By late summer of 1862, Confederate forces had beaten back every military invasion of their soil mounted by the Lincoln administration, a feat that earned deep sympathy overseas tantamount to formal European intervention, an act that would guarantee recognition of Southern sovereignty among the family of world nations. Poised to tip the balance in favor of his infant country, Gen. Robert E. Lee moved his Southern army into Maryland knowing expectant European eyes were riveted on him. Should he successfully defeat or at least embarrass Union forces on their own soil, British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston was prepared to call a cabinet meeting early in October to implement interventionist policy backed by British arms. The international climate would never be more conducive to Southern independence. The finding of Lee's "Lost Order" arguably marked the war's great turning point. With it Gen. George B. McClellan deftly moved to interpose between the widely separated halves of Lee's army via Crampton's Gap, a conspicuous though little understood declivity in South Mountain, there to drive a fatal wedge that would prevent reunification of Lee's forces above the Potomac River. This, McClellan's sole brilliant counter-stroke--and the havoc it wrought in Confederate ranks--constitute the very spine of the campaign, the "aperture to Antietam," and an end to the wildest possible opportunities for both belligerents. Though conventional wisdom routinely tells us that great battles beget even greater results, it then becomes difficult to accept oversight of this comparatively small engagement that came astonishingly close to destroying Lee's army and ending the war in the east, the arena under anxious scrutiny by Great Britain and France, superpowers of that era eager to sustain Southern independence for their own ends.While it is far more satisfying and simplistic to attribute such a great national turning point to the monumental clash at Gettysburg, the prosaic truth is that history inevitably decides such matters through the timely alignment of political stars, abetted by the misalignment of military plans. In September, 1862, the world was indeed watching and, when the skills of Lee, McClellan, and Lincoln had spent themselves, European powers prudently opted to let the American belligerents settle it among themselves. And so war's outcome had become inevitable. In the aftermath, neither Lee nor McClellan found cause to dwell upon Crampton's Gap in concealing deep mutual disappointment, belying the essential truth that this mountain top shoving match had become, in microcosm, the pivotal battle of the pivotal campaign of America's most pivotal conflict. Price: $40.00