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(1)Wednesday, 28TH June 2000 [Open session] [The witness entered court]
--- Upon commencing at 9.35 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning to the technical booth, to the interpreters. I see they're all there. Good morning to the court reporters, legal assistants, Madam Lawyer, Mr. Harmon, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Cayley; good (10)morning, Mr. Petrusic and Mr. Visnjic; good morning, General Krstic; good morning, Witness. Mr. Richard Butler, good morning to you. We are all assembled to continue with the proceedings. Let me remind you are continuing under oath. You will still be answering questions put to you by Mr. McCloskey. (15)Mr. McCloskey, your witness. You may continue. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed] • EXAMINED by Mr. McCloskey: [Cont'd] MR. McCLOSKEY: I will start off by reminding myself and (20)Mr. Butler about the pace, that we need to keep it slow and steady. I believe we left off -- if you could put OTP Exhibit 424 on the ELMO. That is the list of some of the main players from the VRS Main Staff, some of the units of the Main Staff, and some of the Ministry of Interior people.
• Q.: And if you could just start from the top and give us, like you did
(25)yesterday, just a little background on each of the folks and where they
• A.: The first name on the list, General Ratko Mladic, of course, is
the Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS. We see him in that context.
He shows up at the Srebrenica area on 10 July 1995. We see his presence
(5)in Potocari. We see his presence up and around the road along the
Bratunac-Konjevic Polje highway through 12 July and 13 July.
The next person, Lieutenant Colonel General Milan Gvero.
He is the Main Staff Assistant Commander for Morale, Legal, and Religious
Affairs. He is referred to in several messages on both the 8th of July,
(10)1995 and on the 10th of July, 1995 related to Srebrenica. We don't have
any physical sightings of him in and around the area.
Colonel Radislav Jankovic is an officer assigned to the Main
Intelligence Administration of the Main Staff of the VRS. We note his
presence in the meetings between the VRS, the Dutch, and Muslim
(15)representatives in Potocari on the 11th and the 12th. We further note his
involvement dealing with the issue of the transportation of the Muslim
population from Potocari, and we'll see his involvement also in the
following days, the 13th and the 14th, in dealing with issues pertaining
to wounded Muslims held or at the Bratunac military -- or at the medical
(20)facility. I'm sorry.
The next individual is Colonel Ljubisa Beara. He is the head of
the Main Staff, Main Security Administration. We see his involvement
starting as early as the 13th and the 14th and subsequent days. He's
responsible for many of the aspects of the movements of male Muslims out
(25)of the Bratunac area where they were held to the main execution sites in
• Q.: Mr. Butler, I just want to correct one thing for the record. (5)Under Mandeljev Mane Dzuric, I believe we have spelled his name incorrectly. We have left out the diacritic on the "D" there. There should be a slash across that "D", just for the record. • A.: The last two individuals, also members of the Ministry of the Interior, however, they're municipal police individuals. They're not (10)associated with the Special Police Brigade. The first one is Dragomir Vasic, who is the chief of the Zvornik police department. And when I say that, as the police department, that is not just encompassing the actual city of Zvornik, but it's the general CSB of Zvornik. It's a regional police area which includes Srebrenica. (15)And the final name is Mane Dzuric who is the Deputy Police Chief of that same area. • Q.: Can you tell us a little bit more about the difference between the MUP Special Police and the MUP Municipal Police, especially as it may regard to that law we reviewed yesterday about using MUP outfits in (20)combat?
• A.: Dealing with the municipal police aspect first, their functions
and roles are traditional police and law enforcement type of functions:
investigations, traffic control, criminal protection, those type of
aspects. At times, those municipal police officers are involved in combat
(25)operations, but very rarely and not as very large, organised units per
• Q.: You mentioned the term paramilitary. Now, there is perhaps an (15)historical Bosnian connotation to this term, paramilitary. Does that apply, can you tell us -- clear up that issue for us about how paramilitary is used in Bosnia and whether the MUP units resemble that in any way?
• A.: The MUP units that we're talking about, the Special Police
(20)Brigade, are bona fide members of the armed forces of the Republika
Srpska. They are not in any way a paramilitary irregular formation that
is normally associated within the Bosnian context. This is a codified
legal unit established under the command of the government, the Ministry
of the Interior to be exact, and by law it is a part of the armed forces.
(25)So it is an organisation that operates within the framework of the RS law.
• A.: In my sense when I discussed the issue of a paramilitary, that is a unit that is operating outside the legal framework of the laws which (5)establish the army, the laws which establish the military interior units, and things of that nature. Paramilitaries within that context of the Bosnian conflict were operating outside of that law and outside of military control. In this aspect, in 1995, with the Ministry of the Interior units, they're operating within the context of the legal (10)framework of the government of Republika Srpska. JUDGE RIAD: Which means that the paramilitary are not under military control, they're on their own? • A.: In the period context of 1995, sir, there were no paramilitaries as we understand them in the previous course of the years. I don't feel (15)I'm qualified to be able to answer the issue of paramilitaries in 1992 and 1993. That's not necessarily my field of expertise, sir. JUDGE RIAD: 1995? • A.: In 1995, sir, relative to Srebrenica, we see no activity which in any way, shape, or form we can say belongs to any paramilitary formation. (20)All of the formations that were involved in that operation were under the command and control of either the army forces or other entities of the Republika Srpska government. We don't see any formations of that nature operating outside of that control. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. (25)
MR. McCLOSKEY:
• A.: No, sir. Looking at the volumes of material, documents, orders, things of that nature, I'm not able to substantiate any presence of any of those criminal organisations or paramilitaries at Srebrenica in 1995. • Q.: Okay. Let's go on to a different area now that we've set the (10)scene. Let's go to the period of time between March of 1995 and July, early July right before the operation at the enclave occurred. Can you give us a brief background of the military situation of those months, and then we'll get into some of the particular documents that you have referred to. (15)
• A.: In the larger context of early 1995, to set the framework for the
military operation, the general military strategy of the Republika Srpska
at this point in time is best described as being on the strategic
defence. The government of the entity for the most part had achieved all
of the territorial gains that it had wanted and was, for the most part,
(20)conducting military operations, not for the gaining of additional
territory, but to set the framework for a negotiated peace which would
allow them to achieve their war aims.
They realised in the context of looking at the material that came
out at that time, that 1995 would be for them a decisive year in the
(25)conflict. They were just coming off of, in the January and February time
• Q.: All right. Well, let's go to that very interesting document. It's Exhibit 425. If you could put the front of that on the ELMO. Tell us just briefly about this front page and then -- and how we got the document. (10) • A.: The front page of this document is the cover letter or memorandum passing it down from the Main Staff to, in this case, the command of the 1st Krajina Corps. This document and many of the other corps-level documents that we'll see in the next few days were obtained when the Office of the Prosecutor searched the offices or searched the headquarters (15)of the 1st Corps of the army of the Republika Srpska pursuant to a search warrant in January of 1998. • Q.: All right. Let's go to the next page then, the -- what is marked as page 2 in the English translation, but it's the first page of this document which is referred to as "Operations Number 7," dated March 8th. (20)Who signs this document? • A.: At the end, this document is signed by President Radovan Karadzic as the President of the republic and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
• Q.: And before I get into some of the specifics of the document, this
(25)is -- Karadzic is doing what in sending out this document and who is he
• A.: This document, as you can tell from the paragraph, is essentially sent out to the major army commands, and within this framework, this is the political guidance to the army for the broad conduct of the war for (5)the next series of months. • Q.: All right. Then I would like to take the Court and counsel to the section that is specifically addressed to the Drina Corps, and I want to read briefly a section here because I think it's a very important session, and I will try to keep it slow. It's page 10 of the English translation, (10)but it's under the "Drina Corps" heading. In any other translation you will see that each of the corps has a various heading on it. I will go down to the Drina Corps section: "Enemy breakthroughs along selected operative tactical lines should be prevented by extremely persistent and active defence in (15)cooperation with part of the forces of the SRK on the north-west part of the war front and around the enclaves. As many enemy forces as possible should be tied down by diversionary and active combat operations on the north-west part of the front using operational and tactical camouflage measures." (20)Now, that part of it, Mr. Butler, that sounds like a military directive in nature; is that correct? • A.: That is correct, sir.
• Q.: Let me continue reading:
"While in the direction of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves,
(25)complete physical separation of Srebrenica from Zepa should be carried out
• A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Now, I want to direct the Court's attention to what is now page 4. It's under paragraph 6, "Support for Combat Operations". It's page (10)14 on the English version, paragraph 6.1, "Moral and Psychological Support." Again, I would direct your attention, Mr. Butler, to the fourth paragraph, which should be highlighted. Can you tell us what this paragraph is basically saying? (15) • A.: Essentially what this paragraph is doing is directing the relevant state and military organs, most probably in this aspect the security and intelligence organs, to put together and basically execute a plan to block the UNPROFOR and to block the International Community from adequately supplying the enclaves, to restrict the UN's movement, to essentially (20)create all of the conditions for not supplying the enclaves and to cutting off all physical communication, but more so doing it in a way where it's not seen as obviously obstructing the process. It's just to tie it up to such a point where -- through almost a bureaucratic process to achieve the military goals. (25)
JUDGE WALD: Could I ask you one question, Mr. Butler?
JUDGE WALD: Sorry to interrupt. I won't do it very often, but it would help me at this point in light of what you said previously, that is that the impetus in early 1995 was a shortage on the part of the VRS of (5)military manpower, as it were, and they didn't -- they were worried about what was necessary to keep the enclaves -- to keep the military aspects of the Muslim population in the enclaves. What would have been the strategic advantage to them at this point of getting rid of all the civilians by evacuation or any other possible means? I mean how would that have fitted (10)into this strategic -- of just getting as happened, just getting rid of all the inhabitants as opposed to just, you know, cutting down the need for military? • A.: In theory, if you were to remove the military threat, I couldn't envision a strategic advantage or disadvantage for the RS. What happens (15)after the fact is by depopulating Srebrenica, in turn, as part of the Dayton agreements, many Serbs displaced from Sarajevo move there, but at this point in time, they don't know that yet. JUDGE WALD: All right. Thanks. MR. McCLOSKEY: (20) • Q.: Just briefly on that same vein, did Muslim civilians pose a great threat to the Serb army? • A.: Muslim civilians per se should not have posed a great threat to the Serb army or the army of Republika Srpska, to be more accurate.
• Q.: Thank you. All right. Let's go to the last page of that document
(25)where we have the signature of the Supreme Commander, and I note the point
(5) • A.: Just like every military organisation, for the most part there's a standard reporting process, which is the mechanism by which senior commanders use to ensure two things. The first that their orders and directives are, in fact, being carried out; and second, to keep them aware of the status of all of their subordinate formations. Not just from an (10)operational point of view per se, but even for routine administrative things such as fuel usage, logistics, casualties, things of that nature. So when you look at these reporting requirements, they are, in fact, codified throughout the entire VRS. Battalions had a fixed reporting chain to the brigade levels; the brigade level had a fixed (15)reporting chain up to the corps command; the corps command had a fixed reporting chain to the Main Staff; and the Main Staff had a fixed reporting chain and network to the supreme command, the Ministry of Defence. So this was more or less an unbroken chain where information is passed from lower to higher so the decision-makers in the army at the (20)political level could make, you know, the best informed decisions that they had to. • Q.: All right. Let's go on to the implementation of this directive, and our next exhibit, 426. Could you just tell us what this is and what it's about? (25)
• A.: This is Main Staff -- this is, of course, the cover letter, but
• Q.: And this is signed by General Mladic. • A.: In this instance, the cover letter is signed by General Milovanovic, the Deputy Chief of the Main Staff. (10) • Q.: But at the end of the -- • A.: At the end of the document it is, in fact, signed by General Mladic. • Q.: Okay. What's the first -- can you tell us briefly how the Drina Corps is responding, how you can tell they're responding from the (15)documents to these two directives?
• A.: As based on these broad directives and the more specified ones
coming from the Main Staff, the next series of that is at the point of
time of execution, the Drina Corps itself will put together the series of
operations orders and operations plans to do that.
(20)The first manifestation that we see in that is a series of
military operations which occur in early June of 1995, one of them that
results in the capture of a UN checkpoint south of Srebrenica and the
takeover of Zeleni Jadar. Those military operations in June create the
conditions for the next stage, which will be larger scale military
(25)operations against the Srebrenica enclave in July.
• A.: The first document that we have is a 2 July preparatory order from the command of the Drina Corps to units of the Drina Corps, instructing (5)them to start conducting the planning aspects and the gathering of the necessary military forces for military operations in the zone of the Drina Corps. • Q.: Could you take that July 2nd document, Exhibit 427, and put it on the ELMO. (10)This is a document that is by Major General Milenko Zivanovic as Commander of the Drina Corps; is that correct? • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: And paragraph 2 on the front page it says: "Based on directives OP number 7 and 7/1 of the RS army." (15) • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Those are the two directives that we've just heard about. Now, since this is the first document we have from the Drina Corps, can you tell us about, up in the left-hand corner, the numbering system? We see a numbering system that says "Strictly confidential, 01/04-156." What (20)significance is that number as you've been able to make out in your study?
• A.: In this aspect, the way that the series of numbers worked was that
the first series of numbers, in this case 01/04, designated the staff
organ that was primarily responsible for the creation of the document.
(25)The second number, -156, is a broad category of documents or orders which
• Q.: Can you, by knowing that specific prefix number 01, identify whether or not the Commander -- the person was a Commander at the time or Chief of Staff or some other job? • A.: Because we have so few of the documents and the documents that we (15)do have with this aspect on the signature don't show a pattern, I can't say that 01, in fact, equals Commander in the sense of the documents or that 02 equals the Chief of Staff or 03 equals somebody else. It is close, but by virtue of the lack of number of documents, I can't say that definitively. (20) • Q.: All right. We'll get to that issue again when we get to some other documents. Now, this document 427, where would the Chief of Staff -- what kind of role would he be playing in these initial planning stages?
• A.: Clearly by position as the Chief of Staff, being the individual
(25)who manages and coordinates the entire planning process, he would be
• Q.: And on page 2 of that document, paragraph 4, the deadline for (10)forming all above-mentioned units is 2 July 1995? • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: And the forward command post is to be in operation on 4 July 1995. That's in paragraph 5. • A.: Yes, sir. (15) • Q.: Okay. Now can we get to Exhibit 428, the actual formal operation plan for the takedown of the Srebrenica enclave, and can you tell us about that, and what role you would expect General Krstic to have played in that development of this plan?
• A.: As the preparatory order alerts units to be prepared to conduct
(20)combat operations and to make moves accordingly, this is what I refer to
as the base operations plan, that being, this is the order which lays out
in detail the actual military operation, code named Krivaja-95, against
the Srebrenica enclave. As in the case of the planning or preparatory
order, as the Chief of Staff, General Krstic would have been very deeply
(25)involved in the actual production of this operations order. I mean, this
• Q.: In developing this order, would General Krstic and his staff and General Zivanovic make specific reference to the directive 7, and 7/1? • A.: I don't believe in this order they did specifically. It might be (5)in here. I don't recall at the moment. • Q.: Okay. Well, let me direct you to page 3 and paragraph 2. • A.: Clearly it, in fact, references both of those orders, yes, sir. • Q.: And does it basically lay out the objective of the plan? • A.: The order does lay out the objective of the plan very clearly. (10) • Q.: And what is that? • A.: The objective of the plan as written is to reduce the Srebrenica enclave to the physical area of the urban city of Srebrenica. • Q.: Okay. And for the record, I'll just read briefly, beginning in the middle of paragraph 2. "The task of carrying out offensive activities (15)with free forces deep in the Drina Corps zone as soon as possible in order to split apart the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica and to reduce them to their urban areas." Now, in your opinion, what does the term "reduce the enclaves to their urban areas" mean? (20) • A.: Essentially to push the boundaries of the enclaves to the town of Srebrenica -- or in this case for Srebrenica, to push it into Srebrenica proper, the physical boundaries of the city or town. • Q.: And what would that mean where the people of the outer -- of the enclave would be? (25)
• A.: Essentially for many of the people living in the surrounding area,
• Q.: And you've seen the July 10th video of all the many hundreds and (5)hundreds of people crowded into the urban area of Srebrenica on July 10th? • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: So in your view, do the objectives in this Krivaja-95 plan mirror any of the objectives of Radovan Karadzic in his directive number 7? • A.: They follow well into sequence essentially what the plan is, is to (10)create the conditions for the UN and the international community to evacuate the enclave. • Q.: And I would point out middle of paragraph 4, page 3, under "objective": "By a surprise attack, to separate and reduce in size the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, to improve the tactical position of the (15)forces in the depth of the area, and to create conditions for the elimination of the enclaves." Now, let's go further on in this report. Does the report designate the various units that are to take part in this plan? • A.: Yes, sir, it does. (20)
• Q.: And could you go to page 5, which is sort of the end of the list
after it lists various Drina Corps Brigades such as the Milici Brigade and
the Bratunac Brigade and the Zvornik Brigade, there's a section about
reserves in the middle of the page, and let me read this. "Reserve forces
of a size of two or three companies of the MUP and one company from the
(25)first Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade."
• A.: By doctrine, and in this sense not just the doctrine of the former JNA and VRS, but by most military doctrines a reserve force is an (5)established and dedicated force for the Commander to use to, one, deal with any unanticipated military situation, or for a lesser role, to be able to deal with an unanticipated success like a breakthrough or an exploitation. Generally speaking, though, the primary role is they're, (10)they're -- in a sense they belong directly to the Commander for him to use for any unanticipated requirement. No other person within the corps, per se, can deploy them without the Commander's approval. • Q.: Okay, that's generally to reserve forces. Now specifically, what are the reserve forces for the Drina Corps operation Krivaja-95 as you (15)understand it? • A.: Based on this operations order, the reserve forces are identified as two or three companies of the MUP and one company of the Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade. • Q.: Are you able to make out whether this is a MUP Special Police or (20)MUP Municipal Police from this order? • A.: I would say that clearly in this case we're referring to the MUP Special Police forces. • Q.: Why?
• A.: For the most part, the municipal police aren't organised in
(25)traditional combat company sense. It wouldn't make sense to refer to the
• Q.: What do you make of this, this phrase, "reserve forces of a size (5)of two or three companies"? That's not very specific. It doesn't seem to be finalised. What do you make of that? • A.: Looking at this in context, what we're seeing here is at a minimum, at the time this order is published, that the command of the Drina Corps understands that at a minimum, there are now two companies of (10)the MUP Special Forces that have been resubordinated to them and that will operate under their control. They're anticipating perhaps getting a third company, but they don't know that yet, for whatever reason. Either it's not available or there are other commitments. So essentially, they're designating these units as their reserve. (15)They know, of course, they have the company of the Vlasenica Brigade. • Q.: So based on Krivaja-95, this order in front of us, who would these MUP units be under the command of? • A.: In this case, they'd be directly under the command of the Corps Commander, the Drina Corps Commander. (20) • Q.: And at this time that would have been -- • A.: General Zivanovic. • Q.: And in your opinion, would the rule regarding using MUP Special Police in combat operations had to have been invoked in order to use MUP in the way that it's anticipated in this order? (25)
• A.: Yes. And in fact, we know that in mid-June of 1995, President
• Q.: Now, let's go to page 7 and to the highlighted section mentioning that, "Security organs and military police will indicate the areas for (5)gathering and securing prisoners of war and war booty." Is that usual? • A.: Yes, sir. That is a standard security organ and military police function. • Q.: And I would also note the order mentions that they will be dealing with prisoners of war in the civilian population, to behave in every way (10)in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Now, we have seen the Main Staff directives -- excuse me, the President Kardic directives, the Main Staff implementing orders, a Drina Corps orders implementing it. Do we have a brigade order to show us that you can talk about also implementing this plan? (15)And if you could go to Exhibit 429, and we don't need to go through this in detail, but if you could just tell us briefly what this is. • A.: What this document is, again, based off of the preparatory order of the Drina Corps, this is the order of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade that (20)it issued to its own formations to organise itself for combat operations. It, again, references the Drina Corps order, and in very specific detail designates all of the military things which have to occur, when they have to occur by, and very clearly designates the command chain for the military organisation as it deploys to Srebrenica. (25)
• Q.: And do these series of orders show a normal chain of command
• A.: In a broad sense, the series -- the last four series of orders or the last five series of orders we've seen demonstrates a standard practice within almost any army where you see orders coming from the political (5)leadership, and how they manifest themselves down from the highest levels to the lowest levels, from the strategic echelon to the tactical echelon. MR. McCLOSKEY: And at this point I would direct the Court to another exhibit that was originally a video, but I believe you've seen that video, so I don't think we need to play it. I will just briefly give (10)you the very short transcript of it, and I can read that. It's an interview of President Kardic we believe in August of 1995. THE REGISTRAR: Can we have the number of the exhibit of this video, please? MR. McCLOSKEY: I've just been informed that that video has not (15)been played, but it's number 99, but I don't think we need to see President Kardic's face. Let me just read you what he said and we'll provide that video as an exhibit if you need to see it. It's also being undertitled at the moment, so we hope to give you some videos for your review with subtitling. (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, I think it is Exhibit 430, is it not?
MR. McCLOSKEY: That is the transcript is 430, and the video is
99. And as you have that in front of you, I'll just, for the record, read
it. It's very short. And this, again, is President Kardic on a news
(25)interview on RSTV. "We wanted to turn Mladic into a legend and we did for
JUDGE WALD: I just have one question, I'm sorry. (10)Mr. Butler, I'm still having trouble -- this is sort of a follow-up of the last question. Within the limits of your report and the information that you analyse, you said that, at least in reading parts of Exhibit 328, that reducing the size which they said was there of the enclaves, and reducing the communication between them or reducing the size (15)of them, would end up making the UN either evacuate its role there or stop making it a safe enclave, and I haven't figured out what the logic of that is. I mean, in other words, if they got them down, and I know that meant they might attack or engage some of the outlying DutchBat posts, but (20)why would reducing them, the enclave to a smaller size, necessarily mean the UN would get out of making it a safe enclave? • A.: In that respect, what you have to do is go back to the situation which first created the enclave. JUDGE WALD: Yes, I'm familiar with that. (25)
• A.: Again, in this sense, the VRS looked at the Srebrenica enclave and
JUDGE WALD: I understand. • A.: What they wanted to do, in essence, is by compressing all of the (5)people into the urban area, essentially force, because of a humanitarian crisis similar to what occurred in 1993, the UN to give up on the concept of the safe area, in particular that one, and evacuate the population. JUDGE WALD: Okay, thank you. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So we're going to have a break (10)of 20 minutes. --- Recess taken at 10:39 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. McCloskey. You may continue, please. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: Mr. Butler, before we get to the attack on Srebrenica, I want you to make one point very clear. Was the objective, the initial objective of Krivaja-95, to take the entire enclave or just reduce it to its urban areas? (20) • A.: Based on the operations order for Krivaja-95 and the preceding documents, it's clear that the objective was not to take the city of Srebrenica as the initial objective.
• Q.: Now, could you briefly summarise the situation, beginning with the
attack on Srebrenica and how that led to the fall and the deportation.
(25)Again, very briefly so we just get the high points, and then we'll go
• A.: I think the easiest way to do this is if I could use the map, sir. Thank you. (5)The operation, as it is specified in the operations order for Krivaja-95, kicked off on schedule with the major effort of the army of the Republika Srpska coming in from the south along the road towards Srebrenica. The units of the Drina Corps that we saw involved there, both as part of the operations plan and in the subsequent videos, reflect the (10)fact that the Drina Wolves, subordinate to 1st Zvornik Brigade, were present, as well as other Zvornik Brigade assets, specifically tanks and armoured personnel carriers. We see elements of at least company light battalion strength from the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, another Drina Corps asset. In that (15)case, also tanks. We see elements of the 1st Birac Brigade, another Drina Corps asset involved. We see elements of the 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade. And the main thrust of the attack for most of the units is pushing up south towards -- from the south towards the north towards the Jadar River in an effort to push the Muslims out of this area right here (20)within the enclave, known as the Bandera Triangle. The army of Republika Srpska views this area as the stronghold reserve of the 28th Division and the area where they believe that the division will try to defend from the most. It is very hilly and rugged terrain.
• Q.: And for the record, we need to point out that the area you pointed
(25)to was in the south-western of the enclave. Thank you. Continue.
• Q.: Can you point as best as you can where the enclave of Zepa would be if there was a map there?
• A.: I believe the enclave of Zepa would be in this area right here • Q.: Okay. • A.: Because when you look at the main access of advance, one, from Krivace down, and the smaller access from this area known as Bracan towards this direction. (25)
• Q.: Would that be within 10 to 20 kilometers of the southern part of
• A.: I think it roughly comes out about 10 to 15 kilometers, yes, sir. • Q.: And Krivace was the initial forward command post for the Drina Corps for the Zepa operation? (5) • A.: Yes, sir, it was. • Q.: Can you give us a little summary of the commanders, where they were, and then we'll go over the documents that help us show that, from the early period as we work into the Potocari deportation?
• A.: At the beginning of the operation, the Drina Corps forward command
(10)post overseeing the operation was established in the village of
Pribicevac, which when you look at -- it doesn't show on the map, but when
you look at the mountainous terrain, it offers a fairly down-the-valley,
clear line of sight to most of the operation. It was an established
command post for several years; it was a logical place to put it. That is
(15)where during the conduct of the operation, the actual takedown of the
enclave, General Krstic and the command staff of the Drina Corps in that
case, or the command group would be a better word, not command staff,
operated and coordinated the entire operation.
The other commanders involved, Lieutenant Colonel Vinko
(20)Pandurevic, the Commander of the elements of the Zvornik Brigade; Colonel
Mirko Trivic, the Commander of the elements of the Romanija Brigade;
Colonel Svetozar Andric, the Commander of the 1st Birac Infantry Brigade,
all were operating generally along this road and as evidenced, would come
from time to time either to the command post at Pribicevac, or would
(25)receive instructions from the command post down to their units. But for
• Q.: Mr. Butler, aside from the testimony of Drazen Erdemovic, do you have any credible indications of the 10th Diversionary Unit, the Main (15)Staff unit, taking part in this operation at some point? • A.: When we look at the video coverage that was done by the both military and Republika Srpska civil news authorities, particularly one clip showing General Mladic, General Zivanovic, and General Krstic entering the town of Srebrenica on the 11th of July, one of the first (20)checkpoints that they pass at the beginning of the town is, in fact, manned by soldiers of the 10th Diversionary Unit.
• Q.: Okay, if you could have a seat. I think we'll go over some of the
documents upon which your briefing was based, and at least in the initial
documents and material, I want to focus your attention on the roles of
(25)General Krstic and the other high command.
• A.: Essentially, this order or document is in response to complaints made by UNPROFOR Command over combat activities in which Dutch members of the UN were being shot at. Clearly they had complained, that complaint had gone through the Main Staff, and this is the manifestation of that (10)back to the command -- or the forward command post of the Drina Corps. • Q.: And from this document, can you conclude or provide your opinion where you believe General Krstic is, where General Zivanovic is when he sends this, or where he ought to be? • A.: Looking at the header information at the top of the document, I (15)conclude that General Zivanovic is at the main command post in Vlasenica at the time that this document is authored, and that General Krstic is at the forward command post in Pribicevac. • Q.: Can you make out anything on the role of General Gvero in this, where he might be? (20) • A.: In this specific document, General Gvero is not mentioned. • Q.: Okay. We'll be getting to General Gvero. • A.: Okay.
• Q.: Now, if you could go up into the left-hand corner again, and I
just want to go to these numbers again. Can you make out from this
(25)numbering, 04, whether that tells us anything about who wrote this
• A.: Again, in the series of numbers, it's unclear. Certainly when you read the actual context of this document, it would read in context that this was something or a document directly authored by the Commander of the (5)Drina Corps to his Chief of Staff. However, in the prefix number again, 04, that would not link up to the number that we would expect to see based on a pattern of 01. So again, this is the difficulty that -- I have in being able to conclude that 01 is definitively from the Commander, 02 from somebody else, 03 from somebody else within that context of 01 to 04. I (10)can conclude what it came out of somewhere involved with either the operations or the command organs, but I can't say specifically. The second number, the 156, middle series, as described before, the 156 series were those orders and directives related to the Krivaja-95 and, initially, preparatory order number 1. (15)And the last suffix again, 5, indicates it is the fifth order or fifth document produced related to the 156 series. • Q.: General Krstic, he's present at the forward command post. What would you expect his leadership role as Chief of Staff would be? What would be involved in here on this day of July 8th, two days after the (20)attack had started on Srebrenica? • A.: At this point in time, based on his rank and based on his position, he is, in effect, commanding the military operation against the Srebrenica enclave. He is controlling the tactical forces on the ground.
• Q.: Okay. Let's go to the next exhibit, 432, which is from the Main
(25)Staff of the army, dated July 9th, authored by Tolimir, Zdravko Tolimir.
• A.: As I indicated earlier, and going back to the theme that the original objective was not the actual takeover of Srebrenica, what this (15)demonstrates is that based on the success of the military operation to date, that the president of the republic, as the Supreme Commander, has authorised the goals to be further set to now take over the town of Srebrenica. • Q.: And from this document are you able to glean anything about the (20)role of General Krstic? • A.: Again looking at who the message is addressed to, understanding that the message comes directly from the Main Staff, General-Major Tolimir, again the awareness that as far as the Main Staff is concerned, the individual on the ground running the operation is General Krstic. (25)
• Q.: How do you tell that from the document?
• Q.: Now we have General Gvero. What can you make of his presence, on this document? (5) • A.: This part is, for me, analytically speaking, an unanswered question. We have no physical evidence or we have no other information either from sightings or from any other aspect of our information that indicates that General Gvero was physically on the ground at Srebrenica or at the forward command post. (10)There are a lot of ways to read this. I mean, he could, in fact, be there and this is the only indication that we have of it, and I cannot confirm that, or that this message was sent to him at the Main Staff for his benefit as well. But the short answer is, relative to General Gvero, I don't know. (15) • Q.: All right. Let's continue and go to the next document, 433, which is from the command of the Bratunac Brigade and dated 10 July, the next day. It's called a daily combat report. Before getting into the substance of this, can you tell us about what a daily combat report is for the brigade level? (20)
• A.: As we discussed earlier relative to the aspect of a formalised
reporting process, these daily combat reports represent how the brigades
passed the relevant information to the next higher level for them, their
superior command, the command of the Drina Corps. Every unit published
one of these reports every day as a minimum. That is called the daily
(25)one. Should situations or circumstances dictate additional reports, we'll
(5) • Q.: Okay. What's the essence of what this report tells us about the command group? • A.: What this report tells us is that in relation to the three at the brigade command, that the Brigade Commander physically locates him in the area of the 3rd Battalion, the Chief of Staff in the area of the (10)1st Battalion, the rest of the commanding officers of the Bratunac Brigade, you know, are where they're supposed to be in accordance with the plan. It further notes the physical presence of General Mladic for the first time; General Zivanovic, also for the first time; and General Krstic in the zone in the area of the 1st Bratunac Infantry Brigade. (15)So from a chronological perspective, 10 July 1995 is the first indication that both General Mladic and General Zivanovic show up in the zone of the Bratunac Brigade specifically related to the conduct of the military operations ongoing. MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. And I would note for the Judges, (20)paragraph 5, just to highlight this to you, this says: "Streten Petrovic, son of Ilija, Deputy Commander of the" -- I believe that's the "3rd Battalion" -- • A.: 3rd Infantry Batallion.
MR. McCLOSKEY: -- "suffered serious injuries in the thigh and the
(25)forearm."
• Q.: All right. Now, to continue the story, we now have an exhibit, a (10)video exhibit, which is number 145. You've seen it before, but I'm told we now have a subtitled version of it. It's very short, and it will show the Commanders coming in to Srebrenica. MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could play that exhibit. I don't know. Is there is a transcript to go along with it? (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. MR. McCLOSKEY: You've got it. Okay. And that is exhibit -- the transcript and the video are 145A, and B. I believe it should be in the booth and be ready to go. If we could play that. Thanks.
• Q.: Mr. Butler, while we're waiting, you've seen this before. Could
(20)you give us a preview? Here, it looks like it's coming. MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I'm advised that should have been Exhibit 145 bis. • Q.: Mr. Butler, what date did that scene play out? (25)
• A.: That scene played out the late afternoon hours of 11 July 1995.
• A.: Yes, sir, I did. • Q.: And was Popovic with General Mladic and General Krstic? • A.: Yes, sir, he was. (5) • Q.: Who else can you recognise there? • A.: Going through the film chronologically, Colonel Vinko Pandurevic, Commander of the elements of the Zvornik Brigade that were deployed. We had, of course, General Mladic, General Krstic, General Zivanovic. Colonel Popovic, already discussed. They pass through the checkpoint. (10)Those were members of the 10th Diversionary Unit. Coming again through the town, Colonel Mirko Trivic, Commander of the 2nd Romanija Brigade assets, 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade assets. Later in series of the town, Colonel Svetozar Andric, Commander of the deployed assets of the 1st Birac Brigade. Further towards the end, Lieutenant Miso Pelemis, (15)Commander of the 10th Diversionary Unit, who was in the middle of the town. I think those are all the major players. There are probably more out there. • Q.: All right. Now we have a series of exhibits that help us identify (20)some of the players and some of the goings on, and they go chronologically. So if you could just start with Exhibit 434, which is an intercept, and just place it on the ELMO, and if you could just summarise briefly, and just use your best judgement to get through this.
• A.: In the case of this intercept, very quickly, it's one part of a
(25)discussion between General Gvero, the Main Staff Assistant Commander for
• Q.: And this is an 11 July intercept, and again, we have Gvero coming (5)in on the scene again. And let's go to the next exhibit. This was an exhibit that's been seen; it's Exhibit 45. • A.: I'm sorry, wrong -- • Q.: It should be a video still of General Krstic. • A.: This video still of General Krstic is taken at what we call the (10)second meeting between the VRS, the UN Dutch Battalion, and Muslim representatives that occurred in the late evening hours of 11 July, 1995, in the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac. • Q.: Okay. Let's go to the next -- and that was Exhibit 45. Let's go to the next exhibit, 435. It's an intercept from 12 July in the morning (15)at 0735 hours. Tell us about this. • A.: What this intercept represents, and the next series of exhibits that will also come in to play, are the series of actions that occurred sometime after that second meeting when the decision was made to evacuate or to move out, transport, the entire civilian population of Potocari (20)out. Again, that being an event that was not anticipated, it started a flurry of orders, both verbal ones that were picked up over the telephone and written orders, to military units and to civilian state-owned companies to start assembling the large amount of buses that would be needed to carry out the movement. (25)
• Q.: And General Krstic as Chief of Staff at this point for this tricky
• A.: Clearly I would expect him to be one of the primary people involved in it. And the other personality noted, Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic, is in fact the Drina Corps Chief of Transportation Services, (5)another person who should be very involved in the programme. • Q.: So this -- it's fair to say this is an intercept with Krstic and Krsmanovic dealing with buses and getting buses from various places? • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Okay, let's go to the next exhibit, 436. Now, this is a (10)communication from General Zivanovic dated 12 July as Commander of the Drina Corps. How does this fit in? • A.: Again, this is another manifestation of the process of going out and assembling all of the buses and other transportation assets necessary to move the Muslim population out of Potocari. In this aspect, they're (15)specifically ordering all of the Drina Corps subordinate units to provide the buses. The order is dated 12 July, 1995. And again reflecting when that decision might have been made, when you look at the translation of the communication centre received stamp at the bottom, what that indicates is that that order was received by the command of the Zvornik Brigade at (20)0835, the morning of 12 July. The inference there is, clearly the order was given earlier that morning.
• Q.: Now, if the Main Staff had taken over direct command of the
brigades leaving out the normal authority of the Drina Corps, would there
have been any need or any point for General Zivanovic to send this order
(25)to his brigades?
• Q.: Let's go to the next exhibit, 437. This is a new kind of document from the Defence Ministry. What is this? • A.: Within the context of the laws of the army and the laws of the (5)defence -- on laws on defence, it is the responsibility of the Ministry of the Defence to deal with those issues having to deal with other aspects of the government or the state of the Republika Srpska. What you have here is, again, referencing a Main Staff order or directive to the Minister of Defence or Ministry of Defence, for the Ministry of Defence then turning (10)that around and ordering the various civilian agencies and assets under the control of the Ministry of Defence to mobilise buses and send them to Bratunac. • Q.: And this is one of many such orders; we didn't put all the other ones on there. (15) • A.: We have a total of -- sorry, we have a total of six of these orders: three dated 12 July, 1995, three dated 13 July, 1995. • Q.: Is there anything about this that indicates the chain of command involving the various ministries and armies is working anything but normally? (20) • A.: This order at face value is consistent with all of the other series that we have of this. • Q.: Let's go to the next exhibit which is an intercept, 12 July, still in the morning, 0915, and if you could just tell us about this.
• A.: This clearly is not a verbatim translation of the conversation.
(25)It represents notations of one of the operators as to what the context of
• Q.: In your review of the various documents, have you seen the allocation of fuel being dealt with in a certain way? • A.: What they did in order to get past the fuel issue, particularly in (10)the situation in Bratunac -- a light infantry brigade it had very few vehicles therefore very little fuel holdings -- was the buses that arrived on the 12th and the 13th, the fuel was essentially requisitioned from the state-owned Vihor Transportation Company in Bratunac. And we have detailed lists that are included in the supporting materials where as the (15)buses arrived, buses were given 50 or 100 litres of diesel fuel, D2 as it's referred to; the license plate numbers of the buses were written down; and those buses were then sent to Potocari to start picking up the members of the population. And when you look at the gross count, 60, 70 buses, as well as (20)other military vehicles that were requisitioned into the process, when fuel subsequently was allowed into Potocari from the UN, in order to basically compensate the Vihor Transportation Company and, in effect, the state of Republika Srpska for the fuel, that fuel was reallocated to the Vihor Transportation Company. (25)
• Q.: All right. Let's go on to what was Exhibit 55. It should be a
• A.: Again, represents the presence, the physical presence of General Krstic at what we call the third meeting between the VRS commanders, in (5)this case now members of the Republika Srpska civilian authorities, Muslim authorities, and the Dutch Battalion representatives. • Q.: And without getting into the details of this meeting, General Krstic is the highest ranking officer aside from General Mladic there? • A.: Highest ranking officer of the Drina Corps present, yes, sir. (10) • Q.: Let's go to the next exhibit, which is an intercept from 12 July, 1200 hours, perhaps by the chronology, shortly after the meeting ended or right about that time. • A.: Can you give me the exhibit number, sir? • Q.: I'm sorry, it's 359A. And if you don't see it there, I can just (15)read it briefly, and we can go on to the next. • A.: I don't have that exhibit here. • Q.: We have a copy which we should be able to deliver. Just before you put it on the ELMO, could you check for initials and just fold it down so those initials can't be seen? (20) • A.: This exhibit again discusses the issue of buses being assembled. It further specifies the requests for fuel being forwarded to Krstic. • Q.: Now, is there another Krstic that may be involved in fuel issues? My recollection is that there are other documents. Who do you think this Krstic may be? (25)
• A.: In this instance, the Krstic that we're referring to is, in fact,
• Q.: Why do you say that? • A.: The only other Krstic that comes up in relation to the military documents and the fuel-related issue is a Private Krstic functioning as a (5)Captain Krstic in logistics in the Zvornik Brigade. It's unlikely that this conversation would have involved him. • Q.: Is fuel important enough to have the Major General, the Chief of Staff, involved in it like this? • A.: In the context of Eastern Bosnia in July of 1995, it would be safe (10)to say that diesel fuel was the equivalent of liquid gold. It was one of the embargoed items that had to be smuggled in, and the fuel records were very meticulously kept from the individual operator level all the way through the major commands. Fuel usage was a mandatory reporting requirement as part of every brigade's daily combat report to the corps. (15) • Q.: All right. Could we go to the next exhibit, 440, another 12 July at 1210 hours. • A.: I'm sorry, this is the wrong exhibit. 440. • Q.: Tell us about this. • A.: Clearly this is not a verbatim transcript of an intercept. It's (20)the synopsis notes of the individual collector noting that Krstic wants the buses to start moving right away. • Q.: In your opinion, who should this be in the context of the overall situation?
• A.: Again, in the context of who the conversation correspondents are,
(25)this would be General-Major Krstic.
• A.: Yes. • Q.: Let's go to the next one, 441, 12 July, 1212 hours. Is it fair to say this is Krsmanovic involved with trailer trucks, the same issue? (5) • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Let's go on to 442. Sorry, that's the same one. Let's go to 443, 12 July, and we see -- what do you make of this conversation? • A.: Again, what we're seeing here is between two unidentified correspondents, the discussion pertaining to the movements of large (10)scale -- or large numbers of trucks. Miletic. The name, I believe, is General-Major Miletic, the Chief of Operations of the VRS on the Main Staff, and clearly they're discussing the movements of vehicles from the major municipalities. He's also noting one of the correspondents, "X", that he's received an order from Krsto, a nickname of General Krstic, and (15)he's ordered it directly, and again we're talking the issue here of fuel. • Q.: We've heard the name Krle. In fact, General Mladic just used it coming into Srebrenica, but we have not seen Krsto before. Why do you believe this is a reference to General Krstic? • A.: Looking through the context of the intercepts that we have, we see (20)other high-ranking Serbian officers, at least at his level, will call him that as a nickname, and again, in correspondence between the lower subscribers, where the presence of the General isn't there, they'll, of course, call him by his slang nickname as well.
• Q.: Let's go to the next exhibit, 444, 12 July, 1240 hours. And
(25)Panorama is one of the participants. What's Panorama?
• Q.: So this -- (5) JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me just again. The nickname of General Krstic did not appear on the transcript. Could you repeat it, please, Mr. Butler, the nickname of Mr. Krstic? • A.: In the intercept it's referred to as "Krsto." K-i-r -- I believe it's K-r-s-t-o. (10) JUDGE RIAD: Krsto, yes, but there is another one. If you look here, "called him by his nickname," the other one. • A.: Krle, K-r-l-e. JUDGE RIAD: So "Krle" and "Kristo" are both used? • A.: Are nicknames we have associated with Major-General Krstic, yes, (15)sir. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: While we're on the nickname topic, we hear Krsmanovic also referred to as Krle in one intercept, don't we?
• A.: That is correct. And again, as part of what I did in analysing
(20)the intercepts, part of that clearly is not going and taking names at face
value, it's looking within the context of the intercepts, the context of
the conversation and the correspondence, to make those assessments whether
we're talking about Krle, the Chief of Transportation, and Krle, the Chief
of Staff at this time of the Drina Corps. So it's not a face value
(25)judgement of a name equals a person.
• A.: Nothing unusual at all. It would be expected that the Main Staff (5)would be very involved in this, particularly in the acquiring of assets outside of the zone of the Drina Corps, which the Drina Corps would not normally be empowered to do on its own. • Q.: Okay. Let's go the next intercept, 445, 12 July, 1250 hours, General Mladic and unidentified person talking about buses and trucks. (10)What can you make of this? • A.: Again, General Mladic, as the Commander of the Main Staff, querying an unidentified correspondent as to whether or not the trucks and buses are on their way as directed. Further, when you go into the text, he's telling that unidentified correspondent to continue to monitor the (15)situation; "Don't let small groups of them sneak in." I would be very hesitant, at that point, to try and speculate what that meant in relation to the overall context. Going further into that, again General Mladic makes the point that they've all capitulated and surrendered and, "We'll evacuate them all, (20)those who want to and those who don't want to." Clearly, in this case, we're discussing the civilian population at Potocari.
• Q.: Now we just saw on the video General Mladic ordering people to
take flags, to take Bratunac, to do this, to do that. We've seen him try
to pull a Dutch APC out of a ditch in a former video. Now we see him
(25)involved in some detail with the buses. Are those indications that
• A.: No, sir. • Q.: Why not? (5)
• A.: Taken in context, General Mladic, as the Commander of the Main
Staff of the VRS, will be making the major decisions, clearly. In the
cases where he's on camera, he'll make them very publicly. And in the
sense of dealing with Generals, one of the facets of command and
leadership is to be publicly seen being in command and leading, and a lot
(10)of what General Mladic does, clearly, is for the benefit of the cameras
and for the benefit of all of his soldiers to be seen being in command.
Commanders at all levels, Generals, be it brigade Commanders, even
battalion Commanders, they don't have -- I mean, one of the most precious
resources is time. They don't have the time to do everything themselves.
(15)That's why, within a military context, they have staffs to perform all
these functions and subordinate Commanders to perform all of these
functions.
For General Mladic to issue an order and then exercise that order
outside of the chain of command when there is a perfectly functional staff
(20)at his disposal, the Drina Corps command and the Drina Corps staff, does
not make military sense per se. The normal portion of that or the normal
way that would occur would be for General Mladic to give the orders to his
subordinate commanders. And in the case we saw that in Potocari, him
informing his subordinate commanders that he wanted to go from -- I'm
(25)sorry -- from Srebrenica to Potocari, informing them what he wanted to
• Q.: Do you get the impression that the VRS was a poor and undisciplined army? • A.: No, sir. They are a very well-organised army. • Q.: Thank you. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, this would probably be a good time to take a break. JUDGE WALD: Can I ask one question? Sorry. Between Exhibit 444, which was Panorama, although we don't have the identified participants, they're only "X" and "Y", but it's clear between them they're saying -- Y (20)is saying: "We'll accept all the civilians who want to stay. Those who don't want to can choose where to go," and approximately an hour later we've got 445 which says they're going to go whether they want to or not. I mean, evacuated. Is there something out of your analysis that can bridge that gap? (25)
• A.: Clearly in the context, that falls out of the general chain of
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So we're going to have a (10)20-minute break now. --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m. --- On resuming at 12.44 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, we may continue. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. (15)
• Q.: Mr. Butler, if we could go to Exhibit 446, it should be an
intercept 12 July, 1305 hours, and I want to ask you a few questions about
this, and I want to read a bit of it. And "K" appears to be Krstic where
it says:
"Put me back to the switchboard. Miss, put me through to the
(20)Vlasenica Brigade."
And there's an answer "yes". And then,
"This is Krstic.
Can I help you General?
Give me Kosoric."
(25)Who is Kosoric again?
• Q.: And can you point to the map where the Vlasenica Brigade should be? (5) • A.: The Vlasenica Brigade is located, almost physically located with the headquarters of the Drina Corps in Vlasenica. • Q.: Okay. Now, I'll continue to read. General Krstic is told, "He's not in. He went somewhere. Give me Savo, put me through to Savo. (10)How are you general? This is Savo. Srpski!, fuck it, how else? Congratulations." Then Krstic: "Get in touch with these guys from the MUP. That means you, (15)your brigade and them." What do you make of this sentence, who is he talking about, "Get in touch with these guys from the MUP, that means your brigade"? • A.: To start with, first I'm not yet able to identify who Savo is; however, clearly from the context of the conversation, the correspondent (20)Savo is someone with the Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, again, a Drina Corps asset. And what he -- what General Krstic at this time is instructing him to do is coordinate with the Ministry of the Interior police units, as well as with people in his own brigade, to accomplish something. (25)
• Q.: Okay. And then Savo responds: "I gave everything there is." And
• A.: The crossroad intersection I'm presuming to be the major crossroad from the road south from Vlasenica. Drava is the radio telephone callsign for the Birac Infantry Brigade headquartered up in Sekovici, which is not located on the map but is in this area right here. So putting that (10)together, what they're being instructed to do is secure the road from Vlasenica up past Tisca -- or up towards Tisca in the direction of Drava, the Sekovici Brigade, or Birac Brigade it's known alternatively. • Q.: Now, do you know of a tunnel that exists just west of Luke? • A.: There is a tunnel along the road from Luke to Kladanj which the (15)survivors of the transportation out of Potocari discuss having gone through as part of their trek where they were let off at Luke towards Kladanj. • Q.: So if we start off in Vlasenica, assuming that's where this guy is from, and we go 12 kilometers in the direction of Drava but then over (20)towards the tunnel, where does that roughly put us? • A.: That puts us along the road from Vlasenica through Tisca to Luke.
• Q.: And then we have another line that says "To the tunnel," and then
Krstic says, "Of Course." And then "S" says "okay". And then Krstic
says, "That's where they'll be disembarking."
(25)Now, on 12 July at about 1301 hours, who would be disembarking
• A.: That would clearly, by the timing of when the first convoy left Potocari, that would be the lead elements of the buses that were moving the people out of Potocari to Luke. (5) • Q.: That would have been the women and children mostly? • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: And then the next line, "okay" by "S", and then Krstic says, "Take care, nothing must happen to any of them." Who do you think Krstic is referring to when he says, "Nothing must happen to any of them"? (10) • A.: Presumably he's talking about the women and children on the buses. • Q.: And then he says "Is that clear," so he's making a point of it? • A.: Emphasising that, yes, sir. • Q.: What do we know, militarily speaking, what happens at that disembarking place in the afternoon of July 12th? Do we have any military (15)officers there that you recall from previous testimony? • A.: One of the witnesses identifies a Drina Corps officer, Major Sarkic, who he had previously identified as being a member of the Milici Light Infantry Brigade at that location doing the physical separations in the event of the Muslim men who had managed to sneak on the buses. As (20)other witnesses testify, those Muslim men were then placed in a school at the Tisca facility, and were later taken to an execution site.
MR. McCLOSKEY: And to clarify, the testimony of the protected
witness who we referred to as the Tisca survivor, to give you
recollection, he was separated, as best I recall, on the 13th of July in
(25)the early morning and was -- sat all day at that school, and then was
• Q.: Mr. Butler, aside from the obvious difficulty the women and the children had surviving in the heat and without water and food, is there (10)anything in the record that it's part of the command or any orders that there was any hostility directed towards the women and children during this process? • A.: Within the framework of the orders and other documents, there is not. (15) • Q.: All right. Let's go to the next exhibit, number 58. We are still in a chronology in the afternoon of 12 July. It should be a photo of General Krstic leading Popovic in the background. Exhibit 58. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Excuse me for interrupting you, Mr. McCloskey. We don't seem to have Exhibit 447. (20)
MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, 447 should be a photograph of --
and you should have it -- of a Bratunac Brigade officer, with a video
attached to it. We're not quite there yet. I hope that's not a problem
we have. The exhibit immediately right in front of it is the one that
is -- I now see it on the ELMO.
(25)It's my understanding that prior court exhibits, I'd asked them to
(5) • Q.: Mr. Butler, this is from a previous -- a still from a previous video exhibit that was an interview of, the Court will recall, General Krstic in the afternoon of July 12th in Potocari, and can you identify the people that you know in that photo? • A.: Clearly General Krstic is the main subject of the still (10)photograph. Behind him, and if I can use the pointer, this individual here is Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic, the Assistant Commander for Security of the Drina Corps. • Q.: Now, this exhibit, it's a bit fuzzy and his face on this particular exhibit is not exactly clear. Have you had a chance to see (15)this video and play it several times to get a good look at who this fellow is behind General Krstic? • A.: Yes, sir, I have. It is Lieutenant Colonel Popovic. • Q.: Popovic who we also just saw on the video coming through Srebrenica on the 11th with General Krstic, and General Zivanovic and (20)others? • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: All right. Let's go on to the next exhibit, which is 447, the still. If you could -- it should be a still of the Bratunac -- well, there's also a video, which is 136. (25)
• A.: I don't have that.
MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could play the video 136. Again, this is an
interview of a Bratunac Brigade officer, shot, we believe, about the same
time as the interview with General Krstic, and it should be subtitled.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we play that back, and could you try to see
if you can try to catch the man with the moustache that comes behind him?
We'll just give it one try. If not, we'll go on. For the booth, there's
a fellow with a bald head and a big moustache that comes up for a second
(10)or two behind the person giving the interview.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. Thank you. If you can go slowly, I'll let
you know where he is. (15)
MR. McCLOSKEY: Sorry, we passed it. I didn't see it. There he
is. Stop. That's the back of his head. If you can follow the fellow on
the right-hand side of the screen very slowly, he'll give us a facial
shot, I think, unless he's already done it. Okay. Keep going. (20) MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. Right there. Stop. • Q.: All right. Mr. Butler, this fellow that appears to be behind a rifle at the moment, do you recognise that fellow?
• A.: That individual is Lieutenant Colonel Svetozar Kosoric, the Chief
of Intelligence for the Drina Corps. The primary subject of the video is
(25)identified as Zoran Kovacevic who is further noted in Bratunac Brigade
• Q.: Okay. We can leave the video. How does the presence of that Bratunac officer fit in with what you know about the plan and who should (5)be where at the time? • A.: As discussed within the context of the military units that we physically see entering Potocari on the 12th and 13th of July, the Bratunac Brigade units involved from the south and from the north the 3rd Battalion of the Bratunac Brigade and the 2nd Battalion of the (10)Bratunac Brigade. So his physical presence in Potocari on the 12 July would be consistent with that. • Q.: Now, I want to ... MR. McCLOSKEY: I think it should fit right over that. It looks like there's enough room. I'm sorry. If we could put that right over the (15)top. • Q.: Now, the presence of Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic and the presence of Colonel Kosoric in Potocari at that time, and again, could you point out where they are on the command chart? • A.: Lieutenant Colonel Popovic, again, Assistant Commander for (20)Security of the Drina Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric, the Chief of Intelligence of the Drina Corps. • Q.: And what is going on in Potocari on that day that would involve their job descriptions, if anything?
• A.: On that day, you have the physical process of the transportation
(25)of the Muslim population from Potocari through or out to the Muslim free
(5) • Q.: Where would they fit, if anywhere, into the planning on what to do with the inhabitants of Srebrenica? • A.: Clearly in an aspect from the security role, the planning for the aspects or the security aspect of moving them for the chief -- you know, the security aspect, I guess, for moving them and securing them, making (10)sure that none of them pose a threat to the Drina Corps. Further, from a security aspect, you have the function of screening people who are accused by the VRS or by the Republika Srpska for war crimes. • Q.: So you're now talking about the male population of Potocari would be a specific security situation. (15) • A.: In one aspect it would be a security situation. Further, an intelligence perspective, clearly members of the male population of Potocari would presumably have information which would be of value for the command of the Drina Corps relative to the location, the identities, and the personalities of members of the Muslim 28th Infantry Division, and it (20)would be a logical function for the Chief of Intelligence and his people to be involved in identifying Muslims who would have such information and to interrogate them accordingly.
• Q.: Okay. Let's continue with our chronology and getting back to an
intercept. It's Exhibit 448, 12 July, at 1648
[sic] hours. Panorama is
(25)noted as one of the participants.
• Q.: Yes. Make sure there's no initials or anything on that. And if I'd said 1648, I should have said 1848 hours is the time of this. What can you tell us about this conversation and how it fits in (5)your analysis, if at all? And I would note that on the bottom of page 2 there is a mention of Krle, but is there anything specifically you can glean from this? • A.: The conversation as depicted, clearly the primary correspondents are between two people of the Main Staff, Panorama and an individual going (10)by the code name of Panorama-03. They're looking for the big boss, who we presume to be General Mladic. They're unable to find him, and they pass him to an individual named Rajko. We believe, but I'm not sure, that Rajko, is the name of a military officer who serves the function as the aide to General Mladic. (15)What is happening is that the individual identified as 03 is discussing back and forth with this individual what steps both the Main Staff and the forward command are taking, and essentially Rajko is passing on the instructions or the intent of his superior. • Q.: Now, on the bottom of page 2. Is there enough information to (20)determine Krle, who that may be? • A.: Again, in the context of knowing who is in the discussion being at the level of the Main Staff, Krle, in this context, is referring to who -- I believe General Major Krstic. • Q.: Do you know who this Kocic might be who is referred to also? (25)
• A.: No, I do not, sir.
• A.: This conversation occurs, again, early morning hours of 13 July. (5)The correspondent "X" is looking for whom I believe, the first indication of the name Nikolic, as Captain First Class Momir Nikolic, the Chief of Intelligence and Security for the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. • Q.: Why do you think that? Nikolic is a fairly common name. • A.: Well, again going into the aspects of the rest of the (10)conversation, we know that Captain First Class Nikolic is, in fact, involved in dealing with the aspects of Muslim people in Potocari on both the 12th and 13th. Additionally, he's specifically dealing with issues of Muslim wounded males in Bratunac on the 13th. • Q.: And how about the reference to the other people there? (15) • A.: Jankovic, I believe when we look at it in context with other material, the individual referred to is Colonel Radislav Jankovic, the chief or a member of the Intelligence Administration of the VRS Main Staff. We make that conclusion -- I make that conclusion in so much as we have his involvement on the meetings with the 11th and the 12th, and we (20)have other messages and orders by him showing his dealing with the actual movement of the population from Potocari out through to Kladanj. So we know that Colonel Jankovic is extremely well involved in this.
• Q.: I note in the middle of the page on this conversation that he is
introduced as: "Here's Police Commander Jankovic." Would that be a MUP
(25)guy and not the Main Staff Jankovic?
• Q.: Okay. Now, getting closer down to the bottom of the page, maybe a third down, there's a discussion about: "About one-third of them have probably been transferred, (5)about as many as there are." One-third have been transferred, around about 70 vehicles have left." Then: "Around 5.000? (10)Yes. And you'd say there's another ten? Two-thirds more. 10.000." Is that roughly consistent with the numbers and the times and the (15)dates of the people being sent out of Potocari? • A.: Certainly within the context of the times it is consistent. We know that the bus movement stopped in the evening hours of the 12th of July to the hours of darkness and resumed at about 0700 on the morning on the 13th. (20)As for the numbers, I'm not sure that anyone's ever been able to come up with an accurate number of just how many people who were at Potocari and who went through the evacuation or movement process, so I don't know if that's an accurate number or a reflection of the numbers or not. (25)
• Q.: All right. Going to page 2 of that conversation, there's more
(5) • A.: Considering the work load and his function, that would be consistent. • Q.: Now, there's also a general talking in this. After a while it says, "Anything else, General?" And the "Y", who is perhaps the general, says, "Where is my squad commander?" Then the conversation goes on, and (10)the person that is the general says, "All right, Jankovic, send me what you have up here since the Main Staff has been to me every six minutes." That is a General. Who might that be, or what can you tell us, if anything, about that? • A.: Clearly on something like this there are many interpretations that (15)could be given. Looking at this one in context, I believe that the General in question that we're discussing is one of two possibilities. The first one would be General Krstic, and again, the reference to the Main Staff has been bothering "him". The second would be General Miletic of the Main Staff, who would use the phrase the colloquial phrase "Main (20)Staff" to refer to other individuals of the Main Staff or beyond. It is very unclear who the General is. • Q.: This is the morning of the 13th under your -- by your opinion, General Zivanovic is still the corps commander. Could this not be General Zivanovic? (25)
• A.: Again, that is a possibility.
• A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: Let's go to 452, 13 July conversation at 1110 hours. What can you tell us about this? (5) • A.: In this conversation, clearly Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic is one of the subscribers, we see where we've discussed earlier the aspect of Krsmanovic having the same nickname as General Krstic did, that nickname being Krle, K-r-l-e. Going beyond that, clearly you see Colonel Krsmanovic is the Chief (10)of Transportation deeply involved in the staff work and in the monitoring of the movement of the transportation and the bus fleet for movement from Potocari out. JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, Mr. McCloskey, you said the 13th July conversation? (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: That's correct. JUDGE RIAD: Is there no indication? There's no indication of that. It says 11 -- is it written down?
MR. McCLOSKEY: I believe, while I know I missed out on that week
of intercepts, I believe you should have a binder of the two or three
(20)volumes of intercepts that are organised by date and by time and with a
large reference sheet. As you recall from your week with intercepts, many
of these intercepts did not have the actual date on them, and so we did
not write in the date as we go over the exhibits; but I have my notations
from the final conclusions that the operators made, so that's what I'm
(25)referring to, but you should have a record of that.
MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: So looking at the bottom of the page, "Listen, we'll ask UNPROFOR for fuel, you can count on that." So they're still low on fuel? (5) • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: All right. Now, that ends the intercept section of Potocari, and I would like for you to go to Exhibit 453. And if you could -- MR. McCLOSKEY: This exhibit has been, Your Honours, has been developed by the Prosecution as just a wrap-up to help make it clear who (10)some of the main players were that we're seeing in Potocari at the various times on the 12th and 13th, and I would just ask Mr. Butler to make some brief comments on any military aspects of their presence. • Q.: So, Mr. Butler, from your review of the videos and witness statements, what can you tell us briefly about the first person that's (15)seen, General Ratko Mladic? • A.: Clearly with respect to his presence in Potocari, he is identified by numerous witness [sic] and video as being present in Potocari those dates. • Q.: And you've already mentioned General Mladic's -- seemingly his (20)habits with the camera. Aside from that, can you tell anything from the military command and control function about what his presence on those two days means?
• A.: Clearly his physical presence there and his engagement there
lends, lends the position that this is done under his direction. Of all
(25)the events that are occurring, he is still in command. He is in command
• Q.: And how about Colonel Radislav Jankovic? • A.: Colonel Jankovic, we don't have a physical presence of him in (5)Potocari on the 12th and 13th. His physical presence is noted by a witness, and I'm not sure if he's a protected witness or not, so I won't identify him. But he is noted on the 14th by a witness as being involved with dealing with the UNPROFOR members in diverting fuel that had arrived and essentially taking the fuel from UNPROFOR. (10) • Q.: Perhaps related to the previous intercept where the participants in the conversation said that they would get fuel from UNPROFOR? • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Now, the Drina Corps, and if you could just -- we have five senior officers from the Drina Corps. If you could go over briefly each one, and (15)could you, again, circle for us on the exhibit that's up there where they are, and then tell us a bit about what their presence there means in a military command context.
• A.: Again, with the case of General-Major Krstic functioning at that
time as the Drina Corps Chief of Staff/Deputy Commander, it would have
(20)been his role to essentially coordinate and control and manage the entire
process of the assembly of the buses, the movement of the personnel from
Potocari all the way up through and out. And again, all of those duties
would have been consistent with his functions as the corps Chief of
Staff.
(25)General-Major Zivanovic, still performing as the corps commander,
• Q.: How about Drina Corps units now?
• A.: Within the context of the Drina Corps units, we have witness
(25)testimony that puts elements of the Drina Wolves sweeping through
• Q.: Let me interrupt you for one second. We'll go into more detail on the Bratunac Brigade in a few exhibits, but if you could just make your conclusions on them. • A.: Clearly within the aspect of the Bratunac Brigade, we see the (10)elements of the 2nd and the 3rd Battalion of the Bratunac Brigade as well as at least one member of the command of the Bratunac Brigade present in Potocari on the 12th and 13th as well. Again, on the ground, considering the military situation, that would have been where they would be expected to be. (15) • Q.: And if you could now just talk briefly about the Ministry of Interior people, and then we'll get into some of the exhibits that show their presence and other soldiers in the area.
• A.: The first individual listed, Dusko Jevic, is identified as a MUP
individual by witnesses, and his role is amplified in the interview by
(20)Zoran Petrovic pertaining to the move there as a Company Commander of one
of the MUP special police companies. His physical presence is noted on
12th July.
Lieutenant Colonel Ljubisa Borovcanin is identified as the Deputy
Commander of the special MUP Brigade, the Special Police Brigade at Janja,
(25)and his physical presence is noted in the Petrovic video in Potocari and
• Q.: Okay. Let's go to some of the video stills that will help solidify some of this testimony. Could you go to Exhibit 74 which should be a still of a fellow with a moustache, I believe to be Jevic. Could you take your pointer and point out Mr. Jevic or -- (10) • A.: This individual, Mr. Jevic, who's also nicknamed Stalin, and identified as such by some of the witnesses. • Q.: What date is that believed to be taken, that still from the video? • A.: This still video was taken 12 July, 1995. • Q.: All right. And do you have another exhibit of Jevic? (15) • A.: That would be Exhibit 73. • Q.: Thank you. Same person with General Mladic, same general area, same general time? • A.: Yes. • Q.: Okay. Let's go to the next exhibit, should be an Exhibit 185, and (20)it should be a still of Borovcanin? • A.: That's marked as Exhibit 185. • Q.: Okay, good.
• A.: This is Lieutenant Colonel Borovcanin. This is taken on 13 July
from the Petrovic video. It is, in fact, Potocari. You can see on the
(25)extreme right-hand portion partial face of Colonel Kingori, one of the
• Q.: The patch on his left arm, what is that? • A.: That is the very distinctive, we call it in the US army, a brassard, shown the insignia of the special -- of the Ministry of the (5)Interior police. • Q.: And has that helped -- that patch helped you identify other soldiers of the Ministry of Interior in other parts of the video footage? • A.: Yes. • Q.: Okay. Could you go to the next exhibit which should be 71 and (10)perhaps 72? • A.: Exhibit 71. • Q.: Can you tell us, do you know who these people are? • A.: The individual on the left is the individual identified as the Battalion Commander subordinate, and I just confess his name has escaped (15)me. If I can go back and review my notes here. I'm sorry, yes, this is Mendljev Dzuric, D-j or "D" with the diacritic across, who is identified as a Battalion Commander. Witnesses have also identified that his nickname is Mane. • Q.: And that's -- (20) • A.: I'm sorry. • Q.: And that's the same name as the Deputy Municipal Police Commander in Zvornik? • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: Mane Dzuric? (25)
• A.: That's correct.
• A.: Given the set of circumstances at the time, and as we previously discussed, the issue of most of the army forces being deployed south of Srebrenica on the 12th through the 13th, the fact that the MUP were functioning as the corps reserve and were available to deal with this type (15)of issue, it's very logical to conclude that what this was was, in fact, the use of the corps reserve, those MUP forces, to assist in the dealing with the issues at Potocari. • Q.: And again, under Krivaja-95, the Special Police reserves would have been under the command of who on July 12th and 13th? (20) • A.: They would have been under the command of the Commander of the Drina Corps. MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, this may be a good time to break, because we'll be getting into some six soldiers from the Bratunac that were identified by various witnesses. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] So let's have a 20-minute
--- Recess taken at 1.39 p.m. --- On resuming at 2.00 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. McCloskey. You may (5)continue. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: We were just about to get to the -- discussing the various Bratunac Brigade officers and soldiers that were witnessed in and around Potocari on the 12th and 13th of July. And if we could go to Exhibit 454, (10)which is basically a compilation of the witness testimony that have identified various people. Mr. Butler, if you could just start with the first person and tell us about that person and what you can and what you know about him.
• A.: Streten Petrovic, according to the roster of the 1st Bratunac
(15)Light Infantry Brigade in July of 1995, is the Deputy Commander of the
3rd Infantry Battalion.
As you will recall from earlier, he is identified on 10 July 1995
as being injured in the combat leading up to the capture of Srebrenica on
the 11th. Subsequent information that we have indicates that while on the
(20)10th his injuries are described as severe, subsequent to that, information
indicates that they were not severe injuries at all and, in fact, they
were relatively minor injuries. He was observed by individuals, as well
as in the Petrovic interview he was discussed by name with Petrovic noting
his presence in Bratunac, walking around with a sling and a leg bandage.
(25)Further to that, on the 17th, as part of what most militaries do
• Q.: Hold on one second. I want to ask you what, if anything, we can (10)conclude from the presence of a Deputy Commander being present in Potocari on July 13th, militarily. • A.: Militarily, his presence there certainly infers that members of the 3rd Battalion, other members subordinate to him, are present as well. Again, Commanders being wherever the bulk of their troops are. (15) • Q.: All right. Let's go to the next person then, Momir Nikolic. • A.: Captain First Class Nikolic, again off of that same roster, is identified as the Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security for the Bratunac Brigade command in the month of July of 1995. Again, witnesses identify him in Potocari on that date, a representative of the (20)brigade Commander. • Q.: Now, what military reason would the Security Intelligence Officer have for being in Potocari on the 12th of July?
• A.: Essentially the same military applications that the presence of
Colonel Popovic and Colonel Kosoric would imply, those being security and
(25)intelligence aspects related to the Muslim population there.
• A.: The next person is identified as Sergeant First Class Zoran Milosavljevic. He is identified as a member of the Reconnaissance Unit of the 2nd Battalion, and again as we've discussed earlier, the 2nd and the (5)3rd Battalions would be the units, based on their positions on the battlefield, that we would most expect to see in the environment of Potocari on those days. • Q.: Okay. And how about the next person? • A.: Individual Slavoljub Grujicic, again a member of the 3rd Infantry (10)Battalion. • Q.: And the next one? • A.: Soldier Goran Rakic, a member of the brigade Artillery Unit. A very small unit but, nevertheless, he's identified on that list as a member of the Artillery Unit. That falls under the brigade command. So (15)again, it's consistent with what units would be there. • Q.: And the last person? • A.: I lost my list. I'm still using it. The last person is Zoran Spajic. MR. McCLOSKEY: We're okay with that document. We've checked it. (20) JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. Mr. Butler, you mentioned earlier that we should remember carefully Streten Petrovic. You mentioned that his father had the biggest moustache. That's the one? MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, sir.
JUDGE RIAD: Then why did you ask us to remember him carefully? I
(25)took a note of that.
JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. • A.: Yes, sir. MR. McCLOSKEY: And, Your Honour, in addition, proving Streten Petrovic's presence in Potocari is putting together quite a few dots, (15)which I think we can probably do it in argument, but it depends on at least two different witnesses that remember first names, names of fathers, moustaches, this kind of thing, and I also bring that to your attention because unlike the other identifications, this one relies on a fair amount of circumstantial evidence being put together. (20) JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. • A.: The last individual, Zoran Spajic, again, a member of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Battalion, consistent with who we would expect to see there. MR. McCLOSKEY: (25)
• Q.: Now you've mentioned the roster for the July 1995 Bratunac Brigade
• A.: Yes, sir, it was. • Q.: And is that attached as supporting material to your narrative? (5) • A.: Yes. MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't have that exhibit number for the supporting material right now, Your Honours, but we can come up with it, but it's there. • Q.: Now, Mr. Butler, if -- we have some more exhibits about Potocari (10)and identifying military units. If you could go on to the next exhibit, which should be 460. Put that on the ELMO, and tell us what that is. • A.: This still is derived from the video, the Petrovic video taken in Potocari on 13 July, 1995. It is a side shot of an armoured personnel carrier, and what you can see from that number is what they call, the (15)army, the Republika Srpska army, called a Bort number, which essentially is a vehicle identification number. That number, 10864, matches up from records of the Bratunac Brigade as being -- belonging to their unit. In addition, when you look at the Petrovic video segment of that, one of the individuals on this armoured personnel carrier is, in fact, (20)engaged in a discussion with at least one of the members of the Muslim population in Potocari at the time. • Q.: Now, the records that identify this with the Bratunac Brigade, are those, in addition, records captured in the search of the Bratunac Brigade? (25)
• A.: Yes, sir.
• A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Let's go to the next exhibit; I believe it is 461. If you could put that on the ELMO. What's this? (5) • A.: In time sequence, this is off of the same video, literally within a few seconds as the vehicles pass. This vehicle is in front of the -- I believe in front of the armoured personnel carrier. This is one of the two TAM rocket launchers that is assigned to the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. (10) • Q.: How do you know that? • A.: The license plate, even on digital imaginary or digital show, is unclear, but we know from, again, the Bratunac Brigade records that there were two TAM rocket launchers assigned to the brigade. • Q.: All right, let's go to the next exhibit. This should be Exhibit (15)455, and do you know the date of this still, and what it depicts? • A.: As with the other two previous stills, this is an extract from the Petrovic video taking in Srebrenica on 13 July, 1995. The individual in the middle is clearly wearing that arm brassard of the Drina Wolves, subordinate to the Zvornik Infantry Brigade. (20) • Q.: All right, let's go to the next exhibit, 456, and I believe this exhibit is to be discussed in combination with 457 which appears to be a patch. Can you tell us about these two exhibits?
• A.: Yes, sir. This still, again extracted from the Petrovic video in
Srebrenica on 13 July, the larger sequence seen is the filming of a T55
(25)tank going through the town. As the tank rolls past, for a brief fraction
• Q.: Can you just point out where that patch is? The photo is a bit fuzzy from here. (15) • A.: I'll just -- [indicates] MR. McCLOSKEY: Indicating the right shoulder of the guy in the vehicle. • Q.: Let's go to the next exhibit, 457. It should be the patch. • A.: Yes. (20) • Q.: Now, how does this fit in with the last photograph?
• A.: If I can put both of them up, the key visual indicator that I use
-- there are essentially two. One of them the white line -- or the black
line going up here consistent with the slope of the mountain or hill; and
the second, what I refer to as the Pacman phenomenon where you have this
(25)pie-shaped slice here, again, consistent with this pie-shaped slice here
• Q.: All right, thanks. Thank you. Now, we've gone back to some intercepts on the 13th of July; we're getting towards the evening. Exhibit 458, what do you -- what can you (5)tell us from this intercept, if anything? • A.: What this intercept discusses, and again, we don't know who the correspondents are, is an issue where somebody is looking first for Colonel Lazic, who we believe to be Colonel Milenko Lazic, an operations officer of the Drina Corps. And further, that same correspondent is (10)asking if Krstic is there, and is being told, "He's in front of the building." Later on in the conversation it's made clear by the person talking to him that Krstic is here with Mladic. • Q.: Sorry, it's not clear where Krstic and Mladic are, but you do believe the message of this intercept is that they are together? (15) • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: Let's go to the next exhibit, 459. This is a document authored by Colonel Jankovic, the person we remember from the meetings, the Main Staff Colonel. It's dated July 13th, and can you tell us who it's to and what it's about? (20)
• A.: This order or this report dated 13 July, 1995, is to both the
command -- it's to the command of the Drina Corps Intelligence Department,
identifying himself as, you know, from the Main Staff or intelligence
sector of the Main Staff. This report essentially is a wrap-up report
that discusses the conclusion of the evacuation, as they call it, of the
(25)Muslim population; discusses the status of the wounded, and where they
• Q.: Okay. I want to reference you specifically to near the bottom of the paragraph where it says, "The MUP is stealing on a massive scale from UNPROFOR. Today they openly stole their PUH. They wanted to participate (5)in the search of their base after the departure of the refugees which I categorically refused." What do you take the meaning of that to be in a military command sense? • A.: In a military command sense, I take that statement to be indicative of the fact that the MUP is under the command of the army (10)during this aspect. • Q.: And this also points out in the beginning right at paragraph 1 the actual time, 2000 hours, date, July 13th, when the evacuation or deportation of the entire Muslim population was completed; is that right? • A.: Yes, sir. (15) • Q.: All right. You have described today a bit about the plan that went into the attack on the Srebrenica enclave, Krivaja-95, General Krstic's -- what role he should have played in that as Chief of Staff, and the continuing attack on July 9th of the overall enclave. What can you -- briefly tell us what role General Krstic as Chief of Staff should have (20)played in that.
• A.: As we previously noted when I gave that briefing at the map,
during the period of the operation, on or about the evening of 9 July, the
goal of the operation changed from the actual pushing of the Muslims back
into the urban area to the actual accomplishing of taking the urban area
(25)of Srebrenica.
(10) • Q.: All right. And the next subject of the military operation, dealing with all the men and women and children that have crowded around the Potocari base, the period from the evening of the 11th to the 12th and 13th, General Krstic, as Chief of Staff, through the afternoon of the 13th, what planning role would you expect him to take in dealing with all (15)these people?
• A.: Certainly when you look at all of the military aspects of things
that we know happened or had to have happened to get to the things that we
know happened, and then when you put them across the staff functions of a
corps command, it is very evident, you know, the planning and the overall
(20)coordination process which the Chief of Staff would have had in that
specific to the management and movement of the Muslim population, the
broad aspects of security and intelligence falling again directly as part
of his staff.
The physical assembly, the logistical refuelling, the movement,
(25)the traffic planning, all of those things which militarily have to occur
• Q.: From the intercepts that you've discussed today, is it consistent or inconsistent with General Krstic taking part in the planning and the execution of the movement or deportation of the people out of Potocari? • A.: They are consistent, sir. (10) • Q.: Now, the next military objective on the screen of the Drina Corps after or during the deportation process would be what?
• A.: In time sequence, the very next one would have been as the Army of
Republika Srpska and the Drina Corps command became aware of the 28th
Infantry Division moving from Sandici and Jaglici towards Tuzla, would
(15)have been the military preparations and coordinations necessary to deal
with amounted to a significant military threat. That manifested itself in
many aspects with the coordination with all of the military units and the
Special Police Units deployed along those roads. And the coordination
particulary important in ensuring in a very confused military environment
(20)like that, absolute criticality of knowing where the friendly soldiers
are, your soldiers are, to ensure you do not have incidences where your
forces are firing on forces which are yours as well.
And in the environment that you had here, moving up along the
road, you had units -- two battalions of one unit, you had Special Police
(25)forces, you had a Drina Corps Engineer Battalion, you had elements of the
• Q.: Mr. Butler, we'll get into some of the details of that tomorrow. My question is: Could we expect General Krstic to have been involved in the planning and dealing with that issue? (10) • A.: Absolutely he would have been. • Q.: In addition, the VRS had their sights on other areas at this time, did they not? • A.: That is correct. • Q.: What's that? (15) • A.: While all of this was occurring, they were also starting to plan for now the operation against the UN enclave at Zepa. MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I have one exhibit related to Zepa and then we'll be into an a whole other topic. • Q.: Would you have expected on -- well, the days perhaps preceding the (20)attack on Srebrenica or at least at the time of the attack and takedown of Srebrenica, that General Krstic would have been thinking about Zepa and a plan to take Zepa? • A.: Yes, sir.
• Q.: Do we know whether he was involved in the planning aspect of that
(25)Zepa operation?
• Q.: Could you go to Exhibit 483. It should be the 13 July -- • A.: I'm sorry. Are we at -- • Q.: We've got -- (5) • A.: Okay. That's the one. • Q.: -- one that will work. What is this document? • A.: This document is the Drina Corps command order pertaining to the base OP planning for setting up of military operations against the Zepa enclave. (10) • Q.: And it's dated 13 July 1995? • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: And it's authored by Major-General Krstic, Chief of Staff? • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Are you able to determine anything related to the time that this (15)document was done on the 13th or received or shipped or anything?
• A.: This document, unlike a lot of the other documents, does not have
a date sent or date received stamp on it. What I've done in examining the
document in detail, tried to infer what time it would have been published,
and there are, in fact, several indicators in the context of the document
(20)where there are clues as to when that could have occur.
The first one, if I can direct your attention, will be -- in
paragraph 10, command and communications, noted that it's establishing
that work at the command post at Krivajic shall begin at 1800 hours on
13 July, 1995. Using that as a start point, we can presume that the order
(25)was not published after 1800.
(15) • Q.: Do you have an opinion on when this document would have been first begun and the work that went into it established? Could this have been a last-minute thing? Does it look like there's planning involved? What's your opinion on that?
• A.: There was, in fact, advance planning done on this document. We
(20)start to see initial indications as early as 11 July 1995, as the Main
Staff, now aware that successful operations should be occurring in
Srebrenica, is starting to plan ahead to the next military operation being
Zepa, and we see a series of orders, starting 11 July, where the Main
Staff first and then later the command of the Drina Corps is issuing
(25)orders to units surrounding Zepa, those primarily the 1st and 5th Podrinje
• Q.: I note on page 3 of the document, paragraph 6, there's a mention (5)of "in coordination with the Protection Regiment," and then it talks about other things. What is that about? • A.: As -- when you look at the force layout on the ground, the actual military or the UN enclave at Zepa is located very close physically to the Main Staff headquarters in Han Pijesak. One of the primary functions of (10)the 65th Protection Regiment was the protection of facilities associated with the Main Staff. Clearly what this order is doing at this stage is it's directing the subordinate brigades of the Drina Corps to coordinate their plans and operations with the battalions of the 65th Protection Regiment that are also surrounding the enclave of Zepa. (15) • Q.: From this order, can you tell whether or not the Protection Regiment that's mentioned here would be under the command of the Drina Corps or would be under its own command? • A.: Under the terminology of paragraph 6 where it says "in coordination," I can't say that that would be a hard command link. In (20)fact, in the JNA doctrine in regulations, it discusses the issue of what coordination is, and in this effect, coordination is not command.
• Q.: All right. Now if you could go to page 4, paragraph 9(C). In the
middle of it it mentions: "In coordination with the MUP, all units shall
be ready to control and search the field." So we get this term "in
(25)coordination" again with the MUP.
(5) • A.: Again, in the context of this paragraph and looking at the operation order in its entirety, again it's clear that they're discussing coordinating the security issues with the MUP. It does not, in this sense, envision the MUP forces at Zepa as being under the command of the Zvornik or -- I'm sorry -- the Drina Corps. (10) • Q.: All right. So, finally, you've concluded that General Krstic was obviously involved in the planning of the Zepa operation as well as all the other details that you've talked about; is that correct? • A.: Yes, sir. MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, this is a good time to close, I (15)believe, for the upcoming day tomorrow. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, we agree, Mr. McCloskey. As you know, it would be convenient or at least we should seek to finish with the examination-in-chief on Friday. In relation to this goal and in your judgement and estimation, where do we stand? (20)
MR. McCLOSKEY: Well, I'm a little worried, Your Honour. I wanted
to get through a book and a half a day, and I think we got through a half
a book, though I'm through a third of my outline. So perhaps there's some
hope, though, as you could tell today, these were some of the most
fundamental documents of the case. We'll see some more tomorrow. Then
(25)we'll be getting into lots of records, but records that perhaps don't need
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] It's difficult to finish on Friday? (5) MR. McCLOSKEY: It's difficult to give you a very good estimate. I would love to finish by Friday, and we'll certainly give it our best effort. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] How much time would you need to finish on Friday in order to be able to finish on Friday? How much more (10)time would you need? Perhaps I could go a little further. The Chamber cannot sit on Friday after 2.00, which means, and I'm asking Madam Registrar to take note of this, that we must sit as from 9.00 on Friday to make up for the difference. Another possibility is to sit for longer hours tomorrow afternoon, a little later tomorrow afternoon. So (15)the time that you need can be perhaps envisaged for tomorrow afternoon. So I think it is really time -- it is really desirable for us to finish on Friday because we're going on to another case. We are not going on holiday; we're continuing to work. Therefore, perhaps we should really do everything to finish with the examination-in-chief this week so that (20)the Defence can prepare for its cross-examination.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I absolutely agree with
that. I'm -- unfortunately, I think realistically and I know the
documents that we have to go through and I know how important they are in
the case, I think it's probably more realistic to look to finishing the
(25)direct in our next session.
MR. McCLOSKEY: And some victim impact witnesses, as recall us mentioning. So it doesn't look like a real full two weeks. So I hate to (10)get -- I don't want to get the anticipation that we can finish on Friday. I wish we could, but the documents that are here are so important that I think we're going to have to go through them slowly. When I find myself hurrying a bit, I find that I miss some things. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] All right. You are quite (15)right. We will keep this objective in mind, and I will ask the registrar to be ready to extend hearing time tomorrow if after re-evaluation we consider there is a possibility of concluding on Friday. If we see that that is not possible at all, then we will work according to regular working hours. (20)But in any event, on Friday we will be sitting from 9.00 rather than 9.30, and we will finish at 2.00 instead of 2.30. Madam Registrar, is there any problem with these working hours?
THE REGISTRAR: A priori there will be no problem. We just need
to take rather strict measures to ensure the transfer of the accused to
(25)the Tribunal at 9.00.
THE REGISTRAR: [Int.] We have to know also until when you intend to sit tomorrow. We'll see tomorrow. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] No. For the moment, Friday is sure that we want to sit from 9.00 to 2.00. Can we have the response from you tomorrow? THE REGISTRAR: [Int.] Yes. You will have the reply tomorrow, Mr. President. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Thank you very much. We will do our best to make progress with this case. That is always our concern, as you know. So we will meet again tomorrow at 9.30. If we come to the conclusion that it is realistic to complete the direct by Friday, then we can envisage the possibility of working a little longer (15)in the afternoon. If not, we will stick to our regular hours. Until tomorrow.
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.37 p.m.
to be reconvened on Thursday, the 29th day of
June, 2000, at 9.30 a.m.
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