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/ Colormap • Page 5538 • {1/93} (1)Monday, 24 July 2000 [Open session]
--- Upon commencing at 9.35 a.m. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning to the technical booth, the interpreters; good morning to the legal assistants and the court reporters, the registrar, the Prosecution; good morning, Mr. Harmon, Mr. Cayley, Mr. McCloskey; good morning to the Defence counsel: Mr. Visnjic, Mr. Petrusic; good morning, (10)General Krstic. We are here today to resume our case, and I believe there was a question related to the tendering of documents. So I turn to Mr. McCloskey. Do we have some exhibits to deal with relating to Mr. Richard Butler's testimony? (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: Good morning, Mr. President, counsel. Yes, we do. Prior to getting into that, could we go into private session briefly so I can explain just a situation that occurred at the last day of Mr. Butler's testimony that we had some concern about? (20)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, let us go into private
session for a few minutes.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I have an exhibit, one more (5)exhibit, 394, which is a list of all the exhibits that Mr. Butler referred to, and I would just provide it as sort of a last exhibit to the Court so we don't have to go and list every exhibit, and in combination with it is a two-page -- or excuse me, a three-page document which lists all the exhibits that should be under seal. And both the Exhibit 394 and the (10)under seal list has been provided to the registry, and it is all those exhibits that we wish to tender into evidence. The Defence has been provided with that list, and we've had a chance to speak with them briefly. And could this Exhibit 394 be under seal as well since it has some sensitive information on it? (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, do you have any objections?
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, in view of the fact
that Exhibit 394 is a list of exhibits tendered by -- produced by
Mr. Butler, it is rather long, so the Defence will not go into each
(20)individual exhibit on that list, but it will analyse them by accepting
some exhibits without any objection and making objections regarding
another set of exhibits, so that according to a methodology that we would
like to propose, it would be more appropriate to refer first to the
exhibits to which the Defence objects.
(25)Therefore, if this exhibit is marked as 394 by the registrar, and
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey?
MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. These intercepts were listed
on this list merely so as a record of which intercepts Mr. Butler
particularly referred to. It is my understanding that the Court has
(20)already ruled on all these intercepts and that they've already been
admitted into evidence. I think counsel has implied that in his question,
also.
We're not aware of any new intercepts. As far as we know, we have
not offered any new intercepts, and I can be firm on that.
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Your Honours, in view of the fact that these are the same kinds of documents or, rather, the same exhibits on which the Chamber has ruled, the Defence has nothing else to point out except for the reasons already given. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We would like to review all those documents again, but if there is nothing new, then we will repeat the decision. However, we would like to reserve a little bit of time, perhaps until the end of this morning, to review the documents and to see if there is any difference or not. So we'll reserve our decision until (15)the end of the morning. Maybe it's not necessary now to separate the documents to which an objection has been made and those in regard to which there are no objections. So we will reserve our decision until the end of the morning regarding the whole list of documents. However, in the meantime we can now proceed with the testimony (20)planned for today. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. One last issue Ms. Keith reminds me of. I referred to an exhibit as 638/1A, and as counsel pointed out to us last week, that should be 638/A. With that, I will give the floor to Mr. Cayley. (25)
MR. CAYLEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours,
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, General Dannatt. Can you hear me? (10) THE WITNESS: Yes, I can. Thank you very much. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Will you please read the solemn declaration that the usher will give you. THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. (15) WITNESS: FRANCIS RICHARD DANNATT
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] You may be seated now. JUDGE RODRIGUES: First of all, let me thank you for having come here to testify before the International Criminal Tribunal. You will (20)first be answering questions that Mr. Cayley is going to put to you. Mr. Cayley is on your right-hand side. Mr. Cayley, you have the floor. MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • EXAMINED by Mr. Cayley: (25)
• Q.: Witness, your name is Francis Richard Dannatt; is that correct?
• Q.: Your last name is spelled D-a-n-n-a-t-t. • A.: That's correct. MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher, could you move the ELMO, because at the (5)moment the witness and I are looking through a solid objective at each other. Thank you. That's perfect. Thank you very much. • Q.: You are British. • A.: I am British. • Q.: You were born in 1950. (10) • A.: That's correct. • Q.: You are presently a Major General in the British Army, commanding the 3rd United Kingdom Division based in Bulford in the United Kingdom. • A.: That's correct. The headquarters of the division is based in Bulford. (15) • Q.: Just to remind you, General, as we spoke previously, you and I speak the same language and between us there are interpreters. I will try to speak as slowly as I can, also to keep a reasonable pace. If you could pause between my question and your answer, and I will do the same for you, that will facilitate the work of the interpreters. (20) • A.: That's understood.
• Q.: General, you were consulted by the Office of the Prosecutor as an
expert in this case and we asked you about three specific areas on which
you produced a written report, which has been given to the Defence and,
indeed, to the Judges. Could you summarise for the Judges essentially the
(25)three principal areas that we asked you to give your opinion upon?
• Q.: In a sense, you are giving a strategic or bird's-eye view of (15)matters relevant to this case; would that be correct? • A.: It's my endeavour to do that, yes. • Q.: General, what qualifies you to give these opinions to this Court?
• A.: First, I have 31 years' experience in the British Army. I have
served on operations in every rank from 2nd Lieutenant to Major General,
(20)and I shall perhaps return to that later, what those different
responsibilities have been.
I've also spent time as a student at the British Army Staff
College and also on the staff of the British Army Staff College where I
ran the Higher Command and Staff course which is particularly responsible
(25)for teaching the operational level of war, that is, the campaign level of
(10) • Q.: General, in assisting in this volume concerning command and control, did you study command and control doctrines of armies around the world? • A.: Yes, I did. As part of the studies of the Higher Command and Staff course initially, which I attended that course as a student before I (15)became the director of it, part and parcel of the syllabus is the study of other armies' command and control procedures. This, for me, was a very useful background before I began writing the War Fighting Doctrine to which I've just referred. • Q.: General, let's speak a little about your career in some detail to (20)confirm what you've already said about commanding at all levels in the British Army. MR. CAYLEY: If Prosecutor's Exhibit 395 could be placed on the ELMO next to General Dannatt, that will assist him in this part of his testimony. (25)
• Q.: Now, General, while that's being placed on the ELMO, I think
• A.: That's correct. I joined the army straight from school in 1969 (5)and spent two years at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst to equal myself to become a regular officer and commissioned into my regiment in July 1971. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I think that the ELMO and other equipment seems not to enjoy weekends. Is (10)it possible to do something to improve the quality of the image? MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, as much as I realise this is not -- does not facilitate the public gallery in viewing it, might I suggest that if we place copies in front of Your Honours and proceed -- Defence counsel also have copies -- rather than taking a break so we can move ahead with (15)General Dannatt's testimony. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well, Mr. Cayley. We agree with you. MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, Prosecutor's Exhibit 395 has been placed on the ELMO. (20)Unfortunately, the image is not very satisfactory that's coming up on the television screens, but if you can give a brief synopsis using this exhibit of your career from 1971 to date, please.
• A.: Yes, I'm very happy to do that. As I mentioned just now, I
commissioned in 1971 and joined my regiment, an infantry regiment known as
(25)the Green Howards, and assumed command of a platoon. There are three
• Q.: General, can I interrupt you? You said, you said at the beginning of 1984, and I think you meant at the beginning of 1994. (25)
• A.: You're quite correct, yes. 1994 I assumed command of 4th Armoured
(25)
• Q.: General, just to give an idea of numbers to the Judges, when you
• A.: A platoon is approximately 35 men; and a company, I judge to be your next question, sir, is about 100 to 120 men; and a battalion is between 600 and 800 men, depending on the role that a battalion is (5)fulfilling at the time; and a brigade is between 4.000 and 5.000 men, and I've just mentioned that my current division is about 20.000 men. • Q.: Now, next year I believe you have been selected and, indeed, appointed to the position of the Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the British Army; is that correct? (10) • A.: That's correct. I shall move to that position sometime yet to be specified in the middle of next year. • Q.: Now, finally, on your biographical details, I see that you're wearing the military cross. You were decorated for gallantry on operations in Northern Ireland in 1973; is that correct? (15) • A.: That's correct, sir, yes. • Q.: And I think you were made a Commander of the Order of the British Empire in 1996 for your services in the former Yugoslavia; is that correct? • A.: That's also correct. (20) • Q.: And I think that you have also received the Queen's commendation for valuable service in Kosovo; is that correct? • A.: That's correct. When I was going through my former service, I didn't mention that last year I was Commander British forces in Kosovo in the central section of the initial operations there. (25)
• Q.: And in fact, on that point, in June and July of last year, you
• A.: I was Commander British forces, and my task was to maximise the British support to NATO's KFOR, yes, that's correct. (5) • Q.: Now, General, really finally in terms of biographical details, you are a British Army officer. General Krstic is a JNA and VRS officer. There are many similarities between your careers. You're both professional officers, but you grew up in very different systems. If Prosecutor's Exhibit 396 could be placed upon the ELMO, and (10)I'll give you the question while the exhibit is coming. On the basis of what I've just said, General, what gives you the right to comment on those matters that you've already stated to the Judges that the Prosecutor asked you to address? MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, do you have this in front of you (15)because it's actually quite an important document? Thank you.
• A.: I think first within all professional and well-trained armies
there are a number of general principles of command and control that apply
that from my studies of a number of armies, I recognise both within my own
army and also within the army of the former Yugoslavia. But probably
(20)rather more specifically, and having looked at General Krstic's former
career up to this stage, I notice a number of similarities between himself
and myself which I've shown on this exhibit.
We're roughly the same age; General Krstic is two years older than
myself. He has been a Battalion Commander. He has been a Brigade Chief
(25)of Staff, both posts that I have held. He has been a Brigade Commander.
MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be given Exhibit 397 which (15)actually helps to explain this slight difference in the ranking structure so that the Judges can understand perfectly what you're speaking about in these terms. Again, unfortunately the ELMO is not working, but nevertheless, General, if you could briefly explain Exhibit 397. (20)
• A.: Within the British Army, a battalion is commanded by a Lieutenant
Colonel, and my understanding in the VRS is that usually a battalion was
commanded by a Major.
Again, in the British Army a brigade is commanded by a Brigadier
or, as somebody would call it, a one-star General, but in the VRS,
(25)brigades are invariably commanded by a Colonel.
• Q.: Now, General, you said that there was no equivalent to a Lieutenant General although, in fact, in the VRS, I think you may mention it in your report, there is a Lieutenant Colonel-General which is a two-star rank, essentially; is that correct? (20) • A.: That's correct. MR. CAYLEY: Your Honours, if during General Dannatt's testimony you wish to ask any questions for clarification, please go ahead. JUDGE WALD: Can I just ask whether or not in the VRS, the top rank, army, Colonel General, is that what Mladic was? (25)
• A.: My understanding is that that is correct, yes, a senior
JUDGE WALD: Okay. MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, what materials have been supplied to you by the Office of (5)the Prosecutor in order for you to come to your conclusions and, indeed, prepare your report and your testimony? • A.: A number of documents have been made available to me. I have seen the two reports by Richard Butler; one entitled "The VRS Corps Command Responsibility Study" and the second, "The Srebrenica Military Narrative (10)Krivaca 95." I've seen and asked to see and been shown much of the documentary evidence in support of those reports. I'm aware that those reports are derivative pieces of work and I've asked to see selected documents which underpin both those reports. I've also seen a number of maps and other documents and video (15)footage pertaining to these issues generally. I also asked, as my previous service in Bosnia had not taken me to the area of Srebrenica, to go and visit the various locations and places germane to the matters before the Court. In April this year, I visited those principal locations with senior investigator, Mr. Jean-Rene Ruez, (20)and also with Mr. Cayley from the Office of the Prosecutor. • Q.: I think as well, General, you've viewed certain maps in the possession of the Prosecutor, some video footage, and indeed, as you rightly said, documents that you've requested to see from us; is that correct? (25)
• A.: That's absolutely correct.
• Q.: General, if we can turn to the first substantive part of your report which deals with fundamental principles of command and control, and (5)you'll find that on page 4 of your report. Could you explain to the Judges the basic principle of command and control that, from your understanding, is of universal application to all armies of the world?
• A.: Yes, sir, I will. I think first, the first overall principle, and
(10)it's an obvious one, is that Superior Commanders give orders to their
subordinate Commanders who carry out those orders and implement them.
Now, of course, the manner of implementation may allow a greater or a
lesser degree of interpretation or useful initiative according to the
command doctrine, the method of command used by a particular army. In the
(15)case of the VRS, the superior-subordinate relationship is laid down quite
clearly in a number of documents, and that particular principle is
well-established.
The second basic principle is that subordinates must report
upwards the results of their actions to inform their superiors of progress
(20)or otherwise in order for the higher command to know what's going on, to
be informed, and for itself to take subsequent decisions to order
subsequent activities. In some armies, reporting is by exception. In
other words, if things are going well, you don't need to keep an endless
pattern of reports going. But it's a basic duty of all subordinates to
(25)keep the passage of information moving upwards so that decision-making can
• Q.: Now, General, in your written report, you identify two principal (5)command doctrines which are practiced in armies of the world, and the first one that you give a brief synopsis upon, and forgive me for murdering the German, is the military doctrine of Auftragstaktik. Can you explain to the Judges the meaning of this and give an example of an army which adopts this command doctrine? (10) • A.: Yes, I can. We use two terms to describe the two principal schools of command philosophy. One of those terms is the one you just used, Auftragstaktik, I'll explain that, and the other term is another German word called Befehlstaktik, and I'll explain that. Under the doctrine -- (15) JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. Could you repeat this, please. • A.: The two words are -- they're both German words, Auftragstaktik, and the other word is Befehlstaktik. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.
• A.: The Germans are always very precise in their definition of these
(20)things, and that is why we tend to use those two words in the sort of
parlance of military command and control to describe those two schools of
thought.
Under the doctrine known as Auftragstaktik, this is a doctrine
whereby a Superior Commander decides what his mission is and sets out his
(25)broad intent to his subordinates and then gives them considerable latitude
MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: Now, General, in your report at page 6, you say that as part of this doctrine of Befehlstaktik, that authority is not delegated; (20)limitations are invariably imposed; the culture is one of seeking authority rather than taking decisions based on one's own authority. Does that mean in simple terms, General, that nothing really happens without orders coming from above in an army based on this kind of doctrine? (25)
• A.: In general terms, that is correct. When you've got a centralised
(15) JUDGE WALD: Could I ask one question along those lines, General Dannatt. Would it also be a characteristic of this kind of command and control, Befehlstaktik, for those orders from above to be usually written? I mean, is there any tradition or expected practice (20)differentiating between written and oral orders depending upon the command and control or the flexibility of the subordinates?
• A.: An order is an order, whether it's written or spoken. Armies tend
to be a little bureaucratic, so a lot does get written down. There's a
bit of a feeling sometimes that if it's not written down, it's not really
(25)true or doesn't really have to happen, so often difficult orders are
MR. CAYLEY: (15) • Q.: Following on from Judge Wald's question, General, within the Befehlstaktik doctrine, there would be, and I ask this as a question, oral orders, presumably following on from a main operations order from a Commander, oral orders could be given to subordinates?
• A.: Yes. A normal process of the deliberate planning phase at the
(20)start of a major operation is for a Superior Commander to call together
his principal subordinates and to go through an oral, spoken process of
giving orders invariably following a set procedure and sequence of
subjects. And that is then followed up by the issue of the written
operation order which underpins and underlines everything that was said in
(25)the oral orders which -- the oral orders process is terribly important in
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, just one question. General, to have one system or another, to choose between the two, (20)does that have anything to do with the level of training of officers? In other words, if I have very well-trained officers, I can choose between one of the two systems; if I have officers or soldiers who are not very well trained, would it be preferable for me to choose another one?
• A.: I think there are two parts to an answer that I could give to
(25)that, sir. First of all, an army is an institution, and it will have
(25)
JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. Just to be able to follow you up very
• A.: Oral orders could suffice, but those oral orders would probably be very lengthy and go on for really some time and would run the risk of (10)error creeping in. So the complete solution to the planning process would be the production and issuing of a detailed written operation order which would specify all the subordinates their various tasks and their timings, and the coordination of one brigade with another and the artillery and the air force support and so on. (15)But it's still important that there is a spoken, an oral order session, particularly so that the Commander himself can get over some of his character, can put over to his subordinates sort of the way that he wants to do it. The military business is a human business, and humans need to interact so that a subordinate understands the strength of intent (20)of his subordinate and understands something of his character. So it's a two-way process. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, General. MR. CAYLEY:
• Q.: General, you just stated at the end of your answer to Judge Riad
(25)that a subordinate needs to understand the strength of his intent of his
• A.: Yes, I did. • Q.: Sorry, just to correct your -- • A.: A junior officer has to understand what his senior wants, and do (5)it. • Q.: General, you stated earlier that the Bosnian Serb army was based on the doctrine of the JNA Befehlstaktik. Why do you say this?
• A.: I said it for two reasons, really. One is having studied in a
theoretical sense the origins of the army Republika Srpska, one can see
(10)its origins in a general and, in many ways, pretty specific sense in the
army of the former Yugoslavia, the JNA. And although the former
Yugoslavia was not a Warsaw Pact country, it was very much influenced by
Eastern Block thinking, and one sees a lot of exchange of officers between
the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, and the thinking of the
(15)former Soviet Union, the Befehlstaktik, the centralist thinking, in
viewing itself in the army of the former JNA and in the army of Republika
Srpska. So in a theoretical sense, I'm convinced that in general terms
that that's where the VRS has its origins.
In all practical sense, operating myself in Bosnia -- and of
(20)course I should also say that a number of former JNA officers didn't just
form the framework of the VRS. To a certain extent and a lesser extent
they formed the framework of the HVO, the Bosnian Croat army, and also the
army of the Muslim government. Therefore, that's all centralist control
one saw in all three of those armies.
(25)And operating on the ground, one saw several examples of the
MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry, Your Honour, we've got used to sort of signalling each other about breaks. I thought you were signalling to me that now would be an appropriate time to have a break.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley, I think it is
(25)the appropriate time before you go into your next question, so we'll have
--- Recess taken at 10.59 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.41 a.m. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley, I think that the ELMO is here again. MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Mr. President. At the break I think the old one was declared dead so they've brought in a Barns Wallace creation which does work. But it would facilitate the public essentially seeing (10)documents which I know is very important. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very good. There will be a death certificate issued for the ELMO, I suppose. I think that we can now proceed. Mr. Cayley, please continue. MR. CAYLEY: (15)
• Q.: General, as you will see next to you, there is a video camera.
The ELMO machine is not functioning. In order to facilitate the public
seeing documents that we're going to use in your examination-in-chief,
they will be put on the table. We may have to manoeuvre the table around,
but it will at least enable public transmission of documents that you're
(20)going to refer to.
Before we move on to the next area of your testimony, I want to
come back briefly to a particular topic that you addressed in response to
a question, I think, from Judge Wald. It was concerning the JNA, the
constitution of the JNA, and you said that the JNA was a conscript army.
(25)The equivalent of commissioned officers, those of the rank from 2nd
• A.: I think what we saw and see is a corps of professional officers, a number of whom were mostly professional officers, were former JNA (5)officers. The more senior ones had been through a formal staff process. And to that, obviously were added a number of officers and soldiers who, through the expediency of the situation and the fact they found themselves in a war situation, found themselves in the army. So on the one hand, you had a corps of professionally trained (10)officers, but the majority of the army were locally recruited, effectively conscripted individuals. • Q.: When you say "a corps of professional officers, a number of whom were former JNA officers," here you're referring to those officers who subsequently went into the Bosnian Serb army; is that correct? (15) • A.: That's correct. As I mentioned also earlier, one found in the army of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims a number of former JNA officers who, by inclination, had chosen to serve with those armies rather than another. • Q.: Now, I'm right in saying that you have been spending time serving (20)with the British Army, with UN and NATO forces, in the former Yugoslavia from 1994 to date except for the year 1998; is that correct? • A.: Yes, I've served at some stage or other in Bosnia-Herzegovina every year except 1998, since 1994. I first went to Sarajevo in February 1994 whether General Rose was the UN Commander there. (25)
• Q.: I think all in all you've spent just under a year in the former
• A.: The time aggregates to about that. The majority of it was in 1995 and 1996, and then a period of time last year; that aggregates to about a year. (5) JUDGE RIAD: Can I just ask a specification. When you said, "the majority of the army were effectively conscripted individuals," what is the meaning of "effectively conscripted individuals"? • A.: By which I meant that the VRS was, in the main, a conscripted army; that people were called up from civilian life to become soldiers for (10)the duration of the emergency. That was where the majority of their people came from, and that was based around a corps of professional officers -- JUDGE RIAD: No previous training? • A.: Well -- (15) JUDGE RIAD: No military education? • A.: Well, obviously everybody is first and foremost a civilian and has to go through some process of training before they become a soldier. I think most of the people that were involved as soldiers in the VRS were civilians before the war, the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, began (20)and had some training, probably rather less training than they would have liked to have necessarily and became soldiers, and therefore had all the characteristics of being a conscripted army. JUDGE RIAD: They were disciplined. • A.: Oh, yes, yes. (25)
JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.
• Q.: General, just to clarify the point that His Honour Judge Riad has raised, are you aware that up until the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, there was a requirement for males to perform compulsory military service (5)in the JNA? • A.: Very much so, and that underpinned the whole defensive philosophy of the former Yugoslavia as a national policy to maintain its own independence. Widespread conscription for military service was common to make sure that All Peoples' Defence, which was their defensive doctrine, (10)could be facilitated by widespread military training. Therefore, a return into the army of the VRS would have, perhaps, not been as much of a surprise for individuals living in that part of the world than it would be, let's say, in Great Britain. • Q.: So indeed in 1991, most males over the age of 18 who served in the (15)VRS would have completed some form of military service in the JNA? • A.: A high proportion would have done, assuming they were fit and weren't in a small number of occupations that excluded them from military service. • Q.: Now, General, just briefly going back to your time in the former (20)Yugoslavia, can you give to the Judges very briefly your opinion regarding the Bosnian Serb army, what you saw when you arrived in country in 1994, 1995?
• A.: My direct exposure to the Bosnian Serb army, the VRS, really did
not start until we began to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement in
(25)December 1995. As the majority of UN soldiers were located and based
(10) • Q.: General, let's move swiftly on to the next part of your report which addresses the command and control. You've titled it "Responsibilities, The Roles and Responsibilities of a Corps Commander and Chief of Staff Generally," and then with specific reference to the Drina Corps. (15)Now, you yourself had been a Chief of Staff in a British Army brigade; you currently have a Chief of Staff who is a full colonel in your division. Can you explain to the Judges on universal principles the role of a Chief of Staff within -- at your level within a division, based on your experience within a brigade? (20)
• A.: The overall division of responsibilities between a Commander and
his Chief of Staff are that the Commander exercises personal overall
authority and takes personal responsibility for all those under his
command. He commands in the fullest sense of that word "command." The
Chief of Staff assists the Commander to exercise his command by
(25)controlling the activities of the command, of the corps, of the division,
• Q.: On page 13 of your report, you state that even though others may (15)be of similar rank to him, to the Commander, he is primus inter pares, effectively, the most senior. Can you explain what you mean by that?
• A.: Yes, I can. And I'm talking obviously about the command and
control system that I am most familiar with which is my own British
command and control system, and that is that within the headquarters, my
(20)current headquarters, my Chief of Staff is a full colonel. There are five
other full colonels in that headquarters. They are of equal rank, but
because he holds the appointment of Chief of Staff, they know he is the
senior amongst those, although they are all of the same rank. Because
he's the Chief of Staff, he holds the senior appointment; hence, he's the
(25)first amongst equals. And that system works both at the brigade level,
• Q.: Now, General, you have looked at various documents that we've provided to you in respect of the general regulations of the JNA. Indeed, we provided to you the JNA 4th Corps Regulations and the JNA Regulations (5)of the Land Army Corps Peacetime. MR. CAYLEY: Those, Your Honours, are Prosecutor's Exhibit 402, tab 3/7 and Prosecutor's Exhibit 410. • Q.: I won't place them in front of you, but from your study of those particular documents, how do you find the role of a Chief of Staff in a (10)corps in the VRS?
• A.: The role of a Chief of Staff within the VRS in many ways is
similar to the role of a Chief of Staff that I'm familiar with and in
which capacity I have acted, with one principal exception, and perhaps I
should deal with that exception straight away. From my study of the
(15)JNA/VRS regulations, the Chief of Staff also holds the appointment, the
dual appointment of Deputy Commander; and therefore, in the absence of the
Commander, either on duty on or leave, or whether it be as a result of
being a casualty, the Chief of Staff by regulation becomes the Commander.
This is not the case in the system that the British Army follows
(20)in that another officer is appointed as the Deputy Commander and the
person who would take over command if the Commander became a casualty.
However, the Chief of Staff still in those circumstances where the
Commander has become a casualty, the Chief of Staff still exercises
command for a short period of time until a new Commander is appointed.
(25)So that is the one difference that by regulation in the JNA/VRS,
• Q.: Now, you state in paragraph 38 of your report that the role of the Chief of Staff within the VRS is a privileged and onerous position that (15)puts the Chief of Staff far closer in relationship and responsibility to the Commander than any other staff officer or subordinate Commander. Can you expand on that statement at all?
• A.: Yes. I think for both the two reasons that I've already given,
first, the Chief of Staff is a first amongst equals; and second, because
(20)he has to exercise command in the Commander's absence, then he has to know
as much of what is going on as the Commander does. He has to orchestrate
on behalf of the Commander the workings of all the staff in the
headquarters, and he is very much the focal point of making everything
happen. And it therefore takes a very special and qualified and
(25)well-trained person to do that and to do it effectively because he is the
• Q.: General, let us move on to Corps or Divisional Commander. You are (10)a Major General. You command a division of the British Army; you've already described to the Judges the military unit that you command. Now, in your report, you state, and I'll read it word for word: "Command is a personal matter in the sense that the Commander takes personal responsibility for all that goes on and is done by all those (15)under his command." Now, that statement does speak for it itself, but could you explain exactly what you mean by that?
• A.: Command is a personal thing in that every Commander is given
orders himself from above and he is responsible for carrying out those
(20)orders and achieving the mission, achieving the intent of his superior;
therefore, in that sense he is personally liable for the success or
failure of the actions of all those under his command.
That, then, flows down in that he must ensure that all those under
his command are doing what he wants done in the way that he wants done in
(25)the manner that he has laid down and to the timings to create the effect
(10) • Q.: Is that principle unique to the British Army? • A.: No, it's not. One's seen that throughout many armies in the world: that when an operation or campaign is successful, the successful General will be given various medals or awards or whatever, but when there is failure, at least personal failure, then he's removed. One can see (15)that probably through, I hesitate to say, every army, but the majority of armies throughout military history. Where it's gone well, the General has been congratulated; where it's gone badly, he's often been removed. It's a personal thing. • Q.: Now, I can't put my finger on it in the report, but you do discuss (20)the amount of time that various -- these different sides of military units take to plan operations. To give the gist of what you say: The higher level of command, the larger the formation, the longer the planning period; the smaller the formation, the less the planning period. Can you explain that to the Judges? (25)
• A.: Yes. I've already explained that a division in my army, for
• Q.: Now, here, General, you're talking about the British Army/NATO
structures. But does this principle apply again universally, the
principle of longer periods of planning for larger formations. The time
(25)periods may be different, of course.
• Q.: Let's move on to the manner in which you, as a divisional (15)commander, make decisions. On what do you base decisions that you make in your division?
• A.: I base the decisions that I make on a number of things.
First of all, I will base it on advice that I'm given by my staff,
and by "my staff," I'm referring to a whole variety of functions within
(20)the staff: the intelligence staff, the operations staff, logistics staff,
personnel staff. There are a whole range of staff functions all of whom
will provide me advice; principally provide me advice on the intelligence
and operations side through the Chief of Staff and on the personnel and
logistics side through the Deputy Chief of Staff. So the staff is one
(25)major input.
• Q.: On operations, are you briefed regularly by your staff? • A.: Yes, I am. When I'm in my main headquarters, which is not the whole time, I'm briefed twice a day formally. Our sequence of events is (10)to do this at 8.00 in the morning and 8.00 at night, when all the principal staff officers gather around the operations table and, to a set sequence, they update me on what is going on in their areas of responsibility by staff function, and also across the geographical area that I might be responsible for at that particular time. That is a (15)comprehensive and a formal briefing which we do, as I say, twice a day, at 8.00 in the morning and at 8.00 in the evening. Now, at other times, I can ask for additional reports, or, indeed, if a subordinate commander has got something important that he wants to tell me, he will get in touch at any time or, indeed, if there's a (20)particular question that I want to ask him, at any time I could ask him. So there is a formal regular process which is supplemented by other dialogue as necessary.
• Q.: Now, you state in your report that you regard it as a major part
of your responsibility to be out and about talking to commanders and
(25)soldiers within your division; is that correct?
• A.: Yes, it is. I can't really countenance a well-trained, (5)well-structured army whereby a Commander could really operate in a different way. In a sense, technology these days is driving Commanders to spend more time in their main headquarters because technology can make the information so good. But I would suggest that a Commander, even because the information was so good he stayed in his main headquarters the whole (10)time, is going to become a less effective Commander pretty quickly. He must get out and about and get a feel for what is going on. • Q.: Now, moving on to the Bosnian Serb army -- again, you viewed the regulations which I won't show you -- based on your review of these documents, can you explain to the Judges how you see the role of General (15)Krstic as the Commander of the Drina Corps?
• A.: I would see him operating in pretty much the way that I've just
been describing. My understanding of the way that the Drina Corps was
constructed, it's similar to my division in that there is a main
headquarters where for most of the time I would expect to see most of the
(20)staff. There is also a forward headquarters, a tactical headquarters, to
which, as a Commander, either I or General Krstic would deploy to for a
particular period to oversee a given operation.
Again, it comes back to what I was just saying. Part of the art
of command, and we teach at the Staff College that it is an art rather
(25)than a science, is to know where to be when; when to be in the forward
• Q.: Now, in paragraph 31 of your report, at page 11, and I'll read from the end of the first line onwards: "... the Corps Commander is fully, and personally, accountable for the conduct of all military (10)operations in the Corps zone of responsibility. Furthermore he is specifically charged to ensure that there is an uninterrupted flow of information and situation reports into and out of his Headquarters. In short, he is required to stay in touch with his superiors and all his subordinates, at all times." (15)On what do you base these two statements?
• A.: I base that statement having looked through a number of the
regulations pertaining to the former JNA 4th Corps, which, to my
understanding, became the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in the VRS and as such
is most probably typical of the way that all the corps of the VRS
(20)operated. I've not seen the regulations for the Drina Corps; I don't
believe they are in the possession of yourselves, or certainly I haven't
seen them. But I have no reason to believe that what I've seen in the
Sarajevo-Romanija Corps would be any different from the way the Drina
Corps operated.
(25)Under the regulations that I have looked at, the basic duties of
• Q.: I think they're clearly contained, actually, on page 10 and 11 of your report so I don't think there's a necessity to go through each and every one, although, indeed, the Defence may have some questions for you (10)about this. We'll just come back to this in more detail later in your testimony, but you have certainly reviewed reports available to the Prosecutor which are going into the Drina Corps from subordinate brigades, and in reviewing those documents, what is your opinion on the reporting (15)procedure within the Drina Corps, at least as far as the brigades were concerned?
• A.: I've seen a number of documents originating from several of the
subordinate brigades which are daily combat reports, reporting activity
going on in their brigade areas to the corps level of command. Those
(20)daily combat reports follow a set pattern, a set format, and they are
broadly common to all those brigades. So what that says to me is that
there were orders and regulations laid down within the corps which told
the subordinate formations, the brigades, when they had to report, and
what they had to report, and the manner in which they had to report.
(25)These appeared to be coming through on a daily basis. Indeed, they are
• Q.: To move to a specific area of command before we move on to the (15)third and final part of your report, are you aware who the Assistant Commander for security was within the Drina Corps? • A.: Yes. We're talking about Colonel Popovic? • Q.: That's correct, General. Now, do you have a similarly appointed officer on your staff who is responsible for security matters within your (20)division?
• A.: Within my division, the intelligence and security function is
delivered by a Major who is answerable to my Chief of Staff upwards within
the staff hierarchy and downwards. This Major has two Captains who work
for him, one of whom is specifically responsible for security and with a
(25)small staff to help him, and another who is responsible for intelligence
MR. CAYLEY: If, Mr. Usher, you could give to the witness Prosecutor's Exhibit 418. • Q.: Now, General, if you could look particularly at paragraph 16 and (5)18, you've looked at all of this document, and the simple question for you is this: Within whose chain of command did Colonel Popovic fall within the VRS? Under whose command did he fall? • A.: Colonel Popovic as a member of the staff of the Drina Corps was under the command of the Commander of the Drina Corps. There is no doubt (10)about that. • Q.: What relationship did Colonel Popovic have with the Main Staff security officer? • A.: Ah, well, that's a different issue, and I recognise the same kind of system within my own army, that at the level above whatever level one (15)is at, there are going to be people in the higher headquarters who also are carrying out the similar functional responsibilities. • Q.: General, could I interrupt you? Because I'll give you Prosecutor's Exhibit 398. You've actually come on to the point. MR. CAYLEY: So if the witness could be given 398, which is, I'll (20)say this for the benefit of Their Honours, is a diagram in fact indicating the structure. I have it here, Mr. Usher. I have a copy if you don't have it available, and if it could be placed under the camera. If the technical booth could focus down. (25)
• Q.: I'm sorry, General, you'll have to read this, it's going to be
• A.: That's all right. • Q.: Now, this is specifically your organisation. Whereabouts is your command, if you could point to it on the exhibit? (5) • A.: Currently, that's my position there as Divisional Commander. • Q.: And above you in -- • A.: In a full NATO deployment sense, that would be a corps, a Corps Commander at the Corps Command level. • Q.: And he would be a Lieutenant General? (10) • A.: He would indeed, yeah. • Q.: Now, under your division you've put "Chief of Staff" and "G2." • A.: Yes, if I could just explain this. It's really what I was saying a moment or two ago. Under the Chief of Staff there are a number of staff branches. G2, it's the NATO nomenclature for the intelligence and (15)security staff, and in my headquarters, that post is filled by a Major, and beneath him he has a Captain responsible for security, and he has another Captain responsible for intelligence. Up here I could be showing a whole series of other boxes of G1 to G9 as it happens, but I think we're just talking about intelligence and security now. (20)But the security Captain is answerable to the Major, who is answerable to the Chief of Staff above him, who is answerable to me. But I think the question you were asking me before is, what is the relationship between the Divisional Command and the Corps Command as far as the security function is concerned. (25)
• Q.: If I could just ask you one question to make things absolutely
• A.: Indeed, the functions are mirrored at the levels above.
(5)Now, the way that it operates is that the security staff, and it
could be the personnel staff, the operations staff, any of the other
staffs, obviously need to do business on a day-to-day basis with the
equivalent staff at the level above. After all, information is always
going to be more comprehensive, probably better, at the higher level. So
(10)if the man on my staff responsible for, we'll say, security wants to ask
security questions that he does not have the answers to, the logical and
first place that he would go to would be to go to the security staff at
the level above him.
I'm at division level. He would therefore go to the corps level,
(15)and the security staff there would be perfectly in order for there to be a
dialogue between the security staff at my headquarters and the security
staff at the higher headquarters. And that's why on this diagram, I don't
know whether you can see it, I've shown a dotted line there, this sort of
line of liaison and dialogue. But that's very different from the solid
(20)line which actually is the command line. The security staff are linked to
me by the solid line. I am linked to the Corps Commander by a solid line,
but down here it's a dotted line indicating liaison, dialogue, discussion,
but it's not a command line.
And, well, in my organisation I would get extremely shirty if I
(25)found that someone on my staff was taking orders from someone on the staff
• Q.: Now, you've read the VRS regulations on the security organ. You've reviewed a large number of documents and, indeed, some intercepts. (5)What was the relationship between Lieutenant Colonel Popovic and General Krstic when General Krstic was the Commander of the Drina Corps? • A.: From some of the material that I've seen, it's -- I describe it as a normal relationship. Colonel Popovic commands or heads one of the staff functions within the Drina Corps headquarters and staff, and I see a (10)certain amount of dialogue, questions being asked, both upwards and downwards. Between General Krstic and Colonel Popovic, in the same way that I might quiz any of the heads of branch of my own staff seeking clarification on certain issues or giving direction on certain issues. • Q.: What would have been Lieutenant Colonel Popovic's relationship (15)with the security organ on the Main Staff of the VRS? I don't want you to repeat everything you've said, but ... • A.: It would have been a relationship seeking advice, seeking the answers to questions, probably ensuring that what was going on within the Drina Corps area of responsibility in sort of security functional terms (20)was consistent with what was going on at the higher level, making sure that there was property integration and harmony with the functionings at the higher level and the functions at the lower level. That is the nature and the purpose of the kind of dialogue that one would expect to see going on, and it's perfectly normal to go on. (25)
• Q.: Was Colonel Beara Lieutenant Colonel Popovic's Commander?
MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be given Exhibit 622 and 661. JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley, your question was, was Colonel Beara -- THE INTERPRETER: Microphone please, Your Honour. JUDGE RIAD: You said, "Was Colonel Beara Lieutenant Popovic's (10)Commander?" Popovic was a Lieutenant or Lieutenant Colonel? MR. CAYLEY: Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Riad. I'm sorry if I misspoke. JUDGE RIAD: So a Lieutenant Colonel. Were they the same grade? That's the point. (15) MR. CAYLEY: Perhaps I should let the witness answer the question. • A.: Popovic was a Lieutenant Colonel, and I'm trying very hard to remember whether Beara was Lieutenant Colonel or a Colonel. The point that I was making, though, was that I don't recognise Popovic of whatever (20)rank as being the subordinate of Beara of whatever rank. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, these are two intercepts. There are others. THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Cayley. Microphone. (25)
MR. CAYLEY:
• A.: The first one, the larger one I'm looking at -- (5) • Q.: Which is 622 for the purposes of the record.
• A.: -- is Colonel Popovic asking to be connected with General Krstic
at Zlatar, and Zlatar I understand as being the code name for the Drina
Corps headquarters.
He was told that General Krstic wasn't there, so he asked to be
(10)connected with someone else. And I see in the transcript of this
conversation reference to the fact of reports, being an interim report,
and really it's Colonel Popovic trying to pass a report to his Commander,
to General Krstic, that particular actions that were ongoing at the time
had been finished. In fact, he says, "I'll come there tomorrow, so tell
(15)the General I've finished the job." So there was obviously something that
Colonel Popovic had been tasked to do, and he felt a responsibility to
tell General Krstic that whatever it was had been done. And that's
normal, and I would expect a subordinate member of staff to want to inform
his General that this indeed was the case.
(20)And the other one is similar. We have a conversation here, and I
see, for example, that it says find this Popovic chap and have him report
to the forward command post. So Colonel Popovic had gone missing for a
bit but was uncontactable, and it was deemed important for him to get in
touch with the command post where, I would presume, General Krstic was so
(25)that he could either deliver or clarify his report or, indeed, receive
MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher. If I could have that exhibit back because
(5)that's the Prosecutor's copy. Thank you.
Mr. President, I don't know whether the Judges wish to ask any
questions on this area at this time, or if you wish me to move to the
final part of General Dannatt's report. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, I think it would be convenient to have a break because General Krstic needs to move because of his leg, so perhaps we can have a 15-minute break now. --- Recess taken at 12:37 p.m. --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, let us continue, bearing in mind that around a quarter to two we will have another break. MR. CAYLEY: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
• Q.: General, if we could move on to the final and fullest part of your
evidence which is command and control operations: the operational and
(20)logistic planning, tactical tempo, headquarters command and control
procedures relevant to this case, and that begins on page 13 of your
report.
Now, you should have Prosecutor's Exhibit 425 in front of you and
this is a document that you've seen. This is a document from the Supreme
(25)Command of the armed forces of Republika Srpska. It's from the ...
• A.: It's a slightly puzzling directive, or part of the directive in (10)that it's not, to me as a military person, entirely clear what it is that the political authorities actually want. My first inclination, I have to say, would probably be to go back and try and seek a dialogue with the originator of this to try and get more specific about what it is that they wanted me to do. When I read the (15)words "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations to create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa," it's pretty broad and it's pretty ambiguous, and as a military person, I wouldn't be very comfortable with that. (20) • Q.: Now, bearing in mind that you've said it's broad, that you would go back for clarification, what kind of operation is envisaged by this particular plan?
• A.: Well, I think what is intended here is that Srebrenica and Zepa
should be captured. I would assume that the reference to "no hope of
(25)further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa" meant
MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 427 and 428.
• Q.: Now, General, this is the preparatory order and the combat order
for Krivaja 95, the taking of the Srebrenica enclave. From a pure
(25)military format point of view, is this what you would expect to see, a
• A.: Yes, the normal convention in planning a military operation is to issue initially a warning order to give advance notification to those (5)units that might be required to take part in an operation, to give them an outline of what they're likely to have to do and when so that battle procedure, as it's termed in the military, getting things going, can begin. And then the main document is what I would recognise as being an (10)operation order issued by the Drina Corps for a significant operation, and it gives, as I would expect, missions to subordinate commands and coordinates the other activity necessary to ensure successful delivery of an operation. MR. CAYLEY: For the purposes of the record, 427 is the warning or (15)preparatory order; 428 is the main combat order. • Q.: Now, I don't want to go through the whole of this combat order, but if you could go to page 3, General, and place that on the ELMO next to you. First of all, paragraph 2 states: "The Command of the Drina (20)Corps, pursuant to Operations Directive no. 7 and 7/1 of the [GS] VRS /Main Staff ..." et cetera. Now, you would agree with me that this paragraph is referring back to the document that we've just referred to, the document signed by President Karadzic, Prosecutor's Exhibit 425; would you agree with that? (25)
• A.: Yes, that is the document referred to.
(5) • A.: Yes, I would. It is perfectly normal at the start of an operation order to review the situation, but also to review the higher orders that have been issued that authorise, if you like, the operation that is about to be described in the main body of the operation order. It provides the context, and as far as subordinate Commanders are concerned, shows them (10)the authority under which the operation is being planned. • Q.: And would the document signed by President Karadzic have been referred to by senior officers in deciding what was the ultimate aim of this operation, Krivaja-95? • A.: I can see no reason why it shouldn't be. It's perfectly (15)reasonable to be done so. • Q.: If you could now go to page 5 of that document, and I want you to specifically address the paragraph which is -- you can see it's in the middle of the screen, "Reserve Forces." What can you say about that particular paragraph, General? (20)
• A.: I think I've got two comments, really. One is in the sequence
which has been followed through in this order and the sequence up to this
point here, has shown particular tasks and missions being assigned to a
number of the subordinate brigades. That's already gone before. Then we
get to this piece here which talks about reserves, and in general military
(25)convention, the subordinate commands that are part of a higher command
• Q.: If I could just show you, General, two intercepts which you've (5)looked at, Prosecutor's Exhibit 504 and Prosecutor's Exhibit 529, and I don't think you have those. The usher is just about to give them to you. And if you could in the context of speaking of the military police -- of the, I'm sorry, of the MUP, of the Ministry of Interior Police, what these particular documents show. And if you could place them (10)on the ELMO, that would be helpful. This is Prosecutor's Exhibit 504. What can you say about this particular document, General? • A.: What that says to me is rather consistent with what I was just saying about the operation order, that we have a military police unit (15)within the Drina Corps task organisation and force structure for this operation that is clearly part of the command and control structure and quite happy to accept and receive orders from the Drina Corps command. As it says here, so that he can give orders to them through the Commander of the Engineering Battalion. This is a means of command and control that's (20)been establish to pass messages to that police organisation through the engineering battalion.
MR. CAYLEY: And this date of this intercept, Your Honours, is in
fact the 12th of July.
If we could move to the next intercept, General, and this is
(25)between the accused, General Krstic, and, as you know already, Borovcanin
• A.: It demonstrates really the same thing, that there is an established command relationship between General Krstic and this police (5)Commander, and they're discussing the operation. And there are aspects of the operation being talked about in exactly the same way that I would expect within a superior/subordinate command relationship, asking for information and giving it. • Q.: Now, General, you mentioned earlier that you'd actually reviewed (10)the regulations which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 420 -- I won't show them to you now; the Defence may well wish to show them to you -- but do you see anything within that particular document that would be inconsistent with your conclusion that these MUP units were under the Corps Command at the relevant time? (15)You have it in front of you now. It's Article 14.
• A.: There is one aspect to it, and that's in the third paragraph of
Article 14: "Police units resubordinated to the army of Republika Srpska
in a certain zone shall be used only for combat operations established in
advance by the Commander-in-Chief or the Minister of the Interior." And
(20)that would indicate to me that it's only legitimate for the Drina Corps in
this set of circumstances to have used those MUP companies while there was
combat ongoing.
That said, what we in fact saw happening on the ground in that
period in July indicated that combat operations were ongoing for really
(25)quite some time, and particularly the combat operations against the Muslim
• Q.: If we could briefly return to Prosecutor's Exhibit 428, and I (15)wanted to review one more section within this -- actually, two more sections. On page 7 of the English translation, there is a direction, "In dealing with prisoners of war and the civilian population, behave in every way in accordance with the Geneva Conventions." General, is that the kind of direction that you would give in one (20)of your orders to your brigades, and what would you mean by that if you said that?
• A.: It's the kind of statement that actually I wouldn't think it was
necessary to place in an OP order. I would like it to be thought to be
implicit in anything that I in my division would order, that my soldiers
(25)would act in accordance with the Geneva Convention anyway. There are some
• Q.: If you could go to the final page, page 9, and if you could place (10)that on the ELMO. Yes, that's perfect. First of all, in paragraph 11 it refers to the IKM-1 of the Drina Corps, the IKM being the forward command post that you've referred to earlier. Is this where the battle would have been fought, in essence, in Srebrenica, where the battle would have been conducted from? (15) • A.: Yes. I mean, as I was saying before, an operation like this would have been planned in all probability at the main headquarters, and then the executive function, the implementation of the battle, carried out at the forward headquarters which is what is referred to here, the forward command post. And that's where I would expect the Commander to be for the (20)majority of his time, other than when he wanted to go even further forward to visit the headquarters of one of his subordinate formations or need to go on the ground and see what was going on. That's where tactical command and control of the operation would have been mounted from.
• Q.: You've also spoken about the need for a Commander to keep in
(25)contact, keep in communication, with his subordinate units, and indeed
• A.: Yes. It's, again, what I would expect: submit daily reports every (5)day until 1800 hours -- the word "until" I don't quite understand, I'm assuming there's a translation aspect to that -- with a situation report at 1700 hours. But what I understand from that, those couple of lines, is that each brigade every day should send a situation report at 1700 hours, and that those daily reports should be at the command post by 1800 hours, (10)and interim reports as necessary should be sent in addition. And although I've referred earlier that some things are standard procedure, in an order like this, this is the sort of thing that could be repeated just so that everyone was quite clear when the daily report had to come. It was as at what time, and had to be at headquarters at what time. That's something I (15)would expect to see in a decent OP order. • Q.: General, this order is signed by the Commander, General Zivanovic. Who would have been responsible for drafting this combat order?
• A.: A large combat order like this would have been worked on for a
period of time beforehand, a day or two or maybe longer beforehand, by
(20)various members of the staff, coordinated by the Chief of Staff, and he
would have overseen the overall drafting of it; and then when he was
content that the order was complete, properly described what the Commander
wanted, he would then have shown it to the Commander and invited him to
sign it. And I understand that General Zivanovic did indeed sign this
(25)order.
• Q.: Thank you, General. We'll move on now.
(10)I have shown to you a video of events in and around Bravo Company
in Srebrenica on the 9th, 10th of July, 1995. That is an exhibit; it's in
evidence. The Defence have a copy of it. And I've also shown to you some
of the testimony of professional officers from the Dutch Battalion who
were present there at the time, in and around Bravo Company or at the
(15)operations centre in Potocari, receiving reports about what was happening
in Srebrenica. There's a large amount of testimony about this. I'm only
going to select three, and I'll read some very brief extracts. I've
already shown you this.
This first extract is from the Deputy Commander of the Dutch
(20)Battalion, Major Robert Franken, and this is what he said about what was
happening in Srebrenica. He was at the operations centre. He was
receiving reports from his company, from the battalion's company in
Srebrenica. He said to my question:
"Q. From your recollection, thinking back now to July of 1995, do
(25)you have any recollection of the number of shells that fell on
• A.: Yes, I remember that I ordered Bravo Company to start reporting every single explosion, and it was -- when we reached the figure of about 200. (5) • Q.: Now, you stated in an earlier response that there was no military objective by this stage that would require this level of firing, and I'll ask you the question again: In your opinion, what was the reason for this very heavy shelling? • A.: There could have been two reasons, but was the same effect: (10)killing people or trying to raise a panic by killing people. And I mean by 'people,' I mean civilians, women and children." MR. CAYLEY: And that can be found, for the purposes of the Defence and the Court, at page 2019 of the transcript, lines 3 to 17. (15)
• Q.:
[redacted] • Q.: [redacted] • A.: [redacted]
• Q.:
[redacted]
• A.: I could, sir. • Q.: Do you know the direction of their fire? (10) • A.: Yes, sir, I could. They fired into the town of Srebrenica. • Q.: Were there any military targets, as far as you're aware, in the town of Srebrenica? • A.: No, sir. Just refugees and a UN base. • Q.: Did you have an opinion then as to the purpose of the firing (15)of the tank rounds into the town of Srebrenica? • A.: I think they wanted to scare the refugees who were in the city of Srebrenica so they would go north to Potocari and they could enter the town. They were scaring them, and of course they were wounding them, killing them." (20)General, I don't want you to comment on the reliability of that evidence, but based on the observations of three officers present in the region at the time, what conclusions would you draw about the artillery that was firing into Srebrenica on that day?
• A.: It would seem to me that the artillery that was being fired was
(25)not predominantly at military targets. My understanding by that stage is
(25)
• Q.: General, you're a professional army officer. In your view, was
• A.: Well, again, it comes back to the issue, what was the objective? If the objective was to defeat the Muslim army in Srebrenica so that (5)Srebrenica as a military objective could be taken, then the use of artillery against military objectives in concert with infantry and armoured attacks is a perfectly legitimate and reasonable way to conduct an operation. But if, however, the use of artillery was designed more to put fear amongst the people and get the people to leave, then I would (10)regard that as an illegitimate use of artillery. Indeed, it is contrary to the Geneva Conventions which specifically addresses the responsibility of military Commanders to not inflict unnecessary suffering on civilians and non-combatants, and it would seem that in the circumstances that was exactly what was being done. And on that basis, to me that's (15)unacceptable. Although, as it turned out, it was actually effective.
• Q.: General, let's look briefly at two exhibits, 445 and 614. Exhibit
445 is an intercept; it's identified as a conversation between General
Mladic and an unidentified male person. And the statement that I'm
particularly interested in is the second sentence in the middle of that
(20)document. If you could place it on the ELMO.
Mladic speaking: "They've all capitulated and surrendered, and
we'll evacuate them all. Those who want to and those who don't want to."
Now, this is a conversation, an intercept, and this is the Chief
of the Main Staff, General Mladic, speaking. What does this indicate to
(25)you about the intent of the operation to capture Srebrenica?
• Q.: General, finally on this point, Exhibit 614, the second page of that document, this is an interim combat report from the 16th of July, the previous exhibit, the intercept, was the 12th of July. If you could place (15)that on the ELMO so that paragraph 6 is visible. This is a document signed by Vinko Pandurevic, Lieutenant Colonel, Commander of the Zvornik Brigade. "I consider that the Krivaja 95 operation is not complete as long as a single enemy soldier or civilian remains behind the front line." (20)What does that indicate to you about the understanding that Colonel Pandurevic had about Krivaja 95, the operation to take Srebrenica?
• A.: Well, the order which had been produced and signed by General
Zivanovic, which we looked at earlier, was a comprehensive order. It was
a clear order. It had been clearly understood by subordinate Commanders,
(25)such as the Brigade Commander here, Pandurevic, and that he did not regard
(5) • Q.: Now, General, we've had General Mladic stating in a radio conversation that everybody had to go; we have a Brigade Commander from the Drina Corps stating that the operation was not complete until everybody had gone. Does that indicate to you some understanding of this plan within the chain of command? (10) • A.: It indicates to me quite clearly that the plan, as I've already just said, was clearly written, clearly communicated, understood by subordinate Commanders who needed to know it, and was complied with thoroughly. Whatever the rights and wrongs and whatever of this might be, it was a successful military operation in terms of being a military (15)operation. The intent was clearly communicated and the operation was thoroughly carried out. • Q.: Overall, and finally on the order, what is your view, your global view of Krivaja 95? What kind of situation were the VRS trying to create by this operation, by this order? (20)
• A.: I think I'd just refer you back, if I may, to my earlier comment
that there were obvious operational-level benefits, campaign-level
benefits, for the overall VRS command and control, Higher Command level,
to remove Srebrenica and Zepa as Muslim enclaves within Serb territory so
that they could redeploy forces elsewhere. That was an obvious and
(25)greatly advantageous objective.
JUDGE WALD: Can I ask one question? MR. CAYLEY: Please go ahead. (10) JUDGE WALD: General Dannatt, would that benefit to the VRS be accomplished or would it be materially diminished if everybody in Srebrenica was evacuated, both the civilians and the elements, the remaining elements of the 28th which were in the column along with the civilians? In other words, if everybody had just been pushed on or (15)allowed to get over the border, would that have made a material difference in these objectives which you're talking about?
• A.: I think the key thing was that there would be no longer a Muslim
population in Srebrenica, because if there was a Muslim population there,
there was the potential for there to be fighters hidden amongst the people
(20)which could, albeit in small groups, have sallied forth, broken out as,
indeed, had happened earlier in the war and made attacks on Serb villages,
and therefore there would still have been a need to have kept a garrison
force around the outside of the enclave, and therefore it would have
denied them the advantage they were seeking to gain of not having to have
(25)soldiers doing that.
JUDGE WALD: But then why this additional overlay which appeared, (5)where they felt they had to separate the men and, even according to their own rationalisation, find out which ones were part of the military and not let them go through?
• A.: I think there are two aspects to that, ma'am, if I can just draw
on them. I think, one, it is not an unrealistic or not an unreasonable
(10)thing to have wanted to do, to separate the men from the women initially,
and if they wanted to make a serious attempt to screen the men, to
establish their identities, to see who might have been, in their eyes,
guilty of war crimes in the past or activities in the past. After all, it
is a known fact that from the Srebrenica enclave, particularly earlier in
(15)the war, Naser Oric and others attacked Serb villages, and they may well
have felt that some of those attacks were outside the norms of war and,
therefore -- and they may also have known who some of these people were
and therefore they might have wanted to try and identify them, believing
that they had a legitimate legal case against them. So that is not
(20)entirely surprising. The fact they didn't actually really do that, I
think, is surprising but perhaps it's a side issue.
Secondly, to separate the men from the children doesn't altogether
surprise me in that we have much evidence throughout this civil war of
exchanging large numbers of prisoners, one side with another. Therefore,
(25)if, for example, General Krstic or General Mladic had had in their
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, I think this is a good time to have another break, another 15-minute break, that is, until three minutes past two. [In English] Three minutes past two. (10) --- Recess taken at 1.48 p.m. --- On resuming at 2.03 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, you may continue. MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Until 2.30, would that be correct? (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: Yes. MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, finally on this area, if -- the usher has disappeared. I need you to be shown an exhibit, Prosecutor's Exhibit 404/1, tab 20. I'll find the page so that we can deal with this quickly. (20)General, this is a debriefing report produced by the Dutch government after Srebrenica. You've seen it before. If you could quickly read paragraphs 5.14 and 5.15, and then after you've read it place it on the ELMO and then make any comments about those two particular sections.
• A.: This is a rather unfortunate paragraph, really. What it indicates
(25)to me is that Mr. Akashi, the special representative of the
• Q.: I'll just read paragraph 5.15 which is the next paragraph: "The
Battalion was," and it's referring to the Dutch Battalion, "however
surprised by the speed with which the Bosnian Serb army commenced the
evacuation of the refugees from Potocari to Kladanj. Unexpectedly, it
(25)turned out the Bosnian Serb army already had large numbers of buses and
• A.: Well, what we now know, of course, means that this should not have been a matter of surprise. We know, we were discussing it a little (5)earlier this morning, that part of the intention of the operation was to remove the civilian population from Srebrenica, and in order to do that, a large number of buses and trucks had been gathered together in order to quickly facilitate the removal of the people. The fact that it surprised the Dutch Battalion in itself is not surprising because they did not know (10)what the plan was. We now know that the plan was to rapidly remove the people to behind other Muslim lines, and the fact that they were able to do it quickly was because it was planned and because large numbers of buses and trucks were gathered together, made available, and as I would expect with a military formation such as the Drina Corps, it was done (15)efficiently, done properly, and it was done quickly. Therefore, it's no surprise that actually it happened quite quickly. MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could now be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 404/2, tab 73, which is a report from the President of the Bosniak Presidency in Srebrenica, Osman Suljic. This is a report from a session (20)of the Municipality Presidency held on the 9th of July. • Q.: Now, in reading this document, General, which is addressed to Mr. Izetbegovic in Sarajevo and to the Commander of the Bosnian army, Rasim Delic, what do you interpret this particular dispatch to represent?
• A.: This, if you like, is the other side of the same issue. The
(25)President of Srebrenica municipality was getting in touch with his own
MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 432 and 433, we can look at these two together.
• Q.: Now, General, there is evidence, which you've addressed this in
your report, that indicates that at the time of the operation on
(15)Srebrenica, on the 9th and 10th of July, there were a number of senior
officers present from the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb army.
Prosecutor's Exhibit 432 indicates that General Gvero of the Main
Staff may have been present. We have no sightings of him but this
document indicates that he may have been there.
(20)Prosecutor's Exhibit 433 indicates that General Mladic, Major
General Zivanovic, and Major General Krstic were in the Bratunac Brigade
area of responsibility. So General Mladic was present on the ground in
Srebrenica at the time. There's also evidence that we've provided to you
that indicates that Colonel Jankovic, also of the Main Staff, was present
(25)in and around Srebrenica at the time of these events.
• A.: No, I don't find it odd in the slightest. What was going on
around Srebrenica at that time was the most significant military activity
(5)going on in the whole of Republika Srpska at that moment, and therefore
it's entirely not surprising that General Mladic, for example, the Chief
of Staff of the Main Staff should have been there to see what was going on
and, indeed, to influence what was going on.
If I could widen it out to a more general military point. The
(10)military often describes the most significant set of activities going on,
the focus of what is going on, as the main effort, and consistent with
what I was saying earlier, that a higher Commander will try and put
himself at the right place at the right time in order to influence the way
that an operation -- the way that a battle is going. Here around
(15)Srebrenica, as I said, the most significant activity within Republika
Srpska was going on and therefore it's entirely consistent that General
Mladic, the overall Commander, the Chief of the Main Staff, should come
there to see what was going on and, indeed, to influence it. He was
supporting the main effort.
(20)The fact that General Krstic was also there, General Zivanovic was
there, that's what I would expect. They, depending on the date here in
Exhibit 433 -- I suppose I should put that there -- that's the 10th of the
July, what I see is General Zivanovic as the Corps Commander, General
Krstic as the Corps Chief of Staff, and General Mladic all being there;
(25)the responsible Commanders in that area. It's a Drina Corps operation.
• Q.: General, let's move on to the next section of your evidence which (10)concerns the movement of the population from Potocari to the Bosniak-controlled area in Kladanj and Tuzla. Now, from general principles, if you, as a military Commander, enter an area with a military force and a large group of civilians gather in a small location as a result of the entrance of that military force, (15)what is your obligation to those civilians as a military Commander, as far as you understand? • A.: Well, under the Geneva Convention, the military are obliged to assume certain responsibilities for civilians when those civilians can no longer look after themselves. When their own civilian municipal or local (20)government structure can no longer look after them, then it falls to the military to carry out that function. The minimum requirements of that function would be to provide food, water, shelter, and medical support.
• Q.: Now, you state in your report that you, as a military Commander,
would actually have a duty of care to those people. Is that an obligation
(25)that you see as applying in this situation in Potocari?
MR. CAYLEY: Now, Mr. Usher, if you could place this exhibit, this (10)large VRS Drina Corps structure. • Q.: General, what I'd like you to do now is to explain to Their Honours, from your own understanding as a military Commander, what is required to move 25.000 to 30.000 people a distance of about 50 miles? What kind of resources, what kind of planning? (15)In your report, I know you've used NATO references for the Staff Branches involved but what I would like you to do is to address this VRS Drina Corps structure. Explain to the Judges the planning involved, the resources involved, and the Staff Branches which, in your opinion, would have been engaged in planning and executing this kind of operation. (20) MR. CAYLEY: So, Mr. Usher, if you could give the General the microphone. THE USHER: Of course. MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: There's a pointer, I think, there, General, you can use. (25)
• A.: Thank you very much.
• Q.: Please, General, if you would like to take your seat. Thank you. General, this is a question that you've essentially already answered but I'm going to ask you again: Is it possible that this operation could have taken place without the involvement or the knowledge (15)of the Corps staff, the Chief of Staff, and the Commander? Is that possible?
• A.: No. I couldn't countenance it, of that magnitude, taking place.
I mean, the way I rather envisage the situation of the Drina Corps area
over these few days is it was a very busy place. One had an attack that
(20)had just been mounted on Srebrenica; we know of another attack being
planned on Zepa; we have the 28th Muslim Division having broken out,
heading off towards his own line, a large column, which is a major issue
in its own right; then we have another bunch of 25.000 to 30.000 people
who are going to be moved to behind their own lines to a place of safety.
(25)There were a tremendous amount of moving parts in the Drina Corps
MR. CAYLEY: In fact, if the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 435, which I think is just a small demonstration of one of the elements that you've just addressed. (15) • Q.: This is an intercepted conversation between General Krstic and Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic who was in, I think, the Department for Rear Services of the Drina Corps staff. What does this conversation represent to you?
• A.: Well, it's a detailed and very clear confirmation of the general
(20)point I've been trying to make. What we have here, and it happens to be
General Krstic speaking in this paragraph here, giving quite clear orders
that 50 buses in total from those various towns that are shown in the
first two lines are to be at the stadium in Bratunac by 1700. They were
needed there because a large number of people had to be moved.
(25)Whatever position General Krstic was in at the time, at that time,
(5) MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 459, which essentially ends the movement of the civilian population. • Q.: This is a report to the Command of the Drina Corps from Colonel Jankovic, a Main Staff officer who we mentioned earlier. What does this particular document say to you, General? (10) • A.: It's essentially a report to the Drina Corps Command reporting that this deportation operation had effectively been completed. In fact, the first line says: "The evacuation of the entire Muslim population from the former enclave of Srebrenica was completed." So it was a subordinate officer who had some responsibilities for part of this operation, (15)informing his higher headquarters that the operation that had been ordered was now successfully completed. It, rather, bears out what I was saying: that it was a major operation that needed Corps-level control, and it had had it and now it was being reported back upwards. • Q.: General, one last point that we asked you to address in your (20)report was the matter of interrogation of men who were separated at Potocari. What evidence have you seen from the documents that you've looked at, from Mr. Butler's report, what evidence have you seen of organised interrogation? How do you understand, as a military Commander, how that kind of activity takes place? (25)
• A.: Frankly, I haven't seen much evidence. Rather, as I was
MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I don't know whether you feel this is an appropriate time to finish for today, since we're now moving into another area. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley, I think this
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.31 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 25th day of July, 2000, at 9.30 a.m. |
