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HISTORY 221 – MODERN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1870-1990s:

CONSTRUCTING IDENTITIES

 

 

 

 

 

 

Essay 2:

 

 

Explain how nationalism continues to play an influential role in determining the policies of modern states in Southeast Asia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Joshua Arbury – 2522603

Tutorial Time: Wednesday 11-12

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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When nationalism is referred to by historians regarding Southeast Asian history, they are usually using it to define the movements which emerged in the early twentieth century against colonialism, and how the main groups or individuals involved in these ‘nationalist’ movements became associated with the newly independent Southeast Asian nations after World War II. However, there is a much broader definition of nationalism: that it “is not a phenomenon that appears suddenly. It is the result of a process by which a people become conscious of themselves as a separate national entity in the modern world, a process by which they become willing to transfer their primary loyalty from the village, or the region, or the monarch, to the nation-state.”[1] It is this sense of nationalism that has remained an influential force in Southeast Asian politics; the very nature of the Southeast Asian countries has meant that creating a sense of nationalism is an important task for the various governments. Many different policies have been undertaken by the various nations in order to instil a sense of nationalism in the population – ranging from a state-approved education curriculum, the creation of a national language, to the suppression of dissent or the placement of emphasis upon economic growth at the cost of social liberty. Whereas the nation-state ideal is to create a national community with a cohesive culture that is coextensive with state territory; the reality of modern Southeast Asian nations is a vastly diverse range of ethnicities, religions and languages, which has compelled the state “to create common values and goals that will create unifying national themes and a sense of shared territory.”[2] Creating a sense of national identity has been an important part of Southeast Asian politics ever since independence and it seems that this will continue well into the future as the area remains one that is highly diverse.

 

            The period of colonisation in Southeast Asia has left its mark in the most visible way possible: the definition of state borders in the region. Prior to the Second World War, only Thailand remained independent of all the Southeast Asian nations, elsewhere Britain, France, Portugal, the USA and the Netherlands had divided up the land into unnatural boundaries with frequent disregard for indigenous peoples, who found themselves split across a border or incorporated into a region dominated by a much larger ethnic group. Somewhat surprisingly, the border regions have been accepted internationally by Southeast Asian nations, apart from minor disputes between Malaysia and the Philippines. However, the variety of sometimes-incompatible racial groupings, including immigrant communities, has left problems and tensions that were formed during the colonial period and continue today.[3] Ethnic separatist movements in Burma, for example, has left Burma in a state of civil war, more-or-less, ever since independence. Groups such as the Shan, Karen, Karenni, Kachin and others have felt that their national sovereignty has been violated through their incorporation into the Burmese state.[4] Other areas of particularly active resistance to the national boundaries imposed by colonialism include the southern part of the Philippines, with its Islamic Moro population challenging state authority, which has remained in the hands of the Christian majority in the north; as well as East Timor’s struggle for independence against Indonesia, resolved recently with the help of the United Nations.[5]

 

            Although the violent uprisings and rebellions of above have not spread throughout the whole of Southeast Asia, in many places the lack of a naturally cohesive society has placed great pressure on the governments of these nations to create a sense of identity for their country, and to forge a sense of nationalism among the entire population. The creation of a state ideology, in order to underwrite its own legitimacy while also connecting individuals to the national order, has been an important aim for post-colonial governments. It has not been an easy process, as even the concept of a nation-state is western in origin and was only introduced to Southeast Asia through colonialism, or pressed upon them during the process of decolonisation. States have sought to “achieve a shared national outlook among all its population groups and attempted to build nationalistic values that are general enough for all people to embrace.”[6] Various methods have been undertaken by the governments to achieve these aims, according to the particular state ideology, and they have had varying success.

 

            In general, the success of the state in implementing the unifying force on the population depends upon whether it is able to encompass both individual and community values and beliefs, while also taking into account traditional values of class, and ethnic affiliation as well as religion, language, dialect group association and ultimately ruling national order.[7] It is difficult to identify a nation in Southeast Asia that has not attempted in one way or another to create a unifying force for its population, although the methods used to achieve this have ranged from utterly repressive in Burma and Cambodia, to economically successful policies in Singapore, which place a sense of nationalism in economic performance. Although various tools have been used by governments to create this sense of nationalism, “with some variation among individual states, the most dependable elements of a shared national consciousness are generated and controlled through policies on official state history and ideology, language, education, religion, the press, political participation, population size settlement, and human rights.”[8]

 

            Hereditary leaders have continued to play an important role in the governing of modern Southeast Asian nations, even if they have lost some of their political powers. Thailand made a transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy while remaining independent throughout the colonial period, although the political forces in Thailand still proclaim allegiance to the king. In this sense, King Bhumipal Adulyades has remained an important political figure, and one which nationalistic sentiment can be attached to. The king “has retained the aura of a god-king and has earned extraordinarily prabaramee (respected charisma) with the Thai people for his moral integrity, nearly faultless leadership, and utter devotion to the country.”[9] In the case of non-hereditary leaders, some have assumed the role of ‘presidents-for-life’, as in the case of Lee Kuan Yew and Suharto, presidents of Singapore and Indonesia respectively. Men such as these have contributed greatly to the creation of the state ideology, and have directed much of the activity undertaken to achieve a sense of nationalism. Through such actions, as well as associated propaganda, these presidents themselves have become symbols of the nation and a unifying force, and “it would be difficult to imagine how Singapore would be today without the leadership of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.”[10]

 

            Campaigns have been undertaken by state governments to reinforce their nationalistic values, most commonly schools, workplaces and the media have been used to spread their messages. Although it is impossible to actually achieve a common national outlook in any country because of the huge population, campaigns through education can create an imagined sense of nationalism. “When all people have read the same textbooks in school, have read the same national newspaper, or have watched the same national news programs on television, they begin to become bound together in a shared national consciousness.”[11] Throughout Southeast Asia, the state has frequently influenced the content of what is distributed through the media, from the most open country of the Philippines – where the press has enjoyed great freedom and experienced little censorship apart from during the Marcos regime; to Vietnam where all television and radio stations are owned by the state and law prohibits any material that would appear to undermine the state. However, “most countries have attempted to strike a balance between sophisticated international news coverage and control over information that the state finds threatening to nationalist ideology.”[12] These infringements upon civil liberties are quite typical in Southeast Asia, and are often supported by the very classes that would normally oppose such policies.  “Significant elements of the capitalist and ‘middle’ classes actively support authoritarian regimes because their social position, their access to resources and their protection from other social forces require the coercive power of the state.”[13] Instead of forcing the people to adopt the nationalistic ideology, the state has either ingrained it into the people at an early stage through education or the creation of a national language, or made it in the best interests of the people to adopt the ideology – through economic growth and specific government policies.

 

            The teaching of a common language has frequently been used by the governments of highly diverse countries to promote national unity. In Burma, this process was enforced upon the ethnic minorities by the Burmese government, who made Burman the national language shortly after independence. This policy was extended to clothing, customs and the Buddhist religion, as the government has – sometimes ruthlessly – attempted to extend the Burmese culture to the rest of the country.[14] In Indonesia, the process of creating a national language has been more successful, mainly because the language adopted as the ‘national language’, Bahasa Indonesia, is an ethnic Malay language rather than one associated with the traditional elite or any particular ethnic group within Indonesia. This has made it easier for ethnic minorities to accept the language, which “has been called the major vehicle of postcolonial Indonesian national culture.”[15] Clearly, by creating a national language that is not linked to any particular ethnic group, it is much easier for people from Sumatra to Sulawesi to accept this unifying force without assuming subservience to traditional elites in Java. A similar policy was attempted in the Philippines, although the language policy emphasised Tagalog, the language of Manila and its surroundings. Even when the national language was named Pilipino, it was effectively Tagalog with a new name which has meant that opposition to the language has remained fairly widespread and it has not served as a unifying national force.[16]

 

            Education has an important economic goal, as achieving high literacy rates is almost always seen as a necessary prerequisite for industrialisation. Also, economic growth is linked with creating a sense of nationalism as “without social coherence and stability, the state could not guarantee economic development.”[17] Education has become a highly politicised issue because of these linkages and in countries such as Malaysia, education policy reflects ethnic and class dimensions of national culture. “By 1977 non-Malay student admissions to universities had been reduced to less than 25 percent.”[18] This policy reflected the government’s aim to promote Malay people in a society where most of the wealth was in the hands of the Chinese minority. There has also been a growth of national forms of curriculum in history and social sciences; this has been a particularly effective way of indoctrinating the people through education about the importance of a national identity, as well as ensuring that the national body becomes the primary loyalty for the people. By learning about Malaysian or Indonesian history and social sciences, for example, rather than information about the particular region or ethnic group that is associated with the people, the population is being nationalised. Due to the importance placed upon education in Buddhism and Islam, the two primary religions in Southeast Asia, education has proved a highly effective tool for creating a national identity.

 

            Another important tool for governments has been religion, which is seen as a unifying force that is complexly entwined with the state, unlike the Western concept of separating state and religion. While religious freedom has been guaranteed, the state has emphasised some religions as being an important aspect of national identity while demoting others as backward and inconsistent with the goals of economic development. Due to the long history of religion in Southeast Asia, and the importance of it in everyday life “the state needs the historic continuity that religious culture provides to create some of the basis for national culture building.”[19] In Brunei, Islam is an official religion while the state ideology is known as Malay Islamic monarchy showing the importance of religion in this particular nation. Even in larger, more diverse countries such as Malaysia, there has been an Islamic resurgence movement which has resulted in non-Malay, non-Muslims feeling that their role in national politics could be threatened.[20] In Buddhist nations, religion is seen as legitimating the power of the government and is therefore a crucial aspect of nationalism. Thai Buddhist temples are located on public land while Buddhism is taught in Thai schools through officially approved textbooks. However, often religion has been a divisive factor in Southeast Asia, conflicts in East Timor and the southern Philippines are based upon religious differences. Just as nations have attempted to identify themselves through a particular religion, ethnic minorities have often been brought together through religion in their efforts to overcome the influence of the nation-state – most clearly seen in the example of East Timor where the popularity of Roman Catholicism soared as a result of their opposition to the Indonesian regime.

 

            In Singapore especially, economic growth has been used as a nationally unifying force. Since independence, Singapore has been transformed from a small island lacking natural resources into a nation with one of the best standards of living in the world. Through guidance by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the People’s Action Party has led Singapore throughout their entire history, and has promoted strict social and moral values – most famously regulating behaviour in the public sphere by prohibiting smoking and chewing gum, as well as eating on subways. The Singapore government has guarded against globalising Western cultural forms by promoting Confucian ideologies in schooling as well as throughout modern Singapore society.[21] In this way, a mixture of economic success, traditional values and education policies have been used by the government to indoctrinate a sense of nationalism in the people.[22] Such a mixture of policies is mirrored throughout Southeast Asia, as respective governments attempt all possible ways in which to create a national sense of unity.

 

It has been deemed incredibly essential by all Southeast Asian governments to create a nation-state in which a cohesive society can exist. Unfortunately, the very nature of Southeast Asian society, as well as its history, has made this task very difficult. The large number of religions, languages and ethnic groups that can be found in the region, as well as the artificial borders imposed by European colonialism, has meant that there are significant minority populations in every Southeast Asian nation. In response to this situation, governments have had to embark upon various policies to create the ‘imagined community’ necessary to stimulate economic growth and national cohesion. These policies have included: the promotion of various religions, the education of the people into a nationalistic society, the creation of a national language, and stressing the importance of economic growth. In some places, repression has occurred against ethnic minorities, although somewhat surprisingly there have been few large-scale conflicts with the exception of the Vietnam War. Recent expansion of ASEAN to include all established Southeast Asian nations could be seen as evidence that nationalist policies have succeeded to some extent, and more emphasis is now being placed upon creating an identity as a region as a whole, as Southeast Asia attempts to become an important player in world affairs.

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

 

Achaya, Anitav. The Quest for Identity: International relations of Southeast Asia, Oxford, 2000.

 

Cartier, Carolyn. ‘The Role of the State’, in Thomas R. Leinbach and Richard Ulack (eds.), Southeast Asia: diversity and development, New Jersey, 2000. pp. 244-273.

 

Heidhues, Mary Somers. Southeast Asia: A concise history, London, 2000.

 

Hewison, Kevin, Garry Rodan and Richard Robison, Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, St. Leonards, NSW, 1993.

 

Rodan, Garry. ‘Preserving the one-party state in contemporary Singapore’, in Kevin Hewison, Garry Rodan and Richard Robison (eds.) Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, St. Leonards, NSW, 1993. pp. 76-108.

 

SarDesai, D.R. Southeast Asia: past and present, Boulder, Colorado, 1994.

 

Turnbull, C.M., ‘Regionalism and Nationalism’, in Nicholas Tarling (ed.) The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Vol. 4, Cambridge, 1999. pp. 257-318.



[1] Nicholas Tarling, Nations and States in Southeast Asia, Cambridge, 1998, p. 73.

[2] Carolyn Cartier, ‘The Role of the State’, in Thomas R. Leibach and Richard Ulack (eds.) Southeast Asia: diversity and development, New Jersey, 2000, p.244.

[3] C.M. Turnbull, ‘Regionalism and Nationalism’ in Nicholas Tarling (ed.) The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume 4, Cambridge, 1999, p. 263.

[4] Cartier, p. 254.

[5] ibid., p. 255.

[6] ibid., p. 244.

[7] ibid.

[8] ibid.

[9] ibid., p. 245.

[10] ibid., p. 246.

[11] ibid., p. 245.

[12] Ibid., p. 259.

[13] Kevin Hewison, Garry Rodan and Richard Robison, Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, St. Leonards, NSW, 1993, p. 4.

[14] Cartier, p. 258.

[15] ibid.

[16] ibid.

[17] ibid., p. 257.

[18] ibid.

[19] ibid. p. 258.

[20] ibid. p.259.

[21] ibid., p. 246-7.

[22] Garry Rodan, ‘Preserving the one-party state in contemporary Singapore’, in Kevin Hewison, Garry Rodan and Richard Robison (eds.) Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, St. Leonards, NSW, 1993. p. 77.