Site hosted by Angelfire.com: Build your free website today!





(Compilation Date 24/01/2003 by Desaster Area)

IMPORTANT! Please read the DISCLAIMER!

Content / Colormap



• Page 2103 - JOHANNES RUTTEN

• Page 2201 - VINCENTIUS BERNARDUS EGBERS


• Page 2110 • • Page 2120 • • Page 2130 • • Page 2140 • • Page 2150 • • Page 2160 • • Page 2170 • • Page 2180 • • Page 2190 • • Page 2200 • • Page 2210 • • Page 2220 • • Page 2230 •





• Page 2103 • {1/136}

(1)Wednesday, 5 April 2000
[Open session]

--- Upon commencing at 9.35 a.m.
[The accused entered court]

(5) JUDGE RIAD: Good morning. I would like to greet the parties, the accused, the technical staff, the legal officers, the stenotypists, and the ushers. And I would like to extend my greeting to the public gallery. (10)Would you please let in the witness.
[The witness entered court]

JUDGE RIAD: Good morning. Before we start, kindly take an oath. We appreciate you very much for coming. Thank you. Now, if you will please take the (15)oath, as he will show you.

THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. Please be seated. (20)Mr. Harmon, you are today our Prosecutor.

MR. HARMON: That's correct, Judge Riad. Good morning, Judge Riad, Judge Wald. Good morning colleagues from the Defence, and good morning Captain Rutten.

(25) WITNESS: JOHANNES RUTTEN

• Page 2104 • {2/136}

(1) • EXAMINED by Mr. Harmon:

• Q.: Could you state your name please and spell your last name for the record.

• A.: My name is Captain Rutten, and I could spell (5)my name, it's R-u-t-t-e-n.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, you're a professional soldier in the Royal Dutch army; is that correct?

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: And you currently hold the rank of captain.

(10) • A.: That's also correct.

• Q.: Now, when you and I speak, in the course of my examination, as I've told you before, it's important that you pause after I ask a question so the interpreters can have time to interpret my question and (15)interpret your answer.

• A.: Okay.

• Q.: Now, you joined the Royal Dutch army in 1981; is that correct?

• A.: That's also correct.

(20) • Q.: And you served in DutchBat III in the Srebrenica enclave from January of 1995 until the 21st of July, 1995.

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: Now, one of your mandates while you were (25)serving in DutchBat was to assist in the delivery of

• Page 2105 • {3/136}

(1)humanitarian aid; is that correct?

• A.: That is correct.

• Q.: And while you were in the enclave, did aid convoys carrying humanitarian aid in the form of food (5)and medicine arrive in the enclave?

• A.: They did -- convoys from the UNHCR arrived in the enclave, yes.

• Q.: Was there any obstruction of those humanitarian aid convoys?

(10) • A.: They had -- first there was a lot of paperwork with the Serbs before any UNHCR convoy was coming in, and during the whole period in the enclave, we saw decreasing, the number of convoys during the seven months we were there.

(15) • Q.: And why were the number of convoys carrying humanitarian aid in the form of food and medicine and the like, why did they decrease?

• A.: The Serbs wouldn't let in more. The situation in the enclave was, at a certain point, real (20)bad and the Dutch LO team, which means the local negotiators, asked for more assistance from the UNHCR, but the Serbs wouldn't let come in no more.

• Q.: Now, what effect, Captain Rutten, did the obstruction of those humanitarian aid convoys have on (25)the population who resided within the enclave?

• Page 2106 • {4/136}

(1) • A.: Everything that was edible, they tried to get. Even where our garbage was dumped, there was a lot of people when the garbage was really dumped, trying to found something edible in our garbage.

(5) • Q.: Was there sufficient food for the civilian population?

• A.: No, certainly not.

MR. HARMON: Now, can I have Prosecutor's Exhibit 85, which is a photograph, distributed, and if (10)the usher could place a copy of Prosecutor's 85 on the ELMO, please.

• Q.: While we're waiting for the distribution of this exhibit, Captain Rutten, was the obstruction of the aid convoys by the Bosnian Serbs something that you (15)saw on a constant basis or did the obstructions increase as time went on?

• A.: It probably increased because we saw less convoys coming in during the period.

• Q.: Now, Captain Rutten, there's been a (20)photograph placed on the ELMO. Did you take this photograph?

• A.: Yes, sir.

• Q.: When did you take this photograph?

• A.: During patrolling in the enclave, on the (25)route to OP Quebec and Romeo, we saw our garbage truck

• Page 2107 • {5/136}

(1)that we hired local, from the local people there, and they had picked up our garbage there. That was dumped on a mountainside, and these are the local people, the refugees that were inside the enclave of Srebrenica and (5)tried to something edible around the garbage that was dumped in the place where you see on the photograph.

• Q.: Did this scene repeat itself every time the UN garbage truck went to the dump site?

• A.: Yes. I'm not the only one that have seen (10)that scene. My colleagues told a lot about it because, yeah, they find it unbelievable that people do that in such a way, as you see here on the photograph.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, when did the attack on the enclave start? What date?

(15) • A.: We had some problems in June, but the real attack on the enclave, from out of the northern side also firing, started on the 10th of July.

• Q.: All right. And tell the Judges what occurred on the 10th of July, as you recall it, and what you (20)did.

• A.: On the 10th of July, we heard during the night some impact just behind the compound, real severe impacts. Later it appeared to be fired from a rocket launcher, an M-77 Oganj that was placed in Bratunac. (25)We knew that because later on our local negotiators

• Page 2108 • {6/136}

(1)saw, during the negotiations in Bratunac, that the Oganj, the M-77, was still in place there. And the day after the shelling, at night we found one of the rockets that had not gone off just behind the (5)compound. The days after that, the shelling started more heavier during the day and it stopped during the night, in the late evening. They tried to bind us, more or less, on the compound so we couldn't get off. (10)From out of the hills of Birici, that's near OP Papa, at the entrance of the enclave, they shot more or less in a lane, which is the road that leads from Potocari to Srebrenica, also on our vehicles or nearby, just to intimidate us and to try to stay -- to let us stay at (15)the compound. That evening, on Monday evening exactly, we heard about our other company that was at that moment B Company in Srebrenica, that the situation was growing out of hand and people, the refugees itself from the (20)enclave, were on the move to Potocari. At that point, I got the order to make a hole at the rear side of the compound in the fence so that we could let people in, not by the main entrance but just at the rear side of the compound, if there was a necessity. (25)That evening, some soldiers of the B Company

• Page 2109 • {7/136}

(1)came along with the first refugees, and we kept them at the bus remise because we didn't want to have too much refugees at that time at the compound, at least I haven't got an order at that time to let the people (5)in.

JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, Mr. Harmon. Captain Rutten just said Monday evening. Was the 10th of July Monday, or was it the 11th?

• A.: I started on the 10th, and that's the Sunday, (10)and the 11th is Monday.

JUDGE RIAD: That was the 11th. Thank you.

MR. HARMON:

• Q.: Now, Captain Rutten, while you were in Srebrenica, what were your normal duties and functions?

(15) • A.: My normal duty was -- I was commander of an anti-tank platoon, but since the means were on the OPs itself and the soldiers also, my second duty was patrol coordinator in the northern area of the enclave and intelligence officer of the battalion.

(20) • Q.: Captain Rutten, you've described heavy shelling in the Srebrenica enclave. Can you tell me, based on your presence on patrols and your experience in the enclave, were there any military targets in the town of Srebrenica or in the town of Potocari?

(25) • A.: There were no real military targets. The

• Page 2110 • {8/136}

(1)military targets that were there were on the confrontation or border line at that time of the enclave. There were some BiH soldiers still, but not in Potocari or Srebrenica itself.

(5) • Q.: What is your view on the purpose of the shelling?

• A.: The purpose of the shelling was, at first, to intimidate us not to leave the compound anymore or to see what was really happening outside of the compound, (10)and to, yeah, more or less it was a terror act because the shelling was not on marked goals, you could say, not on marked military goals, you could say.

• Q.: I'd like to focus your attention on the 11th of July. Tell the Judges what happened.

(15) • A.: The 11th of July, as I told you before, it was in the evening, we made a hole in the fence. Eventually no one came in. We sent out a Red Cross APC because they were shelling on the people that had left Srebrenica, on the way to Potocari. They were (20)accompanied by some Dutch -- by a Dutch group of the B Company that had left Srebrenica to accompany them to Potocari. Because of the shelling they had to stay and they came no further than the bus remise. We sent out (25)the Red Cross APC to give assistance over there to the

• Page 2111 • {9/136}

(1)wounded, and that was at that time the stage. I was with a group near the rear side of the compound, at the fence, waiting if there were probably refugees coming in.

(5) • Q.: Captain Rutten, when did the large influx of refugees arrive at the Potocari compound?

• A.: On Monday evening, finally we closed the fence again, the hole that I made, because no one was coming in. Only a heavily wounded woman we carried (10)over the fence because we had closed the fence then. She was cared for at our battalion hospital, you could say, at Potocari, and brought later in the evening, when she was stabilised, back to Srebrenica again, with a Dutch APC, a Red Cross APC. (15)The next day, and I speak of Tuesday, we were all in a bunker because of the shelling and had to wait. In the morning, I was sent out again because someone was at the main gate and waved with something that looked like a card or a map of the area, and they (20)assumed, the guard assumed, that probably that was a Muslim leader of the Muslim party or whatever. I went out with a colleague, a colleague lieutenant, to see what really was happening. But there were no leaders, there were two soldiers. One (25)was wounded who had a shot through the underarm and was

• Page 2112 • {10/136}

(1)taken care of, before when I saw him, by a Dutch soldier, and I could see that there was a card on his arm and on the card you could see what treatment he had given, the Dutch soldier. We asked him where he came (5)from. He came from the surroundings of OP Mike. And we sent him back to Srebrenica because we couldn't help him. We gave him something to drink and that was the whole of it.

• Q.: Let me interrupt you there. Was that a (10)Muslim soldier?

• A.: Sorry. That was a Muslim soldier.

• Q.: Please continue.

• A.: At that time, I went back to the bunker, reported it, what I've seen, to the operations room, (15)and we -- shortly after that we got a new assignment with a group of almost ten men to open the hole in the gate that I made the night before again. I opened it again and we had to wait for what was going to happen. A new group also came out with (20)Lieutenant Koster as leader and had to go to the bus remise to see what was happening over that. At that time, I heard by my communication means that large refugee groups were coming to Potocari, and the B Company had to leave Srebrenica because of the shelling (25)and the total chaos over there.

• Page 2113 • {11/136}

(1)We sent out, from out of the Potocari compound, a lot of trucks so they could assist to get the refugees to the Potocari compound. At that time, the first groups of refugees came by the rear side, (5)sent out by Lieutenant Koster, with his group of men that were, at that time, at the bus remise, sent in at the rear side. That went on almost the whole day, until more or less 5.00, 6.00 in the evening, and more or less 4.000 to 5.000 refugees we held in the compound (10)at that time. At that time also I got the order not to let in more refugees because the factory hall itself was completely filled up with the refugees of the enclave then, and we couldn't have more people over there. There were prepared some meals of the rest of (15)the things we had for the refugees. Still waiting at the fence and had to close it. I got back, and we got with a few colleague lieutenants, from Major Otter, a new assignment to get together three groups of ten men and to secure the (20)refugees during the night that had stayed outside, near the bus remise. We prepared for that, and as it got dark, we went out to secure those refugees that had stayed outside.

MR. HARMON: Could I have the usher's (25)assistance, please, and could you place Prosecutor's

• Page 2114 • {12/136}

(1)Exhibit 5/2 on the ELMO.

• Q.: Now, Captain Rutten, you've referred to the bus remise. Would you take a look at Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/2 and can you identify what you have called (5)the bus remise on Prosecutor's 5/2.

• A.: [Indicates]

MR. HARMON: Indicating for the record the Express Bus Compound.

• A.: I'm now showing with a pencil where the words (10)say Express Bus Compound. That is that side where I stayed with my group of ten men. In the middle there was another group of Lieutenant Koster's of ten men, and at the Zinc Factory, at the other side, were also a lot of refugees. The group of Lieutenant Schotman also (15)consisted of ten Dutch soldiers with him.

MR. HARMON: So for the record, Lieutenant Schotman stayed on the right side of the road that bisects the Prosecutor's 5.2 in the area of the Zinc Factory, and Lieutenant Koster stayed on the left side (20)of the road between the road and the Express Bus Compound on Prosecutor's 5/2.

• Q.: Is that correct?

• A.: That is correct, sir.

• Q.: Now, did you stay there the whole night?

(25) • A.: We had the order to stay there the whole

• Page 2115 • {13/136}

(1)night. We saw that there were very many refugees over there. We tried to organise it more or less by -- had red/white tape around the whole area, that everyone could see that that was the area where the refugees (5)were kept by us, because we had no other means to do that, and so making clear to everyone that that was the secure area that was under UN surveillance.

• Q.: Now, the following morning, what did you observe?

(10) • A.: The following morning, in the early morning, there was again some firing on the hills.

• Q.: When you say "firing," what kind of firing do you mean?

• A.: Small arms, that was the thing that we heard (15)at first, and later on there was some mortar fire, and we saw some houses burning and some pile of hay that were also on the -- that was harvested by the farmers, was also in flames then. That was to -- I think to make the situation look more worse than it really was (20)at that time.

• Q.: Now, Captain Rutten, let me show you another photograph.

MR. HARMON: And if I could have Prosecutor Exhibit 5/19 placed on the ELMO.

(25) • Q.: Captain Rutten, are you familiar with the

• Page 2116 • {14/136}

(1)area depicted in Prosecutor's 5/19?

• A.: Yes, it's familiar to me.

• Q.: Have you seen this area on the morning you have just been testifying about?

(5) • A.: Yes, I saw that area, yes.

• Q.: Can you tell the Judges what you saw in this area?

• A.: When you look at this area, it was all filled up with refugees and --

(10) • Q.: Pointing to the blue buildings.

• A.: Pointing to the blue building, yes. It was all filled up around here, almost packed up with refugees. And on the hillside, there were some houses burning. There were harvested crops that day set (15)afire, just to -- and when I mean "they," they were the first Serb soldiers that we saw who came down from the hills. And what kind of types were they? The first one that got to me were more or less the Rambo-types.

• Q.: Captain, let me ask you, did you see anything (20)in respect of the houses in the foreground in this Prosecutor's 5/19?

• A.: Some of the houses were burning too that were here [indicates], around the bus remise.

• Q.: And what effect did these objects that were (25)burning have on the refugees?

• Page 2117 • {15/136}

(1) • A.: The effect was that there was a total panic then because the shooting, the fire, and seeing the Serb soldiers coming in from all sides, the people thought that this was -- something really bad was going (5)to happen. We tried to calm down everything, and as the first soldiers came down, Serb soldiers, I spoke to the first of them that looked to me like a leader. I didn't know if he was one. And I said to him, "You can't go behind the red/white tape because it's UN (10)territory and there are refugees under our surveillance there." He didn't -- not he, but also the rest of the Serb soldiers were just laughing and trying to step over the red/white tape and do as they please.

• Q.: Did you see any of the soldiers threaten any (15)of the refugees?

• A.: We had, during the night, a man in a wheelbarrow came in. I knew the man because he was in the BiH army. Now he was in civilian clothes, wounded at his leg, he had a shot through his leg. The doctor (20)that was with me that night cared for him near the bus remise. The first Serb soldier that was more or less what I just called the Rambo-type made that sign
[indicates], a sign along the throat, to the more or less young Muslim soldier that was in the wheelbarrow.

(25) MR. HARMON: Indicating, for the record, the

• Page 2118 • {16/136}

(1)sign being a finger running across the throat.

• Q.: What was your interpretation of that sign?

• A.: My interpretation of that sign, that from that moment on, it was very clear for me that they (5)looked for the man, and it was also very clear to me that the things that were going to happen with the men predicted nothing good.

• Q.: Now, were you still at the same location near the bus remise?

(10) • A.: Yes, I was still at the same location.

• Q.: And you had your squad of soldiers with you; is that correct?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Did anything happen to your equipment?

(15) • A.: We had between some old buses that were shot and completely torn down, we had to spend the night in shifts, and we had our gear there, our bags, for staying for the night because we didn't know how long we were staying. At that moment, the first Serb (20)soldiers that came in stole a part of the equipment, what they could use, and some personal belongings that were in our equipment. I sent out some soldiers to prevent that, but they were pushed away and sent back to me, and said "Get out of here." (25)At that time that the soldiers were walking

• Page 2119 • {17/136}

(1)back, or tried to walk back, there was some gunfire that came down from the hill, the BiH probably, and then the Serb soldiers fired back using a few of my men as a shield. At that time I walked to the Serb (5)soldiers and said that I had to bring my men back. It was a panic situation, more or less. I grabbed my weapon, I pointed it at the Serbs, and at that time they let go of my personnel so they could get back to me. And then eventually the firing stopped and they (10)went on with the stealing from our gear.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, did you make a complaint about that?

• A.: Later, sometime later, I think one hour, I saw our Dutch Captain Matthijsen, which was on the S-5 (15)team, and with him was a Major -- to me known as a Major Nikolic.

• Q.: Was Major Nikolic a member of the BSA, the Bosnian Serb army?

• A.: That is correct, yes. I made a complaint to (20)Matthijsen that we were looted by the Serb soldiers and they were threatening the refugees. I also addressed the BSA Major Nikolic, he said that he could do nothing about it but they wouldn't harm the refugees at that time. And he said that it was very difficult for him (25)to get our stuff back. So I made a complaint but I

• Page 2120 • {18/136}

(1)doubted that that was of any use at all.

• Q.: Now, let me focus your attention on Major Nikolic. Did you know from what unit Major Nikolic came?

(5) • A.: To me, it was known that Major Nikolic was our contact person of the battalion, at least, of the northern part, and in the northern part the Bratunac Brigade was located.

• Q.: To your knowledge, was there another liaison (10)officer from the Bosnian Serb army?

• A.: There was -- to my knowledge, there was another Bosnian soldier that was also there that was called Jovo at OP Papa. That was the contact, the first contact between OP Papa, the battalion, and the (15)BSA, you could say.

• Q.: So if you needed to make a contact with Major Nikolic, for example, you would go to Jovo, who was at OP Papa, and the request would be communicated to Major Nikolic; is that how it worked?

(20) • A.: That is how it worked, sir.

• Q.: Now, at some point in time, did something happen to you and your men, that same day?

• A.: The time the BSA soldiers came in, we had our vests, we had our weapons, and I had my two (25)communication sets for doing my job over there. During

• Page 2121 • {19/136}

(1)the day I got threatened by the BSA soldiers to give up my weapon, my communication sets, and my vest.

• Q.: Now, when that happened, let me ask you to put it in the context of the time, had buses arrived (5)yet in the enclave, or was this before the arrival of the buses in the enclave?

• A.: The threatening started before the buses arrived, and the real -- the real threat later on was when the buses already were coming in.

(10) • Q.: So the event that you just described occurred as the buses were coming in.

• A.: Yes, that is correct.

• Q.: Okay. Now, continue, please, if you would, describing what happened to you and to your men at that (15)time.

• A.: At the point that the buses were coming in, we were threatened, and I at first, had to give up my weapon and my vest and the rest of my things. I sent the men back, because I said, "I don't talk to an NCO," (20)which he probably was, "I need to speak to your commander." And "This is UN gear so I can't give up my gear."

• Q.: Now, did the same thing that was happening to you happen to your ten men as well?

(25) • A.: Yes. And I ordered them not to give up my --

• Page 2122 • {20/136}

(1)I ordered them not to give up their weapons or whatsoever.

• Q.: Did they give up their weapons?

• A.: Finally they had to because they were (5)threatened with weapons and had to give up their vests and their armoury.

• Q.: Did the same thing happen to you? Did you have to give up your weapon and your armour?

• A.: Yes. Also the doctor that was standing next (10)to me, someone, a BSA soldier, probably the commander at least, he looked to me like one, came to me and said, "I need your stuff." There was a soldier next to him, grabbing my weapon, and I said, "I can't do that," and I turned away from him, with my back to him. He (15)pulled his gun on my head, at the rear side, and said, "I need your communications set now." I gave him one, and I grabbed my other one and I made my last signal to my superior officer that I lost my weapon now, and that that had been kept now by the Bosnian Serb army. (20)At that time we were taken -- I was at the time at a small bridge in the middle of the bus remise. We were taken to a place next to the bus remise again with the whole group, and we had to stay there, under the surveillance of two Bosnian Serb (25)soldiers.

• Page 2123 • {21/136}

(1) • Q.: How long did you stay at the location where you were being detained?

• A.: A few hours.

• Q.: Did that include your other men as well? You (5)and the men?

• A.: Yes, that was including my ten men and the doctor that was with me. At that time I saw someone that looked to me also as an officer, and later on he became known to me as the so-called Captain Mane. I (10)protested with him that we were held there, and I protested to him that we had lost our equipment. He didn't even bother to look at me and sent me back to the rest of the group. Later on when he came back, and I say later on, a few hours later, I protested again (15)and I said that we could do nothing more there and that we had to go back to the compound. And finally he said that we could go back and sent with my group two Bosnian Serb soldiers to escort me to the compound again.

(20) MR. HARMON: Could I have Prosecutor's Exhibit 71, please, and could that be placed on the ELMO.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, can you identify the individual on the left-hand side of this Prosecutor's (25)Exhibit 71?

• Page 2124 • {22/136}

(1) • A.: That was the so-called Captain Mane.

• Q.: Now, let me ask you, did you at some point that day, after your release from captivity, did you see General Mladic in the area of Potocari?

(5) • A.: Not the 12th, because the 12th we got back to the compound and we stayed the night over at the compound. But on the 13th, in the afternoon, early afternoon, I saw Mr. Mladic arriving at the compound. And I must correct that. On the 12th, I saw Mr. Mladic (10)for the first time, handing out -- his troops were handing out some bread and water then. That was on the 12th.

MR. HARMON: Now, let me ask if I could have the lights dimmed and if I could have Prosecutor's (15)Exhibit 78 played, please. The Court has already seen this exhibit, but for purposes of showing this witness and putting his testimony in context, I'm replaying it.
[Videotape played]

(20) MR. HARMON:

• Q.: Captain Rutten, that was a very brief snippet of a film that you have seen in my office prior to coming here to testify. Did you see that scene?

• A.: Yes, that was the scene near the road, a (25)house near the road that led from Potocari to

• Page 2125 • {23/136}

(1)Srebrenica. That was the moment on the 12th when Mladic came in, with his bodyguards around him, and there was also a truck behind him and also a firetruck. In the first truck there was bread being (5)distributed among the refugees, and in the firetruck they brought along to give the refugees water they had brought with them.

• Q.: Now, tell the Judges what you saw happen -- actually, let me ask you another question. At the time (10)the candy was being distributed, we've seen the film of at least a portion of that episode, was the distribution of the bread also filmed?

• A.: Both scenes were filmed, as well as the distributing of the bread, the water, and the handing (15)out of the candy to some children near the house. It was only a short instant that they filmed over there.

• Q.: What happened after the filming stopped?

• A.: After the filming stopped, they stopped also handing out the bread, the water, and the candy. They (20)even took back some of it that they gave to the refugees.

• Q.: At any other time while you were in Potocari on the 12th and the 13th did you see the Bosnian Serbs distribute any other bread, water, food, or anything (25)that would help the refugees?

• Page 2126 • {24/136}

(1) • A.: No, they did not. The only thing that got distributed was given by us, and that was some water and the things that we had left for the refugees on the compound.

(5) • Q.: Did the image that you just saw on Prosecutor's Exhibit 78 of a soldier, a Bosnian Serb soldier, handing out candy and the scenes that you saw of the distribution of the bread and the water, did that create a correct and accurate impression of the (10)way that the Bosnian Serb soldiers in the enclave were treating the refugees?

• A.: No, not really, because it was a short moment that they showed some, you could say, mercy to the refugees, but it stopped at the moment the cameras went (15)away. And from that moment on, they started filling up the buses that had also arrived then, and behind the buses, there you directly saw that the men were separated from the rest of the refugees.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, what's your impression of the (20)purpose of that filming of those generous moments?

• A.: To me it looked more or less like a media campaign or propaganda, whichever word you want to use, because it stopped after a very short time. It looked like, to the world and to us at first, that they were (25)showing, as I told you, some mercy to the refugees, but

• Page 2127 • {25/136}

(1)in fact it was all a big play and well registered.

• Q.: Now, Captain Rutten, did you have access to Dutch national television in your compound?

• A.: Yes, we had.

(5) • Q.: And was that through a satellite transmission?

• A.: We had a satellite transmission, but the days that we had to cope with the refugees and when we had to do our task, we couldn't see any of it. But two (10)days later, on Friday, we saw the Dutch news on our TVs, and we saw the same scenes, on which we saw one of them here right now, Mladic with his soldiers handing out candy, bread, and that was what the world saw two days later. We were completely astonished then in our (15)room where we had our TV because, yeah, we couldn't understand that those films were that fast shown to the whole world.

• Q.: And at the time you saw those films, were there any refugees left in and around the compound at (20)Potocari?

• A.: There were none left then, the moment we saw it. It was Friday then.

• Q.: I'd like to show you Prosecutor's Exhibit 28/4, please, and if that could be placed on the ELMO. (25)Before we put that on the ELMO, Captain, did

• Page 2128 • {26/136}

(1)I show you the exhibit that the usher is holding in his hand, this binder with a number of individuals in it, and did you identify somebody in that binder?

• A.: Yes.

(5) MR. HARMON: Would you place Prosecutor's Exhibit 28/4 on the ELMO, please.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, do you recognise anyone in this particular image?

• A.: Yes. I recognise that man [indicates]

(10) MR. HARMON: Indicating, for the record, the second individual from the right-hand side of the image, the man in the foreground with an orange face.

• Q.: Where did you see that individual?

• A.: I saw him in one of the cars that accompanied (15)Mr. Mladic near the compound.

• Q.: Now, let me change the topic and ask you, Captain Rutten, are you familiar with a location known as the White House?

• A.: Yes, I'm familiar with it.

(20) • Q.: Did you go to the White House?

• A.: Yes, several times.

• Q.: When did you first go to the White House? What date?

• A.: First I went to the White House on the (25)Thursday, Thursday morning.

• Page 2129 • {27/136}

(1) • Q.: Okay.

MR. HARMON: Now, could I have Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17 and then 83 given to the usher. Mr. Usher, if you could place Prosecutor's (5)5/17 on the ELMO, and if the assistant could disseminate Prosecutor's Exhibit 83 to the Judges and to counsel before I show it. Could you place Prosecutor's 5/17 on the ELMO.

• Q.: Do you recognise that particular building, (10)Captain Rutten?

• A.: That was what we all called the White House.

MR. HARMON: Now, Mr. Usher, if you could place Prosecutor's Exhibit 83 on the ELMO, please.

• Q.: Now, Captain Rutten, this is a picture that (15)you took; is that correct?

• A.: Yes, that is correct.

• Q.: Can you identify the location of the front gate of the UN compound and the location of the White House?

(20) • A.: This is the entrance of the compound
[indicates]

• Q.: Keep your pointer there for just a moment so I can describe it.

MR. HARMON: Indicating, for the record, in (25)about the middle of the picture, near the road, there

• Page 2130 • {28/136}

(1)appears to be a road that travels from the middle of the picture diagonally to the left, and there is a bunker facility that has a blue flag atop it.

• Q.: And that's the entrance; is that correct?

(5) • A.: That is correct.

• Q.: Now, could you move your pointer to the location of the White House?

• A.: This is the White House [indicates]

MR. HARMON: Indicating a building with a (10)rusted roof on, looks like, a flat field or a flatter area below the hill, and it's to the left of the entrance to the compound.

• Q.: Thank you very much, Captain Rutten. So the White House really wasn't far from the entrance to the (15)UN compound.

• A.: No. We could see it when we were at the entrance and the guard could see it almost constantly.

• Q.: Why did you go to the White House?

• A.: That morning I had a duty at the operations (20)room, and we heard that -- by transmission, that a colleague had seen two buses leave, and the colleague was a Lieutenant Versteeg who saw two buses leave nearby the White House, filled up with men. We had outside several jeeps in place to accompany or to (25)escort the buses when they left the enclave. This

• Page 2131 • {29/136}

(1)lieutenant saw the two buses leave and asked to our ops room if he had to escort those two buses. I ordered him to immediately follow those two buses because they were separately leaving and not leaving with the (5)greater amount of buses that were also ready along the road. At that time he accompanied the buses to Bratunac, and the next transmission we got was the bus is going not on the way to Kladanj, but turns another (10)way, "and I am being obstructed now by Bosnian Serb soldiers to follow the bus." I said to him, "Try to stay with the bus," but it wasn't possible at all because the Bosnian Serbs blocked his car and even hijacked his car, more or less. And he and his driver (15)were later on brought back to the compound. So we never knew where those two buses went.

• Q.: So based on that series of events, did you decide to go to the White House personally?

• A.: I spoke to my company commander and I said, (20)"Perhaps it's good to have a look outside, at what's really happening, because if we get everything through transmission, we might not be getting a clear picture." So I went outside, accompanied by a sergeant major. We took with us a wheelbarrow with water, (25)filled up with packages of water, and went to the White

• Page 2132 • {30/136}

(1)House to have a reason to be there, and tried to get into the White House. As we came at the gate, we saw that, on the left side of the entrance, where the pointer is now, a (5)great, a huge pile of rucksacks and another belongings of the refugees. A few metres further on, on the ground there were all kinds of identity cards, passports. And then you get to the house, and that was guarded, well guarded by Bosnian Serb soldiers. We (10)tried to get in at first but they wouldn't let us. There were also, in front of the house, two Dutch soldiers that had been given stars on their soldiers, that were in effect corporals. Why they got stars, it looked better to the Bosnian Serbs that there is a (15)lieutenant around than if there is just a mere soldier around. We tried to inspect the house but we didn't come in at first. We walked around the house. We got in at the rear side, and I can point it out to you. (20)This is the rear side of the house [indicates]

MR. HARMON: Indicating, for the record, it appears the pointer is on the left-hand side of the house.

• A.: We went in, and that means the sergeant major (25)and I. We had a look around, downstairs and on the

• Page 2133 • {31/136}

(1)first floor, and everywhere, in every room we came, we found on the ground, on the couches, and on the bed, all kinds of photographs laying next to each other. It looked to me whether they were looking for something or (5)some familiar faces or something, and, yeah, the whole house was -- yeah, it looked like if there was just a burglary. And, okay, we couldn't find nothing there. In that part of the house, there was no one around. So we tried to go around the house. (10)I saw behind the house, and that's here
[indicates], behind the electricity pole, some -- sitting on two chairs, Serb soldiers, two of them. I went to them. They sat in front of a little orchard. I asked them whether I could go further, to have a look (15)around. They wouldn't let me. And if I persisted to go on, one of them pointed a weapon at me and said, "Get the hell out of here," so I had to leave. Coming at the entrance again, or I went back to the house and I heard some voices at the rear side (20)of the house, inside of the house. I couldn't see through the window because it was blinded, more or less. I said to the sergeant major, we tried to get in again. We went to the wheelbarrow, we offered the Serb soldiers some water, and that was the moment we could (25)get in.

• Page 2134 • {32/136}

(1)When we came in the corridor, there was a Muslim man hanging at the staircase with one arm. I asked the Bosnian Serb soldier to lower him so he could reach his two feet to the ground, so he would be more (5)comfortable, and at that time, when I was asking that, I went to the right side of the corridor and that was the room that -- where I heard the voices before, and it looked to me as an interrogation room and I tried to get in. But at that moment, the Bosnian Serb soldier (10)put a weapon in my face and eventually he stuck it in my mouth, so it -- I had to leave, so I had to pull back more or less. At that time it was very clear to me that there was something going on, and I tried to get a (15)better picture of it. We got some new water, and I told the sergeant major that he had to stay on the staircase and that I would go upstairs to have a look. At that moment, as we stepped outside, we saw at the entrance new men coming in. The soldier at the (20)gate, the Serb soldier at the gate, said "Throw down your things," made just an arm gesture, and a few metres further on, they had to throw their identity cards. At that moment I went in again, went (25)upstairs. The sergeant major stayed at the staircase.

• Page 2135 • {33/136}

(1)As I came up to the first floor, there were two rooms. They were filled up with, more or less, 50 men, and by "men," I mean men from 45 to 55, and some children, some 12 to 13 years old, all boys. (5)I made one arm gesture, upstairs in both rooms, meaning that they have to sit next to each other so that I could make a photograph. I had a camera with me. I made a picture, several pictures, in both rooms, to have a picture of them and, yeah, to testify, to (10)clear, or whatever it later may be good for, that those men were in that house on that day. I had to stop because new men came in, and a Serb soldier came up. So I put away my camera and went down again, and we left the house. It was clear to me (15)that the moment we left the house, that this was no normal interrogation, as we normally teach our own soldiers, because we let the ID and the belongings of the soldiers, when we take someone into custody, or a prisoner of war, in an envelope, and we more or less (20)mark the person that goes with the envelope; otherwise, you cannot clear or state later what person belongs to the belongings or to the IDs. So it was to me very clear that they wouldn't be needing it anymore, the IDs and their belongings.

(25) • Q.: Captain Rutten, did you eventually see what

• Page 2136 • {34/136}

(1)happened to those belongings that were in front of the White House?

• A.: In the late evening, on Thursday, and in the early morning, they set all the stuff that was outside, (5)the belongings and the IDs, afire.

MR. HARMON: Could I have Prosecutor's Exhibit 84, please, placed on the ELMO. Your Honours have already seen a previous exhibit of these items in front of the White House set (10)on fire, but let me introduce another exhibit, a similar exhibit.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, what is this exhibit?

• A.: This is a photograph that I made, standing on a table, looking over our prefabs that you see in front (15)of the photograph, here [indicates], and what you see is here is the entrance of the gate and here
[indicates], what is burning, is in front of the White House, and that is the White House.

• Q.: Right. The smoke.

(20) • A.: You see the smoke of the burning of the belongings and of the IDs of the men that came into the house, of the Muslim men that came into the house.

• Q.: How long do you recall that fire burning?

• A.: It burned almost for two days.

(25) • Q.: Now, let me just clarify just a couple parts

• Page 2137 • {35/136}

(1)of your testimony about your visit to the White House. You said in your testimony that when you first went to the White House, you went to the left-hand side of it, to the rear, and you entered an (5)area that was apparently vacant, there was nobody in it. Was this White House divided into two portions?

• A.: Yes, you could say that it was a -- that there were actually two houses under one roof, two separate houses under one roof.

(10) • Q.: You mentioned, Captain Rutten, that you saw a number of photographs laid out. Were these photographs laid out in an orderly fashion, or did it appear that they were thrown about at random?

• A.: No. They were laying down in an orderly (15)fashion, and the ones that were laying next to each other were all men and not women.

• Q.: Who did you think had laid out those photographs?

• A.: I think that it was the men, the Bosnian Serb (20)men that were around there and in the other side of the house.

• Q.: Now, let me ask you one point of clarification. You said at one point you tried to enter an interrogation room, and a weapon was placed (25)near your face. Could you describe the man who did

• Page 2138 • {36/136}

(1)that? What was he wearing?

• A.: He was a Bosnian Serb soldier. He was wearing a green camouflage uniform.

• Q.: Now, after you left the White House, Captain (5)Rutten, where did you go?

• A.: After we went -- after that we went to the blockade of four APCs. There I spoke to a local interpreter of ours, a Muslim who lived in the enclave. Admir was his name. And he said that there (10)were rumours from the refugees that there were men killed near a well, near the road, on the Budak side. I asked my colleague, who was in charge there, and that was Lieutenant Koster, that it seemed to me that we had a look over there because under our (15)eyes, more or less, was happening something that we hadn't heard earlier about it or, yeah, we hadn't seen. So I went together with Lieutenant Koster and Sergeant Major van Schaik through the blockade, through the APC blockade, that consisted of four APCs where the (20)Lieutenant van Duijn was around, the Dutch Lieutenant van Duijn.

MR. HARMON: Captain, let me interrupt you there for just a moment. It will be perhaps easier for you to illustrate with the Prosecutor's next exhibit (25)where you went. And if I can have Prosecutor's Exhibit

• Page 2139 • {37/136}

(1)5/3C placed on the ELMO.

• Q.: If you could use this exhibit, Captain Rutten, to illustrate where you started, where the blockade was, and where you went.

(5) • A.: On this image you see that the blockade was here [indicates] and here were the four APCs --

MR. HARMON: Indicating where the yellow line starts, at the other end of the yellow line is an oval shape with the word "bodies".

(10) • Q.: Please proceed.

• A.: Then the three of us went up to where the yellow line starts, go to the right, up along the road. It is a dirt road. Here [indicates] we saw a man running from one of these houses, running down. I (15)tried to speak to him but he ran just away. Further up I saw a woman. I asked her if she heard something about any men or whatever, or a well. I know a few words that I learned during patrolling. She marked at me and pointed further up the road, and what she marked (20)was that there were some killings. She also made that sign along her throat [indicates], that there were some killings up that road. So we went up the road. It's a real bushed area. We saw here [indicates] a small stream at the (25)left side, just behind the house, and there is a

• Page 2140 • {38/136}

(1)meadow. And the moment we saw the meadow, we saw also, along the stream, some men lying there. As we got into the meadow, we saw that the men were shot down. I inspected all the men that were on the ground. They (5)were all civilian men, at least they had civilian clothes on. There were nine of them. They were laying with their faces towards the stream. Two were laying on their sides, as if they had looked back. The rest of them were laying with their faces to the stream. (10)They all had shots at their back, at heart height. They were shots of small calibre weapons. The men were all about 45 to 55 years old. The blood was still running. There were no flies on them. It was very warm that day. So you could easily say that it hadn't (15)been long ago that they were shot. At that moment I said to the sergeant major to pick up the ID that was on the grass in the meadow, in front of the refugees, and I made a photo, one photo, with my colleague, with Lieutenant Koster, (20)sitting on his knees between the dead men, and I made a photo as a whole of the nine men that were laying along the stream. At that moment there was some firing at us, so we couldn't stay any longer there. The moment the (25)firing started, first a shot, I saw a woman running out

• Page 2141 • {39/136}

(1)of the houses that are here [indicates] between the bushes, and she was chased by a Bosnian Serb soldier. At that moment I said to the sergeant major, "Okay. Drop all the ID that you've got in your -- that you (5)picked up, and we have to leave here now." Lieutenant Koster said there was another shot -- we heard something and he said, "The shots are nearby. We have to leave." And at that moment we went again up the dirt -- down the dirt road, to more or less the street (10)from Potocari to Srebrenica. And we tried to get back. At the blockade we grabbed a stretcher, more or less so it looked like we were helping some refugees, and got back to the blockade, to the Dutch (15)side. Some time later, and I think five or ten minutes later, I spoke to the Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans, that I found nine bodies and that I made a picture of them. And I said, "It is very clear now that they do shoot the men that are around," the Muslim men.

(20) • Q.: Captain Rutten, let me just make a number of clarifications on your testimony.

MR. HARMON: For the purposes of the record, in Captain Rutten's testimony, he indicated that on his way up, and before he found the bodies, he saw a man (25)running from the house, and for purposes of the record,

• Page 2142 • {40/136}

(1)Captain Rutten pointed to a number of houses, three houses above the yellow dotted line that are in the centre of the picture, and it was from that location that he said he saw the man running from the houses. (5)Also, when he said the woman near the well who he had talked to who had indicated a direction to travel, it indicated a sign again, the sign that was used by Captain Rutten was a finger going across the throat. (10)When Captain Rutten testified that he saw a woman running out of a house near the trees, he was referring to a location that was in the trees, slightly to the left of the oval shape and before one gets out onto the clear road that leads to the main road to (15)Bratunac and Potocari. I wanted to clarify the record for those purposes.

• Q.: Let me just ask you a couple of other questions in respect of your observations. You personally went down and touched these bodies, didn't (20)you, Captain Rutten?

• A.: Yes, I did.

• Q.: Were the bodies cold? Were they warm?

• A.: No, they were warm.

• Q.: Were there any boys amongst the nine bodies (25)that you saw?

• Page 2143 • {41/136}

(1) • A.: No, there were no boys around.

• Q.: Were any of the bodies that you saw wounded in the head?

• A.: No, none. All had back shots.

(5) • Q.: All right.

MR. HARMON: Now, let me place on the ELMO Prosecutor's Exhibit 82.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, this was in the area with which you were familiar, because this was an area where (10)you had done your patrols; isn't that correct?

• A.: Yes. I'm very familiar with the terrain over there.

• Q.: Now, are you aware that other colleagues of yours had also found bodies in that same area?

(15) • A.: Yes, I'm aware of that.

• Q.: All right. And one of those colleagues was named "Oosterveen"?

• A.: Yes, that was the Warrant Officer Oosterveen.

• Q.: The diagram that is in Prosecutor's 82 is a (20)diagram that you prepared. Isn't that correct?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Could you show the Court using your pointer the road that you took, that was indicated on the previous exhibit, in the general area where you found (25)the bodies that you found, using your pointer.

• Page 2144 • {42/136}

(1) • A.: Okay. This is the road that I used
[indicates], and I went up here. This is the meadow that I talked about [indicates], and here are nine little lines, indicating the nine bodies I found.

(5) MR. HARMON: For the record, there's a rectangle at the top of the diagram, and there are nine parallel lines, and it is the area that Captain Rutten was just referring to. And the road that Captain Rutten took on Prosecutor's 82 is the road that is seen (10)starting on the right-hand side of that rectangle and going directly down, intersecting with a road that leads from the right to the left of the page.

• Q.: Now, Captain Rutten, was it Lieutenant Oosterveen who discovered the other bodies?

(15) • A.: No, it was a NCO, a warrant officer, a senior warrant officer.

• Q.: Senior Warrant Oosterveen. Show the Court the route that senior officer Oosterveen took in the location where he found the bodies?

(20) • A.: Oosterveen went up here, and that is also a small stream, at least when it had rained, there was a small stream here, and he went up here [indicates] and that's where he made his photograph, he said to me. Oosterveen was a staff NCO, so he was not as much (25)outside as we were. And our bodies, as I call them

• Page 2145 • {43/136}

(1)like that, that I indicated on the meadow, is along a stream that flows from the north to south, and there was a water wheel just behind the house. Here is also a stream, but that stream was also -- only filled with (5)water during heavy rainfall.

• Q.: Now, let me ask you this question, Captain.

MR. HARMON: For the record, by the way, the path indicated by Captain Rutten on Prosecutor's 82 is a -- starts to descend below the words "pad Oosterveen" (10)and the line and the route of Warrant Officer Oosterveen again intersects with the same main road in the -- going from the right to the left-hand side of the diagram. Now, could I have Prosecutor's 82 -- I'm (15)sorry, 5/3A placed on the ELMO.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon, do you think 11.00 would be a suitable time for a break?

MR. HARMON: Yes.

JUDGE RIAD: Good. Thank you.

(20) MR. HARMON: This is a diagram, Mr. President and Your Honours, that was introduced through Witness F.

• Q.: Do you see the oval-shaped area in -- the upper oval-shaped area in Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/3A?

(25) • A.: [Indicates]

• Page 2146 • {44/136}

(1) • Q.: Yes, that area. Now, is that area the same area or a different location where you found your bodies?

• A.: To me, when you look at the map, it is a (5)different area because in the drawing that you saw just before, you can easily see that this is the path that I'd drawn there.

• Q.: That was Oosterveen's path.

• A.: That was Oosterveen's path. And I went up (10)here [indicates], where you see the APCs, I went up here and went right at this larger road, went up higher here [indicates], to the meadow that is here just behind the house. And here is the house with -- that house. Just behind that house there was a small stream (15)with a waterwheel.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, do you therefore conclude that the bodies that you saw were different than the bodies that were seen by Warrant Officer Oosterveen.

• A.: Yes.

(20) MR. HARMON: I think this is an appropriate time to conclude.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. We'll be back in 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.

(25) --- On resuming at 11.23 a.m.

• Page 2147 • {45/136}

(1) JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon, you can proceed.

MR. HARMON: Thank you, Your Honour.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, before the break we were -- I was asking you questions about the discovery of certain (5)bodies, and you had testified that when you returned from the discovery of those bodies, you went, took a stretcher, and returned to the compound, I believe. Is that correct?

• A.: No, we didn't go directly to the compound. (10)At first I saw, a few minutes later, the Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans. I spoke to him and I said that I'd found nine bodies in the meadow and that I made some pictures of it. He said that he would give the report to a higher level. And from that moment on, (15)we didn't go directly back to the compound. We stayed around with the blocking, with the blockade, where the APCs are. There I tried to make some pictures behind the APCs, showing what the Serbs were doing and more or less also what we were doing. (20)Looking through the camera I saw a picture that didn't look that good, because one of our lieutenants and our men were actually assisting the deportation of the Muslims, trying to do their best to help the refugees. But looking through the camera, as (25)I said, it wouldn't give too good an idea of what the

• Page 2148 • {46/136}

(1)UN was doing over there.

• Q.: Let me ask you, Captain Rutten, the pictures that you took in the White House, the pictures that you took of the bodies, were those pictures developed, or (5)did something happen to those pictures in the development process and therefore they were never developed?

• A.: I kept the film with me, until I got back in Holland again, after the 21st of July, 1995. Two days (10)later, a day later, in fact, the 23rd, someone of the intelligence branch of the army came to me and picked up the film, and I gave it to him with the idea that it got developed.

• Q.: In fact, you were informed later that that (15)film, something had happened to it during the development process; is that correct?

• A.: That is correct.

• Q.: Now, let me focus your attention back, then, to the next set of events in which you were engaged, (20)and that is the request to escort buses. Could you tell the Judges, did you receive that order and what did you do in response to it?

• A.: During the day I got an order to -- from my company commander to escort the last buses that were (25)leaving the enclave. We prepared for it, my driver and

• Page 2149 • {47/136}

(1)I, to get some gear and a jeep, and prepared and placed the jeep next to the entrance to wait until the last refugees had gone.

• Q.: When you say you placed your vehicles next to (5)the entrance, you mean the entrance to the UN compound?

• A.: Yes, I mean the entrance to the UN compound.

• Q.: Now, while you were waiting to escort buses, did you have an occasion to return to the White House?

• A.: As we waited for the last buses to leave, I (10)told my driver, "It's good to let you see what is happening in the White House," to get as many witnesses as possible of the things that were happening over there. He went with me. We walked around the house. At that time there was at the entrance a huge pack of (15)belongings of the refugees. Also many more IDs and passports were laying on the ground. We went to the side that was empty that morning, that same morning. That side there were two Bosnian Serb soldiers on the staircase. On the staircase itself was filled up with (20)Muslim men. The moment I came around the corner of the house, they looked at me and they had a weapon on the Muslims and the Muslims were handing out to the Bosnian Serb soldiers Deutschemarks, which they had with them at that time. (25)They stopped at the moment that I came, and I

• Page 2150 • {48/136}

(1)walked around the house. In front of the house, there was a balcony that was totally filled up with refugees, all men, and boys in fact. We went to the other side of the house. We couldn't get in then. There were (5)more Bosnian Serb soldiers around, and I think that at that moment almost 300 men were in the house itself and on the balcony. It was completely filled up.

• Q.: Can you describe the condition of those men?

• A.: As we were to the place that I told you (10)before, near the staircase, you could see the total fear, and I never thought that it really existed, but you could even smell death there because it was total fear, what you saw on the faces of the men and the young boys. And that was the thing that I wanted to (15)show to my driver too. Then we went around to have a quick look, and seeing that so many refugees were in the house, we said to each other, "They have to go out here. It's no way to stay here." And I talked to the two Dutch soldiers (20)that were still in place in front of the White House, and they said too, "The house is completely filled up." Then we went back to the entrance and I spoke to some -- one is a Dutch major and a Warrant Officer (25)Rave that was also of the battalion, and we said "Why

• Page 2151 • {49/136}

(1)can't the men go from the house? Because we have to do something at least to get them out of the house," because there was no way they could stay there. "You have to speak to the Bosnian Serbs over there and see (5)whether you could get them into a bus or whatever, because staying there is no use for them." Finally Rave and Major Kingori went to the White House and spoke to the Bosnian Serbs, and some time later, a bus came to get some of the men out, and (10)later on more buses came to get them out again. And they also drove away and we couldn't escort them because we had to wait until the last buses -- yeah, we had to escort the last buses out, so we had to wait. And no one else could escort them because all of the (15)jeeps and soldiers that were escorting the convoys of buses were either thrown out of the buses or pushed out, and the jeeps were hijacked by the Bosnian Serbs. So if we continued the process of escorting the buses, we had no jeeps left. So more or less it was no use to (20)escort them when you lose all your materiel and are brought back half an hour back to the compound, or a day later. And, yeah, the escort hadn't succeeded at all.

• Q.: Now, let me ask you, Captain Rutten, when you (25)said you came around the corner of the White House and

• Page 2152 • {50/136}

(1)you saw Bosnian Serb soldiers relieving Muslims of their Deutschemarks, how were those soldiers dressed?

• A.: Those were soldiers dressed in the green camouflage uniform of the Bosnian Serb army.

(5) MR. HARMON: Now, can I have Prosecutor's Exhibit 28/8.1 placed on the ELMO, please.

• Q.: You've seen this photograph before, Captain Rutten. Let me ask you to -- as soon as it's placed on the ELMO. Let me ask you, during your second visit (10)when you were at the White House, did you see a man who you see in Prosecutor's Exhibit 28/8.1 at the White House?

• A.: It was this man I saw at the White House
[indicates]

(15) MR. HARMON: Indicating, for the record, the man in the brown T-shirt on the left-hand side of Prosecutor's Exhibit 28/8.1.

• Q.: Now, what did you observe him doing?

• A.: He was talking to the soldiers of the Bosnian (20)Serb army. To me he looked not like a plain soldier, because he spoke to everyone who was around. He spoke not only to the Bosnian Serb soldiers but all men of the Bosnian Serbs that came in front of the house, and I mean also private cars that came along containing (25)also some soldiers but in different uniforms, and by

• Page 2153 • {51/136}

(1)"different uniforms," I mean black uniforms, and spoke to them. Some of the cars were coming out of Srebrenica itself and stopped in front of the White House, he spoke with, and some of them came out of the (5)direction of Potocari, stopped in front of the White House, spoke to each other, spoke to the man here on the photograph, and then leave again with the car, again to Srebrenica.

• Q.: Now, did you ever see the men in the black (10)uniforms go into the White House?

• A.: No, they didn't go into the White House.

• Q.: Describe the people, the soldiers, and how they were dressed, specifically the ones who went into the White House and who were in and around the White (15)House.

• A.: The ones who were in and around the White House were all soldiers, the Bosnian Serb army, wearing green camouflage uniforms.

• Q.: Now, at some point in time -- let me ask you (20)this question: How long did you observe the man who was in Prosecutor's Exhibit 28/8.1 at the White House?

• A.: Well, sometime it's difficult to say, but he spoke somewhere between 15 to 20 minutes, he was around there.

(25) • Q.: At some point in time, Captain Rutten, did

• Page 2154 • {52/136}

(1)you leave the area of the White House and did you start your escort duties?

• A.: Yes, later on, when it was clear that the last buses were filled up. The first bus started (5)driving. At that time the battalion had said -- we stopped escorting because it was no use anymore. I asked at my company ops room whether I could go and escort the last to make an attempt to escort the last buses. I got an okay and I drove quickly to the head (10)of the convoy. The first buses were driving. As we got in front of the convoy, we saw in our back mirror, at least the driver saw it at first, that a car, a private car, had come behind us and in the car were three Bosnian Serb soldiers. I instructed my driver, I (15)did it before but I did it again in the car, "The moment we get blocked or whatever or they try to hijack us or whatever, turn the car and drive back because it's no use then to escort the bus or to have an attempt to escort the bus."

(20) • Q.: Captain Rutten, how far had you travelled -- first of all, did you travel in the direction of Bratunac with those buses?

• A.: No, I didn't reach Bratunac.

• Q.: Were you travelling, however, in the (25)direction of Bratunac, from Potocari?

• Page 2155 • {53/136}

(1) • A.: I was travelling in the direction -- and also in the direction of the entrance of the enclave, more or less, and that was with OP Papa.

• Q.: Where did this private car come from?

(5) • A.: One of the small dirt roads between the meadows, along the street, the car drove up, the one behind us.

• Q.: Can you identify or can you describe the people who were in it?

(10) • A.: They were all Bosnian Serb soldiers, wearing also the green camouflage uniform.

• Q.: Okay. And what happened next?

• A.: What next happened was that another car came also from the side of the road and blocked our road. (15)There were two soldiers in it. So we couldn't go much further. And they pointed at us with weapons. At that moment, I gave my driver the sign to make a u-turn and to go back. We hovered more or less along the road, along the side of the road, and got back along the (20)buses that were driving up to OP Papa, and we went back because it was no use getting your car hijacked and not getting your mission completed, more or less.

• Q.: Can you describe the soldiers in the vehicle that blocked your escort vehicle from the front?

(25) • A.: Those were also Bosnian Serb soldiers.

• Page 2156 • {54/136}

(1) • Q.: Now, as a result of making that u-turn, was there any escort for that bus convoy?

• A.: No, there wasn't any escort left at the time.

(5) • Q.: Do you know what happened to that particular convoy?

• A.: I'm not sure. It went on the route to Kladanj, but I didn't know if it ever reached it.

• Q.: How far away from Potocari was it that this (10)series of events that you've just described took place?

• A.: About a kilometre, a kilometre and a half.

• Q.: Had you reached the location of OP Papa yet?

• A.: No.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, did it appear to you that (15)what was happening to you was organised?

• A.: I think that it was well organised, because having no one on the buses, having no UN car around, it was impossible for us to secure the road to Kladanj and impossible for us to see what happened to the refugees (20)which were on the buses.

• Q.: Now, I take it you returned to the UN compound after that.

• A.: Yes, I returned. And the moment I came to the entrance, the major of the staff guard told me that (25)I had to go with a truck and some medical personnel, to

• Page 2157 • {55/136}

(1)go into Srebrenica and to pick up the last elderly people that were left behind or along the road, or whatever, and to get them also on the remaining buses and trucks that were standing along the road, waiting (5)for the last few refugees.

• Q.: Did you follow that order?

• A.: Yes, I followed the order and I went in with the truck, on the road to Srebrenica.

• Q.: What were you driving?

(10) • A.: I was driving a Mercedes jeep.

• Q.: What happened?

• A.: In a turn, at first I saw on a hill some soldiers. We stopped. There were two soldiers next to the road. I spoke to them. They were BiH soldiers. (15)They had no weapons on them, but certainly they were in the house that was on the hill, where the rest of the soldiers were. I think there were at least ten men.

• Q.: Were these men that you had become acquainted with on your patrols?

(20) • A.: Yes, I saw some of them, yes.

• Q.: All right.

• A.: And I stepped out of the car, spoke to them. I said, "It's not good to go to either Srebrenica," and they shouldn't go to Potocari, because it's an enormous (25)risk to go to Potocari. I said, "It would be better to

• Page 2158 • {56/136}

(1)leave the enclave, and the most possible road then is the Bulijen [phoen] area, which is a very wooded area, so you have a real chance to reach the Muslim territory." (5)Then --

• Q.: What happened then?

• A.: Then we got in the car again. First I grabbed out of the car a few food parcels. I gave them the few food parcels we had left because I -- yeah, (10)it's quite a long distance out of the enclave, through the Bulijen area, to Kladanj itself, so they had to travel for a while. Then we went on, and a few hundred metres further on the road, in a bend, I got stopped by the (15)Bosnian Serb army soldiers again, and they pointed at me with weapons. It all got very hasty. They pulled out the driver and they also said that I had to step out. The sergeant that was in the back of the jeep made the last communication message and turned on the (20)switch to another channel, and that was it, because they hijacked our jeep and we -- they said that we had to go further on the road and complete our mission, or whatever we were doing with the truck. I had to explain that we were going to pick up some elderly (25)people, and so on.

• Page 2159 • {57/136}

(1) • Q.: Did you continue on in the direction of Srebrenica in the truck?

• A.: Yes, we went on to Srebrenica with the truck.

(5) • Q.: Did you see anything unusual as you were driving in the direction of Srebrenica?

• A.: It was a total mess along the road. But along the football field, I saw next to the hill, and that's quite a distance, I saw some Bosnian Serb (10)soldiers in camouflage uniforms and some civilian people. But there were also some Bosnian Serb soldiers along the road, and they gave me the sign to drive through and not to stop over there.

• Q.: Did you eventually arrive at UN Bravo Company (15)base?

• A.: Yes. We got stopped on the road several times. They all were men that were asking for all kinds of things from us, and finally we reached the Bravo compound. It was more or less destroyed as a (20)compound itself. The fences were down. There were all Bosnian Serb soldiers looting and stealing the compound of the UN possessions that were around there and Dutch possessions that were around there. They were even driving in Dutch APCs. They were totally filled up (25)with everything that they had stolen. They cleared out

• Page 2160 • {58/136}

(1)the weapon collection point where the materiel was of the BiH that was in the enclave. They drove with a T-54 or 55 tank that they also had picked up out of the weapon collection point on the B Company compound. (5)I spoke to a Bosnian Serb soldier. He looked to me like someone that has any rank whatsoever. I asked him if there were men or women around, Muslim people that were sick or whatever, that I could pick up. They said, "There's one man," and he escorted me (10)on the compound. And as we reached the place where the men could have lain, you could see that they could have had someone laying on a ground. There was a blanket but that was it. There was no man around anymore. So we left. The moment we left, there was (15)also a Bosnian Serb in a black uniform and said, "In the houses are much more people. You have to pick up that people." You know, "We don't go into houses. We just pick up the people that are outside." We found a few people along the road to Srebrenica, elderly (20)people. The medical personnel treated them and laid them in the truck. Some were very old, and they wouldn't leave the enclave anymore because it's no use for them, they said, to leave the enclave. As we drove around in Srebrenica, we saw two (25)dead bodies in the streets. They were completely

• Page 2161 • {59/136}

(1)swollen, probably from the warmth. They were shot earlier, I think. We couldn't stop at all places. At some places I did stop. In front of the great bazaar or (5)supermarket that was in Srebrenica there were some Bosnian Serb men. I spoke to them and they told me, "Don't worry. In a week you'll be in Holland again and you'll forget all about this."

• Q.: Thank you, Captain Rutten.

(10) MR. HARMON: Your Honours, I've concluded my direct examination of Captain Rutten.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Harmon. Captain Rutten, you will now be questioned by the Defence counsel, and I give the floor -- which one (15)of you both will deal with our witness? Mr. Visnjic.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Thank you, Your Honours.

• CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. Visnjic:

(20) • Q.: Captain Rutten, you said, during your examination-in-chief, that you recognised the individual shown on a photograph, Exhibit 28/4.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could the usher please place the photograph on the ELMO.

(25) • Q.: Could you tell us where and when did you see

• Page 2162 • {60/136}

(1)that individual?

• A.: Yes. I saw the man, he was accompanying Mr. Mladic when he was in front of the compound, on Thursday, the 13th of July, 1995.

(5) • Q.: Thank you. Captain Rutten, have you ever seen before General Krstic, who is in the courtroom with us today?

• A.: I have seen him before but not when I was in the enclave.

(10) • Q.: Thank you.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Before I ask you my next question, I should like to tell the Chamber that Mr. Harmon has informed me that the report on Srebrenica, that is, the report on the debriefing of (15)Srebrenica, is a public document, and I shall, therefore, take the liberty of using it in my cross-examination of the witness.

MR. HARMON: Yes. I was going to raise that issue at the conclusion of the examination, but Defence (20)Exhibit D1 was the exhibit that was tendered by the Defence, and the acceptance of that as a public document was deferred until I could ascertain whether, in fact, it was a public document. I can tell the Chamber now that it is a public document, and we have (25)no objection to Defence Exhibit D1 being removed from

• Page 2163 • {61/136}

(1)the protection of the seal.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Harmon. Then you can proceed.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, (5)from that document, from the same report, I should like to use several fragments during my cross-examination, and I should like to ask the usher to help me.

JUDGE RIAD: He will.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Much to our (10)regret, we have the translation only into Serbo-Croatian. But I gave the interpreters the document in the advance, so that I hope there will be no difficulties in this regard.

• Q.: Captain, while you were on duty in the (15)enclave between January and June 1995, did you ever assess the respective strength of the Bosnian Muslim forces and the Bosnian Serb forces who surrounded the enclave at the time?

• A.: I was aware that there was one Bosnian Serb (20)brigade in the north, the Bratunac Brigade, and one --

• Q.: Could you just tell me yes or no now. Answer with yes or no, and then later on we may belabour this point further. So did you make such an assessment of the (25)Bosnian Muslim forces and Bosnian Serb forces?

• Page 2164 • {62/136}

(1) • A.: Yes, we made some assessments.

• Q.: Thank you. Now I shall read to you passage 2.34 of the report on the debriefing, and I shall then invite you to comment on it. "The ABiH forces in the (5)enclave were divided into four brigades with the overall strength of 3.000 to 4.000 men. Their armament comprised almost exclusively light weapons, complemented with inter alia a limited number of heavy machine-guns, anti-tank armourment, and mortars. (10)Although the DutchBat, in compliance with this mission, did all in its power to disarm the ABiH, the battalion succeeded in this only in part. Regular ABiH troops were reinforced by the local police. Their operations were fairly unpredictable because those units had (15)received practically no training and were rather undisciplined. The ABiH forces conducted systematic actions from the enclave, and after that, they would withdraw into the territory protected by the United Nations." (20)Captain Rutten, is this correct, what the passage in the report says, passage 2.34?

• A.: It's partly correct because there were that amount of soldiers probably, but you couldn't call them real soldiers because they were refugees, more or less, (25)placed in duty by a man called -- as you speak of the

• Page 2165 • {63/136}

(1)ABiH soldiers, placed in a sort of a brigade system by Mr. Oric. And you can't speak really of any army, real army structure, but more or less about a permanent group of a few hundred men and the rest were all more (5)or less people, refugees, that were ordered into the army, ABiH army, as you could call it like that, by Mr. Oric, more or less forced. The estimation -- sorry?

• Q.: I'm sorry.

(10) • A.: The estimation of the Bosnian Serbs was difficult for us to make because we couldn't see at the other side of the boundary of the enclave --

• Q.: Captain Rutten, I will come to that later on. I'm sorry for interrupting you, but I should like (15)us to keep, for the moment, this subject in mind, that is, your assessment of the strength of the Muslim forces. The last sentence in this passage of the report of the Ministry of Defence says: "The forces of (20)the army of BH conducted systematic actions from the enclave, after which they would withdraw into the territory protected by the United Nations." Is that true?

• A.: I can't say whether that was true or not. We (25)weren't aware of it. We heard some of the stories by

• Page 2166 • {64/136}

(1)the earlier called Major Nikolic, told by our local negotiation team. But we ourselves haven't checked any such information that the ABiH army was having raids outside of the enclave. For us, the ABiH was partly (5)disarmed and the armament was in the weapon collection point, and partly we didn't succeed in disarming the BiH. But what I have seen of the BiH was that they only had small armaments partly and light mortars -- that was the only thing I've ever seen by the BiH -- (10)and some RPGs, that is, an anti-tank weapon, and that's it. And they had almost no ammunition. Because I spoke to several BiH leaders of the northern part, and I was regularly on patrol, and I never, during my whole period, saw a large amount of ammunition or weapons of (15)the BiH army.

• Q.: Thank you. I should now like to move on to another area, another passage.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Will the usher please help.

(20) • Q.: The passage is 2.35, from the same document, that is, the official report of the Dutch Ministry of Defence, based on the debriefing in Srebrenica. Passage 2.35 addresses the strength of the Bosnian Serb forces and says: "The army of the (25)Republika Srpska had until and ending with June had

• Page 2167 • {65/136}

(1)between three and four battalions belonging to three brigades of the Drina Corps deployed around the enclave. The average strength of the battalion was 250 men. The units were well-equipped and had tanks, (5)armoured caterpillar vehicles, artillery, and mortars. Men in the units were mostly made of Bosnian Serb refugees who had lived in the enclave before. One cannot exclude the possibility that the regular units of the VRS had been reinforced by radical police. The (10)area along the southern boundary of the enclave was not occupied by the VRS, and it was manned instead by combat patrols. The only road in that area was blocked by mines. The VRS used infantry, several offensives of lesser importance because of the structural shortage of (15)manpower. The strength of the VRS was in the use of heavy weaponry. The operations conducted by VRS forces were adjusted to the maintenance of the status quo and of the protection of the Bosnian Serb population in the enclave against the army of BH, carried out, launched, (20)from the enclave."

MR. HARMON: Judge Riad, may I -- I have a copy of the English translation of this, and if counsel is going to ask the witness questions about this particular exhibit that's in B/C/S, may I provide to (25)the witness the English translation of that so he may

• Page 2168 • {66/136}

(1)refer to it?

JUDGE RIAD: I believe that that would be very appropriate. Thank you.

MR. HARMON: And then if it can be returned (5)to me, I can later file a copy or give a copy of the English translation to counsel.

JUDGE RIAD: You will have to see to that.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Thank you very much, Mr. Harmon, for the assistance.

(10) • Q.: Captain Rutten, is it correct what this report of the Dutch Ministry of Defence says, in passage 2.35? Is that correct?

• A.: Yes, sir, that is correct.

• Q.: Thank you.

(15) JUDGE RIAD: Can you read this passage to us, please?

• A.: You mean passage 235?

JUDGE RIAD: Yes.

• A.: "Happening up to and including June, the BSA (20)had between three and four battalions belonging to three brigades of the Drina Corps positioned around the enclave. The average strength of the battalions was 250 men. The units were well-equipped and had tanks, tracked armoured vehicles, artillery, and mortars. The (25)units were manned chiefly by Bosnian Serb refugees who

• Page 2169 • {67/136}

(1)had formerly lived in the enclave. It should not be precluded that the regular BSA units were reinforced by radical militia. The area along the southern boundary of the enclave was not occupied by the BSA but was (5)guarded by means of combat patrol. The through-road in the area was sealed off by mines. A structural shortage of infantry men meant that the BSA launched what amounted to minor offensive on foot. The BSA strength lay in use of the heavy weapons. Operations (10)by the BSA troops around the enclave were geared to maintaining the status quo and protecting the Bosnian Serb population in the enclave from offences by BiH from within the enclave." Reading it again, the things that I have saw (15)myself, in regard to the report, is that it is right that there are -- there were some Bosnian Serb people that lived around the enclave and in the enclave itself, formerly, that we saw on the hills and around the enclave. But by the end of June, we saw, from the (20)OPs, regularly movement of regular BSA army; and then I mean well-equipped soldiers as meant in the report, and not poorly equipped. And there were more infantry men than we saw here in this report. And we saw, at the end of the month of June, more tanks and more artillery (25)placed on the hills around the enclave.

• Page 2170 • {68/136}

(1) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.]

• Q.: In other words, Captain Rutten, the Serb forces began to receive reinforcements sometime in June, in early June, if I understand you well.

(5) • A.: Yes, that was what we noticed. By the beginning of June to the end of June, we saw a build-up of forces.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, if you could, will you please comment on the last sentence in this passage, 2.35? I (10)mean, operations conducted by the forces of the Army of Republika Srpska, right up to the eve of the attack on the enclave. The sentence is: "The operations conducted by VRS forces were adjusted to maintaining the status quo and protecting the Bosnian Serb (15)population in the enclave against the offensives of the Army of BH launched from within the enclave." Could you tell us something more about that?

• A.: This happened all in the south, and what I know of this is, as an intelligence man of the company, (20)was that I was placed in the north, and I only read the reports during the morning sessions of the battalion. What I know is that there was a build-up of BSA forces not only patrolling in the last phase before the enclave fell, but also really entering the enclave, and (25)we did not know at that time that the BiH was launching

• Page 2171 • {69/136}

(1)raids outside of the enclave. So what I mean to say is, what we saw were BiH soldiers defending in the last phase, trying to defend the enclave, and trying to get us helping the BiH. But we couldn't help them, because (5)we were, as UN soldiers, had to be impartial. And we saw a strong build-up by the BiH, and rolling up, more or less, our OPs in the southern part of the enclave, starting with OP Echo.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, my question related to the (10)period before the build-up of the Serb forces. Did you receive any information prior to that about these attacks which the Army of BH launched from the enclave, after which the ABiH men would go back to the enclave? I'm therefore referring to, say, early June 1995.

(15) JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. In the transcript, you mentioned the build-up by the BiH. Is that what you said: The build-up by the BiH, the strong build-up by the BiH?

THE WITNESS: Sorry.

(20) JUDGE RIAD: You said, from something like the seventh line from the bottom, "And we saw a strong build-up by the BiH and rolling up our OPs in the south of the enclave, starting with OP Echo."

THE WITNESS: No, no, no, no. That isn't not (25)correct. We saw a strong build-up of the BSA.

• Page 2172 • {70/136}

(1) JUDGE RIAD: BSA.

THE WITNESS: And rolling -- and the BSA was starting to rolling up our OPs. Sorry.

JUDGE RIAD: I think there is a slight (5)difference between --

THE WITNESS: Yes, there is.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.]

• Q.: I don't think you answered my question.

(10) • A.: I think that I answered your question in regard of the build-up. In early June there was no real knowledge to us at that moment that the BiH was launching raids from out of the enclave on the BSA villages around the enclave.

(15) • Q.: Captain Rutten, to your knowledge, did anyone else, except your battalion, somebody else from the Dutch army, could acquire such information without being a member of your battalion, or being in one way or another -- having to do with your battalion, being (20)linked to your battalion?

• A.: We couldn't go over the boundary of the enclave. We could only see with our binoculars what happened. And we didn't hear about raids, about the BiH throughout the enclave, on Serb villages around the (25)enclave. And I don't know -- at least to me it is not

• Page 2173 • {71/136}

(1)known if there anyone was that had such information.

• Q.: I'm asking you because this is part of the report of the Dutch Ministry of Defence. But let me move on to another question. (5)Captain Rutten, you mentioned humanitarian convoys arriving through the Serb territory. Did you know that weapons had been found in these convoys? Did you ever receive information to that effect, about weapons and ammunition?

(10) • A.: At the moment the humanitarian convoy came in, the trucks were driven by mostly UN personnel. We escorted the convoys from OP Papa to the warehouse in Srebrenica. At OP Papa I saw several times that the convoys were being checked by the Bosnian Serb army, (15)and the times that I was there, there had never been a weapon found on the UNHCR convoys.

• Q.: You said at the time that you were there. But did you perhaps hear from some other members of Dutch forces that something had been found at some (20)other time?

• A.: To my knowledge, and the other soldiers from other patrols that accompanied UNHCR convoys, I never heard that there were weapons found. It could be, but it's not to my knowledge.

(25) • Q.: Thank you. Captain Rutten, did you know that

• Page 2174 • {72/136}

(1)what we call the Bosnian Muslim army, or the BH army, was being armed by receiving weapons from outside the enclave, and that those weapons were getting into the enclave? Did you receive that kind of information?

(5) • A.: Yes, we got some information that there were some routes that came in from the southern part and that the BH army was getting supplies from those routes. And we saw also that there were some new uniforms coming in for the BH army.

(10) • Q.: Captain Rutten, are you aware that part of those armaments arrived by helicopter, and have you heard anything about that?

• A.: There were some reports of our OPs that mentioned that they had seen a helicopter fly over the (15)enclave, but they didn't actually see that the helicopter landed and got unloaded. So no one of the UN personnel, of the battalion, saw really those helicopters unload equipment for the BH army. We saw what I earlier mentioned, that there came some in, but (20)what we saw were mostly uniforms, because they were brand new and, yeah, appeared to us that some materiel was coming in, but not in a large amount.

• Q.: Thank you.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] I should now (25)like to ask the usher -- Your Honour, I won't test your

• Page 2175 • {73/136}

(1)patience much longer. I only have another fragment from this report. The passages I'm referring to are 4.13 and 4.14.

• Q.: Captain Rutten, I shall read out to you the (5)passage numbered 4.13, and will you please just confirm whether you knew about the event which you described in it. "Soldiers of the army of BH, fully dressed and wearing blue berets or blue caps, arrived within 50 metres from one of the observation posts. Operating as (10)UN personnel, they opened fire from that position in the direction of the VRS front line so it seemed that the UN had opened fire. In this manner they tried to draw the fire of the army of Republika Srpska to the observation post and thus embroil the DutchBat combat (15)in operations." Captain Rutten, did you know about this incident?

MR. HARMON: I apologise for interrupting my colleague in his examination, but again I have the (20)English translations of that, and if those could be furnished to the witness, it might assist him in answering the question.

JUDGE RIAD: That would be very good, thank you, and it would assist the Judges too.

(25) MR. HARMON: Perhaps 4.13 and 4.14, which are

• Page 2176 • {74/136}

(1)the excerpts that counsel is referring to could be the only ones shown on the ELMO, since the previous paragraph is not one that has been introduced by my colleague. And I think it would be appropriate, if he (5)wants to introduce it, if we want to introduce it, we make the introduction of that separately. So if the ELMO could only show 4.13 and 4.14, that's the appropriate paragraph.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.]

(10) • Q.: Captain Rutten, were you aware of the incident which is described in passage 4.13?

• A.: No, not this kind of incident. What I see here is -- yeah, there is no location, real location mentioned in the enclave. So, yeah, it's kind of a (15)vague statement, what's standing here. The only thing I can say about our UN equipment was that every time we missed something at our compound, that had gone or whatever, we had an immediate search action that could bring up the last of the uniforms or berets. So this (20)is a very vague statement to me, and you have to give me a location so that we -- so that I can see where it happened.

• Q.: Unfortunately, the Ministry of Defence says only what it says, I mean, using these broad terms, so (25)evidently we shall have to investigate it further.

• Page 2177 • {75/136}

(1)But Captain Rutten, I should like to seize this opportunity, while we have this English translation available to us, to read also passage 4.14. "It also transpired that the BH soldiers were (5)not always recognisable as military personnel. Men who had previously been seen in uniforms fighting in the southern part of the enclave, recognised by members of the DutchBat when they mingled, dressed in civilian clothes with refugees moving from Srebrenica to (10)Potocari, or when they were observed in the Potocari compound. Local women who were known to be members of the ABiH were subsequently also seen in civilian clothes." Captain Rutten, do you know anything about (15)this?

MR. HARMON: May I ask that the English translation be provided to the witness so he can review that. That was a rather fast translation, and I'm not sure whether he got it all.

(20) JUDGE RIAD: Let's do that, yes.

MR. HARMON: If the item on the ELMO could be placed in front of the Captain, he can read it and then perhaps he could answer it.

JUDGE RIAD: Whenever there is an English (25)translation, we'd appreciate having it. Thank you.

• Page 2178 • {76/136}

(1) • A.: I earlier mentioned that I saw a soldier in a wheelbarrow this morning, and it was also a BiH soldier wearing civilian clothes. The same thing I find here now on paper, also that women had been members of the (5)BiH army. Some of them were, really. But in spite of the situation, I would add something. If you know that every BSA soldier looked at the man and makes signs like I made this morning to the throats and had a kind of terror look, and looking (10)through the history, what had earlier happened, about the Bosnian Serb army now facing a problem of leaving the enclave, I myself also would dress up in civilian clothes and leave the army, because what is your chance, really? I would ask the question to you: What (15)is the chance, really, to leave the enclave if you know that you have been shot or will be detained in a house in which you are not being held as a prisoner of war but merely being held up and put on buses and driven out of the enclave? (20)So knowing that, and they also got some intelligence, but knowing that, I would also dress up in civilian clothes and leave the enclave. And what here is on paper, yes, I think that I was in such a situation, I would do the same.

(25) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.]

• Page 2179 • {77/136}

(1) • Q.: Thank you. So you are confirming that this, indeed, happened. Captain Rutten, another thing. You described the place where you found nine bodies. I do not want (5)us to go back to photographs and a map. But could you tell us roughly how far from the place where you found those nine bodies and where Lieutenant Oosterveen also found nine bodies, could you also tell us the distances between those places?

(10) • A.: If I know my way there, and I do, it's more or less 150 metres, maybe some less even, between the places of the bodies. Yes.

• Q.: Thank you.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Your Honours, I (15)have no further questions.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Visnjic. I think we can continue. I will ask Judge Wald. Would you like to have a break? I would like to ask the interpreters, who are very valuable to us. (20)Would you like to have a rest, or can we continue? I'll suggest a 20-minute break. Thank you.

--- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon, you have the floor.

(25) MR. HARMON: I have no questions.

• Page 2180 • {78/136}

(1) JUDGE RIAD: You have no questions. Thank you. I would now like to ask my colleague, Judge Wald, if she would like to ask some questions.

(5) • QUESTIONED by the Court:

JUDGE WALD: Thank you. Captain Rutten, in the beginning of your testimony, you talked about the fact that there was a gradual restriction in the number of humanitarian (10)convoys that were allowed into Srebrenica during some of those early months that preceded the attack. My question to you is: Was that decrease raised with the Serbian liaisons, and what if any justification or excuse did they give for adopting a (15)tougher policy on letting the convoys in?

• A.: Mostly that information didn't come to us, but what I heard of the battalion was that the Serbs were decreasing the number of convoys by simply not giving them permission to go into the enclave.

(20) JUDGE WALD: Yes. But was this raised by your forces, DutchBat forces, or anybody with the Serbs, with a demand for some explanation?

• A.: What I know of is that our negotiation team did discuss that with Major Nikolic and the post next (25)to OP Papa.

• Page 2181 • {79/136}

(1) JUDGE WALD: But you don't know what the reason or the answer that the Serbian liaison people gave?

• A.: No, I don't really know.

(5) JUDGE WALD: Okay. When the UN trucks -- when some UN trucks carried some of the refugees from the Srebrenica proper up to Potocari, and we saw earlier film clips of people on those trucks, do you know where they took them? Did they take them right (10)inside the compound or did they leave them on the outskirts of the compound?

• A.: The trucks? The UN trucks?

JUDGE WALD: Right.

• A.: The Dutch trucks drove up to Srebrenica, near (15)the Bravo compound, picked up there the refugees, and they didn't need to pick them up, really, because they more or less stormed the trucks. They got on the trucks, got even inside the trucks, but up the trucks. The driver couldn't even see where he drove. So they (20)were completely filled up. And then they came to Potocari, and they drove into the factory almost to give them the security that we could guarantee them.

JUDGE WALD: Okay. So they were, to your knowledge, mostly taken at least into the factory (25)compound.

• Page 2182 • {80/136}

(1) • A.: Yes.

JUDGE WALD: At another point in your testimony, you said that you -- I think it was maybe the first night, the second night, were told to secure (5)the refugees on the outside of the UN compound in Potocari. What did "secure" mean? Did it mean simply what you told us about, that you got tapes and tried to tape off the area to at least alert the Serbians that that's where the refugees were, or did "secure" mean (10)something different, that you were supposed to patrol it, to try and make sure that they were not molested?

• A.: With "secure" I meant, and I'll give you an estimate of the total situation, in the south of the bus remise were still remains of the B Company that was (15)securing the south side. At the other side, there were the three groups that I earlier mentioned, the three groups of ten men.

JUDGE WALD: Right.

• A.: We patrolled the site that we spoke about. (20)We spoke with the people, we helped them. My team had a doctor, so to give them the first medical aid during the whole night. And more or less we secured them not only by the red/white tape, but just by being there and walking around, and looking up into the hills, that (25)there was no one coming down. And on my side, that

• Page 2183 • {81/136}

(1)night, no one came down.

JUDGE WALD: All right. Thank you. At another point in your testimony you told us about being actually detained for several hours by the Serb (5)soldiers before you were allowed to go back to the compound, and that was during one of the days when the busing was actually taking place; correct? Now, when you got back from the period of detention, were most of the buses gone by that time, or did the busing continue (10)for a long period after that?

• A.: The day that you speak about is the 12th, and then during -- in the early evening, the buses stopped coming and there were no buses around anymore. The next day, very early, new buses came and the drivers (15)had to wait for the instructions from the Bosnian Serb army.

JUDGE WALD: Okay. You also told us that one of the pictures that you took, or you almost took, in this case you didn't take it, you thought would have (20)not portrayed a, I think you said, good scene because it would have looked as though the UN people, the UN soldiers were actively participating in the separation, in the evacuation. Can you tell us a little bit more about what that scene was, and what was the reality? I (25)mean, what was the reality of the UN soldiers taking

• Page 2184 • {82/136}

(1)any active part in the actual separation and evacuation of the refugees?

• A.: I did make some pictures. I did that first because it was difficult because around the APCs there (5)were also the Bosnian Serbs around. The situation was that they had taped an area in which you could place more or less 60 to 70 people, and that was the UN, the Dutch UN personnel that did that. Then they came in, 60 until 70 people. They were more or less shown the (10)way to the buses, or directed to the buses. And between another line there was standing all the people that were waiting, and in spite of the heat, many people were falling down. Dutch soldiers helped them, stood them up, gave them water, helped women with (15)children, to hand out water and to cool them. So that was the situation at the place. And that didn't give a good estimate of the situation, because what I saw through the camera, and actually I made some pictures, was that the Bosnian (20)Serb army was sitting along the road on all kinds of things, with their weapons in front of them, and we were actually at work there, so more or less helping with the deportation. And I found that not a good way to do that, in spite of the things that I heard from my (25)commander and my other colleagues. Because it looked

• Page 2185 • {83/136}

(1)like we were not an impartial party anymore, and as we had our blue caps on, our blue berets on, we had to be an impartial party. So I told that to my colleague, and that was (5)Lieutenant van Duijn, and, okay, he did see that from a different point of view, but I did discuss that with him. But it went on like this.

JUDGE WALD: Were UN soldiers working with the refugees at the point where the men were being (10)separated from the women?

• A.: No. At that point, that was at the other side of the line of the buses, and there were some Bosnian Serb soldiers instructing that the men are -- had to be separated from the rest of the family.

(15) JUDGE WALD: So there were no UN personnel around that particular operation.

• A.: Right.

JUDGE WALD: When you visited the White House on the various times, did you ever see any signs in (20)there of violence, torture, in the sense of -- we've heard in other locations of blood, tissue, anything like that.

• A.: No, we couldn't see any. We tried to avoid that more or less by placing some UN soldiers around.

(25) JUDGE WALD: You also identified a man with a

• Page 2186 • {84/136}

(1)moustache in one of the Prosecutor's exhibits as somebody who appeared to be, at least at one point in time, in charge, or of a higher echelon, appeared to be engaging with anybody who came in and possibly giving (5)orders. Was that the only person that you had any information, either from your own observation or from hearing, that was in charge of the operations at the White House, of all the men coming in, later on going out in the buses, et cetera? Was he the only one that (10)you could identify during that whole period as having some position of authority as to what went on in the White House?

• A.: There were some more people that I identified. For instance, the so-called Captain Mane (15)that I spoke earlier off, he was at the blockade but not actually with the White House itself. I couldn't recognise any specific leader that I've shown here on the photographs or on maps or whatever.

JUDGE WALD: Two more questions is all I (20)have. As the buses went off, the early buses that had the women and children on them, and went off to Kladanj, did you later on get any reports back from the other side that those buses had actually gotten to their destination and the women and children had (25)actually crossed over into Muslim territory? So that

• Page 2187 • {85/136}

(1)you knew that at least the women and children were -- those buses were going to where they said they were going?

• A.: We had -- some information came in from other (5)colleagues that were brought back, that were on the route escorting some buses. Two days later, some of the -- for instance, Lieutenant Egbers came back, told us about the situation, what had happened there, and also I can refer to our Dutch television, two days (10)later, that we saw actually -- yeah, it's more or less an incident. A woman that we helped, that had something -- a fragment of a grenade in her leg, and she was in a pink training suit. That same woman I saw on television two days later, near Tuzla, and telling (15)that Dutch soldiers had done nothing. So we helped her two days earlier, and she said that nothing had been done. So we knew that the women mostly and the children got to Tuzla airfield. That was more or less two days later.

(20) JUDGE WALD: But while the evacuation was going on, in the two days when the buses were leaving Potocari, did you at that point know that the women and children were mostly being allowed to go across the border, or were you still in the dark as to what (25)happened to them?

• Page 2188 • {86/136}

(1) • A.: We were still in the dark, as you called it.

JUDGE WALD: Okay. My last question has to do with the two excerpts from the Dutch Ministry debriefing, because I had a little trouble. I think (5)you, in the main, agreed with these, but I had a little trouble understanding how they came together. In one of those, it was said, I believe, although I don't have the English translation here, that sometimes the Muslims inside the enclave, inside (10)the Srebrenica enclave, were helped by the local police. And then the second part of my question is: Later on, in the second excerpt that Mr. Visnjic read, it said that some parts of the VRS were, in fact the (15)soldiers, were supplemented by something called the radical police. What I'm trying to get at is, in your observations in Srebrenica, were the local police allied with one side or the other, and if so which side?

(20) • A.: The local police that were still in Srebrenica, in the enclave itself, consisted only of Muslim people. So there must be some ties there because I can't conclude any other.

JUDGE WALD: Okay. So when the second (25)excerpt talked about the Serb army being supplemented

• Page 2189 • {87/136}

(1)by the radical police, that's something different, in your view?

• A.: Yes, that's something different.

JUDGE WALD: Okay. Thank you very much.

(5) JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Judge Wald. Captain Rutten, I also have some questions to ask you, after listening to your very clear testimony. I would like to make sure that I understood the main lines of your testimony. (10)First, in your answer to the Defence counsel, Mr. Visnjic, you told him that the BiH army, you cannot speak of a real army structure. It was refugees collected by Mr. Oric with small arms. Now, I'm going to ask you the same question (15)concerning the Bosnian Serb army. What would you say?

• A.: I would say totally different. They were well structured. As I tried to say before to the Defence, in the northern part, there was the Bratunac Brigade, for instance; in the south, the Milici (20)Brigade, all parts of the Drina Corps. We had some information about that, but not all that specific. But you could see during the whole operation that -- and by that I meant the things that I really saw myself -- that everything was well prepared and a well preplanned (25)machinery that you could see from the moment of the

• Page 2190 • {88/136}

(1)arrival, and the time before you could also see that. Everything was well planned, was well overthought. You could see that everything and every man knew exactly what to do. (5)They even had signs at their -- like me, to show that I'm a captain or whatever. Everyone knew who the other was. In fact, that is the perfect way to work with each other and also is a perfect way that your opponent, or an impartial party, can never (10)recognise any of your people at all, because they all told us all kinds of nicknames. So as I refer to this so-called Mr. Mane. Mr. Mane is a well-known nickname with the Serbs. So you see all kinds of things with the structure, and thinking about it, it's almost like, (15)yeah, that it was all well prepared and preplanned.

JUDGE RIAD: Good. Well planned. And what about the chain of command or orders, was it, in your assessment as a military man, conformed to the military rules, obeying the superior and orders going down in a (20)chain?

• A.: The things that I saw were that the ones that were in command only have to say things once, and everyone understood what he meant or what the senior commander meant. So you could easily tell then who was (25)in control. So it was well-structured, as I said

• Page 2191 • {89/136}

(1)before.

JUDGE RIAD: According to your testimony, you went through -- I mean, this is really the thrust of your testimony -- you went through two main difficult (5)experiences. The one is concerning the UN, or the DutchBat, the UN representative soldiers, and I noted sometime some of your descriptions, you said that your soldiers were used as shields sometimes. I'll take them in order. Were any of them killed or touched as (10)shields?

• A.: Not at that moment that I described.

JUDGE RIAD: But they were used later. They were touched later.

• A.: Yes.

(15) JUDGE RIAD: And some were hurt?

• A.: No. No one got hurt at that time.

JUDGE RIAD: But they were used?

• A.: They were used, yes.

JUDGE RIAD: The UN soldiers representing the (20)International Community.

• A.: Yes.

JUDGE RIAD: And I'm now going gradually. You were laughed at when you always interfered and wanted just to put things in order or to request (25)something, you were just laughed at and ridiculed.

• Page 2192 • {90/136}

(1) • A.: Yes.

JUDGE RIAD: And then going further, you were looted.

• A.: Yes, that's also right, sir.

(5) JUDGE RIAD: Your jeeps were hijacked.

• A.: That's also right.

JUDGE RIAD: And to go further, you sometimes had a pistol at your neck.

• A.: Yes, also my neck, my mouth, everywhere.

(10) JUDGE RIAD: And do you think that was serious, or they were just joking with you? How did you take it then?

• A.: I think that it was serious. Walking around for some time and trying to get some information, as I (15)did, they knew exactly who they had to send away, and some of them they couldn't send away easily just by telling them, so they had to be more specific, if I can call it like that, by placing, for instance, a weapon in their face. And it was serious -- it was serious (20)threats.

JUDGE RIAD: Did you consider that your life could be in danger --

• A.: Yes.

JUDGE RIAD: -- if you did your job?

(25) • A.: Yes.

• Page 2193 • {91/136}

(1) JUDGE RIAD: Now, did you raise the matter to the superiors? And whom did you raise it to?

• A.: The moment that our things at the bus remise were looted, sometime afterward, there was a Dutch (5)Captain Melchers who accompanied this so-called Mr. Nikolic. I said that we were not only looted, but also being threatened by the BSA, and he said, "No, we don't do that, and if you all keep quiet, nothing is going to happen." So more or less he said also the same thing (10)as the other soldiers and the other commanders, that, yeah, he ridiculed it, more or less.

JUDGE RIAD: And after your complaints, the same thing was repeated?

• A.: Yes.

(15) JUDGE RIAD: It did not stop?

• A.: It did not stop.

JUDGE RIAD: And in other places.

• A.: Yes. It did not stop as well.

JUDGE RIAD: So you felt that there was a (20)general attitude systematically applied.

• A.: Yes, it was systematically, yes.

JUDGE RIAD: In spite of the complaints.

• A.: In spite of the complaints, Your Honour.

JUDGE RIAD: Now, I just wanted to make sure (25)that you were not falling into the hands of some

• Page 2194 • {92/136}

(1)undisciplined soldiers who did not know who you were and whom you represented.

• A.: They knew exactly who I was, they even asked me for my rank, and they knew exactly who was in (5)charge. They could see that. They easily -- they didn't speak to the soldiers. They more or less addressed always the lieutenants that were around. So they knew exactly what they were doing.

JUDGE RIAD: The second line, of course, of (10)your experience was the fate of the Muslims of Srebrenica. You were an eyewitness of nine corpses, nine dead people.

• A.: Yes, yes.

JUDGE RIAD: Apparently freshly killed. And (15)you saw in the White House what you called the smell of death, and you saw children of 13 years old. So they reached that age of 13 years old, the children?

• A.: My estimation at that time was 12, 13, some maybe 14, but not all of them. They were also in the (20)house with the older men, yes, that's right.

JUDGE RIAD: And you did not know what was their fate afterwards?

• A.: Later on I heard, but not at that moment. But seeing the whole structure of it, when you're (25)standing at the fence in front of the house seeing the

• Page 2195 • {93/136}

(1)steps, one after each other, by throwing off their rucksacks, throwing down on the ground their belongings, and as I said earlier, it's no -- it was very clear that there needn't be any identification on (5)the persons. There just was a point where they collected all men together, and at that point they tried to get them on the buses to anywhere, I don't know.

JUDGE RIAD: But on the face of it, they were (10)supposed to be checked to know -- I mean, apparently they went to the White House for inquiry.

• A.: Yes, that was the story, but this morning I also told that when you do a proper inquiry, you always leave the ID with the person or you mark envelopes or (15)whatever, just to get a system in it, to recognise who's who in the house. And if you only throw back the stuff on the ground and go into the house, then you never can be sure who's in the house or to interrogate or whatever.

(20) JUDGE RIAD: So it was indiscriminate, in your opinion.

• A.: Yes.

JUDGE RIAD: Completely.

• A.: Completely.

(25) JUDGE RIAD: It was just because they were

• Page 2196 • {94/136}

(1)men.

• A.: Yes, I think that just -- that was the main reason, and you could see it at the beginning of the line of the buses, the immediate separation of the (5)soldiers -- of the men by Bosnian Serb soldiers, the dividing of the families almost immediately at the moment that they got walking to the buses, to the White House. That was a well-planned and well -- almost, I would almost say well-rehearsed is the word for it.

(10) JUDGE RIAD: But the women were left out.

• A.: Women were left out. Women, very old men, and --

JUDGE RIAD: And the children?

• A.: -- and the children.

(15) JUDGE RIAD: Children under 13.

• A.: Yes, and very young children, yes.

JUDGE RIAD: Now, about women, you happen to have seen yourself a woman running, chased by a Serb soldier. Was she running out of her house? Was he (20)dragging her out of her house? What exactly was the scene?

• A.: The scene was that the woman ran out, probably out of her house, I don't know really, but she ran out of the house, and shortly after, almost (25)directly, a Serb soldier came after her, in a

• Page 2197 • {95/136}

(1)camouflage uniform, and chased her around the house. And that was what I saw at an instant. And then we had some shots on the spot where we were taking photographs, so I saw nothing more of it.

(5) JUDGE RIAD: That was for looting for rape or for what?

• A.: I couldn't make out of that situation what was really happening. Just a woman being chased by a Bosnian Serb soldier.

(10) JUDGE RIAD: Was that the only case you saw during your stay there, the only case where women were chased?

• A.: Yes, that was the only case that I saw that, yes.

(15) JUDGE RIAD: Or heard of?

• A.: I heard about some more things, but I can't state them, really, here now.

JUDGE RIAD: Perhaps my last question. Of course, you could not follow at all the buses which (20)were taking the refugees, and at a certain moment they would hijack your jeeps. Did you know afterwards where these buses went and what happened to them?

• A.: We were told that all buses were going on the route to Kladanj, but we did never know, because it (25)wasn't a secure route and the men that were on the

• Page 2198 • {96/136}

(1)route of our battalion were held in houses, so we never were really sure what happened with the refugees in the buses because it wasn't a UN-secured road. It was under the surveillance of the Bosnian Serb army. So we (5)had to wait and see who was coming in near Kladanj.

JUDGE RIAD: And was there anything? Later was anything found?

• A.: There was -- as we saw later and heard later, there were people coming in finally at Tuzla airbase, (10)and they were all refugees from the Srebrenica enclave.

JUDGE RIAD: Men or women or old people?

• A.: Only women, children, small children, and some very old men.

(15) JUDGE RIAD: But the other men, nothing in sight?

• A.: No. There were -- in the first -- one of the first convoys, you can call them like that, there were two Dutch officers with it, and it was Major Boering (20)and a Captain Voerman, and they saw many refugees coming in at Tuzla airbase, and that was only the women, very old men, and children.

JUDGE RIAD: Nothing discovered concerning the men who were taken apart?

(25) • A.: No, they didn't discover anything because

• Page 2199 • {97/136}

(1)they were also held at the convoy route and then at Tuzla airbase, so they couldn't see anything else, just the bus they were riding with.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, Captain (5)Rutten. I think this ends our witness, and he can walk out.
[Trial Chamber confers]

MR. HARMON: Judge Riad, I would move into (10)evidence Prosecutor's Exhibits 82 through 85 and Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/3C.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Visnjic, do you have any comments?

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, (15)no objections, but I would like to use the opportunity also to tender three exhibits which we have offered, as Defence Exhibits 11, 12, and 13.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon?

MR. HARMON: We have no objection.

(20) JUDGE RIAD: Then we'll accept all these exhibits. Thank you. I would like to thank you again, Captain Rutten, for your help to the Tribunal.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
(25) [The witness withdrew]

• Page 2200 • {98/136}

(1) JUDGE RIAD: Whom shall we have now?

MR. HARMON: Your Honour, our next witness is Captain Vincentius Egbers. And while we're waiting for Captain Egbers, may I tender into evidence Prosecutor's (5)Exhibit 1/E/1. It is an exhibit which is a smaller version of this map, Prosecutor's 1E, minus the various relevant sites that are attached, and I'm tendering this for purposes of convenience for the Court, if the Court may wish to use this exhibit and counsel may wish (10)to use this exhibit for whatever purpose.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Harmon. Mr. Visnjic, you agree?

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Yes, Mr. President.

(15) JUDGE RIAD: Good. So we'll tender it into evidence. Would you like to call the next witness.

MR. HARMON: Judge Riad, I believe that the usher has gone to collect Captain Egbers.

(20) JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon, perhaps we can have a break at twenty to two for ten minutes.

MR. HARMON: Yes.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.
[The witness entered court]

(25) JUDGE RIAD: Yes. Go ahead.

• Page 2201 • {99/136}

(1) THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE RIAD: Please be seated. Thank you.

(5) THE WITNESS: Thank you.

JUDGE RIAD: I would like to thank you for coming to testify and to contribute to justice being done. Our Prosecutor, Mr. Harmon, will ask you some questions before the Defence counsel will also take (10)over. Thank you.

MR. HARMON: Thank you, Judge Riad.

WITNESS: VINCENTIUS BERNARDUS EGBERS

• EXAMINED by Mr. Harmon:

• Q.: Captain Egbers, could you spell your last (15)name for the record?

• A.: E-g-b-e-r-s.

• Q.: You are currently serving in the Netherlands Air Force; is that correct?

• A.: That's correct.

(20) • Q.: And you have the rank of captain?

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: From 1988 to 1998, were you serving in the Royal Dutch Army?

• A.: I was, sir.

(25) • Q.: And did you deploy to Srebrenica with

• Page 2202 • {100/136}

(1)DutchBat III in January of 1995, and did you remain in the enclave of Srebrenica until July the 21st, 1995?

• A.: I did, sir.

• Q.: Could you tell the Judges what were your (5)duties and responsibilities within the enclave?

• A.: In the enclave I was a platoon commander.

• Q.: And what did you do as a platoon commander?

• A.: As a platoon commander, I was responsible for a piece of -- the section of our company's terrain.

(10) MR. HARMON: Could I have placed on the ELMO Prosecutor's Exhibit 89, please. Mr. Usher, I'm particularly interested in having just the area of the Srebrenica enclave appear on the ELMO; the rest is not relevant for the purposes of the testimony, at this (15)point in time.

• Q.: Captain Egbers, this is an exhibit that I prepared after talking to you. Can you explain this exhibit to the Judges, please.

• A.: You see at the north of the enclave, this was (20)the terrain of the Charlie Company [indicates]; the south of the enclave was the terrain of the Bravo Company, over here [indicates] My company commander divided his terrain into three sections; the section for the 1st Platoon [indicates], the 2nd Platoon
(25) [indicates], and for the 3rd Platoon [indicates], and

• Page 2203 • {101/136}

(1)it was my job to man Observation Post Alpha in the west and to patrol with my platoon in the section of this area. So I was the platoon commander of the 3rd Platoon.

(5) • Q.: And the 3rd Platoon is in the area in which you patrolled with -- the 3rd Platoon is the area marked in yellow on Prosecutor's Exhibit 89?

• A.: Yes, that's marked in yellow. This is the terrain, sir [indicates]

(10) • Q.: And when you say OP Alpha, that's the spot indicated with the letter "A" next to it; is that correct?

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: And the spot marked with "M", was that also (15)in your area of responsibility?

• A.: It was, until the last month of July.

• Q.: And is that OP Mike?

• A.: OP Mike was a non-permanent observation post until June 1995.

(20) • Q.: So your principal responsibilities then, Captain Egbers, were in the yellow, pie-shaped area.

• A.: Yes, sir, it was.

• Q.: In addition, were you also part of a reserve platoon or a reserve unit of the DutchBat?

(25) • A.: Starting in April 1995, we've had a lot of

• Page 2204 • {102/136}

(1)shortage of gasoline, diesel, and we had a big problem with our soldiers who were at leave. The Bosnian Serbs didn't allow them to come back to the enclave. So we were -- my platoon wasn't 30 persons big, but it was a (5)lot smaller. All the platoons had a shortage of men. They were in Zagreb waiting for clearance to come back to the enclave.

• Q.: Just so we're clear, a platoon is normally 30 people; is that correct?

(10) • A.: That's correct, sir.

• Q.: And what happened? Why was your platoon reduced in size?

• A.: Well, the Bosnian Serbs had to clearance every transport of troops out of the enclave, and of (15)course clearance them back then. And soldiers were allowed to leave the enclave, but from April 1995, they were not allowed to come back to the enclave. So they were waiting at Zagreb for a clearance to come back.

• Q.: And as a result of the lack of clearance by (20)the Bosnian Serbs, the size of your platoon diminished.

• A.: It did, sir, and that's why the officers of the northern part of the Charlie Company were at the main base at Potocari, and the officers had to form (25)with a few soldiers a so-called battalion reserve, four

• Page 2205 • {103/136}

(1)APCs who were under my command.

• Q.: Did those reserve members, including yourself, then deploy to other areas in the Srebrenica enclave in order to fill the gap that was left by the (5)inability to fully man your units?

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: Okay. Now, what was the effect of the dilution, if you will, in the number of your soldiers on the ability of DutchBat to perform its mandate?

(10) • A.: It's clear that when you've lost one-third of the platoon, it's very hard to man observation posts and patrol in the area, and so that's why we had a lot of pressure on the men who were still in the enclave. And we had to form this battalion reserve and try to (15)support the Bravo Company, who was in the south of the enclave.

• Q.: Were you able to patrol using your vehicles, or is there some reason why you couldn't do that?

• A.: We couldn't patrol with our vehicles because (20)of the lack of fuel. And, for instance, when we had to bring water and food to my soldiers in the west of the enclave, we used some local horses. So we would walk all the way up from Potocari to OP Alpha, which is one day going to OP Alpha and coming back again. So we had (25)some fuel, but we had to keep that in case something

• Page 2206 • {104/136}

(1)happened and the APCs had to drive. So from April, there was a lot of -- we were very short of diesel.

• Q.: Were you short other supplies also as a result of the actions of the Bosnian Serbs?

(5) • A.: Yes, sir. We were very short of food. We only had some rice and some fresh packages left. It was not very good for the morale of the soldiers.

• Q.: What about medicines?

• A.: Well, I don't know anything about medicines, (10)sorry.

• Q.: All right. Now, in the time that you were in the enclave, were you able to make an assessment of the Muslim military forces within the enclave?

• A.: During the first six months of my stay in the (15)enclave, the Muslim soldiers, whether you can call them soldiers or not, the Muslims didn't carry their weapons openly. Only until OP Echo fell and we had some threatening in the south, the Bosnian Muslims carried their weapons openly, and I saw them carrying some (20)AK-47s and some machine-guns in the south of the enclave.

• Q.: Now, when did OP Echo fall?

• A.: I don't know the exact date, but it was at the end of June or beginning of July.

(25) • Q.: How would you assess the organisation of the

• Page 2207 • {105/136}

(1)Muslim armed forces within the enclave?

• A.: Well, they were not very well-organised. They were badly dressed. They had no uniforms -- a few uniforms, yes. They had only a few weapons. They had (5)no communications, a bad structure. They told us they had a few brigades, but we only saw refugees. And in the end of the month of June, we saw some weapons but not very much.

• Q.: Now, was there a weapons storage depot at (10)UN Bravo Company, and did that location have Muslim heavy weapons?

• A.: Yes, it had.

• Q.: Now, I'm going to get a little bit ahead of the sequence of events, but did you ever see an (15)artillery piece in your entire stay in the Srebrenica enclave?

• A.: I did, sir.

• Q.: And without going into details of the circumstances, can you tell us when you saw that (20)artillery piece?

• A.: I saw that piece of artillery -- that was the second day when I took up the blocking position in the -- near the Srebrenica town.

• Q.: Was that during the invasion of the enclave (25)by the Bosnian Serb army?

• Page 2208 • {106/136}

(1) • A.: It was during the invasion of the south of the enclave that I saw a piece of artillery called a Mike 48.

• Q.: Is that a heavy piece of artillery?

(5) • A.: No, it's just a small piece of artillery.

• Q.: Can you tell the Judges the circumstances, just briefly, about what you know about that particular piece of artillery?

• A.: They had the piece of artillery for a few (10)years in the surrounding of my blocking position, Bravo 1, and they've only had a few shells. I thought they told me about four or five. And there was a commander of this piece of artillery with a few soldiers, and they communicate by writing notes to (15)their bosses.

• Q.: Did you ever see that piece of artillery fired?

• A.: No, sir, I did not.

• Q.: At the time you saw that piece of artillery, (20)were Bosnian Serb army forces advancing into the enclave?

• A.: They were.

• Q.: Now, let me ask you, as a professional officer, your overall assessment of the military forces (25)of the Muslims within the enclave as you saw them and

• Page 2209 • {107/136}

(1)experienced them.

• A.: I think it was badly organised, badly weaponed, a group of refugees who had to be soldiers. No training, no weapons. I didn't think of them as an (5)army as well.

• Q.: Turning your attention to the Bosnian Serb forces, can you give me your assessment of the Bosnian Serb forces, as you experienced them and as you saw them in operation?

(10) • A.: Well, I certainly left the enclave in July 1995 with the buses of refugees, and then I saw the military strength of the Bosnian Serb army. They had anti-aircraft missiles, heavy machine-guns, a lot of AK-47s, anti-tank weapons, grenades. They were (15)heavily armed, well-structured. They had communication lines. There were commanders, there were lieutenants who were in charge of a platoon. There was a military structure. That's what I saw of the Bosnian Serb army.

(20) • Q.: Did you see any tanks?

• A.: I did, sir. I saw tanks, ambulances. I saw troop transport trucks. They had it all.

• Q.: Did the army, the Bosnian Serb army that you saw, can you give us your assessment of how it appeared (25)to you to function?

• Page 2210 • {108/136}

(1) • A.: Well, we learned that tanks won't operate by itself, but tanks would mostly go in with four tanks and support each other. But the Bosnian Serb tanks entered the enclave by itself, they raised their (5)barrels and fired like a piece of artillery on the town of Srebrenica.

• Q.: Did the various components of the Bosnian Serb army that you saw appear to be functioning in a coordinated fashion?

(10) • A.: Yes, it did so.

• Q.: Overall, how would you make an assessment then of the Bosnian Serb army, the elements that you saw?

• A.: Well, they were well-trained, they were (15)structured, they were well-armed. They were more like an army to me.

• Q.: Do you believe or are you able to make a comparison of the two?

• A.: Well, I think the Bosnian Serb army was a (20)real army, like we know armies, and the Muslims, they were just refugees who were carrying weapons.

• Q.: Do you believe that the armed elements of the Muslims within the Srebrenica enclave posed a credible military threat to the Bosnian Serb army that (25)surrounded the enclave?

• Page 2211 • {109/136}

(1) • A.: I don't know, sir. No.

MR. HARMON: Judge Riad, would this be an appropriate time to take a break for ten minutes?

JUDGE RIAD: If it's good for you, it will be (5)good for us.

MR. HARMON: All right. Thank you. This is an appropriate time for me.

JUDGE RIAD: Just ten minutes.

--- Recess taken at 1.40 p.m.

(10) --- On resuming at 1.50 p.m.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon, you can proceed.

MR. HARMON: If I could ask the usher to place Prosecutor's Exhibit 90 on the ELMO, please.

• Q.: Captain Egbers, I'd like to draw your (15)attention to the 9th of July and ask you if, as part of the unit of DutchBat, you took up a blocking position somewhere in the south of the enclave.

• A.: Yes, sir, I did.

• Q.: Could you tell the Judges, first of all, (20)could you indicate where, on Prosecutor's Exhibit 90, you took up the blocking position? If you mark it with a highlighter, it might be more effective, and use a green highlighter for the purposes of the record.

• A.: You see the road going to the west
(25) [indicates], this is the road. It makes two angles of

• Page 2212 • {110/136}

(1)180 degrees. I was on this angle here, above the "V".

• Q.: Okay. Now, what I'm interested in, Captain Egbers, is first of all can you tell the Judges the circumstances under which you took up that blocking (5)position, what the purpose of the blocking position was?

• A.: The circumstances were the following: We had to take a blocking position so we could be seen by the Bosnian Serb army with our white vehicles, and we had (10)to draw a line, a line that couldn't be passed by the Bosnian Serb army. It was approximately this line
[indicates], there was a blocking position on this line. So the Bosnian Serbs knew that we were on that line and they can't cross that line.

(15) MR. HARMON: So the record is clear, Captain Egbers has indicated a line that appears to be a line that goes from the right-hand side of this exhibit to the left-hand side of the exhibit, and it is the dark line that appears under the word "Srebrenica".

(20) • A.: It is. So these were blocking positions, not as we were taught green, hidden, but now on top of a hill, with white vehicles and blue helmets, so we could be seen by both parties as being a line they couldn't cross. (25)And from this point, I had a good view to the

• Page 2213 • {111/136}

(1)south, because my commander, who was in Srebrenica, on the compound of the Bravo Company, he couldn't see anything in the south of the enclave. His observation post couldn't see a thing, so the blocking positions (5)had to watch the south with their binoculars.

• Q.: At this point in time, the 9th of July, was the invasion of the enclave by the Bosnian Serb army well under way?

• A.: It was, sir.

(10) • Q.: Was the purpose of your blocking position to at least deter the invasion of the enclave beyond the line you've indicated?

• A.: It was. We had to search the terrain for any tanks or Bosnian Serb artillery that were there, and we (15)had to report it.

• Q.: How long did you remain at that blocking position?

• A.: We stayed there three days.

• Q.: What did you see on the 9th of July?

(20) • A.: I saw a Bosnian Serb tank entering the enclave, firing at Srebrenica, and going back again. And I town called Pusmulici, it's marked yellow here, it's approximately three kilometres away from my blocking position, and with my binoculars I could see (25)Bosnian Serb infantry entering houses, setting them on

• Page 2214 • {112/136}

(1)fire, and stealing stuff out of the houses.

• Q.: Now, you said also that you could see some tanks coming and firing.

• A.: I could, sir.

(5) • Q.: Do you know the direction of their fire?

• A.: Yes, sir, I could. They fired into the town of Srebrenica.

• Q.: Were there any military targets, as far as you were aware, in the town of Srebrenica?

(10) • A.: No, sir. Just refugees and a UN base.

• Q.: Did you have an opinion then as to the purpose of the firing of the tank rounds into the town of Srebrenica?

• A.: I think they wanted to scare the refugees who (15)were in the city of Srebrenica so that they would go north to Potocari and they could enter the town. They were scaring them, and of course they were wounding them, killing them.

• Q.: Now, was it at this particular location where (20)you saw the artillery piece that was the subject of your previous testimony?

• A.: Yes, this was the location. Mike 48 from the -- stood and watched south. Just the group of soldiers stood by the piece of artillery, didn't fire (25)it, and was just there in case they had to fire it.

• Page 2215 • {113/136}

(1) • Q.: How many Bosnian Serb soldiers did you see advancing into the enclave from your particular blocking position on the 9th of July?

• A.: Well, at first I just saw tanks coming into (5)the enclave, firing, and going back again, but at the end of the day I saw infantry entering the enclave as well.

• Q.: How were they entering the enclave?

• A.: They were coming with a transportation, an (10)ambulance going after them as well, and they were walking one by one.

• Q.: So walking single file, then?

• A.: You can call it single file, sir, yes.

• Q.: How were they dressed?

(15) • A.: They were in green camouflage.

• Q.: Could you tell from your location how they were armed?

• A.: They were armed with AK-47s and just rifles, so to me it appeared to be one or two infantry platoons (20)heading for the town of Srebrenica.

• Q.: You may have mentioned earlier, but what were you making your observations with? What kind of an optical device were you using?

• A.: We had several binoculars, but we had one (25)special one which could go onto 60 times.

• Page 2216 • {114/136}

(1) • Q.: Sixty power.

• A.: Sixty power, yes, you could call it that way. So we could see very clearly in the south, and that's what we reported. When we reported that the (5)infantry was heading for the town of Srebrenica, we were ordered to accompany the four APCs that were on the marketplace already.

• Q.: So you then returned to the town of Srebrenica.

(10) • A.: We did, sir.

• Q.: What did you see in the town of Srebrenica when you returned?

• A.: When I arrived at the marketplace, I saw thousands of women, children, men. And I saw the men (15)carrying anti-tank weapons. I saw machine-guns and AK-47s. And there was a total chaos at the time because they knew the Bosnian Serbs were entering the town, the south of the town. They were very scared. They were asking me what to do and they were pointing (20)their RPGs on my vehicle. They wanted me to join the other four APCs who were in the south of the town.

• Q.: When you say "they," are you referring to Muslim men who were armed?

• A.: Yes, sir, I am.

(25) • Q.: Okay. Now, had you ever seen so many Muslim

• Page 2217 • {115/136}

(1)men with arms prior to this date?

• A.: I saw prior to this date a few Muslims carrying weapons openly in the south of the enclave. After OP Echo fell, we had two mobile OPs in the south (5)called Sierra and Uniform, so I saw Muslims carrying openly their weapons.

• Q.: Now, did you redeploy to a different location?

• A.: I did, sir. I did enter the marketplace and (10)I joined the other four APCs, and then I went back to cover the APCs and stood there all night.

• Q.: Now, at some point in time, while you were at that location or near that location, were you aware that close air support was being summoned?

(15) • A.: In the early morning, my forward air controller, who was in my APC, had to go back to position Bravo 1 because at 0700 there would be a gunship firing at all the targets, the tanks, artillery, in the south of the enclave.

(20) • Q.: Do you know what results occurred as a result of any close air support that you received?

• A.: Later on that evening -- that afternoon, there were Dutch F-16 fighters who were attacking one or two tanks that were in my neighbour, that were (25)threatening me, and they carried out well. The tanks

• Page 2218 • {116/136}

(1)disappeared; I don't know whether they were hit. But I could go back to the city of Srebrenica to help Captain Groen with his Bravo Company. So there was a close air support with two F-16s in the afternoon, instead of a (5)gunship promised by us in the morning, the early morning.

• Q.: When you say "the afternoon," do you know which date that was?

• A.: What's the date? Sorry?

(10) • Q.: Which date?

• A.: It was the 11th.

• Q.: Now, you said you returned to Srebrenica town. What did you see and what did you do then?

• A.: Well, there were thousands of people looking (15)at you and asking -- they asked me, "What should I do?" and we tried to move all those people to Potocari because we were certain that the Bosnian Serbs would attack the town real soon. And that's when I told my soldiers to leave the APC, and I got as many wounded (20)and mentally ill people as possible on my APC, and I drove in front of them towards Potocari.

• Q.: When you say you drove in front of "them," who are you referring to?

• A.: I'm referring to the refugees. I'm not in (25)front of them, I'm driving between them. They are

• Page 2219 • {117/136}

(1)coming with me towards Potocari.

• Q.: Where were you in relation to the column of refugees that were going from Srebrenica to Potocari? What was your position?

(5) • A.: About one kilometre behind them. So I'm not at the front but I'm nearly at the front.

• Q.: Were you the first of the UN armoured vehicles in that column?

• A.: One of the first, sir.

(10) • Q.: When you were advancing toward Potocari with a column, did you see or hear any artillery fire in and around the advancing column toward Potocari?

• A.: I did. I saw some Bosnian Serb artillery to the left and right of the road. All the refugees took (15)to Potocari. I thought they wanted to scare them and wanted to impress them. They didn't hit the road but nearby the road.

• Q.: I'm reminded by my colleague that we have to slow down. So since we speak the same language, if you (20)would pause after I ask a question and I will pause after you answer a question before I give you my next question, then the interpreters would be greatly assisted in their job. We've talked about this before. Let me return to the examination, then. (25)Where was the shelling hitting in respect of

• Page 2220 • {118/136}

(1)the column? And could you tell the type of artillery or weapons used in the shelling?

• A.: I saw some detonations about 100 metres from the road the refugees took. I couldn't see whether it (5)was mortar fire or if it was artillery, but it definitely was one of those two.

• Q.: Okay. What result did that firing of the artillery have on the people in the column of refugees?

• A.: The refugees were very scared, of course. (10)And they saw two F-16s coming over the town to support them, support us, and when they saw the Bosnian Serbs shelling them again, in the nearance [sic] of the road, they were very, very scared, of course.

• Q.: Now, did you eventually succeed in getting to (15)Potocari on the 11th of July?

• A.: I did, sir.

• Q.: What did you do that night?

• A.: When I arrived at Potocari, I took care of all the ill people who were in my APC, and then after (20)four days of blocking position, I took 12 hours off. I slept.

• Q.: So you had been up for four days, the previous four days; is that correct?

• A.: Correct, sir.

(25) • Q.: Okay. Let me turn your attention, then, to

• Page 2221 • {119/136}

(1)the next day after you woke up, which would be the 12th of July. Did you receive any orders from Major Franken that morning?

• A.: I did.

(5) • Q.: What were those orders?

• A.: I had to assemble 12 soldiers and meet him at a conference room.

• Q.: And what were your orders then?

• A.: My orders then were to escort the buses who (10)were appearing nearby the main gate, and take some food, take some water, take a sleeping bag. "We don't know where the buses are going to; we don't know where you're going to. Stay by the buses and try to radio everything you see on your way." That was my order.

(15) • Q.: And who was in the buses?

• A.: In the buses were the women and children, the refugees, the Muslims, who were gathered by the HQ of DutchBat.

• Q.: Did any other Dutch officers accompany you on (20)your escort duty on this occasion?

• A.: I escorted the first convoy of the deportation, and in front of this row of buses there was another UN vehicle, with Major Boering and a captain, and I was at the end of the convoy.

(25) • Q.: Now, I'd like you to describe your journey on

• Page 2222 • {120/136}

(1)that first convoy that left Potocari, and I would like you to, first of all, tell the Judges about what you observed in the town of Bratunac.

• A.: When you leave OP Papa, it's the northern (5)part of the enclave, soon you will be on a road going through Bratunac, and there were Bosnian Serbs, hundreds of them, standing on both sides of the road, partying, celebrating, shouting, throwing things at the buses. I was very, very scared. It reminded me of a (10)video movie we saw a few weeks before called "Schindler's List", and you see there the Jews walking towards trains and a lot of other people standing nearby the road and shouting at them as well. It was the same picture.

(15) • Q.: Did you succeed in -- you succeeded eventually in getting through Bratunac, did you not?

• A.: Yes, I did, sir.

• Q.: Did something happen to one of the buses in the convoy that you were escorting?

(20) • A.: One of the buses, the engine caught on fire. It stopped on the right side of the road. And all the other buses passed this bus and were following the leading bus towards Kladanj. And I stopped nearby this road, I stopped with this bus.

(25) • Q.: What happened?

• Page 2223 • {121/136}

(1) • A.: There were several Bosnian Serbs coming towards the refugees who were in the bus. I ordered them all out of the bus. I wanted them to be safe because there was a fire in the engine. At that time I (5)handed them over all my food, all my medicine, and all the water I had, because they were very thirsty, very hungry, and very scared, with a lot of headaches of course. Then I ordered them -- I allowed them to go to a river nearby and drink, and I saw a lot of Bosnian (10)Serbs coming towards this group of people, just standing there looking at them. Then a few Bosnian Serb soldiers approached with a photo camera, with some cans of lemonade, and they were giving them to the children and taking (15)pictures of it, for propaganda use.

• Q.: Did the bus eventually -- was it eventually repaired and could it continue on its journey?

• A.: It could not continue.

• Q.: Was another bus brought to bring those (20)refugees on their route?

• A.: The bus driver asked to borrow my Mercedes, UN, to get another bus, but I told him to solve -- to let himself solve this problem. And he managed to get another bus. So there was another bus that the (25)refugees got in, and I followed that bus.

• Page 2224 • {122/136}

(1) • Q.: Which direction did you take? Could you use Prosecutor's Exhibit 1E, which is to your right, and take the pointer and just indicate on this large exhibit the route which you travelled with that bus.

(5) • A.: I'll talk louder. This is the city of Bratunac [indicates] So we left from Potocari to Bratunac, towards Konjevic Polje. Here [indicates] we go to the south, crossing Nova Kasaba, Milici, Lazenica
[phoen], and heading for Kladanj.

(10) • Q.: Now, can you point -- use your pointer and as best as you can recall, where did that bus break down?

• A.: The bus broke down in this location here
[indicates]

MR. HARMON: For the record, the witness has (15)indicated the area on the right and the left side of the town of Glogova.

• Q.: Now, as you -- you can have a seat, Captain Egbers. Thank you. Captain Egbers, as you advanced, then, on (20)your journey, what did you see?

• A.: I saw a lot of infantry -- Bosnian Serb infantry on the road, facing the woods, facing the enclave, and firing at the woods. And they told me there were Muslim fighters in the woods and they would (25)fire on them. So they stopped me -- they would fire an

• Page 2225 • {123/136}

(1)anti-aircraft gun at the woods with great rockets, and then when they got finished, the bus and I could go through.

• Q.: Did you hear any return fire from the woods (5)in the direction of the Bosnian Serbs?

• A.: No, sir, I did not.

• Q.: How many soldiers would you estimate you saw in the stretch between, say, Sandici and Nova Kasaba?

• A.: Well, I saw hundreds of them grouping with, (10)let's say, five or six together, and then 20 metres on, another group, always facing the woods, nearby -- between Sandici, Nova Kasaba, and Milici.

• Q.: How were they dressed?

• A.: They were dressed in green. They were (15)Bosnian Serb infantry. They were well-armed with AK-47s, with machine-guns, and they had vehicles with anti-aircraft guns on it, with four barrels, firing at the woods.

• Q.: Did you have an occasion to pass a football (20)field near Nova Kasaba on your journey toward the drop-off point with that bus?

• A.: Yes, sir, I did.

• Q.: Let me show you Prosecutor's -- I'm going to show you two exhibits.

(25) MR. HARMON: So if the usher can be given two

• Page 2226 • {124/136}

(1)exhibits, Prosecutor's Exhibit 12/4, which I should like placed on the ELMO first, and then Prosecutor's Exhibit 12/2. So, Mr. Usher, if we could start by placing 12/4 on the ELMO.

(5) • Q.: Have you seen this picture before, Captain Egbers?

• A.: This is the football field nearby Nova Kasaba.

• Q.: Now, could you describe to the Judges what (10)you saw at that location on the 12th of July?

• A.: When you drive the car over the road, you see -- you can look through the trees, and I saw this field covered with men, sitting on their knees with their hands on their necks. There was a table on which (15)there were some soldiers, and there were some soldiers around the football field.

• Q.: How many people were there on their knees, with their hands behind their neck?

• A.: Almost the entire football field was covered (20)with men.

• Q.: Now let me show you Prosecutor's Exhibit 12/2. Now, this is an aerial image, Captain Egbers, and it is dated the 13th of July, 1995, at approximately 1400 hours. And you will see indicated (25)on the football pitch two ovals and some dark markings

• Page 2227 • {125/136}

(1)within those ovals, which those have been identified as groups of prisoners. Were there more prisoners that you saw on the football pitch than are indicated in Prosecutor's (5)Exhibit 12/2?

• A.: Yes, sir. I saw the entire football field covered with men.

• Q.: All right. Thank you.

• A.: There must have been hundreds of them.

(10) MR. HARMON: Thank you, Mr. Usher.

• Q.: Did you see any -- let me withdraw that question. Were you able to ascertain who those men were?

• A.: Well, when I drove over this road, towards (15)Nova Kasaba, I saw some groups of Muslims walking towards the football field with their hands on their necks, and those were the Muslim men who were taken from the woods.

• Q.: Now, eventually, Captain Egbers, did you (20)arrive at a destination where the bus stopped and people on the buses were discharged?

• A.: I did, sir.

• Q.: Do you know where that location was?

• A.: It was in the nearance [sic] of Kladanj, near (25)the confrontation line.

• Page 2228 • {126/136}

(1) • Q.: Did anything unusual happen there, at that location, at that time?

• A.: It was well organised. The buses stopped there. The women and children saw me and they made (5)this sign [indicates] to me, so they were sure they would be killed, because it was in the middle of the woods and all those buses stopped over there.

• Q.: When you say "this sign," you indicated, for the record, your finger went from your right shoulder (10)to your left shoulder, across your neck.

• A.: That's right, sir. They were certain that the journey stopped there for them and that they would be slaughtered. Then I saw three of those buses drive through (15)a point where they could debark, the refugees could get out of the bus, and had to walk towards the road, towards central Bosnia. And when those three buses were empty, another three buses had to drive on. So it was well organised, and in the first convoy, a lot of (20)women and children walked a few miles towards central Bosnia.

JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. I just want to know what he means by "central Bosnia". To the woods? To the city? What?

(25) MR. HARMON:

• Page 2229 • {127/136}

(1) • Q.: What do you mean by "central Bosnia"? In which direction were they walking?

• A.: They were walking in a western direction, near the confrontation line, in the direction of (5)Kladanj. We were stopped not nearby by the city, but in between -- in the woods. So there was a lot of wood on the left and right of the road, so that's why the women thought that their lives would end there.

• Q.: Now, you returned to Potocari after that (10)debarkation was concluded?

• A.: I did, sir.

• Q.: Did you pass that football field that you previously testified about, that is, the football field near Nova Kasaba?

(15) • A.: I did, sir.

• Q.: What did you see at the football field when you returned?

• A.: I saw that it was covered with a hundreds of men with their hands still on their necks, on their (20)knees.

• Q.: So a scene that was very much similar to what you had seen when you passed by the first time?

• A.: It was, sir.

• Q.: Now, let me focus your attention to the 13th (25)of July. You have returned to Potocari. Did you

• Page 2230 • {128/136}

(1)receive an assignment on the 13th of July?

• A.: There was a captain who ordered me to report at 0600 to escort another convoy, but my convoy, it was convoy number 4, it wouldn't leave until 11.00. So (5)between 6.00 and 11.00, I was in the surrounding of the main gate.

• Q.: Did you have an occasion to see anything occurring at a location known as the White House?

• A.: I saw -- yes, I did, sir. I saw and I heard (10)a woman screaming for help, and I reacted on that.

• Q.: Why was she screaming?

• A.: She was screaming because she had to enter the buses, and her man or the male had to stay in the White House. He was brought there by Bosnian Serb (15)infantry soldiers.

• Q.: Let me just very quickly have you identify the White House.

MR. HARMON: And if I could Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17 placed on the ELMO.

(20) • Q.: I'm going to ask you if you can identify this structure in this exhibit as the White House. Do you see Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17 that's been placed on the ELMO?

• A.: I can see it sir. That's the same house.

(25) • Q.: That's the White House that's in the centre,

• Page 2231 • {129/136}

(1)off to the right of this particular exhibit; is that right, sir?

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: After you heard the screaming of the woman, (5)what did you do?

• A.: I contacted two corporals who was standing near the White House and I asked them what was going on. They told me they didn't know because they were not allowed to enter the White House. When I asked (10)them, "Why aren't you allowed?" Well, the Bosnian Serbs wouldn't let them. That's when I approached these Bosnian Serb soldiers and I told them that I was a First Lieutenant and that I wanted to inspect the White House, and I went in.

(15) • Q.: How were the Bosnian Serb soldiers who were around the White House dressed; do you remember?

• A.: They were dressed in green, green camouflage, infantry uniforms.

• Q.: What happened when you went?

(20) • A.: I saw men sitting in different rooms, just waiting for things to happen.

• Q.: Did you have a conversation with any of the Bosnian Serb soldiers who were there?

• A.: I did. I asked them, "Why would you separate (25)the men from the women," and he pointed at a lot of

• Page 2232 • {130/136}

(1)knives, just pocket knives that were lying there and said, "Well, you see, they are all armed with knives and we don't want them to attack one of our bus drivers."

(5) • Q.: Did they say anything else?

• A.: They told me later on that they would bring them to Kladanj.

• Q.: So the Bosnian Serb soldiers told you they would bring them to Kladanj.

(10) • A.: They did, sir, yes.

• Q.: Did you see anything else in addition to the pocket knives?

• A.: I saw some money from former Yugoslavia. I saw some pictures of families. A lot of luggage left (15)there by the men.

• Q.: Where did you see the photos of the families, the luggage, and the money?

• A.: In the garden of the town -- of the house.

• Q.: In front of the White House? On the side of (20)the White House?

• A.: In front and -- in front of the White House.

• Q.: All right. Now, did you see any buses with men from the White House -- I'm sorry. Did you see any men from the White House board buses?

(25) • A.: I did, sir. There were three buses loaded

• Page 2233 • {131/136}

(1)with men, and it had a number 3. It was escorted by my colleague who had to escort number 3, I had to escort number 4. I was there and I told them that the Bosnian Serbs would bring them to Kladanj, but the men told me (5)otherwise. They said no, and they made the same signal I just described, the same signal. "They will kill them," that's what they said, and they offered me some German marks.

• Q.: Could you just demonstrate for the Chamber (10)the signal that was made to you by at least one or maybe more of the Muslim men you saw within the White House?

• A.: It was this signal, sir [indicates]

MR. HARMON: Again, the record should reflect (15)the finger crossing the neck from the left shoulder to the right shoulder.

• Q.: Now, you say they offered you some Deutschemarks. Who offered you the Deutschemarks?

• A.: The Muslim men, because they said that it was (20)useless to them. I then believed that they would go to Kladanj, they would be escorted. And I said, "No, keep the money. It's your money. I don't want it."

• Q.: How many men did you see get into the buses, or approximately how many men did you see?

(25) • A.: Nearly 200.

• Page 2234 • {132/136}

(1) • Q.: How did those men look when they were getting on those buses?

• A.: They were very scared. They were mostly elder men. Scared, very scared, yes.

(5) • Q.: We have to slow down once again, I believe, I'm reminded by my colleague. Did you ever see any Muslim men walking in the direction of the White House under Bosnian Serb army escort?

(10) • A.: I saw one man with his hands on his neck, being taken to the White House by a Bosnian Serb.

• Q.: Now, is there anything else you can tell us about the White House that you recall, or have you told us everything you know about the White House, as you (15)remember it today?

• A.: Everything, sir.

• Q.: All right. Do you know what happened to the convoy of three buses that you saw leave with the men?

• A.: I left with convoy number 4 later on, but (20)some days later, I've been told, those three buses never left Bratunac. They went to Bratunac and the escort was stopped there by the Bosnian Serbs.

• Q.: Let me ask you, then, you proceeded then with your convoy; is that correct?

(25) • A.: That's correct, sir.

• Page 2235 • {133/136}

(1) • Q.: Did you take the same route that you had taken the day before?

• A.: I did, sir.

• Q.: How many buses were -- approximately how many (5)buses were in the convoy that you were escorting?

• A.: About 14 or 15.

• Q.: Now, what did you see that struck you as significant while you were making your journey toward your ultimate destination, near Kladanj?

(10) • A.: We were stopped several times. There were AK-47s pointed at our heads, and we had to hand over our armoured vest, our helmets, and everything they wanted from the car. It happened about seven times that journey.

(15) • Q.: Did you refuse -- apparently you must have refused about six times; is that correct?

• A.: I did. I pointed at my rank and I translated that into their language and told the Bosnian Serbs that I was a First Lieutenant and that I needed it (20)myself, and we drove on.

• Q.: Ultimately did you relinquish your body armour, and did your driver as well relinquish his body armour and his helmet?

• A.: Yes, sir, but that was when there was an (25)AK-47 at our heads.

• Page 2236 • {134/136}

(1) • Q.: So the items that you relinquished were relinquished under force.

• A.: They were, sir.

• Q.: Okay. Now, could you describe -- did you see (5)any soldiers in the area as you were proceeding toward Kladanj, Bosnian Serb soldiers?

• A.: I saw, from Sandici until Nova Kasaba, every three metres, a few soldiers. So there were a lot more soldiers. They were dressed in green, not as (10)disciplined as the troops who were there the first day. They were heavily armed, firing at the woods where the Muslim men were supposed to be. And they were regular soldiers but not as disciplined.

• Q.: Now, at least on this part of the journey, (15)did you hear any firing coming out of the woods in the direction of those soldiers?

• A.: No, sir, I did not.

• Q.: Did you pass the football pitch again at Nova Kasaba?

(20) • A.: Yes, I did.

• Q.: And the same field that you've identified earlier in an exhibit; is that correct?

• A.: It's the same field.

• Q.: What did you see at that football field, on (25)the 13th of July, as you made your way toward Kladanj?

• Page 2237 • {135/136}

(1) • A.: It was still covered with men, sitting on their knees, with their hands on their neck.

• Q.: Were there fewer men on their knees? Were there the same amount of men? Were there more? How (5)would you describe the number of men on their knees that you saw at Nova Kasaba football field?

• A.: The same amount.

• Q.: Did these appear to be Bosnian Muslim men who had been taken from the woods?

(10) • A.: Yes, sir, because there were groups of Muslims walking, with their hands on their neck, towards the football field.

• Q.: Who was surrounding these men at the football pitch?

(15) • A.: I'm not sure. But I saw a truck with a white wolf's head painted on the doors of the truck. It was a crying wolf. And later on the Bosnian Serbs told me that it was a truck of the Drina Wolves.

• Q.: Now, perhaps --

(20) MR. HARMON: Are we going to conclude, Judge Riad, at 2.30?

JUDGE RIAD: How long do you have to go?

MR. HARMON: I have a considerable time to go.

(25) JUDGE RIAD: So if you have to finish one

• Page 2238 • {136/136}

(1)question, we can conclude after that.

MR. HARMON:

• Q.: Well, did you proceed, then, on your journey to Kladanj, after you passed the football pitch?

(5) • A.: I did.

MR. HARMON: Judge Riad, I have a number -- Captain Egbers has a number of other observations on this particular leg of his journey that he will be describing in his testimony, but this would be an (10)appropriate place to stop.

JUDGE RIAD: If it is appropriate for you, it is appropriate for us. Thank you very much.

MR. HARMON: Thank you.

JUDGE RIAD: Captain Egbers, we will request (15)you coming tomorrow, at 9.30.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

JUDGE RIAD: So we'll adjourn until tomorrow, at 9.30. Thank you.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at (20)2.30 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 6th day of April, 2000, at 9.30 a.m.