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Filed by Atty. Jess Beard
for Martin McKay
No SS# to Register to Vote

This case was heard in Chattanooga, TN, Federal Court,
Oct. 29th at 2:30. This document is in text format as
received. Do not assume you can change the names and
file as your own. Jess argued to not require a SS#
as a prerequisite to register to vote in Tennessee.
Collier ordered "In accordance with the accompanying
memorandum, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Martin S. McKay's
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

             UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT
      EASTERN  DISTRICT  OF  TENNESSEE  AT  CHATTANOOGA
                                     *
MARTIN S. McKAY                      * CIVIL ACTION
                                     *
VERSUS                               * NO.
                                     *
BROOK THOMPSON, individually and as  * SECTION:
 Coordinator of Elections            *
 State of Tennessee                  * JUDGE
RILEY DARNELL, as                    *
 Secretary of State                  * JURY DEMAND
 State of Tennessee                  *
CAROLYN JACKSON, individually and as * INJUNCTIVE RELIEF &
 Administrator of Elections          *  MONEY DAMAGES
 Hamilton County, Tennessee          *
CLAUDE RAMSEY, as                    *
 County Executive                    *
 Hamilton County, Tennessee          *
                                     *
 
 *****************************************************************

          COMPLAINT  FOR  ABRIDGEMENT  OF  RIGHT  TO  VOTE

 The complainant, Martin S. McKay, being more than eighteen (18) years
of age and a resident of and domiciled in the County of Hamilton, State
of Tennessee, brings this action against the above named defendants to
secure his right to vote.  In support of this complaint plaintiff would
show as follows:
 PARAGRAPH 1.

 Brook Thompson, defendant herein, is the Coordinator of Elections for
the State of Tennessee and as such is the "Chief Election Official" for
the State of Tennessee.  The Division of  Elections is an organizational
unit of the Tennessee Department of State.  Under T.C.A. 2-2-207, the
Coordinator of Elections "may promulgate rules" controlling voter
registration procedures in Tennessee.  The defendant Tennessee Division
of Elections is served by serving Brook Thompson and by serving
Tennessee's State Attorney General John Knox Walkup.

 PARAGRAPH 2.

 Riley Darnell, defendant herein, is the Secretary of State for the
State of Tennessee.  The defendant State of Tennessee is served by
serving Rilley Darnel as Secretary of State and by serving Tennessee's
State Attorney General John Knox Walkup.
 PARAGRAPH 3.

 Carolyn Jackson, defendant herein, is the Administrator of Elections
for the Hamilton County, Tennessee, Board of Elections, a position
commonly and in the Tennessee Code referred to as the "registrar."
Under T.C.A. 2-2-120 in such capacity she "shall determine, from the
answers to the questions on the permanent registration record, if
necessary, whether the registrant is entitled to vote (and if) the
registrar determines that the registrant is entitled to register, (s)he
shall declare the registrant a registered voter."  The Hamilton County,
Tennessee, Board of Elections is a political subdivision of Hamilton
County, Tennessee.  Defendant Hamilton County is served by serving
County Executive Claude Ramsey.
 PARAGRAPH 4.

 The jurisdiction of this Court is based upon 28 USC 1331, as this civil
action concerns the laws and statutes of the United States of America,
specifically 42 USC 1973gg, Public Law 93-579 Section 7, 42 USC 1971, 42
USC 1973a, and 42 USC 1983.  Additionally, this civil action concerns
Article 4, Section 2 of the U. S. Constitution.  Further, this civil
action concerns the 1st, 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
 PARAGRAPH 5.

 Venue in this district is proper pursuant to 28 USC 1391(b) as
plaintiff is a resident of this district and defendant Jackson is
employed in this district and a substantial part of the events giving
rise to plaintiff's claim arose in this district.
 PARAGRAPH 6.

 Plaintiff has a private right of action pursuant to 42 USC
1973gg(9)(b)(2) for violations by defendants of the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) as it is within 120 days of the
November, 1998 U. S. Congressional elections and defendant Thompson has
not corrected the violation within the 20 day time frame specified by
this statute.
  PARAGRAPH 7.

 Plaintiff tried to register to vote on Sunday, June 21, 1998, during a
voter registration drive at St. Stephen Catholic Church and at such time
individuals representing the Hamilton County Election Commission advised
plaintiff that the Social Security Number (SSN) was required before he
could register to vote; because of this, and the fact that disclosing
his SSN in such a manner would be contrary to plaintiff's religious
beliefs (as addressed in Paragraph 21 below), plaintiff declined to
complete the application.  On Tuesday, June 30, 1998, while obtaining a
Tennessee license at the Driver License Testing Center, plaintiff could
have registered to vote but again declined because the SSN was
required.  On Wednesday, July 29, 1998, plaintiff went to the office of
the Hamilton County Election Commission and when he attempted to
register employees of the Election Commission advised that his SSN would
be required before he would be allowed to register.  Plaintiff objected
and was provided with a copy of page 1 of Tennessee Attorney General
opinion number 84-504 stating that the State may require SSN to register
to vote.  A copy of such first page of such Tennessee Attorney General
opinion is attached to plaintiff's attached Affidavit. On Monday, August
10, 1998, plaintiff returned to the office of the Hamilton County
Election Commission and spoke with defendant Carolyn Jackson,
Administrator of Elections, and advised her that he had prevailed in
litigation on this issue in Louisiana but she still maintained that SSN
is required.  On Monday, August 17, 1998, plaintiff notified defendant
Brook Thompson, Coordinator of Elections, as he is the "Chief Election
Official" for the State of Tennessee, of said violation pursuant to 42
USC 1973gg 9(b).  A copy of plaintiff's notice to defendant Thompson
documenting these events is attached to plaintiff's attached Affidavit
and is made a part of this complaint by reference thereto.
Additionally, plaintiff spoke with defendant Thompson on the afternoon
of Monday, August 17, 1998, to confirm that he received said
notification by facsimile and he confirmed same.  On Thursday, September
3, 1998, plaintiff received notification from the Hamilton County
Elections Board that his application to register to vote had been
rejected (copy attached to plaintiff's attached Affidavit).  One week
later, September 10, 1998, plaintiff's counsel, attorney Jes Beard of
Chattanooga spoke by phone with Carolyn Jackson on behalf of plaintiff
in an attempt to resolve this matter short of litigation and Jackson
again refused to allow plaintiff to register without a SSN.  Also on
September 10, 1998, in an attempt to resolve this matter short of
litigation plaintiff's counsel spoke by phone with Brook Thompson and
Thompson refused to change his position; Thompson contended that
prospective voters in Tennessee are required under T.C.A. 2-2-116 to
provide SSN before any voter's registration can be considered complete.
Thompson further contended that the practice is "grandfathered" in under
the Privacy Act of 1974 and therefore not prohibited under the NVRA,
because T.C.A. 2-2-116 was passed in 1972, and because T.C.A. 2-2-116
required the collection of SSN prior to the time the Privacy Act of 1974
prohibited requirements that prospective voters disclose a SSN prior to
voting.  NVRA took effect May 20, 1993.  Attorney Beth Henry Robertson
in Thompson's office later during the day of September 10, 1998, stated
as defendant Thompson's position that because the voter's registration
form used by the State of Tennessee does disclose the authority for the
requirement of providing SSN at the time of registering to vote, and
also the SSN is required under Tennessee statute, and because such
requirement and practice has existed prior to January 1, 1975, that the
State of Tennessee is exempt from the restrictions in the NVRA on the
collection of unnecessary information, and Ms. Robertson further cited
the unpublished Tennessee Appellate Court opinion of Carter v. Dunn,
decided on or about December 3, 1976, and 1980 Tennessee Attorney's
General Opinion # 80-384, as authority for the defendants' position in
denying the plaintiff his right to vote without his disclosure of his
SSN.  The facts set out in this paragraph are sworn to in the attached
Affidavits of the plaintiff and of attorney Jes Beard.
 PARAGRAPH 8.

 Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of events occurring on and
after June 21, 1998, as plaintiff sought to register to vote in a voter
registration drive at St. Stephen Catholic Church.  After further
unsuccessful attempts to register to vote, plaintiff was not allowed to
participate in federal, state and local elections in August, 1998.  This
civil action is brought to protect plaintiff's right to participate in
upcoming state and local elections and also to participate in the
November, 1998 U. S. Congressional elections.
 COUNT ONE  NVRA VIOLATION
 PARAGRAPH 9.

 Pursuant to 42 USC 1973gg-3(c)(2)(B), the NVRA, the State of Tennessee
may only require the minimum amount of information necessary to prevent
duplicate voter registrations and enable state election officials to
determine the eligibility of the applicant and to administer voter
registration and other parts of the election process.  Plaintiff asserts
that the requirement that he disclose his SSN under T.C.A. 2-2-116
exceeds the statutory requirement permitted by Federal law.
Specifically, plaintiff's Social Security Number is both more than the
"minimum amount of information necessary" to prevent duplicate voter
registration and to determine whether plaintiff is eligible to vote, and
is unnecessary for either function as is illustrated by the defendant's
own practice of allowing any voter to register without disclosing an SSN
on the mere assertion by the prospective voter that they have no SSN..
 PARAGRAPH 10.

 T.C.A. 2-2-102 serves as the guidelines by which Tennessee determines
if a person is "eligible" to vote.  T.C.A. 2-2-102 sets forth the
"qualifications" of an individual to vote as being:
   "A citizen of the United States eighteen (18) years of age or older
who is a resident of this state is a qualified voter ..."

The SSN has no bearing on determining his eligibility to vote.  SSN's
cannot serve as evidence that an individual is "eighteen years of age or
older" because an SSN may be obtained prior to the age of eighteen.
SSN's cannot serve as evidence of citizenship because an SSN may be
obtained by resident aliens or other non-citizens.  SSN's cannot be used
to evidence an individual's residency status because the assignment of
an SSN does not depend on a person's place of residence.  Further there
is no reason to believe that deferring to the Social Security
Administration for detecting or preventing fraudulent or duplicate
applications provides any better protection from fraudulent or duplicate
voter applications than would result from the State of Tennessee
conducting its own independent efforts or issuing its own independent
identification numbers, as the State presently does in the issuance of a
driver's license.
 PARAGRAPH 11.

 Plaintiff prevailed in litigation with the State of Louisiana on this
same issue in the case of McKay v. Altobello, et al, USDC E.D. La 1997
(West Law Case No. 266717) -- a copy is attached and incorporated by
reference.
 COUNT TWO  PRIVACY ACT VIOLATION
 PARAGRAPH 12.

 Public Law 93-579, Section 7 -- The Privacy Act of 1974 specifically
prohibits any State, it's agencies, and/or political sub-divisions
thereof, from denying any individual any right, benefit, or privilege
provided by law because of such individual's refusal to disclose his
Social Security Number.  No exception to The Privacy Act is applicable.
Plaintiff asserts that the Coordinator of Elections and the Hamilton
County Elections Board did not have an "operational" system of records
in existence prior to January 1, 1975 which used an SSN to verify the
identity of an individual. Plaintiff prevailed in litigation with the
State of Louisiana on this same issue -- McKay v. Altobello, et al, USDC
E.D. La 1997 (copy attached).
 COUNT THREE  CIVIL RIGHTS ACT VIOLATION
 PARAGRAPH 13.

 In the unlikely event that the Coordinator of Elections or the Hamilton
County Elections Board successfully demonstrates to the Court's
satisfaction that either one or the other, or both, did indeed have an
"operational" system of records prior to January 1, 1975 which used an
SSN to verify the identity of an individual; plaintiff asserts that such
a system of records was prohibited by 42 USC 1971 (a)(2)(B)  commonly
referred to as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  This provision of Federal
law forbids any person from acting under color of law to,
   "deny the right of any individual to vote in any election because of
an error or omission on any record or paper relating to any application,
registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such error or
omission is not material in determining whether such individual is
qualified under State law to vote in such election"

When the State of Tennessee enacted Chapter 740, Public Acts of 1972,
sub-chapter 2, paragraph 216, which required a voter to give his or her
SSN to register to vote, such requirement was prohibited by Federal law
because an SSN was not then and is not now "material" in determining
whether an individual is qualified to vote under State law.
 PARAGRAPH 14.

 According to Chapter 740, Public Acts of 1972, sub-chapter 2, paragraph
202, now embodied at T.C.A. 2-2-102, every citizen who is eighteen (18)
years of age or older and who is a resident of the State of Tennessee
and a resident of the county in which he offers to vote is a qualified
voter.  An SSN cannot serve as evidence that an individual is "eighteen
years of age or older" because an SSN may be obtained prior to the age
of eighteen; An SSN cannot be used to evidence an individual's residency
status because the assignment of an SSN is not dependent on a person's
place of residence; An SSN serves as no evidence that a prospective
voter is not disqualified to vote by reasons of infamy or on any other
basis; deferring to the Social Security Administration to detect or
prevent fraudulent application for SSN's which might be obtained to
allow fraudulent repeat registration by an individual wanting to vote
more than once in any given election does not assure any detection of
such fraud, but merely leaves detection of the fraud in the hands of
another government entity, the Social Security Administration.
 PARAGRAPH 15.

 Further, T.C.A. 2-2-102 as currently written, is materially unchanged
pertaining to the specifications required in determining an individual's
qualifications to vote.  The present language reads as follows:
   A citizen of the United States eighteen (18) years of age or older
who is a resident of this state is a qualified voter unless the citizen
is disqualified under the provisions of this title or under a judgement
of infamy pursuant to section 40-20-112.

Plaintiff asserts that an SSN has never been "material" in determining
an individual's qualifications to vote, but that Tennessee uses an SSN
only for the expressed purpose of determining if an individual is
attempting to commit fraud by trying to register and to vote more than
once, but not to determine whether the applicant is in fact qualified to
vote at all.  Therefore, plaintiff has the statutory right under 42 USC
1971 (a)(2)(B) to omit the information from the registration form.  As a
result, plaintiff asserts and maintains that the Coordinator of
Elections and the Hamilton County Elections Board have been in violation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for as long as they have been requiring
an SSN as a pre-requisite to registering to vote.
 COUNT FOUR  UNCONSTITUTIONAL BURDENING VOTING RIGHTS
 PARAGRAPH 16.

 Plaintiff asserts that his Constitutional right to vote is
substantially burdened by the Coordinator of Elections and the Hamilton
County Elections Board because the statute requiring disclosure of his
SSN as a pre-requisite to registering to vote unnecessarily conditions
his right to vote upon public dissemination of his SSN.  Note the
appellate decision in the case of Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344
(4th Cir. 1993).  The Greidinger case challenged a Virginia law which
required disclosure of an SSN while at the same time making these
records open to public inspection and also allowing wide spread
publication of SSN's on lists which are made available to political
parties and/or other organizations.  Much like the Virginia statute
involved in Greidinger, Tennessee has a law (T.C.A. 2-2-127) making the
permanent registration records open to public inspection.  Further, much
like the Virginia statute involved in Greidinger, Tennessee's T.C.A.
2-2-138 requires each county Election Commission to make available for
purchase by citizens a listing of registered voters.
 PARAGRAPH 17.

 While T.C.A. 2-2-138 does not specifically state that SSN's should be
published, it does not specifically state that SSN's shall not be
published or disclosed when any county Election Commission sell the
voting lists as contemplated by the statute.  As a result, even if the
Coordinator of Elections and/or the Hamilton County Elections Board
opted not to publish SSN's in such a list, if an individual were
inclined to seek a legal remedy forcing them to do so there would be no
statutory basis protecting the confidentiality of this information ...
therefore, defendants may conceivably be compelled by court order to
publish SSN's in such a listing.  The Greidinger court found that this
substantially burdened Greidinger's right to vote upon application of
the strict scrutiny test and determined that the State statute was not
"narrowly tailored" to meet whatever compelling interest the State put
forth.  Your instant plaintiff similarly maintains that the State of
Tennessee statute (T.C.A. 2-2-138) is not "narrowly tailored" to meet
any compelling interest upon which to condition his right to vote in the
instant matter.
 PARAGRAPH 18.

 Even if the Court were to determine, in the instant matter, that the
Tennessee statute is narrowly tailored in regard to the publishing of
lists for purchase by citizens ... the permanent registration records
are still open to public inspection, something which the Greidinger
court found that, in and of itself, substantially burdened his right to
vote and this, in it's own right, was not narrowly tailored to meet the
State's compelling interest requirement.  As a result, the Greidinger
court struck down the Virginia statute, as plaintiff is requesting of
this Court in the instant matter.
 COUNT FIVE  FIFTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION
 PARAGRAPH 19.

 In the unlikely event that the Court should find insufficient grounds
for enjoining the Coordinator of Elections and the Hamilton County
Election Board from requiring SSN based upon statutory and judicial
references as cited above, plaintiff notes that the U.S. Constitution
states in pertinent part, in the 5th Amendment that "No person shall
be... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law," and in the 14th Amendment, Section 1, that "No State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ..."  Plaintiff asserts that even if the Court finds the defendants'
practice of requiring disclosure of an SSN before allowing a person to
vote is "narrowly tailored" and passes Constitutional muster under this
test, such practice of the defendants effectively and practically
deprives him of liberty without due process of law in direct conflict
with the 5th Amendment and the 14th Amendment.  This is because
plaintiff has not been convicted of any crime for which the right to
vote should be denied.  Thus, based on these grounds the requirement of
providing SSN is unconstitutional.
 COUNT SIX  PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE VIOLATION
 PARAGRAPH 20.

 Article 4, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution states in pertinent part
that "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several states."  The 14th Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution states that "no state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States."  Plaintiff notes that there are at least two states
(Louisiana and Virginia even if no others -- the cases of Greidinger and
McKay prohibit either state from requiring SSN as a condition to voting)
which do not require a voter to give his or her SSN in order to register
to vote or to vote; as such, the practice of requiring SSN in Tennessee
violates Article 4, Section 2 of the 14th Amendment of the U. S.
Constitution because plaintiff is being denied "all Privileges and
Immunities" of citizens of the states which do not require SSN as a
condition of voting.  On this basis, the requirement of providing SSN to
register to vote is unconstitutional.
 COUNT SEVEN  FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION VIOLATION
 PARAGRAPH 21.

 If the Court concludes the cited statutory and constitutional grounds
are insufficient to strike down the Tennessee statute (T.C.A. 2-2-116),
then as a final matter the plaintiff would show that under the 1st
Amendment to the Constitution he has a religious objection to providing
his SSN as a condition of voting.  Plaintiff has a bona fide belief that
SSN's are being used as universal identifiers, as referred to in the
Bible, Book of Revelations, Chapter 13, verses 16-17, and that
submitting to the use of SSN's beyond their function with the Social
Security Administration is contrary to his religious beliefs.  The
exercise of plaintiff's fundamental right of voting can not be
conditioned upon requiring that he provide his SSN in a manner directly
at odds with his religious beliefs, thereby unreasonably interfering
with his right to exercise his religion.    Because two different
fundamental rights are involved here  both the right of voting and the
right of free exercise of religion -- the appropriate test of the
constitutionality of the government action at issue is not rational
relations but is instead strict scrutiny, a determination of whether the
"government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a
central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling
governmental interest justifies the burden."  Hernandez v. Commissioner,
490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).  Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (state laws burdening religions "must be
subjected to strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by the
State of a compelling interest"); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 732 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part wrote, "Our
precedents have long required the Government to show that a compelling
state interest is served by its refusal to grant a religious
exemption"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-258 [494 U.S. 872,
908] (1982) ("The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by
showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental
interest"); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("The state may justify an inroad on religious
liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling state interest"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972) ("[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (question is
"whether some compelling state interest . . . justifies the substantial
infringement of appellant's First Amendment right").
 PARAGRAPH 21-A.

 The defendants allow those without SSN to register to vote and to vote,
severely undercutting any claim the defendants might make that they
cannot accomplish the overriding government interest of preventing voter
fraud without disclosure of an SSN.
 COUNT EIGHT  RETAINING JURISDICTION
 PARAGRAPH 22.

 If the Court finds the plaintiff's right to register to vote was
unlawfully denied, then plaintiff requests that the Court retain
jurisdiction in this matter under 42 USC 1973a(c) which states in
pertinent part as follows:
   "If in any proceeding instituted by the Attorney General or an
aggrieved person under any statute to enforce the voting guarantees of
the 14th or 15th amendment in any state or political sub-division the
court finds that violations of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment
justifying equitable relief have occurred within the territory of such
State or political sub-division, the court, in addition to such relief
as it may grant, shall retain jurisdiction ..."

Plaintiff believes that even if the Court Orders the defendants to
permanently allow him to register to vote without disclosing his SSN,
the defendants are unlikely to voluntarily correct all of the systems,
both procedural and automated (i.e.-computer systems), which have been
illegally collecting SSN's for more than the past 20 years.  These
systems include, but are not limited to, not only the information system
for the Division of Elections but also all other local and state
agencies where persons can now register to vote as promulgated by NVRA.
An example would be the computer system for the Division of Motor
Vehicles which collects SSN and automatically transfers SSN to the
Division of Elections.
 PARAGRAPH 23.

 Based on his recent experience in Louisiana on this issue, the
plaintiff believes that only through the Court retaining jurisdiction in
this matter and directly supervising the implementation of requisite
changes to the voter registration and electoral process in Tennessee
will permanent and meaningful change be effected.
 COUNT NINE  42 USC 1973a DEMAND FOR FEDERAL EXAMINERS
 PARAGRAPH 24.

 Plaintiff requests that the Court authorize the appointment of Federal
examiners by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management pursuant
to 42 USC 1973a which states in pertinent part:
   "Whenever the Attorney General or an aggrieved person institutes a
proceeding under any statute to enforce the voting guarantees of the
fourteenth or fifteenth amendment in any State or political subdivision
the Court shall authorize the appointment of Federal examiners by the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management."

Under such quoted language of 42 USC 1973a, once the instant proceeding
has been instituted to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment, the compulsory language of "shall" requires that the Court
authorize the appointment of Federal examiners even if the Court were to
determine that the plaintiff's right to register to vote was not
unlawfully denied.
 COUNT TEN  42 USC 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION
 PARAGRAPH 25.

 The U. S. Congress found under the NVRA -- 42 USC 1973gg(a) that,

   1.) the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a
fundamental right;
   2.) it is the duty of Federal, State, and local governments to
promote the exercise of that right ...

Further, plaintiff again references the 14th Amendment to the U. S.
Constitution which guarantees his right to vote.
 PARAGRAPH 26.

 Plaintiff asserts that upon receiving official notification on August
17, 1998, that plaintiff's constitutional right had been denied without
due process, defendants Thompson and Jackson acted perniciously and with
malice aforethought by continuing to deny plaintiff's right to register
to vote.  Plaintiff maintains that upon receiving his letter citing the
statutory, judicial cases, and constitutional authorities in an effort
to convince defendants that the position which they were taking in this
matter is prohibited, defendants did thereupon decide to continue to
deny his constitutional right (copy of notification attached).
Plaintiff maintains further that upon speaking with plaintiff's counsel
as set forth in paragraph 7 above, defendant Thompson and Jackson
decided to continue to deny plaintiff's constitutional right to vote.
 PARAGRAPH 27.

 The actions of the State of Tennessee and the Hamilton County Election
Commission, which were manifested and carried out through the conduct of
defendants Thompson and Jackson, resulted in plaintiff being deprived of
his civil rights as guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.  The actions of defendants Thompson and Jackson referred
to herein were carried out and committed during the course and scope of
each of the defendant's employment. The actions of defendants Thompson
and Jackson were undertaken in their role and capacity of policy makers
in their respective agencies.
 PARAGRAPH 28.

 Defendant's conduct in depriving plaintiff of his civil rights,
specifically his right to vote, occurred while defendant's were acting
under color of state law.  Accordingly, defendants conduct and
plaintiff's loss of his right to vote is actionable under 42 USC 1983.
Plaintiff seeks compensation for all damages which he has sustained as a
result of the defendants conduct.
 COUNT ELEVEN  ATTORNEY'S FEES
 PARAGRAPH 29.

 If the defendants are found to have unlawfully abridged plaintiff's
right to vote and/or are found to be liable under 42 USC 1983 plaintiff
seeks an award of reasonable attorney's fees and cost of these
proceedings.  Plaintiff also seeks an award of attorney's fees,
expenses, and costs as authorized by 42 USC 1973gg (9)(c) and 42 USC
1973 (l)(e).
 WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that this action be filed and that after due
proceedings had, judgement be entered in favor of Martin McKay and
against defendants Brook Thompson, Riley Darnell, and Carolyn Jackson
permanently enjoining them from requiring SSN as a pre-requisite to
registering to vote and ordering the defendants to register the
plaintiff to vote for the November, 1998, U. S. Congressional elections
as well as other state and local elections.  If the Court is unable to
hear this case before the November, 1998, U. S. Congressional elections
plaintiff prays that a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order be granted to enable him to exercise his right to vote.
 Additionally, plaintiff prays that upon entry of a declaratory
judgement and permanent injunction by the Court an order will accompany
said permanent injunction and be entered compelling the defendants
herein to remove the SSN's of all registered voters in the State of
Tennessee from it's computer system and all paper files because said
SSN's were collected illegally, by placing said voters and citizenry in
fear of losing their constitutional right to vote.
 Further, plaintiff prays for an award of reasonable attorney's fees,
expenses and costs associated with this litigation.  That a proceeding
be had with a jury to determine an amount of damages to be awarded to
plaintiff from the date of judicial demand, together with legal interest
as well as all costs of these proceedings, reasonable attorney's fees
and litigation expenses.
      Respectfully Submitted,
      Jes Beard, attorney for plaintiff

      ___________________________
      737 Market St., Suite 601
      Chattanooga, TN   37402
       (423) 267-4391
PLEASE  SERVE:
     Mr. Brook Thompson, individually and as Coordinator of Elections
     Division of Elections
     James K. Polk Bldg, Ste. 1700
     505 Deaderick Street
     Nashville, TN   37243    (615) 741 - 7956

     Mr. Riley Darnell, as Secretary of State
     Tennessee Dept. of State
     State Capitol, 1st Floor
     Nashville, TN   37243      (615) 741 - 2819

     Ms. Carolyn Jackson, individually and as Administrator of Elections

     Hamilton County Election Commission
     514 E. 4th Street
     Chattanooga, TN   37403    (423) 209 - 7720

     Mr. Claude Ramsey, as County Executive
     Hamilton County Courthouse
     Chattanooga, TN 37402

     Mr. John Knox Walkup, Attorney General
     State of Tennessee
     425 Fifth Ave., N.
     Nashville, TN   37243   (615) 741 - 3491
DIRECTORY TO COMPLAINT'S CONTENTS:
Paragraphs 1-3 -- identification of defendants; Paragraph 4 --
Jurisdiction, Paragraph 5 -- venue, Paragraph 6 --Statement of private
right of action under NVRA; Paragraph 7 -- general factual background
regarding efforts to register; Paragraph 8  damages; Count 1  NVRA
violation, Paragraph 9 -- NVRA requirements; Paragraph 10 -- Tennessee
voter qualifications; Paragraph 11 -- results of McKay v. Altobello;
Count 2/ Paragraph 12  Privacy Act Violation; Count 3  Civil Rights
Act Violation; Paragraph 13 -- provisions of 42 USC 1971 (a)(2)(B)
regarding denial of voting rights for  immaterial omissions on voting
applications; Paragraph 14  Tennessee voting eligibility requirements
of TCA 2-2-102; Paragraph 15 -- application of 42 USC 1971 (a)(2)(B) to
TCA 2-2-102; Count 4/Paragraph 16 -- Unconstitutional Burdening of
Voting Rights as addressed in Greidinger v. Davis and application of
statutes requiring public disclosure of an SSN included in voting
records; Paragraph 17  risk of public disclosure of SSN and strict
scrutiny test; Paragraph 18  risk of disclosure substantially burdening
right to vote; Count 5/Paragraph 19 -- 5th Amendment Due Process
violation; Count 6/Paragraph 20 -- 14th Amendment Privileges &
Immunities Violation; Count 7/Paragraph 21 Free Exercise Of Religion
Violation; 21A  defendants allow registration w/o SSN; Count
8/Paragraph 22  Retaining Jurisdiction; Paragraph 23  need to retain
jurisdiction; Count 9/Paragraph 24  Demand for Federal Examiners; Count
10/Paragraph 25  1983 Civil Rights Violation; Paragraph 26 
defendant's actions pernicious and malicious; Paragraph 27  defendant
actions in policy making capacity; Paragraph 28  acts under color of
law; Count 11/Paragraph 29  Attorneys Fees; unnumbered  prayer for
Preliminary Injunction, unnumbered  prayer for Permanent Injunction,
unnumbered  prayer for damages and jury demand


1.  Because of the length of the Complaint, a Directory to its contents
is offered on the last page, without such Directory being included for
any purpose beyond assisting in making reference to or finding matters
in the Complaint.

2.      Portions of the Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law 93-579 Section
7, are not codified, but have been enacted and read as follows:

           ''(a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any Federal, State or local

    government agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or
    privilege provided by law because of such individual's refusal to
    disclose his social security account number.
  ''(2) the (The) provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection
    shall not apply with respect to -
         ''(A) any disclosure which is required by Federal statute, or
      ''(B) the disclosure of a social security number to any
Federal,    State, or local agency maintaining a system of records in
existence and operating before January 1, 1975, if such disclosure was
required under statute or regulation adopted prior to such date to
verify the identity of an individual.
 ''(b) Any Federal, State, or local government agency which
    requests an individual to disclose his social security account
    number shall inform that individual whether that disclosure is
    mandatory or voluntary, by what statutory or other authority such
    number is solicited, and what uses will be made of it.''

 Relevant to the present inquiry is that the grandfather's clause
exemption claimed by Thompson under (2)(B) applies only "if such
disclosure was required under statute or regulation adopted prior to
such date to verify the identity of an individual", meaning the State of
Tennessee or the Hamilton County Election Commission must show that in
fact they have so used voter's SSN's prior to January 1, 1975.
 But far more important is the fact that it appears the defendants may
be in error in relying on an exemption in the Privacy Act of 1974,
allowing the grandfathering of the collection of certain information
under the Privacy Act of 1974, and in further reliance on the 1976
Carter v. Dunn decision and the 1980 Tennessee Attorney General Opinion
80-384.
 It would appear that such reliance may be misplaced because the
plaintiff is relying solely on the Privacy Act of 1974, but is instead
the NVRA, which was enacted in 1993, meaning the Carter v. Dunn and any
1980 Tennessee Attorney's General opinion could not possibly have
considered the NVRA's prohibition on the collection of anything beyond
the minimum required information.  In fact the NVRA, as codified at 42
USC 1973gg-3(c)(2)(B) nowhere includes any reference to SSN, the Privacy
Act of 1974, or any "grandfather's clause" exemption.  Though the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 certainly predates the Carter v. Dunn decision and
Tennessee Attorney's General Opinion 80-384, the "grandfather's clause"
exemption of the Privacy Act of 1974 creates only an exemption to the
Privacy Act of 1974, and not to application of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.

3. TCA 2-2-127:
   Permanent registration records as public records shall be kept in a
safe place by the commission, shall be available for public inspection,
and may not be removed from the office of the commission except as
required for the performance of duties under this title or in compliance
with court orders.

4. While the defendants may show that they have not in fact disclosed
the SSN of any voter as such SSN is recorded in the voter registration
records, TCA 2-2-127 still requires such disclosure and such disclosure
could presumably be compelled by court order by anyone seeking such
information through use of TCA 2-2-127.  The mere fact that the
defendants might have an operational practice of violating TCA 2-2-127
is a very thin veneer of protection of disclosure of the SSN when TCA
2-2-127 clearly requires such disclosure.  The defendants essentially
take the position that they should not fall subject to the requirements
of 42 USC 1971 (a)(2)(B) (as addressed above in paragraph #13
hereinabove) because defendants have an expressed policy of flouting the
requirements of TCA 2-2-127, or at least doing so until they are
challenged in court and compelled to comply with TCA 2-2-127.

5. TCA 2-2-138: Voter registration lists - Purchase by citizens.
   (a) In counties of this state having a population in excess of one
hundred eighty thousand (180,000) according to the United States census
of 1970 or any subsequent United States census, or in any computerized
county, it is the duty of the commissioners of elections to prepare or
cause to be prepared each month a listing, by voting precinct, of all
persons registered to vote in each precinct during the preceding month.
However, in the discretion of the commissioners of elections, such
listing may be prepared on a bimonthly basis.
   (b) Such list, and any other voter registration information such as
voter history, if compiled, shall be available for purchase for a price
not to exceed the cost of production. The state election commission
shall establish a uniform cost for this information. Any county election
commission whose cost of production exceeds this rate may petition the
state election commission and be granted an increase upon establishing
its actual cost to the satisfaction of the state election commission. If
the information is provided on computer generated media such as disk,
diskette, tape, telecommunications or any other form of magnetic media,
then the information shall be provided in non-proprietary and
non-encrypted form. Minimum data standards shall be EBCDIC (Extended
Binary Coded Decimal Interchange Code), ASCII (American Standard Code
Information Interchange) or BCD (Binary Coded Decimal).

6.  Revelations: 13:16 He causes all, the small and the great, the rich
and the poor, and the free and the slave, to be given a mark on their
right hand, or on their forehead; 13:17 and that no one would be able to
buy or to sell, unless he has that mark, the name of the beast or the
number of his name.

7.  The plaintiff is a Roman Catholic, and the prevailing theological
belief among Christian scriptural scholars in general is that the
references in Revelations to "the beast" are in fact references to
government in general.  Roman Catholic theology instructs Roman
Catholics not to take references to the "mark" of the beast and the
"number of his name" as being literal references; such language is often
interpreted by some scriptural scholars as to mean a "universal
identifier", or a unique number issued by the "beast" (government)  to
individuals and required to be used as a condition of engaging in
commerce or other vital activities such as voting ("that no one would be
able to buy or sell," Revelations 13:17).  Plaintiff himself views the
language of Revelations to warn of government use of universal
identifiers as a condition to engaging in commerce or other vital
activities such as voting and he further views the SSN as such a
universal identifier.  Revelations further warns that  "If anyone
worships the beast and his image, and receives his mark on his forehead
or in his hand, he himself shall also drink of the wine of the wrath of
God.'" Revelations 14:9,10. The question of whether such belief is
"right" or not is purely a matter of faith and religious conviction and
not a matter which need be addressed by the Court, which need only
address the question of whether the defendant's practices unduly burden
the plaintiff's free exercise of religion under Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, L.Ed.2d (1963), and Thomas v. Review Board of
the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 US 707, 101 S Ct 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d.
624  (1981).

8.  An issue somewhat related to the present one, namely whether
citizens may be required to obtain or provide social security numbers as
a condition for receiving welfare benefits, has been considered on
numerous occasions by the federal courts.  In Stevens v. Berger, 428
F.Supp. 896 (EDNY 1977) the district court held that the plaintiff's
sincerely held religious beliefs outweighed the requirement that they
obtain social security numbers for their children in order to receive
welfare benefits.  The court applied a strict scrutiny test and
determined that while SSN's were an important tool in efforts to combat
welfare fraud the state did not discharge it's burden of demonstrating
that alternative measures, which would not conflict with plaintiff's
religious views, were unfeasible. id. at p. 907.
 A case which is similar to the instant matter is Leahy v. District of
Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046 (DC Cir 1987).  Leahy concerned a religious
objection to the requirement that individual's seeking to obtain a
driver's license in the District of Columbia supply their SSN.  The
plaintiff maintained that the mandatory use of SSN was for a type of
identifier which has "come to share many of the characteristics of the
mark of the beast".  Leahy, p. 1048, Book of Revelation, chapter 13,
verses 16-17.  The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint sua
sponte.
 The Court of Appeals, however, sided with the plaintiff in Leahy and
reversed the judgement of the District Court, in an opinion written by
now Justice Ginsburg.  The Court of Appeals held that in light of
plaintiff's claim that his religious freedom, as guaranteed by the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment, had been violated by the
municipal regulations of the District of Columbia, the District Court
had erred in not applying the compelling state interest test set forth
by the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, L.Ed.2d (1963), and Thomas v. Review Board of the
Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 US 707, 101 S Ct 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d. 624
(1981).  Under the compelling state interest test the Supreme Court has
held that it is incumbent upon the governmental entity to prove that a
regulatory scheme which impinges upon the free exercise of religion is
the least restrictive means of achieving the state's goals.
 In light of the District Court's failure to properly apply the
compelling state interest test the Court of Appeals in Leahy remanded
the matter for additional proceedings, including a determination that
the plaintiff was sincere in his religious belief and objection to the
requirement that he give his SSN.
 While a splintered Supreme Court ruled against a plaintiff in the 1986
case of Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), dealing with issues very
similar to the Circuit Court in Leahy v. District of Columbia, and while
Justice Burger wrote for the court in most of his Opinion and stated
that "`(T)he Government meets its burden when it demonstrates that a
challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in
its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public
interest.' Five Justices expressly rejected this argument in Roy. See
id., at 715-716 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part); id., at 728
(O'CONNOR, J., joined by BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., concurring in part
and
dissenting in part); id., at 733 (WHITE, J., dissenting). We reject the
argument again today." Hobbie .v Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla.,
480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).

9. The later decision of Employment Division, Oregon Department Of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), does not limit the
applicability of the other decisions cited here, because as Justice
Scalia noted in the majority opinion the Smith case dealt with conduct
prohibited by law and or belief, while in the cases of Sherbert v.
Verner, Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Indiana Employment Security Div., and
Hobbie v. employment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, "the conduct at issue...
was not prohibited by law."  In fact, the Scalia majority opinion in
Employment Division, Oregon Department Of Human Resources v. Smith, held
that "the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the
Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction
with other constitutional protections."  The Scalia majority opinion in
Employment Division, Oregon Department Of Human Resources v. Smith and
the concurrence of Justice O'Connor, both in the last paragraphs of the
respective sections I-A of their opinions, and also the dissent of
Justice Brennan (joined by the remaining Justices, Blackmun and
Marshall) in its second paragraph, make clear that in cases in which a
"hybrid" of constitutionally protected rights are at issue, then the
heightened scrutiny used in Wisconsin v. Yoder and in Sherbert v. Verner
is the proper test of the government action or policy at issue.




UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT
 EASTERN  DISTRICT  OF  TENNESSEE  AT  CHATTANOOGA
 *
MARTIN S. McKAY * CIVIL ACTION
 *
VERSUS * NO.
 *
BROOK THOMPSON, individually and as * SECTION:
 Coordinator of Elections *
 State of Tennessee * JUDGE
RILEY DARNELL *
 Secretary of State * JURY DEMAND
 State of Tennessee *
CAROLYN JACKSON, individually and as * INJUNCTIVE RELIEF &
 Administrator of Elections *  MONEY DAMAGES
 Hamilton County, Tennessee *
CLAUDE RAMSEY, as  *
 County Executive *
 Hamilton County, Tennessee *
 *
 *****************************************************************

 AFFIDAVIT OF JES BEARD

 Affiant Jes Beard, being more than eighteen (18) years of age, and
competent to attest to this Affidavit, and after being duly sworn hereby
states as follows:
  1) I am, and at all times relevant to the above referenced cause of
action have been, an attorney at law, licensed to practice in the State
of Tennessee and having my office at 737 Market St., Chattanooga,
Tennessee.
  2) On September 10, 1998, I spoke by phone with defendant Carolyn
Jackson, identifying myself as an attorney calling on behalf of Martin
McKay in an attempt to his dispute over registering to vote in some
manner avoiding litigation and at such time defendant Jackson stated
that she would not allow Martin McKay to register to vote without a SSN.

  3) Later during the day of September 10, 1998, still trying to resolve
this matter short of litigation, I spoke by phone with defendant with
Brook Thompson, identifying myself as an attorney calling on behalf of
Martin McKay; during such phone call defendant Thompson refused to
approve allowing Martin McKay or anyone else to register to vote without
disclosure of a SSN; during such phone call defendant Thompson contended
that prospective voters in Tennessee are required under T.C.A. 2-2-116
to provide SSN before any voter's registration can be considered
complete; during such phone call defendant Thompson further contended
that the practice of requiring a prospective voter to disclose his or
her SSN before a registration in accepted is "grandfathered" in under
the Privacy Act of 1974 and therefore not prohibited under the National
Voting Rights Act, because T.C.A. 2-2-116 was passed in 1972, and
because T.C.A. 2-2-116 required the collection of SSN prior to the time
the Privacy Act of 1974 prohibited requirements that prospective voters
disclose a SSN prior to voting.  Defendant Thompson further advised me
that an attorney from his office would call me back later during the day
to direct me to the specific authority for his position.
  4) Later during the day of September 10, 1998, a woman identifying
herself as attorney Beth Henry Robertson in Thompson's called me and
stated the position of defendant Thompson's office is that the State of
Tennessee is exempt from either the restrictions of the NVRA  on the
collection of unnecessary information or the restrictions of the Privacy
Act of 1974, and that the defendants can deny Martin McKay his right to
voter without his disclosure of his SSN for the following reasons: the
voter's registration form used by the State of Tennessee discloses the
authority for the requirement of providing SSN at the time of
registering to vote; the SSN is required under Tennessee statute and
such requirement and practice existed prior to January 1, 1975; the
unpublished Tennessee Appellate Court opinion of Carter v. Dunn, decided
on or about December 3, 1976; and 1980 Tennessee Attorney's General
Opinion # 80- 384.
 Further Affiant saith not
      Jes Beard, attorney for plaintiff

      ___________________________
      737 Market St., Suite 601
      Chattanooga, TN   37402
       (423) 267-4391
STATE OF TENNESSEE
COUNTY OF HAMILTON
 Personally appeared before me, the undersigned NOTARY PUBLIC in and for
the State and County above, the within named to me known or by
satisfactory evidence proven to be the person named in the aforesaid
instrument, and acknowledged that he executed the aforesaid instrument
for the reasons and purposes therein contained.

This 12th day of October, 1998.


      NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:







UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT
 EASTERN  DISTRICT  OF  TENNESSEE  AT  CHATTANOOGA
 *
MARTIN S. McKAY * CIVIL ACTION
 *
VERSUS * NO.
 *
BROOK THOMPSON, individually and as * SECTION:
 Coordinator of Elections *
 State of Tennessee * JUDGE
RILEY DARNELL *
 Secretary of State * JURY DEMAND
 State of Tennessee *
CAROLYN JACKSON, individually and as * INJUNCTIVE RELIEF &
 Administrator of Elections *  MONEY DAMAGES
 Hamilton County, Tennessee *
CLAUDE RAMSEY, as  *
 County Executive *
 Hamilton County, Tennessee *
 *
 *****************************************************************

 AFFIDAVIT OF MARTIN McKAY

 The complainant, Martin S. McKay, being more than eighteen (18) years
of age, and competent to attest to this Affidavit, and after being duly
sworn hereby states as follows:
  1) I am a resident of and domiciled in the County of Hamilton, State
of Tennessee, and am in all ways required under the law of the State of
Tennessee as set forth in TCA qualified to vote.
  2) On Sunday, June 21, 1998, during a voter registration drive at St.
Stephen Catholic Church, I attempted to register to vote and at such
time individuals representing the Hamilton County Election Commission
advised me that my Social Security Number (SSN) was required before I
could register to vote; because of this, and the fact that disclosing my
SSN in such a manner would be contrary to my religious beliefs,
plaintiff declined to complete the application.
  3) On Tuesday, June 30, 1998, while obtaining a Tennessee license at
the Driver License Testing Center, I could have registered to vote but
again declined because the SSN was required.
  4) On Wednesday, July 29, 1998, I went to the office of the Hamilton
County Election Commission and when I attempted to register, employees
of the Election Commission advised that my SSN would be required before
I could register; I objected and was provided with a copy of page 1 of
Tennessee Attorney General opinion number 84-504 stating that the State
is allowed to require SSN to register to vote.  A copy of the one page
of the Tennessee Attorney General opinion so provided is attached, as
well as is a single page document given to me at the same time, such
document bearing the heading of "SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER FOR VOTER
REGISTRATION IN TENNESSEE."
  5) On Monday, August 10, 1998, I returned to the office of the
Hamilton County Election Commission and spoke with defendant Carolyn
Jackson, Administrator of Elections, and advised her that I had
prevailed in litigation on this issue in Louisiana but she still refused
to allow me to register to vote unless I disclosed my SSN in the
application.  At that time I filed out an Application for Voter
Registration as attached but such application was rejected for the
stated reason of my refusal to include my SSN on the Application.
  6) On Monday, August 17, 1998, I notified defendant Brook Thompson,
Coordinator of Elections, as he is the "Chief Election Official" for the
State of Tennessee, of said violation pursuant to 42 USC 1973gg 9(b); a
copy of my notice to defendant Thompson documenting these events is
attached.
  7) On the afternoon of Monday, August 17, 1998, I spoke with defendant
Brook Thompson by phone to confirm that he received said notification by
facsimile and he confirmed same.
  8) On Thursday, September 3, 1998, I received notification from the
Hamilton County Elections Board that my application to register to vote
had been rejected (copy attached).
  9) I am a Roman Catholic and disclosing my SSN as a condition of
voting would violate my religious convictions.
  10) I desire to vote in the upcoming elections in November of 1998.
 Further Affiant saith not
      ___________________________
      Martin McKay
STATE OF TENNESSEE
COUNTY OF HAMILTON
 Personally appeared before me, the undersigned NOTARY PUBLIC in and for
the State and County above, the within named to me known or by
satisfactory evidence proven to be the person named in the aforesaid
instrument, and acknowledged that he executed the aforesaid instrument
for the reasons and purposes therein contained.

This 12th day of October, 1998.


      NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:


--
Jes Beard, Attorney at Law, 737 Market Street, Suite 601
Chattanooga, TN 37402-4820  423/267-4391/267-4394(fax)
jesbeard@usa.net