Bakimandanho-i din-i Islam ve rahho-i bartaraf namundan-i onho
"Islamic survivals and the ways to overcome them"

by
A. Bazarov and R. Majidov

translated from the Tajiki
by
Iraj Bashiri
University of Minnesota

copyright (c) 2001, Iraj Bashiri

Concerning the Concrete Shapes of Islamic Survivals in the Thought and Lifestyle of Some Farmers

Prayer, fasting, circumcision, burial, and a number of other such customs are among the Islamic survivals in Central Asia. For instance, each Muslim faithful devotes 30 days a year to fasting. During this time, from dawn to dusk, they do not eat food, do not drink, and do not smoke. What benefit, one might ask, is accrued from this ritual that fatigues the body and dulls the senses?

Do all farmers fast? No. Perhaps 25% to 30%, the older generation are the most afflicted. Others fast the beginning, middle and end of the period, altogether about 10 days. There are, however, certain villages where over 50% fast. In these villages children are forced to fast and are not allowed to attend school on the Id.

During the Id, the faithful attend the mosques in droves to perform prayers. It is especially important for the older men to perform this prayer in one of the large and famous mosques.

Fasting has both an economic and a psychological drawback. The economic drawback for the farmer lies in the fact that he has to pay a certain amount for the upkeep of the mosque and for the salaries of the preacher and the keeper of the mosque. For the State, fasting creates a loss of manpower and a poor quality of work, especially when farm work must be done during the summer. How can a farmer who is psychologically devastated by hunger perform his task and meet his quota? Others end up doing his work for him.

The Qurban festival, observed in Khujand, is also harmful. During this festival, in order to accrue blessing in the next world and to expiate their sins, the faithful slaughter a sheep or some other animal. This, in spite of the fact that, recently, the clergy have given a fatwa allowing the faithful to pay sadaqa instead of sacrificing an animal; still many continue to kill animals. Does not this incur losses to both the kolkhoz and the individual?

A study of the religious situation in the Leninabad region indicates that gravitation to religion is on the decline. While in 1960 altogether 12,000 attended the Shaykh Muslihaddin mosque, in 1962 only 7,000 have done so (4,000: Qurban & 3,000: Ramadan).

During the Qurban and Ramadhan festivities, some kolkhozes have reported instances of work stoppage. On these days, it seems, the farmers have abandoned their assigned tasks and headed for the mosque to pray. Some have gone to ziyarats to visit their departed relatives or the departed blessed.

The main harm in such activities lies in their promotion of the Islamic 'asabiyyah. As a result, Muslims tend to look upon other religions and ethnic and nationality groups as inferior.

The circumcision ritual, however, is the most prevalent in Tajikistan. The reason for this is that circumcision is considered one of the most tangible rituals of the Muslims.

In both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the circumcision festival is held by almost all families. It is not necessarily observed as a religious ritual. The only exception is, perhaps, when a boy's mother is a Russian or from a non-Muslim group. Otherwise, the Tajiks and the Uzbeks regard the circumcision of a boy to be a necessity. The reason for this is that they view this act not only as a religious duty but as a cement that bonds, an incentive that keeps the nationality alive and vibrant.

Furthermore, the toi for the circumcision may ruin the family as they invite almost every relative and friend to the celebration spending their entire savings on it.

A study of the facts surrounding these festivities indicates that not all the farmers are aware of the religious and sacred import of these rituals; neither are they aware of the stories, myths and riwayats which project each into the faithful's consciousness. For example, from among the 50 individuals at the 40th Anniversary of the Revolution Kolkhoz, only one-the kolkhoz guard-knew the religious intent of the fast of Ramadan. This, however, should not be misinterpreted. The fact that these people do not know the religious intent does not automatically mean that they are free from the ideology that underlies religious thought. One thing must be pointed out. Those kolkhoz workers who are professionals, i.e., who have a degree of expertise, do not hold some of these festivities. For instance, individuals working with engines: truck drivers, combine operators, tractor drivers, cotton harvest operators, and the like, are much less set in their beliefs than shepherds, water masters, gardeners, and cotton pickers who make use of their hands.

Another aspect of Islam that is prevalent and public in Tajikistan is the Muslim burial of the dead. First, it is compulsory to recite the special death-prayer before the individual dies. The performance of this act is very highly regarded. This indicates that a good number of the farmers, especially the elderly, still have a firm belief in paradise, hell, and the hereafter. Furthermore, women are not allowed to participate in the death-ritual activities because it is believed they "pollute" the grave. During the first few days after death, a few mullahs constantly attend the grave and recite prayers so that the soul of the deceased is not tormented. Thereafter, the local farmers hold the 7th, 20th, 40th and the anniversary of the event and prepare a special osh for that.

It was also observed that among the farmers of Khujand in Tajikistan, except for the burial of the notable Party or Soviet officials, burial ceremonies, and the accompanying prayers, were performed by the Muslim clergy. Many of the farmers resisted the building of public cemeteries in which both Muslims and non-Muslims could be buried. This created a delicate situation because, without such cemeteries, the health code for the cemeteries cannot be adhered to. More importantly, such separation promotes nationalism and a sense of elitism among subgroups.

One of the Muslim customs still honored by the Tajiks is resistance to eating pork. Apparently the Qur'an has prohibited the consumption of pork. Here is the verse in which this prohibition appears: "He has prohibited you from consuming dead animals, blood, pork, and whatever is not slaughtered in the correct Islamic way (Q. 2: 168)." Sociological studies show that almost all Muslims are familiar with this Qur'anic decree and follow it. Not only do they not eat pork but they shun those who do. We observed many such instances in both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In crowded stations and teahouses, we observed Muslims refuse to lend their knives to cut pork with. In addition, some farmers refuse to spend money earned by handling pork on their families or on themselves. The Muslim clergy play a major role in promoting this way of life. Their base of propaganda is the Shari'a which says: The sale of wine and pork is against God's rule. The Prophet has outlawed their consumption. Every food that is bought using money earned by the sale of wine and pork is also haram (Hidayah, Shar(tm)-i Shariat-i Musalmani, val. IV, 1893, p. 60). An example of this is where in Khujand, the kolkhoz master of K.I. kills a wild boar in his field. His Russian friend takes the animal to town and sells it. They divide the money among themselves. The mullah finds out about this and comes running to the farmer. He prohibits the farmer from using the money for his family's needs, but, ironically, he accepts the same money as payment for his tithe.

The celebration of the day of birth of the Prophet Muhammad is another festive occasion for the urban as well as the rural population, especially the zealous. This constitutes a smaller number of believers and is prevalent among the elderly who have not been able to disregard the influence of the mosque over their lives and thoughts. It is, however, age rather than distance from the urban centers that is important. The people of the Leninabad district, for instance, although distant from the center, do not celebrate the birth of the Prophet.

Muslims tend to gravitate to almost every kind of structure as long as it is within a recognized and sanctified place. Such places include the tombs of the blessed, pirs, and shaykhs. Here again there are some drawbacks. Visiting such ziyarats takes a lot of time that could be put to good use elsewhere. It also affects the general class struggle in which we all should participate. Rather than guide them, the Muslim clergy confuse the farmers and prevent them from full participation in class struggle. This is not to mention that they cheat them out of their entire livelihood.

In the past, the Muslim clergy somehow fused the life of the faithful with the life of a certain saint. Then, as soon as this relationship was established, the saint (read, the mullah) took over the entire world of the farmers, businessmen, and artists.

During Soviet rule, with the progression of socialism in Tajikistan and with the assistance of many of the workers, the tombs of the shaykhs, pirs, and other so-called "holy" persons were destroyed. Also destroyed were the ziyarats that belonged to Muhammad's disciples, his son-in-law Ali, and the latter's horse Duldul. At the present only a few such "holy" places are left. I should add, that they, too, are being demolished (1962).

The exposure and refutation of various reports and legends related to the tombs of the blessed continue, as do genuine efforts to disestablish and uproot such legends. This effort entails confronting the deceitful acts of the shaykhs and the ishans in both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Places of worship such as Khwajah Ab-i Garm, Chehel Tan Baba, and the like are now closed. The tomb of Khwajah Ab-i Garm had been the center of attention among the Tajiks and Uzbeks in the past and, at the hand of shaykhs, ishans, hakims, and storytellers had achieved a considerable degree of fame. But, by the same token, it also constituted a major source of loss of labor and of positive attitude for the workers to move ahead.

The Islamic clergy have created a legend about this tomb. The legend states that a person by the name of Abutalkh, a follower of Muhammad, resided in this place. The legend further relates that this Abutalkh took care of the Prophet on one of the latter's journeys-he kept the jar that the Prophet took to the bathroom warm by holding it under his arm. Then, in response to this kindness, it is said, the Prophet blessed Abutalkh with the appearance of a spring of warm water wherever he went. It is argued that this fact accounts for the medicinal value of the water of Ab-i Garm.

Our historians have refuted the assertions of the mullahs. History shows that no one by the name of Abutalkh has ever come to Central Asia. Rather, an Abutalkh had been a resident of the city of Medina in Saudi Arabia. He is buried in a cemetery called Jannat al-Baqiyah. The faithful who visit Mecca and Medina readily testify to the veracity of this statement.

What kind of a place is Khwajah Ab-i Garm? It is a beautiful resort located in a gorgeous site in the Qatar mountains of the Hissar range. It has a hot-water spring and a pier. It is not surprising, therefore, that the illiterate and simple people should be so deceived as to ascribe the natural beauty of this place to the miracle of some sacred tomb. Before it was taken over, the faithful swam in the hot springs and used its hot waters for cooking mutton or goat meat. Of course, all these actions were undertaken under unsanitary conditions.

In addition, a group of mullahs and ishans spent their entire time around the tomb. There, they performed various contrived religious ceremonies for visitors, wrote prayer wheels, told fortunes and, basically, robbed them of their money. The most respected among these men of cloth were Mullah Nar, Mullah Rahim, and Mullah Nur.

In 1958, to assist future generations of the Ab-i Garm region, the government took certain steps. As a result, many of the springs were closed and showers and piers were installed. In addition, lecture sessions regarding the nature and medicinal value of the water were held. After that the farmers no longer accepted either Khwajah Ab-i Garm or the deceitful magic ascribed to him. Now Ab-i Garm has acquired kurort status and is being used by all our countrymen who suffer from various diseases.

To openly contest the fraudulent claims of the mullahs, the scientific and atheistic propaganda group recently disinterred two of these sacred graves. In one, in the Kolkhozabad territory, called Qarabugo, they found a horse and in the other, called the Tomb of the Martyr, they found the body of a Basmachi. Upon learning the true history of these sacred places, people kicked the shaykhs out and stopped frequenting the locations. The number of those who visit the Leninabad mosque, called the Shaykh Muslih al-Din mosque, also has diminished. This, of course, should not be interpreted as the Islamic faith is no longer practiced in Tajikistan. Some subgroups of workers still adhere to Islamic teaching and practice the rituals prescribed by the mullahs.

In Tajikistan those who believe in Islamic teachings tend to live in the villages rather than in the cities. The reason for this is that during the building of the urban centers, many of the Muslim sacred places were demolished and, in time, people forgot that they ever existed. It is, therefore, imperative to give special consideration to the call-for-elimination aspect of rural propaganda.

In the Leninabad district, there are about 60 tombs which the faithful visit. Among them the tomb of Khwajah Takkabord (Kan-i Badam raion), Khwajah Sangduzd (Ghonchi raion), and Balagardan (Isfara raion, Varukh village) are very famous and respected.

These tombs, too, have their own legends concocted by the mullahs for deceiving the public. For instance, the following myth is prevalent about Khwajah Sangduzd. It is related that the Khwajah has transported the heavy stone column, i.e., the cornerstone of his own tomb, from Mecca in the course of a night's journey. In fact, this feat has earned him his title of the Rockburgler Khwajah.

There is no need to dispute such claims. How could such a heavy rock be transported over such a long distance in one night by one person? Furthermore, if this rock is sacred, wouldn't the Khwajah's act of thievery be considered a sin?

The Balagardan tomb is located on the road to Varukh and Isfara. The legend states that Shaykh Balagardan and his seven brothers traveled from Iran to Varukh. In Varukh, Balagardan dies. In his will, he requested to be buried on the road to Varukh-Isfara so that he can avert any calamity that might afflict the travelers on that road.

Among the inhabitants of this region, the supporters of this tomb are considerable. Travelers on this road can see the faithful as they go about requesting the Shaykh to attend to their problems and to organize their lives for them. If you travel by bus, you will see at least two or three such faithful aboard. They lift their hands in prayer as the bus passes this location.

In many places in Tajikistan and, indeed, in other locations in Central Asia, such as in the Qalajay mosque, in Varukh, one sees a painting of the hoof of a horse. The clergy claim it to be the hoof print of the Duldul, the horse of Imam Ali. They say, riding this steed, the Imam had come to these parts to punish the nonbelievers. We have often seen farmers who, upon seeing the point of Duldul's hoof, dismount and pay respects.

Some religious farmers, especially the women of Khujand, Panjekant, and other raions of northern Tajikistan, believe in the tombs' ability to avert calamity. For instance, the religious farmers who are afflicted with jaundice visit the Maybulaq tomb, pray and perform sacrifices in the hope of being cured. In order to find a cure for their children, women go to Chihil Mazar and perform the following: they tie wheat grains to the tail of the shirt of the child; then they bring the child here. For the disease to be transferred to the birds, they take the wheat and sprinkle it all over the grave.

Following such rituals, religious parents refuse the good services of our doctors and by not taking care of the sickness in a proper manner, expose their children to future discomfort and illness. For instance, Z. H. from the Frunze raion of Khujand brought about the death of his own eight-year-old son. On March 24, 1962, he wrote a note to the child's doctor stating that he intended to cure his son using religious methods and that he had moved his son out of the hospital on his own. Similarly, two pregnant women in the Frunze Kolkhoz and the 40th Anniversary of Revolution Kolkhoz, respectively, have brought about the deaths of their own infants by not going to the hospital and by relying on faith healing.

Some barren women go to Khwajah Qar in search of a cure for their barrenness. Apparently, there are some small worms there that they eat, believing earnestly that these worms will end their misery. The clergy, who supervise these rituals gain a substantial amount of money.

The real damage of these so-called sacred places lies in the psychological and physical damage that they incur. Visits to the tombs affect the villagers' intelligence; they become convinced that as individuals they cannot influence events. It also diverts their attention from what goes on around them and plunges them into a world in which science and technology have no meaning. Such individuals have no opportunity to gain faith in the successes of science and technology and, consequently, their social progress suffers. The damage does not end with the individual. The progress of science and of our communist way of life is the ultimate victim. This is not to mention the damage done to the body of the Soviet laws governing religious practices, in general.

The activities of many shaykhs, ishans, and sacred pirs are directly related to the mausoleums of the blessed because, like parasites, these clergy deceive the religious farmers and live a good life at their expense. Many farmers truly believe in the sanctity of the ishans and recognize them as their own pirs. As soon as an ishan dies, therefore, his disciples pronounce him sacred and build a ziyarat around him.

A certain group of religious farmers believe the fatwa of the clergy who state that every faithful Muslim must have a pir to whom he must pay visits and for whom he should offer sacrifices. The clergy claim that the soul of the individual who does not have a pir in this world will fall into the hands of the Shaytan (devil) in the next world.

Unless we consider the age-old problem of bai-feudal dominance of men over women, the problem of the religious survivals in Tajikistan will never be fully addressed. A major religious survival is the bride price that is paid by the groom to the bride's family. This practice, at the root of which lies a transaction mentality, belittles women and brings their status to the level of animals.

We have often observed the ill-perceived transaction that takes place between the parents of the bride and the go-between. They talk and haggle until the amount of the groom's wealth is ascertained. The demands of the bride's parents on the groom often become overwhelming enough to block the marriage between the two youths in love.

In such cases, the girl's views are not sought. As a result, the union between the two is one that is not based on mutual love but on pride price, a foundation that is doomed to failure.

We still observe religious divorces in the villages. According to the Islamic Shari'a, a man who does not wish to live with his wife can say "I divorce thee" three times and abandon her. In Islam, related to this act, which is called ce taloqa, is the degrading halola. This occurs when a man divorces his wife only to realize that he has made a mistake and wishes to bring her back as his wife. In this case, he must marry his ex-wife to another man. Only after this man divorces the former wife can the original husband remarry her.

Our sociological investigations in the Khujand Kolkhoz lead us to the believe that a) there must exist certain customs that greatly diminish and degrade women and b) that these customs are promoted by the very backward-thinking men of the community. As mentioned above, in the course of the introduction of communism into the kolkhoz, the life of the farmer has changed. New houses are being built according to modern plans: windows open into the street and tall walls that kept women secluded are gone. The concept of the inner and outer house, however, continues to be a feature of homemaking. For example, if a man enters one of the houses as a guest, the woman must retire to the other house. We believe that women learn this behavior at an early age. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that many fathers unwittingly discriminate against their own daughters by exclusively educating only their sons.

For example, when a guest comes to a Kholkhozman's house, he would ask his son to sit next to him, but he would send his daughter with his wife to the other house. There are also fathers who would never be seen with their daughters outside their house. Such fathers criticize those fathers who allow their daughters to accompany them outside the house; they, however, gladly place their sons on their shoulders and visit crowded places. This kind of behavior, of course, is due to ignorance; nevertheless, it establishes an unjust preference for boys over girls. It also promotes in the girl's mind and, indeed, in the mind of the future woman, the idea that men do not consider them respectable or worthy.

Preventing girls from attending school is one of the relics of the past. Many parents who would allow their daughters to attend elementary school would refuse their participation in higher education. They believe that the acquisition of knowledge does not fall within the purview of women. They believe that girls should concern themselves with knowledge that assists them in bringing up a decent family. They believe that a woman's essential duty is to see to the affairs of the household and to see that her husband is content.

As far as local girls being attracted into the field of education is concerned, Tajikistan occupies the last place. This was correctly reflected in the report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, where the republic was ranked 15th among the Union republics. The reason for this is that obvious. Only a few girls were allowed to enter the higher levels of education. The root of the problem, of course, lies in the old bai-feudal system that is still prevalent in the republic.

The rate of attrition at higher levels is incredible. For instance, of the 3,944 girls who entered first grade in the Panj raion in 1952-53, only 14 finished the 10th grade and only 6 finished the 11th grade. Furthermore, statistics show that even this situation is not stable and that compared with the total student body the number of girls in higher levels of education is declining.

Our research and our discussions with the school authorities indicate that a major reason for the girls' dropping out of school at higher levels is marriage. Indeed, some girls are sent to the husband's house before they have reached the appropriate age for marriage.

The decrease in higher levels of education affects the republics' pool of knowledgeable workers. It affects the number of technicians, doctors, engineers, agronomists and the like.

In regions like Khujand, where women have been incorporated into the work of the kolkhoz, the problems of veiling and seclusion have been mostly overcome. But still, in audience hall, where plays are performed or Soviet concerns are discussed, women sit separately from men. Tajik men still refuse to take their wives and daughters to the movies, theater, museums, and other public places. This generalization includes the village intelligentsia as well.

The more women are kept in seclusion, the more they are deprived of a social life and the more ignorant of the political dynamics and of civilization. This distance from social, political, and civilizational concerns creates a vacuum in their lives that is generally filled by religious dogma.

The above statements show that Islamic survivals exist in many shapes and forms in Tajik life and among Tajik farmers. Our research can be summarized as follows. First, Tajik farmers are still, in varying degrees, under the influence of Islam. Second, the religiosity of the Tajik farmers can be summarized in the performance of certain customs and rituals. The Tajik faithful are not familiar with the meaning underlying the rituals. They follow legends and riwayats that have been prevalent in their area for a long time. Third, the influence of religion is much less powerful among professionals such as engineers than among water masters, cotton pickers, and gardeners. The number of religious women far outweighs the number of religious men. And fourth, Islamic survivals are an anomaly in the contemporary world. They cannot be reconciled with communism and certainly are not helpful in educating a new Soviet man. They stand in sharp contrast to the very ideology that guides us.

The Reasons for the Existence of Religious Survivals and the Manner by Which They Can be Eradicated

After the total diffusion of socialism in our country, all the factors that nourished religious beliefs in the past have lost their strength; today, they are on the wane. In other words, in our country, the social roots of religion have been destroyed and its professional ties to society have been severed. Viewing the situation along these lines, some believe that, due to a lack of exploitative measures in Soviet society, i.e., a society in which one class does not enslave another, religion has lost its reactionary role. They assert that religion is not worth contending with any more. But such thoughts are erroneous.

Of course, in socialist countries religion does not-and will not-play the kind of role that it plays in capitalistic countries. In capitalistic countries religion feeds the power base that nourishes the upper classes, allows the exploitation of man by man, tolerates social oppression of workers, and adds to poverty and inequality. In fact, one could say, in capitalistic societies religion has a social base of its own, one that derives strength from exploitative cadres. Whereas socialism neither produces nor nourishes religion. The victory of socialism in our country brought about the total collapse of religious institutions. As a result, the character of deriving social benefits has totally changed; relations governing private property have become socialist relations; exploitative cadres have been destroyed; and the world in which illiterate people had to follow orders blindly is transformed to one endowed with freedom based on laws which themselves are derived from a collective understanding of the human condition.

The description of the foundation of religion signifies the annihilation of the roots of religion. This signifies that religion is the creature of society and that its growth requires special circumstances.

According to Karl Marx, an incorrect worldview is a product of an ill-conceived world. Religion by splitting the world creates a divided and disparate world, one in which fanciful ideas abound-ideas that are attractive to the uneducated mind. Viewed differently, it can be said that the sociological roots of religion in their true form are not the sum of those social factors that affect the person's religiosity, strengthening or weakening him. Rather, they are social and economic processes innate to particular societies and vital to their physical and spiritual survival.

We must understand the meaning of religion through an understanding of its causes that are lodged in a particular society's economic base and cadres. For example, in a capitalistic situation the sociological roots of religion are in a government that is empowered by capital, in social oppression of the workers in various forms including economic, political, and spiritual tyranny, and in a lack of concern for true social progress. At a certain juncture, these factors will necessarily produce a sense of helplessness in the worker, especially in view of social tyranny, inflexibility among the rules governing management and worker relations as well hopelessness, and insecurity. When he arrives at this juncture, the individual has no recourse but to gravitate to some supernatural power. Strangely enough, the ruling cadres actively promote these feelings and beliefs. Why? Because they have a huge stake in spreading ideologies that increase obedience and acceptance of one's lot, especially if that lot is decreed by God. Perhaps that is why V. I. Lenin, during those special and deciding periods of our history, stressed the social factor and indicated the need for an informed class struggle, resulting in the disestablishment of capitalism.

Communism rejected all the formations of the past and dismissed all economic, class, and political relations that reflect reality in some fantastic world away from reality. In our country the social roots of "ill-conceived worldviews" were destroyed; new ties now bind the workers placing them in charge of political and civic relations. The duality on which religion draws for its sustenance is removed.

The reason for the existence of religious survivals is apparent. Under the current circumstances, the historical roots of religious concepts including titles, customs, lifestyle, and ancient beliefs remain prevalent among the populace. What is called for is education.

We must mention here that when socialism's hold on our country is complete, the roots of religion will necessarily wither. Our country neither promotes religion nor provides the social and economic incentives necessary for the population to be religious. Nevertheless, there still exist some subjective and objective reasons that uphold religion and prevent its destruction. Relatively open socialist thinking is, perhaps, one of the major reasons for the existence of religious survivals.

The classical followers of Marxism-Leninism have often indicated that a mere change in social relations does not automatically and immediately change prevalent ideologies. That is because ideologies are relatively independent. For example here, in the context of ideology, we are talking about aspects of society that are directly related to production. Religion is the creature that stands the farthest away from becoming involved in production. In fact, it would not acknowledge the need for production. From ancient times, religion has occupied itself with fanciful images and has accumulated a wealth of them. Does not that make religion one of the most conservative of ideologies? Furthermore, is not this why religion utilizes colorful festivities and rituals to bolster the credentials, status, and respect of the elderly in the family? Since all of these are somehow related to 'an'ana, a major question can be raised: What is 'an'ana?

'An'ana has two meanings. On the one hand, it refers to habits and customs, lifestyles, norms, and ethics that have been transferred across generations. On the other hand, it is an idea-oriented concept governing politics, science, literature, and the arts. In this latter sense, 'an'ana is the force behind the foundation of schools of thought created by knowledgeable individuals in particular fields-schools that are directed by distinguished authorities.

With respect to religion, the word 'an'ana is used in the first sense. Here 'an'ana is regarded as the influence of previous generations to the contemporary generation by the passing of its feelings, imaginings, and ideas to its children. Furthermore, 'an'ana refers to well-established habits and customs among the religious-minded, passed from generation to generation. That is perhaps why festivities like the Qurban and Ramadhan have been given the status of 'an'ana, or customary rituals that cannot be abandoned.

One reason for the existence of religious survivals is that the ancients grew up in a milieu that was suffused with ideology. But although all that belonged to the past, there are many in our society who continue to refuse to change. Worse yet, they teach their outmoded values to their children. It is well-known that knowledge acquired at a young age remains with the individual the most. Besides, the child accepts the advice of the adults as belief and interprets world events according to those early beliefs. It is the eradication of this kind of thinking that requires the greatest effort.

It is true that a new set of customs are now being adhered to, but it is also true that some of the old customs linger and are being cherished. In our republic, for instance, around the Kholkhozes, people live in clans. Sometimes a clan includes between thirty and forty families. These families are often very large indicating that none of the members have moved out. Sometimes a whole village is comprised of several such families. Among these families and clans, the elders play a crucial role. The reason is that, generally, before the October Revolution, in Central Asia, the elders were heavily involved in the affairs of both the ruling classes and the religious institutions. Indeed they were the leaders in both legislative and administrative affairs.

Today, too, among the clans, the elders participate in the resolution of many problems (especially with regard to habits, customs and rituals) and, thereby, exert a great deal of influence. In fact, in raions and villages they serve as consultants in wedding tois, circumcision tois, where they are received royally. In these tois, the elders insist on upholding ancient customs and rituals. In wedding and engagement tois, of course, the mullah is also invited. The activities of the elders, therefore, must be scrutinized.

What we call religiosity is, in fact, a collage of feelings, psychological states, and customary rituals lodged in an individual's psyche. That is why the role of communist ideology, the purpose of which is to change group psychology and thought, is of great importance. Our task becomes especially difficult when these psychological states find a certain degree of affinity with private ownership and with other bai-feudal remnants known as "birth defects."

It is apparent that religious differences and nationality struggles are intertwined. It is also accepted that they nourish each other. Unfortunately, the constructive elements of this struggle are not religion-specific and are observed across religions. Another reason for the existence of religious survivals is that the leaders of these groups are allowed to publicize their cause. Some even receive assistance from outside the Soviet Union. Such propaganda assumes many shapes, including word of mouth and written notes. The former is carried out by the clergy, the latter is spread through literature in books, ancient and modern texts, manuscripts, and the like. Similar propaganda reaches here from abroad via the radio. Foreign tourists, who visit the religious institutions, also play a major role in the propagation of such ideas.

It needs to be stated that active participation of the faithful in prayers and in various festivities as well as in intercommunity and personal relations plays a major role in keeping religion alive. Indeed, religious propaganda has adopted much from the Soviet culture and has used it as a facade to shield its own old and decadent ideas. The religious leaders assess their audience at different times. They will then release only those dogma that have the best chance at success. Ideas that seem to be out of step at the present are withheld. How else could the religious leaders boast that they follow the rules specified by the Soviet government to a dot? In fact, using the methods described above, they have managed to create a certain correspondence between religious dogma and Soviet law. For the creation of this seeming correspondence, they have curtailed the amount of time specified for specific rituals, change the order of steps in others, and disguised the observable shape of the rituals. Often, when they are in a tight spot, they might forego the entire ceremony. At the international level, the clergy use the democratic way introduced by communism to repackage, as it were, their own out-dated ideas. In this way the old religion not only acquires a new garb but, unashamedly boast of freshness as well.

Persistence of religious survivals in Tajikistan is related to two factors: the complex nature of communism and the negative factors inherent in our country. After all we were economically the least developed republic in the world to open its doors to communism. It should be stated especially that negative factors such as a shortage of kindergartens for children prevented women from entering the social life of society and, consequently, hindered progress in eradicating religious survivals.

Nature must be considered one of the elements that can influence the retention of religious survivals. Man, too, exerts a degree of influence on nature. For this reason, it is necessary that we understand the elements that create nature, recognize the wealth that nature places at our disposal and find ways to decrease the harmful effects of nature on man.

Even though our sociological research allows us to use natural resources according to a plan and avert natural disasters, there are still some aspects that remain outside the purview of scientific explanation. For this reason sudden events caused by the wind, climate, lack of rain, too much rain, earthquake, among others, perpetuate religious superstition in people's thoughts and prepare them for gravitation to religion. The clergy use the effects of these accidents and unfortunate events in their ideological propaganda. It is for this reason that our Party program emphasizes the urgent need for a quick resolution of village administration structure, expansion of irrigation works, and increase in the use of minerals. These activities not only increase productivity, they also place nature under the tutelage of man.

The influence of the bourgeois ideology, the existence of a capitalistic world land a threat of war help religious concepts, and other outmoded customs, to subsist. The weighty consequences of the past war gave both superstition and religious thought a shot in the arm. Even though we were victorious in the war, our people suffered a great loss. Anxiety regarding the well-being of loved ones revived religious superstition in many, especially in women. The war situation created the grounds for the return of superstition; religious institutions especially were rehabilitated and the so-called patriotic clergy were employed in the war against Fascism. Who knew that the clergy would use this opportunity to gain respect and popularity.

Another point is that as long as capitalism exists, even in the absence of war, a threat of war is present. This situation generates anxiety and a need for maintaining security, especially in that the United States is doing its best to create war. The whole world has been witness to the imperialists' aggression in Vietnam. The clergy exploit this state of people's uncertainty and anxiety.

The slow progress of the formation of the materialistic world, especially the slack in the education of atheist workers, is the major reason for religious survivals. We may have achieved a degree of success in atheistic work, but there are many serious shortcomings. Neither the extent of the atheistic work nor its content fully justify the needs expressed at the 22nd and the 23rd meetings, and the needs of the new program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. One of the major shortcomings of the program for the education of atheists rests with its low regard for criticism. Many shortcomings and errors are visible in the form and principles of atheistic propaganda. For instance, the propaganda is neither sufficiently complex nor is it systematic. Furthermore, those in charge of atheistic education fail to cooperate with each other.

Finally, atheistic solutions are not always arrived at with sound judgment and clear views, Neither do they account for all the levels of the population. In some remote villages of Tajikistan, atheistic lectures are often not held for years. This makes the discussion of the other forms of atheistic propaganda academic.

Facts indicate that the majority of the religious individuals are either illiterate or are poorly educated. Everyone knows that limited worldview is an ideal ground for the nourishment of religion. Our observations confirm that in distant villages, among the kolkhoz workers, there are some elderly people who are illiterate. With this fact in view, it is necessary to adjust the atheistic teachings and make them accessible to all the people. Another shortcoming of the teachings of atheism is that they do not respond to the inventions of the clergy who are making their religion compatible with the times. In order for our oral and written propaganda to become effective, it is necessary to take the Muslim clergy's modernizing tactics into account and counter them with sound criticism.

It is obvious that the number of women who are religious is more than men. This is of particular importance when we come to the lack of equality between men and women. According to extant records, women spend more than 4-6 times more of their time at work. It should be mentioned that "work," lack of meaning in life, and boredom affect the women's capability. Even though social welfare is well on its way in our villages, they do not reach our female population. How can women go to the movies, read books and improve their civic sense if they continue to remain under the circumstances outlined above?

To sum up, Islamic survivals are related to many subjective and objective causes, the most important among which are : 1) habit forming 'an'anas belonging to the remote past; 2) usual religious practices; 3) a lack of scientific, atheistic propaganda.

Glossary

'asabiyyah: group feeling; that which binds the members of a group together; zeal; devotion to religion or to one's place of birth or nation.

bai: a local notable; someone of substantial economic worth; the bai-feudal relationship refers to the relations that were prevalent during the rule of the tsars and amirs.

bride-price: locally referred to as kalym, the bride-price is paid by the groom's family to the father of the bride between the time of the betrothal and the wedding.

Duldul: the winged steed of the Saint Ali.

fatwa: legal opinion in written form issued by a mujtahid or a mufti (canon lawyer) in response to a specific question for which there is no precedence in the Qur'an and the ahadith, i.e., the words and deeds of the Prophet as reported by the Prophet's family and close companions.

halola: (also known as muhallil) the compulsory marriage of a divorced woman to a man other than her original husband before she can remarry the latter.

haram: that which is not allowed by the Shari'a law.

Id: (here, referred to Id al-Fitr) feast that commemorates the end of the Ramadan. During this time the Muslin believer is expected to make donations to charities and make other sacrifices.

ishan: (lit., they) master of Sufi brotherhood, also referred to as shaykh, pir, usta, and murshid.

kolkhoz: a collective farm in which land and equipment are the property of the community and the members of which receive compensation for their surplus produce.

kurort: place of rest usually equipped with spas.

mullah: honorary title given to members of the clergy according to merit.

osh: a memorial feast; a dish consisting of rice, meat, and carrots cooked in oil.

pir: see ishan.

Qurban: the great feast of sacrifice is celebrated 70 days after the end of Ramadan. The holiday commemorates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son, the son he had from Hagar.

raion: administrative district.

Ramadan: the ninth month of the lunar calendar is the most celebrated of the twelve months. It was during this month that the Qur'an was revealed to Prophet Muhammad, an auspicious event that Muslims celebrate by fasting every one of its days.

riwayat: relating the words of another, especially relating accounts of the words and deeds of Prophet Muhammad as reported by his family and close companions.

sadaqa: voluntary contribution by the believers to the Muslim community for charitable purposes.

shaykh: see ishan.

Shari'a: Islamic law based on the Qur'an, ahadith, and other considerations, including ra'y (individual opinion), ijma' (consensus), and qiyas (analogy).

sovkhoz: a collective farm in which land and equipment belong to the state and the members of which are simple wage-laborers.

toi: (also written as tuy, toy, and tui) is a feast given by the family in honor of one of its children. The toi may celebrate a wedding or a circumcision. It usually is among the most weighty and expensive enterprises that the family undertakes.

ziyarat: mausoleum of a saint frequented by the believers, especially when access to the tombs in Mecca, Medina, and Karbala is denied.




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