Allah is that mankind should remain diverse (Abd Al-Razıq, 1994: 109-111; English translation by Binder, 1987: 142-143).

Thus Abd Al-Raziq believed that all of the Muslims had not to be joined in a single polity. The campaign to restore the caliphate did not necessarily entail the political unification of the Muslim countries, but it was related in an ideological sense, at least, to the declining pan-Islamic movement. For, Abd Al-Raziq is insisting that Islam is not the legitimate basis of the state. The state can only have rational and natural grounds.

Indeed, by all his critical analyses on the restoration of the caliphate Abd Al-Raziq was in quest for purifying Islam from some traditional elements of distortion. As for the initial parallelism between the Islamist discourse on the purification of Islam, to be a true Muslim and the modernist discourse to get rid of religious obstacles in the way of

modernization, the ruling question should be asked again: what was the Islamic body for them and what did it mean to restore or the medicine the Islamic body politic? This question would be translated into the language of the primary question whether the emancipation of the Islamic embodiment would be with or without the existing body politic and whether the parallelism in question might have been considered as an opportunity to get rid of a body which had been appropriated (of course in unislamic ways) through history, which had no authentic references in Islamic theology. Once the caliphate has been distorted together with the public sphere which took its own volume from this ill body, one becomes inclined to think that the Islamist political identity would accommodate the developments without any serious resistance. However, we witnessed an interesting course of formations of different attitudes. As I tried to show this led the Islamists of the time to a famous paradox which I've chosen to call and locate it "between modernism and superstition defendership" (Aktay, 1993: 49 ff.). This defendership was chosen in order not to leave an opportunity to the secularists and in any way not to be appearing in parallel with them. Because as I tried to illustrate it with the case of Mehmed Akif's attitude towards the order to translate the Qur'an into Turkish; and with the cases of the four, early generation Islamists of the post-caliphate period regarding the *ijtihad*, the existence of the Republic has brought about a distortion of the manifestation of the normal attitudes of the Islamists. Here I'm aware of the difficulty (or the impossibility) of deciding which action or which attitude is undistorted. But my point of departure is not a transcendental reference, but the shifting that, I assume, has occurred between the caliphate and postcaliphate period. I tried to illustrate it with the above examples of the Islamist figures, that, while all were positive towards any attempt to restore the Ijtihad gate, just with the abolition of the caliphate and the establishment a Republic of a secularisation programme, they all seem either to have changed their attitudes or to have left the issue in silence.

Consequently we see the Islamic political disembodiment as a turning point in the emergence and formation of a political action of its own kind. In this chapter I tried to outline the origins of such special kind of action to make the present action of the Islamists understood. To summarise it, one can say: 1- In this attempt to draw an historiography for Islamism, one can very easily identify a period which is characterised as a post-caliphate one. 2- The political identity and thereby the political participation which occurs

through bodily actions and gestures have been immediately influenced by the very characters of this post-caliphatism. 3- The post-caliphatism refers to a series of political programmes for decaliphatising the Muslim society; but this has created statu quo onto which the Islamic theology of caliphatism could also be questioned. 4- Thereby the way of Islamic embodiment at individual or socio-political level has become a serious problematic. 5- One of the manifestations of this problem has been occurring through a sense of diaspora which has given to the daily/social/political action its volume. The concrete result of this is an essential distortion of communication, in Habermasean terms, which divides across the social relationships. For, the sense of diaspora which is created by the actual conclusions of the social and political disembodiment renders the real existence irrelevant or impossible. The believer whose existence is rendered relevant through being an organ of the religious embodiment become dislocated. Then, the religious encoding of action is translated into the conditions of emptiness or a diaspora where the action is diversed by pragmatizm and emancipating disembodiment, that is seclusion. In this chapter I tried to locate the Ajzmendy into the latter, while almost all the rest into the former. 6- During this post-caliphatic period the political Islamism has reconstructed the definition of the "Other" in quite a different way than the former cases. That is, while until this point the "other" was the European, Christian or Jew, now the "other" is identified with the one who is just the neighbour, the culturally Muslim but politically or ideologically taking part of the disbelievers, namely the secularists.

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND GENERATION OF A DIASPORA

A Diaspora and New Generation of Islamic Intellectuals

In the previous chapter I tried to characterise the formation of the Islamist political identity with the cases of Mehmed Akif Ersoy, İskilipli Atıf Hoca, Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır and Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. The common feature of all these figures was identified in their being pioneers of a specific kind of political self-identification: They all rejected to be articulated with the new constituted body politic and they all felt themselves as organs without body, or as having body without organs. This led them to realise the conditions under which the caliphate is abolished and the secularisation is run as a world of diaspora. They become to formulate these conditions applying the fundamental terms of Islamic dichotomy of the "self" and the "other" to the inner conditions of the country they had been living. As organs without their own body they found themselves lost in an emptiness. The public sphere that normally gives to the body politics its major volume was occupied by the body of the "other." Therefore the "outside" meant not but an attack on one's body. For, the new body politic, as usual, constituted itself through the exercise of power on the individual bodies. The ulema, as illustrated above by the four figures, found no way other than escaping from the country or secluding themselves to their home or of opening their ear to the calling of the prophet and delivering themselves to death. This way would invalidate their own bodies as a site of exercising power by the "Other", or would get their bodies being articulated with the body of the "Other" as organs.

This generation, through their attitudes as seclusion, migration and virtual suicide have caused a reconstitution of self-identity in terms of the nature of the antagonism into which they participated by their attitudes as civil disobedience. This antagonism was not based on economical superstructure, that is on class antagonism, or on ethnic level but on the appropriation and reappropriation of body as a site of exercising power. The

immediate result of this was the occurrence of a tension on the body that was enforced to be articulated into the existing body politic. That tension had found its corresponding embodiment in the body of the Islamists as a condition of diaspora that was associated with the distortion of communication and the transformation of the action as codified through the jurisprudence. A very good illustration of this diaspora can be observed in the changing course of their discourses regarding change, modernity and authenticity. The critical measurement of their attitudes towards this discourse is their discussions on the reformation of the religious institutions in general and on the restoration of ijtihad in particular. While all have had somehow modernist or reformist tendencies toward the issues, they suddenly changed their minds, either denying the requirement for such a restoration or by being silent, from the abolishment of the caliphate forward.

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, one important feature of the typologies was their growing roses and students, that is the new generation. Although mainly Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır was thought to display this typology, it seems that has been a common typology of the ulema, who were declared as illiterate with the issuing of the law of alphabet in 1928. They have lost their language to communicate with people living in the public sphere, then they have tended to grow the generation that would understand them and to transmit their ideals to the next generations. Some of the most important figures of this generation are, namely Eşref Edip, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Nuri Pakdil and Sezai Karakoç, where the former two are indeed, to a certain extent, contemporary with the first generation in age, but regarding their participation in the tradition and political activities in this course, differed with the first one, and rendered them more akin to the second generation. My contention in this chapter is to illustrate this second generation of the post-caliphate period and to characterise a stage in the history of the formation of Islamist self-identity running the same conceptualisation of body (as) politic.

To repeat, the most important theme common to all figures chosen here, is their strong emphasis on their diaspora. Considering all these figures are mostly men of letters, their thematisations of being exiled from their country, altogether function in elaborating a national body which is a modern kind of the "imagined communities in Andersonean sense. This sense of diaspora and the notion of the missed land which is conceptualised here in terms of the disembodiment of a community might be considered in

such an approach as the elements of the constitution of a nationhood. There has been a huge literature turning around such an argument of Anderson, which identify all such thematisations, even those which have taken place as responses to colonialism or to exploitation, as mere attempts to constitute a nationhood. Undoubtedly, even in such responses which are not to be appreciated for being rightful or not, there is a mechanism in work, which organises a collective consciousness for making a political self-identity. This approach is very inclined to see all kinds of self-identities as discursive products, which are conventionally shared illusions, just as the body and its organs are considered as discursive products. While the empirical observations collected to deduce such an hypothesis are empirically strong, I see a full obstruction in such a direction towards standing critical against all kinds of violences. That is, having informed by such argumentations, or even scientific observations, consequently, leads to nihiliation of struggling for any ultimate value in this world. For example, very simply being at the side of the rightful and against any kind of tyranny, looses its al relevances etc. One is tempted to ask here whether an individual of an historical consciousness of the colonial or post-colonial condition would have such a luxury.

In this respect I want to mention briefly a recent edition by Ernesto Laclau, namely *The Making of Political Identities,* (1994) in which several examples of making self-identities are considered using such an approach. For example in her article, Anna Marie Smith considers the "Rastafari" the black discourse of resistance, "As Resistance" but in terms of the "Ambiguities of Essentialism in the 'New Social Movements'", of course here, in the Rastafari Movement. Among ten other articles, one which has been written by Gleen Bowman is worth of special interest because it includes some parallelisms with our study. It is just on the discourse of diaspora of the Palestinian Nation, which focuses on the actual exile from the Palestinian lands as well as on the experience felt even at the land itself by those who haven't been exiled actually. Bowman quotes a poem by Mahmoud Darwish, a famous Palestinian poet saying:

> "We travel like Other people
> but we return to nowhere
> ...
> We have a country of words. Speak speak so I

>   can put my road
> on the stone of a stone
> We have a country of words. Speak speak so we
> may know
>   the end of this travel!

From here, Bowman begins to talk on a 'Country of the Words', that is underlined by the notion that all national identity is a discursive production which impels an analyst of nationhood and nationalism to examine the process of articulation through which elements of everyday experience come to connote the presence of a thing which is never actually evidenced in full, that is, the national entity. Bowman's central contention is that, all ideas of community are 'imaginary' constructions in so far as community always exists through the imaging of the group of which one conceives oneself a member:

> Darwish's phrase, 'a country of words', has pertinence not only to Palestinians and others who have suffered from nation theft and can only locate their countries in reminiscences, stories, songs and histories, but also to those who, living within existent communities, take the presence of those entities as given. All communities are. Thus, all communities are 'countries of words' in so far as the rituals of inscribing borders, picturing territories and populations, and thematizing issues salient to those terrains and the communities believed to occupy them occur within discourse. In both oral and literate societies, the community is not a 'thing' in itself but a way of speaking, and thinking, about others who are 'like us'.

Thus in this part of the thesis I want to maintain the descriptive analyses on the rhetorical strategies of the Islamist literature in respect of imagining a community, which is argued to be dominated by a discourse of diaspora. Since I had indicated a starting point for a diasporic experience in the decaliphatisation which was conceived as a disembodiment in the illustrative figures of four persons, I've chosen to consider the next examples as a "second generation of a diaspora".

Eşref Edip: A Stranger in His Own Land

As I mentioned in the previous chapter where Mehmed Akif's experience of a diaspora was narrated, Eşref Edip (1882-1971) was a young fellow of Mehmed Akif and After his leaving Turkey the journal they were jointed

together was closed by the Law of the Order (Takrîr-i Sükûn Kanunu, 1925) until the transition to multiparty system. In 1946 he began to publish the journal *Sebilürreşâd* again. It was issued by Eşref Edip until the February of 1966 and was ended by himself at its 641 st. issue (Düzdağ, 1989: XXXVI-XXXVII). The journal is important because it is the first public manifestation of a political identity emerged with the abolition of the caliphate. It was published to continue the intellectual and political line of the previous editor of the journal from the point he had to leave it. Since democracy was still under serious reservations, the journal initially applied the Islamic terminology of political identification with implicit ways. The "other" for example was being constructed in such a way that it had no serious attributions of political claims but rather of cultural ones. The poems of Mehmed Akif we quoted above to illustrate the mood brought about by the occupation of the enemies during the war of liberation now was being charged with additional implications, which have never been enunciated explicitly, because of the indisputable nature of the revolutions. It is a well-known fact that with the transition to the multiparty regime, a law was issued to preclude criticising Mustafa Kemal and his basic principles, which are made memorised in the schools by children and youth of the universities as constitutive elements of the Republican body politic.

Eşref Edip's *Sebilürreşâd* commenced its second period of publication as deprived of its target masses. The Islamic schools had been closed and the emphasis on religion diminished to its maximum limits. He was, with his few fellows, to be speaking in a desert without hoping to find an addressee. Perhaps that was why the literature of "desert" which connotated also the emergency conditions of the Prophet raised. The best example of this literature was Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's literary study known as *Çöle İnen Nur.* This book was running some parallelism between the desert conditions of the Prophet, who was suffered by several pains and had to migrate from his motherland because of his religious claims. The "desert" metaphor now, was to be employed to refer to the moral conditions of the post-caliphate Turkey, where there had remained no handle to hold. The "desert" can be imagined here as the place where the embodiment which is thought as divine light, perhaps something like a *gheist*, is not present; but just a darkness and chaos is pervading. Then, Edip's Sebilürreşâd was speaking in the desert but with a will to political embodiment, albeit the messages were literally insisting on an apolitical ground. Since the

publication of the journal associated the process of transition to multiparty or democratic regime, it tried to participate in the disputes on the modifications of the system in expectations of either to regain some lost values or to conserve some other values under threat. That attitude which was shared by most of the Islamists of the time was, according to İsmet Özel (1984) the true content of their conservatism, or the reason which brought about labelling the Islamism as "conservatism". That is to say, Islam (ism) is not by nature conservative, but the modernist or the Westernist attacks on the Islamic values or establishments has led the Islamists to buckle down to the remaining ones in order to "conserve" them in the literal meaning.

That would perhaps be the best explanation to characterise the political participation of the Islamism of this time. This kind of participation was, no doubt, determined by the legal constrains on talking or writing freely. In the case of Eşref Edip and *Sebilürreşâd*, for example, we see a very tenuous and refined usage of the language in care of not entering into the prohibited domains. Therefore, the political discourse in the *Sebilürreşâd* is at its final boundaries of the distorted communication. In this respect Eşref Edip's narration of his defence in the Court of Liberation is a very good text to be analysed. It seems very clearly that the discourses through which he had been enforced to express himself in the court, that is the language of a defence, of an apology for the accusation of reactionist or anti-Republicanism has, by time, become the dominant language of his journal. Once the Republican regime has been established and prevailed for three or four decades it is to be taken for granted as an actual reality. The position of the Muslims under this political embodiment which didn't exclude the Muslim's individual body but which occurred as an alternative to the Islamic political embodiment, become very problematic. By keeping silent towards many crucial issues and by employing a distorted language to express their demands from the state, they had become appropriated by the political body as citizens, albeit in many respects opponent ones. In his narration of the Sebilürreşad's novel, in the Courts of Liberation, Eşref Edip reported a dialogue occurred between himself and the chief of the Court. When the chief asked him whether he believed that the religion was in decline during the Republic or that it had found its proper place Edip replied him in such an indirect way that the chief had to be inclined to think Edip was evading

from the question, and repeated his question. Here is a part of the dialogue occurred between them:

> "No any Muslim can deny the magnitude of the national struggle. This jihad of the Anatolia has brought about deep impacts throughout all of the Islamic World. Today all Muslim nations conceive of the national movement of Anatolia as the highest ideal"

> "Please, reply shortly without mediation!"

> "Well, one of the greatest principles of Islam is freedom, not to fall under the occupation of the foreign forces. There can be no delight even in the mosques or the worshipping of the nations under the occupation of the foreigners"

> "Then what do you mean?"

> "Then, above all the liberation of the country from the enemies is the greatest service to the religion performed by the Republic" (Edip, 1960: XIII/308, *Sebilürreşad'ın Romanı,* Sebilürreşad İstiklal Mahkemelerinde: Part 24).

Although the occurrence of this episode is resulted by aneed to be camouflaged against the judging insight of the court, Edip's narration of it in the year 1960, very interestingly, includes some affirmation of his enunciation. That is to refer to the deep influence of the enunciated discourse on the genuine insight of the political agents. The clothes dressed in order to be camouflaged, actually transform the order of the discourse.

Notwithstanding, in *Sebilürreşâd,* we see the constitution of the "self" and "other" in the comments on the westernization process, through the criticisms of the political steps taken forward by this process, and, of the politicians or intellectuals and artists advocating this process. The opposition to the regime is replaced by or is reduced to the opposition to westernization and modernization and to communism which then was the name of atheism. The conservatist attitude taken toward the restoration of the *Ijtihad*, again, might be seen as a spontaneous or unconsciously organised response to the storm. This spontaneity is a traditionalisation of a political measure taken against the intervention of the foreigners to the intimacy of the "home". While it had been just a political attitude, now it has been associated by some sacred elements and conserved with religiously untouchable boundaries. Sebilürreşâd tried to be active in the formation of the government policies on religion, secularism and the human rights. It has advocated the programme of the Democratic Party and tried to draw it to a

more Islamist point. Together with the major part of the Islamism of that time, for example with that of Necip Fazıl, *Sebilürreşad'*s policy of conservatism, as İsmet Özel has characterised, was appropriated by or referring to a power of a political subject. This subject was to be identified with the nation itself, whose implicit cultural property was not but of Islamic hegemony. The so called Islamist will didn't appear to give up so easy from its own political potential imbedded in the popular culture. As a matter of fact the actual acknowledgement of the post-caliphatism has always been associated with a discourse of the wrongedness, which corresponded to a will to power in Nietzschean sense. The common language employed in the journals, where there was no clear essential opposition, was charged with some intensive metaphorical functions. The famous poems by Mehmed Akif, such as Bülbül, Hicran etc. which had been enunciated as a poetical reaction against the occupation of the country were conventionally feeding the sense of diaspora in one's own country. The subject talking in the poem was being identified with the country which was under occupation, and which was worthier of a mourning than the Bülbül which was crying out over time for her separation (diaspora) from the blossoming moment of the rose.

Necip Fazıl Kısakürek: The Poet of Suffering

The association of the attitude toward the ijtihad with sacred elements is the case also in Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, who declared that all reformation attempts were in fact "deviant branches of the right path" (1978). Any attempt to restore the ijtihad institution was to be treated in this way as a conscious participation in the organised treachery to Islam.

Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1905-1983) has been an important respectful figure among a large part of the Islamists. He has published a number of books which mostly elaborated a discourse of wrongedness which focused on the formation period of post-caliphatism, in other words, on the fate of the ulema, of the religiousmen during the formation of the Republic. He has initially been famed as a poet with his poetry books such as *Örümcek Ağı* (1925), *Kaldırımlar* (1928), *Ben ve Ötesi* (1932), which had got no religious or political implications. In those times he also has accomplisehd numerous theatrical and literary publications of relatively secular content. Necip Fazıl

had a turning point or a second birth in his life. He was advocated in the mid-thirties with a Naqshibendi Sheikh Abdülhakim Arvasi and was religious-politicised from this point forward. He began to publish the journal Büyük Doğu in 1943, which initially was of a scientific, thinking, literary content, and then acquired a religious-political content. His political-historical studies included *Müdafaa* (1946), *Maskenizi Yırtıyorum* (1953), *Her Cephesiyle Komünizma* (1961), *İman ve Aksiyon* (1964), *Ulu Hakan Abdulühamid Han* (1965), *Tarih Boyunca Büyük Mazlumlar* (1966), *Son Devrin Din Mazlumları* (1969), which mostly have elaborated and tried to decipher the conspiracies of the enemies of Islam and the Ottoman Empire and to demonstrate the wrongs made against the Muslim leaders and insisted on their wrongedness. The characteristic style of his writings is their aggressiveness and authoritative pretentiousness. The common theme of his writings after the forties insisted on the wrongedness of the Muslims, so that they had become "pariahs in their own countries". His poems has become like a manifesto for the Turkist-Islamist youth. For example the Gençliğe Hitabe which is thought to be an alternative to the one read by Mustafa Kemal is known and read by the Islamist youth as a guider text. His *Sakarya Türküsü*, where Sakarya is identified with the country, with the essential sons/girls of the country, *(Sakarya saf çocuğu, masum Anadolu'nun / Divanesi ikimiz kaldık Allah yolunun)* that is the Muslim people depict the position of Sakarya in quite a dramatic way. The words "Öz yurdunda Garipsin, Öz Vatanında Parya" are the best way of characterising the Sakarya, the Islamic youth, which is thought to be a miraculous potential for a revival, where Necip Fazıl is stricken by its movement: *"Fakat Sakarya bir garip, yokuş mu çıkıyor ne! Kurşundan bir yük binmiş köpükten gövdesine.."* (Kısakürek, 1988: 399)

The poetical personality of Necip Fazıl has been characterised by the name he gave to his collection of poems, namely, *Çile* (Suffering). This poem, in accordance with his general discourse elaborates a theme of the vertical i.e., intellectual, spiritual and mental diaspora of the religiousmen in the world dominated by the Westernist staff of the Republican regime. With his very rich personality Necip Fazıl has had a very deep and important influence on the formation of an Islamist political identity in the post-caliphatic period.

It would be useful here to mention a striking work searching for the "will to power" dimension of the Islamist discourses of the wrongedness by

Fethi Açıkel who has found very fitting relevances between such discourses and a will to power. He brings a rich range of examples from the contemporary Islamist intellectuals or popular leaders to illustrate the intensive functioning of the wrongedness, aggrievedness discourse in the service of the will to power. Following Nietzsche's aphorism that equates the ethical discourses or the crying out of the sufferers with the will to power Açıkel suggests to read all this discourse in terms of deciphering the Islamist will to power. One of his best examples is Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. In his analysing of Kısakürek's Sakarya Türküsü he argues that the (collectively) injured subject who look from the perspective of the suffering conditions of what is actual or present, tries to keep the "unjustness" s/he was suffered through some historical narratives. Because the more s/he achieves in showing that s/he had been suffered by unjust treatments the more s/he would hold a right to power. Considering the general interest in appealing to history, which tend to write it again but with a natural modification, and which is ruled by the quest for an origin, one become as Açıkel is, inclined to think that when you focus in history just on the oppression made on yourself, you are not do but a declaring of the right to compensate your damage. By so doing, the oppressed searches for converting the accumulated wrongedness into an advantage for his political struggle. Thus, the oppressed both celebrates the idealised past and rejects it. With a claim for justice and settling account mutually with the past, the Islamist discourse of wrongedness aims the politicisation of the masses. As it very clearly appears in Kısakürek's works to Açıkel, the development of the discourses of compensation to make up the past include a calling to the subject who would put an end to the "cosmic injustice". The discourses of compensation/resentment and of positive exhalation differ in that the latter is more long term as well as it is more egalitarian-emancipating and encompassing (Açıkel, 1996: 166-168).

I think it is very appropriate to identify a "will to power" dimension in the wrongedness, aggrievedness and even the diaspora mood of the Islamism of the post-caliphate period. But such an emphasis to this dimension in every kind of historiographical attempt to write or to tell the oppressions or the conspiracies of the enemies seems to reach to the extend of a clear reductionism of the will to power. The discourses of even the wrongedness are more complicated than any such simplifications would seem to be aware of. This reductionism seems at least to ignore the deep

existential concerns which is stimulated by the notion of political disembodiment, which invalidate the meaning of the everyday life. Although that is not to underestimate the will to power dimension in the Islamist discourses of wrongedness, it should be noticed the deep motivations of the political embodiment which render the making of self-identity and the existential meaning possible, are more tightly knit to this discourses than a simple will to power. As I tried to show in the writings and attitudes of the previous four figures, the abolishment of the caliphate has brought about a sense of disembodiment in their existential concerns. Apart from being in a pure search for power they become essentially injured by a process of, so to say, disembodiment, which made them deprived of their organs to speak, to hear, to act in any way etc. as the realization of the religious existence. That is the situation I've chosen to call a *diaspora*, the Jewish name of the experience of banishment. An experience of banishment make the believers of a religion live and act relatively free from the normal codes of their jurisprudence. That is perhaps an allowance to keep themselves away from, or to be camouflaged against the probable enemies. Consequently, while the wrongedness discourses really include some will to power it would be an exaggeration to reduce all of such discourses to this will; and to focus exclusively on this existent relation may make one ignore the other dimensions of the sense of diaspora. Moreover, for such a reductionism which also includes a claim for scientific objectivity in itself, I think it is necessary to repeat the words I said at the beginining in respect of the discourse analyses of the "liberation movements" as were performed by some articles, for example, in Laclau's edition: While the empirical observations collected to deduce such hypotheses are really empirically strong, I see a full obstruction in such a direction towards standing critical against all kinds of violences. That is, having informed by such argumentations, or even scientific observations, consequently leads to a nihiliation of struggling for any ultimate value in this world. For example very simply being at the side of the rightful and against any kind of tyranny looses its all relevances etc. One is tempted to ask here whether an individual of an historical consciousness of the colonial or post-colonial condition would have such a luxury.

No doubt the Islamic experience of a diaspora would have some unique features which couldn't be ignored in this respect. Above all, it has much to do with the relationship between the special interaction of the text and the

body which is under many other influences. The original experience of the diaspora, that is, by the Jews, perhaps has not to feel an oppression of the texts over the bodies to the same extents. For, in Judaism, the text may be said to be less enforcing the action of the believer, or, in other words the believer's everyday action is determined through a looser relationship with the text. That is probably because of the way of engagement to the religion, which relies on some ethnic bases and which therefore doesn't require compulsory practises for remaining in the religion. It is known that, although it has some versions on the contrary, the commitment to the Judaic religion may take various forms of the world religions. A Judaic conception of God may be realised in the form of other religions' gods. That feature of Judaism whose development might have been brought about through the long-term experience of the diaspora has let the Jews relatively free towards the possible constraining effects of their religious texts. But this liberty is also made easy by the strong blood ties of the believers with their religion. That is, the ethnic ties and the religious ties are so interwoven with each other that, in Judaism, no body can claim an exit from the religion while ethnically s/he was born as a Jew. There is an indispensable tie among the Jews just due to their being Jews. Complained "of not being a Jew", Özel points that, when one's commitment to the Jewish religion become known s/he becomes to be called as "Jew". That is Just the reason for their imprisonment into feeling well for being "Jew" as an ethnic self-identity (Özel, 1994), which in turn doesn't necessitate a series of everyday practices as *sine qua non.* Furthermore that should be the reason for some themes on the correlation between the religion and the development of capitalism, which has usually been thought for Protestantism.

In Islamic case, however, there is an intensive relationship between the text, either as a scripture or as codified practices manifested in habitus, and the social existence of a believer. There can be seen a clear will to live in accordance wit the text. It can be said that the interpretation of the text and the presence of its meaning is never popularly and insurmountably problematized. Perhaps because of the strong nexus of the religious conviction the meaning of the text has always been felt as present, in the Derridean sense, as opposed to the différance of the meaning which refers to the always postponed and removed character of the meaning. Indeed, a religious orthodoxy has to be based on a conviction that all textual statements has their own corresponding and predetermined meaning. This

meaning is so present that everybody can see it objectively. Therefore, one becomes more easily inclined to derive some conclusions about something essential. This easiness is the most important reason that has drawn the orientalists and the fundamentalists to close lines of the so called logocentrism (Binder, 1987: 93 ff.). While there is many possibilities to talk on ways out of the logocentrist metaphysics in Islam, one has to admit that the logocentrist conception of the religious commands are dominant at popular level. That is not to reach a decision, however, on a possible conception of the heterodoxy versus orthodoxy dualism at popular level. For, I want to think on this issue beyond the constructive effects of such a dualism (Aktay, 1994). What is important here is just the unignorably strong emphasis on the coherence of the text and the body in Islamic jurisprudence, which requires a social-political embodiment for existence. Then, it is not just a simple will to power that make the ideological discourses talk on their history of wrongedness, but it is also this sense of disembodiment which make them experience a diaspora, so that their everyday religious actions become irrelevant.

Turning back to Necip Fazıl, one more point should be made: His civic personality and his place in the formation of an Islamist identity whose agents are mostly from the provinces may be treated in interesting relevances. In this respect, among the second and third generation Islamic intellectuals, Necip Fazıl is, perhaps, the first and the single personality who was born and grown in İstanbul. The rest of the Islamist intellectuals were of provincial origins. I draw attention to this point for the service of a convenient remark on the centre and periphery relationships in the development of the Turkish Islamism, which has been of a special concern of the sociologists of Turkish Islam (Mardin, 1989). This difference is conceivable in his writings, but especially in his way of life. As one of an urban origin he has more individualised and free personality, albeit in the course of his poetry one can observe a trend from individualism toward communiterianism. At the early years of his artistic life he has written the poems of the modern man; his anxieties, depressions and existential crisis. Indeed Necip Fazıl's poetical personality has been shaped in these years, and in one sense, it can be said that in as much as his political identity become manifest his poetical dimension has declined. If needed, one could find a continuity between the existential depressions of the earlier Necip Fazıl and his sense of religious diaspora in his later life. In any way, he has

influenced the recent generations of the Islamic intellectuals and perhaps most agents of the political Islamism.

Sezai Karakoç: The Generation of Resurrection

Sevgili
Ey Sevgili
En sevgili
Uzatma Dünya Sürgünümü Benim

Having taken the discourse of diaspora as a characteristic legacy emerged with the phenomenon of decaliphatisation, through the writings and personalities of some Islamic ulema/intellectuals and inherited by the later generations, we can best illustrate one of its later stages in the writings and lives of two important figures, whose ideas have profoundly influenced the present generation of the Islamic intellectuals, namely Nuri Pakdil and Sezai Karakoç. Those figures are more worthy of considering, as the second generation of an experience of diaspora, who might have been imagined as the child grown by the man who was also growing roses. Because, in contrast to the former two figures, that is, Eşref Edip (1882-1971) and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1905-1983), these two figures were born after the foundation of the Republic. They were really just at their childhood stages when their predecessors were growing roses.

Sezai Karakoç and Nuri Pakdil are typicalmen of letters. A further common characteristic is that both have lived and wrote through their own channels within a kind of seclusion. They have been known as shy and very reserved persons, so that they have very rarely accepted to have interviews with mediatic organs. But their state of seclusion has to do with their general critical overview of the existing social and political conditions rather than with their personal peculiarities. They seem very clearly to have inherited the tradition of seclusion from their predecessors, as a response to the political disembodiment. They were motivated, however, by an additional sensitivity during their isolation from some spheres. This sensitivity developed as a response to modernity and cultural westernization with all institutions. Especially the urbanisation, industrialisation and the increasing individualisation alongside with secularisation are the most important themes in the writings of Pakdil and Karakoç. Both derives from their own poetically successful observations and sensitivity towards the profound impacts of modernity on the traditional aspects of the social life

and combine it with the political course of the country. Thus, their criticisms doesn't focus only on the political situation of Turkey but also on the general process of modernization which also has meant westernisation. The sense of diaspora, therefore has been united with a response to modernity together with all its aspects. While the foundation of the republic has deprived the Muslims of their body (politic) and brought down them in a state of a diaspora in terms of political disembodiment, modernization has associated this process by distorting the human nature and the traditional indigenous values. For both, the antagonism runs at the level of civilisation, between the Western and Eastern ones. Of course, the latter is identified with the Islamic civilisation. Indeed, their overall criticisms are based on the claim that modernity has killed the man who is the carrier of the traditional and transcendental values. Apart from the special case of the Turkish Muslims, in particular, and all world people under the domination of the two ideological and political blocks of communism and capitalism, in general, are in need of a salvation which could be undertaken by the specially grown generation of the Muslims.

For Sezai Karakoç, for example, the name of this salvation is resurrection *(diriliş),* which has also named all intellectual activities of himself. Beginning from the early sixties, he has published a journal, under this name. While initially it was published once a month as a journal, it began to be published weekly, then became a daily newspaper, surviving for several years. He has also published all of his books at his own Publishing House named *Diriliş*. Finally, he founded a party with the same same in 1990. The theme of the resurrection, thus, is central in Karakoç's writings. Just looking at the names of his books one can recognise the weight o this theme: *The Resurrection of Islam (İslâm'ın Dirilişi,* 1967); *The Resurrection of Human Being (İnsanlığın Dirilişi,* 1977); *On Resurrection (Dirilişin Çevresinde,* 1967); *Resurrection After Death (Ölümden Sonra Kalkış,* 1970); *The Resurrection of the Spirit (Ruhun Dirilişi,* 1974); *The Crede of the Generation of Resurrection (Diriliş Neslinin Amentüsü,* 1976); *The GladTiding of Resurrection (Diriliş Muştusu,* 1980).

As it seems, for Karakoç the resurrection of human being is based on the resurrection of the spirit, and of Islam. This requires a pioneer generation which would undertake the key role in this universal process. The resurrection is the reembodiment of the Islamic, and also of the human existence. This embodiment, of course, includes or even is dominated by the

Islamic principle of unity which entails, by its nature, an anti-humanist position, one can see a clear metaphysics of humanism in this discourses of resurrection. That is why once Karakoç's writings has been read as Islamic cases of existentialism. Karakoç has written a crede, or in one sense a manifesto for the pioneer generation of the resurrection, into which he includes himself. He believes that he is a soldier of resurrection and there is a Front of Resurrection. Then there is a struggle, but rather then taking place through some guns of wars, it is the war of spirits.

> In those wars, before the material bodies, the spiritual bodies are overthrown, captivated and defeated or overthrowing, captivating and defeating... It is a war between mentalities…, life styles..., world views .. (and) civilisations.
>
> I believe that my body, my material existence, is the instrument, the violin, the gun, the equipment of my spirit.
>
> My body is a gun to hit the enemy (target) right at the point of twelve.
>
> In this respect the body as well as the material existence and the surrendering physical world, all gain a supreme meaning as extensions of the spirit.
>
> My body should be under the obedience of my spirit.

One of Karakoç's central emphases is that it is this Islamic belief that give meaning to the life and death, to our entrance into the time and space and to our relationships with them. He declares over and over again that his lungs want to inhale the disciplined and orderly atmosphere of the Islamic site. Thus speaking, Karakoç has wanted to grow a generation motivated by the everyday discipline of the religious life. Either in this book or in his other books introducing the Islamic religion, he tries to interpret the Islamic principles and actions in terms of arriving at an ideological ground for a resurrection movement. One can see the five pillars of Islam as the channels of resurrection. He gives a detailed depiction of all these pillars from the point of view of restrictive dimensions. Some Islamic concepts such as *qıyamah* (the eschatology), *hicrah* (migration of the believers), *sabr* (patience), *ghaib* (the unseen), *ni'mah* (the goods), *tawbah* (repentance), *qıyam*, *haya*, *zamzam*, *muhlah*, *Ashab-ı kahf* (the friends of the Cave), *sawm*

(fasting), *malak, cum'a* (Friday), *shahid* (martyr) etc.[11] interpreted by Karakoç in terms of their potential for resurrecting a society. I will give two examples to illustrate his way of interpretation in terms of our interests. The first one is his treatment of the Friday prayer. For Karakoç the Friday prayer is a potential for Islamic first step in the way of resurrection; it will perhaps be the first seed of the Islamic resurrection for the humanity in the new worlds. Making a reference to Imam A'zam Ebu Hanife he concludes that it is a prayer of the state. That is, it plays a central role in the political embodiment of the believers. In this respect, the Friday prayer leads the believers to the idea of a "leader" which, in turn, leads to the idea of "state'; for, while in the everyday five times prayers the worship with the community behind an imam is not compulsory, for the Friday prayer one has to pray behind an Imam. The Imam is the head of the community which was selected by the community in order to be their leader in the organization of the religious and worldly affairs. The state is the foundation of the Islamic life towards inside and against the outside. The Friday prayer gathers this "head" and the community, the state and the people together in the presence of God to make them settle accounts mutually, to control their reciprocal loyalties and to examine them before the God. Comparing this Friday conception of the Hanafi sect of the Islamic Sunnism with the other one, namely Shafii, he concludes that in Shafiism the Friday is a prayer of the society. Their difference is concluded by the discussion on the priority of the leader or the society in constituting a community. The latter (the Shafii) entails that if the community has already occurred it naturally introduce a leader, while the former precede the existence of the leader in the process of constituting a community. It is therefore that for praying in the Friday the Shafii requires forty men, while the Hanafi suffice with only three men including the Imam. For Karakoç, this difference is not so important in consequence, for, when the Islamic society exists together with its leader and community, the Friday prayer already unites these two

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[11] These are only some titles taken from his books wherein he tries different interpretations of them. I should warn the reader that the English equivalents of the concepts are just literal ones and may not coincide with Karakoç's, or even the common interpretation of them. For they have also metaphorical meanings which encourage such men of letters as Karakoç to derive their own quite different interpretations in literary style.

approaches inseparably with each other. The problem may arise in the cases of social crisis of Islamic society, in cases of social chaos. Then, the problem takes the form of an hesitation of giving a priority: To give birth to a "head" or to a "society". This is not but to proliferate the alternatives as hermeneutically should be applied to the social, psychological and characterological situation of the resurrecting generations. Then this difference in the approaches stand in the reserve of the believers just as a blessing of the God upon the believers —this is a common approach to the proliferation of the interpretations of the mujtehids in the Sunni Islam. The word *Jum'a* as equivalent of the Friday is derived from the original letters of *j m 'a* which means to gather together. Jum'a means the gathering together with those who come together. A prayer of the Jum'a necessitates a mosque that literally corresponds to the *jami'* that is active space which is comprehensive and which gathers together. All this etymological analysis, obviously leads Karakoç to derive very easy connotations for his discourse of resurrection (Karakoç, 1968: 106-111).

Indeed Karakoç (together with Pakdil) is not the only figure to illustrate the second generation of the post-Caliphate Islamism of Turkey. There are many other names to be mentioned in a historiography of this period of Islamism. But the significance we attached at the beginning is their strong thematisation of diaspora for the situation of the Islamists under the rule of the Republic which means the disembodiment of the Muslims and an attack on the Muslims' individual bodies. Therefore as a second one it should be a good example to take Karakoç's interpretation of the Islamic migration (in one sense) banishment, that is *hijrah* to illustrate his signs of the sense of diaspora in his writings. Indeed the best example of the discourse of diaspora can be shown in his actual life which is very akin to that of Nuri Pakdil. Personally he has lived in a kind of seclusion without giving interview to anyone. He has very deliberately stayed far from the mediatic scenes and resisted against the conditions of the intellectual markets. Obviously he seems to have chosen this way as a means for protesting the modern conditions of social relationships which are determined by the impossibility of an Islamic social/political embodiment. While he had worked as an official in the bureaucracy for about six years he has resigned in the early seventies and has never returned to work at this level. He began to make his living from the selling of his books. The bookstorers who work with him tell that he imposes his own conditions during the exchange

through which he applies the principles he thinks are Islamic ones. For example he necessitates cash and don't accept cheque or bill, even while they are prevalent means of exchanges during the trade.

Now, I think it would be quite appropriate to mention Karakoç's interpretation of *hijrah* as a way of encountering the world. The word *hijrah* in Islamic history corresponded to the migration of the Prophet with his friends from Makka to Madinah for the sake of religious ideals or because he was enforced to leave his country. This historical fact has been considered very important, so that it was declared as the starting point of the Islamic calender. However it seems it hasn't been a matter of any remark by the Islamic historiographers or the exegesis, until some contemporary thinkers such as Sezai Karakoç who might have been heralding Ali Şeriati's considerations of the Hijrah. For those contemporary Islamic philosophers of history the fact that the *hijrah* occurred as a starting point is not an accident. There lies a very deliberate and profound significance in this historical choice. The word *hijrah* includes in its stock of meaning to emigrate; to dissociate of something; to give up, renounce, forgo, avoid of something etc. While it includes also the simple meaning of emigration, it is certainly not to be reduced to such a spatial mobility. For Karakoç the *hijrah* is a state of being which never leave the existence of the Muslim. It is just with their attribute of *muhajrun* (those who emigrate from Makka to Madinah) that the Muslim political and existential consciousness was accomplished. Then, it could be said that the Islamic self-identity begins with a sense of diaspora, but of course not necessarily with the same meaning of the Jewish one.

In this respect writing on the architecture of hijrah, Karakoç declares that all Muslims are the men of hijrah. They always carry the anxiety of *hijrah* in all its implications in their heart. If there is a burning fire, they know that it will be out. If the road is uphill, it will be soon downhill. They are aware that the very green trees will dry; the black winter will follow the summer. That the believer is in hijrah in the world means the awareness that he is not to be eternal in the world in any state of being. He is in *hijrah* in this country. He is in *hijrah* in this time and also in this world. Every prayer is a *hijrah* from these places. Every fasting is *hijrah* of the body from the material things. Even the *zekah* (the religious taxation of the property) is the *hijrah* of the property from the property. *Hajj* (the pilgrimage to Makkah) is a hijrah. The trial is a *hijrah* and those who accomplish their trial gain a

right to arrive at their madinah, but the settlement in Madinah never means an eternal settlement but to carry the attribute of *muhajir* eternally. Thus, a Muslim is he who burns in the fire of this zoning *hijrah* in order to get closer to greatest affinity. He has been washed with the hijrah.

Indeed what Karakoç does, here, is a new adaptation of some elements of sufism in improving a style of attitude towards some worldly and political issues. Illustrated the experience of *hijrah* from the lives of almost all prophets and all Islamic saints (or its Islamic correspondents the *vali*s), Karakoç concludes that the sense or the experience of *hijrah* is the very authentical dimension of every Muslim, and this had been experienced for more than a thousand years until several centuries before. But for Karakoç, since the time, that is, from the beginning of modernity, the Muslims have been deprived of the authentical sense of hijrah. Instead, or because of this deprivedness they were banished from their authentic city of God —in one sense from the Dâru'l Islam. Then, now they are not in the authentic state of *hijrah* which is a conscious and voluntaristic preferences of the believers as a way of disciplinizing their bodies, their souls and their social world, but in a state of being banished as a wrong. This state, for Karaoç, is not belonging just to the responsibility of the tyrants but the Muslims who have lost the consciousness of *hijrah* are responsible for this state of being which is characterised by sin. Speaking with Karakoç's words, the *hijrah* is not a breaking escape but a bridge binding a state with another state. But we have demolished this bridge which binds the Makkah and Madinah with each other. Therefore our inner Makkah and Madinah have been broken off from each other. The architecture of *hijrah* which made the transition from the individual to society, or vice versa, possible, has been demolished. We began not to understand the meaning of being a man of *hijrah* who is the trace of the other world in this world. That is just because we wanted to settle in this world that we were condemned to banishment. We were banished from ourselves and from the age. That is why we are now banished in our own country (Karakoç, 1968: 24-26).

Following this description of the *hijrah* one can make some conclusions about the self-identification of the Islamism regarding the existing social world, political authority (body politic) and the self-embodiment. As it seems the Islamism charge the responsibility of the so-called state of diaspora to the agents of Islamism themselves. Here, one can find some affinities with the way of explaining the formation of an ideology by

Althusser, who argues that all ideologies rely on the strategies of constructing the men of ideology as Subject(s). But I think this would be another level of an analysis of the constitution of the political identity which is not to be introduced here. What is relevant here is just to try to understand the discourse of an intellectual Islamism in terms of the making of political identity through the conceptions of native country / motherland *(vatan)*. In this respect, Karakoç seems to contrast the state of *hijrah* with the sense of diaspora which is not a voluntary preference but an operation of the Others on the believers' bodies. While the authentic being in the world for a believer is accomplished through the consciousness of *hijrah* the state of diaspora is not so acceptable. Because the believer in the state of diaspora seems to be just wronged without self-consciousness of being a *muhajir*. Then, the conception of the diaspora and the *vatan*, appears as an existential opposition rather than a concrete spatial differentiation. It is resulted in a vertical differentiation of the space rather than its horizontal classification in Karakoç's thought.

One important biographical point should be made about Karakoç is that he has published his early writings in *Büyük Doğu,* Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's famous journal, which has named Kısakürek's great ideals of the East. That point could be considered in order to follow the sequence of some intellectual and ethical continuities in Turkish Islamism.

Nuri Pakdil: Growing Roses in the Gardens of the "Others"

The other important figure in the second or third generation Islamism which might be characterised with their typical experience of a diaspora is Nuri Pakdil. Similarly as was mentioned above the best example of the discourse of diaspora can be shown in his actual life before being illustrated in his texts. Personally he, too, like Sezai Karakoç, has lived in a kind of seclusion without giving interview to anyone, participating any television or even radio programme and any commercial activity exceeding the limits of a small organisation. He has, like Karakoç, very deliberately stayed far from the mediatic scenes and resisted against the conditions of the intellectual markets and showing activities. He has chosen this way as a means for protesting the modern conditions of social relationships which are determined by the impossibility of an Islamic social/political embodiment

and therefore which is also distorting the authentic state of being through the modernization (destroying) of the traditional manners of life. Nuri Pakdil has published a journal called *Edebiyat Dergisi* from the early seventies to the mid-eighties. Just looking at the list of names who have written in this journal would give a good idea on its place in the formation of a literary dimension of the Islamism of recent times. Some of these names are: Rasim Özdenören, one of the most important men of letters and, so to say, a theoretician of the current Islamism; Cahit Zarifoğlu, again a strong poet whose poetry has influenced and accepted by not only the Islamists but also by the genereal circle of poetry; Erdem Bayazıd, Akif İnan, Arif Ay, Osman Sarı, Süleyman Kalkan, Yaşar Kaplan, etc. are the other names who are well-known in Islamic circles.

Pakdil's diaspora is experienced in the soiled human relationships while it has some roots in the political steps toward decaliphatisation as a result of the foundation of the Republic. Although this is not so pronounciated during his writings very clearly, all theme dominating his writings is this deprivedness of a body social and politic. Pakdil seems to have tried to substitute it by a communal experience together with a literary elite gathered together around his charismatic personality. Thus *Edebiyat Dergisi* appeared not just as a professional journal of literary for the sake of literary, but it aimed at being a frame for illustration of a community life. Therefore, there was elaborated a strong ethic of solidarity, benevolence and brotherhood, in order to be able to resist to or even to challenge the modern process of individualisation which is to be characterised by a dismemberance, or in our terminology by disembodiment, of the community.

While the major step towards this disembodiment is the victories of Kemalism and so there is a strong emphasis on the otherness of Kemalism, in *Edebiyat Dergisi,* the problem of degeneration exceeds the boundaries of the political level of the antagonism. The Republic as a way of decaliphatisating the Muslims is never referred as "kemalism" or as "the republic", but as "the Revolution of 23" (23 Devrimi).

For the general discourse of the journal, the reasons of the distortion of the authentic social relations are not to be reduced to simply changing hands of the governmental apparatus. The process is to be explained, of course, through applying some other dichotomies such as the modernization process with its appearances as secularisation, individualisation, urbanisation,

industrialisation. Such an enhancement of the front may be striking. For the early generation of the Islamism the decaliphatisation was the immediate result of the political decision of some staff which were directed by Western forces. The identification of the modernization with westernization was probably just because of this. This was to constitute the administrators of the Republic together with its all institutions as the "other" of the believers' embodiment. And the body of the believer was, thus, to be in conflict with this body social, in terms of Nietzschean process of embodiment:

> ...every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (- its will to power) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ('union') with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they conspire together for power. And the process goes on" (Nietzsche, 1968: 340, section 636).

Pakdil and his fellows, however, keeping this antagonism in their depth of consciousness and reflecting it to some extent in their discourses, they saw the on-going state of disembodiment as a consequence of more extensive process of modernization. Therefore, they focused on and problematised the ethical dimension in the modern condition, which has created completely new institutions and manners of everyday behaviours. In this respect, *Edebiyat Dergisi,* mostly in the writings of Nuri Pakdil, has relied on the negation of some modern phenomena characterised with "black politics" (kara siyasa) and "dirty property" (kirli mülkiyet). According to one of his clients Pakdil's personal feature lies in his being a man of attitude. That is, he has a strong emphasis on the harmony of the theory and practise which is another translation of the Islamic principle of the harmony of word and deed, or belief and action. The attitude of Pakdil in this respect of his conceptualisation of dirty property and black policy is illustrated through his characteristic attitudes. For example, he has never participated in any political activity and caste a vote in the political elections. He has not supported any political party, even those claiming an Islamic identity. In several times he declared in the journal that "my vote is to writing". Then, to Pakdil, writing seems to function as a means for secluding himself, in Pakdil, to protest the current civilisation. Well the latter word is not casually introduced into the sentence, it plays a crucial role in Pakdil and his circle's self identity. The antagonism which is on play

for this circle is an antagonism of civilisation. The situation of the Islamic society for the recent centuries is just a stage in this antagonism which is to be characterised by the superiority of the Western civilisation and defeat of the Eastern civilisation, that is by its nature also Islamic. This defeat is now to be taken as the main reason of the on-going negativities as inequalities, tyrannies, totalitarianisms etc. For this, Pakdil frequently makes references to a "civilisation consciousness", its awakening and motivating its agents for a challenge against the Western civilisation.

Having read Pakdil's writings one becomes inclined to think that there is a mood of seclusion even in their style of enunciation. They don't resemble neither to poetry nor to prose; neither completely narrative nor explanatory descriptions of something. They seem to go on their own course improving their own styles and to carry intensive charge of Pakdil's symbolism. When I said to one of his students that Pakdil, too, can be considered among the men who grow roses, he replied that "well, he grows roses but not exclusively in his own garden; he also tries to grow roses in the gardens of the others". That is, perhaps, because he is not so optimistic in the possibility of separating a space from the existing social system, even one's own home. The spatial seclusion, thus, doesn't seem so meaningful for Pakdil because it may create an illusion of the possibility of a coherent existence. The system has encompassed all details of the space, so that one can not escape from it by a simple seclusion. The homecoming, if to follow this special experience of diaspora, would be initiated from the minds and hearts of the new generations. This explains why Pakdil and his circle have intensively been interested with the Western and modern thought and literary. While all are pure Islamists, without any reference to nationalist elements or origins, none of them has been educated from any religious educational institution. Most of them know English, French or German. Moreover the vocabulary they employ in their writings is in search for pure Turkish, but not because of nationalist concern. It is even well-known that Turkish nationalism paradoxically has objected to the revival of the original Turkish words, especially after the fifties onward. It is the Kemalist nationalism that had insisted on the purification of the language, eliminating all Arabic and Persian elements from the language. The conservative tendency as manifested either in nationalism or in Islamism has resisted to such an elimination. The argument underlying this conservatism was that the traces of a civilisation should be kept at least in the language in order to

hold a reference or a motherland for one day homecoming. The interest in the purification of the language came from this special aspect of Pakdil and *Edebiyat Dergisi* that claim to grow roses in the gardens of others. It is no more wrong to claim an isolated space for ourselves which wouldn't be but an illusion. Instead, we were to learn the language of the current society and to grow roses in their gardens, to translate the holy message into their language and to render it understandable.

Pakdil and the *Edebiyat Dergisi* circle resisted against being incorporated into the economical aspect of the system as well as they resisted against the political aspect. They objected to the advertisement system, so that Pakdil, as an editor in chief of his journal, declared ironically the price of advertisement in the pages of his journal so astronomical that would be even unthinkable apart from being applicable. The conditions for acceptance of the advertisements were declared as "12 000 000 000 000 TL per cm., and in condition that they would be compatible with our principles. Moreover, the advertisements of the banks, holdings, and wine would not be accepted". It is told that when the law of supplementary taxation (Katma Değer Vergisi) was issued he has allocated all content of his bookstores without any price for protesting the economical system. This has been also the date of his complete seclusion, of his falling into complete silence. At least since the mid-eighties onward he has not written even one line. He has chosen the silence, of course deducing an idea for himself that rendered the writing and speaking meaningless for himself. The allocation of his books without price and the disposing of his all products has been charged with very pessimistic messages on the possibility of an ideal existence.

Consequently, we tried to illustrate various discourses of diaspora in the lives and writings of Eşref Edip, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Sezai Karakoç and Nuri Pakdil. Their conception of the existing social situation in a kind of banishment state is very characteristic which I wanted to show that it is inherited from a first generation of the, so to say, Islamist tradition in Turkey.

The Possibility of Jurisprudence for the "Disembodied"

The foundation of the republic has gone hand in hand with a process of decaliphatisation which meant a disembodiment of the Islamic community.

From the aforementioned first generation onward, this has led to the constitution of a diaspora condition for a considerable number of people whose self-identities had been defined through political Islamism. What is important in this respect is the role of such political self-identification in the tensional conception of the everyday religious action. Here, the religious text, scripture or juridical codifications are thought to be considerable social partners of the social actions of the Islamists, together with modernity, the political steps toward modernization, and the process of decaliphatisation itself. If a significant antagonism is to be identified in the world of the Islamists, it would certainly be found by taking seriously the interrelationships of those actors. One of my contentions in this respect is to suggest that the sense of diaspora arisen as a result of decaliphatisation has much to do with the problematisation of the possibility of religious jurisprudence in the post-caliphate condition. The above examples (from the second generation of the political disembodiment of Islamism) show the poetical and intellectual response of the Islamists. as I shall try to illustrate with some examples, and as might have appeared in the response of the first generation, this response had has its roots in the characteristic place of the jurisprudence in the Islamic religion. In the following lines I shall try to give a profile of this place through some examples.

For the Hanafi sect of jurisprudence, the task of appointing a *qadi* belongs to the caliph. It is not allowed for the people of a country coming together to select a *qadi* for themselves. He wouldn't already be a *qadi* with such an appointment (Ibn Abidin, IV: 308). This has been the common attitude of this sect, which had prevailed in the Ottoman system of citizenship or the law of international relationships. This principle of law created a centralist organization of the body politic, into which all activities had to be mediated by the representative will of the caliph.

Apart from the appointment of a *qadi*, even the appointment of a local leader (imam) who would lead the prayer of Friday depended on the allowance of the caliph. The common assumption of the Hanafi sect asserted that even the obedience to an imam of the Friday prayer meant obedience to or recognition of the existing caliph. Therefore, one of the most important conditions of the prayer has been that the imam had to be appointed by the caliph himself. For, the imam leads the prayer on the name of the caliph whose body is the representative of the embodiment of the

ummah or of the God himself.[12] Considering the importance of the Friday prayer in the religious life of the Muslim society, the consequences of the absence of such chain of legitimation would be more understandable. That is, the cases where the caliph has not already appointed an imam, or where a community came together for this special prayer in its time without a permission or an appointment by the caliph, had been discussed among the ulema. It has been argued by some that in the country of the struggles *(daru'l-harb),* an Islamic community may select one among themselves without such a permission, while it has not found sufficient recognition. Those who required the affirmation or the appointment of the caliph have insisted on the conditions of the prayer. The absence of the caliph is similar with the absence of a ritual ablution (abdest). A prayer without ablution is not possible. It is an absurd thing and invokes sin. Then the existence of the caliph becomes a condition for the existence of an Islamic community. His absence is also the absence of an Islamic community, that is, the disembodiment of a community.

Undoubtedly, the role of the caliph is not to be reduced namely to his place in the Friday prayer. Properly, his existence gives to the religious existence of a believer its meaning. It makes also the individual existence possible, which is not separated from the being-for-the community in an Islamic society. Even most of the individual practices, thus, become impossible wherein the caliph's existence has not extended. However, all this is the case where the Caliph exists, but something occurs without his information. As for the country of the struggles, as will be described as the alternative to the city of God, that is the city of the 'other', there has already been elaborated a rich literature on the juridical conditions for this situation. The juridical codifications for these conditions are almost completely different from that of the country of Islam, which is also worth studying more elaborately, perhaps in some other work. For example, the economical relationships with the settlers of these places are codified into quite different ways: especially in his famous book *Al-Radd 'Alâ Siyaru'l-Awzâî,* regarding

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[12]As Ali Shariati very properly argues, the word *"Nâs",* that is the people or the community, the ummah, can be replaced by the word God in most places employed in the Qur'an. The message of the Qur'an, which begins with the name of God and concludes in the name of the people, is that rulership belongs to God, that is, to people.

the international relations, Abu Yusuf, the second name of the Hanafi sect, the interest in the economical exchanges is allowed. This is really very striking, for the interest is very negatively reproached, and those who get exchange with interest, either giving or taking, have already been accursed eternally, so that it has constituted a strong archetype in the consciousness of the popular Islam. This derives from the general rule that in a country of struggle any profiting exchange with the *harbi*s (the settlers of the *dar al-harb)* is allowed only with the condition that it occurs with consent of the *harbi* (Abu Yusuf, no date, 96-97). Therefore, some relations with the unbelievers, or in some cases with even the believers are encoded in different ways just because of the differentiation of space. In this most classical text on the Islamic jurisprudence of the international relations and citizenship some general statements in this respect read as follows:

> Abu Hanifa said: 'When the army fight with a country under the leadership of a commander, he has not to fulfil the boundaries of the Shariah just by his soldiers, except that he is an imam of Egypt, Damascus, Iraq or that he is an equivalent of those imams' ... It has been quoted from Zeyd B. Sabit also that 'The boundaries of the Shariah can not be settled in *dar al-harb* because of the fear of being caught by its settlers with hostility'... (Abu Yusuf, no date, 80-82).

In all these juridical principles it can be seen that even the simplest practices in everyday life of the Muslims require an organiser head, or an involvement of a political or social body which is represented by an Imam or a caliph. The ruling of the Holy Law is accomplished through the bodily existence of such a caliph. And the conception of the space is shaped in accordance with the activity of this caliph. Thus we see at first sight, in the presence of a caliph, a possibility of the regulation of the space and of the application of the religious jurisprudence. In the case of the existence of a caliph there are also spaces where the caliph doesn't rule. Such spaces are just temporary for the believer; they are not real spaces. The Muslim is there either in a state of struggle or of a necessity to leave there. Therefore a Muslim was not allowed to live there permanently.

The situation described through the phrase of the post-caliphate conditions, however, is quite different from this. As İsmet Özel would say, this is the situation where the Muslims as such have been deprived of the notion of being together onto a body (politic). As a potential for motivating

the Muslims to a political embodiment the caliphate has lost its meaning. Muslims no longer think of themselves bearing a political identity which entails having to come together for the universal goals of Islam. The post-caliphate conditions have meant the gradual loss of the significance of the political embodiment among the Muslims. Its realization has been achieved through an operation of the political apparatus towards modernization. This has created a serious difference in the Muslim society in terms of engagement to a political self-identity. While it can be said that this shows the dissolution of the body politic of the Muslim society, it may also show the redefinition of the self-image of the society. In any way, now the body politic of the Muslim society all around the Islamic World, is characterised by a political division between the political Islamism and the cultural Islam. Although neither one can be claimed to be consistent within itself, the former considers reviving the Islamic society through a political reembodiment, while the latter no longer imagine itself having to be engaged with a political identity embodied through a caliph. That is because of the secularisation of the life-worlds of the individuals. In other words, those people have popularly affirmed the political and cultural process towards secularisation. No doubt, the increasing individualisation as a result of urbanisation has sustained this process. People of the Islamic countries have mostly been the target carriers of the discourses of political disembodiment or decaliphatisation through the manipulated response to the process of urbanisation. This, of course, has been added to the immediate intervention of the state apparatus to the speed of modernization of the societies.[13]

The political Islam or the so called Islamic revival, however, insists on the restoration of the consciousness of the political embodiment. Therefore, the debate on the caliphate play a very important role in the discourses of an authentic Islamic life, on the possibility of the embodiment of the political

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[13]The unique pass to modernıty has been the matter of various analyses on Islamic societies. That of Turner (1974), for example, giveS a good summary of the analyses which insisted on the Jakobinist manner of modernization of the Islamic societies in contrast to Western societies where it is assumed to has taken place with internal dynamics of the society. Furthermore, Göran Therborn, in his recent article 'Go to/through Modernity' identifies at least four ways in the process of modernization. At least one way, of course coincides with that which has taken place within the Islamist societies of the so called post-colonial conditions (Therborn, 1995).

self-identity. Now, taking the theoretical considerations of the significance of the caliphate as were described above, I will try to refer to a question on the possibility of the jurisprudence in the post-caliphate conditions and its effects on the political Islamist consciousness. We saw that in the cases of Islamic jurisprudence on *daru'l harb,* where the Muslim is allowed to stay only temporarily and where the caliph had no powerin ruling, the boundaries of the Islamic law were invalidated. For, the absence of the caliph was rendering the Islamic social embodiment very difficult, if not impossible. The caliph by his existence gives a start to an elaborated religious life. And his disappearance has been conceptualised only through the spaces where his hand hadn't extended yet, namely daru'l-harb. But it is not impossible to arrive at the country of the caliph to engage with his body politic. In the post-caliphate conditions, however, the caliph does not exist, then the application of the Islamic jurisprudence faces with radically different problem of meaningfulness. Now, what is the possibility of various Islamic practices, regarding international relations, law of punishment, civil codes etc.? With which body would the Muslims enforce the justice or the boundaries of the holy law? With which hand would they perform the goals of the divine will in the world? All these are the basic questions of the post-caliphate condition.

In this respect Sayyid Qutb's approaches to the possibility of Islamic practices under the conditions dominated by infidelity is very characteristic, for he can very easily be considered an analyzer and a theoretician of the post-caliphate condition. He tried to provide an explanation to the changes in the situation of the Islamic society, which has been characterized by the domination of the West and the retrieval of the Islamic civilization. Qutb's contribution to this sociology of change relied in the diagnosis that the (Islamic) belief is not something to be permanent in the property of another society. It is something to be achieved rather than being an ascribed attribute of a society. In this sense there is a historical circulation of the true belief which entails a true contact with the world, with nature, with people and with the God himself. This contact is to be achieved through a hard study against the established ways of the distorted kinds of this contact. The history of the prophets (which is also the history of the mankind for Sayyid Qutb) can be summarized by the circulation of the true belief throughout all societies of the world. There is no guarantee for a society which once achieved this true contact, to continue it and to transmit it to its own next

generations without maintaining the same performance. Thus the self-identity (either its political or cultural one) should be achieved over-time with permanent efforts. Otherwise, if it is considered an essential attribute of a nation, the belief becomes an element o a nationalism which doesn't require a permanent engraving. This means that those who claim an Islamic identity may not be Muslim if they are not in a true state of Islamic existence. For, the Islamic existence is not an essential feature of a man, a society, or a nation. As a matter of fact, for Qutb, the Egyptian society, as well as many other Islamic countries, is not Islamic society, not simply because they have not an Islamist leader (imam) to enforce the Islamic rules, but also because of the existential position of their people.

Qutb, employs the term *jahiliyya*, from the Islamic history that is the name of the age of ignorance, to describe this state of being. The jahiliyyah historically meant the preislamic condition of the Arabic society. Qutb interprets this word in a dynamic way as he interprets the faith, and locates it against the true belief. For Qutb the jahiliyyah is not just a historical stage but an existential position of the human-being. It means an ignorance about the true attitude taken towards the life, toward the true relationship that should be settled with God and with His creatures. The most important aspect of this true relationship is to obey the God exclusively, that is to reject obedience to any body but Allah. This has not solely referred to a religious commitment in the classical meaning. The obedience to a god, for Qutb, is not anything to be escaped, but it is rather an indispensable human condition. Everybody has to obey a god; this god may be embodied through a collection of doctrinaire principles relying on human source or a state authority claiming a right to be sovereign over all life-worlds of the individuals, or a sheikh or saint who claim a mediator position that would necessarily be converted into a worldly authority.

As it seems, Qutb has interpreted the true conditions of Islamic embodiment through an existential approach. For this, he suggests to be sensible against every kind of ignorance which would not be so far from us, the believers, in the present time that it would never catch us again. Believing is a dynamic process as well as the jahiliyyah, and it can not be like a name of registering populations to the Islamic society. This is a typical existential approach that seems to have been largely inspired to Qutb by his readings of some western philosophers. Although he has never made such references, Qutb's aesthetic (Binder, 1988: 170) and dynamic approach

to the authentic Islamic being seems to have been influenced by Heidegger's ontological hermeneutics of the truth. Qutb hasn't made such references because his major claim was not to rely on any source of ethical and ontological scholarship but on Allah's revelation through the Qur'an and the sunnah. He might have consciously concealed the western origins of his ideas but quite in coherent way with the ontological hermeneutics which acknowledged the prejudgements as positive elements in understanding. His reinterpretation of the term *jahiliyyah* as existential ignorance about the true attitude towards life is very similar with the forgetting of being in Heideggerian sense. Qutb very often makes references to the reminder *(tezkire)* aspect of the Qur'an. Being Muslim, in one sense, means a remembering *(zikr)* of the authentic being, the *fitrah*, the nature on which the man was created by God.

Qutb argues that the existing jahiliyyah is a practically organised social reality. Since the true attitude towards life, that is being Muslim, remembering, begins with negating every kind of ignorance, the jahiliyyah, one has to put his existence at practical level through an organization corresponding at least the same level of the existence of the jahiliyyah. That is, for being able to negating the system of jahiliyyah, the ideal Islamic generation has to come together to constitute an alternative to the jahiliyyah. For Qutb, since the jahiliyah is present at practical level, its negation as a remembering should also be embodied at practical level. The manifestation of this negation is the constitution of an Islamic community which would declare the negation of all kinds of obedience to creatures and the absolute obedience to God. It is not possible for a Muslim to live individually while surrounded by the practical organization of jahiliyya. Therefore, there is no place for an individual existence in Qutb's theory of commitment. Although the process of remembering, the decision for choosing the obedience to God is an individual process, the individuality in its ideal sense, for Qutb is teleologically community-oriented.

> ...the *jahiliyya* which is based on the sovereignty of man over man, and which deviates thereby from existential being *(al-wujud al-kawni)*... that jahiliyya was not represented by pure "theory." Rather, perhaps sometimes it didn't even have a theory at all! It was instead always represented by a dynamic concrescence

(or congress)[14] manifested in a society subservient to its leadership, and to prevailing conceptions, and values, and understanding, and sentiments, and traditions, and customs. Moreover, (*jahili* society) is an organic *(adhawi)* society, there being among its individual members that organic mutuality, complementarity, coordination, trust and cooperation which gives that (jahili) society its dynamic quality —with or without consciously willing it— to preserve its existence and to define its being ... And since the jahiliyya is not represented by abstract theory, but is represented in a dynamic concrescence, any attempt to destroy that jahiliyya and to restore mankind to God once more ... cannot be represented by pure "theory." ... Rather it is necessary that such a renewed attempt to destroy the jahiliyya be represented in a dynamic social concrescence which is even more powerful (Qutb, 1980; the English translation quoted by Binder, 1988: 179-180).

Thus, we see that Qutb's interpretation clearly includes a programme of a political embodiment for the believing individuals, for their attempt to restore mankind to God once more. Apart from his affirmations, in several times, of the significance of the caliphate, and his analysis on the decaliphatisation of the Muslims in the early twentieth century, he develops a unique explanation in terms of a cyclical kind of historicism. For Qutb it is not the time of crying out for such a lost pass, but of a restoration of this caliphate in a more dynamic way. Therefore he usually insists on the Qur'anic references to the caliphate nature of mankind not to underestimate the importance of the Caliphate as a historical institution of the Islamic society, but to motivate the discursive potential of Islamic teachings for a strong and universal restoration of the caliphate. But this would have to be realised just as a repetition of the works of the prophets and their clients, all who passed from the same process of remembering (zikr) and paying some substitute for their remembrance.

Notwithstanding, Sayyid Qutb can not be said to have developed an opposite frame to the traditional discourses on the Islamic body politic. In fact, what he wanted to do has never been to develop an original and very different doctrine added to the traditional frame of reference. Just on the contrary, he considered such thing as luxury and he wanted to upraise the

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[14]*Tajammu'a haraki* is the term used, meaning a form of integrative social and cultural process similar to social mobilisation (Binder, 1988: 179). All quotations from Sayyid Qutb, here, are taken from the English translation of Binder, except the references.

claim of purity in the conception of the Qur'an and the religion. His frame, in this sense can be said to be a transparent in such sense that he tried to preclude his thought to be an obstacle before his followers. Therefore, it can be said that he didn't want to do more than discovering the authentic meaning of the Qur'an and it's possible implications for the practical life. In this respect he believed in a continuity of this existential attitude, and so acknowledged most of the Islamic juridical and exegetical tradition as a good accumulation of knowledge before any restorative attempt. That is, however, not to say that they are to be taken without any questioning and critical approach. For Sayyid Qutb:

> Today we are in the midst of a jahiliyya similar to or even worse than the jahiliyya that was "squeezed out" by Islam. Everything around us is jahiliyya: the ideas of mankind and their beliefs, their customs and traditions, the sources of their culture, their arts and literature, and their laws and regulations. This is true to such an extent that much of what we consider to be Islamic culture and Islamic sources, and Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought ... is nevertheless the product of jahiliyya."

As might very easily have been seen, the terms decaliphatisation, disembodiment of the Islamic community and the spaces of struggle for Muslims are all replaced by the term jahiliyyah in Sayyid Qutb's special terminology. While not excluding these traditional conceptions of the spaces and situations which altogether constituted a ground for a discourse of diaspora, as mentioned before, he insisted on this as one of its aspects, which would render the process of commitment highly dynamic. As for the possibility of jurisprudence in the conditions of jahiliyya, which was problematised in other conceptions, Qutb improved a fairly unique solution to this problem in accordance with his general aesthetic approach.

In his reply to the invitations to declare the projects of Islamic ideology to solve the contemporary problems, Qutb argues that Islam is an open-ended system of life and, so that its universality and adaptability to all conditions comes from this aspect. It has not to present detailed solutions to the existing social, political and economical problems in a closed-ended system. The Islamic jurisprudence, apart from its major basic principles, has not a constant collection of rules for all details of life, while it includes a strong logic or style of deducing rules to all kinds of social requirements every time. That is not to say that Islam has no possible responses to the

existing conditions, but that it is not at the position of producing such projects because it has not a ground for being forced to do this. Having drawn an attention to the fact that it is the society and its requirements that produces the juridical codifications and not vice versa, he argues that now Islam is deprived of the basic condition for producing its jurisprudence. That is to say that Islam is deprived of a social body and this is the main reason why one can not expect from Islam to give an appropriate response to the jahiliyya. The Arabic name of the jurisprudence is *fiqh* that means a comprehensive and hermeneutic understanding of the relationship of texts and conditions. But this hermeneutic understanding requires first a body who lives in and interact with the conditions enforcing the constitution of such a *fiqh*. Otherwise the absence of such a body would cause falling into an emptiness. For, the absence of a body social is itself a state of irrelevance in terms of the functioning of a *fiqh* action. In Qutb's conception, the *fiqh* is even the basic action of the Muslim in practical level of existence. As Binder has pointed out, all these has resulted in a quite sophisticated theory of praxis in Qutb's thought. This praxis involved reconciling direct (rather than discursive) experience in (what Husserl called) the life-world, through activity which has meaning in the Islamic sense. While the themes of movement, dynamism, activity, and change reminds to Binder the familiar criticism that Islam has become stagnant and that its rigid law prevents it from adapting to changed conditions, Qutb's response to such critiques has gone beyond the usual apologetic to locate the purportedly missing virtue in the very essence of Islam (Binder, 1988: 197).Qutb thinks of such criticisms as part of an organised conspiracy against the Islamic challenge to close Islam's discourses into a systemic approach that would be abstract doctrine irrelevant from the life. Therefore, Qutb argues that the so called Islamic philosophy or the so-known Islamic jurisprudence as packaged and closed codification:

> ...and the theoretical ordering of life alone will not produce "Islam" in the world in an actual-dynamic way. Moreover ... it will profit those to whom Islam is presented in this way (i.e.,, as tasawur and nizam, or conception and order) only if they are actually engaged in an actual Islamic movement. The greatest benefit that can accrue to those to whom Islam is thus presented will occur if they interact with it in the measure that they actually reach that tasawwur in the course of action.

Once again I reiterate that the doctrinal tasawwur must be immediately represented in a dynamic concrescence (coming together) and, at the same time, that dynamic concrescence must be a true representation and a faithful translation of the doctrinal tasawwur (Qutb, 1980: English translation by Binder, 1988: 198).

The relevant condition for talking on the possible forms of the contemporary Islamic jurisprudence can be accomplished only by the practical existence of a community. Only then, one can talk on the possibility of even the reformation of Islamic law. Otherwise all discussions on this issue would be performed at irrelevant levels. all this may inspire one to think that Sayyid Qutb postpone all kind of speaking to the time of the constitution of his ideal society. Indeed, that is not what Qutb implies. According to him, the constitution of a community is not a thing to be postponed but rather to be initiated immediately. For, the Islamic practices are expected from all individuals whose existence is teleologically community-oriented. That is, the Islamic community starts with an individual converting and goes on with spreading to the engagements of the second, third and the next individuals who altogether aim to be organised in an alternative body social as alternative to the existing jahiliyya. After the constitution of even a small community the practical requirements of this community begins to form its own jurisprudence in interaction, of course, with the text in hand. It chooses the questions or problems to be responded in accordance with its natural development. The jurisprudence would not have any final form but have always an open-ended nature. While this doesn't mean that Islam has no any constant project to be applied to the reality, it means that the reality, the reality of the living community, of the praxis, is always of a dynamic nature and a jurisprudence has to be consistent with this nature. If the community is composed of a small group, it should not be expected to give a response to the problems that the huge countries are faced. By so doing, it would not produce a jurisprudence, but a very short-termed and closed-ended, and usually totalitarian-aimed project. We can speak, thus of a jurisprudence of the community of this and this age, and of this and this country (Qutb, 1969: VIII/120 ff.).

Qutb's approach can be considered, in another sense, an early response to the criticisms of logocentrism. Indeed, it is the prototype of this criticism in the Islamic tradition of jurisprudence and exegesis. For this criticism, as

we have been made familiar by Heidegger, Gadamer and Derrida, reading the texts in a logocentric way necessitates an exercise of violence over the reality the text claims to correspond. There is a one-sided determination of the reality by the text in such reading. It is assumed that the text includes a single way of encoding the corresponding reality. Especially where it is a normative text as a religious scripture the violence content of the text becomes more apparent. The logocentrist reading in the poststructuralist criticisms is attached to a long history of the metaphysics of presence (Derrida, 1978). Although he is never to go on in parallel with deconstructionist approach of the poststructuralists, the discourse he suggested for understanding and for juridical interpretation of the Qur'an and the sunnah has settled a strong criticism to the text-centric reproduction of the traditional Islamic jurisprudence, and promoted the importance of a praxis of a community committed to the basic convictions of the text. ın this sense he recall the dialectic of belief and understanding in the hermeneutic process of the reproduction of jurisprudence, which was formulated by Bultmann's theological hermeneutics (Bleicher, 1980).

What do all these mean in terms of the issue under the question here? In other words, what is the implication of Qutb's ideas regarding the constitution of the self-identity in the so-called post-caliphate condition within which the most prominent manifestation is the sense or experience of diaspora? If we are to find a continuity in this sense within the history of Turkish Islamism what is the relevance of Sayyid Qutb who is indeed an Egyptian man of letters? As it seems Qutb provides a very appropriate terminology and understanding to overcome the sense of diaspora. Because one can immediately expect to develop a jurisprudence compatible with a life under the domination of the jahiliyya. If the jahiliyya is to be overcome immediately through an individual commitment to a prototype of Islamic community, then can one expect also to perpetuate this compatibility in a kind of jurisprudence?

One has to respond these questions beginning with the identity of Qutb. Well, he is an Egyptian man of letters, but what is considered here is his Turkish identity, because he has been read in Turkey since the early sixties before his execution. And his ideas have influenced the political Islamism since then very profoundly, so that one can very easily see a Turkish reproduction of Sayyid Qutb. Therefore, while analysing his ideas I consider his profound influence on the Turkish political identification of Islamism.

As for Qutb's requirement of a community embodied to/through practising the Islamic ideals and jurisprudence, clearly it have caused a radical movement of protest against the existing political systems and especially against the kemalisms of the Islamic countries in the sense that Bob Sayyid (1994) refers. But there arises another question out of his opening the way for the possibility of jurisprudence through his hermeneutic approach even in the conditions of jahiliyya. If the jurisprudence of the everyday life become so possible that to perpetuate a life consistent with a corresponding jurisprudence, then the paradox of diaspora would be overcome. In this case, there may be improved a jurisprudence for a community living in the conditions of jahiliyya or in the post-caliphate conditions without being condemned necessarily with a state of disembodiment. The implication of this possibility is that the jurisprudence of the Muslims of a post-caliphate condition may serve to stagnate the dynamism of the Islamic community. Turning back to Qutb's cyclical historicism one becomes inclined to ask whether this would not be the end of the ideal community of Qutb. For, such a juridical community would necessarily face with the inseparability of the public life and private life which seems to serve as the phenomenological base of Qutb's schemes in the modern or even postmodern society. Although Qutb outlined a radical constitution of an alternative society which would have got the complete practices of the everyday or longer-term Islamic jurisprudence, his projection seems to have to collide slightly to the consumer nature of the modern or postmodern society (Turner, 1994; Featherstone, 1993). If the modern society was to be characterised by all that is solid melts into air, the late modernity, or the radical modernity or even the postmodernity is worthier to be (as it is) characterised by the decline of the meta-narratives. If so, Islam might be considered as one of the most important meta-narrative which is expected to decline in the age of globalisation. Globalisation is one and the most important aspect of our age, whether considered radical-modern, late-modern, or postmodern. The most prominent feature of globalisation is the hybridisation of the cultures (Friedman, 1995) which are subject to the consumer culture it includes.

Therefore, it is not very easy to appreciate what functions Qutb's project, which was advocated to make the very existence of jurisprudence under the domination of the jahiliyya possible, would really have. On the one hand, by so doing, it may lead to the overcoming of the sense of

diaspora in question, in behalf of the settlement of a religious *habitus* through the practising of the jurisprudence, but on the other hand, the question arises: what, after overcoming this sense of diaspora? As we tried to see, it the sense of diaspora served as a diamonic element in the formation of the political consciousness and identity of the Islamists.[15] It is perhaps this element that made Açıkel pay attention to the discourses of sacred wrongedness in the Islamist circles (Açıkel, 1996). And it has certainly a function of motivating the carriers of the Islamic ideology toward constituting a hard political self-identity. That is, the constitution of an isolated community claiming a self-sufficient state of being has to improve its logic of living together with the opponent reality by time; especially if the antagonism onto which it is based is long time-taking and its opponents are much enduring in terms of being overcome. Added to this natural rule of the political movements is the conjuncture we referred above in terms of the consumer culture of postmodernism and globalism. In turn, this conjuncture softens all radicalist political movements so that almost all become integrated or articulated within the social and political system. And in spite of all its radicalism Qutb's formulations includes the risk of improving, in fact, a discourse which would make the political Islamism accommodate the existing social reality. According to Binder's observations on the followers of Qutb in Egypt, this discourse have resulted in an accommodation of the radical groups with the existing social system because of the reasons mentioned above. Making reference to Qutb's distinction of theory and practice and favouring practice over theory, Binder says that "but there is no guarantee that such practice can transform the world of live experience into the ideal of the Islamic tasawur." According to Binder although Qutb has been isolated, imprisoned, in ill health, and dispirited, choose martyrdom over accommodative compromise, his choice,

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[15]The diamonic element is employed by Gellner, as one of the distinctive "essential" features of the Western society which has motivated the West in the way of development. As it is seen very well it is an obvious orientalist theme to found an essential difference between the Western and the Eastern societies. For Gellner and for the diamonist discourse, the Eastern and the Islamic society is deprived, as many things as civil society, revolutions, autonomous cities, etc., of diamonic element. For the assumed roles of this diamonic element in the orientalist literature cf. Gellner, 1974; for the application of the theme to the Turkish intellectuals in the case of Sabri F. Ülgener cf. Mardin, 1994; and for a good discussion of the theme in terms of its implications in the Islamic equivalents, namely, Satan and İblis, cf. Armağan, 1994.

indeed, was not the only possible conclusion, nor even the most usual conclusion, drawn from his ontological or historical preference for practice over theory. For, this preference by its essence was to led, as now leads, to pragmatic, existentialist and historical accommodation rather than a permanent opposition.

Indeed all this appreciations on Qutb's formulations by Binder aim to construct his argumentation that all radicalist discourses teleologically run towards liberalisation. As usual this recalls the famous celebration of "the end of history" in the liberalist scene by Fukuyama (1991). The title of his works is Liberal Islam and just as Fukuyama tried to find out the potentials of liberalisation in various cultures and societies that might have been expected to be opponent to the world system, he tries to find out the potentials for liberalism in the genius of various Islamic movements. His theory would be successful inasmuch as he achieve in demonstrating everybody runs towards the liberal society of the world, that is toward the "end of history".

The same logic may be available also in the application of the eschatologies of postmodernism mentioned above. As Qutb's formulations of the jurisprudence in the so called post-caliphate conditions, the Islamist claims are available in the world of an antagonism of its own. My contention in this point is to suggest that all such explanations may serve in accomplishing the profile of the antagonisms they witness in their own sight. The Islamic political movements, however, are crying out from one other antagonism whose logic and history is still to be recognised and understood.

Being in System and Having a System: İsmet Özel

Dostlarının eşiğine varınca başlıyor
senin diasporan.
İsmet Özel

In this part of the thesis, I want to give a profile of another important Islamist figure for accomplishing the depictions of the general chain of development in the formation of Islamic political identity in terms of its discourses of diaspora and authenticity. This figure is İsmet Özel; and considering him just after Sayyid Qutb is not a casual choice but is because of their somewhat comparable features. If Qutb has so strongly emphasised

and favoured the importance of practice over theory, Özel's significance in this respect lies in his rather unique formulations of the Islamic practice, of the possibility of the Islamic existence in the foreign systems. Thus, at the beginning, we can say that Özel's diaspora find it's way of expression with the phrase "foreign system". For, his approach to the existence of a Muslim individual or community in unIslamic conditions is performed through a conceptualisation of the system.

Since the early eighties the Turkish Islamism has been employing some new conceptualisations for its self-definition and location in respect of its relation with the existing body politic. In this process İsmet Özel, the old Marxist who declared himself as having been converted in Islam, has had an important role. In our crude classification, the first period of post-caliphatism, whose formulations were sought for in the four important figures, was characterised by a kind of existential irrelevance because of the emptiness brought about by the abolishment of the caliphate which had direct effects on the everyday life. This has led to a special constitution of self-identity pronounced through a discourse of diaspora. We also distinguished a second generation for this diaspora, which has had its characteristic features. This generation grew alongside with the course of various developments in the Turkish social and political life and the reactions (rather than efforts) to adapt to this course, conserving something of its identity. These reactions appeared as an alienation from the public sphere and behaviours of a distorted communication, in Habermasian terms. While we can talk on a series of reactions to the constitution of a new body politic by an imagined community, that is not to say the attitudes of this disembodied community against this body politic have always kept consistent. Actually, the ways through which the Islamists have participated in political activities have made it manifest that the conception of body politic of the Islamists is, in fact, ambiguous. We mentioned before İsmet Özel's explanation for the unique development of the Turkish conservatism. This was a dilemma, for Özel, catching up the Islamists who sought for conserving what remained at their hands from their traditions under attack of secularism. This dilemma seems to be of the same origin with what always has sustained the rightist tendency in Turkish Islamism: Above all, although the foundation of the Republic and its institutions seem to have set up as part of a decisive attack against the Islamic values, they have never sought for a legitimation on a ground of full opposition to Islam. Even the

abolishment of the Caliphate was realised appealing to some religious references for being legitimised. In fact, the Caliphate was not abolished, but the authority it included was transferred from one person to the National Assembly. Together with the democratisation process begun in 1946, and bringing about the government of Democratic Party in 1950, the attempts to abolish the pressures on some religious symbols, especially setting the Arabic calling free, constituted a turning point in the history of the Turkish Islamism. From this point onward, religious liberties have constituted a matter of attraction for democratical life. Religious liberties, at least just as the squatter housings, have been considered by almost all political parties as a standing reserve of votes in spite of all secularist sensitivies. In the political life, the equation has been almost set forth as follows: The more democracy grows, the more religious resurgence is likely to increase. Inasmuch as this is realised by the Islamists, their attitudes towards the Republican body politic i.e., the state apparatus, they become also inclined to orient their body political *habitus,* emerged out of the existence of an Islamic state, to function in service of the existing one. Especially toward the third generation, inasmuch as democratisation is realised, we come to witness an obvious decrease in, or in fact the transformation of, the sense of diaspora. It is too early, however, to pass to the description of this state wherein the diaspora is felt ended, for, before this we want to illustrate even an example within which this sense reached its pick, and to make some remarks.

Actually, İsmet Özel has made the Islamists familiar with a new terminology concerning body politic and political self-identity. In the early period of the postcaliphate condition, the "other" of this self-identity had been represented by the Republican cadres. This "other" sometimes was indicating the "West", sometimes the "Republican regime" as the representative of the West, sometimes the "modernity", and sometimes solely the regime itself. Undoubtedly depending on what it indicated it always included proposition to corresponding political action. Now, what concerns İsmet Özel is the "system". The organised Satan, either in the everyday life or at world-wide, which precludes the participation of wo/men into a perfect Islamic life is embodied through the system in Özel's terminology. In fact, his appeal to this concept recalls the Marxist world-system theoreticians of the seventies, but he do not recognise any chance to a possible Marxist opposition to stand against the world-system. For Özel,

the political organisational dimension of the world-system which usually recalls a conspiracy has very much to do with the everyday human *habitus* and practices. His all political and intellectual efforts, by his own statement, has been advocated to constitute a site of resistance against the world-system.

From his beginning writing daily in *Yeni Devir,* the Islamist newspaper at late seventies and early eighties, in 1977 onwards he has tried, on the one hand, to make profound analysis on the nature, operation and logic of the system and, on the other hand, to develop practical propositions to the Muslims on how their relationships with this system should be set. "The Brain of the System, *Noch Einmal",* "We are Both Inside and Outside the System"[16], "Will the System Settle Accounts Mutually With Islam?", "Will Islam Settle Accounts Mutually With the System?", "The Way For Standing Against the System", "The World-System, Germany and Turkey", "Have the System a Brain?", "The Supports Fort the Opposition to the System"; all these are some examples of the titles including the word "system" among the writings of İsmet Özel. But of course, it should be thought that for a systemic analysis the word has not to be located in the title. For İsmet Özel, what makes an Islamic practice or existence possible lies at its capacity to be set forth against the system or to stand its own system. As a matter of fact, when the Iranian Revolution took place in 1979, he examined it regarding its capacity to open a domain of resisting against the world-system. Then, realising the fact that not the occurrence but the failure of the Revolution would cause a decline in the exchange rate of the dollar, made him pessimist about an expectation from this Revolution for being an occasion for such a resistance. In this sense, it can be said he has been equipped with, or insisted on, a high degree of consistency in his intellectual and political stand which is vouchsafed to very few writers.

Thus, Özel, is inclined to read all history of the Republic as its course to be integrated with the world-system. According to him, Kemalism, is but

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[16]Here, a word play is made inspired by A. Hamdi Tanpınar's poet saying: "Ne içindeyiz zamanın / Ne de büsbütün dışında / Geniş yekpâre bir ânın / Parçalanmaz akışında". Özel applies it in negative way. Here what should be noticad is the conjunture of the system and the time which can not be thought without its ontological connotations. The system is that we are neither inside nor outside of it, which means we are both inside and outside of it. Indeed Özel's conception of the system could be followed from this line necessitating an ontological point of view.

a project of carrying the country to a position of playing perfectly the roles determined by the world-system. The transition to the multiparty regime, the government of the rightist governments (to which Democratic Party constituted an exception), the liberation of religious activities, Islamisation etc. all were, in this sense, to be treated as the historical measurements taken to fulfil the historical requirements of Kemalism. He reads the developments created the Motherland Party of Turgut Özal as part of the modernization of Kemalism. He becomes then, inclined to think of the government position of the Welfare Party too, as part of not its own history or antagonism, but of the requirements of Kemalism. Indeed, in this respect he seems to be a historian of he system rather than of Islamism, and be advocated, together with what he has said and written, to the mission of keeping the Muslims against the system. His comment on the decline of the Populist Republican Party's votes in the last election, in one of his recent writings in the newspaper *(Yeni Şafak)* is very interesting. For him, the Party has accomplished its mission, and that is why its votes are in decline. But that is not to say, the values it represents, and its discourses or forces have been old-fashioned; rather, all these elements have so strongly been absorbed by, and settled within, the social and governmental institutions that there were left no need for being represented by a party. By such way of approach to most of the issues, Özel, while holding himself or his readers awaken against the trickles of the system, he also adopts an extreme voluntarism by indicating and elaborating a conspirative will in a quite paranoiac way. His voluntarism appears both in his depictions of the super performance of the operators of the system to keep the system dominant and in his recognition of an existential possibility for those who would constitute a resistance against this system.

Here, we will take İsmet Özel's way of definition of the existing political system as an important cross-roads in the way of making self-identity by the Islamism of the postcaliphate condition. We chose him in tihs cross-roads, firstly, because he has very characteristic discourse on the phenomena of being deprived of a caliphate, decaliphatisation, or in our words, postcaliphatism, which dominate all of his writings and attitudes. Secondly, his systemic approach has much implications to do with both the process of the constitution of political-identity and the determination of the limits of the everyday life. In this respect, İsmet Özel, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that we are faced with a strongly sophisticated system

having an impersonal nature, and penetrating into all moments and details of people and, on the other hand, showing that all ways to go out of this system and to resist against it, which have been invented hitherto, have been hold by the system as a counter-attack, and almost all possible ways out have been appropriated by it, he represents very pessimistic stand. Considering all his criticisms as valid reasons for being pessimistic, however, he is inclined to render all that he says as an occasion for an infinite will to overcome this pessimism.

Özel's problem begins with positing himself against a socio-politically and intellectually integrated body which is to be called a system. When he gets disillusioned that he is struggling against a system, he recognises that it is not so easy to do it. He begins to ask how one can fight with a system, if the system includes a way of thinking and acting? Especially having realised that the mental and bodily efforts performed against a system considered enemy/opponent have not any conclusive results, he sees that one has to be disappointed and defeated (Özel, 1984: 113; see also the Appendix). And goes on asking "how can one struggle with a system?" If the system is a mechanism operating according to some rules and principles, one has to be aware and catch the essential nature of those principles in order to be able to set forth a struggle. Once doing this, however, hasn't he to be incorporated into the system. If so, after entering into a system, appropriating its ways of thinking, how can one be a radical opponent of that system? Obviously, Özel argues, then, the system has already assimilated his self and made him its own member. Özel affirms that all systems includes their own weaknesses in themselves and they may decline by time through some transformations and decadences, but these weaknesses, he argues, can not be recognised living within the system, even thinking himself as an opponent to the system. He concludes that the systems can be destroyed from outside by foreign elements without being even aware of the logic on which the system work. But for Özel, an Islamic movement can not engrave the sense of victory by so doing and without performing any conscious action. If one day the system is to be overcome by the development of the Muslims, this would be a spontaneous consequence of the growth of its own embodiment, therefore there would not be so valuable thing to be considered.

In his writings at early eighties, Özel arrived at a radical conception of the system and the ways to be protected from the system. But he insisted

that it is not the interest for making an alternative to the system that makes one (individual, social group or social movement) free from the system. For being saved from the system, he refers to some authentic equipments that comes from the essence of some traditions. These traditions suggest essentially not but staying outside the system. Otherwise suggesting alternatives to the system is in very contrast with the Islamic beliefs and ideas. Therefore, for Özel, while all authentic traditions include a potential of resistance against the system, none of them has a "convictional" supporting/reference for excluding the system completely except the Islamic religion. Because it is only Islam that is able to provide a content for the word *"kufr",* which means infidelity in the terminology of Islamic theology, but etymologically has some other dimensions. The word *kufr* in Arabic means "to conceal", "to hide", "to ignore" before it means infidelity in the widespread religious meaning. It is to conceal what is evident. The way of concealment is either practically or mentally which creates a phenomenological life-world as well as the believing which would mean in this sense unconcealment of the concealed evidences. Then, it is only Islam that could mark the existing system as *kufr* in all its phenomenological implications. For, the content of *kufr* can be filled only by an Islamic tradition of faith, so that it is also only the Islamic conception that would be degenerated in case of being merged with the values of modern age. That is, while some other ideas and ideological approaches may be merged with the system without falling into a contradiction of their self-definitions, Islam would have to fall into a self-negation in such case.

Thus, as it seems, Özel refers to quite a radical attitude toward the system through his conception of it as a whole. Therefore one mostly is inclined to ask what is the practical implications of this conception of system. For, if the system is conceived in such a way, there emerges a serious problem of making the everyday practice relevant. As it seems, a negation of such a system should require also a radical regulation of the everyday practice which almost would have not any way out of the system. As we read in Özel's writings, even any attempt to improve an alternative to the system would but reproduce the system. Özel's conception of the system thus recalls Foucault's conception of power which is reproduced in any attempt to overcome it. Özel, refers to some examples from some religious or ideological protesting movements who insisted on the importance of being settled through some formal practices. He reminds and shows that

such movements usually become appropriated by the system and serve in reproducing the system. But then, practically what does it mean to be opponent to the system, or what is the possibility of being outside the system? This is the major question faced by İsmet Özel during his advocating of this conception of the system. When he was asked at early eighties about the consistency of this conception in *Yeni Gündem* that how would it be possible to develop a coherent line of remaining outside the system while one has to be an ordinary consumer of the society, for example, writing with an IBM computer, driving a car and watching TV, his reply constituted a complementary part of his attitude. In his reply, he required to assume that you have to walk on an asphalted road that you want to abolish its asphalt. The only possible way remaining is that you also have to walk on it till you are able to abolish it.

One immediately becomes inclined to ask, then, what is the practical implication or suggestion of this explanation. Probably the apparent conclusion of this would lead to a clear state of political and cultural schizophrenia. For, if the system as embodied through the political, economical and cultural levels tends not to exclude even the alternative efforts to overcome the system, there remains no any practical way to rescue from the system completely except rejecting it at mental level. This is also perhaps the Achiel Heel of Özel's radical criticisms of the system, so that he has usually been faced with questions asking the possibility of making his criticism coherent with his daily practices. Indeed, the possibility of such a coherency is very important in terms of the problem we tried to conceptualise the possibility of jurisprudence in the spaces defined in any way as diaspora. An additional contribution of Özel lies at his comprehensive analysis of the modern times and his attempt to explain the religious meaning of the everyday life in the modern world once conceived as organised into or occupied by a system. In an illustrative dialogue with one of his readers who reminded his radical attitudes and asked how would he account for his everyday practices which are not (or whether or not they can be) essentially different from those who have not any complaint from the system. Replying this question Özel affirms that he writes his writings with an IBM compatible computer and the readers read his writings owing to the functioning of some mechanisms of the system. And immediately he concludes that it is perhaps just because it is impossible to escape from the

system practically that being outside the system mentally gains special significance.

The question searches for measuring the coherence of İsmet Özel's criticisms of the system and of his ideal of being outside the system. That is to say, "what would guarantee that you (Özel) are not also swallowed by the system?"

Then, Özel declares that it would be meaningless to talk if to be practically outside the system is required. As we have seen in the case of Sayyid Qutb in the previous chapter, Qutb was suggesting setting up a community which would be the site of the embodiment of Islamic ideals. This was thought to be a project of creating an alternative forces to the jahiliyya which is an organised identity through a series of practices. For Qutb it was not possible to remain a believer without setting forth a coincident set of practices against the jahili society. Although he had also a global perspective to the world-wide jahiliyye, he didn't considered it impossible to achieve the constitution of such a society at local level. In this sense Qutb's project tended to run in the same course of the circulation of power in the Arabic countries which was characterised by the military intervention or aid to a professional cadre of revolutionists. Although Qutb's vision for constituting a society had never preceded such a revolution of attaining the state apparatus, his suggestions were declared in the political vision of the Arabic revolutionism which had always to promote coming by the political power. Qutb was preceding a constitution of the political body through the community life of a pioneer group. He didn't allow postponing the practising of the Islamic way of life. But what he understood from the "Islamic way of life" was to be interpreted through a hermeneutic considerations of the mutual positions of the community and the text. Although Qutb was relying on the fundamental references, on his unique reading of the history of the prophets which inclined himself to derive a dynamic model, this model could also be sustained by some traditional juridical references such as the customary law *(örf), istihsan and mesalih-i mürsele.* The contribution of Qutb lied in his requirement of a functioning Islamic community for the validity of such techniques. For him, it was the existence of such a community which would give a relevance to the functioning of such techniques.

Then, as it seems Qutb considered it possible, even necessary to put forth an Islamic practice to achieve an existence outside the jahiliyya. But in

İsmet Özel we see a clear difficulty in the possibility of such a practice of which he is also aware. It can be said that it leads to a clear paradox which is perhaps at best expressed poetically in the following words of Özel's poem:

> *"Evet, ilmektir boynmdaki ama ben*
> *kimsenin kölesi değilim*
> *tarantula yazdılar diye göğsümdeki yaftaya*
> *tarantulaymış benim adım diyecek değilim*
> *tam düşecekken tutunduğum tuğlayı / kendime rabb bellemeyeceğim*
> *From "Of Not Being a Jew"*

> Well! It is a loop on my neck, but I am
> not a slave of any body
> the fact that they wrote "tarantula" on the placard on my breast
> can not make me say my name is tarantula
> I will not know the brick as my lord
> the brick on which I hold just while falling.

In spite of all affinity of their sensitivities, the difference, I think, is resulted from Özel's choice to think within a systemic approach which doesn't exclude anything outside a system. Perhaps, Qutb's practical suggestions may seem to Özel as a possible way to be appropriated by the system just because it involves a practical claim. Indeed, as also Binder has pointed out, Qutb's suggestions in turn would hit to the walls of the liberal trend of the globe. Here, Özel seems to be a good political and sociological analyst of the contemporary Islamic movement. His analyses include also a strong political philosophy.

Apart from all these comparative features, Özel's position is strengthened at best through a phenomenological point of view which would insist on the construction of reality through consciousness and values. In spite of all possibilities Özel insists on the point that to try to construct a social body as alternative to the existing hegemonic one would almost necessarily articulate you tragically to the system. But this doesn't mean that one has not to act in accordance with some prophetic suggestions, namely sunnah. Sunnah organises the everyday life, even under the hegemony of the system and if it is to be considered as a constituent of a political identity it has a strong potential to constitute a resisting site against the system.

The constitution of a political identity plays a major role in Özel's conception of an Islamic authenticity. However, he is very sensitive against confusing such a constitution with a modern paradigm. For him, the authentic Islamic identification already includes a making political identity for itself. It may take some modern forms, but this is already the natural share of the spirit of the soil in any possible formation of an Islamic identity. If this spirit of the soil is not to be confused with a kind of racist nationalism, it is affirmed by the Islamic principles and it would have no role in a possible degeneration of the authenticity.

What would degenerate an authentic being as we tried to show is twofold: The general course of modernization together with its associating philosophical premises and its globalisation on the one hand, and the concrete organization of an exploiting system which is running at global level and taking form of a world-system. These two aspects of the embodiment of the "other" can not be separated from each other and any attempt to revolt against these has to be very awaken and sensitive against being articulated or caught up by this system. While all these criticisms may lead to recall the self-reflective aspect of the modern society as conceptualised by Giddens (1991; 1992) and Beck (Giddens & Beck, 1994) as part of the super abilities of the modern Subject, İsmet Özel's conception of the Subject is very sensitive against going beyond the limits of being subject to human destiny. In this sense, Özel's preference in the Islamic faith is Asharism which corresponds to a kind of divine determinism in Islamic history of ideas, while not excluding completely the human responsibility. But what we are responsible to do are determined within the boundaries of our biographies. That is the major constitutive element of conceiving the life as examination.

Apart from this dual aspect of the embodiment of the "other" for İsmet Özel, the political situation of Turkey and the position of the Muslims throughout the period we called post-caliphate, constitutes perhaps the third focus of his analyses and the reason for the political disembodiment of the Muslims. As we mentioned above, the substituting of a secularist government for an Islamic caliphate, now is perhaps the most important component of the political consciousness of Özel. His discourse run heavily around this historical fact and take it as constitutive of the historical consciousness of the contemporary Turkish Islamism. Notwithstanding he never considers the formation of the Turkish politics from the 1923 onward

as a manifestation of an indigenous will. He rather considers the Turkish revolution as an operation for being articulated with the world-system. Therefore, the criticism or analyses of the world-system and the criticism and analyses of the Turkish politics always run together in İsmet Özel. As a matter of fact, he attributes a special significance to the caliphate as well as to its abolishment in terms of the operation of the world system:

> That the caliphate has been abolished in Turkey since 1924 and there appeared nobody claiming caliphate in any other country since then, is very interesting point. If the caliphate was really being, or potentially to be, abused in behalf of the non-Muslims, sometimes of the German and sometimes of the British interests; then, the lords of the world-system could try a path of manipulating it arbitrarily by transferring it from the Ottoman state they defeated in the First World War to a controllable country. They didn't do this. Because, no matter under whatever influences might be, the existence of a caliphate, the maintenance of the caliphate before the eyes, would inevitably stimulate the idea that the Muslims should be thought as an whole, in one body, and this would encourage and sustain the efforts seeking for the realization of the unity of the Muslims. Therefore, the abolishment of the caliph and the caliphate was not sufficient; but it was accomplished by intensive efforts to remove the possibility of a caliphate, the idea of a caliphate, and erase the possibility of its existence from the minds. And this task has been successfully achieved (Özel, 1992: 162-163).

Özel requires a caliphate for the Muslims for constituting a focus, a centre for an embodiment of the Islamic will. The most characteristic feature of the contemporary Muslims is that they are deprived of such a body, albeit he is not so optimistic towards the existing examples of attempts to such an embodiment. When I asked him about the existing discourses on caliphate to restore it in some examples prosed in Britain or in German, he replied that "these attempt are allowed to make the caliphatic notion more manipulatable, in other words to preclude a formation of an Islamic focus." A discourse turning around the importance of the caliphate is, however, important even if it is impossible at the conjuncture. As would be seen, this draws the boundaries of a paradox which approximates to the conditions we tried to identify as a state of diaspora which is very characteristic of the Islamism of the post-caliphate condition. In this description of the state of diaspora, again, the Islamic jurisprudence is afunctional; the everyday life has been engaged to a global organization of a

system which embodies the *kufr* as the "other" of an Islamic attitude; any attempt to go out of this system, to overcome its determination of the everyday life which is very important in realising an authentic identical existence runs immediately the risk of being appropriated by the system; and in spite of all these negative factors the irresistible weight of negating the system leaves almost no way except criticising it and rejecting it at mental level. Although Özel might haven't thought that any kind of organization may preclude the realization of some everyday practices of the Muslims considered among the pillars of Islam, such as praying, fasting, religious taxation or charities etc., his difficulty seems to arise from his consideration of the system as a whole. Such an approach requires considering the everyday life as an indivisible entity. A running system appropriates all activities under its hegemony and it doesn't share its power with any possible formation. All these inclines Özel to promote the significance of the authentic consciousness which is almost remains the only possibility of negating the system.

So far, we tried to outline İsmet Özel's conception of an Islamic identity in terms of the existing conditions of the Muslims which are (in our terms) disembodied and the kufr which is embodied through a system of a world-wide range. We also mentioned Özel's approach to the specific conditions of the Turkish Islam in the course of post-caliphate conditions as integrating his general approach to the world system. This approach has always influenced Özel's attitudes towards some specific discussions or events in Turkish current. For example, against the Islamic version of the civil society projects, Özel's attitude is very characteristic. From the late eighties onward Turkish Islamism may be said to have come into a turning point in terms of its political self-identification in the secularist scene. After a rapid uprising of the Islamism, the political Islamism participated in a discussion of civil society which questioned the nature of the state, its legitimacy in terms of civil society and the nature of the citizenship. This discussion, of course, would require a coming together of various ethnical, ideological and religious groups to talk on the nature of a possible future project of the constitution of a new social contract for the society. Some Islamists such as Ali Bulaç, the sociologist and theologian writer, whose books have always been best-seller among the Islamist youth since the mid-seventies, and Bahri Zengin, one of the most important figures advocating renovation in the political discourses of the Welfare Party, elaborated an Islamic alternative

for the sake of this discussion. It became to be known as Madina Contract, which referred to a historical contract realised between the Prophet and the religious groups staying at Madina, especially the Jews. The argument suggested that the Islamic politics has admitted to live together with other religious or ethnic groups in peace without claiming a domination over each other. As a matter of fact the Prophet has demonstrated the possibility (theoretical at least) of the occurrence of such a 'living together' ideal. Some empirical references were collected from the case of Islamic History, especially of the Ottoman case. It was pointed out that in the Ottoman Empire, the applicability of this model has been tested for at least six centuries. What is important in the Ottoman case in terms of this discussion is especially the autonomous organization of the ethnic and religious groups in their everyday life. And this autonomy was including a freedom of appealing to one's own system of law. Each religious group was free in applying its own jurisprudence even to a certain extent in the public sphere. The general public sphere was organised according to the Islamic law which was serving as over-law as a patronage over the rest.

Indeed, this theme may be said to have provided a joint of the Islamists to the parallel uprising of the liberalist discourse associated with such themes as the end of history, the end of the meta-narratives, or the civil society in its all vulgar implications as crude pluralism. As we tried to show, the nation-state organization of Turkey through the Republic was from the beginning onward considered as alien to the nature of the country. While that was the case for the Islamists inasmuch as it created the notion of a diaspora, it was also the case for some other parts of the country. Now the ideological density of the state was being problematised together with its consequences at the level of liberties and human rights. And this nature of the nation-state, its constitutive elements, become to be questioned after the mid eighties under a company of arriving at a new construction but in the form o a social contract that might be called "second republic". The theme of Medina Contract appeared to be an Islamist affirmative respond to the contractual invitation. Notwithstanding it also corresponded to a strategical stage of the Islamic resurgence in Turkey. For, it was especially promoted by the intellectual part of the Welfare Party which sought for plausible alternatives to overcome the present conflicts and antagonisms in Turkey — the conflict between the so-called secularists and the Islamists, the Turks and Kurds, the Alevite and Sunnis. The projects for overcoming these

religious, ethnical, and political antagonisms would be the new stage in the political course of Islamism in Turkey, that will be analysed in more detailed form in the next chapter.

Now, we have to report Özel's attitude toward this debate as an important level of the proliferation of the Islamism of the post-caliphate condition. The unique position of Özel, which is shared by a considerable part of the Islamists or which is even carried in the ideological genes of the political Islamism, can be read in all his writings. But an interview made with him on his attitude toward the Sivas calamity, where 38 persons, including leftist musicians, poets, men of letter and intellectuals, were killed in a burning of hotel is a very good example to illustrate and concretise his attitude. In contrast, with all uprising discourse in which even the Islamist intellectuals have participated, Özel approached to the issue asking "what was the role of those who died in the burning? Were they leftist or socialist? Were they being there for providing a solution for the problems of the people of Sivas?" He reminds that when he was a socialist he was charged with a populist notion, even when people were reacted against them blaming them for being communists. He tells they thought that "people don't think that all that we want to do is for their sake." But, according to Özel, the died men had lost this just position even in their own eyes. For Özel the residents of the Hotel couldn't go out of the hotel and said to the outside crowd "we are here just for your good." While he added that all that might have been said couldn't justify the murder, for him this, was an occasion to think on the issue. Referring to some words of Aziz Nesin, the humour writer, died in the summer of the year 1995, who was blamed for being the provocateur of all these events as, "we will call the army for intervention if we see the Muslims become dangerous", Özel makes a special emphasis on the "we" in the words and asks "who are those called *we*". Are they the representative of the people of this country or are they a minority thinking themselves over the people or what?

By making such a question Özel refers to his general tendency in formulating the Turkish body politic as composed of a divided entity of two-nations. One of these nations is the indigenous initiative which has been oppressed and rendered passive in all activities and regulations of the world-system. The second one is also actually the dominant one, which is alien to the former one and whose almost all functions is to control the movements of this former one, and to run the operation of the country in the

broad way of the world-system. Özel's famous aphorism always declares that "there is two nations in Turkey and they should be united". That means the latter nation, which is actually governing, should represent the will an interest of the former one and to represent a political resistance against the operation of the world-system which is by its nature exploitive. Therefore, when Aziz Nesin declared that "we will call for the army", Özel responded that "you'd better call for Serbian planets, because they have been professionalised in killing Muslims." To a question asking how he evaluates the attempts for coming together with the secularists for constructing a new contract Özel's response is very interesting in this sense:

> Turkey is in an encounter with the Muslims because she has been in the need of listening the voice of this nation since 1945. Now you tell about the dialogue of the secularists and the Muslims. The people with whom you fight are those who have been trying to regain their basic rights since the 1945; the rights that had been captured by the course of Turkish modernization through the abolishment of the Caliphate and the establishment of the Republic. Now, under the name of contract you want to take the return the positions they have been achieving since the 45. Turkey has passed from a period of a single party government. It has had some consequences. You can not take these consequences as given as if they are innocent, legal and justified and invite me talking on such a ground. We should initially talk on those things. At first some have to ask for pardon for what they have done, then... I don't now what is then. We haven't taken the revenge yet (Özel, 1993).

Özel argues that secularism in Turkey has been applied to hold the Muslim people (as the genuine nation) under oppression (by the nation of the sovereign). If it is so, Özel asks how could it be argued that it would had better compromising the wronged with the wronger? If we can not talk on a spontaneous development of the secularisation, and if rather this process has occurred as an imposition, Özel goes on asking, is there a part of people having participated into a long-term struggle for being secularist or it as occurred just as an imposition of the authority. Then Özel argued that there is a stolen money, and a man whose money stolen, and some other who admit that he has stolen the money. Then, Özel asked, how one whose money has been stolen is expected to say "well I have a share (and only a share) in the stolen money? If the information that the money is stolen is at present, then, the only one that is to be made is to be helpful in returning the money to its true owner.

Thus, the last component of Özel's attitude toward the existing political system as the part of the world system becomes prominent. Together with the other components they create an almost unescapable world for a Muslim, wherein he always have to be in a state of deep anxiety. While the so called disembodiment has played a crucial role in the diaspora conception of the Islamists, for Özel the problem of diaspora can not be reduced to a simple political or social disembodiment. An existentially authentic position is of more central interest of Özel's questioning. As we tried to illustrate the sophisticated and well-organised nature of the system may very easily create an illusion in the minds of the anti-systemic attempts that it has been overcome, while it has already appropriated these attempts. One can believe that he has created a world for himself, into which the system couldn't penetrated, while in fact he has been just a part of the system. But what makes a social movement or an individual action inauthentic is not only the system as an actor. Özel makes often references to some Islamic mystical elements in stimulating an anxiety (of himself and of his readers) of being awaken towards the human task in the world. He thus tries to keep alive a sensitivity to capitalise and appropriate a religious commitment or identity as a racial right. The Islamic identity is process rather than being a constant sign of a group. While he is clearly in search of the "we" as a religio-political identity, he is also clearly very opposed to the racial-like conception of this "we". The "we" is the result of a process, and it is also constituted during the process in Özel and it begins to be experienced with the ritual access, namely *"iman"*, that means faith, belief, conviction and commitment. Referring to a verse from the Qur'an saying "O believers, believe in ...", he deduces that Qur'an requires the men who have already believed to believe again. That is a general strategy of the Qur'anic (and Islamic) teaching that is manifested through some life examinations of the believers to test their faith, to render their faith not an ascribed attribute but an achieved level that should be achieved ceaselessly. Therefore, a believer may loss his authenticity while he feeling himself at the state of higher commitment ton Islamic social or political body. Because he probably has conceived that level as a mark of his worldly place; or he has attributed consciously or unconsciously an additional meaning or goal to his commitment; or more importantly this commitment might have occurred within some misconceptions of the God, Man, Nature and their interrelationships. That dynamic process keep alive the existential anxiety

which might correspond to the diaspora of İsmet Özel. Probably that is why he says in his poem *Of Not Being a Jew:* "Kardeşlerin pogrom sana / Dostlarının eşiğine varınca başlıyor / senin diasporan / Herkesin bahanesi var senin yok".

This sensitivity in İsmet Özel's thought which can be said to have come from his poetical personality, finds a close affinity in Heideggerian conception of authenticity and existential anxiety. Özel's first study analysing three important concept, and the ways he follow in treating these concepts give the clues of this affinity which would be later more intensive. Considering Heidegger's special concern with the question of technology, this affinity begins even from the choice of the object of study onward. For İsmet Özel's objects are Technique, Civilisation and Alienation. He problematises these three conceptions as an introduction to formation of an authentic Islamic way of thinking. These concepts or problems are the products of the existing civilisation which is a system in itself. For being able to think Islamicly we have to be faced with these concepts which are essentially alien to an Islamic way of thinking. We have to be faced with them because they are dominant all-over the world.

The technology has already penetrated into the world; we are always tempted to be civilised as human beings; and especially as a modern conception we have been inclined to be alienated to an "essential" definition of humanity. Özel very strikingly questions all these conceptions and argues that, technology in as much as penetrating into all everyday life can not be separated from culture. It has much to do with the conception of the man's relationship with the God and with the nature which is established in unislamic way. Therefore he tries a radical negation of technology.

In relation with the concept of civilisation Özel makes an interesting diagnosis: that is, while the civilisation is measured with the level of the urbanisation and thereby through some signifier as architectural works, we forget the fact that all such works of the civilisation has come into presence at the stage of stagnation or decline of a civilisation, and that urbanisation is the last stage of a decadence of some values and authentic merits. Because at the constitutive or initiative stage of a nation people's concern is rather with the realization of more authentic ideals. The building of some huge architectural works therefore refers to the decadence of some constitutive elements of a nation rather than to the merit of a civilisation.

Lastly, referring to the discussion on alienation in the current of the social sciences, Özel argues that social theorists stems from a notion of human being that is self-sufficient and a manifestation of the sovereign Subject of the Enlightenment. The alienation, in the social scientific current, therefore, is seen as the accident passed over the Man and removed him from his natural abilities. Özel sees a sublimation of the natural, animal man in this conception, who is determined by the natural conditions. Referring to the Islamic notion of man as having dual aspect ranging between the natural being and his contract with God, or between the soil and the spirit of the God, Özel instead sublimates the alienation itself inasmuch as he treated it as a journey to escape from the domination of natural conditions. The Man is man because of his alienation, and only man can be alienated and this is his venture of existence itself. Therefore, the authenticity of the Man lies in his alienation. That is why it is said in the Qur'an by the God that "I shall create a successor (caliph)". Caliph, here means that who has inherited somethings which changed himself. The Arabic word for the Man, that is *insan,* is derived from the word *e n s.* It means to be companionable, sociable, nice, friendly, genital etc. Among the all alives it is only the Man that can be a successor of somethings. And this is the name of his authenticity. But this caliph may take a voluntaristic form, that is man can approach critical to his traditions and this is another level of his alienation; and alienation is something to be desired rather than to be negated.

In his foreword and appendix to the second edition of *Üç Mesele,* Özel refers to the paradox we tried to locates in the state of diaspora in the terms of radicalism and utopia. Drawing attention to his radical attitudes towards various issues as well as to these basic ones as technique, civilisation and alienation, Özel wants to warn the reader not to confuse his attitudes with an utopianism, because he doesn't suggest any alternative system which should necessarily be a mirror image of the existing system. But this is a special kind of the utopia which is a projection departing from the existing conditions and which is therefore limited by the present perspective. The construction of an utopia implies an idea that man knows what is better for himself and what is worst ultimately. For Özel such an idea is contrary to the Islamic conception of man. For, its underlying notion is a sovereign self-sufficient Subject. Indeed, every human notion/claim is not but an acknowledgement of the ignorance of the created about the process of creation. The positive aspect of the utopia from Islamic point of view, thus,

appears in the conscious comprehension that we don't obey to the domination of *kufr*; in knowing deeply and certainly the possibility of living without compromising with the *kufr* and finally in believing that the promise of the God will be realised.

Similarly, man can not suggest a radical solution without going beyond his limits of finitude. While İsmet Özel is extremely a radical thinker, he insists that his radicalism should be distinguished from the radical suggestions. He argues that the conception of the problems in a radical way is our praising side. On the other hand, to offer a radical solution to a problem is a claim for godness. Indeed, one who has comprehended a problem radically, has already understood the fact that the solution is not in his hand. Those who are not radical in their comprehension can not be right in their direction.

> To think about the *Three Problems* comes to the meaning of thinking about the bases of the global rule of unbelief *(kufr)* Alienation is thought which is invented as one sets out with the hypothesis that the highest form of existence concerns the matter of what the son of Adam is able to know and do. Because of this, all positive values are assumed to be achieved by means of the perfection of humankind. But this acceptance and contemplation of the inevitable superiority of man will bring with it the inevitability and legitimacy of a *civilisation* which is considered a developed stage of what man is and what man can do. This inevitable and legitimate *civilisation* will in turn endow the means which sustain its vitality with legitimacy, immunity, and eventually necessity. A compulsory *technology* will make a *civilisation* compulsory, and humanism will sustain its sovereignty over men as an oppressive thought. Against this trinity of powers, the single thing that we have as Muslims is that we are in the position of defending the morality of Islam (Özel, 1984: 187; English translation by Meeker, 1993: 171).

Özel is aware that he puts the morality against the force. And in spite of all the widespread materialistic approaches to the formation of a culture and of a system he still insists on the mental acceptance of a value system. For him, this dichotomy of morality and power is not a new dichotomy but its traces can be followed back to the history of the prophets. He reminds that while the *mushriks* of Mecca proposed some worldly advantages in exchange for giving up his ethical and religious claims the underlying idea of their offer was that a calling for morality was a sign of weakness, of a will to power. Özel admits that the powerfuls are not completely wrong in

so thinking. Because the callings for morality whose foundation is not other-worldly are not against despotism but against the oppressor. Therefore the Western thinkers who treated all these issues as problems couldn't do anything but reproducing this trinity of power at another level. In turn, he concludes that The solution of these three problems lies at their outside, at faith and worshipping.

Thus, we tried to give a profile of a radical Muslim intellectual in terms of the issues discussed here. As we have seen İsmet Özel's conception and criticism about the system is at least threefold. He thinks of the system as an indivisible entity at global level, of the existing Turkish socio-political construction as an articulation with this system. Finally he thinks of his relationships with such a system as an existential problem and tries to develop an appropriate perspective or theory (although he don't enjoy using this word for naming his efforts) to encounter with it. As might have been seen, the importance of Özel in terms of the issues discussed here is lies primarily at his emphasising the crucial role of a well-organised system, which is usually the name of the modernity itself in Özel's terminology, in the making of an Islamic identity and in the formation of an Islamic everyday life together with it's paradoxes, in such world of us. By so doing Özel provides a strong framework for a possible Islamic political theory as well as a sociology of modernity for the contemporary Turkish Islamism. By his characteristic style of writing, that is short, literary and exhaustive, and poetical personality, which was described by himself as resulted from an "uninhabited nobility" (Tevarüs edilmemiş bir asalet, Özel, 1988), he has also provided the highest intellectual level of expression of the Turkish political Islamism. He has been defeated through various kinds of conspiracies but he is waiting and being prepared for the ultimate revenge. His attitude towards the existing body politic of the Turkish Republic gives a good example and also an important stage in the formation of the Islamist attitude. As we tried to show the embodiment of the Turkish Secularist State has meant a disembodiment of an imagined community of the Muslims since the early twenties. Therefore, the Republic period of Turkey has constituted the major element of the post-caliphate condition of the Turkish Islamism. And, in theorising this condition from an Islamist point of view, Özel's approach has constituted an important momentum whose basic feature lies at his involving the globalisation perspective and the individual responsibility in resisting against the world-system. Then, the systemic

approach appears to be an important element in describing a post-caliphate condition, especially in terms of the influence of the system in the possibility of an authentic everyday life. İsmet Özel's radical approach, including a description of such an almost indivisible and irresistible refer to and define a paradoxical condition in the place of this post-caliphate one. While that giving the clues of a repetition of the common theme, which we have chosen to call diaspora, Özel's special contribution at poetical-existential, or in other words at philosophical level, render this diaspora as a human fate. Notwithstanding his awareness of this paradox has led him to solve it by distinguishing the practice without approval and practice with approving the system. This has appeared as a contradiction in the general readings of İsmet Özel by his special readers, so that one of his readers, Adnan Kebenç, asked him in a newspaper article that "Why did İsmet Özel Hit Us from Behind?". The discussion including the article by Kebenç, and İsmet Özel's responds and some other writings on the system and the daily life of the Muslims regarding the system are given in the appendix chapter.

In this discussion Kebenç, blames Özel for showing us a fast way out the back door of the difficulty of the problem. For him, applying to such a way of explanation which legitimated the gap between theory and action Özel has fallen into a clear contradiction with his own approach appeared in the *Üç Mesele* onward. Kebenç point out that they, the young Muslim intellectuals have learned from İsmet Özel himself that "all civilisations have a logic of themselves. In order to be free from the mental operation of modernity they become inclined to choose a way of excluding the formal and practical engagement with modernity. For, every form had to impose a mentality, in Özelean Islamic teaching. Kebenç argues that if one (motivated by Islamic principles) considers the mental background of the computer his fingers can not go to the keyboard. A mental opposition should lead to precluding a physical meeting. If one's stomach meets with a food which is not approved by the mind to vomit becomes irresistible. Otherwise the mind would either not be honest in the claim of opposition or it has already accommodated to the situation. That would probably be the verification of the famous prophetic tradition saying: "If you don't act as you believe, you begin to believe as you act". According to Kebenç, acting in contrast with the belief corresponds to the actual separation of mind and body, namely to a schizophrenia. Özel's paradox, according to Kebenç,

stems from his not giving for eating the content of the egg while he insists on not breaking its shell.

Notwithstanding the paradox, I think, begins with presuming the system or modernity as an indivisible entity which doesn't exclude anything under the sun. To define such a world, from which one can not escape without giving for the life itself, create really a huge paradox for the Muslims of the post-caliphate period. This paradox conceives of all places as nowhere, where the Islamic jurisprudence, everyday life, and even more global projections become irrelevant. I think, that is the most prominent problem of the so-called Islamism of the post-caliphate condition. We tried to give a brief profile of the proliferation and variation of the Islamic responses to this condition beginning from the early period, that is from Mehmed Akif to İsmet Özel. In this profile we tried to distinguish a theme of diaspora which has much to do in the interpretation of the authenticity. In Sayyid Qutb, for example an authentic Islamic existence is always possible, but this possibility is provided at the cost of (or owing to) operating the dynamic aspect of the jurisprudence. In so doing, we have seen that a usual risk is run. That is, such an aesthetic approach may lead to a delivery to modernization of the religion or to liberalism as a legitimative factor. In any way we may appreciate that in Qutb such problem as that discussed by Özel and Kebenç may not arise. Because for Qutb, the individual will to commit in God's religion excluding every kind of human authority can not be determined without the content of the individual. There should always remain a domain on which the individual could achieve his human responsibilities to negate all kind of obedience to the subjects of the God. In the case of the debate between Özel and Kebenç, however, the paradox is established in such a way that one can not exceed it without reproducing it. Really the best words to express this paradox is the egg metaphor. If the Islamic responsibility lies at eating the content of the egg, there should be a way for being ready to break its shell. Otherwise the only way would be to live with the paradox, and exceeding the paradox usually goes hand in hand with a delivery to a secularisation in everyday life.

In the next chapter we will try to analyse the phenomenon of Welfare Party as another stage in the story we tried to narrate in terms of the formation of the political identity through some body politics (or politic of body) and thereby through a thematisation of diaspora which dominated the political action in relation with the existing political authority.

CHAPTER VII

A POSTMODERN APPROPRIATON
OF A BODY CAPITAL

At the cost of vulgarising a Bourdiean concept which adapted some economic formulations to the cultural and symbolic sphere, I will try to suggest that the body as an individual entity and as a political apparatus is conceived as a capital in the process of policies to regulate the body. According to Bourdieu, symbolic forms such as dress codes and body postures are important in understanding the social function of symbols. Such symbolic systems which mostly operate through the bodily postures, thus, become the instruments of knowledge and domination, which make a consensus possible within a community as to the significance of the social world, as well as contributing to the reproduction of the social order. Bourdieu distinguished the symbolic, cultural, political and economic kinds of the capital and conceived them as coinciding each other. It has been accepted that, by so doing, Bourdieu has applied some Marxist themes to various domains of life, which were ignored by the classical Marxism, through his own way of synthesising between Marxist analysis of economic capital, phenomenology and structuration theory. Thus, for example he identified the symbolic world as a capital "a transformed and thereby disguised form of physical 'economic' capital, produces its proper effect inasmuch, and only inasmuch, as it conceals the fact that it originates in 'material' forms of capital which are also, in the last analysis, the source of its effects" (Bourdieu, 1977: 183).

    The struggles between symbolic systems to impose a view of the social world defines the social space within which people construct their lives, and carry on what Bourdieu sees as the symbolic conflicts of everyday life in the

use of symbolic violence of the dominant over the dominated, i.e., education, relationships in the workplace, social organisations, even in conceptions of good taste and beauty. According to Bourdieu the social space is a space of status groups which are characterised by different lifestyles (Harker, Mahar & Wilkes, 1990: 5).

To repeat, at the cost of a vulgarisation of this theory of Bourdieu we can see the body of the modern Turkish citizens as a capital inasmuch as it is conceived as a site over which all symbolic struggles take place. The existing political apparatus has chosen a way for embodiment through a direct reflection on the individual bodies since its emergence. "Being dressed like the European nations" has been considered as the most important signification of being engaged to the general process of modernization, just as it has given a life to the modern body politic. This strategy of embodiment through a discipline on the body has also been the source of a resistance against the existing authority. The intervention to the body has constituted a permanent source of nutrition for the opponents. As we tried to show the Turkish Islamism has kept a political identity through a discourse of diaspora owing to the difficulty of social and political embodiment under the domination of the existing body politic. In this relatively short history of Turkish Islamism which is characterised by a post-caliphate condition we identified a discourse of diaspora. This discourse or sense of diaspora has been very influencive in constituting the political identity of the Turkish Islamism which had much to do with the (im)possibility of jurisprudence and the religious strategies for the distortion of communication *(taqiyyah)*. Notwithstanding the Turkish Islamism has had another dimension which has to be considered here. That is, Turkih Islamism has been participating into political struggle at least since 1946, in one sense of a systemic approach paradoxically as a part of the existing body politic, but considered as possibly fragmented entity as demanding a restoration of lost rights of the oppressed people of the country. The history of democracy in Turkey, therefore has been also the history of the restoration of the Islamic political embodiment. So that, the Turkish democracy has been caught by a paradox of democracy versus secularism. Because the symbolic capital which is manifested through the body, has been the matter of struggle between at least two major groups. Undoubtedly there might be found some dialectical aspects in this struggle. This might have some economic roots, but following Bourdieu, its symbolic capital

dimension can be treated autonomously. In the Turkish case secularism has always constituted an occasion for penetrating into bodies which in turn constituted the political body of the republic. And the democratisation has always immanently manifested and grown a resistance or a challenge of the other, of the oppressed against the secular domination of body. But here, the body, either the political or the individual one, has constituted a site, a capital over which a struggle has taken place. And Islamism has constituted a protagonist of that struggle during this process of democratisation, together with all its strategies of giving a struggle. That is the coin of the story of Islamism in the post-caliphate condition.

Together with the democratisation which began in 1946 elections the Islamic politics of embodiment began to work through taking back some positions and conserving some positions under attack. Therefore the first manifestation of the Islamism in Turkey has been dressed with a vision of conservatism, as mentioned in the previous chapters. There has been founded several parties with the beginning of multiparty regime in Turkey. The most important emphasis of almost all those new emerged parties was that made on the liberty of religious life which was thought to be coincided wit the liberation of the people. It was as it is still really an irony that all parties founded as opposed to the Republic Party and as advocating the restoration of religious life were promoting the democracy and the nation itself. This of course,

> helped to bring religious interest to the fore, as rival candidates who had at first eschewed any concern for religion in their political platforms soon changed their minds and added appeals to the religiously inclined to their campaign promises. Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, the late hero of the war of liberation and a devout Muslim, helped to found the Nation (Millet) Party in 1948, and many conservatives, including those who sought a revitalised, traditional Islam in Turkey, rallied to him. Another, more subtle, yet also more important outcome of the development of new political parties in relation to Islam in Turkey was the fact that, in their search for votes, all parties, but the democrats in particular, turned to Turkey's oft-forgotten man and his family —the peasant majority of Turkey (Reed, 1954).

Indeed, this "oft-forgotten man and his family" figure has been usually applied to explain the social origin of the Islamic revival. Many sociological approaches such as that of Nur Vergin tends to explain this revival in terms

of the circulation of the elites in society as the promotion of the migrated religious peasant from the doorkeeper flats to the upper flats of the apartment. In the following we will mention some versions of these approach which became very fashionable in explaining the political rise of the Welfare Party. In this context, here we will suffice with mentioning the possible origin of a protagonist of the struggle taking place over the political body and individual bodies which is suggested to be conceptualised as capital. But from the story we tried to narrate the antagonism in question is not to be reduced to a circulation of the economic capital, and to mere collective economic demands of a rising group. Undoubtedly there can be identified in this antagonism some features or elements of such occurrences. Even there can be drawn some other pictures of this phenomena, or some other *risoms* in Deleusean sense (Yıldırım, 1995: 79), of it may be chosen to be put in the focus. What I want(ed) to do is to point out the existence of another important aspect of this phenomena, which should be approached phenomenologically; or speaking with argumentation promoted by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), to realise the plurality of the antagonisms which have been ignored and all reduced to economic ones.

As a matter of fact, to repeat, the pass to multiparty regime has also broken the existing monopoly over the right of embodiment and of exercising power on bodies which in turn at least two major tendencies which corresponded all social divisions of the Turkish society. The political expression of the religion has gone hand in hand with the steady rise in number and frequency of privately sponsored practices or enterprises marking an outgrowth of revived interest in Islam. These included private mosque construction and support; private religious education; pilgrimage to Mecca and to local shrines; public observance of prayer and the fasting month of Ramazan; substantial, even crowded, attendance at mosque services; deferential respect shown to the increased numbers of those wearing apparently religious garb, especially the rapidly increasing numbers of those head cover among students is worth of more attention; the popularity of religious ejaculations or phrases in colloquial speech; the use of religious talismans in public places, especially in conveyances such as buses or taxis; the rising popularity of religious groups or orders (although dervish orders are still outlawed); the spate of publications catering almost exclusively to religious interests; considerable press coverage of events in other Islamic countries; private participation of leading personalities in

Islamic congresses abroad; substantial private support of government-sponsored schools to train religious leaders and preacher; the large number of students attending these institutions and enrolling in the Faculties of Divinity; the daily press announcements of the semi-public recitation of the great Turkish religious folk poem, *Mevlidi Sherif* of Süleyman Çelebi, after death and on special family occasions; the willingness, even eagerness of people in virtually all walks of life to discuss religious questions and their ability to be more realistic and more critical in their evaluation of them; the demand for properly qualified imams in rural villages; and finally, the frank, general recognition that too much time has gone by without attention to these matters that it behooves individuals and the community to reevalutae their spiritual position and rededicate themselves to an Islam which can and should properly demand more of their wholehearted allegiance. Then, as it is well-known, restrictions against giving the call to prayer in Arabic were removed in 1950. The reading of selections from the Qur'an over the state radio network has also been scheduled regularly and now with the commercialisation of mass communicational apparatus there emerge numerous private channels into which the religious recitations or propaganda is made very intensively.

Indeed, all this profile of steps taken in the domain of religious practices is a rarely revised depiction of the position of religion in 1954 in Turkey by Reed. One easily becomes inclined to think there has not taken place a need to revise this profile except somehow overemphasising the special role of the head cover, known as *turban* of the girls in the universities and the embodiment of the discourses of political Islamism through the Welfare Party inherited from the National Order and then National Salvation Party.

On the part of the secularist body of practices, we can remind at first the collection of wearings which were introduced through the law regulating attire (kıyafet kanunu) and constituting a revolution against the old fashion of wearings; then, the substitution of the Gregorian calendar for the Hegira calendar, of the Western units of measurement for the traditional ones, of the Latin alphabet for the Arabic alphabet etc. The declaration of the surname law has much to do with breaking the nexus of the social interrelationships and stratification of the Ottoman society and creating citizen individuals in terms of the homogenisation of the society. The new musical and artistic tendencies such as the classical Western music, the new

trends in architecture etc. were introduced as symbols of the victory of the Turkish revolution. They all were charged with somehow semi-religious significations. It should be remembered that the classical Turkish music had been forbidden until the early fifties, so that the first performances of the Turkish music from the radios was considered as symbolising the liberation of the voice of the ordinary people. The stuff of the Republic played a pioneer role in establishing the new Western habits which were considered altogether as the only road to civilisation. Thus, the manner of Western civilisation manifested in the daily life as a court society, in Eliasean terms, was encouraged. For this, for example, the daily habits of the people were changed by a total education either in the schools or in the houses of people (halkevleri). Thus the Turkish people began to use "günaydın" for the "good morning" and "tünaydın" or "iyi akşamlar" for the "good afternoon" as a Turkish translation of the "bonjour" and "bonsoir" instead of the "selamünaleyküm" (peace be on you). This apparently simple change in the greetings, undoubtedly has had important consequences in the conception of time and of the social reciprocity. By all these interventions to the everyday life manners and symbols, introducing the court manners of eating, wearing and behaving into the general public to resemble the Western society, there were aimed to create a civil society following the path of the Western model. As Elias informed us all these manners spread spontaneously because they corresponded to the social ideals of the rising bourgeoisie, and they adopted the ceremonial behaviours of the court as their lifestyle (Elias, 1978; 1982; 1983). But just as the general line of its modernization, the reconstruction of the everyday life also followed a way that required an immediate state intervention.

Since the secularists sought to represent the unity of the community not by a reference to Islam, but by articulating nationalism, they tried to eliminate everything connotating an Islamic identity. It was 'nation' that was used to undermine Muslim identity, and weaken the claims of Islam as the foundation of the various Muslim societies. Therefore, much of all those reformations were introduced not only to imitate the Western society but also to reinvent a 'Turkish' identity. The nation became a prime source of loyalty and solidarity and it was justified by the formation of historical narrative. Thus, 'the Turk' was used to replace 'The Muslim' as a historical subject.

As Sayyid argues in his article, wherein he applies the word Kemalist to refer to those "Muslims who rejected the use of Islam as a political signifier and who sought to bring, however mediated, a reconstruction of society in which the role of Islam would be analogous to the role of Christianity in the post-reformation Western Europe; to all those Muslims who rejected the use of Muslim metaphors, who felt that Islam should not interfere with the state" (Sayyid, 1994: 269). In order to constitute themselves as Western, the Kemalists had to deny and and repress any traces of the Orient. This was necessary, because, the West was constituted through its opposition to the Orient. For modernization, the Kemalists believed they had to Westernise; but paradoxically the very nature of Westernization meant Orientalisation. For, given that the identity of the West was constituted vi-à-vis the Orient, they had to continue to articulate an identity of the Orient to constitute themselves as Western. The identity of the Orient could not be reduced to an aggregate of features and practices. The rejection had to be of that which unified all these elements into the Orient. According to Sayyid for the Kemalists:

> …to be Western, one had to reject more than the Oriental; that is, one had to reject more than the use of the veil, the fasting in Ramadan, and so on. The rejection had to be 'superhard' as it involved a certain metaphorical surplus: the rejection of the impossibility of being the other (ibid: 270).

Although in the following lines Sayyid argues that in this binary logic, representing the West meant the impossibility of being the Orient, another aspect of this logic was that it was not only the limit but also a threat to the West, and that Kemalism, by orienting itself towards the West, and embarking on the project of Westernization, indeed, did nothing but necessarily (re)producing an Oriental subject, which may explain the rigid and sharp line they followed in settling the revolutions along with the destruction of the then existing Islamic identity.

Now, turning back to our initial propositions in this chapter, we aimed at identifying a capitalisation on the body (of individual or political kind) and a final struggle given in this context. Then, what should be noticed here is that there has taken place a deep conflict within the Turkish society, at least since the foundation of the Republic, on the body which has been demonstrated through the bodily postures at symbolic levels. Indeed this

struggle has its corresponding origins or extensions at economic and political levels. As it seems, each group has chosen to be expressed or embodied through a set of symbols of its own. This created a number of binary oppositions of the mosques versus schools, pilgrimage versus Çankaya or Kocatepe versus Anıtkabir, turban versus hat or modern wearing, Praying with Fatiha versus esteeming stand, the Birth Recitations of the Prophet versus the national festivals including the death day of Atatürk (10 November) and the constitution of the National Assembly (20 April) and of the Republic (29 October), the classical Turkish Music versus the Western (classical or popular) music etc. My contention in this chapter is to show that while, at the beginning, the symbols were applied exclusively, that is, the hegemony of one symbol necessarily implied its opposite coincident, now the use of these symbols have become mingled with each other in a confusing way. Especially from the first democratising steps onward, the symbols of both sides have converged to each other to form a total entity and constituted a grand total of the national capital of symbols ready-at-hand to be used for reproducing, reforming or constituting new identities. Nowadays, the Kemalists —except the radicalist ones— rarely exclude the Islamic symbols. The Kemalism of the democratic Turkish society also has included or appropriated gradually/increasingly the Islamic symbols which had been excluded for 27 years of the mono-party period. It has become very usual to witness a Kemalist portray who attends to Anıtkabir, sending his children to modern schools, wearing a hat but also praying, fasting, going on a pilgrimage, participating in some religious recitations etc. While, for the majority of the Islamists, who have deep roots in the major part of the society, it would be not so easy to say the same thing, I will try to find such a tendency in the political expression of the Islamism, namely the Welfare Party and in some policies of other Islamic communities, such as that which is known as Fethullahçılar. I will argue that in the political discourse of these groups, there appear an interesting way of appropriation of Kemalist symbols, but of course in accordance with the postmodern manner of politics. That is, especially in the policies of the Welfare Party, there may be observed a clear applications of a spontaneous deconstruction of the existing dominant symbols and appropriating them through a reconstruction. The symbols as a whole were taken as a capital and a very strategic struggle is given for its appropriation. Thus, I've chosen

to call this a postmodern appropriation of a body capital and suggest that it constituted a turning point in the self-identification of the political Islamism.

A Turning Point in the Political Self-Identification of Islamism: Refah Partisi

So far we tried to identify a trend in the political identification of the Islamism of the so called post-caliphate condition. We tentatively that one of the major characteristic of the Islamism has been lying in its conception of itself in a state of diaspora which, in turn, has brought about a problematic interrelationship of the text, jurisprudence, political and individual bodies. A political self-identity relying on a discourse of diaspora, to some extent necessitates a social isolation, seclusion or at least a distortion of communication of which religious justification or appearance may take place in a form of camouflage i.e., taqiyyah. This means a strict polarisation of the political agents against the existing political state and its subjects which, altogether, constitute the infidel Others. As we have seen both in the analysis of the "system" and in some literary productions of the Islamists as the Men Who Grow Roses, this polarisation has played a crucial role in the constitution of an Islamic political self-identity. Thus, the state, as the embodiment of the Western modernity in Turkey, which transformed the space into its own forms, together with its institutions, has been conceived as the embodiment of the "Other". Then, the relationships with it has been problematised in terms of the possibility of the jurisprudence. Their doing so may be criticised for also constituting the weakness of the Islamic movement in terms of producing appropriate policies relying on appropriate political theory. As we have seen again, the systemic conception of the existing nexus of the socio-political relationships is perhaps the most sophisticated approach, for, it also includes an attempt to explain the existing social disembodiment at the level of everyday life experience in relation to the political relevances of the globalisation process, as well as of the relatively micro formation of the political self-identity in the Turkish political life. This approach too relied on the strict otherness of the existing political apparatus. And the Islamists kept a semi-religious sensitivity against political participations due to the fear of integration with the system. The system is an integral indivisible entity or body of the other. No organic

action attributable to it might be possible without negation of itself and revival of the system. Then, the system in this conception has its own personality which participates in the action of the religious agent as an independent social actor and affect his actions. Indeed, one can speak of a reification or personification of the system as well as the reification or personification of the modernity which is thought as an independent, indivisible actor, inasmuch as one can ask the question "who is modernity". But that is itself the the subject of another study. Now, what we want to do is to remind the alienation, to some extent of some political agents to the existing social system in order to be able to locate the political discourse of authenticity and self-identity of the Welfare Party in a sequence.

The first edition of İsmet Özel's *Üç Mesele* ends with the declaration of this paradox: To arrive at an Islamic society first, and then to try to strengthen it, or, to arrive at a strong society and then to try to Islamise it? That is probably one of the most important paradox before the Welfare Party or any other institutionalised Islamic movement, which have come from the tradition of the so called diaspora. For, to participate in the political activities in the boundaries of the existing system, within which all are thought to be appreciated and encoded as legal, would lead to legitimate it. The Islamic movement has, to a large extent, relied on the claim of the genuine property of existing political power which has been occupied or stolen by the Westernist others. Then, it also included a further claim that for a relevant political participation, the stolen property should be restored in a way of revenge. While that is the characteristic underlying discourse of almost all Islamic movements, it has not been so useful in producing an appropriate and coherent policy. While this attitude has preceded the former part of the paradox in question i.e., arriving at an Islamic society and then trying to strengthen it, it has been seen that no Islamic movement can succeed without proving itself to a considerable portion of the society. For doing so, one firstly has to contribute in solving the social, economical and political problems of his society. For the society doesn't acknowledge the rightfulness in itself of a movement or of a social group and as it has very clearly seen the identification of the Turkish or probably of the all so called Islamic societies with an innately Islamic character is not but a political construction. Promoting and insisting on such a construction as a ground for an Islamisation policy, in all its implications for authenticity, have failed to find a corresponding echo in the society. Furthermore it has created another

problem of legitimacy of the Islamic movements in Turkey as well as in most other Islamic societies. Indeed, this is the major reason why the political expression of the Islamic movement in Turkey has experienced a shifting from insisting on salvation, which required a semi-religious emphasis, to insisting on welfare which is charged rather with this-worldly emphases.

Indeed, the National Salvation Party too had already strong emphases and promises on the heavy industrialisation of the country. The steps taken towards realising this programme had been characterising the discourse of the Party. And it had already this emphasis that stimulated some criticisms claiming more authenticity in religious discourse and demanding the precedence of an Islamic society before trying to strengthen it. For these criticisms the efforts to strengthen it without conditioning a change in the system would not but be articulated with the existing political organism. And the existing organism and the spaces it occupied were altogether being conceived as belonging to the sphere of the Other of the profane. There were no other attitude to be taken except rejecting it. Because, to some extent, the constitution of the political identity relied on the possibility of the negation of this Other. Indeed the Salvation Party has, from the beginning, been engaged with the problems of the country. Even it introduced itself as a pioneer of the progression of the society, through the projects it suggested for a rapid and effective heavy industrialisation. Notwithstanding, the central emphasis of the Party was still on the Salvation that was of religious connotations, and it was hardly interested with the economical and social problems of the society except the requirement of the quest for vote in the electoral system. In this sense one can witness a location of the Salvation Party heavily in the antagonism whose historical consciousness is limited with the constitution period of the Republic, which was mentioned before as the post-caliphate period. This antagonism is not an economical one and it would not suffice to reduce its origins to economical reasons. Furthermore, it can illustrate very well a plurality of the antagonisms by being motivated by religious or semi-nationalist anxieties for self-identity.

In fact, the starting point of the party movement of this cadre led by Necmeddin Erbakan, can be traced back to the struggle in the Turkish Association of the Markets and Chambers, TOBB, between the urban high bourgeoisie and the Anatolian middle entrepreneurs. Wining the elections

on the part of the latters, Erbakan's movement has usually been considered as the representative of the Anatolian small and middle industrial and commercial entrepreneurs. The conventional sociological analysis of the Welfare Party and of its predecessors National Order and National Salvation parties has insisted on this connection which in turn had to be caught by a reductionism of economical determinism (Sarıbay, 1985 ff.). While it may intersect to some, to a considerable degree, with such antagonisms or spheres, this thesis has not already concentrated on the analysis of these dimensions. So far we tried rather to find and set forth a unique line of antagonism that has been at work since the formation of the Republic and to locate the Welfare Party in this line.

Then, in the concrete example of the organization of the Islamic movement through a Party, we can identify a double shifting: First, in this line, that is, in the history of the self-identity formation of the Islamic movement in the post caliphate period. As mentioned above, the expression of the Islamist identity in relation with the existing body politic, the system had to realise a shifting from the complete sense of diaspora to an appropriation or internalisation of the given components of the existing body politic. In so doing, the Welfare Party, has on one hand, incorporated the Islamist opponent potential into the existing body politic i.e., functioned as a legitimating mechanism at the level of the conflict of the history of the disembodiment of the Islamic community. On the other hand, it gave a realistic content to the relatively abstract antagonism of the post-caliphatic condition. But this realist content, as an interpretation of the Islamic political ideals by its very nature, has also relied on the incorporation of some nationalist components in the discourses of self-identity. We see in the National Salvation Party as well as in the National Order Party a relatively strong emphases on a "nation", as also Tanıl Bora points out, in as much as it was constructed on the otherness of the West and Westernization, of Zionism and Semitism (Bora, 1996). He thinks that the conception of the Nation as *Ummah*, that is, the body of the religious community, by the Turkish Islamism is a Turko-centric, or at least Turkey-Centric one. And this conception depends on the Leadership of Turkey as potentially the sole leader of the Islamic Union of the world.

Indeed this has been the main reason, as well as being the result of, why the Islamic movement of the fifties, sixties and even the early seventies had been defected by a kind of rightist conservatism, as mentioned earlier.

Indeed, while it considerably included a kind of internationalism, this had been nourished by the historical consciousness of being the heirs of the Ottoman which was conceived as the natural leader of the Islamic World. Notwithstanding, it should be admitted that, this conception of the nation has never arrived at a level of clear nationalism in the formation of the, so to say, Islamist self-identity. While it has relied on the otherness of the Western and particularly Jewish identity, the otherness of the Party generally relied on the non-Muslim category, and this, by the very nature of the Islamic identity has had no more essential implications than the existential ones even in the case of MSP.

The second shift, of course may be observed within the short history of the Party organization and of its associating discourses. Primarily, as mentioned above, the name preferred for signifying the party corresponded this shifting. This change in name, although not being a voluntaristic preference, but being forced by the military regime of the 12 September, 1980, which put an end to all democratical activities, was also accompanied by a corresponding emphases on economical and social problems. It aimed to arrive at a welfare society which would in fact paradoxically be a result of a high level of modernization. In fact, as Sarıbay pointed out in his early study, analysing the National Salvation Party, the predecessor of the Welfare Party, and its relationship with the Turkish modernization and the incorporation of religious element in a modernization project at political discourse, the political organization of the religion in Turkey has always had close affinities with the modernising forces. While the most emphasised affinities in such studies are found in sociological parallelism with the affinities of Western Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism, in this thesis I tried to draw attention on another important factor, that is the diaspora sense of the Islamic community, in explaining the contribution of the Islamic movement in modernization and in motivating some capital movements. It was, Turgut Özal, the eighth President of the Republic, who saw this point perfectly and tried to draw the afunctionally accumulated money from the hands of the religiousmen to the financial market or to the capital circulation. Together with their own financial organisations, televisions, radios, educational institutions, residential sites, markets, holiday and tourism organisations, a considerable number of people become, on the one hand, to find an embodiment of their own ideals, as Ömer Laçiner has chosen to call "to constitute a second society in Turkey"

(Laçiner, 1996), to feed and also to go beyond their sense of diaspora. But on the other hand, all these manners of life, especially inasmuch as they are related with the consumption-production and financial system of the society, have had the Islamists become integrated into the general process of the self-identification of the society. One can expect that the difference would be diminished, even disappeared if the political antagonism in question is not stimulated by the political will of the otherness.

Indeed, here is a dilemma. On the one hand, one can say of a high degree of homogenisation in the manners of consumption and production and thereby of the everyday life. But on the other hand, still some differences can be maintained, yet owing to such consumptional conducts which are differentiated thorough symbolic remarkations. As mentioned above, referring to Laçiner's argumentation, the Islamist population has produced a kind of "second society" within the general society, but at the cost of maintaining some binary paradoxes: They improve their own financial institutions, but thereby they are incorporated within the general system of financial capitalism; they reject to adopt and consume the existing products due to the incoherence with their belief and yet, produce consumer goods and participate in the mass production and consumption system which helps sustain the existing economical system. For example they decided not to be dressed in contrast to some Islamic rules, and not to behave like the ordinary people who are the object of capitalism; at the next stage they begin to improve a fashion of their own. The fashion shows performed by some famous professional beautiful models, who don't distinguish between any kind of job, exhibiting some, so called Islamic wearings has been a characteristic vision of the, so to say, Islamic form of fashion at the nineties. The dilemma, however, is still at work. While people are extremely homogenised in terms of their obedience to the same logic of consumption, production and finance, the symbolic capital has still a high potential of producing struggles which have been rooted in the same history of the decaliphatisation or of the disembodiment. That is, while the individual bodies are under the invasion of the existing culture of consumption, there is still a way out. This way, however, is rendered open just because the site of the antagonism is at symbolic rather than at economic level.

Therefore, the shift that has taken place in the two periods of the Party, is not only because of the name changed as a result of militarist intervention

and its corresponding more emphasis on this-worldly affairs, but also of the diminished resistance of the antagonism as a result of the involvement of its voting population with the similar manners of consumption where the everyday behavior is determined, and with the socio-economical problems of the country. As a political party gradually approaching the power, the Welfare Party has had to develop some projects and perspectives which have to look from the point of view of the country. That means the internationalism or the anti-nationalism of the Party had gradually to be engaged with the national problems and perspectives of the country in its given conditions. The constitutive elements of the self-identity had to make more reference to the local origins etc. Indeed, as a political party, the Welfare Party has never deliberately refrained from being identified with such elements; but for the population or for the Islamic world view, it claimed to represent, which had been characterised by a diaspora since the beginning of the so-called post-caliphate period, this was a break, a point of being attached to the existing body politic as an organ etc.

Now we see a clear appropriation of the symbolic capital by the Islamic movement through the political strategies of the party. In that occasion, the Islamic political discourse seems to have missed the point of accounting for the process of decaliphatisation which constituted the conditions of the (il)legitimacy of the existing system. Instead the symbolic capital of the existing body politic is appropriated through some mechanisms which will be referred as deconstructionist policies. In this way, the country is redefined as *"our* country", the given problems of the society and even of the existing political body are acknowledged as *"our* problems". So that, this would seem, to most analysts of the Turkish political scene, as a manifestation of the identification of the Party with the system, rather than being an alternative to it. As we mentioned above, referring to Tanıl Bora's argumentations, this process also makes some nationalist elements more manifest in the discourses of the self-identity of the Party. Indeed, this comes from the appropriation of the problems as a Subject of solution, rather than from an ideological modification. In one sense, the issues problematised in a discourse are articulated with that of the next discourse. But in any case what should be admitted in turn, is that there can be seen an obvious shift in the nature of the relationships between the existing political body and the individual body. One important aspect of this new construction of the relationships is that, it coincides with a totally changing

relationships of the significations system in a somehow postmodern condition. Thinking the body as metaphor signifying something outside itself, one of the most important appearance of this condition has been that any given system of signification of body or a language of body is of a contingent nature. Similarly, this shifting in the political identity of the Islamists has occurred owing to the acknowledgement of such contingency in the language of the body (politic). This contingency, however, is not of an infinite nature. Still all possibilities have to rely on some objective grounds. In this case, for example, we see obvious references to the religious and cultural identity of the society, which makes one treat it as a return to nationalism.

Consequently, all references made by the Islamic political movement to the components of the national identity are on the one hand, in search of legitimacy for its religious programme, on the other hand, such references together with their corresponding political practice help in going beyond the sense of diaspora in question. As we mentioned above the bodily signs applied to refer to the hegemony of the "Other", of the secularist, such as Atatürk, Turkey, secularism and some rituals and gestures signifying a loyalty to these values, are appropriated in the totality of the symbolic capital. This appropriation and the subsequent integration with the existing political body, of course, require an interpretative procedure. In the following part of this chapter I will try to identify this procedure with a kind of deconstruction corresponding to the so-called postmodern political condition.

Politics Through Deconstructing a System

The appropriation of the totality of the symbolic capital of the country seem so have been chosen as a conscious strategy by the Welfare Party. If it is so, we can identify a deconstructionist strategy in the political discourses of the Party. Furthermore, while such a deconstructionist line can be followed back to the beginning of the party organization since the early seventies, for example in the speeches preceded the government coalition with the Republican Popular Party (CHP) (Sarıbay, 1985), it can very easily be argued that this line has began to be bolded since the late eighties. So that nowadays the dominant element in the political discourse is a kind of

deconstruction. I will try to illustrate how the deconstruction is applied together with its aftermath. But before this, I need to make a warning on the implications of such a narration. One may be inclined to think of the party and its organs, its president and its influence as a self-sufficient Subject with a potential of determining the political process as a whole. Indeed this is the underlying idea of elaborating a strategy in a political party. As Althusser has referred, all ideologies depend on the possibility of constituting their subjects as Subjects. And paradoxically, a deconstructionist strategy would have to presume an internal coherent structure in the reality, while the poststructuralist thinkers, the very advocators of the deconstruction, as well as the underlying idea of the deconstruction, seems very inclined to reject such a coherence. I will remind this point especially when applying Laclauean terms as dislocation and articulation to describe the processes of embodiment and disembodiment of a community.

The deconstructionist way of politics in the strategy of the Welfare Party lies first in its appearance as having made a return or a withdrawal from its claims for being an alternative to the system. Especially after the constitution of the coalition with the Right Path Party, the theme "U turn" has been used to characterise all activities of the leader of the Party. For, at least in appearance, he seems to have really withdrawn his previous claims as being against the existence of the Multinational forces, known as "Çekiç Güç", within the boundaries of Turkey, against the integration with the Unity of Europe, against the regulations of abnormal condition in the South-eastern Turkey, against any kind of co-ordination with Israel etc. Having inherited all these national and international issues, Necmeddin Erbakan didn't show a considerable resistance at the beginning of the coalition government. Apart from such compromises he, suddenly began to adapt some very statist and nationalist discourses, so that one becomes inclined to agree with the the impressions of a "U turn". For example, during the ordinary party congress held just after signing the coalition contract, he declared that he is "a Turk, secularist and Atatürkist" and that the Welfare Party is the insurance of the Democracy and the secularism. In his very important speech which referred to a new period in the Party programme, Erbakan said:

> The WP is in line with the history and believes of people... All children of the
> country turn to their essence. The cadres of the WP are the faithful followers of

the path of service. The goal of the WP is to substitute a service state for a guardian one... It is the National Opinion, which has founded the Republic after the victory in the war of liberation. Then, those who have founded this state are neither the leftists nor the masonists. Unfortunately, toward the end of its government period, the Populist Republican Party brought about the conditions of a guardian state and bored the people. The second buck against this was realised under the leadership of Adnan Menderes through the motto of "Enough! It is nation's turn to speak". These efforts, however, did not suffice to reach the main goal. Just after this, in 1969, with the constitution of the National Opinion (Millî Görüş) the third buck was started. This reached at its aim by the elections of 24, December, 1994. Now, with the government we founded, we are living at the core of the fourth buck and we will establish the Great Turkey...[17]

They said 'the WP is the opposite of secularism'. Now, they see how they fell in a great fallacy. We are the representatives of the genuine democracy. The WP is the insurance of democracy. This truth has been revealed obviously. They said "the WP will bring a regime like that of Iran". Turkey does not resemble to any other country. The political principles of Turkey have been determined by her constitution. We govern remaining within the limits of this Constitution. We promote the country remaining within this Constitution, around those principles, because that is 'we', who founded this Republic, and we will exalt it. We are establishing the Great Turkey...

They said "If the WP come to the government, a military intervention will be indispensable". Just on the contrary, our hero army has a privileged place in our heart. We are working together with our hero army continuously as single body for service to our country. We feel just proud of our army *(Yeni Şafak,* 14, October, 1996).

All these words were considered as a radical turn and an integration with the political centre. Most have evaluated this speech as an offer to be engaged with the system. Really, there is a point to be made here, relating to the modification of the discourse of the party, which have had a deep tradition in the Islamic movement in general and in the party in particular. First, the relationship with Atatürk, the founder of the Republic and the constitutive principle of the existing political embodiment. The embodiment

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[17]The Great Turkey, Büyük Türkiye, has been the characteristic motto of Süleyman Demirel, for decades. By so doing, Erbakan also tried to appropriate Demirel's political legacy, which is embedded in the central rightist portion of the selecting population.

has occurred owing to the dislocation of the Islamic principles and to the disembodiment of the Islamic community as mentioned earlier in reference to Delaney's argumentations (Delaney, 1984). Therefore, an order of symbols has been regulated around the centrality of the personal figure of Atatürk, the Father of the Turkish people. This fatherness required an exclusive monopoly of ideological cherishment of the people of Anatolia, which is filled with mothers or the grand mother, in accordance with the monogamy principle. To repeat, this marriage has had emerged as a result of the dislocation of the caliphatic political embodiment based on the ideals of an internationalism. Perhaps one can find some traces of polygamy in such a political embodiment in accordance with Delaney's arguments. But it is not what we want to do here. We just want to remind the significance of the symbolism formed around the personality of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the post-caliphate period for identifying the dimensions of the turn in question. It has been very usual that the Islamist identity too, in Turkey has been relying on the negative imagination of Mustafa Kemal as Atatürk. All by-products of the Kemalist symbolisms, therefore, were serving to deepen a dichotomy. In practice, while the Kemalists were attending regularly to the national festivals and the associated semi-religious rituals as, standing tribute at the Anıtkabir or across the statues of Mustafa Kemal in other places. The members of the Party, as well as the Islamic movement, have thus been characterised by their protest against attending such rituals. Even, until 1989, Necmeddin Erbakan had never attended to the Anıtkabir in the Festivals or at the death day of Mustafa Kemal, while, as a party leader, having a group in the Grand National Assembly he should have attended. According to the widespread conviction, the coup dètat of 12 September 1980 has had found a reason in Erbakan's protesting the 30 August celebration in the Anıtkabir, and his famous meeting in Konya just a week later in 6 September. A group who sat down during the performing of the national anten has had drawn a grand attention. When the Chief of Staff of the time, Kenan Evren, had asked Erbakan in the 30 August for explaining his absence in the festival celebration and for declaring whether he is against or at the side of 30 August his answer has been very characteristic: "We are neither against nor at the side of 30 August, we are just at the mid of it."

There is a clear irony in this way of speaking. And it is in fact the characteristic way of Erbakan's speaking. Indeed what has rendered now our

speaking about the deconstruction of the discourse is perhaps a personal feature of Necmeddin Erbakan, so that his way of speaking and acting is worth a special attention. If postmodernism is to be characterised by an ironical way in the application of the concepts and of the discourses or by the total conditions within which "everything is reversible; everything is (accepted as) constructed and everything is ironized" (Rorty, 1989; Turner, 1994: 196), then Necmeddin Erbakan is one of the most successful agents of the postmodern political condition. Personally he is imagined with the very connotations of the word "hoca", which also refers to the famous hero of the traditional Turkish humour, namely Nasreddin Hoca. Like his predecessor, Erbakan treats the political issues with an ironical way during his dialogues with his political rivals, so that a student of the poststructuralism may easily think he is the best applier of deconstructionist approach. Differently, however, his personal approaches to the issues closely become to be followed as a political programme by the party organisation. Given this characteristic approach one can say (as many now think and claim that) Erbakan has never changed his mind but he sometimes had to apply some simple tactics to be camouflaged. Apart from some little sociological expressions of this thesis, it seems rather a thesis which is asserted from a politically reverse point of view. Therefore, it had to ignore the real change in the discourse of the party, or even to render it employable in their political companies as a way of showing the incoherence of the promises and the activities of the party. For, while Erbakan had really been applying this way of speaking as a disguise, he seems to have really been transformed into what he refers in his speaking. That is because the camouflaging appearance effectively changed the content at a stage later. And that is exactly what we call "shifting". As a matter of fact, in the second stage, the words and the symbols which were previously attached exclusively to the political embodiment of the "Other", now all are appropriated as a result of a deconstructional procedure.

As it is apparent, in Erbakan's speech, Atatürk, the most important part of the symbolic capital of the "other", is declared as the most important predecessor of the Welfare Party. When, Erbakan expressed this idea about two years ago as "If Atatürk had lived, now he would be a follower of the Welfare Party", everyone has conceived it as a characteristic irony or double-speaking exaggeration of Erbakan. Probably nobody has thought that Erbakan believes in what he says. But now, especially with the frequent

recurrences of this idea by himself, and especially with its declaration in the congress, it obviously seems to be a deliberate preference to appropriate the symbolic capital around the personal figure of Atatürk. But this appropriation is not, with all its content, but with a redefinition of Atatürk. The Welfare Party, following Erbakan's personal manner, obviously tried to deconstruct the existing images of Atatürk and produced an image in accordance with its ideals. In this new definition, Atatürk no longer is represented as a hero of the political embodiment whose existence owed to the disembodiment of the Islamic caliphate. Instead, some other features of Atatürk were promoted. For example, departing from some of his speeches given at the early times of the War of Liberation, especially that which was given as a preach of the Friday Prayer in the mosque of Balıkesir (known as Cuma Hutbesi), his picture is modified and presented as a religiousman. More important than his religious aspect, his emphases on independence, on the national unity and co-ordination are overemphasised in such so as to confirm Welfare Party's programme for international relations. To illustrate, it is usually mentioned that Atatürk has never gone out of his country for visiting a foreign country and this is applied to prove his patriotism and the level of his national honour. Thus, by overemphasising Atatürk's nationalism which takes a form of loving his country and independence, and by oppressing some other elements associating Atatürk's portrait as employed by the others, the Welfare Party's notion of Atatürk becomes radically different. They began not to refrain from declaring themselves even as Kemalists; but immediately adding "in this... and that sense..." Thus a new kind of Kemalism is defined and a new portrait of Mustafa Kemal is drawn. In this picture of Mustafa Kemal, the most prominent features are economical and political independence, loyalty to national honour and anti-imperialism.

It can be thought, however, that the six famous principles of Kemalism are likely to create a difficulty in rendering the portrait of Mustafa Kemal compatible with the Islamic political identity. Especially secularism and nationalism may be expected to cause such a difficulty, for, while the former has had much to do with the disembodiment process of the Islamic community either in terms of political existence or of the organization of the everyday life, the latter has much to do with the actual universalist claims of Islamist national body which is based on a conception of ummah, the imagined community based on religious ties. As a blueprint o the society

without distinguishing any level, the Islamic religion is, by its essence, incompatible wit any kind of secularism which separate "what is of the God from what is of Sezar."

The Welfare Party, however, as a party has had to be embodied in Turkey, taking all Turkish historical conditions as constituent part of its existence. These conditions make it be expressed through the language of nationalism, as well as of secularism. Until the embodiment of the Islamism within the Welfare party there has been a clear discourse against both secularism and nationalism. While at the beginning of the political movement, even in the Welfare Party there can be observed an extreme ambiguity about these principles, recently this ambiguity has been relatively removed. That is, the secularism and the nationalism have been appropriated by the party even at the popular levels. But that is not to say that this appropriation has occurred as such. Rather, this has occurred through the same process as the portrait of Kemalism and Mustafa Kemal has passed. So that we can now say that the Secularism of the Welfare party is different from that of the others, among which one can not claim a genuinity except with the help of an outsider intervention of various forces. As for the definition of he secularism, the Welfare Party claims even a radical secularism within which one can not exercise an intervention over the other in terms of the freedom of ideas, beliefs and the corresponding practices. In all platforms the members of the Party from all levels have recently come to demand a secularism in its most radical form. They usually make references to the practices of the political secularism in some European countries and they declare "that is the genuine secularism, just what we want to apply in Turkey." In one of his recent speeches Erbakan defined secularism in terms of the rules of traffic. He said "secularism is like a brake in the traffic, that is to tolerate the other, and to refrain from hitting to others' rights". For Erbakan if one doesn't know the rules and has not a brake he has not to participate in the course of the traffic. Otherwise this would be an obvious attack on the human rights of the others.

As for the principle of nationalism, again, Erbakan and his followers try to dislocate its content and to give it a new content. Since the beginning of his political activities, one of the most important ideals of Erbakan in terms of the international relations, has been the restoration of Turkey's leadership of the Islamic countries. This sometimes takes a form of pan-Islamism and sometimes a kind of neo-Ottomanism. In any way, the Welfare party

represents a restoration of the image of the national body to a line claiming more authenticity rather than to an unknown ideological venture. It has always been critical towards some nationalist practices in the country, especially towards the South Eastern issue, but it also claimed that this has been because of the misunderstanding of the spirit of the nationalism. It can be said that this has recently been transformed into the nationalism of Atatürk. Instead of being critical toward Atatürk himself, Necmeddin Erbakan has chosen again to dislocate the elements of the definition of the concept and begun to talk on genuine nationalism as well as on the genuine Kemalism. Consequently, at popular level, one can easily observe some versions of the appropriation of Mustafa Kemal. To illustrate, a new portrait of Mustafa Kemal has recently been drawn in reference with some esoteric dissemination as depicted in the above quotations. Mustafa Kemal and his first assisting friend, the president of his government and also the second president of the Turkish Republic, namely İsmet İnönü, are discerned from each other in behalf of the former. It is narrated that he was İsmet İnönü who represented the anti--Islamic tendency in the foundation of the Republic. Referring to the conflict taken place between the two in the very last days of Mustafa Kemal, they claim a radical difference in their approaches to every issue. It is believed that Mustafa Kemal had to take some steps toward the secularisation of the country, but he had indeed intended to restore the Islamic identity to the country if he didn't die. However, İsmet İnönü, who had represented Turkey in the peace negotiations in Lousanne, the most important step in the constitution of the orientations of the new state, has in fact participated in a sophisticated conspiracy against the Turkish political identity. Mustafa Kemal, however, had not gone to Lousanne and he was unaware of the dimensions of the conspiracy. Therefore he was innocent and he realized the dimensions of the conspiracy towards his death. That is why a deep tension had taken place between him and İnönü. In some versions, it is even claimed that, Mustafa Kemal had, in facat, tried to disqualify İnönü and he dismissed his presidency. He is even said to have been misinformed and made think that İsmet İnönü was killed in accordance with his directive. It is also rumoured that Atatürk and İnönü had never met, for several years before his death. İsmet İnönü's some applications after the death of Mustafa Kemal are also frequently mentioned as an evidene to the disaggreement between the two. It is said that İsmet İnönü has tried to delete all traces of Mustafa Kemal and

to substitute his own figure as a national leader for Mustafa Kemal. To this end it is supposed to have tried to make people forget Atatürk in several ways. For example he abolished the pictures of Atatürk from the surfaces of the Turkish money. Instead, he put his own picture. They recall also that it was at the time of Adnan Menderes, who has restored some Islamic motives to the country such as the Arabic Calling for prayer and Islamic educational activities etc., that the law of protecting Atatürk was issued. According to the Kemalist project of the Welfare Party, thus, all these relationships show clearly that the negative practice, the anti Islamic applications during the Republic has been caused by the personal caprices of İnönü, and Mustafa Kemal was essentially innocent in that respect.

Thus, the above quotation from Erbakan's speech in the congress of the Welfare Party find its proper ground. What we see is a postmodern attempt to appropriate a symbolic capital through deconstructing the conceptual hierarchy of the existing system and reconstructing them in another way. Considering the extent of irony in the realization of that process brought about by the personal figure of Erbakan Hoca, there can be seen a postmodern strategy of politics. Especially recently, Erbakan's figure in the Turkish political scene began to be characterised by his very radical changing of his minds together with denying what he had said before. One day says something that may stimulate some reactions and the next day he either denies what he has said or he interprets his words in a seemingly irrelevant way. The above examples are in fact sufficient to deduce the following results. But I want to illustrate it once more one of his speeches made at the meeting of the Council of the National Security, on the problem of reactionism. The Council has treated exclusively the problem of reactionism in its meeting at 28 February 1997, and it is revealed that it was an ultimatum to the government of the Welfare Party because of its toleration of the reactionist movements. At the end of the meeting, the Committee declared a manifesto which constitutionally had to be advised (in fact commanded) to the government. This declaration would make the government take measurements against reactionism by which even some legal organizations of the Islamism were implied. Undoubtedly the content of the declaration, its real causes and consequences is expected to be discussed in more detail in the future. That is not what I want to do. I just want to draw attention kothe attitude of Erbakan towards the issue. At 13 March his government was to make its first meeting after the meeting of the

Security Council, and everybody expected to hear the news of a crisis. Because the approval of the declaration would mean a negation of itself for the Welfare Party, while a negative attitude against the declaration would upraise the existing tension between the Army and the Welfare Party, or between the secularist forces of the state and the Islamists. Erbakan's response to all these expectations was really a historical one which included some irony and deconstruction. He has begun his speech by declaring that "reactionism is the most dangerous enemy of our country. But every kind of reactionism. There is no difference between carrying the country back to seventy years ago or fifty years ago." That means the country can neither be backwarded to the conditions of the Sultans nor of the monoparty regime wherein the secularism, for Erbakan, is applied just as a kind of holding the beliefs or religious practices under oppression, as an attack on the individual embodiment of the believers etc. While the reactionism has conventionally been used to label the political Islamism in the Turkish political atmosphere, Erbakan deconstructs and reconstructs it again and applies it to the secularists of the monoparty period.

In many of his speeches, Erbakan has frequently claimed that the Welfare Party is the Nation itself. Applying the Democratic Party's motto in the elections of 46 as "Yeter! Söz milletin" (Enough now! It is the nation's turn) he, especially recently, has been identifying the "nation" with the Welfare Party. Of course, one can immediately say ,that wouldn't be but an ordinary political adaptation of Erbakan who is well-known with his applications of deconstruction or dislocation. But I think what we are dealing with, here, is more than such an ordinary political tactic. In so doing, personally Erbakan, and generally the Islamists try to stimulate a power which is immanent in the cultural genius of the society originated from the Islamic values. They seem to have recognised that Islam is an ultimate power in the hierarchy of the cultural values. If people are not making their political preferences in according with these values, that is because of leaving all these values sleeping. This might recall the famous discussion in the Marxist conception of class in terms of the complex relationships between the categories class in itself and class for itself. Erbakan deliberately repeat this theme in its Islamic form through which he declares the Turkish society is, in fact ,Muslim in itself but it should be also a Muslim society for itself, to be embodied with the organization of the Welfare Party. One other factor that feeds the nationalist element in the

discourse of the Welfare Party, making it appeal to a "national" body identified with Turkey itself, stems just from this idea.

Thus, as it seems, there is no linguistic boundary in front of Erbakan that couldn't be exceeded. Rather than a complete delivery to the conditions without considering any principle, he takes the dominant concepts which rely on and have a relative hegemony, and emptying its contents, fills in them new definitions in accordance with his goals. By so doing, Erbakan personally seems to have caught up the huge gap in the conventions on the words. Therefore he appears to be inclined to think that the words are not so important in determining the reality, rather, it is the active existence in the real sphere that would give a content to the words.

Deconstruction of the conceptual or value hierarchy in a system is inspired by Derrida who suggested to liberate the texts from a logocentric reading. Thereby, the Derridean approach hoped to liberate the people fro such a reading which wouldn't be but a constraining effect before the rich possibilities of the facts. The logocentric reading for Derrida leaves only one alternative before the reader which has been decided by an orthodoxy, by the established authority of the reading circle. It exclude violently the other alternatives, potentially possible in the text. Deciding only one of these alternatives it has to rely on violence exercised on the other readings. As a conventional definition of the logocentrism, this is the chronical illness of the Western Metaphysics, for Derrida, which depended on the basic suggestion that the meaning is *present* in the text and it is only a problem of method to arrive at this *presence*. Therefore, the Western metaphysics is also the metaphysics of presence. Etymologically it claims a spatial and temporary presence for the meeting or correspondence of the textual statement and the reality –which indeed has always been assumed to be realised at best during the speech compared with the writing– in the text as meaning. Derrida's all attempts are advocated to demonstrate the metaphysics underlying this logocentrism, the assumption of presence. Instead, he claims a *différance* for the nature of the text, and of the meaning. That is the infinite possibilities for the proliferation of the meaning. It assumes that the text indeed never impose a meaning for a reading. It is free by nature, but its possibilities are constrained by a logocentric reading which in turn produces a violence. Adapting all these to the strategies of the Welfare party we can say that it tries to liberate the constitutional text or the conventional principles on which the existing political system relies. The

exiting interpretations of these texts produce a potential of violence over the body of the Islamist. And deconstructing the conceptual hierarchy of these texts, thereby liberating the texts themselves would liberate these objects, the Islamists, from the violence of the text. Deconstruction, thus, appears as a liberating strategy for the Islamist to be protected against the violence of the existing political system, and to resist against the intervention to its own socio-political embodiment. As we mentioned in the previous chapters, the text here, functions sociologically as a social actor, but paradoxically in the context of deconstruction, being liberated from its presence, it is made transparent to be exceeded easily, to be eliminated from the socio-political scene. In the context of the struggle for taking part from the total symbolic capital among the competing groups, in Turkish case between the Islamists and the Kemalists, however, it takes place even as an intertextual struggle over the bodies of the struggling groups etc.

All these strategies of the Welfare Party in a postmodern political context can be approached with a Laclauean term, namely dislocation. The term, as it is applied by Laclau in his *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* refers to "the very form of freedom ... (as) the absence of determination (Laclau, 1990: 43). In Laclau's emphasis on the contingent nature of the reality, instead of the dialectical or economical determination, the term plays a crucial role. But rather than referring to some kind of a deconstruction of the conceptual hierarchy, it is used to analyse the nature of the structural development of the social reality and to the interrelationship between the constitution of identity, agency and the structuration process within Marxist and/or post-Marxist context. In this context it is also the very form of possibility. Referring to the Aristotelian movement as defined in the Metaphysics as the actuality of the possible as possible, Laclau suggest to imagine the case of a white object which becomes black. At moment 'A' the objet is white as actuality and black a potentiality; at moment 'B' it is actually black.

> "But what about the specific moment of change, or the ontologial status of 'blackening'? At that point the object is no longer white, but nor is it yet black. the Aristotelian formula of 'actuality of the possible as possible' tries to grasp this situation conceptually: what the change reveals is the *possibility* of the object becoming black. The Aristotelian possibility, however, is a single possibility because the process of change is conceived as development and thus appears dominated by the telos of the transition from potentiality to actuality ....

> (W)ith dislocation there is no *telos* which governs change; possibility therefore because an authentic possibility, a possibility in the radical sense of the term. This means that there must be other possibilities, since the idea of a single possibility denies what is involved in the very concept of possibility" (ibid.: 42).

Dislocation, thus, is rooted in the debates on the contingent nature of the change and developments or revolutions in the social structures. The underlying argument is that changes in the social structures does not take place in sharp revolutions but with ceaseless articulations of several components of the systems with each other. It doesn't include strong implications for a deliberate strategy, but it just indicates the nature of social transitions. That is, the transitions do not take place as a result of radical ruptures from the old structures, but of dislocations of the old structural components. Undoubtedly, the political agents in accordance with the idea of dislocations are condemned to be free; yet they are "transformed into an absolute choicer by the absence of any predetermined nature; but they are choicers who no longer has any reason to choose."

Having had a combination of these conceptual framework for thinking on the situation of the Islamist quest for embodiment in case of the Welfare Party in a postmodern context, what can we say? I tried to find some affinities between the political strategies of the Party, especially as appeared in the personality of Erbakan Hoca, and the postmodern political conditions which relies on dislocation, deconstruction and ironisation. Well, the Welfare Party tried to deconstruct the symbolic capital of he existing political body in behalf of its constructions. The underlying idea of these strategies are enforced by the logocentric nature of the established system. This has perhaps even been appealed for the sake of a camouflage. But in any way, the appeal to the deconstruction/reconstruction procedure has resulted in an obvious integration with the system. But if we have to accept that, this procedure runs also the rule of dislocation, then, some other structural but contingent procedure also may be expected to run. The Welfare Party and the mentality it represents are integrated with the system, but the system also becomes transformed and its components are dislocated for new articulations.

After the contract of coalition between the Welfare Party and the True Path Party and especially with the congress speech of Necmeddin Erbakan

quoted above, most of the analysts have decided to observe an ending point in all quests of the Welfare Party for changing the system. For some, this was a clear integration with the centre, with the system or with the regime. Undoubtedly this has been very simplistic approach to understand what happened in reality. Moreover, all those explanations have fed a simple presumption about the nature of change, development or revolutions. From all discourse of the Islamism, they deduced that it should have been manifested in the form of a clear rupture. That is why they have also always found it impossible, given the Turkey's national or global conditions. Indeed, the application of some terms by Laclau such as dislocation, contingency and articulation (an Althusserian term) had been inspired by the scarcity of the old corresponding naive conceptions of development and revolution.

These terms make it possible to think of the existence of an antagonism relatively autonomous from several spheres which are more centrally concerned in sociological interest. In Turkish case sociologically focusing on the problem of disembodiment as being conceived by a considerable part of the population and its quest for reembodiment may be legitimated through the recognition of this idea of autonomous spheres. Otherwise, it has to be considered in its relation with or its origins in the economical sphere which is determined by the struggle of classes which are categorised economically by definition. Thus, the Welfare Party was treated in the history of such an antagonism of the embodiment of the Islamists in the Post-Caliphate condition. Making relatively less emphasis to the economical dimension of this antagonism is not to claim it is isolated from the economical sphere. Thinking within the limits of the conceptions promoted by Laclau we have to refrain from equating the contradiction with antagonism or vice versa, and to consider the proliferation of the antagonisms which are indeed all articulated with each other to constitute the social structure. In this sense, by the treatment of Islamism in the post-caliphate condition and its associating phenomena, is to refer and insist on the existence of a unique antagonism which has to be treated with its own terms.

Of course, all that is not to deny the effects of globalisation, mass consumption culture and the identity of the Welfare Party as a democratic party which has to demand the votes of a large population. Undoubtedly, a democratic party is like a firm which has to supply its products to the

market in such a way that the profit i.e., the votes would be maximised. This necessitates a relative accommodation to the market conditions which has to open a discourse to the intervention of the demands of the consumers. But here too there is another antagonism in play which would take place between the text (as the origin of the discourse) and the infinite demands of the market place. This again is to be expressed as a problem of authenticity which would be treated in its own terms again.

There is a final point, however, that has to be made in respect of the strategies of the Welfare Party and of personally Erbakan himself, through which we assumed they talk in accordance with a postmodern political condition. The recent discussions on the nature of the regime and on the possible threat to the regime which was resulted in the famous declaration of the National Security Council has constituted an interesting response to so to say a deconstructionist strategy regarding the nature of the regime. Indeed the Turkish combination of democracy and secularism has had come to a point in behalf of the former so that the gap between the religious dimension of the society and state or regime is very nearly closed. Especially with the seventh President Turgut Özal, the nature of the regime had began to be discussed in all respects. The themes like the Second Republic, civil society and liberal democracy had been pronounced in freely. In the social atmosphere constituted heavily by those debates, the Welfare Party has gained 22 % of the votes and took government together with the RPP (Right Path Party). While this was to be another step in the linear development of the Turkish Political Regime, the coalition of the army, the mass media and some other civil organizations has created another atmosphere in the country. This has had a clear meaning that the travelled distances in the way of democracy, or, so to say, postmodern, liberal political condition is not irreversible as it is usually thought in postmodernist context. More ironically it is probably the existence of the Welfare Party at the government that stimulate the rivals to reverse these steps. For, at the time of a governing Welfare Party, which has been the major motivation of the Islamisation of the country, by influencing the centre from periphery, would might be more appropriate. For, having been drawn to the centre, the Welfare Party has been surrounded by the established institutional requirements of the system so that it can no longer rely on the dynamism of the opposition. Therefore, while the deconstruction and irony in politics (indeed they are already the most important inseparable

aspects of the political activity by its definition) may be very effective in getting the desired results, they function inasmuch as they don't go beyond the boundaries of the well-established system. Then, considering a system which has a brain wherein its interests and profits are calculated by an extreme rationality, we become inclined to think that just that is the irony of the system.

An Elitist versus Political Islam (?): Fethullah Hoca and His Community

Undoubtedly any attempt to treat exhaustively the movement of Fethullah Hoca and his community as well as that of Erbakan and his Party would require a more rigorous treatment and my space here is narrow for exhausting such a task. My aim is, in fact, not to undertake such a claim. Rather I want just to indicate some points in respect of the issues discussed here.

Indeed, we have opened a title in the previous chapters on Fethullah Hoca and we mentioned some points on the relevance of his movement, of his conception of and place in the so called diaspora. But our treatment on him was bounded within the limits of his relation with the formation of the phenomenon of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi who was once considered as such (as phenomenon) because of the proliferation of the lines claiming to follow his path. And we have chosen to categorise the actual interpretation of Fethullah Hoca as an embodiment of the "facile face of Said Nursi". That is because of his obvious identification of himself with the existing political body in its all given conditions, without attempting to cause any resistantial relationship with it.

There is a paradox, however, in that his movement is still fairly covered and always implies a sense of illegitimacy. Because of the Law on the Unification of Education *(Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu)* issued as a part of the Turkish Revolution, the educational programmes have to be controlled by the central authority which doesn't allow the communal formations establishing their own educational institutions. From the beginning, however, Fethullah Hoca and his fellows, together with other Nurcu groups has advocated themselves to institute some educational spaces wherein the faithful/nurcu ideology could be taught. While the content of the nurcu

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ideology has never included any kind of resistance against the political authority, and even the conceptual framework of the interrelationships between order, religion and authority has been filled in the same form of the existing nationalist, secularist political body, the history of the nurculuk is filled with stories of exiles, banishment, prosecution of the "innocent", and indeed "anti-anarchist" nurcus. Almost all books of Said Nursi starts or ends with the declarations of the judgements of several courts deciding on the acquittal of the *Risale-i Nur* and the nurcus tried because of reading or teaching them. Said Nursi's activities has always been rectuiting new students and participating systematic conversations at homes. This movement has never claimed to be a mystical order or of an organization against the existing system.

As Şerif Mardin, in his comprehensive study on the nurcu movement and Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, has pointed out, in fact the discourse of Said Nursi was of an obviously modernist, progressive, scientific content. He has promoted the rational and scientific activities instead of blindly advocating the abolished institutions of the pervious political body. He had been ready for being engaged with the new political body as an organ which was in fact necessary for more healthy modernization getting also the support of religion, but which also was denied blindly by the on-going process of embodiment. Indeed there can be found many parallelism between the nurcu movement and he Enlightenment movement in terms of their conceptions of reason, science, nature, order, God, religion, state and the interrelationships among them. Therefore the movement might have provided a strong support to the Turkish movement of Enlightenment, no matter it be in the Ottoman or Republican body politic. In spite of all this compatibility with the modernization process, Said Nursi and his movements have been prosecuted by the state. Because, as we mentioned before, in order to constitute themselves as Western, Kemalists had to deny and repress any traces of the Orient. This was necessary since the West was constituted through its opposition to the Orient. But to be Western, they also had to reject more than the Oriental; that is, they had to reject more than the use of the veil, the fasting in Ramadan, an so on. As Sayyid said, "the rejection had to be 'super hard' as it involved a certain metaphorical surplus: the rejection of the impossibility of being the "other" ... (which required that) representing the West meant the impossibility of being the Orient, an other which was not only the limit but also a threat to the West" (Sayyid, 1994: 270).

Undoubtedly, the discourses of Said Nursi, which do not include but religiously strengthened motivation for modernization, was included in that which was "more than the Oriental" which wasn't preserved from being relatively rejected or excluded from the field.

Thus, the characteristic conception of secularism by the monoparty regime has led to excluding any kind of religious education, ritual, bodily gestures etc. from the society. The nurcu movement too has been prosecuted in that time, especially because of its insistence on the special activity which is based on attending the conversations wherein the Risale-i Nur is read or taught. In spite of all its facile nature these activities has constituted a simple target of the police operations for many years, at several periods.

Fethullah Hoca, as a preacher famed in İzmir, following the same path of the nurcu movement in that sense, seems to have been discovered by the state at least since the mid-eighties. He left the mainstream nurcu movement at the early seventies and began to publish a monthly named, *Sızıntı*. The underlying idea of the name implies that it represents the leakage of the essence of the absolute truth, of the revelation. The major themes in the journal turn around catching the dispatches from the God which is embodied through a striking and mysterious order of the world. Undoubtedly a relevant discourse analysis of the journal may clarify various aspects of the community in terms of also the constitution of the self-identity in relation with the nature, religion and the political body. After leaving the mainstream movement he found an alternative community which depended on his personal charisma achieved by his strong ability in preaching and organising, and of course, on his deep intelligence.

At the beginning, the community has maintained the same tradition of opening houses for the university or high school students, wherein conversations inspired by Risale-i Nur and the preaches of Fethullah Hoca were performed. These houses including no more than ten students functioned as small dormitories throughout all regions of Turkey, . Those dormitory-like places are really worth of a special attention because of the elaborated discipline applied on the body of the student to be grown for an ultimate goal. The best student *(shakird),* for example, is pictured as advocated to this ultimate goal so that he is ready to the commands of the communal body with his individual body. Constituting a part of the community in the communal hierarchy some have been advocated with all their bodies that they don't get married, perhaps symbolically for not giving

part of their bodies to any other way of embodiment, such as an embodiment of hedonism as might have been considered here.

The legitimacy problem for such activities was caused by the special attention of the security forces for such meetings which might have been considered as part of organisational activities in order to substitute the existing state for a religious one. The Fethullah Hoca 's activities as well as all Nurcu activities were carried out under such a suspicion until the mid eighties. After the eighties, the working sphere of the community began to shift from small house-organizations to more professional institutional organizations of colleges, universities, preparatory schools of universities etc. In terms of legitimacy, again, this has had much to do with the law of the Unification of Education. While the activities of the community has been maintained under a suspicion of violating the rule of educational law, this has constituted a condition which has influenced the formation of the Fethullahçı discourses in terms of the political self-identification. The spatial regulations of the institutions, for example, has obeyed the conditions and regulations of the Ministry of National Education. The educational equipments of the schools are relatively more luxury than the state schools. There is a special corner reserved for Atatürk in each school or dormitory. The curriculum of the colleges are completely compatible with the requirements of the Ministry of the National Education; it includes the teaching of the principles of Kemalism and modern values. In short, they perform all services that are expected from the state schools in its best form.

In this sense, it can be said that there is an excellent separation of the scientific education and the religious or nurcu education which is done outside the schools perhaps at the dormitories or at the special houses of the community. The community exercises its power not directly blending its ideological elements within the educational procedure, but instead, through holding the educational system in its hand, i.e., the property of the means of education is, at the beginning, seen enough for ensuring the education of the students in accordance with the national values. Because the property of the means open before the community infinite possibilities for growing the new generation, even after fulfilling all requirements of the secularist system. While it is a widespread conviction that Fethullah Hoca has never engaged with the system, and that all these accommodation with the system is in fact because of his camouflaging strategy for getting steps against the secularist system, the apparent result of his strategies seems to have arrived at an

adoption of the system. This conviction is still sustained by the fact that Fethullah Hoca still tries to insert his men into the army with several strategies of camouflage so that when they become deciphered, they are dismissed from the army with the suspicion of changing the nature of the regime through force. Then one may tempted to ask for the explanation of this paradox, what is the reason for maintaining in a state of illegality, which might recall an experience of diaspora, while the discourse has been strongly articulated with the central authority?

In fact, besides all these compatibilities with the system, the schools of Fethullah Hoca has been considered, by the governments, as a good contribution to the educational programme of the state. Especially his well-known activities outside the country, in the Central Asian countries, in the Balkans, and in some other European countries are appreciated by the state authorities as fulfilling a task that the state itself couldn't do. It is the task of being pioneers in conquering the other countries by education. Undoubtedly this conquest wouldn't be achieved through militaristic superiority but through the educational efforts of the volunteer fighters of morality. As a matter of fact, as Turgut Özal said as a reply to a question asked by Cengiz Çandar just before his death, "Fethullah Hoca's students are our raider units for re-conquering the loosen lands of the Ottoman", making manifest the official opinion on the movement of Fethullah Hoca, and indeed on similar movements. Now, Fethullah Hoca's huge organization of education includes over 250 universities or colleges in about 41 countries. The teaching stuff of these institutions are provided by the mentioned organization of house education which is the traditional way of the nurcu movement in Turkey. The students are grown in the houses, professionally educated at various Turkish universities or at the institutions of the community and then they are sent voluntarily to those schools for teaching. Now a large number of twenty-thirty years old young students are actually employed at these schools, living single and obeying a set of discipline rules applied for the regulation of body. The students are employed for a relatively low salary for the sake of the ultimate goal of the community, to which every shakird has to be advocated without questioning.

It would be quite needless to go into further details within the limits of this thesis. But it also would be useful to mention at least two points:

One is the relationship of Fethullah Hoca and his movement with the Welfare Party which once has been situated within a history of the

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disembodiment (or disorganisation) and the quest for embodiment of the Islamic community in the postcaliphate condition. In this respect, against the political steps of the Welfare Party or Erbakan personally, some occasions indicate an impression of an encounter. More clearly, Fethullah Hoca with all his personality and movement, is presented in the political scene as a modern religiousman against a political version of Islam, namely against the Welfare Party. As we put him, in the previous chapter, as the "facile face of Said Nursi", Fethullah Hoca represented final hope of insurance for some parts, to preserve the secularism from the extremely politicised discourses and activities of the Welfare Party. He usually has relieved some, declaring that there is a possibility of being a good Muslim without even adopting a political Islam. In reply to a question asking the relevance of the hijab (headcover) in Islam, he has said "it is just a detail in Islam". This reply has meant that it shouldn't be exaggerated and made a major rule in Islam as the Welfare Party now does. The secularist public opinion took the message in this way and elaborated the theme that they wish all Islamists be like Fethullah Hoca. In the process that begun with the periods of the last two elections when the Welfare Party's speedily increasing votes become highly popularised, the star of Fethullah Hoca too has brightened. Perhaps, there has been an intensive demand for such a religiosity, which would acknowledge the system in all its secular nature, perhaps as a legitimative element. He suddenly became a star of the mass media organs. He was invited to some important meetings ordained for wedding feasts for similar special days at luxury places. Then he was frequently asked about the state, the government, Mustafa Kemal, secularism and some other characteristic current issues. His reply to such questions would have drawn his boundaries with the Welfare Party and made him perhaps an alternative or a preservative element against the threatening of reactionism.

With all these elaborations he was expected to play a role of the "Enlightened Religious Man" which was the ideal of the Kemalists both in the early years of the Republic and in the late forties when they decided to restore some religious institutions of education. The famous Kemalist figure, Toktamış Ateş, has said that: "The idea of Mr. Fethullah Gülen of the Turkish Islam is an approach that I have for many years been advocating. .. I'm very happy for having shared this idea as well as many other points with him". While major part of this interest was from the

kindness of those who wanted to find an alternative against a political Islam in his existence, in fact he didn't suffice even just with keeping silence. Additionally he betrayed that he would reply positively to such expectations. In this respect, he sustained this image by organising "tolerance nights", by participating at wedding parties of the footballers or artists, by speaking on some national issues in accordance with the central established official discourse etc. Thus, his discourse was represented just as a kind of Turkish nationalism strengthened by a religious element. When Fethullah Gülen was asked about Atatürk and the values of the dominant ideology he replied with high esteem and without any extent of irony as he is engaged with all aspects of this ideology. In any way, either with his own affirmation and with the special efforts of his fellows, Fethullah Gülen was elaborated as Fethullah Hoca to represent a possibility of being Muslim without having any claim in the political sphere or even in the public sphere where the wearings of men and especially women has been a social problematic. He was thereby represented as the possibility of legitimating religiously the on-going social, economical and political system against a possible objection made by the political Islamism which is actually threatening. From the viewpoint of the sociology of body, such a religious discourse would loosen the influence of the religious text over the individual or political bodies, for, it would serve in rendering the text transparent before the life. When he declared in a meeting that "we can apply at least % 90 percent of the content of the text in any way, for, the rest % 10 we can do nothing but hoping being forgiven by the God", he was simply liberating the social, human activities against the religion.

Ömer Laçiner has written two articles for an analysis of Fethullah Gülen and his community. The title of the firs article treated the community "As a Postmodern Religious Movement." Indeed, if some traces of postmodernism would have been sought for, they would have been found in this aspect of the community, which made the text transparent. But Laçiner's labelling as 'postmodern' rather relies on the combination of the Turkish nationalism, traditional political Islam, the esoteric interpretations of the Sufi orders, the neo-liberal thesis, and some elitist data in a discourse for getting a strong state/society (Laçiner, 1995b). Compared with the movement of his predecessor, Said Nursi, who is characterised here as indisputably modernist by his discourse, in Fethullah Gülen and his community, for Laçiner, various elements are dislocated and being gathered

together in another discourse to indicate its postmodernity. Another indicator of the community is to be found in comparison with the Welfare Party which is considered to be modernist. For Laçiner, in spite of its all claim for promoting the Holy Law, the Welfare Party or the Islamism around the party apply the concepts and institution, which are invented and constructed with/by modernity. All criterion seen as *non sine qua non* carry the indelible traces of modernity. The history of the reaction of political Islam against modernity, thus has been resulted in an internalisation of the modernity. What the postmodernity of the Fethullah Hoca community indicates is, for Laçiner, that the internalisation of these values of the age is realised synchronically with the age. That is, the distance between the Islamic interpretation and the age have been closed, this kind of the Islamic interpretation has been synchronised with the state of the age, in this case with the postmodernity. And that is just why Laçiner considers the community to be postmodern.

The second point is related with the scientific and educational preference of the community in favour of natural and technical science. Really the students are either recruited in preference from amongst those who have a tendency towards technical or natural scientific domain or the recruited students are oriented almost exclusively, perhaps solely with the exception of the administrative sciences, towards such schools. If the vast nexus of the universities and their need in various domains of knowledge haven't yet created a need for the proliferation of the scientific interest, this preference is to be treated by Laçiner, again as an indicator of the postmodern nature of the community. But again such a signification can not rely but on the assumption that the community has become synchronised with its time which is now characterised by the domination of the natural science and technology. The reply of the community to this domination doesn't arise as a serious objection but an affirmation of it. Considering it just a weapon that should be hold by "us" against "them" is the very affirmation of this logic. Here not to live in accordance with the Islamic ideals but getting and holding power is promoted as an ultimate value. To get this power there seems an almost limitless accommodation with the existing conditions politics, technology and social relations. So that as if the community was allowed to decide to construct a world in accordance wit its ideals, after getting sufficient power, it seems as if it should not have to make a radical modification in the world it would have already been

experiencing. The extreme promotion of the preference of order against any kind of anarchy seems to reveal the well-known dialectic of the instrument or means and goal again. The instrument, the means chosen for getting a goal, have a transforming effect over the body of the individual as well as the community. As mentioned earlier, Fethullah Hoca, when asked about changing the regime he is known to have replied: "I said to those who wanted to change the state: have you an alternative state? If an instability is to dominate, don't attempt to do this without making a sufficient preparation" *(Sabah,* 26. 1. 1995).

Fethullah Hoca's all activities may be seen as part of a process of preparation which seems to take place in a long-term period. The preference makes a radical difference with the community and with the Welfare Party which, as political party, has to rely on a populist discourse, at least for getting the votes of the people. Ömer Laçiner's second article on Fethullah Hoca, therefore, characterises the community in its title as "An Elitist Tradition". Laçiner finds some parallelisms in the elitist preferences of the Community with the traditional distinction of *"hawas"* and *"awam"* appeared especially in Sufism. He tries to identify and define the antagonism working at this dichotomy of elitism versus populism, whose specific actors would have Fethullah Hoca's community and Erbakan's Welfare Party.

CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION

RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE OF AUTHENTICITY AND MODERNITY

All we have tried to do so far in this thesis can be read in terms of the religious quest for authenticity in a modern society. We tried to show a discourse of diaspora in the case of the Islamists of the post-caliphate condition. Indeed the phrase 'post-caliphate condition' itself indicates a state of diaspora. The diaspora of this kind has been experienced not only by the Turkish Islamists but also by the Islamists of all Islamic countries wherein the Islamic institutions have been abolished and the political body defined itself free of any Islamic binds. We mentioned all political attempts to substitute national bodies (nation-states) legitimated on a secular-western ground for the Islamic one as Kemalism, referring to Bobby Sayyid's work. In fact, Sayyid extended the definition of Kemalism to be applied to all those who rejected the use of Islam as a political signifier and who sought to bring, however mediated, a reconstruction of society in which the role of Islam would be analogous to the role of Christianity in post-reformation Western Europe; and who rejected the use of Muslim metaphors, who felt that Islam should not interfere with the state (Sayyid, 1994: 269).

Indeed, in the wider context of modernization or postmodernization the discourse of diaspora, as argued by Ahmed and Donnan (1994) has led to the oft-remarked quest for identity and authenticity, particularly for those who find themselves abroad but also, to some extent, for those who remain behind and who now find that their culture, transported to new settings, is being defined and practised in novel and sometimes disturbing ways. They suggest that the empirical issues raised by diaspora thus chiefly revolve around questions of identity and the vulnerability of having to redefine the self in a world which seems constantly on the move. Muslims in such a diaspora, for Ahmed and Donnan, thus experience a range of practical, psychological and pragmatic difficulties. These difficulties include the problems of establishing enduring relationships with the opposite sex, of

contracting acceptable marriages, and of adapting religion to a new life, of negotiating with other Muslims and agreeing with them on the meaning of Islam on foreign soil. The experience of diaspora, for Ahmed and Donnan, has also raised issues of identity and direction at "home", among those faced with the fantasy if not the reality of moving, and among those who now find their 'local cultures less pervasive, less to be taken for granted, less clearly bounded toward the outside' than they perhaps once were. Migrants return to their place of origin not only with novel versions of the world which challenge the views of those who never left, but also on occasion with fossilised and outmoded versions of what they left behind: ways of dressing, behaving, believing and so forth which have been developed and reshaped in their absence but which they have lovingly and carefully preserved intact while abroad (Ahmed & Donnan, 1994: 6).

Undoubtedly if we are to think of the problem of diaspora experienced in modern societies we have to deal also with its relevance with the claim of authenticity. For every experience or discourse of diaspora have to rely on a claim of original identity and authentic existence. In addition, all these themes relate us with the consequences of modernity on the authenticity of the Islamic identity of the Muslims who could of course not be reduced to accountable stereotypes at all. For, the Muslims, like any other religious group, have been widely proliferated so that it would really be just a simple reductionism to talk on a single Islamic identity. I tried to demonstrate the proliferation of Islamic identity in modern Turkey in the cases of some important figures who constituted a discernable chronology of a history of a diaspora. In the works of those figures, from Mehmed Akif to İsmet Özel, as we have seen, a rich literature of diaspora has served the constitution of a strong notion of authenticity and identity. To put it in reverse, indeed, the insisting references to an authentic situation have necessitated the constitution of the sense of diaspora about the present situation. Because nobody can claim a coherence of the religious texts with the existing conditions. On the other side, we tried to show that the proliferation of the Islamic formations of Islamic identities exhibits the modern and problematique nature of authenticity.

In this context, what we tried to do in this study was the depiction of the experience of diaspora. For an operational definition of this diaspora we distinguished a post-caliphate condition which was defined by the disembodiment of the Islamic ideals and decaliphatisation making the

jurisprudencial activity irrelevant and, thereby, the individual existence of a Muslim as if imbedded within an original inescapable sin. We tried to follow a long time taking path of being the "other" in one's own country. This process in the presentation of this thesis was thought to have begun with the juridical response to modernization through the codification of the Islamic law as *Mecelle*. It was thought that, indeed, the codification of Islamic law was a pathological response of the Islamic body politic to an infection (westoxication), but as normal as an infected body does. The abolishment of the caliphate and the establishment of the republic were tried to be understood through a vocabulary of embodiment. We have seen that the contemporaries of that period suddenly realised a sense of disembodiment and diaspora in their own lands, which constituted for themselves a postcaliphate condition. This can also be understood as the origin of the fragmentation of the Turkish body politic. As might be seen this conception required an intensive deal with the givens of the sociology of body and the discussions of authenticity.

Now, talking on the religious discourse of authenticity alongside with modernity in its Turkish case, requires some remarks which should also be the results of this study.

First, given the frame of our study, modernity should be redefined. Some of its well-known elements are needless to be treated again, but it should be mentioned that modernity has been the manifestation and consequence of a Euro-centric conception of history. It has supposed a model of development considered universal, while it is, in fact, a story in which the central actor is the Western subject. The story involves a claim of universality which thereby become enforced to consider the "other" people as "retarded", "undeveloped", "underdeveloped", "developing", "premodern" or "people without history". The claim of universality, usually naively, supposes that all societies will early or late pass from the same way Europe has been passing. However, the naiveté of this supposition by time has been made very prominent. The universality of the passage has been interrogated and various ways have been distinguished. For example Göran Therborn distinguishes four passes of entry as routes to/through modernity:

> "One is the *European gate of revolution or reform,* that is, of endogenous change, the pioneering route, the reasons for which so fascinated Max Weber and have thrilled the Weberian tradition ever since...... The second pass was

located in the *New Worlds* of the Americans, a product of transcontinental
migration and genocide, and it was the entrance through *independence*, first of
a major part of North America, soon followed by that of the South and Central
parts of the hemisphere... Third, modernity could appear as a sudden external
threat.. This pattern of *imposed* or *externally induced modernization* started
with Muhammed Ali in Egypt early in the nineteenth century and the somewhat
later Tanzimat reforms at the centre of the Ottoman Empire... Iran, Siam/Thaile
and and a few others, was made up of *external threat and selective imports*.
Popular rights were here typically granted from above as an instrument
strengthening a regime under acute external pressure, and a good deal of
resistance to modernising change came from below, from large sections of the
people itself .. Finally, there is a vast area from North-western Africa via the
Indian subcontinent to the Archipelago of Southeast Asia, where modernity
arrived by conquest, subjection and appropriation, the gate of the colonial zone
(Therborn, 1995: 131-33).

Thus, for Therborn's classification, Turkey has passed through the third
entry. Indeed, this classification can be modified and some other entries
could be distinguished. In any case the uniqueness of Turkey in its path of
modernization, which was called by Ahmet Çiğdem (1993) as "Turkey's
sonderveg" (unique road)*,* makes us apply some other theoretical models for
explaining what takes place here during the encounter with modernity.
Naturally, this uniqueness in its way of modernization has determined also
the nature of the experience of diaspora in question. At first sight, one can
see that the Turkish diaspora is not experienced out of a spontaneous
development of modernity together with its own institutions, social
relationships and mobilities. As a response to the requisites of
modernization imposed on Turkish society, without being adopted by the
masses, the diaspora has begun to be experienced as a constituent element
of political identity making difference. The reactions against the Western
values or modern developments have, therefore, been mediated through an
hostility to the existing political embodiment. In fact, this way of
experiencing diaspora has coincided the experiences of all other aspects of
modernity which is always granted or imposed from above. Then, briefly,
the conjunction of modernity and diaspora has usually been considered in
terms of the natural consequences of modernity as an irreversible and
objective phenomenon, creating horizontal or vertical mobilities in society
because of the very requisite of industrialisation and urbanisation. The
diaspora and its corresponding discourse we tried to depict in this study,

however, has taken place as a reaction to the political imposition of the state which was leading modernization from above. The process of imposition has provoked various religious and what we may call national unconscious elements we tried to explain in terms of body politic and religious politics of body, alongside with the problem of authenticity and identity.

Indeed, in any case, as we mentioned above, it is the quest for identity that invokes the problem of diaspora and authenticity. Therefore, the literature of political or cultural identity has to go hand in hand with the issue of authenticity. In this conclusion chapter, opening the word about the problem of authenticity, what I want to do is to mention some problems in the sociological debates on Islamic problem of authenticity in the modern world. On the one hand, Islamic discourses in modern world have always been charged with the claim of authenticity —a claim which sometimes may be explained in terms of the "objectification of Muslim consciousness" (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996: 37 ff.). In one sense referring to that which does not change; authenticity should constitute a problematic for such Islamic callings. For, as it should have been seen, modernization has created serious problems in keeping some religious *habitus* constant. If a claim of authenticity has not to give up of constancy of certain forms, then, it has to be faced with the very reality of modernity which makes all that is solid melt into air. But where does the claim of authenticity of the religion lie, particularly of Islam? Can a sociologist represent a criterion for authenticity and measure which state of existence is authentic and which is not? The positive answer "yes" to this question constitutes the picture in which, on the other hand, I find another problematic in the sociological studies of Islamic discourses of authenticity. My contention is, and has been, however, that Islam has a view of authenticity of its own, through which the contingencies of life are encountered while the claim of authenticity is tried to be maintained. In Chapters III and IV I tried to show that in Islamic religion there has been a strong tradition of interpretation relying on the special interconnection of the life as a source of the will to change (body), which might also be formulated of course with Nietzschean terms of the will to power, and the religious texts which work just as social injunctions advocating their unchanging positions. Furthermore, there are some mechanisms of overcoming the possible resistances taking place between the two without giving up of the one for the sake of the other.

One further problem of the debates on the Islamic discourse of authenticity, lies in their initiation to decide a certain interpretation or experience of Islam as authentic or inauthentic. We know the classical orientalist study of Islam has been injured (criticised) with essentialism for having attributed essential characteristics to Islam. Major part of the sociological studies of Islam has taken its share from this criticism (cf., for example Turner, 1974; 1978; Geertz, 1968; Said, 1979; Abasa & Stauth, 1990 etc.). The problem that has led these critics against the orientalist trend was in its ignoring the historical and geographical proliferation of Islam and presuming single stereotyped Islam associated with an absence of historical consciousness, civil society, change, autonomous law etc. As it is seen, all these attributes had much to do with the notion of change, development and history, which altogether, now, would catch it again in the debate over authenticity.

In the recent thematisations of authenticity, however, we observe that the same orientalist tendency is incarnated in the very initiative for deciding which interpretation of Islam is authentic and which is not. I will try to illustrate this trend in some studies like that of Clifford Geertz, Muhammed Arkoun, and even Edward Said. My contention is to suggest that like all religions, Islam has its own view of authenticity and one can not deduce an authentic state of Islam without taking into consideration what this view is, at least for the sake of Max Weber's calling for a *verstehende* sociology.

Before going on into this debate, however, I think it would be useful to summerize briefly some references of the theme of authenticity in sociological and philosophical literature in its relation with the problem of identity.

There is an important difference in the range of connotation between the notions of identity and authenticity. Identity has an important psychological referent, which is often expressed in a discourse of tautologous subjectivity. From this point of view, identity is linked to socially defined roles, gender, rites of passage, and the cultural self-definition of the community. There is a major trend in marxism, which has been influenced by psychoanalytic theory, considering all kinds of identity as imposed upon the ego by culture, or prejudice, or ideology, or power. Represented, namely, by Sartre, Marleau-Ponty and Habermas, this trend is explicitly underlined by a calling to authenticity. The emancipation of the self, under the conditions of undistorted communication, for example in

Habermas, we see a manifest declaration of certain definition of authenticity. Indeed, founded upon modernist convictions, every social idea would justify a foundationalist claim of authenticity. We can recall here Habermas' attribution of "postconventional" conception of reality to the Western society, and only to the Western society. Thereby he reproduced a notion of the "other" by attributing to the non-Western societies an illusionary conception of reality, established and maintained through mere conventions (Habermas, 1984: 43 ff.).

What Foucault has made, as we mentioned in the previous chapters in terms of his despising approach to the body, in another sense should be read in terms of the constitution of identity through body. He actually dwelt upon the issue of identity, but from the other point of view, that is, the way in which discourse imposes an identity which impedes emancipation.

Outlining a "hermeneutic of authenticity" in the writings of the contemporary Islamic intellectuals, Leonard Binder finds out that it is at this point that identity and authenticity converge in the debate over whether an historically determined authenticity is emancipatory or enslaving. Binder refers to the Heideggerian position of this debate, which substitutes authenticity and inauthenticity (or alterity) for the freedom or bondage of Hegel's dialectic of the master and slave.

> Authenticity thus stands for the freedom to be what one, in some sense, already is, while identity may also be referred to the freedom to be what one wants to be. Authenticity is to accept, or even embrace, a fate, and it is linked to a self-knowledge which is derived from an "archaeological" investigation of cultural and historical origins. Identity may also mean the negation of one's past, overcoming the particularities of kinship, culture, community, and even personal experience. For many, this kind of freedom is unnatural, frightening, grotesque, socially destructive, and politically suicidal. For other, its meaning is expressed in the hopeful slogan, "today is the first day of the rest of my life." (Binder, 1988: 320-321).

In spite of the presumption of an authenticity underlying the views of emancipation by some Marxists, as mentioned above, it is not surprising that they should also be critical of the concept. This critical context of marxism is provoked by their commitment to revolutionary change, historical transformation, and the substructural determination of ideology and culture. Binder suggests that "there is probably no more thorough,

intemperate, long-winded, and scathing castigation of Heideggerian authenticity than that of Theodor Adorno, who pronounces it a sinister mystification serving as a bulwark of the ideological hegemony of the dominant classes" (Binder, 1988: 321). Indeed such thematisation of the concept of authenticity has been rooted rather in philosophical ground.

As for Heidegger's conception of authenticity, at the outset it can be said that his emphasis on authenticity has been the origin of this debate in the contemporary world, so that most of the debates on authenticity can be considered as immediate derivations of his emphasis. His conception of authenticity, seems to have oscillated between the problem of voluntarism and of his special treatment of Being. Although it is thought to have evolved from the former toward the latter toward his older years, he does not seems to have left the former point completely. Therefore, while saying that authenticity cannot be willed but must be granted, he was sensible of being caught up by a vocabulary of heroism and voluntarism. His emphasis of authenticity refers to a radical critique of the Western understanding of the self as ego-subject. He is primarily concerned with an authentic existence which he thinks it occurs only when the self (as ego) is eclipsed by the manifestation of one's finitude. Only when the self-reserving ego weakens can one become truly open to one's possibilities (Zimmerman, 1981: xxvii). The theme of authentic existence was vitally important in his thinking, and one of his concerns was to explain such existence in non-subjectivistic, non-anthropocentric terms. In his effort to find such an explanation, he pushed against, and sometimes beyond, the limits of Western thinking.

Heidegger's distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity stems from "de-mythologising" analysis of the Christian distinction between faithfulness and sinfulness. In *Being and Time,* he claims that inauhtenticity is largely resulted by man's attempt to conceal his finitude. And by concealing his finitude, the inauthentic individual is able to understand himself as an eternal thing (ego). The inauthentic individual seeks security by attempting to manipulate the world. Although the egoist thinks that he is fully individuated, the fact is that his goals, opinions, and desires are largely determined by prevailing social customs and expectations. The egoism of inauthenticity corresponds to the Christian idea of sinfulness, while the opposite of inauthenticity and sinfulness is openness For Heidegger, such openness can be gained by courage and will. This conception of authenticity, in Heidegger, has evolved from anticipatory resoluteness

toward his mature years to authenticity as releasment. The voluntaristic overtones were minimised in this course of the conception of authenticity. Thereby, the authentic individual heeds the call of conscience when it summons him to be what he already is: temporal (finite) openness. By resolving to accept his mortality, the individual stops the egoistical self-objectification which had prevented him from being open for his possibilities.

Consequently, having minimised the voluntarist aspect, authenticity has taken a very form of advocation of spontaneity in Heidegger. He has said that man is most himself when he acts spontaneously or naturally (like the rose). Thus, he shows his sympathy for a non-historical, non-subjectivistic understanding of the "happening". The authentic person, then, is one who is in tune with this happening; released from the artificiality of egoism, he is open for the natural "way" of things (Zimmerman, 1981).

What matters us in Heidegger's conception of authenticity is not his conception as such but his considerable influence on the formation of this conception among the social scientists. Indeed, his thematisation of authenticity itself has been considered as an incoherence, considering his mastery in the criticism of the Western metaphysics and logocentrism. For, it was thought that a speech on authenticity has to be rooted in a metaphysical question of searching for a truth of a word. With all these efforts, Heidegger has been considered as claiming a position to decide what and who is in authentic state of existence and what and who is not. For the critics of Heidegger, like Vattimo (1988) and Derrida (1989), such a position could not be legitimated unless one becomes imbedded into a metaphysics. Thus he has been criticised for falling into the position of what he had hitherto criticised very violently. Now, this critical point is important from our point of view to the issue. For, while the criticisms against metaphysics would have drawn the lines of a possible ethics of sociological (hermeneutical) activity, which would refrain from advocating any metaphysical position, this is where Heidegger has paved the way to metaphysics arisen out of a decision of authenticity. Considering any evaluation of Islam, of course, that is not to claim a postmetaphysical or beyond metaphysical position for Islam. As a religion, Islam can not have such a claim. But a claim to go beyond metaphysics of presence (in Derridean term as derived from Heidegger's thought), or of logocentrism, has to be faced with the very metaphysical origins of talking on authenticity.

I think, most studies on the cultural and religious discourses of authenticity in the so called Islamic resurgence have been very inclined to go beyond just identifying the actual elements of this discourse. They immediately tend to deduce a genealogy to these discourses, dedicated to a particular moment in the course of modernization. Then, this reduces all kinds of authenticity discourses to a modern behavior in claim of a *sui generis* and self-referential truth. Indeed, here, the role of modernity, as a kind of nominalism, is more important to be emphasised. It defines a universe out of which there is no possible existence, including all critical or alternative attempts to modernity. No doubt, given the actual existence of such an entity, it is ontologically true that any event taking place in this world have to be seen within the limits of this world. But what is it that define such a world? What is modernity but a kind of naming the on-going reality of the recent times; a reality which is essentially chaotic and is ordained by way of this naming? It is Aziz El-Azmeh who says that "naming is not an innocent activity, but lies at the very heart of ideology one of whose principle mechanisms is the operation of classificatory tokens that determine the membership of socio-political groups" (Azmeh, 1993: 50). But it is also he who ignore the naming aspect of modernity which by itself supports the claims of determination over the entire existence of our centuries. Instead, he tries to find out the elements of a cultural discourse of authenticity in the Arab-Islamic world and to dedicate all of it to an inner genealogy of modernity. Indeed, within these limits he is very successful in his attempt to anatomise the notion of authenticity as having "much potency in modern Arab social and political thought." By so doing he hopes that "a paradigm that will make comparable other exclusivist ideologies increasingly at work in the world, such as right-wing Hindu communalism, Zionist fundamentalism both secular and religious, and much else, will become explicit." (Azmeh, 1993: 41).

Aziz al-Azmeh, in his analysis of the discourse of cultural authenticity in the modern Arabic and Islamic literature, equates the term Authenticity with the term *Asala* in Arabic. He follows that, lexically *asalah* indicates salutary moral qualities like loyalty, nobility, and a sense of commitment to a specific social group or a set of values. It also indicates a sense of *sui generis* originality; it specifically refers to genealogical standing: noble or at least respectable descent for humans, and the status of equine aristocrats. Combined together and transferred to an attribute of historical collectivities,

Arab, Muslim or other, *asala* becomes a central notion in a Romantic conception of history which calls forth features commonly associated with such a conception. Indeed, another Arabic word that might be corresponding to authenticity, which is not indicated by el-Azmeh is *sıhha*. The word has usually been applied to decide the historical correctness of a prophetic tradition. It has been the name of the famous six collections of the traditions such as *Sahih-i Bukhari, Sahih-i Muslim* etc. While its primary meaning corresponds to health and hygiene it also means to be in order, to recover, to be sound, strong, vigorous, firm, right, correct, faultless, unimpaired etc. Of course, the hygienic connotations of the word could be considered as to entail also certain bodily state for authenticity. Moreover, this word too, applied as a technical measure of the truthness of the traditions, has sustained a strong notion of a kind of logocentrism. In any way, as El-Azmeh too points out, the discourse of authenticity is consequently an essentialist discourse, much like the reverse it finds in Orientalism, in discourses on the primitive, and in other discourses on cultural otherness.

Indeed, in one sense El-Azmeh's debate is with the "naive relativist temptation with at best a patronising rhetoric of intercultural etiquette dressed up as a philosophical hermeneutic" (El-Azmeh, 1993: 40). Therefore, he interrogates the notion of incommensurability, the famous Kuhnian concept applied to characterise the paradigms, as a kind of relativism. He argues that this notion and its cognates appears quite absurd, not only because historical units are not analogous to paradigms and apprehension is not analogous to translation. Neither are they, for el-Azmeh, homogeneous, self-enclosed and entirely self-referential entities, as would be required by the assumption of univocal irreducability.

Thus, el-Azmeh's study provides a good analysis in outlining the elements of the cultural discourse of authenticity in the so called Islamism of the Arab world. He thinks of this discourse of authenticity in terms of the body national which is based on the projects of Enlightenment. In fact, the religious discourse of authenticity is but a derivation of the Arab nationalism, that is *nahda*. Though revivalism was initially Islamist, and has tended to don the Islamist cloak in the very recent past, el-Azmeh finds out that it received its most thorough grounding in the context of secular Arab nationalist ideology, which regarded Islam as but one moment of Arab glory, albeit an important one. Thus, the contemporary Islamist claim for embodiment, for overcoming the diaspora and for identity and authenticity

are connected with the quest for body national which is to be considered by el-Azmeh as just one moment of the modernization which entailed nationalisms in these same terms:

> ...Since this body, the body national, is arbitrarily posited as *sui generis,* it follows that the liberty of the reformer can best be described by following the Hegelian analysis of Jacobinism: it is one possessed by a freedom based on pure self-identity, for which the world is its own will, and whose relation to the reality of the world is unmediated, and therefore one of pure negation (el-Azmeh, 1993: 50-51).

Thus, all that the Islamist claim of authenticity makes belong to hybrid tendencies which seek to translate various aspects of a modern political programme into Islamic terminology in order to authenticate and thus authorise them or to develop an authentic "Islamic" method of social science whose metaphysical bearings are not Western, and which, not unnaturally, devolve to a restatement of some modern social science terms in a context where Islam acts as a myth of origin and charter of legislation, with an admixture of a vitalist epistemology. In all these instances, Islamism, once called as "Romantic" by el-Azmeh, is the name under which a hypernationalist cultural programme is officiated.

Undoubtedly, el-Azmeh's attempt to anatomise the discourse of authenticity in Islamic revivalism here tends, sometimes tacitly and sometimes explicitly, to take an absolute decision on the inauthenticity of the discourse, albeit it might be considered very successful in demonstrating the origins of its elements. His attempt to anatomise the discourse of authenticity serves in the falsification of the claims of authenticity and in almost nihiliating all possible discourses of authenticity. That is not to sustain an alternative view of authenticity but, as he declares at the beginning of his article, to promote the rationality of the real. For, the validity of authenticity (just as of the universalism or objectivism) does not arise from some transcendental or immanent criterion, but quite simply from affirming the rationality of the real.

Here, I want to indicate a tendency in the mainstream evaluation of the discourses of authenticity of the Islamic revivalism; indeed, el-Azmeh's arguments are good illustration and pronunciation of this tendency. As mentioned above, that is in fact but an incarnation of a nineteenth century orientalism or positivist theoreticism imposing an explanation on the action

without considering the actor's view on his action. More importantly, while this tendency is dedicated to an Heideggerean tradition of authenticity, implicitly or explicitly, it has reached in the limits of poststructuralism and a kind of hermeneutics consisting of almost mere relativism. The works produced in this context have come to construct new stereotypes for the sake of removing the orientalistic ones. While rejecting the essentialist nominalism of the orientalist studies, which ignored all proliferations of Islamic culture and reduced all of its manifestations to a single entity, they have come to represent an interesting preference between the once proliferated Islams. My contention in this emphasis is not to decide that their preference is right or wrong, authentic or inauthentic, for, I think it would enforce the limits of a sociological interest of this kind, but just to indicate the very existence of such a preference and to make some points on it. Above all, I will make the point that this reference has very much to do with the political conjuncture of the time in which we are living. To make it more clear it is needed to go on with examples.

Clifford Geertz, the famous anthropologist, has been famed with his anthropological study on Morocco and Indonesia, namely, *Islam Observed.* In this study he, briefly tries to falsify the orientalist way of describing the Muslim society as a single unity characterised with some essential features. He has, therefore, been praised by the critics of orientalism for having denied that Islam is single, transhistorical phenomenon, forever fixed in the text of the Qur'an (Said, 1979: 326). Geertz argues that Islam has taken on distinctive forms and emphases which vary with historical, cultural and economic circumstances. He seems to have explained the problem of authenticity of a religion in terms of the believability which depends on the ethos, which grows out of it. Religion, considered as a human phenomenon always draws its persuasiveness out of reality it itself defines:

> The world view is believable because the ethos, which grows out of it, is felt to be authoritative; the ethos is justifiable because the world view, upon which it rests, is held to be true (Geertz, 1968: 97).

While Geertz can not be said to have a materialistic position in interpreting the religion as almost a function of an ethos and as a consequence of material or historical change, he seems to require the association of certain material conditions for the survival of a religious belief. Indeed, what he does is to try to show that Muslims have not bound

by the text of the Qur'an, but neither have they freely interpreted the text in accordance with individual inclination. While Islam has not, in fact, been a single religious phenomenon as some orientalists would have it, neither has it varied so as to defy the tyranny of the disciplined discourse of Anthropology. That is why he is classified by Leonard Binder as "good orientalism", although his study on Islamic religion as a Western anthropologist belongs to an orientalistic activity by its very nature (Binder, 19888: 97).

What concerns us in Geertz's study lies in the dichotomy he identifies within the contemporary Islamic societies between scripturalism and a kind of folk religiosity, and in his favouring the latter over the former. He formulates this dichotomy in a distinction between the "religiousness" as such and "religious-mindedness", between "being held by religious convictions" and "holding them." For Geertz, Religious-mindedness celebrates belief rather than what belief asserts. In fact, this distinction seems to follow Lévi-Strauss's distinction of speech and writing and his preference for the former over the latter. Therefore, he demeans writing, text, and what he calls scripturalism. In the Islamic case his target becomes all callings for understanding the Qur'an and following its messages. In his study of the two countries he portrays two figures, the leaders of these societies, and improves models from each one to work as metaphors. Deciphering these metaphors one becomes inclined to think that they are made to illustrate the possibility of being a "good Muslim" or "true believer" without reading the religious texts. Because, one of his figures, Kalidjaga, the Indonesian leader, is emphasised by his being a devout Muslim without ever reading the Qur'an. Thus, Kalidjaga functions in Geertz's study as a metaphor of balance and diversity for an attenuated *différance*. On the other hand, Lyusi, the Moroccan one, is characterised by Geertz as "not submerging himself in the larger religious idea" (ibid.: 53). Instead, he personifies it to the point where Geertz refers to him as *homme fetiche,* and the Moroccan culture as anthropolatrous. As Binder has pointed out, the contradictions in these two figures, involving their corresponding stories, are presented as characteristic reassertions of the underlying cultural character of the two countries. These personalities are used as exemplary representatives of their respective cultural traditions, but they are even more obviously idealised examples of true Muslim believers who have committed themselves to live their lives completely within Islam. For Binder, the aporetic element in both cases arises not from the conflict between Islam and pre-Islamic cultures, but from the fact that both stories are used to support rather than to weaken the established political authorities of the day

(Binder, 1988: 100). Moreover, Geertz tries to apply all these examples to attack on scripturalism often represented by the Islamic revivalism or reformism. In the personalities of Kalidjaga and Lyusi, in their activities mentioned in his study, Geertz tries to conclude that it is scripturalism, with all of its implications of a violent writing which would forcefully transform a traditional culture, which would in turn eternally distort the possibility of an authenticity of the religiousness. Scripturalism is identified with "scholasticism, legalism, and doctrinairism" (ibid.: 62). Making a comparison between the general movements of reformation, he argues that "stepping backward in order better to leap is an established principle in cultural change; our own Reformation was made that way. But in the Islamic case the stepping backward seems often to have been taken for the leap itself, and what began as a rediscovery of the scriptures ended as a kind of deification of them" (ibid.: 69) in the following he concludes that Islam, in this way, becomes a justification for modernity, without itself actually becoming modern. It promotes what it itself can neither embrace nor understand. Rather than the first stages in Islam's reformation, scripturalism in this century, for Geertz, has come, in both Indonesia and Morocco, to represent the last stages in its ideologisation (ibid.: 70). Thus, Geertz seems to argue that scripturalist Islam is somehow a distortion of an authentic culture, and perhaps even of religion itself. As Binder too indicates, the phrase "ideologisation of religion" clearly differentiates between the two, and implies the denaturing of religion, despite the widespread belief that Islam makes no distinction between religion and politics (Binder, 1988: 102).

Consequently, what we should notice in Geertz's distinction and preference is the promotion of what he calls "religiousness" against "religious-mindedness", the religious experience as such against the process of ideologisation of religion and the folk religiousness whose basic characteristic is spontaneity against scripturalism. Indeed, equating the "religiousness" to being held by religious convictions and the "religious-mindedness" to holding these beliefs invokes some critical points to be made. It recalls a Heideggerian discourse on authenticity which has gone hand in hand with his criticisms of technology. We may deduce from Heidegger that the technological determination of a religious action manifests itself through the treatment of the divine elements as something present-at-hand as standing reserves (Heidegger, 1977). For such line of criticism which is followed by Geertz and others who tend to reduce all contemporary scripturalist attempts within Islamic movement to a mere operation of the the techno-cientific mind, all scripturalist attempts are in

turn over-determined by a logic of technology. This distorts the authenticity of religion. But what is suggested here for keeping in an authentic state is but a nihiliation of almost any mediation of cognitive activities in experiencing the religion. Religion should be experienced through an inner dimension in a kind of fatalist, involuntarist spontaneity without interrogating, without any appeal to the texts which suggest not but a way to modernism.

Undoubtedly this point of view, emphasising the technological determination of action may be very useful in explaining some ideological movements within the Islamic paradigm. But inasmuch as it tends to explain all possible existences claiming religious authenticity in these terms it becomes very boring reductionism. Therefore, I should point out here that such a conception of the relationship between the contemporary situation and the development of scripturalism is but an exaggeration which works as a sophisticated reductionism of a kind of modernity determinism. As we mentioned in this thesis, the ideologisation of Islam in the recent times can not be understood solely in terms of the inner history of modernization. It requires a reflexive perspective from inside which would decide what occurs on its own body. We tried to look at that process within which such a process of the ideologisation of the religion has taken place in terms of the problem of religious embodiment including, or even necessitating, a political one. We suggested in this thesis that the ideologisation of Islam alongside with all associating facts has taken place as very natural response to the hygiene of the body social-political-national. We appealed to metaphor of a healthy body which is felt owing to the forgetfulness of the organs, for inasmuch as the organs function normal we forget them. What is remembered is what is problematic in a healthy body. Then, the religiosity was experienced almost owing to the forgetfulness of any cognitive element. Whenever those were remembered, it was in fact because of an unhealthy change in the body religious. The ideologisation of the religion could also be considered as a natural response of the religious body to the unhealthy conditions, apart from being considered as simple delivery to the principles of modernism such as technology. It is a remembering of its own body because of an infection (Westoxication) or of a threat. Thinking with medical terms, as an ideology, and as an intellectual activity the political and scriptural Islam, thus, represent a response to an infection. In this sense, it can be affirmed that it is a pathological occurrence. But, then, one becomes inclined to ask, what is more normal than a pathology which takes place as a response to an infection? On the other hand, it included really some extra-ordinary aspects in terms of a religious experience, but who can

decide that these aspects have had some to do with the religious authenticity of Islam? Isn't there a view of authenticity of its own in an Islamic Great Tradition? Why this view is usually ignored in the analyses of identity and authenticity?

Indeed, in this thesis I tried to show a proliferation of the Islams in a condition that was distinguished as a post-caliphate one being characterised by a disembodiment of the religious community. Principally any possibility of producing any understanding or interpretation of the religion can not be eliminated. The decision of what is true or what is false or what is authentic and what is not should lie in the inner logic of the general frame. The sociological position adopted here suggested not to have a decision on authenticity and of course on the rejection of all such decisions. As for the motivations of these decisions, given the political conjuncture of the days wherein the end of history has been declared to mark the glory of the Western liberal values, we can say that they serve as political decisions rather than having been produced out of an analytical observation, albeit having donned a post-orientalist, post-structuralist or pure scientific cloaks. Consequently, the analyses of religious authenticity, deciding a distortion because of an appeal to voluntarism once considered as an exclusively modernist token, serves to take or to sustain a political part against the Islamic resurgence which has to rely somehow on the possibility of Subject constituted through complicated ways of making identity and difference. This has become recently to take a form of an anti-fundamentalist campaign which tried to distinguish a political Islam based on a scripturalist discourse and invoking a voluntarist action to organise people against the Western post-colonialist hegemony over their countries. On the other side of this campaign, there grows another important aspect of it; appearing as a mystification and aesthetisation of the popular religiosity against the political one. The distinctive feature of this campaign lies in its gathering together various theoretical positions which, under normal conditions, resist to each other. We can see secular Muslim social scientists like Aziz el-Azmeh, poststructuralists like Derrida and Said, hermeneutics like Geertz, positivists like Gellner and the so-called poststructuralists like Mohammed Arkoun, all are in coalition mobilising all their theoretical positions to resist against the fundamentalist threat. The criticism against scripturalism should be read in the context of this campaign whose motivations are but political. Among all these figures Mohammed Arkoun's efforts really worth attention. Around the frame of aesthetisation of the folk Islam, Mohammed Arkoun mobilises the poststructuralist criticism of logocentrism against the Islamic scripturalism, again. He improves a schematic analysis of the history of

Islamic thought starting out with the juxtaposition of "Islamic reason" *(la raison vrai)* and the "social imagination of Muslims", the first identified with interpretative rigidity and political power, and the second with freedom, spontaneity, change and *différance*. The dialectic between these two is the theme of his analysis. As Binder has pointed out, Arkoun, flatly rejects the ideal of the Islamic state in any way, or the aspiration for the establishment of the rule of God on earth, either in its classical philosophical version, or in its orthodox Sunni version, or in its liberal modernist version as a form of parliamentary-constitutional-democracy. Arkoun's goal, Binder follows, is not the establishment of an Islamic state, but rather a democratic state in which the distinction between Islamic reason and philosophical reason will be expunged. He wishes to abolish the idea of a privileged authority based on scripturalist interpretation of the text, and it is from this point of view that he criticises the Islamic revolution in Iran and the doctrine of Ayatollah Khomeini (Binder, 1988: 166).

Referring to the literature which discussed the "sources" or "roots" of theology and of jurisprudence, Arkoun calls the classic, orthodox, Islamic doctrine fundamentalist. He uses the French term *intégriste* to refer to the fundamentalist movements which are, for him, by definition, also scripturalists. He asserts that fundamentalism/scripturalism came not only to dominate medieval theology, but it prevented the development of philosophy, it stymied the growth of scientific rationality, it caused the neglect of the history and culture of the nonliterate Muslim peoples, it transformed Muslim poetry from an expressive discipline into a formalist, elitist, ideology, it allowed the complete overshadowing of oral literature such as that of the Berbers, it has vilified practical reason and the related wisdom of folk religion (ibid.: 164-165).

As it seems, the deconstructionist approaches adapted from Derrida to the Islamic revivalism tends to participate in the campaign in question which works rather as a political discourse. He puts forward what he calls "the social imaginary of the Muslims" whose basic characteristics are spontaneity, involuntarism, being the passive receiver of the political, cultural and ideological hegemonies. It is not so difficult to see that such a populist mystification invokes but a mass society which is the product of the mass culture and which creates the ideal subjects for the political authorities. That is to say, one becomes inclined to think of the magnificent return of orientalism under the cloak of poststructuralist liberalism.

The constructions of binary oppositions in this literature between the "orthodox centre and deviant error, knowledge and ignorance, political order and anarchy, civilisation and barbarism, town and tribe, Holy Law and

mere human custom" (Gellner, 1981: 3) seems to have been operated against the former parts in favour of the latter parts in a Derridean way of thinking. The necessary hierarchy between the dual concepts have favoured the latters, so that it reversed the established textual violence to work against scripturalism, fundamentalism or more generally against the Islamic attempts of revivalism. While Arkoun's suggestions in turn tends to favour Berberist religiosity in Algeria over the fundamentalist religiosity, representing the free "social imagination of the Muslims" against the orthodox scripturalism which is represented by the fundamentalist movement, similar formulations have been improved in Turkey to promote the Alevite religiosity whose everyday practices are minimised to the degree that it become almost absolutely subordinated to the course of modernization and secularisation. Given the fact that the Alevite people have been the most loyal allies of the existing body politic without proposing any religious demand from the state (Shankland, 1993; Aktay, 1994), one can understand the basic motives behind such formulations which tend to have much to do with the claim and representation of authenticity.

Turning back to the problem of authenticity, we should conclude saying that we didn't try to indicate certain religious interpretation as authentic or inauthentic. Even we tried to show that such a decision can not be made except being motivated by ideological or political stands. Instead, we tried to anatomise the proliferation of the conception of authenticity through the analyses of the discourse of self-identity and diaspora given the post-caliphatic condition of the contemporary Islamism. Indeed, our aim at the outset was not to make all these readings to concentrate on the problem of authenticity. It was just to make a comprehensive reading to outline the situation of the Islamists in terms of their relationships with the religious texts and their embodiment in the (post)modern conditions. Gradually we came to be caught up by a conception of these conditions for the part of the Muslims in terms of what we have chosen to call "post-caliphatic". Postcaliphatism then was applied to characterise the situation of the Muslims in our times making some differences in their experience of (post)modernization. Considering the problem of authenticity which would have to arise in such conditions we refrained from giving an absolute role of determination to the process of modernization. Because the religious discourse of authenticity has its own measures and no sociological point of view can decide to its truth or falsity, except being in service of a political or ideological stand.

By depicting a formation of the discourses of diaspora I tried to provide a framework for understanding the mechanisms of the constitution of a political Islamic self-identity. This requires, of course, the examination of the conception of authenticity in their consciousness, albeit not to have a normative decision on its truth. We have, thus seen that, the religious authenticity is not constituted in parallel with the expectations of the social scientist who requires almost a literal recurrence of a religious experience in the definition of authenticity, which approximates to a kind of anachronism. Instead, even in the experience of the full diaspora, the Islamists have found some ways out of this condition. That is to say that even in the postcaliphate condition the possible authentic existence has been realised, as was illustrated by some samples in the previous chapters, through growing roses, being secluded, migrating to another place or resisting against the foreign body politic. The postcaliphate condition or the experience of diaspora, therefore, have not necessarily associated with inauthenticity. On the other hand, while the proliferation of the Islamic identity in question may make one think of the impossibility of an authenticity, the true judge of such decisions lies in the inner logic of the related experiences.

APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: INTRODUCTION OF *MECELLE-İ AHKAMİYYE*
Makâle-i Ula
ilm-i fıkhın ta'rif ve taksimi hakkındadır
1. İlm-i fıkh mesâil-i şer'iyye-i ameliyyeyi bilmektir.
Makâle-i Sâniye
Kavâid-i fıkhiyye hakkındadır.
2. Bir işten maksad ne ise hüküm ona göredir.
3. Ukûd'da i'tibâr makaasıt ve meâniyedir, ilfâz ve mebâniye değildir.
4. Şek ile yakîn zâil olmaz.
5. Bir şeyin bulunduğu hal üzre kalması asıldır.
6. Kadîm kıdemi üzre terkolunur.
7. Zarar kadîm olmaz.
8. Berâet-i zimmet asıldır.
9. Sıfâtı ârızada asıl olan ademdir.
10. Bir zamanda sabit olan şeyin hilafına delil olmadıkça bekâsıyla hükmolunur.
11. Bir emr-i hâdisin akreb-i evkatına izafeti asıldır.
12. Kelâmda asl olan mânây-ı hakîkîdir.
13. Tasrih mukaabelesinde delalete itibar yoktur.
14. Mevri-i nasda ictihada mesağ yoktur.
15. Alâ-hilâfi'l-kıyas sâbit olan şey sâire mâkisün aleyh olmaz.
16. İctihad ile ictihad nakz olunmaz.
17. Meşakkat teysiri celb eder.
18. Bir iş zik oldukta müttesi' olur.
19. Zarar ve mukabele bizzarar yoktur.
20. Zarar izâle olunur.
21. Zaruretler memnu' olan şeyleri mubah kılar.
22. Zaruretler kendi miktarlarınca taktir olunur.
23. Bir özür için caiz olan şey ol özrün zevâliyle bâtıl olur.
24. Mani' zail oldukça memnu' avdet eder.
25. Bir zarar kendi misliyle izale olunamaz.
26. Zarar-ı âmmı def' için zarar-ı has ihtiyar olunur.
27. Zarar-ı eşed zarar-ı ehaf ile izâle olunur.
28. İki fesad teâruz ettikde ehafi irtikab ile a'zamın çaresine bakılır.
29. Ehven-i şerreyn ihtiyar olunur.
30- Def'i mefâsid celb-i menâfiden evlâdır.
31. Zarar bi-kader-il-imkân def'olunur.
32. Hâcet umumi olsun hususî olsun zaruret menzilesine tenzil olunur.
33. Iztırar gayrın hakkını ibtal etmez.
34. Alması memnu' olan şeyin vermesi dahi memnu' olur.
35. İşlenmesi memnu' olan şeyin istenmesi dahi memnu' olur.
36. Adet muhakkemdir.

37. Nâs'ın istik'mali bir hüccettir ki anınla amel vacip olur.
38. Adeten mümteni' olan şey hakikaten mümteni' gibidir.
39. Ezmanın tegayyuruyla ahkâm'ın tagayyürü inkâr olunamaz.
40. Adetin delâletiyle ma'nâ-yı hakîkî terk olunur.
41. Adet ancak muttarid yahut gâlip oldukta muteber olur.
42. İtibar gâlib-i şâyidır, nadire değildir.
43. Örfen ma'rûf olan şey şart kılınmış gibidir.
44. Beynet-tüccar ma'rûf olan şey beynlerinde meşrut gibidir.
45. Örf ile ta'yin nass ile ta'yin gibidir.
46. Mâni' ve muktazi teâruz ettikde mâni' takdim olunur.
47. Vücudda bir şeye tâbi' olan hükümde dahi ana tâbi' olur.
48. Tâbi' olan şeye ayrıca hüküm verilemez.
49. Bir şeye malik olan kimse ol şeyin zaruriyyatından olan şeye dahi malik olur.
50. Asıl sâkıt oldukda fer' dahi sâkıt olur.
51. Sâkıt olan şey avdet etmez.
52. Bir şey bâtıl oldukta anın zimmetindeki şey dahi batıl olur.
53. Aslın ifası kâbil olmadığı halde bedeli îfâ olunur.
54. Bizzat tecvîz olunmayan şey bitteba' tecviz olunabilir.
55. İbtidâen tecvîz olunmayan şey bakâen tecvîz olunabilir.
56. Baka ibtidaen esheldir
57. Teberru' ancak kabz ile tamam olur.
58. Raiyye yâni tebea üzerine tasarruf maslahata mesnuttur.
60. Kelâmın i'mâli ihmalinden evlâdır.
61. Ma'nây-ı hakîkî müteazzir oldukta mecaza gidilir.
62. Bir Kelâmın i'mâli mümkün olmaz ise ihmal olunur.
63. Mütecezzi olmayan bir şeyin ba'zını zikretmek küllünü zikr gibidir.
64. Mutlak ıtlaki üzere cârî olur. Eğer nassen yahut delâleten takid delili bulunmazsa.
65. Hâzırdaki vasıf lağv ve gaibdeki vasıf mu'teberdir.
66. Sual cevabda iâde olunmuş addolunur.
67. Sâkit'e bir söz isnad olunmaz. Lâkin ma'rız-ı hâcette sükût beyandır.
68. Bir şeyin umûu bâtınada delili ol şeyin makamına kaim olur.
69. Mükâtebe muhataba gibidir.
70. Dilsizin işaret-i ma'hûdesi lisan ile beyan gibidir.
71. Tercümanın kavli her hususta kabul olunur.
72. Hatası zâhir olan zanna i'tibar yoktur.
73. Senede müstenid olan ihtimal ile hüccet yoktur.
74. Tevehhüme i'tibar yoktur.
75. Bürhan ile sâbit olan şey ıyânen sâbit gibidir.
67. Beyyine müdda'i için ve yemin münkir üzerinedir.
77. Beyyine hüccet-i müteaddiye ve ikrar hüccet-i kâsıradir.
79. Kişi ikrârıyla muâheze olunur.
80. Tenâkuz ile hüccet kalmaz, lakin mütenâkızın aleyhine olan hükme halel gelmez.

81. Asıl sâbit olmadığı halde fer'in sâbit olduğu vardır.
82. Şartın sübûtu indinde ana muallak olan şeyin, sübûtu lâzım olur.
83. Bi kaderi'l imkan şarta müraât olunmak lâzım gelir.
84. Va'dler suret-i tâlik-ı iktisâb ile lâzım olur.
85. Bir şeyin nef'i zamânı mukâbelesindedir.
86. Ücret ile zamân muctemi' olmaz.
87. Mazarrat menfaat mukâbelesindedir.
88. Külfet nîmete ve nîmet külfete göredir.
89. Bir fiilin hükmü fâiline muzaf kılınır ve mücbir olmadıkça âmirine muzaf kılınmaz.
90. Mübâşir yani bizzat fâli ile mütesebbip müctemi' oldukta hükm ol fâlie muzâf kılınır.
91. Cevaz-ı şer'î zamanâ münâfî olur.
92. Mübâşir müteammid olmasa da zâmin olur.
93. Mütesebbib müteammid olmadıkça zâmin olmaz.
94. Hayvanatın kendiliğinden olarak cinayet ve mazarratı hederdir.
95. Gayrın mülkünde tasarrufla emretmek bâtıldır.
96. Bir kimsenin mülkünde anın izni olmaksızın âhar bir kimsenin tasarruf etmesi câiz değildir.
97. Bilâ sebeb-i meşrû birinin malını bir kimsenin ahz eylemesi câiz olmaz.
98. Bir şeyde sebeb-i temellükün tebeddülü ol şeyin tebeddülü makamına kâimdir.
99. Kim ki bir şeyi vaktinden evvel isti'cal eyler ise mahrumiyyetle muâteb olur.
100. Her kim ki kendi tarafından tamam olan şeyi nakz etmeği sa'y ederse sa'yi merduttur.

**APPENDIX B: DECLARATION OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
ISLAMIC CONGRESS OF COMMERCIAL LAW**
I. Uluslararası İslâm Ticaret Hukuku Kongresi Sonuç Bildirisi

25 Eylül 1996 Çarşamba günü saat 13: 30-19: 30 arasında genel krulda gerçekleştirilen müzâkereler neticesinde aşağıda gösterilen görüşlerin, sonuç bildirisinde değerlendirilmek üzere kongre genel kuruluna arzına oy birliği ile karar verildi.

I. İslâm dini kadının çalışmasını hukuken engellememektedir. Günümüz modern toplumunda kadının çalışması; temel amaç, felsefe ve yaklaşım açısından farklılıklar taşımaktadır. Burada temel sorun, kadının çalışmasının meşrû olup olmadığı değil, toplum içinde kadına İslâm'ın yüklediği rol ile modern toplumun yüklediği rolün ne derece uygun olduğudur. Çünkü İslâm kadına öncelikle annelik ve eş olma rolünü biçerken modern toplum, kadını cinsiyetten arınmış v bağımsız bir birey aolarak algılamaktadır. Bu sebeple, günümüz toplumlarında kadın, zaruret veya ihtiyaca dayalı olarak çalışmalı; iffet güvenliğine ve tesettüre uygun olarak, halvet olmamak, kadının özelliklerine uygun işbölümü yapmak ve eşler arasında rıza esasına dayanmak şartlarını haiz bulunmalıdır.

II. 1. Ticarî isim, ticari ünvan, marka, telif ve patent, insanların mal olarak telakki etmeleri sebebiyle çağımızın örfünde geçerli mâlî değere sahip haklar haline gelmiş olup bunlar sahiplerine özgü haklardır. Dolayısıyla bu haklar şer'an geçerlidir ve ihlal edilmesi caiz değildir. 2. Mâlî birer hak olduğuna göre ticarî isim, ticarî ünvan ve ticarî marka üzerinde tasarrufta bulunmak v eharhangi birisini mâlî bir bedel karşılığında devretmek, garar (belirsizlik), hile ve aldatma bulunmamak şartıyla caizdir. 3. Telif ve patent hakları hukuken korunur, unlar üzernide tasarrufta bulunma hakkı sahiplerine atitir ve bu hakların ihlâl edilmesi caiz değildir.

III. 1. Nasların ve şer'kurallarının ortaya koyduğu ilke, Yüca Allah'ın: "Ey iman edenler! Mallarınızı aranızda haksız yere yemeyin, karşılıklı rızaya dayalı bir ticaret olması müstesna" sözünün mutlak anlamlarının gereği olarak insanlar, alım-satımda ve mal-mülk üzerinde tasarruf konusunda İslâm hukukunda İslâm hukuku hükümleri ve genel kuralları çerçevesinde serbest bırakılmasıdır. 2. Tacirlerin ticarî muamelelerinde, baglı kalmaları gereken belirli bir kâr haddi yoktur. Bu husus itidal, kanaat, hoşgörü ve kolaylık gösterme gibi dini âdâbın gereklerine riayet edilmesi şartıyla, ticaretin genel şartlarına ve tacir ile sözkonusu malın özel durumuna bırakılmıştır. 3. Ticaretin aldatma, hile, yanıltma, gafletten yararlanma, gerçek kârı çarpıtma, ihtikâr gibi zararı fert ve topluma dönen haram kazanç yollarından arındırılması gereğini vurgulayan birço nas bulunmaktadır. 4. Yetkililer sun'î âmillerden kaynaklanam ve piyasanın sağlıklı işlemesini önleyen açık bir durum bulunmadıkça piyasa ve fiyatlara müdahelede bulunamazlar. Böyle bir durumda ise yetkililer kamu zararını önlemeye; pahalılık ve aşırı ayldanma sebeplerini ortadan kaldırmaya imkan vereck adil yöntemlerle müdahelede bulunabilirler. 5. İslâm şirketleşmeyi teşvik etmiştir. Günümüzde çok ortaklı şirket kurmak bir zaruret haline gelmiştir. Bu

şirketler; karşılıklı rıza ve anlaşmaya dayalı olması, b) belirsizliğin (ğarar) ve bilinmezliğin (cehalet) ortadan kaldırılmış olması, c) Zulüm ve sömürünün kaldırılması ve dolayısıyla sorumluluğun şahıslara dayalı olması, d) Faaliyet konusunun meşrûlğu, e) Faaliyet esnasında İslâm'ın temel emir ve yasaklarına uyulması, f) Ortakların eminliği şartlarını haiz olmalıdır. 6. Şirketlerin kuruluşu ve çalışma esasarı; sermaye payları, sermayenin kullanımı, kâr payı ve dağıtımı, yönetim yapısı, ortakların karar alma yöntemi karşılıklı rıza ve anlaşmaya dayalı olarak ana sözleşme ile önceden belirlenmelidir.

IV. Uluslararası her türlü ticarî ilişki prensip olarak caiz görülmekle birlikte bu gün gayri müslim devletlerle kurulacak ticârî ilişkilerin sınırları, hangi tür malların alınıp satılabileceği, hangi ölçüde işbirliği kurulabileceği meselesi maslahat prensibi, mefsedetin def'inin menaat celbinden önceliğe sahip olduğu, hafif zararın büyük zarara tercih edileceği gibi genel kurallar çerçevesinde ve müslümanlar leyhine stratejik üstünlüğe yol açmayacak şekilde haledilmelidir.

V. İslâm'da sözleşme hükümlerine uyulması asıldır. Muhayyerlikler, karşılıklı rıza ile akdi bozma (ikale) veya bir özür sebebiyle akdi feshetme durumlarında zararın tazmini gerekmez. Bunun dışında tek yanlı fesihlerden doğacak zararların sözleşmede belirtilen hükümlere göre, burada yoksa genel hükümlere göre tazmini gerekir.

VI. Günümüz modern toplumlarında ortaya çıkmış olan işçilik farklı bir durumdur.: Mülkiyet ve sermayeden arındırılmış emeği temsil eden işçilik, çalışma ortamında fizikî ve ruhî olarak yıpranmayı da beraberinde getirmektedir. Kıdem ve benzeri tazminatlar işçi ve işveren arasındaki sözleşmeye dayanarak işçinin kendi istek ve kusuruna bağlı olmadan işten çıkarılması durumunda, bu yıpranma karşılığı ödenebilir.

VII. İşletmelerarası rekabet, sürekli büyüme ve rakiplerine karşı üstünlük elde etme amacına yönelik çabadır. Sürekli büyüme, pazara tek başına hakim olma, aşırı ve lüks tüketimi teşvik etme amaçlı ve bunların sonucu olarak yaşam değeri oluşturmaya yönelik rekabet meşrû kabul edilemez. Müslüman toplumun menfaatı, tüketici yararı, serbest fiyat teşekkülü ve mal/hizmet mübadelesi rekabet için esastır. Reklam ve tutundurma çabaları (promosyon) öncelikle olarak bir rekabet aracı olarak değil, üretilen mal ve hizmeti haberdar etme ve bilgi aktarma aracı olarak kabul edilebilir. Değer üreten, yaşam biçimi sunan, yanlış bilgi veren, haksız rekabet douran, İslâm'ın ahlâk ve âdâbına ters düşen reklamlar meşrû değildir.

VIII. Bir merkezden yönetilen firma, işletme ve sanayî kuruluşlarının çeliştli yerlerde temsilcilikler açması ve bu yolla merkezdeki işlemlerin benzerlerinin yapılmasını sağlaması ya da ürettiği malların temsilcilikler eliyle dağıtımını sürdürmesi acentalar eliyle yapılabilmektedir. Acenta sözleşmesinde İslâm'la çelişen şartlar bulunmadığı taktirde müessesenin meşrû olduğunda şüphe yoktur. Acentaların İslâm'ın mudârebe (emek-sermaye) ortaklığı yöntemi ile düzenlenmesi mümkündür. Çünkü mudârebede, sermaye sahibi işletmeciye satış şartları konusunda özel sınırlamalar getirebilir. Buna göre bir firma acenta

sermayesi ile kendi mallarının dağıtımını sağlayabilir.

FİNANS VE BORSA

1. Kredi

a) Devletin verdiği faizli krediyi almak üyelerin tamamına göre caiz değildir.

b) Devletin verdiği teşvik kredisi, aizsizse almak ittifakla caizdir. Faizli teşvik kredisine gelince, üyelerden dördüne göre caiz değildir; üçüne göre ise teşvik için olmak ve dinen meşru sayılan alanda bulunmak kaydıya caizdir.

2. Teminat Mektubu: Üyelerden üçüne göre caiz, dördüne göre ise İslâm bankalarından alınması ve bedelin İslâmî kaidelere göre ödenmesi şartıyla caizdir.

3. Akreditif: Üyelerin tamamına göre prensip olarak akreditif komisyon bedeli ödemek caizdir. Fakat bunların İslâm bankalarından alınması ve İslâmî kurallara göre uygulanması tavsiye edilmiştir.

4. Kredi Kartı: Prensip olarak faizsiz ve yalnız mal ve hizmet alımlarında kullanılmak üzere (çünkü nakit alımı faize tâbî tutulmaktadır) kredi kartı almak caizdir. Üyelerden biri meşruiyetini zarurete dayandırmaktadır. Üyeler İslâm bankalarının da İslâmî kurallara uygun bir şekilde kullanmaları şartıyla kredi kartı vermeleri yönünde tavsiyede bulunmuşlardır.

5. Leasing: İslâm bankalarınca ve İslâmî kurallara göre yapılması şartıyla ittifakla caiz görülmüştür.

6. Özel Finans Kurumlarının Muameleleri:

a) *Mudarebe:* Sözkonusu kurumların İslâmî esaslara uygun olmak kaydıyla mudarebe şeklinde kâr-zarar ortaklığı yapmaları ittifakla caizdir. Ayrıca tavsiye edilmiştir.

b) *Müşâreke:* Üyelerin tamamına göre özel finans kurumlarının hisse senedi alarak veya bilfiil ortaklık şeklinde müşâreke yapmaları caizdir.

c) *Murâbaha:* Murâbaha, İslâmî kurallara harfiyyen uyulması şartıyla ittifakla caizdir. Ancak İslâmî gaye olarak diğer mudârebe ve müşâreke ortaklıklarına girilmesi ve bu yolda gayret gösterilmesi tavsiye edilmiştir.

7. Selem Akdi: Üyelerin tamamına göre faize düşmeden yapılan selem akdi caizdir.

8. Borsa: Devletin çıkardığı tahvil ve hazine bonoları alım-satımı ittifakla caiz değildir. Borsadaki hisse senetlerinin alınıp satılması ise, üyelerden birinin dışındakilere göre İslâm'a uygun iş alanlarında ve İslâmî kurallara uygun olarak çalışan şirketlerin çıkardığı hisse senetleri alım-satımı caizdir.

ZEKAT

1. Zekata tâbî diğer mallarda olduğu gibi ticaret mallarından da zekat verilmesi gerekir. Nisab ve diğer şartalrı bulunduğunda ticaret mallarından verilecek zekat yüzde iki buçuk nisbetinde olacaktır. Verilecek kimsenin faydalanabileceği bir mal olursa zekat, bizzat ticaret malından verilebileceği gibi kıymetinden de verilebilir.

2. Çok ortaklı şirket organizasyonunda ortakların hisselerinin zekatı, bizzat hisse sahipleri tarafından verilebileceği gibi şirket tarafından da verilebilir. Bu konuda çoğunluğun ittifakı hasıl olmuştur. Ancak hisse sahiplerinin zekatının şirket

tarafnıdan ödenebilmesi için a) Hisse sahibi kendi hisselerinin zekatını verme konusunda şirket yönetimine yetki vermelidir. Veya b) Şirketin genel kurulunda bu yönde karar alınmalıdır. Veya c) Şirketin tüzüğünde veya ülkenin mevzuatında ortakların zekatının şirket yönetimi tarafından ödeneceğine dair bir hüküm bulunmalıdır.

3. "Zekata esas servet, zorunlu vergiler çıktıktan sonra mı hesaplanmalıdır ya da zekata ilave olarak verilen zorunlu vergilerin İslâm'da yeri nedir? konusunda, oturuma katılanlardan yalnız bir tebliğ sahibi zekatın İslâm devletinin vergisi olduğunu, mükellef bu vergiyi verdikten sonra ayrıca isterse dini, ahlakî ve ictimai olarak sadaka verebileceğini ileri sürmüştür. Diğer katılımcılar, onun mali bir ibadet olduğunu gerekirse devletin zekatın dışında çeşitli tür ve oranlarda vergi koyabileceğini ittifakla kabul etmişlerdir. Ayrıca, zekat ile verginin keyfiyet, mükellefiyet, hedef, gaye, nisbet ve harcama yerleri bakımından birbirinden farklı olduğu sonucuna varmışlardır. Bu bakımdan, devlet tarafından zekat dışında alınan vergiler zekata sayılamayacaktır. Zekat mükellefi, vermek mecburiyetinde bulunduğu vergi dışında kalan ve zekata thabî mallarının zekatını ayrıca vermekle yükümlüdür.

4. Sanayi sektöründeki üretim makinalarının zekatı ile ilgili olarak yapılan müzakerelerde, 1952 yılında Şam, 1965 yılında Kahire, 1984 yılında Kuveyt ve 1988'de de Cidde'de gerçekleştirilen konferans ve toplantılarda zekatla ilgili verilen kararlara da atıflar yapılarak; a) Zekatın bine, ticaret mahalleri ve makinalar gibi satışa konu olmayan, sadce üretim ve gelir elde etmede kullandıkları için duran sermaye kabul edilen yer ve makinaların bizzat kendilerinin (hisse senetleri dahil) zekâta tabi olmadıkları, b) Bunların ürün ve gelirlerinden zekat verilmesi gerektiği hususlarında ittifat edilmiştir. c) Bunlardan verilmesi gereken zekat miktarında i farklı görüşler ileri sürülmüştür. Şöyle ki; i) Bazı alimler, üretim ve gelir getirmede kullanılan bu araçlara ziraat arazisine, gelirlerini de ziraî ürünlere benzetmişler, bunların aşınma ve eskime durumunu da gözönüne alarak yıllık amortisman, vergi ve mükellefin tabii ihtiyaçları düşüldükten sonra safî gelirden % 10 veya bunlar düşülmeden brüt gelirden % 5 zekat verilmesi gerektiğini söylemişler, ii) Bazı alimler de durumu ticarete benzetmişler, bu gelirlerin mükellefin elindeki diğer ticaret malları ve paraya eklenerek yüzde iki buçuk nisbetinde zekata tâbî olması gerektiğini söylemişlerdir.

5. Parası ödendiği halde ele geçmeyen malın zekatı ile ilgili olarak alimler zekat için mülkiyet şartının gerçekleşmesini esas almışlardır. bu konuda katılımcıların çoğu alım-satım akdiyle alıcının mülkiyetinin gerçekleştiğini söylerken, bir kısmı da satın alınan malın ancak satın alan veya vekiline teslimiyle mülkiyetin gerçekleştiğini ileri sürmüşlerdir. Buna göre satın alınan malın özelliği veya alışverişin şartlarına ve örfe göre alıcıya teslim edilmiş sayılan malların zekatı, ödeme günündeki değerinden, teslim edilmiş sayılmadığı durumlarda da bu mallar için yatırılan bedelden zekat ödenmesi gerektiği benimsenmiştir.

FAİZ

Kur'an ve sünnetin açık nasslarıyla riba kesin olarak yasaklanmıştır. Ancak İslâm'daki riba yasağının kapsamı ve bir kısım borç ilişkilerindeki ödemelerin bu yasak kapsamında mütalaa edilip-ediemeyceği konusunda İslâm alimleri farklı fikirler serdetmişlerdir. Faizle ilgili görülerek kongrenin IV. oturum gündemine dercedilen meseleler hakkındaki görüşler aşağıda belirtilmeştir.

1. Vadeli satım ve vade farkı, ilerde taraflar arasında herhangi bir ihtilafa yol açmayacak bir biçimde akit esnasında taraflarca belirlenmek kaydıyla kural olarak caizdir.

2. Herhangi bir şeklide hesabında faiz tahakkuk etmiş olan bir Müslüman bunu bankadan alıp bir sevap beklentisi olmaksızın hayır yolunda harcamalıdır.

3. Borcun vadesinde ödenmemesi durumunda, —alacaklının bu gecikmede bir kusuru olmaması ve başlangıçta şart koşulmaması kaydıyla— îfâya gücü yeten borçludan asıl alacağına ilave olarak uğradığı zararın tazminini de isteyebilir.

4. Repo yasak olan faizin kapsamı içindedir.

5. Haramların zaruret halinde mübah olma ilkesi faiz için de geçerlidir. Ancak her bir zaruret halinin kendi şartları içinde ayrı ayrı değerlendirilmesi gerekir.

6. İslâm'da alacaklı hakkından fazlasını alamayacağı gibi hakkından eksik almaya da zorlanamaz. Bu itibarla bir kıım Islâm alimlerine göre borç konusu paranın değerinde zamanla önemli sayılacak miktarda değişme olduğu taktirde, ödemelerin enflasyon miktarı dikkate alınarak yapılması gerekir. Diğer bir kısım alimler ise para borçlarının kararlaştırılan rakamsal değerler esas olınarak ödenmesi gerektiği kanaatindedir. Şu var ki, bu gruptaki bazı alimler borçlanma esnasında öngörülemeyen durumların ayrıca değerlendirilmesi gerektiği görüşündedir. Kongrenin IV. Oturumu'nda görev alan katılımcılar tarafından bu görüşlerin ayrı ayrı savunulduğu tesbit edilmiştir.

7. Faizle iştigal eden kişi ve kuruluşlara faiz alma niyetiyle para yatırmak, faiz oranı enflasyon oranının altında da olsa caiz değildir.

8. Akdin konusu meşrû olmak kaydıyla komisyonculuk karşılığında ücret almak caiz olup, alınacak ücret anlaşmayla veya ticârhi teâmülle belirlenir.

9. Kiracının sözleşme süresinin bitiminden önce gayrimenkulü tahliye edip malikine veya mal sahibinin mavafakati ile ikinci bir kiracıya teslim etmesi karşılığında bir bedel alması caizdir. Fakat kira süresi sona ermiş yahut açık olarak veya zımnen yenilenmemişse kiracının tahliye bedeli alması caiz olmaz. Şu kadar var ki, kiracı devir hakkını kullanma konusunda malik ile açıkça anlaşmış ise, mülkiyet hakkını ve sözleşme hükümlerini ihlal etmemek ve hakkaniyet kurallarına uymak kaydıyla bu hakkın kullanımı karşılığında bir bedel alabilir.

10. Factoringde kredi verme dışındaki hizmetler komisyonculuk vb.hizmetlerin hükmüne, kredi verme ise genel faiz hükümlerine tâbîdir.

11. Devletin verdiği teşvik kredileri konusunda: a) Bir kısım İslâm alimleri, ülke ekonomisinin gelişmesine katkı amacıyla verilen bu tür kredilerin —faizinin reel pozitif olmaması ve meşrû alanlarda şartlarına uygun biçimde kullanılması kaydı ile— alınabileceği kanaatindedir. Bu görüşün sahipleri özellikle, dini duyarlılığı olan kişilerin de bu imkandan yararlanmalarına ve ülke ekonomisinde etkin bir

rol üstlenmelerine engel olunmaması gerektiği düşüncesinden hareket etmektedirler. b) Diğer bir kısım İslham alimleri ise ya devletin kamuya ait bir imkanı bu şekilde kullandırmasına olumlu bakmadıkları veya bu uygulamayı riba çerçevesi dışında görmedikleri için ya da her iki mülâhaza ile bu tür kredilerin alınmasının caiz olmayacağı kanâatindedir. Kongrenin IV. oturumunda görev alan katılımcılar arasında her iki görüşü benimseyen bilin adamlarının bulunduğu tesbit edilmiştir.

SİGORTA

1. Heyet, prensip olarak sigorta sisteminin gerekli ve caiz olduğunda görüş birliği içerisindedir. Bnunla birlikte özellikle ticarî hayat sigortası olmak üzere günümüzde cârî olan diğer sigorta uygulamalarının düzeltilmesi gereken bazı unsurlar içerdiğini kabul etmiştir.

2. Günümüz Türkiye'sinde uygulanmaka olan hayat sigortasına bakışları farklıdır. Çoğunluk mevcut haliyle hayat sigortası uygulamasının garar, kumar, faiz gibi akdi batıl kılanunsurlar taşıdığını ve bu sebeple caiz görülemeyeceğini, ancak bu batıl unsurların giderilmesi durumunda caiz hale geleceğini söylemiştir. Bunun için İslâm dünyasındaki bazı uygulamalardan istifade edilebilecği de tavsiye edilmiştir. Türkiye'de halen uygulanan haat sigortası İslâm açısından ideal olan sigorta olmamakla birlite bu sigortaların caiz görülebileeck bazı uygulamalarının bulunduğu ve bu uygulamalardan yararlanılabileceği görüşü azınlıkta kalmıştır. Ancak "kooperatif" tarzında çalışan dayanışma sigortalarını da kanunların elverdiği ölçüde kurumsallaştırmak gerektiği ve bu konuda örnek uygulamalar bulunduğu ifade edilmiştir. Kongreye Malezya'dan katılan İslam Dayanışma Şirketi sekreteri M. Fazlı b. Yusuf hayat sigortasının ihtiva ettiği faiz, kumar ve garar gibi haram unsurlar sebebiyle caiz olmadığını, bunlar giderildiği taktirde hayat sigortası yapılabileceğini ve kendilerinin İslâm Dayanışma Şirketi kurumu bünyesinde hayat sigortası hizmeti verdiklerini ifade etmiştir.

3. *İşsizlik Sigortası:* Tebliğciler işsizliğin "sosyal güvenlik" sistemici sigorta edilen bir rizio olduğunu, işsizlik sigortasının devleti ilgilendirdiğini ve caiz olduğunu ittifakla belirtmişlerdir.

4. *İşyeri, iş makinaları ve kaza sigortaları:* Heyet üyelerinin çoğunluğu işyeri, iş makinaları ve kaza sigortalarının daha ideali oluşturuluncaya kadar mevcut haliyle caiz olduğunu, ancak bu tür sigortanın "dayanışma" esasına göre kurulmak suretiyle daha uygun hale getirilmesinin mümkün olduğunu belirtirken, heyet üyelerinden bir kısmı bu tür sigortaların mala yönelik olması sebebiyle "kaza sigortalarına " dahil bulunduğunu, mevcut "ticarî sigortaların" sunduğu kaza sigorta akdinde garar, kumar ve faiz gibi akdi batıl kılan unsurlar taşıdığından caiz olmadığını belirtmiştir. ancak bunlar dayanışma sigortası ile telafi edilebilir.

5. Prensip olarak işyerinin işçisinin sosyal sigorta primini ödemekle yükümle olduğu konusunda bildiri sahipleri görüş birliğine varmışlardır.

6. Heyet üyelerinden birisi şu görüşü ilave etmiştir: Sigorta özel olmaktan ziyade

devletin işidir. Bütün vatandaşlar devletin sigortası altındadır. Zekattan uyarlama yapılarak bir sigorta sistemi düşünülebilir. Bunların üst sigorta kurumu ise (reassurane) İslâm Konferansı Teşkilatı'na bağlı olarak kurulmalıdır.

APPENDIX C: A DIASPORIC POET
BÜLBÜL
By Mehmed Akif ERSOY

Bütün Dünyaya küskündüm, dün akşam pek bunalmıştım;
Nihâyet, bir zaman kırlarda gezmiş, köyde kalmıştı.
Şehirden kaçmak isterken sular zaten kararmıştı;
Pek ıssız bir karanlık sonradan vadiyi sarmıştı.
Işık yok, yolcu yok, ses yok, bütün hilkat kesilmiş lâl...
Mûhitin hâli "insâniyyet"in timsalidir, sandım;
Dönüp mâziye tırmandım, ne hicranlar, neler andım!
Taşarken haşrolup beynimden artık bin müselsel yâd,
Zalâmın sînesinden fışkıran memdûd bir feryâd,
O müstağrak, o durgun vecdi nâgâh öyle coşturdu:
Ki vâdiden bütün, yer yer, eninler çağlayıp durdu.
Ne muhrik nağmeler, yâ Rab, ne mevcâmevc demlerdi:
Ağaçlar, taşlar ürpermişti, gûya Sûr-i Mahşerdi!
—Eşin var, âşiyânın var, baharın var, ki beklerdin;
Kıyametler koparmak neydi, ey bülbül, nedir derdin?
O zümrüd tahta kondun, bir semâvî saltanat kurdun;
Cihânın yurdu hep çiğnense, çiğnenmez senin yurdun.
Bugün bir yemyeşil vâdî, yarın bir kıpkızıl gülşen,
Gezersin, hânümânın şen, için şen, kâinâtın şen.
Hazansız bir zemin isterse, şâyed rûh-i ser-bâzın,
Ufuklar, bu'd-i mutlaklar bütün mahkûm-i pervâzın.
Değil bir kayda, sığmazsın —kanatlandın mı— eb'âda;
Hayâtın en muhayyel gâyedir ahrâra dünyada.
Neden öyleyse mâtemlerle eyyâmın perîşandır?
Niçin bir damlacık göğsünde bir umman hurûşandır?
Hayır, mâtem senin hakkın değil... Mâtem benim hakkım:
Asırlar var ki, aydınlık nedir, hiç bilmez âfâkım!
Teselliden nasibim yok, hazân ağlar bahârımda;
Bugün bir hânümansız serseriyim öz diyarımda!
Ne hüsrandır ki: Şark'ın ben vefâsız, kansız evlâdı,
Serâpâ Garb'a çiğnettim de çıktım hâk-i ecdâdı!
Hayâlimden geçerken şimdi; fikrim hercümerc oldu,
Selahaddin-i Eyyûbi'lerin, Fatih'lerin yurdu.
Ne zillettir ki: Nâkuus inlesin beyninde Osmân'ın;
Ezan sussun, fezâlardan silinsin yâdı Mevlâ'nın!
Ne hicrandır ki: En şevketli bir mâzî serâb olsun;
O kudretler, o satvetler harâb olsun, türâb olsun!
Çökük bir kubbe kalsın ma'bedinden Yıldırım Hân'ın;
Şenâ'atlerle çiğnensin muazzam kabri Orhan'ın;

Ne haybettir ki: Vahdet-gâhı dinin devrilip, taş taş,
Sürünsün şimdi milyonlarca nev'asız kalan dindaş!
Yıkılmış hânümanlar yerde işkenceyle kıvransın;
Serilmiş gövdeler, binlerce, yüzbinlece doğransın!
Dolaşsın, sonra, İslâm'ın harem-gâhında nâ-mahrem...
Benim hakkım, sus ey bülbül, senin hakkın değil mâtem!
(Mehmed Akif, 1989: 435-436).

APPENDIX D: FRAGMENTS FROM İSMET ÖZEL
ON "LIVING IN A SYSTEM AND HAVING A SYSTEM"

Sistemli Olmak, Sistemin Olmak

By İsmet Özel*(Zor Zamanda Konuşmak,* 113-117)

Çeşitli sistemlerle karşılaşırız yaşarken. İktisadi bir sistem, bir düşünce sistemi, siyasi, sosyal, bilimsel bir sistem, bir eğitim sistemi, felsefhi bir sistem. Belki bunlardan bazıları diğerlerinin temelini teşkil eder, belki iki sistem içiçe geçmiş olarak bulunur.

Sistem olma niteliği taşıyan her yapı kendi dışındaki unsurları hep kendi mantığı açısından bir yere oturtacaktır. Yani sistemle temas halindeki herşey önce onun varlık temposuna ayak uyduracak özellikler sahibi olur, sonra da sistem içinde kendine ayrılmış yörüngeye oturup sistemin merkezî kuvvetinin uydusu olur. Bir sistemin sahip olduğu özellikleri elde etmek isteyen her unsur peşinen onun yapısı içinde erimeyi, o sisteme mahsus niteliklerle donanmış bir yaşamayı isteyerek kabul etmiş demektir.

Hangi türden olursa olsun bir sistemle karşı karşıya olduğumuzu veya bir sistemin içine düştüğümüzü ihssettiğimiz zaman ilk ağızda iki basit tepki bekler bizi: Bunlardan biri, temas ettiğimiz sistemin etkili bir birimi olmak ve böylece bir sistem içinde olmanın kârını sağlamak; ikincisi bu sistemin hangi sabit noktasında bulunursak bulunalım sonuçta zararlı çıkacağımızı düşünüp sistemi yıkmaya çalışmak. Eğer sistemi benimsemiş isek o sistemin etkili unsuru olamasak bile o düzende yerimizi almak tedirgin etmeyecektir bizi. Ama ya o sistemi düşman saydı isek ne olacak? Düşman saydığımız sisteme karşı yürüttüğümüz zihnî veya bedenî çabaların o sisteme zarar vermediğini gördüğümüz zaman bir düş kırıklığına, bir mağlubiyete uğrayacağız. Galibiyete ulaşmamız ancak karşımıza aldığımız sistemin dağılması, yok olması ve sistem olarak varlığını kaybetmesiyle mümkün olabilecektir. Ama böyle bir sonucu elde etmek için işe girişmenin daha başlangıçta düşündürücü bir tarafı var: Bir sistemle nasıl savaşılabilir?

Sistem demek belli kurallar doğrultusunda ve belli ilkeler gereğince işleyen bir mekanizma demektir. Dolayısıyla bir sisteme karşı çıkmakla, onu reddetmekle kalmayıp onunla savaşmaya girişmiş olanın bu kurallardan haberdar olması, bu ilkelerin işleyişinin aslına ulaşması gerekir. Sistemle savaşmak için sistemli olmak bir zorunluluktur.

Eğer karşı çıktığımız, varlığını kaldırmak istediğimiz sistemin kurallarını tanıyacak ve ilkelerinin mahiyetini kavrayacak isek, bu işi o sistemin dışında kalarak başarabilir miyiz? Sistemi içinden tanımak onun içinde olmayı gerektirmez mi? Evetse, sistemin içine girildikten ve sisteme mahsus düşünme yollarını, iş görme yollarını edindikten sonra o sistem hasmını bünyesinde eritmiş sayılmaz mı? Evetse, bir sistemin bünyesinde erimiş olan unsur o sistemi yıkabilir mi? Sistemi yıkmanın kendini de yoketmek anlamına geldiği bir aşamada sistem içindeki bir unsur kendi

mahvı için kararlar alabilir mi?

Sistem dediğimiz şey, ister bir felsefî yaklaşım, ister bir sosyal yapı olsun, kapalı bir devre, kendi içinde tutarlılık sağlamış olan ve unsurlarını mantıkî bir bağla bünyesi içinde kaynaştırmış bir bütündür. Sistem canlılığını hep kendini tekrar ederek korur. Aynı fâsit daire içinde dönüp durur sistem. Öyleyse bir sistemi yıkma çabasının da sonuçta yeni bir fâsit daireye varacağını düşünmek şaşırtıcı gelmemeli. Her sistem, kendini yıkacak zıtlıklar ve zaafları bünyesinde taşır denilebilir elbet. Ne var ki, bu zaafları tanımak acaba bu sistemin bir unsuru olunduğu zaman mümkün mü?

Anlaşıldığı kadarıyla sistemler içten değişmelerini yeni bir sisteme dönüşerek, yani kendilerini aşmak suretiyle gerçekleştirirler. Bir sistemin yıkılması ancak onu sistem olarak tanımayan, o sisteme bütünüyle yabancı ve onun işleyiş şartlarından habersiz dış unsurlar tarafından başarılabilir. Fakat bunun bir başarı olduğu da söylenemez, çünkü sistemi ortadan kaldıran kuvvet sistemi yıkma çabasıyla değil kendi mevcudiyetinin zorunlu kıldığı gelişmeyi ve davranış, düşünce tarzını uygulamaya koyma niyetiyle sonucu hasıl etmiştir.

Sistemlerden Koparsak

Bugünün dünyasına hakim olan sistem bütün yenleriyle ele alındığında tek bir çarkın hareketine irca edilebilir. İktisadi görüntüsü, teknolojik donatımı, ideolojisi ve ideolojileriyle insanları hakikatin derinliğinden mahrum etmek, bu mahkumiyetin rantını küçük kabul ettiği insanlara ödemek niyetiyle açıklanabilir bütün olup bitenler. Günümüz dünyasında yer yuvarlağının her köşesinde aynı sistem geçerlidir. Çin'in kullandığı bilgisayardan, Sibirya'daki ABD yatırımlarına, İsrail saldırısı karşısında dilini yutmuş bulunan Mısır'dan, kendi yurttaşlarını en korkunç faşizan baskılar altında inletirken terkedilmiş adaları hürriyeti için dövüşen Arjantin'e kadar herşey bu sistemin içinde ayrı bir yer ve göreve sahiptir.

Çatışmaya taraf olarak görünen her kamp gerçekte çatışmanın arzulanan sınıflar içinde yürütülmesi fonksiyonu ile yüklü olarak işe başlar. Sistemin ayakta durması için bir çok bölgede ateş hattının bulunması, sömüren-sömürülen ilişkisi, maddeci-maneviyatçı ayrımı, teknolojik yarışma, nötron bombasına evet veya hayır deme, Filistin devletinin kurulmasını isteme veya reddetme gereklidir. Bu gereklilikler insanların ancak bu sistemin içinde bulunabileceğini kabul ettirmek, bu sistemin içinde taraf olmaksızın yaşamanın akla dahi getirilemeyeceğini kabul ettirmek içindir. Son yıllarda zengin ülkelerin zirve toplantısı yapmalarının büyük sistemde aksayan motorları tam gaz çalıştırma gayreti olduğunu akıldan çıkarmamalı.

Benim görüşüme göre Müslümanların kendilerini bu sistem içinde en tercihe şayan alternatif olarak anlamaları ve dışa böyle görünmeye çabalamaları kadar inançlarına, fikriyatlarına ters düşen hiçbir husus yoktur. Onların yapabilecekleri yalnızca sistemin dışında kalmaktan ibarettir. Bu dışta kalma isteği öylesine potansiyel bir güçtür ki, sistemin yürütücü ve savunucuları kendi sonlarının bu "karışmama" faaliyetiyle bağlantılı olduğunu iyi bilirler.

Bir anlamda sistemin dışında kalma imkânını elde bulunduranlar yalnızca Müslümanlar değildir. Bütün "otantik gelenekler" sistemi dışlama özüne sahiptirler. Ne var ki, sistemden kopması düşünülen fikir ve toplum yapılarından hiçbiri sistemi tamamen dışta bırakabilecek "itikadi" mesnede sahip değildir. Yalnız İslâm "küfr" kelimesine muhteva kazandırabilecek teçhizata sahiptir. Yalnız, İslâm, insan hayatının araçlarla mutabakatını ısrarla emreder. Kendini müşriklerden, kafirlerden ayırma titizliğine sahip yegane fikrî bütünlüğü İslâm'da görüyoruz. Modern çağın değerleriyle kaynaşması halinde "Kendi" olmaktan çıkacak tek anlayış tarzı da İslâm'dır. Çağımıza muhalefet eden bütün ideolojik yaklaşımların ve felsefelerin mahiyetleri gereği günümüz modern sistemi içinde yer alabileceğini ve fakat İslâm'ın sistemin içinde yer almakla kendini inkâr edeceğini akıldan çıkarmamak gerekir.

Sistemin sorumluluğunu yüklenmiş olanlar işte bütün bu saydığımız ve sayamadığımız sebeplerden ötürü İslâmî bir hayat tarzının, İslâmî nassların hakimiyetinin, değil bir ülkede, bir "köyde" bile hükümran olmasını istemeyecekler, buna hoşgörü ile bakmayacaklardır. Çünkü bir kere İslâm'ın bu çağda dahi yaşanabilirliği hangi mikyasta olursa olsun gösterildi mi, bunun cazibesinin büyük olacağını, büyük insan kalabalıklarını bundan uzak tutmanın zor ve belki de imkansız olduğunu ve somut, yaşanır haliyle gösterilmiş olan İslâm'ın yaygınlaşmasının sonunun alınamayacağını en iyi bilenler sistemin bekçileridir. Ama müslümanların kafası henüz buna ermiyor.

Kitle İletişim vasıtalarıyla kolayca yönlendirilebilinen, meselelerini sürekli olarak sistem sorumlularının seçtiği ve kendine en büyük hedef olarak, sistemin çarkını bir de kendi tarafına çevirmeyi seçmiş bulunan bir yığının bütün dünya sistemini dışlayacak güce sahip olmayışında şaşılacak hiç bir şey yok.

Sistem İslamcıları Yutuyor

By İsmet Özel *(Yeni Şafak,* 2 June, 1995)

Reddedilmeyi reddetmek. Türkiye'de son otuz yılın İslamcıları bunu amaçladılar ve büyük ölçüde başardılar. Reddedilmekten kurtulunca da amaçsız kaldılar. Bu halleriyle sisteme yem olmaları kaçınılmazdı. Şimdi bir ehlileştirme işlemine tabi tutulmaları bile gerekmeyen İslamcıları sistem birer birer yutuyor, evet, birer birer. Çünkü onları parçalama zahmetine girmesi bile gerekmiyor. Cumhuriyet tarihimiz boyunca bir arada oldukları vaki değildi. Onları şimdiye kadar toplu imiş gibi gösteren, İslamcıları sistemin tümüyle dışlıyor oluşu, tümünü birden reddedişiydi. Yapılan (yaptığmız) bu reddiyeye karşı çıkmaktan fazla birşey olmadığından, birileri "İslamcılık realitesi"ni kabul ettiklerinde bize birbirimizin yüzüne bakmaktan başka birşey kalmadı. Sistem tarafından yutulmaktan korunamıyoruz; çünkü kendimizi sisteme yedirmezsek ne yapacağımız üzerinde anlaşmış değildik. Bırakın anlaşmayı bu konuda konuşmadık bile.

Bir çok başka konuda konuştuk oysa. Bu konuşmalardan biri Kayseri'de sona ermiş ve soru-cevap kısmı da bitmişken dinleyenlerden birinin notu ulaştı bana. Bir soruydu bu ve istenilen şey cevabı sırf kendi kendime verebilmemdi. Zira not bana ulaştığında toplantı dağılmaya başlamıştı bile. Belki de adını kağıda ben belirtilen hususa bilhassa yoğunlaşayım ve yazdıkları içimde düğümlenip kalsın diye yazmayan bu arkadaş şunları getiriyordu:

"Müslümanların yapması gereken şeyin sistemle (medeniyet ve teknolojiden oluşan ve bunların birbirlerini besledikleri mekanizma) uzlaşmak, ona yeni tasvirler getirmek, ona alternatif olmak değil; sistemi tümden, sunduğu düşünme biçimi, bilgilenme biçimi, yaşama biçimi, eğitim biçimiyle, herşeyiyle reddetmek, dışında kalmak, tekerleğe çomak sokmak olduğunu ısrarla vurguluyorsunuz. Tamamen katılıyorum demek isterdim. Fakat düşünme biçiminizde eksiklik (ya da çelişki mi desek?) var gibi. Böyle anlamış olmam benim zihinsel işleyişimin yetersizliği yüzünden sizin söyledikleriniz arasındaki mantıksal zinciri kuramamamış olmamdan kaynaklanıyor olabilir. Eğer böyleyse bile yardımcı olmanızı rica ediyorum.

"Bir yandan yukarıdaki tezinizi ileri sürerken, öte yandan da diyorsunuz ki zihnimizde de olsa bir kağıdı yırtarsak artık o kağıdı ilk haline döndüremeyiz. Biz Türkiye'liler olarak sizin hep söylediğiniz gibi, adı geçen medeniyetin izlerini maddî planda silebilmemiz imkan dahilinde olsa bile zihnî bir kirlenmeyle karşı karşıyayız. Ve artık eski halimize, bu medeniyetle hiç karşılaşmamış olduğumuz halimize dönmemiz, sizin de söylediğiniz gibi imkansız.

"O halde bu noktada bir çözümsüzlüğe dayanmış olmuyor muyuz?

"Az önce konuşmanızda değindiniz: Her şeyden önce biz bu sistemin bir parçası olacak mıyız, yoksa onu tümden red mi edeceğiz? Diyelim ki bütün samimiyetimizle reddettik ve kendimizi sistemin dışında kabul ettik. Yine vurguladığınız bir husus var: Kendi başına bir şey yapamıyorsan başkasıyla hiçbir şey yapamazsın. Herkes başkasını yetiştirmeye kalkışmak yerine, kendi

sorumluluğunu yüklensin. Bu kabulleri de gözönüne alarak ben bir insan teki olarak sistemin dışında kalışımı nasıl pratize ederim, neleri değiştiririm, değiştirmem gerek?

"Bu soruyu böyle sormamalıydım. Herhalde cevabınız ben senin adına karar vermem olurdu. Şöyle sorayım:

"Siz sistemin dışında kalmak çözümünün üreticisi (ya da söylemcisi diyelim) bir insan teki olarark sitemin dışında olmak adına ne yapıyorsunuz? Bu düşüncenizin hayatınıza (zihninize değil) aktarımı nasıl? Bunu örnek almak için değil, tezinizin pratik değeri olduğunu görmek için soruyorum.

"Selametle..."

Arkadaşımın nezaketle söyledikleri belki şu doğrudan soruda özetlenebilir: Senin de başkaları gibi sistem tarafından yutulmadığını nerden bileyim? Çetin bir soru gerçekten. Yakıcı bir soru. Gelecek yazımda bütün gayretimle cevap vermeye çalışacağım. Bakalım başarabilecek miyim?

İsmet Özel Bizi Neden Arkadan Vurdu?

By Dr. Adnan Kebenç *(Yeni Şafak,* 12, June, 1995)

Allah şu Kayserili Kardeş'ten razı olsun. Hani bir konferansının bitiminde İ. Özel'e "sistemin dışında kalabilmek için siz gündelik pratiğinizde ne yapıyorsunuz?" meâlindeki soruyu soran kardeşten. Yazılarını izlemek suretiyle İ. Özel'in zihni sürecinin takipçisi pekçok kişinin zaman zaman zihnine hücum ettiğini sandığım, sorulması da çok gecikmiş bir soruydu bu. Zihinleri kurcaladığı halde sorul(a)mayan; yanıtsız kalınmasının ve tüm kurgunun allak-bullak oluverebileceğinin içgörüsel korkusuyla. Bu son derece önemli ve gecikmiş soru o kardeşin "cüreti" ile varid oldu. Böylelikle zihinlerin bu soruya tekabül eden bilerek küllendirilmiş alanı sarahate kavuşma imkanı buldu.

Öğrencilerimizle, birlikte ev aradığımız bir arkadaşım, kiralayacağımız evin balkonlu olmasında ısrar ediyordu. Çokça ısrarı üzerine dayanamayıp "Sezai Karakoç, evleri balkonsuz yapanların alınlarından öpmeye koşuyor!" telmihinde bulundum. Cevabı: "Geç şimdi bunu; bunlar teoride güzel. Pratikte bir yaz günü ikindi sonrası balkonda çay içmenin tadı gibisi var mı?" Gülüştük; ikimiz de bir açmazın merkezinde bulunduğumuzun ayırdında olarak. O an, zihnimde nüve halinde bulunan bir sorunun; benimsediğimiz, modernite (sistem) dışı kalabilme teorimiz ile gündelik uygulamalarımızın örtüşmediği sorununun birden müşahhaslaşıverdiğini gördüm. Sonraları bir çok olay/olgu nedeniyle bu müşahhaslaşma ile karşı karşıya kaldığım -pek çoğunuzun kaldığı/kalabileceği- gibi.

Allah İ. Özel'den razı olsun. "Üç Mesele" çatısı üzerine kurguladığı modem-dışılık söylemini, doğrusu, içinde yaşadığımız sisteme (dünya düzenine) teslim olmama uyarısı yaptığı, zihinleri müteyakkız olmaya kışkırttığı için çok tuttuk. Bu söylemin günlük uygulamalarımızla örtüş(e)mezliğini gözardı ettik önceleri. Bu noktanın aşılacağı umudunu sakladık yüreğimizin/zihnimizin bir köşesinde. Karşı

konulması güç çatışmalara ve kuşkulara kapı aralamadık zihnimiz arı-duru kalsın diye. Çünkü amaç; modernliğin dayatmalarına kapılmaksızın kendi inanç ve eylem dünyamızın özgünlüğünü yaşatabilmekti. Bu amacı önemsiyor, arzuluyor; dünya ve ahiret esenliğimizi bu özgün kalışta görüyorduk. Bizi bu amaca ulaştırcak teorinin pratik hayatın saldırıları (zorlamaları) ile yıkılıp iptal olmasına ve süngümüzün düşmesine asla razı değildik. İşin en can alıcı noktası, inanıyorum ki, Kayserili kardeş de dahil bu söylemin gönülden bağlısı pekçok kişi, yani biz, hâlâ baltalarımızı toprağa gömmek niyetinde değiliz.

Ancak teori ile pratik arasındaki örtüşmezlik makası gün geçtikçe kapanmak yerine, uçlar arasındaki mesafe giderek arttı. "Teoride modern-dışı olmaya çabalarken pratikte moderne-bulanmışlık" hali tahammül sınırını çoktan aşmıştır.Erol Kozak'ın, 1985'te, Millî Gazete'nin revizyone edildiği periyotta, modern-dışı söylem üzre olup hem de o vakit yeni kurulmuş bir faizsiz finans kurumunun genel müdürlüğünü yürütmek (bir yandan "Küçük Güzeldir"e övgüler döşenerek modernin karşısında olmak öte yandan işletmelerin büyümelerini finanse eden kurumu yönetmek) arasında ne yaman bir çelişki olduğunu işaretleyen yazısının üzerinden çok zaman gecti. Bu söylemle tutarlı eylemler icra etme vakti hâlâ gelmedi mi? Öğütleyiciler, söylemelerinden başkaca da taahhütlerinin olmasına da özenli değiller miydi? Zihni kazanımlarını paylaşmak üzere okuyucularıyla buluşanlar günlük pratiklerinin de dikkatle izleneceğini bilmelidirler.

Diğer modern-dışı söylem taraftarı yazarları bir yana bırakarak İ. Özel özelinde konuşursak O'nun sitemin dışında nasıl kalabildiği sorusu karşısında nasıl bocaladığını görüyoruz. Mutlaka O'nun da zihninde, pratikte sistem-dışılığın nasıl olabileceği sorunu yer işgal ediyordu: ne ki cevabı henüz yok. Üstelik "Bir cevabım yok da diyemeyecek denli ansızın ve hazırlıksız yakalanıyor. Soru sahibinin maksadını "arkadan vurmak" parantezine alması ve soruyla ilgili üç yazısında "cevap veriyorum edası"na bürünmesi bir entellektüelin kibrinin izi değilse eğer, İ. Özel'in haksızlığını göze sokarcasına belirginleştirir. Tüm açıkyürekliliğiyle Özel "Cevabım yok; duâ edelim ki aradığım(ız) mensubiyetle mündemiç bir cevap varolmuş olsun!" deyiverse "müridleri" bu tevazudan dolayı O'nu bağışlardı. Ama "mürşid" cevap veriyormuş kabiliinden birşeyler mırıldanıp postuna gölge düşürmekle kalmadı; müridlerini de yüzüstü bıraktı. İsabetliyse "arkadan vurdu".

İ. Özel, cevap (çözüm) niyetine vurguladığı noktanın temelde, mimarlarından biri(ncisi) olduğu söylemden çarkediş olduğunun farkında değil mi? Soru ile ilgili üçüncü yazısında (Üç yazısı da *Yeni Şafak*'ta yayınlandı) gündelik pratiğimizde moderne yer versek bile moderne zihnen karşı olmakla sistemin (modernin) dışında kalabilme imkanını elde edeceğimizi vurguladı. Haydi bakalım, buyurun ve tutun kelin perçeminden! Ne demek, "modernle hem hemhal olmak hem de moderne zihnen karşı olmak?" Madem böylesi bir "orta yol" tutturmak mümkündü ve bizi hedeften alıkoymayacaktı da baştan beri edilegelen karşı-modern "lakırdılara" ne gerek vardı? Yola nereden koyulmuştuk hatırlayalım: Her medeniyetin bir "mantığı" vardır; kendinden neşet eden unsurlara bu "mantıkla" sıkı sıkıya râbıtalıdır. Modern zihni işleyiş biçminden uzak durabilmek bir anlamda ondan köken alan unsurlara da

"mesafeli" olmaktır... "Form"un bile bir zihniyet dayatabileceğinden yola çıkmıştık, şimdi dönüp-dolaşıp "Arkaplanına rağmen modernle iştigal edebiliriz" diyoruz öyle mi? Modernle hemhal oluş onda kayboluşu gerektirmeyecekse bile en azından yaban bir zihni işleyişin verilerine dayalı bir sürece girişi icbar edecektir. Örneğin, bilgisayarın mevcudiyetinin arkaplanındaki hız ve nicelik verilerini görmezseniz, niteliği kurban etmeye mecbur olursunuz. Modernle iştigal sırasında modernin zihnî alt yapısına ("mantığına") dikkat eden bilinçli bir karşı-duruşa çağırıldığımızı söylemek de işin vehametini azaltmaz. Karşı-oluşta samimi iseniz karşı olduğnuzla iştigal edemezsiniz; iştigal edebiliyorsanız karşı-duruşunuz su götürür kertededir. Bir tesbih imalatının endüstriyel biçime dönüşmesinin dahi hayatı nasıl karmaşıklaştırdığının altını çizen Bay İ. Özel bilgisayarın arkaplanını gözönüne alırsa eli varmaz tuşlara dokunmaya. Zihni karşı-oluş fizikî buluşmaya engeldir. Zihninizde olumlamadığınız (beğenmediğiniz) bir gıda bedeninizle buluşursa mideniz kalkar; istifra etmek kaçınılmazdır. Zihnen karşı olduğunzla (olumlamadığınız şeyle) iştigal edebiliyorsanız ya karşı-oluşta samimi değilsiniz ya da organizmanız "uyum sağlamış" demektir. Yani ruh (zihin) ve beden bütünlüğünüz kaybolmuştur. Ruh ve beden ayrışmasının psikiyatrideki adı, şizofrenidir. Beni, ya moderne teslim oluşa veya şizofreniye götürecek, geldiğim(iz) noktadan çarkettirecek bu cevaba yokum. "Varım" diyenlere hayırlı olsun ve düşen süngüleri yerde kalsın!

Modern-dışı kalma söylemine gönül verenler pek çok kere (tümüyle mi demeliyim?) gündelik pratiklerinde modern'den kaçamama durumunda oldular. Doğrudur. Ama işte, bu "de facto" durum "mürşidin" "Böyle yapın!" demesiyle meşrulaşır. İşte burasıdır güzelim söylemin ipinin çekildiği; arkadan vurulduğumuz nokta. "Mürşid" keşke, "Bu sorunuza verebilecek cevabım yok!" diyebilseydi ah ki ah! Peki, böyle dediği vakit de, çözümü henüz yeter olmayan bir söylemin bağlılarını koşturmakla onları oyalamış olmaz mı? Hayır, yapamadığını ifşa etmek yapabiliyormuş gibi görünmekten farklı ve masumdur. Tıpkı "Yaşayabilseydim yazar mıydım hiç şiir?... " itirafındaki gibi Şiir nasıl ulvi iklimlere götürmek amacındaysa ve böylece masumsa bizi sistem dışı olmak, dolayısıyla iman/İslam-içi olmak gibi ulvi bir amaca yönelten karşı-modern söylem, bağlılarınca oyalamaca olarak algılanmazdı. Hayatımızın en anlamlı şiirini kabul ederdik; şiir, şairince tepe-taklak edilene değin.

İ. Özel'in, modern dünya (sistemi)nin bunalımına, problemlerin temelinde yatan modern verilerden vazgeçmek biçimiyle çözüm "arayan" modern insan için kullandığı "hem yumurta yemek hem de yumurtanın kabuğunu kırmamak isteyen" nitelemesi, hem iştigalden hem karşı oluştan vazgeçmeyen bizim durumumuza da uyar mı dersiniz? Esasen çözüm ya yumurta yemekten ya kabuğunun bütün olması arzusundan vazgeçmek gibi son derece özveri gerektiren bir "dargeçitte" sınanmayı öngördüğü için hiçbirimiz bunu dile getirmeye istekli görünmüyoruz. Ben bile böyle bir vazgeçişi göze aldıracak "mensubiyeti arıyorum".

Arkadan Vurulduğu İddiasının Temin Ettiği Bahaneyle

By İsmet Özel *(Yeni Şafak,* 27-28 June, 1995)

Yirmi yıla yakın süredir dışa vurduğum görüşler konusunda neler yazılmışsa onlarla özellikle uğraşmak gereğini duymadım. Görüşlerimi kendisince olumsuz bulanların benim içine daldığım mesele veya meselelerin uzağında kaldığı yazdıklarından besbelli idi. Görüşlerimden yararlandığını ortaya koyanlar için de yapabileceğim yaptıklarıma devam etmekten başka bir şey olamazdı. Şimdiye kadar hakkımda yazılanlar dolayısıyla ne yerindim, ne de sevindim. Ama Dr. Adnan Kebenç'in *Yeni Şafak*'ta yayınlanan yazısı duygusal tepkimin ne olduğu bakımından beni bir boşlukta bıraktı. Neler hissetttiğimi elbet biliyorum, ancak adını koyamıyorum.

Yazıyı okuduktan sonra üç şey aklıma peşpeşe takılıverdi. Bunları sondan başlayarak size aktarayım. "Mülkiyet hırsızlıktır" sözüyle hatırladığımız anarşist Proudhon'un (1809-1865) yazıldığı zaman şöhrete ulaşmış *Sefaletin Felsefesi* başlıklı bir eseri vardır. Karl Marx; (1818-1883) bu eserle polemik yapmak, görüşlerinin Proudhon'unkinden çok daha temelli olduğunu göstermek üzere *Felsefenin Sefaleti* adını taşıyan kitabını yazmıştır. Cemil Meriç'ten işittiğime göre genç Marx, kendisinden dokuz yaş büyük olan Proudhon'a bir şakird gibi yanaşmış, özel sohbetler aracılığıyla Proudhon'un ağzından yazdıklarının ötesinde neler düşündüğünü sanki onunla aynı hedefleri paylaşıyormuşçasına yakınlık göstermek suretiyle öğrenmiş ve sonra başına neler gelebileceğinin teminatını elinde tuttuğunu farzederek muhalif kitabını kaleme almış.

İkinci aklıma takılan Arisoteles'le ilgili. M.Ö. 323'te Büyük İskender öldüğü zaman Grek kentlerinde ve bu arada Atina'da uzun süre bastırılmış yabancı düşmanlığı ayyuka çıktı. Makedonya egemenliğinden duydukları rahatsızlık sebebiyle Atinalılar İskender'e hocalık yapmış Aristoteles'i suçlama yoluna sahiptiler. Stageira'lı "Atinalıları felsefeye karşı ikinci (bazı kaynaklarda üçüncü) bir kez daha suç işlemekten korumak için (Atinalıların felsefeye karşı bariz suçları Sokrates'i baldıranla zehirlemekti) şehirden kaçtı.

Aklıma ilk takılan ise gençlik yıllarımda bize aktarılan (büyük bir ihtimalle muhayyel) bir mükâlemedir. Taraflardan biri şunları söylüyor: "Nazım Hikmet hapisten çıktıktan sonra Sovyet Rusya'ya kaçmamalıydı. Bunu yapmakla geride kalan bütün komünistleri töhmet altında bıraktı. Anti-komünistlerin eline kendilerinin millî komünistlerin ise gayri millî olduklarının propagandasına elverişle kuvvetli bir koz verdi." Bu sözler üzerine diğer taraf: "Doğru söylüyorsun ama" diyor, "eğer kaçmamış olsaydı Nazım Hikmet'in öldürüleceğine dair şüpheleri doğrulayan bir çok işaretin olduğu söyleniyor." İlk konuşan zat gayet ısrarlı: "Olsun" diye ilâve ediyor, "öldürülseydi ve fakat kaçmasaydı". Bunun üzerine muhatabı şu soruyu soruyor: "Söyleyin bana, siz hiç öldürüldünüz mü?"

Bu günlük bu kadar. Anlaşılan bu hamur daha çok su götürecek.

Birlikte Bir Şeyler Yapabilir Miyiz?

Dr. Kebenç'in yazısının hangi amaca yönelik olduğunu anlamış değilim. Bana daha da anlaşılmaz gelen yazdıklarımı üstünkörü ve hakettikleri dikkati onlardan esirgeyerek okumuş (ihtimal ki kitaplarımdan birini bile baştan sona okumamış) birinin kolları sıvayıp eleştirel bir metin kaleme almasıdır. Benim sistem karşısında tavrımın ne olduğunu öğrenmek için Kayserili kardeşimizi beklemeye gerek yoktu. 1984 yılında *Gençlik ve Toplum* dergisinin Kasım sayısında bana yöneltilen sorulardan biri şuydu:

"—Gene Kitabınızda müslümanlar sisteme alternatif olmamalı, sistemle bütünleşmemeli, onun dışında kalmalılar diyorsunuz...

—Evet, "sistem" meselesini çok kaba almamak lazım. Bir kere müslümanlar inançları gereği, yani belli bir inanca sahip iseler ve bu inançlarını iman haline getirmişlerse zaten iç dünyaları açısından bağlarını koparmışlardır. Bütünleşmeleri sözkonusu değildir. Bu mümkün olmayan bir şey.

—Gündelik hayatınızda sistemle bütünleşmeme sorununu nasıl hallediyorsunuz?

—Diyelim ki yollara asfalt döşenmesini doğru bulmuyoruz. Bunu sağlık açısından, iktisadî açıdan vb. yanlış buluyor olabiliriz. Fakat yollar asfalt döşenmişse bu yollardan gider geliriz; başka bir seçeneğimiz yoktur."

Mesele bizim icbar edildiğimiz şartları makbul sayıp saymadığımızdadır. Asfalt yollardan gider gelirken bunun bize lütfedilmiş bir imkan olduğu fikrine kapılmadıkça sistemle aramızdaki mesafeyi korumuş oluruz. Dr. Kebenç'in öğrencilik yıllarındaki arkadaşı yaz akşamları keyifle çay içmek için balkonlu bir ev arıyor. Böylelikle yalnızca pratikte değil ve bilhassa teoride Sezai Karakoç'un karşısında yer alıyor. Değil mi ki şair "şezlongunuza uzanan ölü" demiştir, ona muhalefet eden de "uzanışın keyfini" sürmek istemektedir. Bu vesileyle benim "Yaşamayı bileydim yazar mıydım hiç şiir?" diyerek sorduğum sorunun Dr. Kebenç'in yazısında aldığı şekli düzeltmeye elimin varmadığını belirtmek istiyorum. Belki benzer kelimeler kullanıyoruz, aynı konudan bahseder gibi görünüyoruz, ama anlıyorum ki düşüncelerimiz çok başka zihni belirlenim alanlarında seyrediyor. Ola ki bu yüzden Dr. Kebenç'in yazısını yazış maksadını keşfedemiyorum.

Benim ısrarla belirttiğim husus fiîlen sistem dışı kalmanın mümkün olmayışı sebebiyle sistemin dışında zihnen bulunmayı göze almanın öneminden ibarettir. Zihnen sistem dışı kalmak niçin önemlidir diye sorarsanız, bu soruya vereceğim cevap "birbirimizi tanıyabilmek için" şeklinde olacaktır. Eğer birbirimizi tanıyamazsak hiç kimse yek diğerine hangi işin yapılacağını soramayacaktır. Yanlış insanlarla doğru iş yapabileceğimize benim aklım ermiyor. Çünkü hangi işin doğru olduğu anladığım, bildiğim, inandığım kadarıyla insanların doğruluğuna, yani o kimsenin o işin adamı olup olmadığına sıkı sıkıya bağlı.

Sistemin Dışında Kalmak

By İsmet Özel *(Neyi Kaybettiğini Hatırla, 47-52)*

Sistemin dışında kalmak tezimin pratik değeri olup olmadığını, varsa bunun nasıl ortaya çıktığını göstermeye çalışacağım. Bu konuda ... sistemin dışında kalmak düşüncesinin zihnime değil de hayatıma aktarımının nasıl olduğu merak edilebilir. Yani gündelik hayatımda ne yapıyorum da sistemin dışında kalmayı başarıyorum? Soru "zihnen sistemin dışında kalmak hiç önem taşımaz, önemli olan hayatımızdaki olayların sistem dışı bir alanda cereyan etmesidir" diyorsa, peşinen söyleyeyim ki, tezimin hiç bir pratik değeri yok. Bu satırları IBM uyumlu bir bilgisayarda yazıyorum ve yazdıklarımı sistemin gereği olan mekanizmaların bir işleyişi dolayısıyla okumaktasınız. Şunu ısrarla belirtmeli ki, fiilen sistemin dışında kalmak mümkün olmadığı için, zihnen sistemin dışında kalmak önem kazanıyor. Hayatî önem taşıyan husus zihnen sistem dışı olmayı samimiyetle üstlenip üstlenmemekte odaklanıyor. Denilirse ki, maddeten sistem dışı kalınmadıkça kimin ne söylediği bana anlamlı görünmüyor; o zaman bu konuyu hiç açmayalım.

Bugün dünya sistemi dediğimiz finans ve teknoloji hegemonyası küfür sistemiyle örtüşmüş durumdadır. Ama dünya sistemi yerküre üzerindeki yayılmasını tamamlamadan önce küfür sistemi vardı ve müslümanlar küfre olan uzaklıklarını öncelikle zihnî (kalbî) değerleri sebebiyle ölçebiliyorlardı. Günümüzde eğer küfür sistemi dünya sistemi ile örtüşmüş halde ise biz müslümanlar için "sistemin dışında kalmak" inancımızın gereği istemediğimiz bir şey olsa gerek diyorum. Dünya müslümanlarının bir arada telakki edilmelerine yol açacak hiç bir siyasî, iktisadî, hatta kültürel ve ideolojik blok doğmamış olmasına rağmen, dünya sisteminin akıl hocaları İslâm tehlikesinden aralıksız söz ediyorlarsa bunun sebebi müslümanların gündelik hayatında sistem aleyhtarlığının pratik belirtilerinin uç vermesi değildir. Dünya sistemi küfür sistemiyle ne ölçüde örtüşmüşse karşısındaki müslüman zihniyeti o ölçüde tehlike olarak görüyor. Daha doğrusu şartların zarureti dolayısıyla sistem karşıtlığı artık evleviyetle bizim maneviyatımızın bir parçasıdır. Bu karşıtlığın maddî bir tezahürü olur mu? Bunu yol boyunca anlayacağız. Yine de şimdiden anladığımız, anlamamız gereken birşey var: O da sisteme karşı yürüttüğü hareketi maddi tedbirlerden başlatanların hepsi şimdiye kadar ya sistem tarafından ezilmiş veya sistem tarafından kullanılmıştır.

Biliyoruz ki, modern zamanlar gayri İslâmî sistem karşıtı hareketlere sahne olmuştur. Ondokuzuncu yüzyılda ütopyacı sosyalistler, yirminci yüzyılda hipiler, komün tecrübeleri yaşadı. Dünya sisteminin pazar/piyasa aracılığıyla kurduğu denetiminden sıyrılmak, kendi maddi gereçlerini, kendilerine mahsus enstrümanları kullanarak sistemin dışında kalmak istediler. Sistemin onlara cevabı aynı gereçleri piyasa şartlarında alınır satılır hale getirmek oldu. Ütopyacı sosyalistler sistem içinde kalınarak en pahalı hayat tarzının, hippiler de en ucuz hayat tarzının nasıl yürütülebileceğinin meşrulaştırıcısı olarak geçip gittiler. Sistem her ikisinin maddi tehditlerinden de büyük kârlar elde etti. Sisteme bir başka muhalefet de kara

gömleklillerden ve kahverengi gömleklilerden geldi. Onlar milletteki yekvücut olma anlayışını ve devletten hareket doğuran gücünü devreye sokarak dünya sisteminden toplum olarak kopma denemesi yaptılar. Onların da sistemin dışında kalma konusunda pratik ve maddi tedbirleri vardı. Dünya sistemi onları önce ezdi ve akabinde onlardan öğrendiği kaba gücün toplumla irtibat kurma yöntemlerini taklit etti veya aynen uyguladı.

Netice-i kelam, sistemin dışında kalmanın bütün maddi tezahürleri boyunun ölçüsünü almış oldu. Ama sistemin dışında kalmanın manevi bir dayanağı var ve o henüz canlı. Bizim işimiz bu dayanakla mukayyet. Sistemi işlemez hale getirecek olan sistemin işlemesini istememektir diyoruz. Eğer bu irade korunabilirse maddi tezahürleri bekler görürüz. Ama maddi tezahürler olmadan iradenin bir anlamı yok diyorsak, sistemle bütünleşmenin mazeretini aramaya başlamış sayılırız.

Sisteme Elini Vermedikçe

Bir sisteme son vermek ona ya içerden veya dışardan uygulanacak zorlama neticesinde mümkün olur. Fakat her iki halde de sistem dışı kalmak, yani sistem tarafından yutulmamış olmak şartı var. Derseniz ki, sisteme dışarıdan zorlama uygulayanın sistem dışı kalmasını anlıyorum; lakin sisteme içerden zor uygulayacak olanın dışta kalışına ne anlam vermeli? Hem dışta kalıp, hem de içerden zorlamak çelişkili ve olmayacak bir şeyi dile getirmek değil midir? O halde hatırlatalım: Sistem dışı kalmak sistemi gayri meşru addetmek ve kendi varlık şartını sistemin hayatiyetiyle özdeş kılmamak anlamına gelir. Maddeten sistemin içinde olabilirsiniz, fakat hayat düsturunuzu sistemin işleyişinden almadıkça sisteme kendinizi kaptırmış olmazsınız. Sisteme el vermediğiniz için kolunuzu kurtarmak gücü sizdedir.

Bu anlamda sisteme içerden uygulanacak zorlama sistemin kendi enstrümanlarını birbiri arasında irtibatı kuramayacak ölçüde geliştirmekle olur. Sistem kendi felsefî, kültürel, teknolojik parçalarına komut veremeyecek boyutlara varıncaya kadar genişler ve kendini tutamaz hale düşer. Bu bakımdan günümüz dünya sisteminin bilinçsiz ve dikkatsiz olduğunu söyleyemeyiz. Görüyoruz ki, yürürlükteki sistem itibarını artırmak ve canlılığını korumak için serbest ticaret, insan hakları, demokrasi, çoğulculuk ve benzeri konuları öne sürerken belli kayıtlar da öne sürmektedir. Sisteme içerden zorlama uygulayacak her unsur işte bu kayıtları geçersiz kılacak bir gelişmeyi sağlayacak yolu tutar.

Sisteme dışardan uygulanacak zorlama işleyiş eksenine doğrudan zarar vermeye matuftur. Günümüz dünya sistemi ayrımcı (discretive) ve üstünlük tesis edici (hegemonic) eksende işlemektedir. Bu yüzden sistemin kendine can veren ayrım gütme ölçütlerini bozan (kendi ayrım ölçütlerini muteber kılan; diyelim ki helal-haram ayrımını gözeten) her oluşum sistem karşısında bir dış zorlama özelliği kazanacaktır. Aynı şekilde sisteme mahsus kâr motifinin geçerli olmadığı bir değerler skalasına sahip olmak da hegemonya eksenini kıracaktır.

Bütün bu söylenenleri içi boş temenniler olmaktan kurtaracak olan nedir? Üstünlüğün sistemi geçerli kılan yöntemlerde saklı olmadığını kavrayan insan

teklerinin birbirleriyle olan bağlantısıdır. Bu bağlantı kurulabildiği için Mekke, kan dökülmeden fethedilebilmiştir. İnsan ilişkilerinin zorbaca ve birinin diğeri üzerinde despotluk kuracaı biçimde mi düzenlendiği, yoksa dayanışma ve dostluk şartların yerine getirmek üzere mi kurulduğu bir yandan da bu ilişkinin hangi ürünü elde etmek üzere başladığına bağlıdır. Kısacası bir insanın sistemin malı olup olmadığı doğrudan doğruya kendini sistemin malı hissedip hissetmediğiyle anlaşılabilir. Demek ki, bu konuda doğru bilgiyi ilk edinecek olan insanın kendisidir.

Kendini sistemin dışında tutma gücü göstermiş herkes bir benzerini tanımakta güçlük çekmeyecektir. Bunca kelamdan sonra yine de elle tutulabilir çözüm yolları sunmadığımı söyleyecekseniz; size elinize dikkat edin diyeceğim. Sakın elinizi sisteme sunmuş olmayasınız? Bu sistem dediğimiz yapı inhirafa uğramış bir hayatın cereyan mekanıdır. Dolayısıyla bizim bu hayat tarzında bulduğumuz her olağanlık, her isabet, her güzel şey bizim de inhiraf ettiğimizin itirafından başka bir şey olmaz. Sistemin mevcudiyetine kalben tanıdığımız en dar meşruiyyet alanı bizim (her iki dünyadaki) meşruiyyet alanımızı o oranda daraltır. Netice itibarıya sistemle bütün alışverişimiz ahlak alanında başlar ve biter.

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