IT Security and crime
prevention methods
Explanations
| 1.
|
IT
Security: definitions |
| 2.
|
Information
processing and IT Security |
| 3.
|
Important
IT Security functions |
| 3.1 |
Information
classification |
| 3.2 |
Documentation |
| 3.3 |
Administration
and personnel |
| 3.4 |
User
identification and authorisation |
| |
Identification -
Authorisation |
| 3.5. |
Logging |
| 3.6. |
Back-up |
| 3.7. |
Firewalls |
| 3.8. |
Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) |
| 3.9. |
Incident
Handling System |
| 4.
|
Computer
architecture |
| 4.1. |
Microcomputers
(stand-alone) |
| 4.2. |
Network
architectures and mini-computers |
| 4.3. |
Mainframes |
| 4.4. |
Hand-held
computers |
|
5. |
Threats
and crime prevention methods |
| 5.1 |
Architecture-independent
threats |
| |
Members of staff - Unauthorised
access from external sources - Media handling - Malicious
program code - Electronic emission |
| 5.2. |
Microcomputer
(stand-alone, Personal Computer) systems |
| 5.3. |
Network
architectures and mini-computers systems |
| 5.4. |
Mainframe-computer
systems |
|
6. |
IT
Security - International Workgroups
|
| Introduction: Goals and
objectives |
|
|
This document gives an introduction to what an investigator needs
to know about Information Technology (IT) security measures in order
to be able to carry out investigations in an IT environment and to
give advice in crime prevention methods.
Information Technology has come to play an important and vital
role in all sectors of society. As a consequence, security has
become an essential component of Information Technology. However, it
is a complex subject and the appropriate measures will often depend,
to a large extent, on the type and location of the IT equipment.
The potential security threats and risks have to be carefully
assessed in every situation and it is absolutely vital that all
concerned are made aware of the threats and risks that affect them,
and over which they have control. Only then will they fully
understand and apply the appropriate security procedures.
This report attempts to explain the various threats and risks
posed by criminal activity in IT environments and indicate advice
which the police can give about security procedures and computer
crime prevention methods. It is not intended to be a comprehensive
study. Threats to information systems may arise from intentional or
unintentional acts and may come from internal or external sources.
This guide will address only intentional threats, made with criminal
intent, to confidentiality and integrity. Availability security
functions will only be addressed if they have an effect on
confidentiality and/or integrity. Examples of prevention methods
will be given.
The prevention methods in this report can not only be used to
prevent crime in companies and authorities information technology
system, many of these can also be used to protect private computer
systems.
| 1. IT Security:
definitions |
|
|
CONFIDENTIALITY (Secrecy)
Information and other resources are only disclosed for those
'users' (persons, entities or processes) who are authorised to
have access to it.
INTEGRITY
Information and other resources are modified only by those
'users' who have the right to do so. The accuracy and completeness
of the data and information is also guaranteed.
AVAILABILITY
Authorised 'users' can access information and other resources
when needed.
THREAT
A 'threat' is a potential undesirable incident.
RISK
A 'risk' is the estimated probability that a 'threat' will be
activated.
| 2. Information processing and
IT Security |
|
|
In order to protect the data held on a computer system, various
steps have to be taken: individual users should only be able to read
the information which is needed to do their job; they should only be
able to modify information which is specifically their job to
modify. Finally, some information should not be accessible at all
for individual users, e.g. the various log records.
In simple terms, information processing involves the following
types of operation:
- READ/CREATE/MODIFY/DELETE information
- TRANSPORT (in one way or another) of information
- STORE information (on computer 'media' to keep it somewhere).
i. READ/CREATE/MODIFY/DELETE
Information is 'Read/Created/Modified/Deleted' by a 'User'. A
'User' is a person or a process (e.g. a computer program).
Authorisation to 'Read' information is a question of confidentiality
while 'Create/Modify/Delete' is primarily a question of integrity.
ii. TRANSPORT
One of the simplest ways of 'transporting' information is the
internal transport between the keyboard, the memory and the hard
disk in a Personal Computer. Another is the external 'transport' of
a diskette from one place to another. Information can also be
'transported' using a 'Local Area Network' (LAN) and/or a 'Wide Area
Network' (WAN). Insecure 'transport' affects both confidentiality
and integrity.
A special kind of undesirable 'transport' is 'Electronic
Emission' (see below).
iii. STORE information
Once the information has been 'stored' on some kind of media
(diskettes, tapes etc.), it may become the target of unauthorised
activities which will have an effect on the confidentiality and/or
integrity of the information.
| 3. Important IT Security
functions |
|
|
As well as knowledge of computer architecture, the investigator
also needs to be familiar with a number of important IT Security
functions and organisational matters if s/he is to be able to give
advice on prevention methods and conduct investigations.
Some important functions are:
- Information classification
- Documentation rules
- Administration and personnel
- User Identification and Authorisation
- Logging
- Back-up
- Firewalls
- Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
- Incident Handling (IH)
| 3.1 Information
classification |
|
It is essential to classify the information according to the
appropriate level of availability, e.g. 'open', 'confidential',
'secret' or 'top secret'. Only then will it be possible to apply the
most effective security measures. The classification should be
carried out by the management or by the 'information owner'.
All systems, but especially the 'Identification and Authorisation
system', 'Information Classification system' and 'Application
systems', must be fully documented.
IT Security policy and the security rules for the organisation as
well as details of contingency plans in the event of a major
incident should be documented in a 'Security Handbook'. The chapter
on IT Security should have separate sections for each user category,
e.g. 'Management', 'System Administrators', 'End Users' etc.
Create a checklist with guidelines concerning the actions which
have to be taken in case of an incident (e.g. immediate reaction,
who to contact). See chapter 'Incident
Handling'.
| 3.3 Administration and
Personnel |
|
Success in information security work depends first and foremost
on developing good basic working practices and establishing
procedures to ensure that they are maintained. It is also important
to create a security-conscious atmosphere and establish a
disciplined approach.
If confidential information is to be
handled, it is essential that the people chosen for the job are
absolutely reliable. They should be security screened to a level
equal to the highest level of confidential information they are
likely to be asked to work on. Access to information should be
restricted to that which the individual 'needs to know' to do his
job. Particularly sensitive material should be split into sections
so that only authorised staff can handle each section; no member of
staff should have access to all the information.
Furthermore, security measures will only be effective if staff
are properly trained. It is essential that they understand the
problem. This can be achieved with in-house training. The individual
users must be trained how to use the network, how to handle
confidential information, making back-ups etc. Employees can be
taught what to do to counter certain threats, what they should not
do, whom they can call and where they can get help. It is also very
important to encourage employees to report incidents so that steps
can be taken to prevent any further damage.
New or temporary
employees should be given introductory training, during which data
security and data integrity can be explained. It might also be
useful to consider including a clause on security and
confidentiality obligations in employees’ contracts.
(a) Management responsibilities
To achieve functional and cost-effective IT Security, a number of
initial steps must be taken by the management:
Risk analysis What are the threats and what is the risk
they will be activated? Threats and risks, acceptable or
unacceptable, vary between different organisations. It is important
to analyse the risks to make it possible for the management to form
a policy with their security intentions.
Policy There
must be an Information Security policy written and approved by
management. No management approved policy = no resources. It should
include the main security targets, information classification
principles, responsible persons, and principles to reach the
targets.
Security plan A plan has to be made to define
how the targets and the intentions in the policy document should be
realised. A priority list must be set up because it may not be
possible to realise everything in the policy at the same time. The
plan is a living document and has to be scrutinised by the IT
security officer.
Security Architecture With the risk analysis, the policy
and the plan as a base, security architecture must be chosen. Stet
Security architecture is a high level description of technical
security functions and organisational needs to fulfil the security
demands.
Implementation With the security architecture as a base,
different security functions and products must be selected to
implement the security architecture.
The main points requiring attention are as follows:
i. All senior management, and not just the computer security
manager, should be sufficiently familiar with the computer systems
in use, to enable them to know what is going on and why.
ii. The role of the system manager is crucial. He must be of the
highest degree of integrity, and sufficiently computer literate to
be able to administer the system in a secure and responsible manner.
The system manager access level should be restricted to the minimum
number of staff required. However it must be possible for the IT
security manager to check on the system manager’s activities.
iii. The only way of establishing how a problem has occurred,
whether the origin is accidental or deliberate, is to examine the
logging information stored on the computer. (One of the reasons for
restricting privileges is that the logging information of the system
is available at this level). Analysis of this information should
show when, where and how the problem occurred. In some cases careful
examination will also indicate who was responsible. It is essential
therefore that the logging capabilities of the particular system are
fully understood and utilised. If the logging functions on the
system are inadequate, consideration should be given to acquiring
suitable software.
(b) User responsibilities
Users should be given specific guidelines about what they should
do - and more importantly - what they should not do. These
guidelines should be distributed in written form, and signed for.
This will counter the defence that they were unaware of the contents
of the guidelines and at the same time provide the investigator with
written proof. Specimen guidelines are given below. They are
certainly not exhaustive and others can be added to take account of
particular circumstances.
- Do not use any computer equipment without
permission.
- Do not try to access information unless you know you are
authorised to do so.
- Do not alter any information on a computer system unless you
know you are authorised to do so. (It is also important to provide
a clear written statement of what information each user is allowed
to access, to whom that information may be disclosed and what
action will be taken if the rules are broken.)
- Do not use a company or authority computer for personal
matters without permission.
- Do not leave a working computer unattended, without using
security options that demand retyping a password (e.g. screen
saver password).
- Make sure you know what to do in the event of a virus being
discovered on the system. Use virus protection programs.
- Be aware of malicious program code, when loading files, mails
etc. from the internet or other media.
- Keep your password and user-ID confidential.
- Do not allow anyone else to use your password. (If people like
engineers need access to the system, they should be referred to
the system manager.)
- Do not use anyone else’s password.
- Remember that anything done on the system using your ID and
password can be your responsibility.
| 3.4 User Identification and
Authorisation |
|
Access to a computer (i.e. a Personal Computer) can be restricted
by means of controls based on various kinds of 'Identification and
Authorisation' systems.
Identification is a two step function: (a) to Identify the
user and (b) to Authenticate (validate) the identity (i.e. confirm
that it is true).
The simplest systems rely on passwords only. More sophisticated
systems use cards (e.g. 'SmartCard') and/or 'biometric' methods in
combination with passwords.
3.4.1 Identification
(a) Password systems
These give some measure of protection against casual browsing of
information, but will rarely stop a determined criminal. A computer
password acts like a key to a computer. Allowing several people to
use the same password is like everyone using the same key.
Passwords should:
- Be issued to an individual and kept confidential, they
should not be shared with anyone. (The golden rule is ONE PERSON
ONE PASSWORD). Should a temporary user need access to a system, it
is usually fairly simple to add to the list of authorised users;
once the temporary user has finished his work, his user-ID must be
deleted from the system.)
- Be distinct from the user-ID.
- Ideally be:
- alphanumeric and
- at least six characters long.
- Be changed regularly, at least every 30 days. It is possible
to warn the user automatically when his password expires. To
ensure that he enters a new one, he will not be able to enter the
system after the expiration date, although he may be allowed a
limited number of 'grace' log-ins.
- Be properly managed. This will involve:
- Using a password history list, giving all the
passwords used in the past year or two. New passwords will be
checked against the list and not accepted if they have already
been used.
- Making a list of frequently used passwords such as names,
brands and other words that are easy to guess and therefore not
suitable as passwords. This list will be used in the same way as
the history list, except that new passwords will not be added;
only the system manager will be able to change the list. N.B.
Some systems conform to these standards and generate passwords
automatically.
- Be removed immediately if an employee leaves the organisation
or gives notice of leaving.
Last but not least it is important to note that care should be
taken with the password used for remote maintenance. Standard
passwords which are often used to get access to different systems,
for maintenance purposes, should always be avoided.
(b) Other identification systems
The 'password' method is built on something you 'know' and might
be misused by someone getting hold of the password. A system built
on something you 'know' (password, PIN-code etc.) AND
something you 'have' (i.e. authorisation card) is a much
stronger system. Even if someone gets hold of your password it is
useless without the card. Today, the strongest method is something
you 'know', something you 'have' and something you
'are' (biometrics).
There are two main types of card:
- Magnetic strip card: As its name suggests, this
type of card has a magnetic strip containing some confidential
information to be used together with the holder’s personal code;
- Chip card: Instead of a magnetic strip, the card
has a built in microchip. The simplest type contains a memory chip
(e.g. telephone cards) containing some information but has no
processing capability. The other, better, type is the 'Active' (or
'Smart') Card. It contains a microchip with both a memory to store
some information and a processor. It is often used in combination
with cryptographic techniques.
Biometric systems make use of specific personal
characteristics (biometrics) of a specific person e.g. fingerprint,
voice, keystroke characteristics or the 'pattern' of the retina.
Biometric systems are still quite expensive (except for the
keystroke system) and not very common.
However, even these sophisticated techniques are not
infallible.
3.4.2 Authorisation
After identification and authentication of the user
(subject) there must be a function and set of rules to
control what object (files, devices etc.) each user is
allowed to access. This is the Access Control
system.
Most computer systems have some kind of log. Even
stand-alone systems sometimes have identification and
authorisation systems (and a log) if different users, with different
authorisation levels, use them and/or when it is desirable to
prevent users from using the disk drive (as an anti-virus measure)
or changing files.
In a multi-user system (client-server-, mini-, mainframe-systems)
there are always logging functions and there is often more than one
kind of log.
The desired level of protection will only be achieved if the
various security measures are properly followed up with a log
that can be analysed as and when necessary. A proper log will answer
the questions:
- WHO (user)
- WHEN (time - date)
- WHERE (place)
- WHAT (event/activity)
- ADDITIONAL (Additional information depending on activity)
There are often many different types of logs, e.g.:
- HISTORY files (e.g. Internet activities)
- TEMPORARY files
- SYSTEMS log
- TRANSACTION log
- SECURITY SYSTEM log
- DATABASE log
- APPLICATION log
- TECHNICAL log (mainly on mainframes)
Log information is one of the most important items for a
computer crime investigator to look for.
Although modern computer systems are generally very reliable,
breakdowns and failures do occur, and users can make mistakes that
lead to the accidental destruction of information. To guard against
total loss of information under these circumstances, it is necessary
to set up procedures for making regular copies. The information on
the computer system should be copied to some form of back-up medium.
This medium can then be stored in a safe place until it is
needed.
For particularly valuable information several copies should be
made, and each copy stored in a different place and at least in
different buildings, if not different cities.
The frequency with which back-ups are taken should be based on
the frequency with which the information changes, the relative value
of the information, and the problems its loss would cause. Regular
back-up of data and system files are an essential security measure.
When combined with the logging information, they should provide a
comprehensive security information package. The following guidelines
may be of assistance when making back-ups:
- Make sure that regular back-up copies are made of both
data and system files.
- Back-up cycles should be of sufficient length to be of some
use in the future. 24-hour overwrite cycles are not
recommended.
- Take a full back-up (both system and data) out of the cycle on
a regular basis and archive it off site for an extended
period.
- Back-up tapes/diskettes should be kept in a safe place under
lock and key and away from the computer and where they are secured
from fire, flood, magnetic and electric fields etc., preferably
off site.
- Periodically test the back-up to ensure that the information
can actually be restored in an emergency; do not wait for disaster
to strike to find the back-up system does not work.
Back-ups (including old back-ups) are another important source
of information for an investigator.
One frequently asked question is 'how to secure the internal
network from an external network such as the Internet?' One solution
is to set up a firewall system.
According to a definition in The Internet Firewall FAQ 'A
firewall is a system or group of systems that enforces an access
control policy between two networks. The actual means by which this
is accomplished varies widely, but in principle, the firewall can be
thought of as a pair of mechanisms: one, which exists to lock
traffic, and the other that exists to permit traffic. Some firewalls
place a greater emphasis on blocking traffic, while others emphasise
permitting traffic. Probably the most important thing to recognise
about a firewall is that it implements an access control policy. If
you don’t have a good idea what kind of access you want to permit or
deny, or you simply permit someone or some product to configure a
firewall based on what they or it think it should do, then they are
making policy for your organisation as a whole.'
Firewall systems are typically the first line of defence
between an internal network (ex. of companies but also private
networks) and the outside world, especially its connection to the
Internet. It should be configured not only to allow certain
operations to occur (FTP, mail delivery, etc), but to make it
difficult or impossible for an attacker on the outside to use the
firewall to penetrate the internal nets.
There are primarily two types of firewall systems, the
packet-filtering firewall system and the application-level
gateway.
The major difference between the two techniques lies in the flow
of communication. A packet-filter gateway acts as a router between
the two networks; as packets flow from their source to the
destination, the gateway either forwards or blocks the packets. With
application gateways, all packets are addressed to a user-level
application on the gateway that relays the packets between the two
communication points.
Firewall system requirements
Firewall systems must support features that will do the
following:
- Prevent unauthorised users from accessing the internal
network.
- Prevent unwanted IP service requests from being passed through
it to the internal network.
- Log its activities.
- Be easy to administer.
- Provide alarm mechanisms.
- Preferably support SNMP.
- Be configurable at the user, service, and IP host level.
Security Policy
If a firewall system will be deployed to secure the access to the
Internet, the configuration of the firewall system must reflect the
security policy of the organisation. The security policy must
address, at a minimum, the following questions:
What is the policy on IP Addresses?
Is the organisation's IP
address space a registered IP address?
Who is or will be the
organisation's Internet service provider?
What is the Internet
service providers security policy? Is their network
secure?
Will firewall systems be used to secure the connection
to the Internet?
If so, what type of firewall system?
What
is the firewall system architecture?
All entry and exit points
to the Internet need to be identified. The firewall network
architecture must be defined to control authorised inbound and
outbound connections.
What is the policy for inbound access to
systems?
Which specific protocols will be allowed to access
nodes on the internal network?
What is the policy on outbound
access to nodes on the Internet?
Do remote offices or branches
connect to the home office?
If so, are remote offices directly
connected to the Internet or is their access to the Internet
through the home office?
If there is a direct connection
between the remote office and the Internet, verify that if the
security of the remote office is compromised, the security of the
corporate network is not compromised.
Are there external
networks that are not trusted?
Are there external networks that
do need access to the internal network via the Internet?
| 3.8 Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) |
|
Do I need an Intrusion Detection System if I have a Firewall?
Yes, the main purpose with a Firewall is to protect against
unauthorised external attacks but it will normally leave the network
unprotected from internal attacks or intrusions. And, Firewalls
sometimes fail to protect from external intrusions because:
- It is hard to configure the Firewall properly
- Hacker/Crackers can get some packets through most Firewalls
and Firewalls don’t know what happens once someone gets through
the Firewall
- The software contains a software bug (software always has
bugs)
- Bad protocols can be blocked by the Firewall but HTTP is
allowed through and 'hack' in HTTP will pass through
- The Firewall can only protect against known problems
An intruder is somebody attempting to break into or misuse the
system. Intruders can be divided into two categories:
- Outsiders Intruders from outside your own network who
try to attack your system via dial-up lines, Internet, a vendor or
other 'partner' etc.
- Insiders Intruders that are authorised to use your
internal network but are misusing their privileges.
There are different types of IDS. Two main types are:
- Statistical detection The IDS looks for deviations from
statistical measures to detect unusual behaviour. A set of
variables is defined for subject and objects such as servers,
files, users and other resources. A 'normal' value is set for each
variable by looking at historical data or by setting expected
values. When system activities occur the list of variables is
maintained and updated for each subject or object.
- Pattern (or Signature) matching detection This type of
IDS compares activities against a collection of known attacks or a
set of rules. The main idea is to watch for events that matches
one of the patterns or violates the rules.
Why should I use a Firewall and IDS? Because most attacks come
from inside and every company or organisation needs a well managed
single point of entry as well. In addition, a Firewall can keep
hackers running automated intrusion programs out of the internal
network. Otherwise those programs can detect and exploit holes in
your security architecture. There is a lot of information explaining
different IDS on the Internet.
| 3.9 Incident Handling System
|
|
Even if you have installed a Firewall and an Intrusion Detection
System someone has to take care of an incident when it occurs (not
'if' it occurs, because it will happen sooner or later). To be well
prepared is the best way to handle an incident. It is very important
to stay calm and not panic when an incident occurs. It is very
valuable to have a special form to register incidents.
For example the SANS Institute has a step by step method for
incident handling and the latest information can be obtained from
the Internet at address ih@sans.org. Their method has six
stages:
- preparation
- detection
- containment
- eradication
- recovery
- follow-up
Preparation
This stage covers things like policy, management
supports, training and interfaces to law enforcement.
Identification
How to identify an incident, responsible staff,
co-ordination with network suppliers’ etc.
Containment
Create the on-site team to survey the situation.
Backup of the system. Risk determination (to let the system run)
etc.
Eradication
Perform vulnerability analysis. Remove the cause
of the incident etc
Recovery
Restore the system. Validate the system etc
Follow-up
Develop a follow-up report.
The main types of computer architecture are indicated below. In
many cases, the specific threats and risks to which a particular
system is exposed will depend on its architecture. However there are
a number of threats which can affect all systems, irrespective of
their architecture.
Main architecture types
- Microcomputers
- Network architectures and Mini-computers
- Mainframes
- Hand-held computers.
| 4.1 Microcomputers
(stand-alone) |
|
These computers have no facilities for permanent external
communications, apart from links to peripherals (e.g. printer,
scanner, streamer, extra disk drive etc.). Nowadays it is common to
have a modem and a temporary connection to the Internet.
This architecture is easiest to 'protect' but it is also the
architecture where the users are least aware of the possible threats
and risks. If it is connected to the Internet it can be vulnerable
to external attacks if it is not properly configured. The user is
responsible for back-ups, keeping media in a safe place, protecting
data from unauthorised access, etc.
| Examples: |
Personal Computer (IBM PC-compatible) -
Desktop, Laptop Macintosh, Amiga,
etc. |
| 4.2 Network architectures and
Mini-computers |
|
A mini-computer is linked to several workstations to serve a
limited number of users. The workstations may consist of just a
keyboard and screen, or microcomputers (so-called 'intelligent'
terminals) may be used. Today, these mini-computers are often
referred to as 'servers' linked to their workstations through
a Local Area Network (LAN). Commonly known as
client-server architecture.
In many organisations the old mainframe architecture is now being
replaced with a number of 'servers' each of which has a different
set of functions. Connections from the LAN to Wide Area
Networks (WAN) are common.
The user is only responsible for backing up the files on the hard
disk on his own workstation (if it has one). One or more
administrators are responsible for all other back-ups, loading new
programs etc. Management of the network is normally left to a
Network Administrator.
| Examples: |
UNIX-systems, OS/2-servers, and IBM
AS400 Digital Micro VAX, etc. |
Used in big organisations to serve a great number of users and/or
where considerable computing capacity is needed. A special
computer-room with air-conditioning is needed, too. This is often
located in a restricted area of the building and specialists are
required to operate the computer. Network operators monitor the
communication functions and assist users if there are communication
problems. System development and programming is a task for
specialised staff. The user is only responsible for backing up the
files on the hard disk of his workstation (if it has a disk).
Because of the very fast technical development in the field of
client-server it is today not possible to clearly define the
difference between mainframes and servers.
This type of computer, like personal organisers, is completely
different from the others and is discussed in section 'Technical
devices & communications' in the Interpol Computer Crime Manual.
The most important prevention method is to keep the equipment in a
safe place and away from unauthorised persons.
| 5. Threats and crime
prevention methods |
|
|
This section gives examples of the threats that may occur. Some
may be encountered in all types of environment, others may only
occur with specific types of computer architecture.
The prevention methods mentioned are only given as examples. The
risk of the threat being activated must be assessed in each
organisation and depends on factors such as the company's
information policy, employees' awareness, etc.
In the following tables, the various threats to which a system
may be exposed are grouped according to where the information is
located in the IT process.
READ/CREATE/MODIFY/DELETE refers to information (data
and software) inside the computer system.
TRANSPORT refers to information (data and software)
'transported' via a network or on media.
STORE refers to information (data and software) when it
is stored on computer media and taken out of the computer system.
(I.e. back-up tapes/diskettes).
| 5.1 Architecture-independent
threats |
|
There are a number of important 'architecture-independent
security targets':
- Members of staff, with certain responsibilities, powers,
information
- Media handling
- Malicious programs
- Electronic Emission
5.1.1 Members of staff
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Disloyal staff |
See advice given above in 'Important
IT security functions'. The strongest form of security
is often procedural security with attendant staff awareness
and responsibility. |
| Unauthorised access to information by
users |
Users should be given specific written
guidelines on what they should and should not do. Guidelines
should be signed for.
Install an 'Identification and Authorisation'
system. Adopt a 'two-man rule' for granting
privileges.
Do not reveal your password for
anyone.
Keep identification and authorisation cards in
a safe place.
Regularly check logs.
Regularly check that configuration is
correct.
Install an Intrusion Detection
System.
See above, chapter 'Important
IT security functions' |
| Unauthorised access to information by system
administrators, programmers, etc. |
The same as above and:
Use separate systems for program development
and for 'production'.
Restrict access to equipment with sensitive
information; adopt 'two-man rule'.
Restrict use of 'super user'/'root'
privileges. |
| Unauthorised access to information by
temporary staff, e.g. consultants, service engineers
etc. |
As for other staff and:
Limit their access to the system to the time
and day required for the specific task.
Do not forget to cancel their access rights
and close their temporary accounts.
Do not leave communication lines for remote
servicing open when not needed.
|
5.1.2 Unauthorised access from external sources
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Unauthorised access |
Install an 'Identification and Authorisation'
system. Adopt a 'two-man rule' for granting
privileges.
Regularly check logs.
Regularly check that configuration is
correct.Install a Firewall.
See above chapter 'Important
IT Security functions' |
5.1.3 Media handling
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Total loss of information through theft of
media |
Media should be kept in a safe place under
lock and key. |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information
as a result of unauthorised access to, or loan of, media
|
Encrypt sensitive information. Staff handling
the media should not have access to the encryption
keys.
'Two-man rule' for back-up.
'Two-man rule' for access to
archives. |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information
during servicing |
Never send equipment with sensitive
information on mounted media for servicing. (It is not
enough to 'Delete' sensitive information because of 'Undelete
/unerase' possibilities) |
5.1.4. Malicious program code
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Viruses and other malicious
programs |
Install 'Anti-virus software'. See Chapter
'Investigations', Section 'Malicious program code' in the
Interpol Computer Crime Manual. |
| Programs altered to obtain access to, or
manipulate, information without authorisation |
Depends on computer architecture.
Use separate systems for program development
and for 'production'.
If possible, restrict access to 'source code',
'compilers' and 'editors' in 'production' system and restrict
use or installation of non-standard software
packages.
An Intrusion Detection System might detect
this type of problem. See above chapter 'Important
IT Security functions' |
5.1.5. Electronic Emission
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Despite all precautions, it is still possible
for a determined intruder to eavesdrop on information by
picking up and interpreting electromagnetic emissions from the
Personal Computer or workstation. In a manner somewhat similar
to the way in which it is possible to detect the operation of
a television receiver and determine which channel is being
watched. This type of eavesdropping is most likely to occur
when very sensitive information, such as that of high
commercial value or dealing with matters of national security
is involved. |
Use equipment with no or limited signal
leakage ('tempest') or put the equipment in a shielded room.
Although effective, those methods are expensive and are only
to be recommended when there is an extremely high risk.
Optical fibres can be used to prevent emission leakage from
the lines running between peripherals and the Local Area
Network (LAN).
Encryption of the Wide Area Network (WAN) will
not stop electromagnetic emissions but the eavesdropper will
not be able to use the information without the encryption
key. |
| 5.2 Microcomputer
(stand-alone, Personal Computer) systems |
|
Much sensitive information is stored on personal computer
systems. The main risk is unauthorised access to that data, or that
the data may become corrupted or lost.
READ/CREATE/MODIFY/DELETE
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Corruption of files (program or data). A
major cause of data loss and corruption is the introduction of
viruses to computer systems. |
Keep program diskettes write-protected at all
times.
Do not keep data and software on the same
diskette. Otherwise, if software becomes corrupted or
infected, the data will usually be lost as well.Making files
read-only will prevent them from being infected by some
viruses, not all of them. All media should be scanned for
viruses before use, preferably on a system specially
designated for the purpose. |
| Unauthorised access of information stored in
the computer |
Restrict physical access to the Personal
Computer, by locking the door (and the machine if possible)
whenever it has to be left unattended. Machines should never
be left switched on and running, unless a reliable software
protection mechanism has been installed. |
| Unauthorised use of the computer |
As above. |
| Malicious programs (i.e. viruses) |
See Chapter 'Investigations', Section
'Malicious program code' in the Interpol Computer Crime
Manual. |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information
during servicing |
Never send equipment with sensitive
information on mounted media for servicing. (It is not
enough to 'delete' sensitive information because of
'undelete/unerase' possibilities). |
| Theft of the computer |
Restrict physical access to the Personal
Computer, by locking the door (and the machine if possible)
whenever it has to be left unattended.
Laptops are particularly at risk when left
unattended in hotel rooms etc.
Use cryptography to protect information from
unauthorised access. |
TRANSPORT
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Loss of confidential or secret information
during transport. |
Transport media in sealed envelopes and/or
locked boxes. |
| Manipulation of media during transport
|
As above and electronic seal (cryptologic
checksum) on information. |
| Total loss of media during transport
|
Never leave media unattended in cars, hotel
rooms etc. |
STORE
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information
|
Diskettes and other media should be kept
locked up in a safe place when not in use. |
| Physical loss of information |
As above and it is advisable to install
removable hard disks, which should be kept in a safe
place. |
| Total loss of information through theft of
computer and/or media |
Regular back-ups of data and system files are
essential. Together with the logging information, they will
provide a comprehensive security information package. For
back-up guidelines, see 3.6 |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information
as a result of unauthorised access to, or loan of, media
|
See 'Architecture-independent
threats' above. |
| 5.3 Network architectures and
Mini-computer systems |
|
Local Area Network (LAN)
If a Personal Computer is connected to a network, there are two
other possibilities for interfering with data, in addition to the
dangers of physical access to the machine (as mentioned above).
Firstly, it becomes possible to access the information stored on
the Personal Computer via the network. Care should therefore be
taken to ensure networking software is correctly configured, and
that only that information which is intended to be generally
accessible is stored in directories which can be accessed via a
network.
Secondly, the danger of leaving a Personal Computer unattended is
much greater: not only can the data on the Personal Computer itself
be compromised, but there is also a risk that any data which the
rightful user of the Personal Computer may be able to access over
the network will also be compromised.
In a network environment, especially where sensitive material is
in use, it is essential to keep a central record of activity, i.e. a
log. This should be held on a machine that is known to be secure,
and should contain a record of ALL activity on the network; there
should also be a procedure for examining the log, so that all
suspicious events can be highlighted and investigated.
Wide Area Network (WAN)
Networks are connected either by cable, by microwave or
satellite. The latter are vulnerable to interception as are any
radio transmissions unless the data is encrypted. The transmission
of electronic signals is governed by standards that are called
'protocols'. There are many standards, the most common is the TCP/IP
which is the standard packet-switching protocol used for the
Internet. Such connection can be protected against improper use or
interception in various ways. The best way is to use Identification,
Authentication and Cryptography as well as firewall and Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS).
Costs have also to be considered. Telecommunication companies can
offer the use of dedicated lines - as often used by financial
institutions, which means that these lines are not available for
normal public use and are protected against intrusion, but they cost
substantially more. This also applies to encryption. There are a
number of encryption standards and devices ranging from small
logical keys installed on sending and receiving equipment to higher
levels of coding which use complicated mathematical cycles and
algorithms. The decision to implement such higher level systems will
have to be taken in the light of the value of transmitted
data.
It must also be remembered that encryption is not an
infallible solution and that its use raises various problems, e.g.
several countries are developing, or discussing the development of a
specific law to regulate the use of encryption.
Even when communications are well protected, problems of
unauthorised access can occur if a well-protected system is linked
directly to another that is not protected. Any given system is only
as secure as those to which it is connected.
INTERNET
Victims of Internet attacks are often organisations that did not
bother too much about their security or who trusted some sales
person who said that the Internet connection was absolutely
safe.
A lot of safeguards are mentioned above and they are applicable
for the Internet as well. Some additions are :
- Do not connect computers or entire networks, which contain
your critical information (e.g. financial, confidential, privacy)
to the Internet.
- If possible restrict the way to the Internet to just one
single point of connection.
- Do not store your password or identification number on your
hard disk, protect it otherwise from unauthorised access. Create a
password policy (see chapter 3.4.1,
identification - password systems).
- Check and update your list of user accounts.
- Install a firewall system and an IDS.
- Do not download files or open emails which you do not
trust.
- Install an anti-virus-software and update it frequently.
- Be aware of shared-files which might be accessed of
unauthorised persons.
- Be aware of cookies, Java and ActiveX applets etc.
- Install only minimal options.
THREATS
READ/CREATE/MODIFY/DELETE
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Manipulations or unauthorised access to
software or information in each workstation (Personal
Computer) in the network |
See chapter 5.2.
Microcomputer systems |
| Unauthorised access to information in the
'server' by users |
Users should be given specific written
guidelines on what they are allowed and not allowed to do.
Guidelines should be signed for.
Install an 'Identification and Authorisation'
system. Adopt a 'two-man rule' for granting
privileges.
Regularly check logs.
Regularly check that configuration is correct.
IDS should be installed. |
| Unauthorised access to information by system
administrators, programmers’ etc. |
As above and:
Use separate systems for program development
and for 'production'.
Restrict access to server; adopt 'two-man
rule'.
Restrict use of 'super user'/'root'
privileges. |
| Corruption of files (program or data).A major
cause of data loss and corruption is the introduction of
viruses to computer systems. |
All media should be scanned for viruses,
preferably on a system specially designated for the purpose,
before use.
Erase all unnecessary codes, default and
unused procedures. |
| Total loss of information through 'disk
crash' or deliberate destroying of files |
Regular back-ups of data and system files are
essential. Together with the logging information, they will
provide a comprehensive security information package. For
back-up guidelines, see 3.6 |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information
during servicing |
Some mini-server servicing can be done
'on-site' but in the case of some hardware problems the
equipment will have to be taken away for repair by the service
company/vendor.
Never send equipment with sensitive
information on media for servicing without a verifiable
guarantee that the information will be destroyed. (It is not
enough to 'delete' the sensitive information because of
'undelete' and 'unformatted' possibilities)
Remember that after repair, the disk drives
could be reused somewhere else and your information might be
compromised.
If it is decided to replace a disk with
sensitive information, destroy it yourself. |
|
Theft of the server |
The server should be kept locked up in a safe
place. |
TRANSPORT in Local Area Network (LAN)
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Interception of cables |
Segmentation of the LAN.
Use optical fibres.
Regularly inspect LAN.
Encrypt LAN. |
| Interception of networks components (like
'routers', 'bridges', 'gateways', 'repeaters' etc.) |
Restrict physical access to
components.
Regularly check that the configuration of each
individual component is correct. |
| Manipulation of network components |
As above. |
| Unapproved workstations |
The system should be set up in a way that the
management must approve the workstations before they can be
used.
Regularly check that the configuration is
correct. |
| Network administrator accessing user files
|
Network Administrators should be given
specific written guidelines on what they should and should not
do. Guidelines should be signed for.
Restrict use of 'administrator'
privileges.
Install an 'Identification and Authorisation'
system.
Adopt a 'two-man rule' for granting
privileges. |
| Access to the LAN from 'outside' |
Provide guidelines for the use of modems or
other connections.
IDS and firewall should be used.
Regularly check that the configuration is
correct. |
TRANSPORT in Wide Area Network (WAN)
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Interception of cables |
Communications can be encrypted, but there
may be legal restrictions. |
| Interception of radio communications
|
As above. |
| Intruders ('hacking'/'cracking') |
Use special modems at each end, which
recognise each other’s signals (mutual signal
recognition).
Install an 'Identification and Authorisation'
system. Adopt a 'two-man rule' for granting privileges.
IDS and firewall should be used.
For password rules, see chapter
3.4., User Identification and Authorisation.
|
TRANSPORT of media
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Loss of confidential or secret information
during transport |
Transport media in sealed envelopes or locked
boxes. Cryptography should be used. |
| Manipulation of media during transport
|
As above and:
Electronic seal (cryptologic checksum) on
information. |
| Total loss of media during transport
|
Never leave media unattended in cars
etc. |
STORE
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information
|
Media should be kept in a safe place under
lock and key.
'Two-man' rule for access to
archives. |
|
Total loss of information through theft of
media |
Regular back-ups of data and system files are
essential. Together with the logging information, they will
provide a comprehensive security information package. For
back-up guidelines, see 3.6. |
| 5.4 Mainframe-computer
systems |
|
There is normally some kind of access system to a mainframe via
terminals or a number of LANs with workstations, which will be
subject to the threats mentioned above. In that connection, see 5.1
(Architecture-independent threats), 5.2
(Microcomputer systems), and 5.3
(Network architectures and Mini-computer systems), as
appropriate.
THREATS
READ/CREATE/MODIFY/DELETE
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Manipulations or unauthorised access to
software |
Use separate computers for system/program
development and 'production'.
If possible, restrict access to 'source code',
'compilers' and 'editors' in 'production' system.
|
|
Unauthorised access to
information |
Users should be given specific written
guidelines on what they should and should not do. Guidelines
should be signed for.
Install an 'Identification and Authorisation'
system. Adopt a 'two-man rule' for granting
privileges.
IDS and firewall should be used.
Regularly check logs.
Regularly check that configuration is
correct. |
| Unauthorised access to information by system
administrators, programmers etc. |
As above and:
Separate test/development systems from
production systems.
Restrict access to the computer room. 'Closed
shop' for all other than those working in the computer
room.
Restrict use of 'super user'/'root'
privileges.
Cryptography should be used for confidential
information. |
| Corruption of files (program or data) by
malicious programs |
Use 'checksums' on sensitive software to make
it possible to control that it has not been changed
deliberately.
Erase all unnecessary codes, default and
unused procedures. |
| Loss (by copying or transfer) of information
during servicing |
Servicing of mainframe systems is done 'on
site'. In the case of hardware problems with disk drives they
should be replaced and the faulty ones sent to the vendor for
repair, if possible. They can later be used as replacements,
perhaps at another site.
Never send equipment with sensitive
information on media for servicing without a verifiable
guarantee that the information will be destroyed. (It is not
enough to 'Delete' sensitive information because of 'Undelete'
and 'Unformat' possibilities).
Cryptography should be used for confidential
information. |
TRANSPORT in Local Area Network (LAN)
TRANSPORT in Wide Area Network (WAN)
TRANSPORT of media
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
| Loss of confidential or secret information
during transport |
Transport media in sealed envelopes or locked
boxes. Cryptography should be used for confidential
information. |
| Manipulation of media during transport
|
As above and electronic seal (cryptologic
checksum) on information. |
| Total loss of media during transport
|
Never leave media unattended in cars
etc. |
STORE
| Threat |
Prevention
method |
Loss (by copying or transfer) of information
|
Media should be kept in a safe place under
lock and key.
'Two-man rule' for access to
archives.
|
| Total loss of information through theft of
media |
Regular back-ups of data and system files are
essential. Together with the logging information, they will
provide a comprehensive security information package. For
back-up guidelines, see 3.6. |
| 6. IT Security -
International workgroups |
|
|
The European Commission has recognised the need for a
comprehensive approach to information system security to protect the
individual, the business community and public administrations
against increasingly sophisticated threats and combinations of
threats.
Consequently, the Commission took the initiative of proposing an
overall 'framework' in which information security problems could be
assessed and an appropriate set of solutions identified and
developed.
The evaluation of the security of information systems has been a
key activity with regard to the implementation of a number of the
action lines. The European criteria ITSEC (IT Security Evaluation
Criteria), and associated methodology (ITSEM), has been the subject
of many of the INFOSEC projects. The art of US evaluation criteria
(TCSEC, Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria) is commonly
known as the 'Orange Book'. A new standard – the CC (Common
Criteria) – has been adopted as new international standard and will
replace ITSEC and TCSEC in a period. However, ITSEC and TCSEC will
be used parallel with CC for some time.