on these statements. It is probable that the official account is nearly correct, and although those in the boats might easily have been mistaken in supposing that they were fired upon by the Turkish ships as well as by the forts, it is quite likely that, surprised as they were, the Turkish gunners started firing, even if they saw nothing to aim at. Such things have been known to happen in better-regulated Fleets than that of the Turkish Empire.
A summary of a portion of Captain Millo's report, published in the Times, stated that the attack was made by five Italian torpedo-boats, the object of the raid being to torpedo the Turkish Fleet. Three of the boats were to attack the outermost warships, while the other two penetrated the Fleet for the purpose of destroying a vessel laden with mines. The attempt failed, all but one of the boats, the Centauro, being hit, though without material damage. A further account of the occurrence was published in the Eivista Nautica for November, 1912 :--
On the night of the 18th-19th, a squadron of five torpedo-boats, the Spica, Perseo, Oentauro, Climene, and Astore, entered the Dardanelles. They were led by Captain Enrico Millo, in the Spica. In spite of the vigilance of the searchlights at the entrance, the squadron was not discovered, and ran about a mile and a half up tha Straits, when the Astore, the last in the line, came under the beams of a light. A blank round gave the alarm, and was immediately repeated by the numerous look-out stations on both shores. A large number of searchlights illuminated the squadron, and the batteries opened fire. The boats increased their speed to 22 knots, hugged the European shore, and boldly continued their course towards the Kilid Bahr-Ghanak Straits. On reaching the Straita, 12 miles from the mouth, the Spica, which was leading, struck one of the steel cables of the boom that had been fixed at that point. The torpedo-boats were then in view of the enemy's fleet, the ships of which were working their searchlights, and opened a violent fire with their anti-torpedo armament, to which was added the heavy fire of the numerous shore batteries. Having ascertained the position of the Turkish Squadron, convinced of the impossibility of torpedoing it, and certain of the complete destruction of the torpedo-boats if the attempt was made, Captain Millo gave orders to return; this was carried out under a perfect tempest of fire, and with marked boldness and sang-froid on the part of the commanders. The damage reported by the boats was insgnificant. During the same night the ships of the First Squadron were to the west of Tenedos, ready for any eventuality if any Turkish unit happened to come out.

Whatever the object of this raid may have been, it must be conceded that the exploit was boldly conceived and made with coolness and courage. Captain Enrico Millo, who was in supreme command, was Chief of the Staff to the Duke of the Abruzzi in the Vettor Pisani.  He had filled the office of Director of Torpedo Operations, and is said to have organised much of the work of the torpedo flotillas.   Of proved capacity and personal bravery, he doubtless felt that if such an adventure was to be attempted, no one had a better right to undertake the business than himself.   His decision to withdraw when no further good could be accomplished without unnecessary loss proves his soundness of judgment and professional resource. The vessels chosen for the purpose were not of the latest and largest class in the Fleet, but five of a group of .twenty-four built between 1905 and 1908. These boats have a displacement of about 200 tons, and carry, in addition to their torpedo armament, two or three 3-pdr. guns.   They have a designed speed of 25 knots. The Spica was built at Elbing, the Astore by the Odero Company at Genoa, and the Climene, Centauro, and Perseo by the firm of Pattison, or Naples. It has been suggested that a sixth boat, the Calipso, a sister to the Climene, was in the flotilla, as a. bucket with this name on it was picked up in the Straits after the affair, and it was inferred that she had been sunk and her presence purposely suppressed in the Italian report. Such an occurrence, however, could hardly have been kept secret for long, as the absence of the boat could not be concealed, and the friends of the crew would in time learn of their loss.  Captain Millo was promoted to the rank of Bear-Admiral, and decorated with the Cross of the Military Order of Savoy for his distinguished gallantry. The Commanders and Chief Engineers were promoted, and received the medal for valour.   Medals were also conferred upon the other officers and the men of the flotilla, and eaoh of the five vessels received a gold medal to be kept on board as a lasting memento of the affair in which they took part.
During the remaining months of the war the Navy continued to do splendid work with the military forces in Africa whenever the operations took place within range of the guns of the ships or landing parties were needed to second the work of the Army. The two most important cases of co-operation occurred at Sidi Said, near Zuara, in April, and at Bu Sceifa, to the eastward of Tripoli, in June.
About 20 miles to the west of Zuara is the gulf of Macabez, inside a peninsula of the same name. On the landward side of the gulf is the principal caravan route between Zuara and the Tunisian frontier.   It was therefore of importance to occupy this place and the fort which protected it.  A division of troops under General Garioni, about 12,000 strong, was embarked in eight transports under the escort of the Training Squadron, commanded by Vice-Admiral Borea Eicci.  The ships present were the Sicilia, Sardegna, Ee TJmberto, Carlo Alberto, Marco Polo, Agordat, Coatit, and nine torpedo craft. On April 10th a feint at landing was made off Zuara by a detachment of the Fleet, and while the bombardment was in progress the remaining vessels convoyed the transports to Sidi Said, at the neck of the peninsula, where the seamen effected the disembarkation of the force. It was intended to have marched on the fort that afternoon, but bad weather caused a delay. Next day, however, a party of troops, with a detachment of seamen, occupied it.   Considering the rough sea, the operations were conducted with great expedition, and so secretly had the whole business been carried out that not until the troops were ashore did it become known what was occurring. In some subsequent fighting divisions from the ships participated, assisted by the small craft in tlie gulf.
On June 16th the same squadron assisted at the capture of Bu Sceifa, an indentation in the land to the east of Cape Zuruk, and the so-called Port of Misurata, a trading centre some 60 miles east of Tripoli. An expedition, numbering about 10,000 troops of all arms, under General Camerara, escorted by the ships of the division, arrived off the place at daybreak, and, covered by the gunfire of the larger vessels, a disembarkation was carried out speedily and in good order. The landing was made in boats and rafts, as when the troops were put ashore at the Bay of Kalitheas. In the subsequent advance to Misurata, six miles inland, naval detachments assisted with their guns.