Rahim Masov

The History of a National Catastrophe

Edited and Translated by
Dr. Iraj Bashiri

Bashiri Working Papers on Central Asia and Iran
1996, 2013
The History of a National Catastrophe

by Rahim Masov
Institute of History and Archaeology, Director
Academy of Sciences, Tajikistan

Edited and Translated by
Dr. Iraj Bashiri, Professor
Department of History
The University of Minnesota
The History of a National Catastrophe
# Table of Contents

**Editor's Note** ............................................................................................................. vii

**Preface** ......................................................................................................................... xi

**Tajiks Within the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkistan (ASSRT)** 1

**The Condition of the Tajiks in the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara** ........... 10

**National-Administrative Divisions: Establishment of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan within Uzbekistan** ........................................... 17

**Infringement Upon the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of the ASSRT. Struggle for Leaving Uzbekistan and the Establishment of Tajikistan SSR** .... 46

**Summary** ......................................................................................................................... 68

**Appendix** ........................................................................................................................ 77
  - The State Central Archives of Tajikistan ................................................................. 77
  - The Chairman of the Committee for the Study of Bukhara ............................. 85
  - Meeting of the Tajikistan-Uzbekistan Boundary Commission ....................... 87
  - The Way They Deceive the Tajiks ................................................................. 93
  - The Statement of the Inhabitants of the Village of Qamishi of the Qashqa Dariya Region, Received in Bukhara through the Communist Division of Iran .......... 97
  - We Must Continually Evaluate Ourselves ..................................................... 97
  - Letter by Comrade Muhiddinov ................................................................. 101
  - In Opposition to the Sabotage of National Politics ..................................... 106
  - Tajiks and Uzbeks ............................................................................................. 111
  - Comrade Muhiddinov Cries for Help ........................................................... 113
  - A Voice from the Basement .......................................................................... 114
  - Report To the Commission in Charge of Resolving the Land Dispute between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan ......................................................... 123
The 1917 October Revolution, led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, opened a new vista on Europe and Asia. It touched the lives of people living anywhere from China to Eastern Europe and from Novgorod to the Caucasus and Central Asia. In this regard, the formative decade of Soviet power (the 1920's) was especially epoch-making. During this decade the Civil War between the White Army—assisted by the United States, Europe, Japan, and Canada—and the Red Army resulted in the victory of the latter; the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced; the Kronstadt rebellion took place; Lenin died; and Stalin took over the Party machine. The decade ended with the introduction of a program of forced collectivization and rapid industrialization of the new nation.

At the same time, there were less prominent, local problems that had to be dealt with in the vast Soviet Empire. In Central Asia, for instance, the Basmachi movement pitted the Soviets against the Muslims who were defending their property, faith, and honor. The fall of the Basmachi movement coincided with the era of the implementation of the national-administrative divisions, and with *Hujum* (assault) on traditional ways. These seemingly constructive efforts changed the face of Central Asia while paving the way for future difficulties.

Academic Rahim Masov’s *History of a National Catastrophe* deals with the delicate issue of the national-administrative divisions of the region. The book is in two parts. Part one analyzes the dynamics of change and examines the various levels at which decisions were made for the allocation of resources and political power. Part two reproduces the archival documents on which the analyses and assessments are based. Altogether, the book presents a clear view of the manipulation of the stronger ethnic groups in the Union to eliminate opposition from the lesser groups in order to harness the resources of the latter. Uzbekistan’s oppressive treatment of the Tajiks during the 1920’s is a case in point. Masov provides detailed discussion of the linguistic, economic, and educational means employed by the Uzbeks to force the Tajiks out of their cultural centers in the north to take refuge in the Pamirs. This, Masov says, could not have happened without the assistance of the European Soviets who served on the committees that studied the issue and made recommendations. The minutes of the meetings provided in the comprehensive Appendix to the work support Masov’s statement.
The European Soviets' allowance of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia to participate in political affairs at a high level resulted in the consolidation of a strong Turkish national feeling and the emergence of Pan-Turkism under the guise of the already existing Pan-Islamism led by the Ottoman Turks. Confronted with this situation, the European Soviets, especially the Russians, changed their strategy in Central Asia from one of cooperation to one of "divide and conquer." The introduction of the national-administrative divisions whereby the different ethnic groups were recognized as separate entities led by their own leaders broke up the power of the Turks and Muslims of the region for a long time to come. Masov analyzes the Russia-Central Asia confrontation in detail and attributes much of the problems of present-day Central Asia to this political move by the Soviet leaders in the very early stages of the development of Soviet power.

While Russification was at the heart of the major plan of the Soviets for the Empire, at lower levels and with the tacit approval of the European Soviets, two other processes were taking place in Central Asia: Turkification and Uzbekization. Put into motion one after the other by the Turks to assimilate the Tajiks and other non-Turkic elements in the region, these processes were intended to expand the Turkish domains and, in the long run, do away with the Russian yoke. Once the process of Turkification, on which the rise of Pan-Turkism rested, failed, the Uzbeks forced the Tajiks to register themselves as Uzbeks. This process, Masov says, confused the ethnographic picture of Central Asia, increased the number of Uzbeks at the expense of the Tajiks, and created tension among otherwise friendly peoples.

The national-administrative divisions were completed in 1924 and, theoretically, should have had a positive impact on the subsequent life of the Soviets who built their empire through hard work, collectivization, and industrialization. But, Masov argues that this is an erroneous conclusion; he believes that the divisions dislocated the ethnic population putting the contending cultures on a collision course. For decades Soviet rulers pushed back the impending doom resulting from these early moves with the promise of a Communist Heaven. Eventually, however, the promise lost its luster. At that moment, Masov says, the mistakes of the 1924 national-administrative divisions returned to haunt Russia and Central Asia. These mistakes must be studied. More importantly, he says, future Tajik and Uzbek generations must learn the hard lesson that has emerged from this experiment.

*The History of a National Catastrophe* was originally written in Russian. Its publication in 1991 in Dushanbe created a stir. The allegation of forced Uzbekization of the Tajiks prompted the government to remove it from circulation. The present translation, based on Nurali Davlatov's Tajik translation, is comprehensive in the sense that it includes data
excluded by the Soviet editors of the original version as well as additional materials released by the archives since that publication.

I would like to thank Academic Rahim Masov for allowing the translation of his work, Nurali Davlatov for his Tajik translation, and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) for providing both the time and the opportunity to complete the translation. I would also like to thank Zulfiya Rahimova for her contribution to the editorial notes, Indira Salieva for clarification of ethnic problems, and Carol Bashiri, Denise Williams, and Sarah Withee for technical assistance. I also would like to thank Askarali Rajabov, Nu'man Tashmatov, and Gary Jahn for their contribution to this work.
Preface

A number of issues in the history of Tajikistan demand careful scrutiny. The most compelling of these issues, however, belong to the early phases of Soviet rule in Central Asia. One such issue is the outcome of the national-administrative divisions of Central Asia, especially the treatment that the Tajiks received at the hand of their Soviet compatriots. Admittedly, this is a somewhat obscure issue, but one that merits attention—one that illustrates a disturbing aspect of Soviet history.

An involved issue, an understanding of the national-administrative divisions requires an intimate knowledge of the 1917 Revolution, the establishment of Soviet rule in Central Asia, and the extent of the authority of the Soviets and the Communist Party during the life time of V. I. Lenin and thereafter. It also requires documentation of glaring "mistakes" that, in the long run, complicated the Tajiks' achievement of a national government at that time. Our understanding of this latter issue is contingent upon other factors like an understanding of Pan-Turkism, the retrogressive and anti-nationalistic movement that incurred great losses on the Tajiks and, of course, the availability of documents that prove the point. The fact that this movement continues to frustrate the Tajiks' aspiration for self-government—it is an issue at the present—makes the need for dealing with it more imperative.

The democratization process in the republics has introduced some changes in academic thinking. For instance, sciences, like history, are rapidly distancing themselves from ideology and historians and publicists alike express conflicting opinions regarding V. I. Lenin's interpretation of the October Revolution. The outcome of the latter debate, of course, is a question for history to answer; but there are some facts about the dynamics of the time that are undeniable. For example, the economic situation supports the supposition that Russia itself was not prepared for a socialist revolution let alone the emirates and khanates of Central Asia. In fact, socialism's failure is in no place more evident than in the underdeveloped country of Tajikistan. Here we observe first hand not only the lack of effectiveness of socialism as a system, but ample documentary evidence as proof.

Neither can we credit the statements of those who argue that the Revolution brought about a dictatorship and that it was responsible for the death of many. Revolution and bloodshed go hand in hand. History does not record any revolution, or even conflict, that has satisfactorily met the demands of all the social classes. Even today, during the era of reconstruc-
tion, or quiet revolution, affairs are not proceeding without bloodshed. Those who aspire to achieve democratic change, social humanism, and social equality with ease merely delude themselves. In fact, confrontation and bloodshed are created by forces in society that oppose revolutionary change because, by necessity, those forces pursue their own interests. Indeed, the same forces are present in our society today and will continue to exist so long as we remain unfamiliar with democracy and with the rule of law as these institutions are understood by the progressive nations of the world. Ratification of just and democratic laws, like the ones being considered at the present, is the answer.

The October Revolution and the Soviet government impacted the lives of the Tajiks in a most profound way. Indeed, these were historical events that will remain as major milestones in the shaping of subsequent Tajik history as will be the violation of the directives regarding the nationality question, a violation that deprived the Tajiks of their inherent rights at a very crucial moment in their national existence. In other words, the contributions of the people of Tajikistan to the creation and development of Soviet power were not recognized properly. Consequently, the importance of the Tajiks as a people was not appreciated by the higher echelon of Soviet rule.

The implementation of the national-administrative divisions and the establishment of Soviet and autonomous republics in Central Asia were major events in the history of the Soviet Union. The measure, in addition to satisfying a need, was a correct act historically, especially if it had been carried out judiciously. This required recognition of the fact that in the past, among the Central Asians, only the Tajiks enjoyed a long tradition of rulership. Before the October Revolution and, even for some time thereafter, the rest of the peoples of the region belonged to the heavily populated Turkistan governorship of Imperial Russia, the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara.

It is becoming increasingly evident that in the process of the implementation of the national-administrative divisions, and the creation of the union republics, autonomous republics, and autonomous regions, many mistakes were made. For instance, historically established boundaries were ignored and cities and large areas were allowed to choose their own affiliation. In time, the consequences of those decisions surfaced and plagued the economy and the educational systems of those regions.

The historical development of the Tajik nation under Soviet rule can be divided into four periods. The first period (1917-1924) includes the October Revolution, the formation of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkistan (ASSRT), the People's Republic of Bukhara (PRB), and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This is known as the era before the national-administrative divisions of Central Asia. The second period (1924-1929) includes the formation of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan, along with its backward economy, within the Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist Republic (UzSSR). The third period
(1929-1990) begins with the creation of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan (Tajikistan SSR). The fourth period begins in 1990 and continues to the present.

Until 1924, there were two types of soviet socialist governments in Central Asia: autonomous republics like the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkistan, which was part of the Russian Federation and People's Republics like the People's Republic of Bukhara and the People's Republic of Khwarazm. These latter, as independent countries, enjoyed diplomatic relations with Russia. During the incorporation of these governmental organizations, their pre-revolutionary boundaries were retained, even though those boundaries did not correspond with the ethnic identity of the peoples that populated them. That was because the major peoples of the region—Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzes, Turkmens, and Karakalpaks—had lived under successive, dictatorial rule and had established khanates to govern themselves.
Tajiks Within the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkistan (ASSRT)

The establishment of the ASSRT and the Russian Federation was a historical event of great proportion, especially in relation to the resolution of the nationality problems in Central Asia. In this context, it dealt heavy blows both against the forces that envisaged the creation of a "Great Turkistan" by unifying all the Turks to be led by Turkey and against those who sought independence from Russia.

There is, however, a discrepancy between the facts and the historical perspective given to the events. For instance, events of the time are documented as though in the Republic of Turkistan the "Tajiks had been given a choice in self-identification" and that that choice had not only been amenable to the promotion of their culture but that it had prepared them for the political arena. The facts do not support this contention; in fact, we believe that there is no foundation for any such claims. Neither is it true that after the establishment of the ASSRT the representatives of the local nationalities participated, in large numbers, in the administration of the Republic and that the minorities were allowed to publish books, newspapers, and the like in their native languages. To the contrary, the oldest people of Central Asia, the Tajiks, did not benefit at all from the social and administrative measures passed by the ASSRT. This was not the fault of the Pan-Turkist element alone; some of the leaders of the ASSRT were equally guilty. They believed that the local people were not intelligent enough to participate in the government, administration, and cultural development of the republic.

In the Reports of the Central Executive Committee of the Union and of the Turkistan Central Executive Committee to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union, U. A. Apin explains the situation in Turkistan as follows, "In the beginning, lacking precise Party policies, the local inhabitants were not admitted into the Soviet administrative positions and the Red Army, even though they had prepared themselves, were skillful, and had proven their dedication to the cause of the common good. This kind of treatment brings Muslims to the conclusion that the European nationals (i.e., the Soviet staff managed by the
Russians—R.M.) wish to rule over the local inhabitants as they had done in the past."

This type of local distrust of the government was harmful. On the ethnic side, it led to regionalism and Pan-Turkism while on the religious side it led to Pan-Islamism. Both currents were fraught with danger for the Tajiks. The main danger was the defection of some Tajik leaders who, to safe-guard their positions, joined the Pan-Turkists.

When the Tajiks entered the self-identification phase of the process, the same individuals continued on their perilous path and made even more damaging mistakes. For example, in the 5th Tajikistan meeting, a People's Commissariat was formed in order to put the Soviet principles of autonomy into action, to ensure the security of peoples' interests, and to attract the mass of the workers to the soviets. Then, on January 16, 1919, the government of the Turkistan Republic announced a new law entitled: "About the Commissariat of the Country Regarding the Problem of Nationalities," for public information. Signed by the Turkistan Central Executive Committee, the law clearly stated that, "They [the minorities] can have their representatives both in the branches dealing with the nationality problems and in the national commissariat dealing with the nationality issues." Following that law, in the Commissariat dealing with the nationalities in the Turkistan Republic, in 1919, the following sections were established: "Uzbek, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Azerbaijani, Armenian, Tatar, Fars, Ukrainian, Jewish, and local Jewish." As can be seen, a Tajik section was not established, even though, the Tajik population in many of the cities and regions of Turkistan exceeded the population of the above-mentioned nationalities. The sentiment of the Tajiks and the mood of the time is expressed by Degtiarinka who says, "Although the number of the Tajiks in the Republic of Turkistan exceeded that of the Turkmens, Armenians, Jews, and others (in some cities and regions exceeded even the Uzbeks—R. M.), they were not assigned a section of their own. This brings us to the conclusion that Pan-Turkism and regionalism were still at work and that they prevented the Tajiks from self-determination. Some researchers believe that this discrimination against the Tajiks was because "the national sections of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities (narkomnats), without presenting any trustworthy documentation, denied the existence of the Tajiks as a nation in Turkistan." Others claim that perhaps the Soviet or Party leaders had not been informed that the Tajiks

---

1 Centralnyi partinyi arkhiv instituta marksizma-leninizma pri CK KPSS (Central Party Archives, Marxist-Leninist Institute, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR; henceforth, ЦПА ИМЛ...), ф. 17, оп. 65, Д. 380, л. 2.
3 Degtiarinka, N. D. Razvitie soveteskoj gosudarstvennosti v Tadzhikistane (The Progress of Soviet Rule in Tajikistan), Moscow, 1960, pp. 31-32.
4 Ibid.
inhabited this land, alongside the above-mentioned nationalities. Needless to say, both claims border on the ridiculous. Even before the Revolution, Russian as well as foreign authors had written extensively about the Tajiks, their history, and their rich cultural heritage. As early as 1921, G. Safarov, one of the great Soviet and Party officials of Soviet Turkistan, who was later repressed, wrote the following about the Tajiks in his Colonial Revolution (The Turkistan Experience), "Among the present-day inhabitants of Turkistan only the Tajiks belong to the ancient Aryan race. Currently, they inhabit the upper reaches of the Zarafshan, the Samarqand region, the Kuhistan valleys, the slopes of the Quqand mountains, Namangan, Margilan, and parts of the Andijan region of Ferghana. They also live in the mountains of Nurata and in the regions of Jizzakh and Katta-Kurgan. The Chinese recognize the inhabitants of the Transcaspia—Khiva, Ferghana, and Sughd—as speakers of Tajiki ("tiagi" in their language)..."5 Claims that the Turkistan Commissariat might have lacked any knowledge about the existence of the oldest people of Central Asia, the Tajiks, would be meaningless and ridiculous. It would have been absolutely impossible to remain ignorant of the identity of not only the oldest settlers of the region, but of the fact that the region owed its cultural development, progressive use of land, and its urban life to its Tajik inhabitants.

It is sufficient to concentrate on the statements of one of the scholars who says, "... although the Tajiks are the founders of almost all the irrigation systems and are the people who have given life to the villages of Turkistan, presently, they are a dispersed people. Having been driven from their homeland, they are incapable of forming an independent political existence."6

In the article of the young anthropologist, R. Rahimov, dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the learned scholar of Central Asian affairs, I. I. Zarubin,7 the various locations, cities, and regions where the Tajiks had lived before the national-administrative divisions and thereafter are documented. He states, "According to Zarubin, historically, the Uzbeks have come into being as a result of the coming together of the tribes that form the Kazakhs. After the Uzbeks settled in Transoxania, their lives underwent great changes. In their own manner, in various places, they accepted the Turkish tribes that preceded them and had become intermixed with the Turkish and Iranian tribes of the region..."8 The author is very correct in stating that, "the coming of the Uzbeks to settle in the region quickened

5 Safarov, G. Kolonialnaia revolutsia (opit Turkistana) (Colonial Revolution: The Turkistan Experience), Moscow, 1921, p. 110.
6 Geyr, I. I. Putushastvie po Turkistanu (Turkistan Travels), Tashkent, 1901, p. 27.
7 I. I. Zarubin, linguist and Iranist, deals primarily with the folklore of the Iranian peoples. He has made noteworthy contributions to the understanding of the peoples of the Kuhistan as well as to those of Bartang and Rushan (ed).
the pace of the Turkicization of the Iranian peoples of the area."9 Continuing to base his analysis on Zarubin's account, he adds, "Before the coming of the Uzbeks, the Turkish-speaking Iranians of the region were called Uzbek and Kazakh. Some are still being referred to as such. To distinguish themselves from the newcomers, these Uzbeks and Kazakhs tried to establish themselves as Sarts, but failed."10

Analyzing the formation of the cities of Central Asia, Zarubin states, "In 1915, the Tajik population of the heavily populated city of Samarqand was 59,991 and the Uzbek population was 819."11 In 1920, in the same place, there lived 44,573 Tajiks and 3,311 Uzbeks.12 The reason for the decrease in the Tajik population compared to the 1915 census was that the 1917-1918 famine in Samarqand killed a large number of Tajiks. And the increase in the number of the Uzbek-speaking inhabitants can be attributed to the fact that many Tajiks became Uzbek and that many Sarts and others chose the same option."13 In addition, the following measures played a significant role in bringing about the change: the formation of the Republic of Turkistan; the forced integration of the Tajiks through discriminatory processes of census taking; granting of key positions to Uzbeks; and the translation of administrative records, educational materials, the news, and the documents of the other organs into Uzbeki and Turkish languages.

In R. R. Rahimov's article, Zarubin's ethnographic conclusions are compared with similar data analyzed by other researchers. The results present a fascinating picture: during the few years of the existence of the Republic of Turkistan, the number of Tajiks is alarmingly reduced. For instance, L. F. Kastanko's conclusion, presented by Zarubin, indicates that, "At the end of the past century the main population of Samarqand was Tajik."14 N. I. Virskiî's data also support Kastanko's statement. His sociological table, dealing with the Zarafshan rural district, provides the population for Samarqand at 35,326 (33,622 Tajiks), in 1876. The remaining population consists of Persians, Indians, Central Asian Jews, and Uzbeks.

---

9 Ibid., p.118.
10 Ibid. The genesis and the meaning of the word "sart" have created difficulty for researchers. Barthold's understanding of sart is that it is the Turko-Mongol tribes' name for the settled populations of Central Asia, especially the Sughdians and their descendants, the Tajiks. Later, this word was used to refer to settled Uzbeks as well. Because of their identification with settled life, traders, too, have often been referred to as sart.

In general, it seems that the word sart, like the word Tajik, was used as an ethnic identifier. i.e., in the same way that earlier Tajik separated the settled Muslims from the pagan tribesmen; sart divided the settled population in general from the nomadic. But as often happens, the tribes settled and, consequently, became sarts themselves. In this sense, it is not at all surprising to find the word sart applied to settled Uzbeks, Kyrgyzes, Kazakhs, and others. For details see, "Tajik Soviet Encyclopedia," vol. 6, p. 609 (ed.).
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
The first general Russian census of 1897, too, indicates that the Tajiks were predominant in the Samarqand region (60.58% men, 66.58% women), Uzbeks (13.59% men, 13.55% women). These statistics, however, are totally obliterated by the results of a new census published in 1926. According to that, the Tajik population of the city of Samarqand is 10,716, and the Uzbek population is 43,304. From this we can conclude that the establishment of the ASSRT provided the foundation for a racial cleansing of the Tajiks to be accomplished through the process of national-administrative divisions—an attempt at corresponding the ethnic identity of the inhabitants with the name of a region. The very appellation, the "Republic of Turkistan," meant that the Turks were the only inhabitants of Central Asia. The leaders of the republic and the officials reporting to the Russians in the Center, were either plagued with amnesia or, knowingly, chose to ignore the advice of learned historians. Even though it was stated repeatedly that the Tajiks were the oldest people of Central Asia and that Tajik self-identification and achievement of independence were of great importance, in the intense struggle between the Pan-Turkists (who sought to establish an independent Turkistan at any cost) and the Soviet and Russian Party officials (who wished to keep Turkistan in the RSFSR), the future prosperity of the Tajik people was compromised.

In the third Muslim Conference of the Communist Party of Russia (b), on the subject of "Autonomy and Centralization," T. Risukulov stated, "Now the communist Turks must correct the mistakes of history, including those of the people of Turkistan. The representatives of the Turkistan workers, the real revolutionaries, must form a unique communist solidarity under the red banner." But, the Pan-Turkists who gathered at the Turkistan Bureau of Muslim Affairs, using revolutionary slogans, promoted the old Pan-Turkist agenda. The representatives of the Bashkird and Tatar intellectuals who worked in Soviet and Party organizations and the Ottoman Turks who were in key positions in the Red Army and the educational establishments also lent their support. When the Pan-Turkists became certain that the Turkish people of Central Asia would not achieve independence without the aid of the Soviet Union, they used the government that had been established by the Red Army as an instrument for furthering the self-identification of the Muslim Turks of Central Asia.

The Soviet government of Turkistan did not implement the process of self-identification of the peoples of Central Asia which had begun during the rule of the Tsars. Indeed, it stopped the process. Consequently, it failed to do justice to the case of the oppressed people, notably the Tajiks. Of course, the main objective of the Turkish-speaking intellectuals—the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzes, Turkmens, and a certain group of Tajik intellectuals contaminated with Pan-Turkism—was to use Islam to

---

15 Ibid.
16 Turar Risukulov served the Communist Party in various capacities, especially as Peoples Commissar of Health (1918-19) and the Director of the Commission for Prevention of Hunger (1919-20). He was purged in 1938 (ed.).
establish an independent Turkish kingdom. The main promoters of this trend were the local young bourgeois and the "jadids." This nationalist view, in reality, a Pan-Turkist notion, was promoted by a group of Turkish officers led by Afandiev. These officers originally had been Ottoman Prisoners of War, captured by Russia and sent to Turkistan, where they monopolized the educational system. After a while, the educational systems of the People's Republics of Bukhara and Khwarazm also fell into their hands. In the resolution of the Third Muslim Conference of the country on Autonomy and Centralization, we encounter the following statement, "For the benefit of the creation of an international Union among the workers and oppressed people, the attempt to break up the Turks into the smaller nations of Tatars, Kyrgyzes, Bashkirds, Uzbeks, and the like should be neutralized. Instead, an attempt should be made at the unification of all Turks and the attraction of others who are not included in the RSFSR around a Soviet Turkish republic. If all this is not possible, an attempt should be made to establish separate Turkish kingdoms based on territoriality."17

The Pan-Turkists had their own interpretation for Karl Marx' slogan, "Proletariats of the world Unite!" In their version, the slogan "international union of all the workers of all countries" and "the oppressed peoples of the world" were changed to "a union of all the Turks." But, in reality, the members of this union shared only two things: the Turkish language and the Islamic faith.18

Instead of furthering the cause of socialism in Turkistan and attracting the peoples of the republic to the changes introduced by the Revolution, the Pan-Turkists used Pan-Islamism as a means for establishing Pan-Turkism. They intended to revive the socialist "Utopia" of Pan-Turkism, something that was very distant from the interests of the peoples of Central Asia in general, let alone the Tajiks in particular. Indeed, the Turks themselves, especially the Tatars and the Bashkirds, could be harmed by the process. This kind of national policy was detrimental to the national and cultural benefits as well as the political process of self-identification of all the people, including the Uzbeks, Kyrgyzes, and Turkmens, but especially the Tajiks. The Pan-Turkists labeled the historical division of the Turks into Tatars, Kyrgyzes, Turkmens, Bashkirds, and Kazakhs as artificial and regarded all the efforts of the Tatars, Kyrgyzes, and Uzbeks for achieving national identity to be erroneous. In their minds only one nation was worth fighting for—an independent nation composed of Turkish-speaking peoples.19

In the field of education, especially during the formation of the schools, the special features of the Uzbeki, Turkmeni, and Kyrgyzi languages were ignored. As for Tajiki, its very existence was denied! The

17 Safarov, G. op cit, p. 110.
18 Ibid, p. 111.
19 Ibid.
Turkicization of the schools was achieved by mixing Turkish and Tatari words. This process could be implemented in this manner because the whole educational reform movement was spearheaded by the Turks and the Tatars. The Turkicization of the schools was implemented within the borders of the republic of Turkistan, even in regions and cities where the inhabitants were not Turks. In addition, when Afandiev was the People's Commissar for Education, he introduced Turkish military marches as well as Turkish songs and drills into all the schools. He also appointed Turk teachers from among the Turkish officers, officially abandoned the use of the new script, and openly persuaded students to involve themselves in religious activities.  

The 3rd Muslim Conference of the country and the 5th Conference of the Communist Party of Russia (b) resolved that the Republic of Turkistan be recognized as the republic of the Turkish peoples and that the Turkistan Communist Party be recognized as the Communist Party of the Turks. The promoters of this insane idea intended to make the underdeveloped Turkistan, which historically and practically was the home of the Tajiks, the new center of culture for the Turks of the RSFSR. The intent of this action was to alienate the Tajiks and separate Turkistan from Russia. The latter motive became better defined when the struggle began between the Turks and the Russians, whom Afandiev regarded as the real enemy. With this in mind, Afandiev proposed that the government of Turkistan be empowered to administer the republic's "foreign relations" independently.

Subsequent events, like the decentralizing efforts of the national union of soviets and Turkish autonomy, reflect the Pan-Turkists' use of the new opportunities to revive and implement their own separatist plans. As the historical experience clearly indicates, all this was happening during an era of revolution and reconstruction. In the past, this happened at the time of the overthrow of the Russian Empire; now it was taking place during the process of democratization in the Soviet Union. The only difference is that this time Pan-Turkism was making its move under the guise of Pan-Islamism, threatening the security of all those who did not have a Turkish affiliation.

From the creation of the ASSRT and throughout its existence, no changes were made to the lifestyle of the Tajiks. This was particularly striking with regard to the appointment of the cadres, formation of self-governing units of Tajiks, establishment of schools, selection of faculty and staff for higher educational establishments, and creation of facilities for the publication of newspapers. This to the point that famous Russian and Soviet Orientalists as well as others knowledgeable about the past history of Central Asia expressed concern about the future of the Tajiks as a people. In 1925, V. V. Barthold wrote, "When the constitution of

20 Ibid.
21 Izvestiya (News), February 5, 1920.
Turkistan was ratified in 1920, only the Kyrgyzes, Uzbeks, and Turkmens were recognized as 'original residents,' while the most ancient people of the land, the Tajiks, were ignored. History will show the contribution of the 1924 divisions to the revival of the national culture of the Tajiks.\textsuperscript{22}

All Party and Soviet governmental officials who worked with the local leaders were contaminated with Pan-Turkist ideology. Efforts expended on the formation of the "unified Turkish nation," the "Communist Party of Turkistan," and the military arrangements in Turkistan all spoke clearly of those intentions. The Turk Commission, the Turk Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of the Soviet Union, and, later, the Middle Asia Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of the Soviet Union were unable to stem this wave of regionalism. Eventually, the policy of assimilating the ethnic groups in Central Asia was directed at the Tajiks. They did not consider the fact that many manuscripts and diverse sources in the world of Orientalistics testify that the Tajiks are the oldest people of Central Asia and that, as a people, they had created a unique culture and had retained their language and ethnic distinction.

Ignoring the fact that statistically the Tajiks were the second largest group in the ASSRT, on 14 July, 1918, the Turkistan Central Executive Committee issued the following decree, "Along with Russian, the official language should be the prominent local languages (Uzbeki and Kyrgyzi)." In the report of the commission on devising administrative apparatus, issued on 14 September, 1924, it is emphasized that there exist many nationalities in Turkistan and that it is necessary that administration be conducted in the three main languages of Uzbeki, Kyrgyzi, and Turkmeni.\textsuperscript{23}

This anti-Tajik policy was in opposition not only to known historical facts but to common sense as well. It was obvious to everyone that the Tajiki language had been, and had remained, the language of the eastern peoples for centuries. Before the national-administrative divisions, Tajiki had served as the official language of successive dynasties and governments in Central Asia. Without a knowledge of Tajiki, it would have been difficult to educate the Turks, including those representatives who now denied the existence of Tajiki, about their own cultural heritage. Tajiki is the key to almost all the spiritual treasures of Central Asian peoples. Nevertheless, during the existence of the Turkistan Republic, in its various forms, the economic and cultural interests of the Tajiks were infringed upon. The Turkistan papers openly advocated the killing of Tajiks and the forcing of the Tajiks to accept Uzbek identity.

\textsuperscript{22} Barthold, V. V. Tadzhiki. istoricheskii ocherk (Tajiki: Historical Essays), Tashkent, 1925, p. 117.

\textsuperscript{23} See also K. Hassanov, V. I. Lenin i Turkbiyoro CK VPK (V. I. Lenin and the Turkistan Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, Tashkent, 1969, pp. 32-33.
For instance, in 1924, Turkistan published "In the Land of the Tajiks," in which it was stated, "Efforts at utilizing this language (i.e., Tajiki—R.M.) has the following meanings: 1) seeking distance from life, an effort which history does not approve; 2) acceptance of it, i.e., the Tajiki language, is tantamount to acceptance of a useless and extra element. That is why it is advisable that the Tajiks employ the Uzbeki language and dismiss their 'special language.' Fate has solved their social problem." This is an extremely frightening piece but, at the same time, it is a clear and sobering reflection of its time.

The mainstay of peoples and nations is their language. The elimination of the language brings about the elimination of its speakers as well. That is why, perhaps, at the present time, too, language has become a primary issue. All the Union and independent republics have accepted language laws and are including languages among their organs of government. The issue of national languages and their future development in our national struggle occupy a prominent place in our country.

In the ASSRT, during the years of its existence, efforts at the introduction and expansion of socialist principles among the Tajiks were hindered by the artificial methods of the Pan-Turkists and by the opposition of the chauvinist-nationalists. If, in the other republics, this time marked the beginning of the elimination of economic and cultural inequalities, for the Tajiks it was a time of struggle for survival and for the restoration of their civil rights.

Even though at that time the Tajik population of Turkistan was 1.3 million, in a report by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Central Asian Bureau of the Communist Party (b) of the Union, I. A. Zelinskii, states that except for Gorno-Badakhshan—western Pamir—the very existence of the Tajiks is denied.

It is worth noting that while the 290,000 Turkmens who lived in Tajikistan had been granted the right to publish books and newspapers and to open Turkmeni schools, the Tajiks were deprived of all that. This was the result of the hidden agenda of the Pan-Turkists. Their hostility against the Tajiks reached the highest ranks of Party and Soviet leadership. The proof is the circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia, issued on 12 August, 1920, which directs the Communist Party apparata of Turkistan to improve its communist and soviet relations with the local population of the republic. Furthermore, it leaves out the people actually being oppressed. The circular states, "The local inhabitants of

25 See also: Zarafshan and Turkistan in Uzbeki for December, January, and February 1920-21.
26 Центральный государственный архив Октябрьской революции СССР (Central Governmental Archives of the October Revolution in the USSR), ф. 1318. – оп. 1. - Д, 627.
Turkistan are the Uzbeks, Kyrgyzes, and Turkmens. The Soviet government must rely on the working masses among these people."\(^{27}\)

The policies of the Pan-Turkists and the Great-Uzbek and anti-Tajik chauvinists yielded devastating results for the Tajiks. Seeing how lucrative jobs went to the Turks and how Uzbeki became the official language of instruction, the majority of the Tajiks panicked. Furthermore, safeguarding themselves and their children against a dim future, they registered themselves as Uzbeks. The 1920 census shows that the number of the Tajiks in Turkistan, in comparison to the previous census, had been reduced by one third. The number of the Uzbeks had increased correspondingly.

In the effort of the Turkicization of the Tajiks of the ASSRT and the other regions of Central Asia, the most zealous were those who had studied in Istanbul, resided in Turkey, or who had willy-nilly found themselves in Central Asia. Most of them were in the educational and in the national military institutions. Academic Z. Sh. Rajabov, explaining the training processes of the instructional cadres in northern Tajikistan, writes, "In the teacher-training courses in Samarkand, alongside the experienced Russian, Tajik and Uzbek teachers, Turkish Prisoners of War also taught. Many of these teachers included extra curricular, Pan-Turkist ideas in their lesson plans. That is why after completing the teacher-training college, we spoke in broken Turkish with our students."\(^{28}\) In fact, at one point, it became necessary for the future academician Z. Sh. Rajabov to speak at a meeting in Khujand. He had to read to a Tajik audience a text that had been prepared for him by his teacher, in Turkish.

This is how, in the ASSRT, one of the first Soviet Socialist republics in Central Asia, the process of self-identification among the Tajiks did not take place. On the contrary, compared with the pre-revolutionary times, the Tajiks' rights were, to a great extent, infringed upon. Revolutionary changes and, later, the socialist principles prescribed by the Soviet government in economics, politics, and culture proceeded very slowly in Tajik-inhabited areas. During the existence of that republic its leaders, none of whom was Tajik, shared the same objective: the creation of an independent Turkish government. Their main motto was, "Turkistan for the Turks."

The Condition of the Tajiks in the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara

The configuration of the Tajik nation and its governance, like those of some other peoples, required that they be placed across two republics.


During the short existence of the ASSRT, as we have seen, the desired formation was not achieved. But could the problem be resolved by placing them in the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara (PSRB), especially when some scholars claim that the PSRB was a national Tajik government? The answer is no. In fact, there is no truth in the statement that the PSRB was a Tajik government.

After the establishment of the PSRB and the initiation of the national-administrative divisions in Bukhara, too, the rights of the Tajiks, the largest population group, were infringed upon. Some scholars claim that Eastern Bukhara was an autonomous administrative unit formed of a single people (Tajiks); they claim that it had local (Tajik) administrative officials, and that it was autonomous within the Soviet Republic of Bukhara. Nothing can be farther from the truth. There is not a shred of evidence supporting these claims. No documents exist that distinguish Eastern Bukhara as an autonomous part of the PSRB. If these scholars are considering the activities of the Extraordinary All-Bukhara Dictatorial Commission in Eastern Bukhara, they should know that that Commission dealt with two separate and different issues: one was neutralizing the activities of the mujahidin who fought against the Red Army and the other was the normalization of the political climate in Eastern Bukhara. Besides, the establishment of the Extraordinary Dictatorial Commission was not a feature of Eastern Bukhara alone. Similar commissions were sent to all the regions of the country where their history was complex and where the political and the military needs of the region required their presence. The Extraordinary Dictatorial Commissions were assigned by the influential organs—the Central Committee of the Union, the Soviet of People's Supervision, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—as temporary governmental units. They served for about two years and did not resolve even a single political or economic problem. Neither did they deal with the nationality questions in a satisfactory manner. In fact, that might be the factor that hastened their dissolution.

According to the decree of the 4th Assembly of all-Bukhara Soviets (11-17 October, 1923), certain degrees of autonomy and administrative rights were granted to areas inhabited by Turkmens. The decree reads as follows, "In order to bring the Turkmen people closer to the government and grant them the ways and means to organize themselves, after hearing the statements of the inhabitants, the 4th Assembly decrees that:

a) Turkmen-inhabited regions like Charju and Ute-Tiran should be separated and given to the Central Executive Committee of Turkmenistan, a body elected by the Turkmens themselves;

---

b) The Central Executive Committee should be directed to prepare a constitution outlining the special rights of the Central Executive Committee of Turkmenistan."\textsuperscript{30}

A similar decree was accepted for the Kyrgyzes and the Kazakhs. It stated, "Having heard the statements about the Kyrgyz-Kazakh situation, the 4th Assembly decrees that:

1. A Kyrgyz-Kazakh revolutionary committee should be formed to administer the affairs of the Kyrgyz-Kazakhs of Bukhara, Nurata, and Charju. The committee, located in Utala-Tiran, should pave the way for a peoples’ government and an executive committee;
2. To bring the interests of the Central government even closer to the Kyrgyz-Kazakh people and for the protection of their political and economic rights by the Central Executive Committee, a Kyrgyz-Kazakh section should be opened in the Central Executive Committee. The assignment of the tasks and responsibilities for the body should be undertaken by the Central Committee;
3. The representatives of the Kyrgyz-Kazakhs should be admitted to the Education Board for National Minorities and necessary steps should be taken for the reorganization of the cultural affairs of the Kyrgyz-Kazakh. For the resolution of the judicial questions among the Kyrgyz-Kazakh peoples, judicial organs, consisting of a director and two members, must be established. The Kyrgyz-Kazakh Executive Committee must be granted the right to sanction elections. The number of such organs is to be determined by the Executive Committee."\textsuperscript{31}

In relation to Eastern Bukhara, the inhabitants of which are Tajik, the 4th Assembly of the PSRB stated the following, "The government's policy of bridging the gap between the inhabitants of the region and the government must be followed and establishment of official organs close to the people must be considered."\textsuperscript{32} There is no mention in the minutes of granting Eastern Bukhara either a degree of local autonomy or national recognition.

A most astonishing thing about these meetings, all of which dealt with the affairs of the peoples of Bukhara, is that they never mentioned the Tajiks, as if the Tajiks did not exist. Further evidence of this exclusion is revealed by the minutes of the Dictatorial Commission on Eastern Bukhara; they are all written in the Uzbeki language. Here too, as was the

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 59.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., pp. 60-61.
case in the PSRB, a policy of excluding the Tajiks and their rights was in effect.

In a way, Turkistan and the Emirate of Bukhara played a complementary role for the Turks. The former was the breeding ground for a nationalist movement, Pan-Turkism, inspired by Tatar nationalist elements, the Young Turks, and the bourgeois elements gravitating towards a Turkish identity. The latter, before the establishment of the Republic of Bukhara, had Pan-Islamism as the center of its governmental ideology. Being of Sunni faith, the Central Asian intellectuals and the religious personages of Turkistan and Bukhara followed the learned men of Istanbul and Kazan. After traveling in these places, either as visitors or as students, they returned to Turkistan with the most radical brands of Pan-Turkism. Among those intellectuals there were also many Tajiks who, due to their religious allegiance, preferred Turkey over Iran; even though, from a linguistic and cultural standpoint as well as from the standpoint of their ancient heritage they should have gravitated towards Iran. But, as was explained above, no matter which sect of Islam they belonged to, their activities were detrimental to the interests of Tajik national unity. Tatar and Turkish missionaries had entered Central Asia and remained there as teachers and educators from the time of the Russian annexation of the region. During the Revolution and the Civil War, military consultants and Soviet and Party employees, sympathetic to the cause of the Pan-Turkists, made a concerted effort to create conflicts among the Russians, other Slavic peoples, Tajiks, Iranians, and the Indo-European kin folks in general. At the same time, there were differences between the Pan-Islamists and the Pan-Turkists. For its center of gravity, the former gravitated to Afghanistan and the Arab world while the latter gravitated to Turkey. In addition, the Pan-Islamists' principal objective was promotion of belief in Islam (Sunni sect), while the Pan-Turkists had promoted ethnicity (union of all Turks). Both groups had developed deep roots in Central Asia, at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, especially among Muslim intellectuals. In fact, a money-lending bourgeoisie had come into existence among whom some Tajiks were regarded very highly.

After the establishment of the PSRB, the majority (if not all) of the members of the administration, the revolutionary committee, and other Soviet bodies were chosen from among the Uzbeks; even the majority of the Tajiks chosen, according to the available documents, were Uzbek-Tajiks. Those who did not change their affiliation were denied positions in the government.33

Until October 29, 1920, there were only three Tajiks in key administrative positions in the PSRB. Of these, two were in the Revolutionary

---

33 See, Istoriya natsional'no-gosudarstvennogo chtoitev stva v SSSR. Na period ot kapitalizma k sotsializmu: 1917-1937 (History of the Construction of the National-Government in the USSR from Capitalism to Socialism), Moscow, 1968, p. 296.
Tribunal and one (Abbas Aliev) was the Superintendent of Education.34 Only those Tajiks who registered themselves as Uzbeks were allowed to serve in leadership positions. For example, neither the Party Secretary of Bukhara Communist Party, Ahmadbek Mevlanbekov,35 nor the Director of the Bukhara Economics Soviet, Abduqadir Muhiddinov was Tajik.36

The majority of scholars accept that there was discrimination both in the PSSRT and in the PSRB. They also accept that the deciding factor was not job performance but nationality. Regionalism, which at the time had assumed an Uzbek chauvinistic form in Bukhara, Khwarazm, and other places, was the chief stumbling block in the way of recruiting and developing Marxist cadres in these republics!37

It is for this reason that, in the resolution of the 12th Session of the Communist Party (b) of Russia (April 1923), it was stated, "In certain multi-national republics, defensive regionalism has changed to offensive regionalism; in these republics, the chauvinism of the powerful ethnic groups is pitched against the vulnerability of the weak. For example, the chauvinism of the Georgians (in Georgia) against the Armenians; the Ossetians against the Abkhazians; the Azerbaijanis (in Azerbaijan) against the Armenians; and the Uzbeks (in Bukhara and Khwarazm) against the Turkmens and the Kyrgyzes (and the Tajiks, as well—R.M.). ... The transformation of these survivals into varieties of powerful local chauvinism with the intent to oppress the smaller communities, had forced the Party to alert its cadres to rise against them."38

The calculated and perennial claim of the Soviet and Party leaders that, like in Turkistan, the original people of Bukhara were the Uzbeks, Turkmens, and Kyrgyzes was so effective that J. V. Stalin in his speech to the 12th Assembly of the Communist Party (b) of the Union enumerated only those three peoples—excluding the Tajiks—as the original peoples of the region. He did not even mention the Tajiks.39 On the other hand, in 1924, when the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan was established, Stalin made it known, for the first time, that he was acquainted with the history of the Tajiks. He congratulated the Tajiks for establishing their own republic at the gate of India. Many years later, after the Second World War, in a conversation with Babajan Ghafurov, the First

34 Abbas Aliev was born in Bukhara (actually in Hamadan, Iran) in 1899. He was one of the distinguished members of the Communist movement in Bukhara. He rose gradually in the ranks of the Party until he occupied the position of the First Minister of Education of Tajikistan (1927). Aliev died in Alma-Ata in 1958 (ed.).
35 Mevlanbekov was born in Khujand in 1897. A revolutionary, he joined the Communist Party in 1918. His early career was spent on Party activities in Khujand. Later he became the Director of the Extraordinary Committee dealing with Basmachi activities in Fergana (ed.).
36 ЦПА ИМЛ. ф. 62. оп. 2. д. 153 л. 2. 2 об., 3.7 об., 8.8 об.
37 Tursunov, H. Obrazovanie yzbekskoy Sovetskoy Sotsialisticheskoy Respubliki (Establishment of the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan), Tashkent, 1957, p. 76.
38 See, Stalin, I. V. Sochineniya (Collected Works), vol. 5., Moscow, 1954, p. 250.
39 Ibid., p. 290.
Secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, Stalin recalled that, in 1924, the Tajiks themselves had been against the establishment of a Soviet Socialist Republic of their own. He attributed the shortcoming to Abdullah Rahimbaev.\footnote{After Rahimbaev joined the Communist Party in 1919, he quickly rose in the ranks, becoming the Director of the Executive Committee of Khujand within a year. Thereafter, he served in various Party capacities, leading to his directorship of the Peoples Commissariat of Tajikistan. Rahimbaev was purged in 1937 (ed.).} The reason for this will be explained further below.

It is obvious that the division among the leaders of Bukhara—creating a "Right," "Left," and "Center," situation—affected the resolution of the political and economic problems of the republic. V. V. Kuybishev\footnote{Kuybishev, V. B. (1888-1935) One of the major leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. He joined the Communist Party in 1904 and the military when he was 16 years old. He was an active participant in both the affairs of the Bolsheviks and the activities of the Red Army. In 1919, as the Deputy Chief of the Central Executive Committee Commissariat, he was assigned to the leadership of the Turkistan Front. His many contributions to the prosperity of Tajikistan have prompted the Tajiks to name regions, schools, stations, and streets in his honor (ed.).} was the first to draw attention to this personalization of the internal conflicts in the Communist Party of Bukhara, divisions that led to espionage and counter-espionage. With regard to this issue, G. K. Orjanikidzi,\footnote{Outstanding official of the Communist Party and Soviet government (ed.).} addressing the Assembly of the Communist Activists of Bukhara, in 1922, said, "We must do all we can to stop the government of Faizullah\footnote{A prominent leader in Soviet government and Communist Party, Faizullah Khojaev (1896-1938) was born in Bukhara in the family of a rich merchant and studied in Moscow. He was one of the leaders of the Young Bukharans. After the 1918 event in Tashkent, he formed the party of the Young Bukharans. After the defeat of the Amir, he became the Chief of the Committee to Oversee Bukhara. After the division of the nationality rights, he became the head of the Soviet Commissariat for Uzbekistan. In 1925, he became the member of the Presidium and the Chief of the KEM SSSR (ed.).} from being consolidated. We must not only eliminate the anti-revolutionary forces that surround him but deprive him of the use of his relatives in administration as well. Until this time Faizullah's criteria for employment had been blood relationship and friendship. This situation must come to an end and conscientious individuals, irrespective of affiliation to groups—to the left or to Abdulqadir Muhiddinov—must be employed. I realize, of course, that this is not an easy problem to solve."\footnote{See, Fish, R. and R. Hashim, Glazami sovesti (With the Eye of the Conscience), Dushanbe, 1978, p. 45.}

After the establishment of the Republic of Bukhara, the representatives of the three Pan-Turkist groups assumed the key leadership positions. In the judicial branch, the section dealing with the national rights of the people of Bukhara was relegated to the Turkish Prisoners of War and others who had entered Central Asia without a permit. The Party and Soviet branches were led by people who had been sent from the ASSR.
(representing the Uzbeks, Tatars, and Bashkirds of Turkistan) and by individuals who were very heavily influenced by the promoters of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism in the region.

Most of the famous intellectuals of the Tajiks' recent history (some refer to them as the jadids), especially those who had studied in Istanbul, along with their learning, imported new, Pan-Turkist notions to Central Asia. They held discussions during which they announced that Central Asia was Turkistan, i.e., Central Asia was the homeland of the Turks, intimating that the Tajiks did not belong there. Among them were some Tajik intellectuals who kept their identity a secret. They did not even try to support the cause of the Tajiks in the newly-formed republics of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkistan and the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara. That is why when the conditions were favorable and the Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kyrgyzes, Europeans, even the Jews of Bukhara had found their own ethnic identity, the Tajiks were denied recognition. The names of the Tajiks were not entered in any of these official documents.

The Pan-Turkists occupied all the key positions in the Party and in the Soviet organs of power. Sharing the same religion and speaking the same language allowed them to integrate themselves into the Turkish-speaking population. In almost all the newly-established schools of the Republic of Bukhara, including in areas where the principle inhabitants were Tajik, classes were taught by Turkish teachers. Turkish became the medium of instruction; Tajik children were forced to study in a language they did not know. They were not allowed to use Tajiki even outside the classroom, during their free time. Additionally, they were forced to register themselves as Uzbeks. Families that refused to register themselves as prescribed were forced out of their birthplace. In Bukhara, Samarqand, Khujand, and other cities, Tajik children were taught Turkish songs. In the national military, soldiers took their orders in Turkish. It is this rush to Turkicization that is translated into Uzbekization in subsequent years. Tajik students had to memorize the war anthem in Turkish:

Turanians rise, rush to arms,
Turks are free, Greece is finished,
May the Turks prosper!
May Kamal prosper!
Abandon ignorance,
Warrior Jamal,
Islam is established, the enemy is dead,
The Turkish world is illuminated.

Refrain

With the efforts of Kamal Pasha, the Turkish army
Is turned into the Turkish nation.

Refrain
Greece is finished, the Turks are free,
The city of Istanbul belongs to us again.
May the Turks prosper!
May Kamal prosper!
Abandon ignorance,
Warrior Jamal.

This poem illustrates the type of ideas that the Pan-Turkists promoted in the schools of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkistan and in the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara.

The Tajiks' lack of concern, especially their cosmopolitanism, cost them dearly. They were deprived of the use of their language, of achieving an independent republic, and of their historical and cultural centers. The matter does not end there either. The national-administrative divisions placed the ancient Tajik cities in the People's Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan, where a policy of forced Uzbekization—under threat of exile for nonconformity—forced them to change their identity into Uzbeks. The Uzbeks used every excuse to close Tajik schools. And, the Tajiks were not appointed to leadership positions simply because of their ethnic affiliation.

The threat of the formation of a major unified Turkish front in Central Asia (against the Center and Russia) and a relative weakening of the economic relations that bound the Central Asian republics to the Soviet Union dictated the need for the implementation of a new policy in Central Asia. That policy is known as the national-administrative divisions policy.

National-Administrative Divisions:
Establishment of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan within Uzbekistan

The archival documents and the newspapers of the time speak eloquently about the national-administrative divisions of Central Asia. In fact, they make a good case for a political, economical, and cultural need for the divisions. But most of the so-called well-documented and substantial accounts dealing with the historical, legal, and philosophical values of this division are not totally reliable. After all, how many opinions can there be regarding the necessity of the administrative divisions of Central Asia in relation to the formation of Central Asian history and of the Soviet Union as a whole? But unfortunately, the literature on specific mistakes and deviations is at best scanty. Some of it can be intimated from the words of
the leaders of the time. "What is important for them," wrote J. V. Stalin about the peoples of the republics, "is not so much the internal structure but the external politics, the expansion of their own republics, the conflicts with neighboring republics, their desire to take over the plots of land belonging to their neighbor and, as a result, looking good to the bourgeoisie-regionalists of their country."45

The hostile actions of the Pan-Turkists against the Soviet government affected the Tajiks the most. Whether in the Republic of Bukhara or Turkistan, they were assigned the most far-off and the most poverty-stricken corner and called it "The Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan." Nevertheless, the comprehensive assistance extended to Tajikistan by Russia, the Soviet government, and the Central Asian Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) should not be underestimated; they enabled the republic, after the divisions, to form its administration, complete its soviet apparata, and expand its urban and educational programs among the workers.

The discussion of the national-administrative divisions began as early as 1920. It was prompted by national friction among the peoples of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkistan. The Pan-Turkists were positioning themselves effectively to separate Turkistan from the RSFSR and transform it into a republic for all the Turks of Central Asia. The resolution of the problem was further expedited by the struggle that ensued between the local leaders and the officials, i.e., the Russian-speaking representatives of the Party and the Soviet officials dispatched by the Center. During the four years that preceded the national divisions, V. I. Lenin studied the documents presented by the Turkistan Commission and, in his decrees on the role of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia in Turkistan, emphasized the necessity of the implementation of the divisions. He decreed that the issue should be studied and that the following points should be taken into consideration:

"1. Drawing up a map of Turkistan with three divisions among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.
2. Careful study of the conditions under one of two eventualities: a single Turkistan, and a Turkistan divided among the three peoples mentioned above."46

The import and the implications of those words of the Great Mind about this issue are yet to be discussed in the literature. It is not clear, for instance, why V. I. Lenin in his decree about drawing up a map of Turkistan should mention Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan; but not the other peoples of the region, among them the Tajiks—the oldest people not only of Central Asia but of the entire East? It is even more startling when we realize that both Russian and other foreign scholars had

45 Stalin, I. V. Sochineniya (Collected Works), vol. 7, p. 143.
published extensively on the history of the Tajiks. The great Russian ethnographer, M. S. Andriev, had drawn up the ethnographic map of Tajikistan, pointing out the areas inhabited by the Tajiks in relation to their neighbors and foreign countries. His basic conclusion is, "The Tajiks are the most ancient people of Central Asia known to us. From the first invasion by foreign armies—which intended to eliminate the Iranians in the region by compelling them to participate in mixed marriages, or by forcing them to escape to the mountains—until the present (i.e., until 1924—R.M.), the Tajiks have covered large tracts of the Central Asian land mass."\(^\text{47}\) It is impossible to believe that Lenin and the other high-ranking Party and Soviet leaders were unaware of the existence of the Tajiks. The Great Mind's knowledge about the ancient history of the Tajiks is evident from his speech to the 8th session of the Communist Party (b) of Russia (March 1919) on the question of the nationalities. In this regard, among other things, he said, "What can we say about such peoples as the Kyrgyzes, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens?"\(^\text{48}\)

The point is that in the preparation of the documents, in addition to the members of the Turkistan Commission, there were some ardent nationalists and Pan-Turkists, like T. Riskulov. Riskulov participated, as early as 1921, in the Second All-Russian Assembly of the Turks, in Moscow. He even had protested against Lenin's statement concerning the need to fight Pan-Islamism and its related movements. In this context, Riskulov had stated that, "Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism were important movements for the Muslim peoples." That is why they, and new Turkey, follow the example of Kemal Ataturk. That is also why the Kemali movement encompasses all the Turkish peoples of the East."\(^\text{49}\)

The same Riskulov group was the most vocal about the establishment of a so-called "People's Turk Republic." In the document that dealt with the internal structure of Turkistan, we read, "The national groups in Turkistan must be given the right to establish autonomous republics, and the national minorities must have the right to form communes. The Central Executive Committee of Turkistan is instructed to invite a meeting of the Uzbeks, Kyrgyzes, and Turkmens to decide what form their people should take in the future."\(^\text{50}\)

The actual national-administrative divisions of Central Asia commenced at the beginning of 1924. Soon after, the 12th session of the Communist Party (b) of Russia sought to resolve the problems arising from the divisions, especially in Central Asia. On February 25, 1924, the open Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bukhara discussed the "Question of the Demarcation of Soviet Central

---


\(^\text{49}\) Central'ni voszdarstvenni arkhiv (hence, ЦГА) ИМЛ., ф. 17, оп. 2, Д. 213, л. 84. 86.

\(^\text{50}\) Lenin, V. I. Complete Collected Works, vol. 41, p. 435.
Asia and the Creation of Several Republics." Then, on March 10, 1924, a number of definite resolutions were made by the Executive Bureau of the Communist Party of Bukhara. These resolutions included the formation of two republics, Uzbekistan and Turkistan. The resolutions say the following about Tajikistan, "The Tajiks, from Maschah to Gharategin and Ghar, should form an autonomous region within Uzbekistan-Bukhara."

With this anti-peoples resolution, the Pan-Turkists, knowingly, tried to prove that the Tajiks as a whole were mountain people. Furthermore, they did not wish to concede that the ancient cities of Samarkand, Bukhara, Khujand, and many river valleys in Central Asia belonged to the Tajiks. These and similar resolutions were routinely accepted by the Soviet and Party authorities; and all these decisions played fateful roles in the future life of the Tajiks. Even such regions as Hissar, Vakhsh, Kulab, and Zarafshan were not included, let alone Gorno-Badakhshan, Surkhan Dariya, Qashqa Dariya, and the separate cities and regions of the Ferghana valley, where the majority of the population is Tajik. Even geographically speaking, this was a foolish division. It was an act of utter irresponsibility to try to create an autonomous region out of two areas that were divided by a mountain range; two areas that were not connected to each other most of the year due to climatic obstacles; and two areas which did not enjoy cultural centers so that they could create a meaningful life for their people. Neither did anyone suspect that this was an intentional move designed to drive the Tajiks into a special "reservation" where they would not have access to their historical, economic, and cultural centers.

In any event, the question of the national-administrative divisions of Turkistan was examined in the joint session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkistan and the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of Turkistan where Abdulla Rahimbaev, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkistan, spoke twice. Without the slightest hesitation, he stated that, "From a governmental and national point of view, Turkistan's principal inhabitants were the Uzbeks, Kyrgyzes, and Turkmens. The rest," he said, "are small ethnic groups." This is how the Tajiks came to be included among the minority groups. When the Pan-Turkists observed that Rahimbaev was on their
side, they gave him full authority to present their views not only in the local meetings, but in the meetings in Moscow, as well.

On April 5, 1924, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) heard A. Rahimbaev's report "About Turkistan, Bukhara, and Khwarazm (concerning the establishment of national republics)," and approved the Party structures proposed for the administration of Central Asia. The Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) ordered its own Central Asian Bureau "to prepare its suggestions and the necessary documents."

When this problem was being examined by the Joint Central Asia Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkistan, Faizullah Khojaev and Usman Ishankhajaev brought up the question of Tajikistan. For the sake of historical integrity, we should say that the situation of the Tajiks genuinely concerned the People's Superintendent of Soviets, F. Khojaev. This can be intimated from his speech in which he said, "Regarding the Tajiks, two variants must be considered. They must either enter our republic (i.e., Uzbekistan, R. M.) as an independent entity or be given full independence. In either case though, we are not privy to the inner thoughts and sentiments of the Tajiks themselves."

After discussions, somewhat altering his previous statement, he conceded that the number of the Tajiks in the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara and elsewhere in Central Asia was small. "If we study the situation in which these people find themselves, we realize that they lack both governance and schools that teach in the Tajiki language," he added. "In addition, the same number of Tajiks live in the Zarafshan valley; they speak the same language and share the same cultural values and administrative structure. In view of that, there is no need to create a special boundary between the two. Both groups can be placed in the same territory designated either as an autonomous region or as some other form of a union. We must reach an agreement with the Tajik officials and form the Tajikistan republic in Uzbekistan. In reality, even after the victory of the October Revolution, the establishment of the Soviet government, and the

---

56 Usman Khan Ishankhajaev was a teacher and reporter. He joined the Communist Party in 1919. Between 1922 and 1924, he was the People's Commissar of Education of Turkistan. The following year, he served "Red Uzbekistan" as a reporter and was appointed the chief of propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. His subsequent positions include Secretary of the Regional Committee for Surkhan Dariya, organizational director of the Communist Party of the Northern Novgorod region, and the Party Secretary for Krasnaufmisk regions (ed.).
57 ЦАА ИМЛ. ф. 62, оп. 1, Д. 25, л. 80.
58 Ibid.
two republics of Turkistan and Bukhara, the Tajiks still did not have their own schools, official language, and a governmental structure."

The speaker was the Director of the Superintendents of the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara, F. Khojaev who, in spite of his awareness of the official use of Persian over the centuries, did not support the retention of Tajiki. After September 2, 1920, Tajiki was eliminated as the official language of Bukhara. In fact, it was Khojaev's government that made Uzbeki the official language of instruction for both the Uzbeks and the Tajiks. The 1920 discontinuation of the publication of the only Tajiki newspaper, *The Flame of Revolution*, was another indication of the Pan-Turkists' lack of sympathy for the language and culture of the Tajiks.

What was the outcome of this process? The language, culture, literature, and the long history of the Tajik people were impeding the progress of the nomadic tribes of Central Asia. The tribal inhabitants who owed their civilization to the Tajiks, therefore, decided to take over the culture of the Tajiks along with its rich scholarship, art treasures, and scientific research. But, it was a great mistake for the Pan-Turkists to discredit Tajiki, as if it were a useless language. No doubt, the offspring of those very individuals who sentenced Tajiki to death, or who had wished Tajiki to disappear from the face of the earth, will be speakers of Tajiki. Tajiki is one of those languages that defy death. Besides, not all the politicians who, during those dark days, were deciding the fate of the Tajiks, were so disposed. There were some benevolent people among them as well. They rose against the claim that the people of Central Asia were one (i.e., TurksNR.M.). One of those who criticized this idea was U. Ishankhajaev. In his speech he recognized five distinct peoples in the country: Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Kyrgyzes, and Tajiks.59

The evidence outlined above indicates that even at the early stages, when the Pan-Turkists and the Great-Uzbek chauvinists were implementing their version of the national-administrative divisions, some people with foresight saw the necessity for the creation of an independent Tajikistan to include the disparate and desolate regions being considered at the time.

The complex nature of the national-administrative divisions, especially the manner in which people wanted these divisions to take place, required the establishment of a special commission. For this reason, the Central Asian Bureau of the Communist Party (b) of Russia established the Commission. In turn, this Commission assigned three subcommissions: one Uzbek, one Kazakh, and one Turkmen. The Tajiks were allowed one representative, Ch. Imamov,60 as part of the Uzbek subcommission. In the

---

59 ЦПА ИМЛ. ф. 62, оп. 1, Д. 25, л. 30.
60 Chinar Imamov began his career in 1918 as the Director of the Urateppe Communist Party. Between 1920 and 1923 he was the head of the Party organization of Jizzakh, Samarqand, and Katta Kurgan. At the end of 1923, he became the Associate Director of the Central Committee of Control and Supervision of Workers and Farmers of the Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan. By 1924, he was the First Secretary of the Temporary Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan and member of the
resolution of the Central Asian Commission, the following is stated about the Tajiks: When it becomes necessary to accede to the wishes of the Tajik members of the Party and form an independent session to discuss self-determination and administrative divisions, the leadership of the meeting should be given to Comrade Abdulla Rahimbaev. There was, of course, a reason behind the choice of Rahimbaev for the resolution of the Tajik problem. Rahimbaev’s position vis-à-vis the issue of Tajik self-determination was apparent even to those who refused autonomy for Tajikistan. He envisaged Tajikistan as an autonomous region comprising the backward areas of Maschah, Gharategin, and Darvaz and he remained steadfast in his position to the end. He was a Tajik but, when working at the high levels of governments of Tajikistan, Bukhara, or Khwarazm, he changed his citizenship several times to fit the tasks that were assigned to him. This was no accident. His ambitious ideas, regionalism, and cosmopolitan nature, from the beginning of his political life until his imprisonment, are all reflected in his directorship of the Soviet of the People’s Commissariat of Tajikistan. We can review his past activities, formation of character, and opinion about issues in his own words:

“I was born in a wealthy Tajik merchant family of Khujand with a regional (national) leaning. I studied at Khujand's famous, but traditional, Ostomov Teacher's Training College and graduated in 1917. During the 1917 Revolution, I still was an ardent nationalist. In May 1917, I participated in the All-Turkistan Muslim Conference in Tashkent, led by the famous nationalist, Behbudi. I participated in this Conference as a guest. At the time, I was entertaining the thought of establishing a republic of Turkistan within the Russian Federation. After graduation, I became the first secretary of the bourgeoisie nationalist organization, the Islamic Soviet. In opposition to the 3rd meeting of the Soviets (The Russian S.S. Republic—R.M.), at the end of the same year, the bourgeoisie nationalists called an All-Muslim conference.

The conference declared the creation of an Autonomous Bourgeois Democratic Turkistan and elected the government of Turkistan to be led by Mustafa Chokaev. Then, at the beginning of 1918, the "Muslim

61 Mahmud Khaja Behbudi (1874-1919), a writer, was one of the ideologues of the Jadid movement in Turkistan. He published the Samargand and Aina journals in Samarqand and wrote a series of textbooks. He supported the new schools and was one of the organizers of the national bourgeois autonomous Kokand. Behbudi was killed in Qarshi at the hands of the Amir’s executioners (ed.).

62 Mustafa Chokaev (1890-1941) was the President of the Provisional government of Autonomous Turkistan which itself was elected by the Extraordinary Congress of the Muslims of Turkistan in 1917. In the late 1920’s, he moved to Berlin where, as an avowed enemy of the Soviets, was given permission to publish his Yash
Workers" Conference was called. This conference was composed of the small bourgeoisie. I was chosen as a representative to this meeting. ... I was also chosen to participate in the People's Soviet. The meeting ratified the declaration of autonomy for Kokand.63

In January, 1918, the government was defeated. At the time of the defeat of the Kokand government, I was in Khujand afraid for my anti-Soviet activities, I had fled to the Dashti Murda. At the end of 1918, I secretly came to Tashkent. ... which also was under the influence of the pan-Turkists. ... Still early in 1918, after the establishment of Soviet power in Turkistan, when the Bolsheviks and the Left S.R.'s, were in key positions, Tursun Khojaev and Nizam al-Din Khojaev, the influential nationalists of old Tashkent, ordered the following, 'We nationalists should follow neither the Communists nor the Left S.R.'s. To further our affairs, however, we must be familiar with the actions of both. Some nationalists, therefore, must accompany the Left S.R.'s and some the Bolsheviks and let us know what they want. We must tackle the problems according to our needs.'64

Continuing his confessions, he writes, "In 1919, under the direction of Munavvar Qari, the 'Unity and Progress' organization was formed. The organization was led by the Central Committee, the Executive Committee of which consisted of Munavvar Qari, Turar Riskulov, Faizullah Khojaev, Tursun Khojaev, N. Turakulov, and others. The main objective of the organization was 'the elimination of the Soviet government and the establishment of a bourgeois-democrat government headed by Turks and Tatars."65

This rather lengthy quotation is necessary for proving our point. It is especially necessary because we are dealing with a historical truth which can be established only by presenting incontrovertible evidence. All the reasons given above in the document, or more precisely in the confession of Abdulla Rahimbaev, correspond to the situation in Turkistan (or Central Asia as it was called later) after the establishment of Soviet rule. Most of what he says is incomprehensible to the scholars in the field, let alone to the general reader. But there is much in this confession that, until recently, neither group was informed about. Even today, there are some "strictly secret" documents which are kept out of the reach of researchers and, of course, out of the sight of the public at large.

In order for the Central Committee of the Central Asian division of the Communist Party (b) of Russia to appoint Rahimbaev as the representative of the Tajik people during the process of national-administrative divisions, the Extraordinary Representative of RSFSR in the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara, A. Znamensky, a man of foresight and an intellectual in the true sense of the word, a man knowledgeable about the history,
culture, and literature of the Tajik people, wrote a letter to the acting
director of the Central Asian Bureau, O. Karklen (September 1, 1924). In
that letter, Znamensky explained the mission of the projected delegation
from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, which
included, A. Rahimbaev, A. Mevlanbekov, and I. M. Vorekas. He further
wrote, “The last two individuals are chosen conditionally, but the
candidacy of Rahimbaev as the secretary general is, in all events, definite.
It is true that Rahimbaev has a number of shortcomings—lack of belief in
work, lack of understanding of the Americans in the academic sense, and
the like—but he has one distinction that outshines all else; he is eloquent
on the subject of party unity within the Uzbek movement.”66

The Central Asian Central Committee and its subcommittees spent the
spring and summer of 1924 examining the national-administrative divisions
of the region. Archival documents reflect the details of this process. The
boundary changes made at the time for the formation of the republics are
outlined in those documents. For instance, in addition to the areas already
given, the regions of Pamir and Kulab were also included in the Tajikistan
Autonomous Region. The decree, however, was not final. Some of the
reports of the local meetings were reviewed by the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia, on June 12,
1924 and marked: "About the National-Administrative Divisions in Central
Asia (Turkistan, Bukhara, and Khwarazm)—Implement the Results!"

For the delineation of the boundaries of the newly-established re-
publics it was decided that a committee consisting of Uzbek, Kazakh,
Turkmen, Kyrgyz, and Tajik representatives be formed under the leader-
ship of a representative from the Soviet of the Peoples in the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR. Some changes took place within the republic. In the
opinion of some scholars and lawyers, in the discussions regarding the
national-administrative divisions of Central Asia, a Tajik government was
created in the Tajik-inhabited Eastern Bukhara. They base their contention
on a decree that appears in the All-Bukharan Central Executive
Committee files. It states, "With the conclusion of the extraordinary
situation in Eastern Bukhara, the Dictatorial Commission comes to an end.
Its place is taken by the Executive Committee of Eastern Bukhara, to be
centered at Dushanbe."67

But the abolition of the Extraordinary Dictatorial Committee and the
establishment of the Temporary Central Executive Committee did not
change the substance of the existing territorial situation; neither did it help
the process of Tajik self-determination, especially in the more backward
regions which were devoid of the very concept of political change.
Nevertheless, the spectacle prepared at the Center regarding the union of
separate territories, and the creation of national boundaries continued to

---

66 ЦПА ИМЛ. ф. 62. Оп. 2. Д. 88, Л. 92.
67 ЦГА Узбекской ССР. ф. Р., 47, оп. 1, дю 1866 лю 143.
play; resolution after resolution passed, without even consulting the people whose fate was being decided.

In the meeting of the Soviets of Eastern Bukhara, held at the beginning of September 1924, rather than the pressing territorial and cultural problems, national-administrative divisions were examined. In the final session, the Central Executive Committee of Soviet Eastern Bukhara was elected to participate in the fifth All-Bukharan conference. The leadership of the Central Executive Committee was given to Nusratulla Makhsum (N. Lutfullaev); and, because the majority of the people of Eastern Bukhara spoke Tajiki, the meeting decreed that the official medium of communication should be Tajiki, even though it had not been so in the past. It was apparent that after the national-administrative divisions only the high mountains and the backward villages destroyed by war would be given to the Tajiks.

The task of the implementation of the national-administrative divisions in the republics of Central Asia began after the ratification of the decree of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia, from 12 June 1924. The job of persuading and inviting people to consider new alternatives also got underway. Contrary to the official method which required acquaintance of the populace with their own nationality, concepts such as "Great Uzbek" and "Great Kazakh" were openly promoted.

It was suggested that the old names like Bukhara, Turkistan, and Khwarazm be retained. There were rumors that the Moscow Communists had purposefully devised the national-administrative divisions to divide the peoples of Central Asia along ethnic lines such as Turkmens, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyzs. It was rumored that the Russians' motive behind the implementation of the divisions was "divide and conquer." It was believed that they intended to eliminate the ancient kingdoms of Bukhara and Khiva.

The creation of a Central Asian federation was another idea at the time. The promoters of this idea believed that the national-administrative divisions should culminate in the creation of the Federated Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia. This to the point that one of the direct participants of the national-administrative divisions, I. Vareikis, said, "sooner or later, history will dictate the creation of a Central Asian Federation. Today, of course, the creation of a Federated Central Asian Republic is out of the question. After all, a federation is a union composed of separate countries. Where there are no countries, how could there be a federation? The new countries have yet to assume forms. The countries must gain their independence before we can speak about a federation." History proved that the formation of a Central Asian Federation into which the above-mentioned national republics voluntarily entered did not

68 ЦГА ИМЛ, ф. 62. Оп. 2., Д. 151, Л. 60-61.
solve the nationality conflicts, it intensified them. The events of the past years indicate that even today the idea of the formation of a regional federation is still unworkable because, even within the current multi-national federations, separatist forces are seeking autonomy. These are people who have been included in these republics through the process of the national-administrative divisions. We believe that, in the near future, the united federation, irrespective of what new agreements are signed, will fall apart and its fragments will emerge as independent nations. These nations might, for some time, retain the earlier ties that the federation had imposed on them. Life, it seems, has rejected I. Vareikis's idea about the inevitability of the formation of a Central Asian federation.

On July 15, 1924, the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee, having completed the national-administrative divisions, began the establishment of temporary bureaus for the emerging republics and regions. Furthermore, a Central Committee was established to review the work of the national-administrative divisions. The membership of this committee included representatives from among the Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kyrgyzes as well as from the People's Soviet Republic of Khwarazm and Russia. Contrary to the decree of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party (b) of Russia (June 12, 1924), which decreed the formation of a commission including the representatives of all the peoples of Central Asia, including the Tajiks, not even one political representative of the Tajiks was admitted to defend their rights.

The Tajikistan subcommittee, with only a consultative voice, consisted of Ch. Imamov, A. Hajibaev, and M. Saidjanov. It was admitted to the Commission very late—only three days prior to the discussion of the establishment of the boundaries of the Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan. It is obvious that three days did not afford the members time to become intimately familiar with the problem; a three-day period was not enough for even a cursory acquaintance. As a result, the outcome of the efforts of the Committee reflected the Uzbeks', rather than the Tajiks' wishes. The minutes of the meeting on the formation of the Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan provide the best evidence. They show that the Tajik representatives discussed the situation in a cowardly manner and, while trying to be accommodating, acquiesced to all demands. A section of the minutes of the national-administrative divisions of August 21, 1924, is reproduced below as proof:

**Director:** Now we turn to the Tajiks, Comrade Hajibaev.

**Hajibaev:** According to the statistics, the number of the Tajiks of Turkistan and Bukhara is 1,240,000 but, at the time of this assessment, the criterion which we used was ability to govern. The Tajiks who live in

---

70 Abdurrahim Hajibaev began his career in 1918 as a teacher in Transcaspia. During 1919 and 1920, he was the director of the land distribution division of Khujand. From there he moved to Ferghana. In 1934, he became the director of the Peoples Soviet of Tajikistan. He was purged in 1938 (ed.).
western Bukhara, in the Samarqand and Bukhara regions, are more akin to the Uzbeks. This is true for both administration and government. These Tajiks cannot become a part of the Autonomous Region of Tajikistan which is being established in Eastern Bukhara.

Following an agreement with the Uzbekistan Bureau, the boundaries of the autonomous region of Tajikistan is delineated as follows: All the territories of the Qurqanteppe, Gharm, Kulab, and Dushanbe regions, all the Qarataq uezd\textsuperscript{71}, three volosts\textsuperscript{72} in Sar-i Asiya, Iskandar in Falghar, Maschah in Samarqand, and the regions of Shughnan, Pamir, and Roshan in Ferghana or, stated differently, all the Tajiks of Pamir.

The Autonomous Region of Tajikistan is bound in the north by Samarqand and Ferghana, in the east by Qara-Kyrgyzstan, in the south by Afghanistan, and in the west by Sar-i Asiya.

The Tajik population of the Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan, according to the statistics of the government of Bukhara—and based on the statistics of the Bukhara Emirate, is as follows: the region that we are separating has a population of 1,200,000; but we must consider the fact that these numbers are from 1913. We also should remember that since 1920 this region has been the center of Basmachi operation and that a considerable number of the population has moved to Afghanistan. Therefore, the Bukharan government now calculates the number to be 40-45\% less than the Emir's 1913 number. In addition, a considerable number of Tajiks have been absorbed by Uzbekistan as a result of the national-administrative divisions. Furthermore, military statistics indicate that the part of Bukhara where the Tajik Autonomous Republic is to be established is occupied (92\%) by Tajiks.

Director: Are there any questions? You have mentioned the Tajiks of Ferghana, Samarqand, and Bukhara. Are you not including the Khujandis?

Hajibaev: In reality in the Samarqand and Khujand uezds, the Tajiks are the most numerous; in some places, 100\%. They occupy Kan-i Badam, Isfara, Sukh, Asht, and the Chust area of Ferghana. Along with the city of Bukhara, they form 95\% of the population. But it is hard to include those in Eastern Bukhara. In the future, perhaps, when good roads are constructed, such an inclusion can be envisaged.

With the assistance of our Uzbek comrades, we have solved the educational and cultural problems for those Tajiks who remain in the republic of Uzbekistan. Their education is restored and the language of instruction will be their native Farsi. The major cities of the Tajiks, Samarqand and Bukhara, however, must remain in Uzbekistan for a while to serve as educational centers for training specialists for Eastern Bukhara.

Director: What percent is included in the autonomous region and what percent remains outside of it?

\textsuperscript{71} Uezd is the Russian for district. It is an administrative-judicial territorial unit, including a town and its rural environs.

\textsuperscript{72} Volost is a rural administrative unit.
Hajibaev: 800,000 Tajiks, i.e., more than half, remain outside the region. Unfortunately, there is no other alternative. Perhaps in the future, when we build roads, possibilities for ethnic unity might change. At the present, however, it is not at all possible.

Imamov: Comrade Imamov says that according to the data from the Central Asian Economic Relations Soviet the number of the Tajiks in Tajikistan and Bukhara is 1,200,000. Some of these Tajiks live in the cities, some live in the mountainous regions of both republics. Of course, given the geographic and economic particulars of Turkistan and Bukhara, a union of the Tajiks as a viable unit is not desirable. In the valleys, the Uzbeks live side by side with the Tajiks and, in reality, are in the majority.

Supporting the suggestion of Comrade Hajibaev about the establishment of the autonomous Tajikistan region being comprised of the Tajiks of the Kuhistan, I reiterate that due to the lack of geographic and economic conditions in both Turkistan and Bukhara, a union of the Tajiks as a unified force is impossible.

I am a 100% in favor of the establishment of a culturally and economically powerful autonomous Tajikistan, but I should say that at the present this is not feasible.

The Tajiks live in the cities and in the valleys. They maintain the same cultural and economic levels as their neighboring Uzbeks.

I believe, however that, at the present, there is no reason for the unification of the city and mountain Tajiks. I do not deny the need for the formation of such a union in the future; but not at the present time. Let me provide an example. What do the Tajiks of Kuhistan occupy themselves with? Some are musicians, some bring snow from the mountains, and some others gather firewood and sell it in the nearby markets. It is incumbent on the future wealthy republic of Uzbekistan, therefore, to extend a helping hand to the people of the autonomous Tajikistan Region and further their progress.

Furthermore, Comrade Imamov discussed the boundaries of Tajikistan suggested by the Tajikistan Committee and was in agreement with it.

Director: Where is your center? (a voice in the hall—Dushanbe).

Imamov: This is a problem for the people themselves to solve. (Director, not for people, for the Party). At the present, life in the Kuhistan is centered around bringing firewood to the cities and alleys. That is their life. In view of this, the government of Uzbekistan must be generous to the autonomous Tajikistan region. We request that our bill be accepted.

Islamov\textsuperscript{73}: Which is the most populated part of Tajikistan and where is the educational center? Answer? Qarataq.

\textsuperscript{73}Rustam Islamov served the Party in various positions including the Minister of Food of the Autonomous Republic of Turkistan, Director of the Peoples Commissariat of Turkistan, First Secretary and Party organizer of Uzbekistan, and the Minister of
Hajibaev: We have come to an agreement on this issue and request that it be accepted. The main body of the Tajiks live in the Samarqand and Ferghana regions. (He enumerates the regions). The Tajik district of Samarqand is in the mountainous part. With regard to the cultural center, we believe that the Tajiks' cultural center is the city of Samarqand. Although that city remains in the republic of Uzbekistan, it must serve as the temporary cultural center for the Tajiks. We must build schools there. We cannot, however, open schools independently because now these cities are part of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan. Suffice it to say about the Tajiks of the vadi, there are no plans for taking a census there in the near future.

The relations between the mountain dwellers of the Uratpepe region and those of Samarqand leave much to be desired. We believe, however, that after the division these irregularities can be smoothed out.

With regard to language, we think that the foreign language is not tolerated. Our cultural centers remain Samarqand and Bukhara. And we suggest that Qarataq should be our administrative center.

Hajibaev: We have placed 40% of the Tajiks in the Autonomous Region, the rest were deprived of this. The cultural center of the Tajiks remains in Uzbekistan and only the far-off mountainous places are included in the region.

[We shall not hold that against you. Maybe that's all they allowed you to give (laughter).] What kind of self-determination are we talking about? The Executive Committee is not forcing its will. ... I believe that this question has not found a complete solution yet. The Tajik comrades may be satisfied, but I am not (laughter). What kind of an autonomous region is this that out of one million and two hundred thousand Tajiks, 800,000 remain outside it. I believe that, according to the decree of the Political Bureau, three representatives should have been included in the commission. Besides, it is incorrect to call mountain peaks regions. But, if they plan to send me along with the Tajiks, I shall say no more.

Director: I, too, am suspicious of this issue. We did not become fully familiar with the documents. I believe we should copy the documents and distribute them among the members. We can express ourselves after we read them carefully. Maybe we shall arrive at what the Tajik comrades want. But, the document must be reexamined.

Imamov: That is quite true that the boundaries chosen for Tajikistan are bare mountains (laughter), but perhaps his initial statement was not correct. He neglected to mention the two regions of the Republic of Bukhara, i.e., Qurqanteppe and Sar-i Asiya which, from an economic point of view, are doing very well.

Agriculture of Uzbekistan. Between 1929 and 1934, he served in the Central Asian Bureau of Central Committee of the Communist Party. He was purged in 1938 (ed.).
Comrade Imamov adds: Now that we have reached an agreement with our Uzbek comrades, it is hoped that they will assist us in making Tajikistan prosperous.

He adds that Comrade Khojaev as a "Tajik" should promote the policies of the Persians. In fact, Comrade Khojaev in all his speeches, mixes the Tajiks with the Persians. Therefore, Comrade Imamov repeats once again that Comrade Khojaev should stop this "Tajik" masquerade.

Comrade Imamov concluding his remarks, states that the establishment of the Tajikistan Autonomous Region is of great economic importance because it is attached to great Uzbekistan.

Imamov: As it was mentioned above, these numbers need to be corrected. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, the number of the Tajiks is 277,000 in Turkistan and 802,000 in Eastern Bukhara.

The entire Eastern Bukhara must be added to this region, district by district. The Uzbek commission apparently has not studied the numbers. We request that our comrades write up a report that we can use as the basis of our discussion. Here Comrade Khojaev spoke as if he were a Tajik, but I should tell him that he overplayed the role (laughter). If he is not satisfied with the situation outlined above, the reason is because there is no difference between the Tajiks and us. We think that in the future the boundaries can be changed and made more clear. At the present, however, we must decide on the boundaries that we have outlined and on which we have come to an agreement with our Tajik comrades.

Imamov has already talked about Khujand and Samarqand, he well knows that. ...

As can be seen, the documents reveal a lack of principle and, to a degree, point to criminal activities on the part of the Tajikistan Subcommittee. It seems that the Subcommittee deprived the Tajiks of their right to self-determination and attainment of independence. Whether these attempts were sincere or were intended to hand Tajikistan over to Uzbekistan, they had enormous economic, social, and cultural ramifications for the Tajik nation, especially for the present time. When Uzbekistan began the implementation of a rapid program of forcing the Tajiks to change their ethnic affiliation to Uzbek, the hope that Uzbekistan would satisfy the economic, social, and cultural needs of its Tajiks, too, was dashed.

---

74 Pulad Khojaev Osman Khaja was born in 1890. He is one of the Young Bukharans who studied in Turkey. In 1918, after the Kalisev event, Khojaev formed the Left Young Bukharan Organization in Tashkent and in September of the same year joined the Communist Party. On the eve of the Bukhara revolution, he was one of the leaders of the Central Bureau of the Turkistani Party of the Revolutionary Young Bukharans. After the Revolution, he was supervisor of the treasury and government controller. In August 1921, he became the chief of the KIM Soviet Republics. In December of the same year, when he traveled to Dushanbe to join the Bashmachis, led by Enver Pasha, he fled to Afghanistan and joined the anti-Revolutionary forces of the Amir (ed.).

75 Oblastnoi gasudarstvennyi arkhiv GBAO (The Governmental-County Archives of the Autonomous Gorno-Badakhshan). Ф. 1, Оп. 1, Д. 28, Л. 64-64а, 66-67.
These efforts manifested themselves in the preparation of educational materials and in other unsavory events in the society. This kind of treatment continues at the present time, especially of the people of Samarqand and Bukhara.

All the activities of the Tajikistan Subcommittee led by the above-mentioned individuals were, from the beginning to the end, humiliating and damaging to the Tajik people. The situation was so incomprehensible that even the concerned Kazakh and Kyrgyz supporters of Tajikistan could not lead the Subcommittee to a wiser solution. The Kazakhs and the Kyrgyzes were astonished at the action of the Tajiks who, knowingly, were handing over their economic and cultural centers to the Uzbeks. The Tajiks were tormented by their conscience, yet they chose for themselves only the most remote and the least desirable (as Khajanov put it, only the mountains) lands. All this happened because the Tajiks did not have a political leader of their own; a caring leader who would think not only about today but about the future as well.

Today, too, we continue to repeat the mistakes of the past, as if the past has been the last teacher. We have allowed politicians to come to power who are totally distant from the daily affairs of the people and who, at the most crucial and historical moments, fail to solve our problems and rescue us from insecurity, poverty, hunger, and backwardness. All of this indicates that both the Party and Soviet leadership lack insight into the workings of history. They do not comprehend the mistakes that took place during the national-administrative divisions.

What motivated the Tajikistan Subcommittee to assume the posture it took during the national-administrative divisions? All the members of the Subcommittee had been born and educated in Uzbekistan. Some of them, when working in that republic, had registered themselves as Uzbek. They liked the lifestyle, customs, and the music of the Uzbeks. They sought high offices which required proof of being sympathetic to the Uzbek cause. When Tajikistan became an Autonomous Republic within Uzbekistan, these Uzbek sympathizers knew that they had reached their goal. Only later, when their situation and the situation of the republic took a turn for the worse, they changed their orientation. But mere confession to past wrong-doings was not sufficient to remedy their situation. The time had past. Why? A rationale is provided further below.

The arguments of the Subcommittee that the geographical, administrative, and cultural situations of the mountainous region would adversely affect Ferghana, Bukhara and its western areas, and Samarqand is absolutely baseless. After several years, first Badakhshan and later northern Tajikistan, including Khujand, were added to the Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan. The geography was still the same, no roads had been built, and many other problems had still remained unresolved. But none of these prevented the formation of an independent republic within the Union.
Let us suppose that the mountains in the Pamir area prevented the peoples living in the far-off regions from forming a union. But what about the people of the Emirate of Bukhara? Were they not all Tajiks living in an area that was not geographically difficult for the formation of a union? Everybody knew that there was no (geographical) obstacle preventing Hissar, Surkhan Dariya and Qashqa Dariya from joining the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan; but both regions were prevented from doing so.

As can be seen, the arguments of the Tajikistan Commission for resolving the problems and uniting certain regions were meaningless. There is no doubt that the Pan-Turkist leaders of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan, who wanted to revive the "great" Uzbek culture, had a hand in this. They intended to take over (and this is proven) the great culture of the Tajik people. The inclination to take over a foreign culture and seek distance from its own culture continues to be a feature of Uzbek life even today. The creation of a union on their own ancestral lands within the great Uzbek nation was not possible unless both the people and the land belonged to the Uzbeks. In other words, the Tajiks were now expendable.

We are deeply indebted to the Kazakhs, Kyrgyzes, and Turkmens who, during fateful times, have come to the aid of the Tajiks and, in principle, defended Tajik interests.

In the meeting of the Uzbekistan Bureau, regarding the national-administrative divisions, F. Khajayev, Segizbaev, Abdurrahim Hajibaev, Chinar Imamov, and Abdulla Rahimbaev participated. In this meeting Rahimbaev stated that he supported the inclusion of Urateppe in the Independent Republic of Uzbekistan. Sekizbaev, on the contrary, spoke in support of inclusion of Urateppe as one of the four counties of the Republic of Tajikistan.

The original concept for the formation of the Autonomous Tajikistan Region includes only the mountainous regions and Maschah. But the Tajikistan Subcommittee did not include even one representative of this region. In reality, during the preparation of the documents, the people of the region for the unity of which all efforts were being expended were not represented. A strange incident happened in this regard. When the voting started, the head of the Commission, I. A. Zelenskii asked: "Who supports the bill presented by the Tajiks?" Khajanov was being facetious, said, "Do you mean the Uzbek bill?" On September 6, 1924, the boundaries of the Autonomous Tajikistan Region were made definite; and on September 7, the Central Committee of Central Asian Affairs ratified it.

The Director of the Central Executive Committee, Nusratulla Makhsum (N. Lutfullaev), after coming to Dushanbe from Tashkent and becoming acquainted with the proceedings, contacted both the Central Committee of the Communist Party(b) of Russia and J. V. Stalin. Among

---

76 Oblastnoi gasudarstvennyi arkhiv GBAO. Ф. 1, Оп. 1, Д. 28, Л. 68.
77 Ibid.
other things, he wrote, "Affairs that directly affect the interests of the Tajik people have been resolved erroneously." He further wrote, "1) The boundaries of the Tajikistan Autonomous Region are drawn incorrectly so that many Tajik areas in the neighborhood of Uzbekistan have remained in Uzbekistan; 2) The inclusion of Tajikistan in Uzbekistan infringes upon the right of self-determination of the Tajiks, while these rights are given to the Uzbeks and the Turkmens. It is requested, therefore, that the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia reexamine the national-administrative divisions and discuss the important and principal issues therein. These include: 1) the inclusion of Uratpepe, Khujand, Kan-i Badam, Isfarayon, Sukh, Rishtan, Uch Qurqan, and the adjacent areas where the majority of the population is Tajik, into Tajikistan; 2) the establishment of a free and independent Tajikistan using the same rules applied to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The geographic and demographic situation for the establishment of such a republic is favorable. It is essential for the economic and cultural development of the Tajik workers to use the above-mentioned guidelines and resolve the problem."

We believe that Nusratulla Makhsum's letter was yet another good reason for changing the decree of the Commission. Instead of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan, the Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic could have been established.

When the national-administrative divisions were being formed, it was impossible to explain the ramifications of the undemocratic moves to a public for whom the very sessions were amusing spectacles. Those who enlightened the people were partial, but not to the Tajik cause. Those who saw through the sham and spoke up were not supported. On the contrary, due to special regulations it was impossible to interfere in Tajik political affairs without the permission of the Party. This to the point that as of August 31, 1924, the Central Committee of the Central Asian branch of the Communist Party (b) of Russia, denied recognition to all public efforts that seemed to be in conflict with the policies of the Party. The reason for the concern was that "in the meetings, the time that was to be devoted to the revelation of the intricacies of the Communist Party and expansion of the intellectual capacity of the servants of the people (or the so-called Party Leaders) and to explaining the mechanics of the national-administrative divisions so that people could understand their importance and recognize their own roles was spent on deciding what volost or village belonged to which region or republic."

The researchers who deal with the question of national-administrative divisions, especially those who misinterpret the history of the Party, refer to the decrees and the instructions of the Party to justify these actions to persecute the opponents of the divisions. The opponents are accused of an

78 ЦПА ИМЛ. Ф 62, Оп. 2. Д. 104, Л. 237-38.
79 ПА Уз ФИМЛ. Ф. 58, Оп. 5. Д. 284. Л. 46.
80 Ibid.
inability to understand the decree of the Commission and, thereby, of grasping the pros and cons of the events. The image projected for these so-called documents was pathetic; it not only lacked insight into affairs, but contained some of the most erroneous ideas about the national formations and about the economics of the region. Besides, we know from the archival materials that the general public was expected to accept all decrees without question.

Among the local inhabitants there were some insightful and experienced intellectuals who were fully familiar with the history of their people, the national composition of the cities and regions, and their economic inclinations. Naturally, those intellectuals grasped the import of the issues discussed in the Central Asian Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia. How could the solutions that they suggested not frighten the "writers" of the history of Central Asia? If these cultured individuals could not improve their own national interest and decide their own future, who could accomplish that for them? For the sake of preventing nationality conflicts from flaring up, resulting in fragmentation, and in order not to deviate from the Party's nationality policy regarding the national-administrative divisions, the apologists of the Communist Party left all the unsavory accounts off the record.

The present situation of the country, especially the national policy question, is indicative of that state of affairs. The flaring up of the present-day ethnic conflicts stems from that lack of application of correct methods for the resolution of national problems. The "axing off," as it were, of the boundaries and other negative events sowed the seeds of armed struggle among peoples and regions. Does not this speak about the erroneous policies of the Communist Party which sowed the seed of hatred among the people by protecting the interests of some while allowing the exploitative activities of the others. Hafiz is so right when he says: "You reap what you sow."

The local intellectuals knew well all the Central Asian governmental and party officials, past and present. Russian Orientalists, who had spent the better part of their lives studying the history of the eastern peoples assisted them in this regard. The document called: "Theses about the Situation of the Tajiks," prepared by Abdurrahim Hajibaev with the assistance of historians, reveals further information about the members of the Commission on national-administrative divisions.

The theses contain precise information about the history of the Tajik people and their situation on the eve of the divisions in the various Soviet republics of Central Asia. They also reveal the reasons for the deep hatred that the Tajiks have felt over the centuries. This hatred became even more evident during the national-administrative divisions and the establishment of the Union of the "Independent States."

We shall produce evidence from these theses to illustrate the causes motivating the infringement on the rights of the Tajik people during their establishment of a national government. The theses (We shall retain the
From ancient times, many people have made their passage through Turkistan. The majority of these people have settled here. Therefore, from a national point of view, the people of Turkistan are diverse. The varied natural conditions of the region have helped in retaining many of the idiosyncrasies of these peoples. Even today there are different types of administration: from the patriarchal, tribal Kyrgyz and Turkmen societies to the progressive socialist cities of Turkistan.

Basically, Turkistani history before the Russian takeover was, on the one hand, the conflict between the tribal and patriarchal society based on blood ties, against native, settled farmers and, on the other hand against the artists, traders, and capitalists. Since the various types of administration outwardly corresponded to the various types of tribal lifestyle, these conflicts often took the form of national struggles.

After the Russian takeover of Turkistan, class wars became the predominant feature combining the residual forms of feudal administration with intrusive foreign capitalism. Because the people of Central Asia were united by one religion—Islam—this struggle, too, in order to support capitalism, became a supporter of Islam against the infidels.

Capitalism repeatedly created wars between the patriarchal and the feudal systems but instead of the tribal, feudal, and religious leaders, a new local bourgeoisie came into being and the intellectuals joined it as go-betweens for the local people and the capitalists. This new class which was the product of the new order, could not oppose the order. It, therefore, began a struggle against the representatives of the moribund administration.

At the beginning, this struggle had an ideological form. It was unsympathetic to the Shari‘a and the Adat. But the later progress of capitalism tightened the reigns on the mediating local bourgeoisie and the intellectuals and, in effect, became the opposing force against the bourgeoisie. As a result, the leader of the people's struggle chose its people from among the Muslims. But, here the old form receives new content. This was not the old Islam, which fought against every type of ignorance but a new one known as jadid Islam. The representatives of these people took it upon themselves to examine the life situation of all Muslims subjugated to European capitalism and found ways to continue the struggle against the exploitative infidels.

Who were the leaders of the jadids? ... The main leaders of the jadids in Central Asia were the merchant bourgeoisie and the Tatar intellectuals who shared the language and the religion of the natives of the region. In addition, when the Central Asians made the pilgrimage to Mecca, it was possible for them to visit Turkey. Turkey was a Muslim country and, compared to Turkistan, was culturally advanced and relatively independent. It is understandable, therefore, that such movements as jadidism and Pan-Islamism in Central Asia had Pan-Turkist roots with the following motto: "Long Live the Union of the Turkish People!"
The October Revolution eliminated Russia's colonialist and capitalist rule over Turkistan. The local bourgeoisie, the clergy, and some of the intellectuals joined the ranks of the anti-revolutionaries and turned into Basmachis. The other intellectuals joined the revolutionaries but did not change their ideology.

This event influenced the first steps of the Communist Party to form an Islamic Bureau at the time of the formation of the socialist government in Turkistan.

The first socialist officials in Turkistan, in most places, were still the local intellectuals, the Tatars, and the jadids who, before the Revolution, had led the Pan-Turkist movement. Even today, we encounter the remnants of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism in the form of "the language of Islam," "Turkish," and the like.

There was also a lack of understanding of the problem of nationalism in Turkistan and Bukhara, especially on the part of many Party and Soviet officials, in particular, the Russians.

In the subsequent stages of the Revolution, the struggle among the peoples of Turkistan is renewed and the struggle against Russian colonialists temporarily halted. The Muslims and Turks are now referred to as the Kyrgyzes, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Uigurs, and Tatars.

But not all the people project their stability right away. The first people to distinguish themselves were the ones who had a different lifestyle; for instance, the Kyrgyzes, Turkmens, and Uzbeks who had been heavily influenced by capitalism. The nationality fights among the Kyrgyzes, Turkmens, and Uzbeks held a special place in the meetings of the Turkistan soviets.

For a long time, the Party and Soviet officials thought that the sure way to put an end to the nationality conflicts among the people was to elevate their level of education to the point of equality. Attracting them to the Party and the Soviets, therefore, was one remedy. But no positive steps were taken for the largest and oldest people of Central Asia, the Tajiks. The Tajiks themselves, too, did not have the courage to demand certain cultural and educational rights; even where the discrepancy between their life situation and that of the Uzbeks was glaring. This allowed many Party and Soviet officials in Central Asia to claim that the Tajiks did not exist as a separate people. If they did exist, they had to be assimilated into the Uzbeks. Such efforts were, and continue to be, expended by some Tajiks, especially by those who identified themselves as internationalists and who tried to be of service to the Uzbeks. They were lowly people, seeking power.

This kind of thinking is not compatible with truth, because the Tajiks are different from the other peoples of Turkistan and Bukhara, both linguistically and racially.

Aryan tribes have lived in Central Asia since ancient times. At the time of the Greek invasion of India, these people enjoyed a high level of civilization. They had very large cities (until the 6th century, the popula-
tion of Merv was more than 2,000,000). They also had the first public hospital, agriculture, and a good system of irrigation. They had trade relations with China and the countries to the west; they began trade with Turkistan in the 6th century, when the Altai Turks captured the northern regions.

In the 8th century, Turkistan and Bukhara fell to the Arabs and the inhabitants were Islamized. But these first lootrs did not destroy the country to any great extent. In the 12th century, the country was invaded by the Turko-Mongols and the population was subjugated. The assimilation of the races and the forced migration of the Tajiks to the mountains began at that time. These wild tribes transformed the orchards and the wheat fields into pasture land; destroyed the villages, and constantly looted the cities. But, in time, these wild invaders realized that they should accept the civilization of the rural inhabitants. Some of the local inhabitants were assimilated by the victors, causing them to lose their language. That is why the Turks and Mongols who have become part of Central Asia speak Tajik and some look Indo-European. The portion of the population that was forced to migrate to the mountains and valleys, resisted change; they retained their language. They are the pure Tajiks.

The reason for the Tajiks' dispersion is evident from their history: the Tajiks occupied all the mountainous regions between the Samarqand and Ferghana regions, two-fifths of the Ferghana Valley, and all the environs of Zarafshan (including the cities of Khujand, Samarqand, Chust, Urateppe, and Bukhara). They also were the sole occupants of southeastern Bukhara, the city of Bukhara, and its environs. They still live in Tashkent, Afghanistan, Iran, and the peripheries of India (Peshawar and Chitral). There is also a large population in Kashghar, in China.

From the point of view of lifestyle, the Tajiks of Turkistan can be divided into two distinct groups: the plains Tajiks and the mountain Tajiks. The Tajiks of the plains include the inhabitants of Samarqand, Bukhara, Khujand, Chust, and their environs. Their main occupations include work in orchards and vineyards as well as in the fields raising cotton and cattle.

On the contrary, the rugged nature of the territory that the Tajiks of the mountains occupy sets their life apart from that of the Tajiks of the plains. A lack of cultivable land forces the Tajiks of the mountain to seek employment in the cotton fields. For this reason, a large portion of every local proletariat was composed of mountain Tajiks. Up to 90% of the factory workers of Turkistan and Bukhara came from the mountainous region of Tajikistan. ...

Linguistically, too, the Tajiks are different from the other Central Asian peoples. While all the other peoples of Central Asia speak languages that are akin to Turkish, the Tajiks speak a language that is related to the Indo-Aryan group of the Indo-European languages, a language group absolutely different from Turkish. Most Tajiks speak dialects that are akin to the Farsi language. In any case, language and orthography relate the Tajiks to the peoples of Afghanistan, Iran, and the other eastern countries.
Until the take-over by Russia, the Persian language was the official language of all the emirates of Central Asia. In Bukhara, it retained that status until the Revolution. Along with Arabic, the Persian language is recognized in Central Asia as the language of medieval science. But the new bourgeoisie and the majority of the intellectuals studied not at the old schools, but in the new schools set up by the Tatars.

Tajik intellectuals, too, recognizing the importance of the reforms, became involved in that movement. Jadidism assumed a Pan-Turkist form in Turkistan, because the new methods were imitations of the models that were prevalent in Turkey. Some Tajik intellectuals, too, attracted by the reforms, joined the Pan-Turkists. Turkish officers (Prisoners of War) who had occupied the educational positions after the Revolution, were among the most effective in the promotion of Pan-Turkism.

The above statements can be summarized as follows:

a) The Tajiks are not a people who have recently found a language; rather, they are the remnants of a large body of people whose mixture with Uzbeks must be addressed truthfully. The current incredible claims are against all historical truths.

If Tajiks are assimilated with Uzbeks, for instance, in the Syr Dariya, where the Tajik population is small, then the reverse should be true here in the south, where the Tajiks are in the majority.

b) The documents presented above indicate that, before the national-administrative divisions, Party and Soviet officials did not show any interest in the plight of the Tajiks. They also reveal that before the Revolution, the Tajik intellectuals, who were still fighting the local bourgeoisie and those intellectuals who were influenced by Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism were totally severed from the body of the rural workers. This group of intellectuals then, in the early stages of the Revolution, became a source of recruits for the Party and Soviet officials of Turkistan. The distance that the Party and Soviet officials of Tajikistan created between themselves and the general public was not a sign of "internationalism," as some would have us believe, but a remnant of Pan-Turkism. ...

The theses then turn to the subversive activities of the Turkistan officials against the Tajiks. In the explanations and recommendations of A. Hajibaev, about politics we read:

1) The Tajiki language, along with Uzbeki, must be recognized as an official language. In the regions with a Tajik population, however, Tajiki must be employed as the language of interaction.

2) The Khujand region must be formed within Uzbekistan immediately; the regions with mixed Tajik-Uzbek populations should be added

---

81 Oblastnoi gasudarstvennyi arkhiv GBAO. Ф. 1, Оп. 1, Д. 28, Л. 71-74.
to that. It should be noted that the population of the region is 400,000; they cultivate cotton and maintain orchards.

The author then expresses his opinion about Party affairs. The propositions also address public education stating, "In cities where there is a Tajik majority, teacher-training schools must be established. In all the Tajik regional and distinct centers, the language of instruction should be Tajiki. This order should be issued as a special decree.

3) Teacher-training classes should be opened during the summer of the current year in Samarqand, Khujand, and Kokand.

4) The number of schools for Tajiks should be increased in proportion to the Tajik population.

5) Instructional materials in Tajiki should be increased."\(^82\)

These proposals were arranged on June 21, 1924. At the time, Hajibaev was a member of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Republic of Tajikistan. The contents of the proposals indicate that he was aware of the discrimination that was being exercised by Party and Soviet officials against the Tajiks. These also indicate that the author was a knowledgeable native son. With the exception of some minor points, all the statements in the theses correspond with historical facts. The facts stated in the report are supported by the studies of Russian scholars and by archival data. What happened then, one might ask, that Hajibaev, who was so well conversant in the history of his people, during his work with the Commission on national-administrative divisions, allowed incredibly glaring mistakes to occur? Why did he accept all those proposals with regard to inter-republic boundary lines and why did he allow not only the most ancient but the most progressive and economically viable cities of the Tajiks to be taken over by the Uzbeks?

We can speculate that maybe the Pan-Turkists put too much pressure on him and that the other members of the Tajikistan Subcommission (he, himself, writes about this); pressure that could not be ignored. Neither did the other Tajik political leaders, influenced by Pan-Turkism, support him. After all, how could one individual with limited voting rights oppose the highly influential Uzbekistan Commission, all the members of which supported the same idea?

At this time the national-administrative divisions were being concluded. During September and October of 1924, the recommendations of the highest organs of the governments of the republics of Central Asia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics assumed their legal form. The legislative acts regarding the national-administrative divisions of 15-16

\(^82\) Ibid., Л. 79.
September 1924 were ratified at the 5th Kurultai of the All-Bukhara Soviets on September 19, 1924.

In turn, on October 3, 1924, the Tajikistan Central Commission, consisting of Ch. Imamov, Hajirahmatullaev, and A. Hajibaev examined the question of mixed borders that were included in Tajikistan with preference for the Tajik people. The decree of the Commission reads as follows, "The following boundaries should be assigned to Tajikistan. ... in Bukhara, the Sar-i Asiya region, which would leave 240,000 Tajiks in Uzbekistan and part of the Bukhara region. In the Samarkand region, the following volosts:'

1) The Panjkent region with the following volosts: Panjkent, Aftabruin, Kshut, Marghiyan, Farab, and Urgat.

2) The Urateppe region: Qonchi, Basmanda, Daliyan and Shahristan.

3) From the Ferghana region: Kan-i Badam, Isfara, Sukh, part of the Rishtan volost, Mahram volost, Laklak, Amas, Babadakhan, Jad-dak, and Asht."

But A. Hajibaev was not satisfied with the decree of the Tajikistan Boundary Commission. He expressed his personal view as follows, "I think it is still too early to include the Ferghana Tajiks within the above-mentioned boundaries. I believe that Tajikistan will not be able to administer the region due to the immensity of the work at hand in the near future as well as what awaits it.

With those remarks, he dealt the mortal blow. As a result of his objection, not only the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan was deprived of the above-mentioned Ferghana region, but of large portions of its Samarkand and Bukhara holdings as well.

Thus, after much discussion, in addition to Eastern Bukhara, the Zarafshan highlands, Panjkent, Urateppe, and their environs were included in the Autonomous SSR. of Tajikistan.

On October 5, 1924, the National Tajikistan Commission requested from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia that the Pamir region be established as an autonomous region and be included in Tajikistan. Because of this request and that two autonomous regions could not be formed within a single union, the ASS Region of Tajikistan became the ASS Republic of Tajikistan.

On October 11, 1924, the suggestions of the Party and Soviet organs regarding the boundaries in Central Asia were discussed in an Extraordi-
nary meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia. At that same time, the Political Bureau assigned V. V. Kuybishev, I. E. Rudzutak, and G. V. Chicherin to study the Pamir problem. The Political Bureau of the Communist Party (b) of Russia found it necessary that the Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan (instead of Region) be instituted in the S.S. Republic of Uzbekistan.

On October 14, 1924, the Second All-Russia Central Executive Committee accepted the decree of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkistan called: "About the Territorial Divisions." It gave the Tajiks the right to establish the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan.

On October 26, 1924, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia examined the national-administrative divisions of Central Asia. On October 27, the Second Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union ratified the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkistan, of the All-Bukhara 5th Kurultai and the all-Khwarazm Kurultai of the Soviets. It accepted the recommendation of the second session of the Central Committee of the RSFSR in relation to the national-administrative divisions of Central Asia, i.e., the creation of Soviet Socialist Republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan within Uzbek SSR, the Autonomous Region of Kara Kyrgyzstan within RSFSR, and the Karakalpakistan Region in Kazakh SSR.

The national-administrative divisions of Central Asia and the establishment of the republics with corresponding ethnic identity were major historical events. These events affected the Tajiks, who had gradually lost their own government and were subjected to assimilation (especially after the Russian take-over of Central Asia), adversely. Using the divisions, Turkish tribes pushed the Tajiks farther into the mountainous regions. On the other hand, thanks to the assistance and foresight of Russian intellectuals, scientists, political and public servants, and the government, the Pan-Turkists did not find the opportunity to implement their anti-Tajik agenda to its fullest extent. Even though the Tajiks were the oldest people of the region, the Pan-Turkists insisted on their being devoid of culture and history; they were treated as "Persianized Turks." They recognized only the Tajiks of Badakhshan as Tajiks and argued that by the dawn of the 20th century the rest of the Tajiks had already become Turks. They further argued that Tajiks did not understand self-determination and, consequently, could not rule themselves. The establishment of the small Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan (even though it was deprived of its economic and cultural centers) neutralized the Turkish peoples' expansionist aspirations. In fact, the establishment of the Autonomous SSR of Tajikistan proved that the Tajiks, whose identity the Pan-Turkists wished to deny, were the oldest people of Central Asia.
At the same time, in the process of the national-administrative divisions of Central Asia (more exactly, regarding the role of such divisions), many mistakes were made. These mistakes were the consequences of visual and mental factors resulting from the past social, economical, and cultural life of the peoples of this region. As a whole, the Central Asians' life had been ruled by one tyrant after another; which caused them to constantly move from one area to another (except for the city dwellers). This was particularly true of the Turkish tribes thus adding huge numbers to the villagers, regions, and districts. With the exception of the cities and the Kuhistan, there were no great concentrations of people or of any recognized or definite habitation limits. This situation was (and continues to be) a source of conflict which has resulted in many deaths.

The psychological reasons were more compelling: they consisted of the persistent persuasions of the Pan-Turkists and of the chauvinist promoters of the Great Uzbek land, both groups occupied the key administrative positions of the republics of Central Asia. It is obvious that the constant denial of the fact that the Tajiks were the oldest people of Central Asia did not pass without resulting in a calamity. All these persuasions and denials were to infringe upon the rights of the Tajiks and to prevent them from establishing an independent republic.

As mentioned above, until 1924, most Central and local Party reports and governmental documents did not acknowledge the Tajiks as a people of Central Asia. Only after the establishment of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia, along with the efforts of insightful Party members, some of the rights of the Tajiks were restored and, contrary to the demands of the dissatisfied Pan-Turkists, the ASSR of Tajikistan was established.

In the process of the national-administrative divisions yet another concept proved to be detrimental. Convinced of the accuracy of their own knowledge, the Party and governmental officials did not listen to the scientific recommendations and the suggestions of the great scholars of the time who knew for a fact which people deserved to be independent.

The report of Academician V. V. Barthold entitled: "About the Inter-relationship between the Turkish and Iranian Peoples of Central Asia," states, "At the end of the 10th century, political power passed to the Turks and since then, one political union of Turks has given way to another. However, these political unions, including the more recent ones, have been mostly Iranian; if not according to the language of the public at large, then from the point of view of the official and cultural language. Even in the new Uzbek region, the Tajik element was so prominent that the Khiva historians referred to the Bukharan military as the Tajik army. The Tajiki language was not only the official language of the city of Bukhara, but the official language of the kingdom of Bukhara (1920) as well.

The ethnographic line separating the Turks from the Iranians lasted until the Turks became natives of the land, then it began to disappear. Iranian farming communities were slowly pushed towards the mountains.
In this regard, one of the scholars of Central Asia made the ridiculous statement that the Tajiks' love of mountains, a 'special Tajik trait,' moved the Tajiks in that direction. Unfortunately, this view was very popular in the 19th century."

Criticism of the national-administrative divisions by many government and Party leaders, scientists, and specialists filled the pages of the publications issued after 1924. In addition, a series of documents and lectures were published by the officials of the Central Committee of Central Asia on the same subject. In his "National-Administrative Divisions in Central Asia," I. Zelinskii states, "It would be self-gratification, if we were to think that the nationality problem in Turkistan was correctly resolved and that we made no mistakes in the creation of the national republics. With regard to assigning the boundaries, we should not expect new, incontrovertible decrees. We lacked statistics regarding the economy and information about the national composition of the regions. In addition, when the national composition is varied, the economic relations are also varied from region to region, small villages, and the like. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to determine boundary lines, republic or otherwise, with any degree of accuracy. It is possible that in the future, the local inhabitants might wish to reexamine and reassign these boundaries."88

I. A. Zelinskii, the Director of the Central Asian Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia, stated the following in his official speech, "Our first step was the implementation of the national-administrative divisions to establish the national republics. What we did, in a manner of speaking, was a rough draft. A great deal still remains to be discussed. We took the ax to the problem, you could say."89

After the first year of the divisions, the following brief analysis of the boundaries of the newly-united countries appeared, "During the national-administrative divisions, the correspondence of certain centers of commerce and known economical points has not been taken into consideration. Several major economic centers of the Tajiks remain in Uzbekistan, simply because of the assimilation issue. Among those places, mention can be made of Sukh, Isfara, Kan-i Badam, Khujand, and Samarqand. In the same document, it was also admitted that the Tajiks were forced to start a new economic center in the far-off village of Dushanbe."90

The claim that Samarqand and Bukhara were assigned to Uzbekistan because the surrounding population of these cities was Turkish was bogus. The majority of the inhabitants of the surrounding areas, especially around the city of Bukhara, were Tajik.

The economic factor is of special importance here because most researchers analyzing the national-administrative divisions refer to the words of V. I. Lenin. What had Lenin said about that? U. G. Barsegov, who has

---

89 ЦПА ИМЛ: Ф. 17, Оп. 68, Д. 168, Л. 12, 12 об.
90 ЦПА ИМЛ: Ф. 62, Оп. 2, Д. 177, Л. 41.
studied the works of Lenin carefully says, "We can clearly state that the immoral interpreters of the works of the Great One usually do not read Lenin's entire works. Rather they substitute the reverse of what Lenin states in simple and straightforward words and present that as an authentic statement made by Lenin."\(^91\)

Once we examine V. I. Lenin's entire provocative conception of the subject, we will conclude that all the supposed "economic concerns" do not have the slightest bearing on self-determination, especially, when we are dealing with forced retention of people in foreign lands." He used to laugh at such naiveté, calling it "economicism" and a "caricature of Marxism."\(^92\)

The words of V. I. Lenin regarding the "simplicity and impossibility of separating the cities from the villages and okrugs (regions) that have economic affinity, and that the Marxists should not accept the national-administrative divisions as a principle," should not be understood in the sense that these cities, as far as economics is concerned, could be given to strangers because, as he further states, "in time such cities change their national features."\(^93\)

As we mentioned, the 1924 artificial ploy—that there were no roads—so that the present-day northern Tajikistan could be included in the ASSR of Tajikistan was indefensible. In 1929, when the Khujand okrug was made a part of ASSR of Tajikistan, that region still did not have a highway; in some places, there were not even service roads between that okrug and Central Tajikistan (the Dushanbe road by way of Anzab and Shahristan was built in 1935).

The claim that the continuation of the Basmachi struggle was detrimental to Soviet rule and for that reason the above-mentioned regions were not included in the Autonomous SSR of Tajikistan is also ludicrous. Would it not be the case that an economically strong and well-defined republic with a strong foundation and well-prepared cadres could undermine the anti-revolutionaries' forces and add to the strength of the Soviet Union?

The Pan-Turkists, continuously used the backwardness of Tajikistan's culture vis-à-vis the other Central Asian republics as evidence to stop the formation of an independent republic of Tajikistan. But when we turn to specific facts, like the census taken during the early years of the Soviet Union, we find that the number of educated Tajiks was considerable. For instance, according to the 1920 census, in Samarkand, in spite of closing the advanced Tajik schools, the rate of literacy among the public was: Uzbeks 1.1%; Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes 2%; and Tajiks 4.7%.\(^94\)


\(^{92}\) Ibid.

\(^{93}\) Ibid.

Infringement Upon the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of the ASSRT. Struggle for Leaving Uzbekistan and the Establishment of Tajikistan SSR

Historical truth and the progression of events subsequent to the division show that the separation of Tajikistan as an autonomous region and, later, as an autonomous republic was achieved by undemocratic and illegal means and through infringement upon the rights of the Tajik people. Under pressure from the Pan-Turkists and the Great-Uzbek politicians who occupied all levels of Uzbek leadership, infringement continued upon the rights of the Tajiks—those in the autonomous region, in the autonomous republic, as well as those who remained in Uzbekistan SSR. These infringements were visible in the administration and in the cultural life of the autonomous republic. At the economic level, the infringement manifested itself as a disregard for the interests of the ASSRT, delays in the payment of loans, use of the loans on projects not originally intended for, and reluctance in releasing important buildings for administrative and educational offices for the use of the Tajiks.

In a letter dated July 9, 1927, the Tajik representatives in Moscow informed the Soviet of People's Commissars of ASSRT that:

1) The government of Uzbekistan continuously uses Tajikistan's income for its own purposes throughout Uzbekistan.
2) Central funds allocated to ASSRT are being spent by Uzbekistan for its own needs. Loan transfers and the division of loans are delayed regardless of Tajikistan's need for them.
3) The Uzbek government uses the privileges afforded the ASSRT as a politically important but backward republic to its own advantage to catch up with the other members of the Union. None of the allocations, however, reaches the people of the ASSRT.”

Abdulqadir Muhiddinov writes that from the inception of the Tajik republic, relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were not good; Tajikistan was never satisfied. None of the development projects of Tajikistan, economic as well as cultural, received proper attention by the

95 ЦПА ИМЛ: Ф. 62, Оп. 2, Д. 282, Л. 63, 64, 71, 72.
Uzbeks. On the contrary, they met with resistance. Therefore, most of the Tajik employees and those who were not Tajik but who dealt with Tajikistan and, thereby, had vested interest in the future of Tajikistan, recognized Tajikistan's independence as a major first step in removing the obstacles to future Tajik prosperity.96 He correctly outlines the main reasons for the inclusion of Tajikistan in Uzbekistan during the national-administrative divisions. The thinking at the time was that Tajikistan was administratively and culturally undeveloped and that any attempt at incorporating it into the Soviet Union directly or at making it an independent republic would meet with difficulty.97

The supporters of the national republics thought that by joining Uzbekistan as an autonomous republic Tajikistan would receive the necessary economic and cultural assistance from Uzbekistan. Helping the Tajiks, they thought, would be Uzbekistan's contribution to the elimination of backwardness in the Union. But their good intentions blinded them to the fact that the two people could not easily live together and that they did not share the same language, ethnic background, customs, or heritage. They ignored the fact that the Tajiks are Indo-European and that they speak the same language that is the official language of Afghanistan and Iran and that millions of other people speak it in India, Pakistan, and China. After all this was, and continues to be, the language of science, poetry, and literature throughout the East. If they had considered these points, they would have given Tajikistan its independence, rather than make it an autonomous republic.

There is a great deal of evidence that from the very first days of the inclusion of the ASSRT in Uzbekistan, the good intentions and the high hopes that had been placed on the Uzbeks were dashed. Of the approved budget, Uzbekistan paid an insufficient amount to Tajikistan, even of the allocations already made by the Center. Spending large amounts of the originally Tajik fund for its own uses, Uzbekistan plundered the assets of not only the ASSRT but also of the Tajiks who lived in Uzbekistan as citizens of that republic. In most cases, in the politics of the cadres, the interests of Tajikistan were not taken into consideration. The following is stated in a report to the Central Asian Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia by the Secretary of the Organizational Branch of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan, V. V. Talpigo and the Director of the Organizational Branch, A.M. Diakov,98 "The Uzbek comrades were not quite the comrades they were deemed to be. They exiled to Tajikistan those individuals who had been rejected by their system. Those who went to

97 Ibid.
98 A. M. Diakov (1896-1975) was an Orientalist, a doctor of medicine, and a member of the revkom or Revolutionary Committee of Tajikistan. Between 1925 and 1932 he was the Commissar for Health and a scientific worker for the Institute of Oriental Studies of AFSSR (ed.).
Tajikistan, too, referred to themselves as exiles, a situation that affected their very psychology and, consequently, the progress of the country."

The government and the Party organizations of Uzbekistan did not assist Tajikistan in the development of its culture, on the contrary, using every excuse, as was said at the time, they made the situation in the civilization front complex. The Tajiks were subjected to many discriminatory acts then and are still being discriminated against in present-day Tashkent. Here, for instance, the governmental publishing houses of Uzbekistan blocked the way of publishing textbooks in Tajiki. In most of the schools in Uzbekistan and the ASSRT they registered the Tajik students as Uzbek. The Tajiks who opposed party policy and the Soviet officials and who tried to safeguard the interests of their people were persecuted. Criminal dossiers were opened against them, they were summoned for interrogation, or were sent to far-off places, in some cases to the ASSRT.

The economic and ideological punishment doled out by the Uzbek leaders to Tajiks and the ASSRT, if not criminal, brought about Tajikistan's subsequent backwardness.

Before long, after the completion of the national-administrative divisions in all the Tajik-inhabited cities, regions, and villages, under the pretext of localizing the Party and Soviet organizations, a process of Uzbekization of the governmental, Soviet, and party organs began.

_Prvada Vostoka_, August 30, 1926, reported that there were only 12 schools for more than half a million Tajiks. In Samarqand, Bukhara, and Khujand where the majority of the inhabitants were Tajiks, there was not even one school or kindergarten in which the language of instruction was Tajiki.

In Shirinsha Shatimur's report to J. V. Stalin, Central Asian Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Russia and the subdivision of the National Minorities of the Central Committee of the Communist party (b) of Russia of June 25, 1924, entitled: "About the Cultural and the Socio-Economic Situation of the Tajiks in the Republic of Uzbekistan," the following is stated, "After national-administrative divisions in the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan, about 800,000 Tajiks remained in opposition to the other nationalities in Uzbekistan. In a socialist republic where the Communist Party issues reports about the situation of the nationalists, it might appear awkward to request special attention regarding the Tajiks, but the present situation of these people requires that. I regard it my debt to my Party to apprise the Central Committee of the Communist Party of these actions.

I shall begin with the situation of the Tajiks before the national-administrative divisions in Turkistan and Bukhara. At the beginning, the very existence of the Tajiks, except for the Tajiks of Badakhshan—Western Pamirs (see the Uzbek newspapers, _Zarafshan_, and _Turkistan_, December 1923 and February 1924), even at the time when Turkistan's official

---

99 ЦПА ИМЛ: Ф. 62, Оп. 2, Д. 185, Л. 42.
records showed 600,000 Tajiks, the situation was the same. According to
the same data, there are 200,000 Turkmens living in Turkistan. They were
given the right to use their native language, publish literature, open
schools, etc.

The Tajiks were deprived of all that. In addition, there were 802,000
Tajiks in the Bukhara Republic and 200,000 Kyrgyzes. The Kyrgyzes had
schools and there was a Kyrgyz branch of the Central Executive
Committee of Bukhara. As for the Tajiks, they were not allowed to use
their native language. They referred to Tajiki as the language of the Amirs,
even though the Amirs themselves were Uzbek, the official language of
the Emirate was Tajiki. Tajiki was also the language of culture and
literature not only in Central Asia but also in Iran, Afghanistan, and India.
This barbaric act would find its equal if, for instance, after the Revolution,
we were to persecute speakers of Russian because Russian was the
language of Nicholas II.

Before the divisions, the discussion of this problem was not appro-
priate. The time, too, was short. Then there was the Basmachi problem
and the general situation in the country. But, at the present, there are
various groups among the people of this republic that are inflicting harm.
At the present time, the Uzbek are teaching in the Tajik schools, using
Uzbeki as the medium of instruction, even though Tajiki is the language of
culture and has a rich literature. Beginning at this time, the Tajiks are
deprived of instruction in their native language. This situation has re-
volved, and continues to revolve, around the concepts advocated by the
Pan-Turkists, Pan-Islamists, Pan-Uzbeks, Uzbek intellectuals, and the
Muslim clergy. The resolution of the Tajikistan problem is of great im-
portance for the entire Soviet Union because, in addition to Central Asia,
the Tajiks form considerable groups in neighboring countries (Iran,
Afghanistan, and India). The Communist Party of Uzbekistan, however,
did not give the Tajik problem its due attention because a large number of
the high officials of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan themselves are
influenced by these same chauvinistic circles. Thus, the local party's views
on this is considerably partial.

This concept will become more understandable, if we analyze the sit-
euation in the following manner. The Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan
unites the mountain Tajiks of Eastern Bukhara, Gorno-Badakhshan
(Western Pamir), and some areas of the Samarqand region. This popula-
tion is rustic in the main and is culturally and economically backward. The
most educated and cosmopolitan of the Tajiks (city dwellers—traders,
artisans, and artists—as well as the working class intellectuals) remain in
the territory of Uzbekistan. It is this latter Tajik population that the
Uzbeks have targeted and, using uncivilized means, intend to make them
Uzbeks. It is evident that this kind of unnatural treatment will elicit a high
degree of chauvinism from the Tajiks and will generate all kinds of anti-
Party and anti-Soviet feelings among them.
After the division of Central Asia, the Tajiki language was mercilessly suppressed. At the time of defining the national-territorial boundaries, in August 1924, the old Uzbek Central Executive Committee in its last plenum accepted that the Tajiks existed as a people and agreed to open a pedagogical school to serve their educational needs. At the end of 1924 that institute was inaugurated in Tashkent. At the present, there are 171 students enrolled in it. It is two years since the opening of the institute and it still has only two classrooms in which to carry out its task.

During September of the same year, the publication of *The Tajik Voice* began but its distribution was informally prohibited. The recognition of the Tajiks in the territory of Uzbekistan, the establishment of the institute, and the publication of newspapers before the divisions were mostly devised to neutralize the efforts of the Tajiks of Ferghana and Samarkand who sympathized with the other Tajiks. In spite of this, when R. Kalinin was traveling through Ferghana, in 1924, the Tajiks of Kan-i Badam requested from him to include their region in Tajikistan. In reality, this request was not satisfied (and there was no need for it either). But following that, the region began to be known as the Tajikistan of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Two years have passed, but in all the schools of the region, the language of instruction is still Uzbeki, even though the children do not know Uzbek.

Since the completion of the divisions, the Tajiks have been protesting and seeking to establish their national rights. In most regions, the issue of instruction in the native language has been taken up by the People's Education Bureau and by the Commissar of Education of Uzbekistan. But none of these efforts has been fruitful. There were even instances of pressure being brought down on the people to silence them. In 1925, in response to an ultimatum by the Tajiks, a four-month remedial teacher-training course was opened in Samarkand. When the teachers finished the course and returned to their posts, they were persecuted. Even today instruction in the Tajiki language is prohibited (see the statement of the teacher Qulikhan Asimzada). Recently, R. Ivanov, Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, in his speech (November 1925) to the First Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan stated that the Uzbeks in the Zarafshan region (in Bukhara) are bringing every kind of pressure down on the Tajiks to prevent them from conversing in their native language.

This kind of persecution of the Tajiki language by the local organs is conveying the wrong message to the Tajiks about the policies of the Communist Party and about the Soviet government's handling of the nationalities question.

In order to illustrate the characteristics of the Party organizations, let us consider the following. On this day, the economic representatives of Uzbekistan were celebrating the first anniversary of the establishment of the Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan. For the occasion, they had invited the representatives of various organizations, Tajik workers of the
Tashkent factories, Tajik students, and the youth of the city of Tashkent. The celebrations began and everything was in the Uzbeki language. The Tajiks voiced their dissatisfaction, because the majority did not know Uzbeki. They requested that the meeting be conducted in either Tajiki or Russian. At the end the celebrations ended as an anti-Uzbek spectacle.

As a result of this event, the director of the Tajik Institute was dismissed for failure to educate his students properly. One of the students (a Tajik national) of the Central Asian Communist University who had participated in the uprising was detained by the Security Commissariat, awaiting Party punishment. That student, perhaps, was reprimanded and, eventually, expelled from the Party. The roots of the nationality problem, however, run very deep. Expelling a few comrades will not resolve the problem.

Even if we were to assign a certain portion of these strange conflicts during the Soviet rule to the inevitable clashes between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks on the issue of nationality, three-fourths of them could be resolved by a judicious application of the nationality rules and the policies of the Party. Such an application of rules would direct the local thinking toward a Soviet dimension. The present situation is such that national antagonism has poisoned all the workers' minds and national conflicts have blocked the achievement of national self-determination.

Based on the above statements, I request that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union pay special attention to the Tajik situation. Here are my recommendations:

1) It should be emphasized that the Communist Party of Uzbekistan has failed to make any contributions to the progress of the education and to the raising of the national consciousness of the Tajiks of Uzbekistan.

2) The Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Bukhara, recommends that the Central Asian Bureau of the Communist Party (b) of Bukhara pay special attention to the affairs of the Central Asian minorities, especially to the Tajiks.

3) In order to investigate the situation of the Tajiks in Uzbekistan more comprehensively, it is recommended that a commission be formed in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Bukhara, with the following mandate: 'Substantial improvements should be made in the Soviet and Party structures to ensure the provision of schools, courts, and the like for the Tajik workers.'

We reproduced the entire text of Shirinsha Shatimur's statement in order to underscore the chauvinistic attitude of the Uzbek leaders and to indicate the degree of anti-Tajik sentiment in the republics of Bukhara and Turkistan before the divisions and when the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan was included in Uzbekistan SSR. The information in the report is only a fraction of the many illegal acts committed against
the Tajiks both before and after the division. These illegal acts continue even today against the Tajiks of Uzbekistan.

It can be said that the process of assimilation of the Tajiks into the Uzbek context reached genocidal proportion and that the assimilation process was carried out by force and through illegal means, including threat of exile to the former Eastern Bukhara; dismissal of Tajik officials who defended the Tajiks' rights and who supported the Tajiks' interests; delimitation of the positions to which the Tajiks could aspire; blocking entrance to special schools; and the threat of curtailing existing freedoms. The Uzbeks made every effort to influence the 1926 census so that it would reflect a low number of Tajiks in the cities and regions where they were in the majority. All this derived from a master plan aimed at artificially, down-sizing the census and preventing the Tajiks from achieving independence (an eventuality that they felt could happen). At the time of the establishment of Tajik SSR, they made an effort to retain the cities of Samarqand, Bukhara, and Khujand in Uzbekistan. It was for this very purpose that the city of Samarqand was made the capital of Uzbekistan from 1924 until 1930.

Whereas according to the 1920 census, the population of Samarqand was 44,758 Tajiks and 3,302 Uzbeks, the 1926 census showed 43,364 Uzbeks and 10,716 Tajiks. In the rural district of Khujand (including Asht, Kan-i Badam, and Isfara), where the Tajiks were in the majority, the 1926 census showed a similar trend. It showed the Tajiks to be 24.8% while the Uzbeks were 73.4%. Is not this a clear example of genocide? (We are not talking about physical genocide, of course). The important thing is that the Tajiks no longer existed as a people in Uzbekistan.

The passing of Samarqand, Bukhara, and the other Tajik regions into Uzbek hands indicated one thing to the Tajiks: in as much as they live in the land of the Uzbeks they are no longer Tajiks, they are Uzbeks. At that time, the famous anthropologist, I. I. Zarubin, said the following about the situation, "The Iranians of Central Asia, having been long surrounded by the Uzbeks, have accepted the latter's identity. In this case the Tajiks call themselves Uzbek, using the term 'Uzbek' in the sense of a resident or settler of Uzbekistan."

Zarubin cites an example about the Urguts. "It is easy to understand this. The Uzbek Republic was formed as a result of the 1924 administrative divisions, but the census was begun on December 17, 1926. At that time, Tajikistan was an autonomous republic within Uzbekistan. The Tajiks' choice of the Uzbeks was also influenced by the fact that Samarqand was the capital of Uzbekistan (and retained this status from 1924 until 1930)."

---

100 ЦИА ИМІ: Ф. 62, Оп. 2, Д. 1744, Л. 6, Об. 176-178.
101 See Rahimov, R. R. op. cit., p. 118.
102 Ibid.
In the article cited above, R. R. Rahimov, referring to the work of the famous Soviet anthropologist O. A. Sukhareva, states: As a result of the 1926 census from the 41,839 residents of Bukhara (old Bukhara) 27,823 have called themselves Uzbek and 8,646 Tajik. Clearly, the scholars have not taken the language of the respondents into consideration; as a result, they have accounted for only a quarter of the Tajik population.

All this, once again, is evidence that the 1926 census, like those taken in subsequent years, was flawed by exerting administrative force. The "introductory" words of the Central Governmental Presidium of Statistics of Uzbekistan SSR entitled, "About the Materials for the Soviet Census," illustrate this point: 1) "The questionnaires were in Russian and Uzbeki; 2) Persuasion was used to prepare the inhabitants for responding to the questions of the census takers in a particular way; 3) booklets, documents, and invitations, in the Russian and Uzbeki languages, were widely distributed."[^103]

Persuasion and incentives were used for the sole purpose of increasing the number of the Uzbeks at the expense of the Tajiks. Thus, efforts were made to produce lower numbers in areas where Tajiks were in the majority. In the secret letter of the Central Asian Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia to the party organization, we read, "The exercise of regionalism and chauvinism on the part of the Soviet officials as well as a lack of care in safeguarding the interests of the national minorities, have forced the representatives of these people to hide their true national identity."[^104]

In relation to this, it is significant to carefully study the activities of the Nationality Committee of the rural district of Khujand. According to the 1920 census and allocations, the rural district of Khujand was 64.1% Tajik and 35.9% Uzbek and others. The 1926 census shows a much smaller number of Tajiks. Since in many areas, like Samarqand and Bukhara, in very recent times, Tajiki was the main language, it can be concluded that the population, too, was Tajik. But in the 1926 census, due to the persuasions outlined above, the number of Tajiks has decreased in the cities and in the region.

We know that within the five years that had elapsed between the two censuses, the Tajiks neither moved out of their ancestral land nor were they summarily killed. The reason was simple, it had to do with the pressures that the Soviet and Party officials brought to bear on them. They were threatened; if they did not cooperate and register themselves as Uzbeks, they would be exiled to Eastern Bukhara. Their only salvation was in changing their national identity.

One of the prominent education leaders of Uzbekistan expressed his general sentiment about the instruction in the Tajiki language as follows,

[^103]: Ibid., p. 119
[^104]: Partiniy arkhiv Tadzhikskogo Instituta marksizma-leninizma (hence, ПА ТФ ИМ/Л)... (Party Archives of the Tajikistan Branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism), Ф. 1, Оп. 2, Д. 208, Л. 8.
"I am personally against allowing the language of 18 schools to change to Tajiki. We are making an effort to decrease the number of schools in which the language of instruction is Tajiki. I have talked to the teachers in Samarkand and have their assurances for the change of the language of instruction into Uzbeki. Within a year, we can convert all these schools into Uzbeki schools."105

The Uzbeks created untold obstacles in the way of providing instructional materials in Tajiki. For instance, in the education branch of the People's Education of the rural district of Bukhara, the People's Commissariat of Education (narkompros) handed out the Alphabets very late. The director of information, some Uzbek named Hamidjan Alimov, in spite of the repeated requests of the Tajik teachers, refused to distribute the books. They remained in his office until the end of the academic year.106

This kind of a scene was universal. Out of the 35 Tajiki schools of the Ferghana rural district only eight received the Alphabet; while, in the Panghiz region, they had 200 unused copies of the Tajiki Alphabet as early as 1922.

During the formation of the Bukhara schools, many illegal acts took place. When filling out the forms, in 1927-28, the teachers directed the students to identify themselves as Uzbek in order to prevent errors. Consequently, it was difficult to know how many Tajiki-speaking students were forced to study through the medium of Uzbeki.107

In May, 1929, A. Ikramov, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan, in one of his speeches said the following about the national minorities, "We must admit that the Tajiks are a strong national group in our republic. Until the past national divisions of the Bukhara and Turkistan republics, and at the time of the establishment of Uzbekistan SSR, we were filled with Pan-Turkist feelings. We went as far as to impose the concept of the 'Great Uzbek Nation' on our minorities." He documented his assertions with the following. "There was not even one Tajik school in Bukhara. In the Khujand rural district, where 90% of the population was Tajik, there were no Tajik schools. There were certain misunderstandings between the Soviet officials and the Tajiks. A great deal of that is the result of the effects of the very "Great-Uzbek-Nation" chauvinism that we are trying to eradicate, granted that we are still not quite well-established."108

The fact that the rights of the Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan and the Tajiks were constantly infringed upon is evident from the speech of Amasov, an instructor of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of the Soviet Union. He states that, "Tajikistan is correct in its complaint that Uzbekistan does not take it seriously. For instance, as far as rights are concerned, Uzbekistan treats Tajikistan as if it were one of its

105 ПА ТФ ИМЛ: Ф. 1, Оп. 2, Д. 208, Л. 7-8.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
own rural districts. Other manifestations of this attitude include a decrease in the budget, and refusal to move the produce. We observe that people are forced to hide their national identity and to assume Uzbek identity. Even the members of the Party hide their true identity out of fear and register themselves as Uzbek."

Before long the incorrect, anti-Tajik decrees of the national-administrative divisions of 1924 displayed their negative influence. The relations between Uzbekistan and ASSR Tajikistan, which was being included in Uzbekistan, were quite complex. Protests against the Uzbek administration policy toward the Autonomous Republic and the towns and regions that had remained in Uzbekistan spread everywhere. The unresolved problem of Tajik leadership led to the dissatisfaction of the Tajiks of the rural districts of Khujand, Kan-i Badam, and other areas in present-day northern Tajikistan.

The famous historian and geographer of Tajikistan, M. S. Andriev, writes the following to V. V. Barthold, "In addition, there is a political item which has local significance. Soon after the establishment of Tajikistan, the Tajiks who were indifferent as to their national origin and had placed themselves at the mercy of the assimilation process, have suddenly become active the other way around. They call themselves Tajiks and, in one instance, have refused documents that have not been written in Farsi. Very recently, they have succeeded in being considered for a decree that would make them a special autonomous region. One of these days, in Isfara and Kan-i Badam, they will celebrate the achievement of autonomy. It is expected that the other Tajiks of Ferghana (Chust, Namangan, Uch-Kurgan) will also join them."

In 1927, the rural district of Khujand was established, uniting Khujand, Isfara, Kan-i Badam, and the Asht region; together they formed the national Tajik rural district of Uzbekistan SSR.

The main reasons for taking Tajikistan out of the Republic of Uzbekistan is explained in the letter written by the members of the regional Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of the Nation, the Central Asian Bureau, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan. Among other things, the letter states that without a doubt, with regard to the national-administrative divisions in Central Asia, the Party has laid the foundation for a progressive educational and economic base." The achievements in various fields include: the defeat of the anti-revolutionary forces; success in the resolution of the land and water problems; liberation of women; positive resolution of social problems; and the creation of positive nationality relations. The members of the regional committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan, at the same time,

---

109 ЦПА ИМЛ: Ф. 17, Оп. 69, Д. 664, Л. 5.
110 Ленинградское отделение Архива АН СССР (The Leningrad Branch of the Archivges of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR), Ф. 68, Оп. 2, Д. 5, Л. 5-6.
111 ПА ТФ ИМЛ: Ф. 1, Оп. 1, Д. 801, Л. 6.
referred to some of the negative factors that had affected the equitable growth of the economics and cultures of the new nations adversely. These mistakes made during the national-administrative divisions have prevented some people from enjoying the right to form an independent nation. Referring to some of the problems that, at the time of the implementation of the divisions, had blocked the way to Tajikistan's independence, they said, "Now the time is ripe to consider the situation of the regions that belong to the Tajiks but which, at the present time, are in Uzbekistan and include them in the ASSRT. The establishment of Tajikistan must receive the same treatment that other republics (i.e., Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have received." There were documents that supported the formation of a Soviet republic if, of course, the insignificant obstacles for the achievement of independent republic status were removed. In addition, the ASSRT had carried out all the terms that, at the time of the national-administrative divisions, the people of Central Asia had assigned to it. A more important factor was that the republic as a whole now provided a much better life for its people, although this statement did not apply to the Uzbek leadership which had infringed upon the rights of the Tajiks. Several times, the ASSRT protested to both the officials of the Union and the Central Asian Bureau about Uzbekistan's discriminatory acts against both its own Tajik residents and the ASSRT. There are archival documents that testify to the manner in which Uzbekistan infringed upon the economic and cultural rights of the people of the ASSRT.

Similarly, we observe that at the time of the inclusion of Tajikistan in the Republic of Uzbekistan, the relations between the two were strained. At a time when the other republics—Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Karakalpakistan, and Turkmenistan—brought territorial claims against Uzbekistan with positive results, Tajikistan, in spite of Uzbekistan's infringement on the rights of its people, tried to satisfy the terms of the agreement. In fact, after the conclusion of the national-administrative divisions, Tajikistan did not make any territorial claims on any republic, including Uzbekistan.

Therefore, in a letter signed by twenty members of the regional committee of the Communist Party (b) of Tajikistan, the following statement is made, "We consider the territorial question, with regard to the Tajiks who are temporarily placed in Uzbekistan, to be of prime importance." What was the content of the ASSRT's territorial demand?

Highest priority for the immediate release to Tajikistan of the rural districts, cities, and regions where the majority of the population was Tajik. In addition, the members of the regional committee of Tajikistan in the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan sought free economic and cultural

---

112 Ibid., Л. 8.
113 ПА ТФ ИМЛ: Ф. 1, Оп. 1, Д. 801, Л. 10.
development of those regions which had a mixed population, i.e., wherein in addition to Tajiks other Central Asian peoples lived as well. The following were mentioned among the administrative units to be turned over to Tajikistan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Region</th>
<th>Tajiks</th>
<th>Uzbeks</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Rural district of Khujand of Tajikistan</td>
<td>83,530</td>
<td>17,005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) regions of the old Khujand district</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) from the old rural district of Namangan</td>
<td>64,351</td>
<td>20,153</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>84,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) All the rural district of Khujand</td>
<td>54,459</td>
<td>27,093</td>
<td>8,139</td>
<td>89,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>202,350</td>
<td>64,251</td>
<td>8,139</td>
<td>274,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) The three regions of Surkhan Dariya</td>
<td>78,303</td>
<td>39,093</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>117,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Samarqand region and city of Samarqand</td>
<td>70,773</td>
<td>13,192</td>
<td>31,162</td>
<td>115,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) The Bekdom and city of Bukhara</td>
<td>163,405</td>
<td>45,775</td>
<td>55,339</td>
<td>262,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>514,368</td>
<td>162,030</td>
<td>94,565</td>
<td>748,953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the 1917 and 1920 censuses, the national demography of Tajikistan on the eve of the national-administrative divisions, was as follows:

Tajiks—553,435; Uzbeks—139,813; other—88,580; total—782,328.

The subtotal of the population of ASSRT, along with the rural districts, cities, and the regions mentioned above, should have been:

Tajiks—1,068,303; Uzbeks—279,843; other—183,143; total—1,531,281.\(^{114}\)

Based on the national composition of Uzbekistan, to some degree the demands of the ASSRT on Uzbekistan about the release of the above-mentioned territories is objective.

For instance, before the national-administrative divisions, the national composition of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan, without the

\(^{114}\) Ibid.
above-mentioned Tajik region, according to the 1917-1920 census was as follows:

- Tajiks—747,222;
- Uzbeks—2,838,935;
- other—440,843;
- total—4,025,000.\(^{115}\)

The national composition, according to the same sources, after Tajikistan's demands were met and Tajikistan was leaving Uzbekistan was:

- Tajiks—235,116;
- Uzbeks—2,674,905;
- other—346,180;
- total—3,256,201.\(^{116}\)

In the column marked "Uzbek," all the Turkish-speaking peoples: Laqais, Qarluqs, Qunqrats, Barlases, and others were mentioned. This included those who did not, and still do not, recognize themselves as Uzbek. The Laqais, who dwell in the present-day republic of Tajikistan, are a case in point.

One of the basic demands of the authors of the letter was that, at the time of the departure of Tajikistan from Uzbekistan SSR, its new demographic composition be assessed on the basis of the statistics that had been gathered before the national-administrative divisions. This was a reasonable demand because the 1926 census and the responses to its questions, being flawed, did not reflect the true demography of Central Asia.

For example, let us consider the two national cities of the Tajiks, Samarqand and Bukhara. Before the national-administrative divisions, the census showed 75% to 98% of the population to be Tajik. The 1926 census showed 15% to 20%.\(^{117}\)

A comparative study after 1926 of the results of the census for a number of rural districts, cities, and regions of the Tajiks who were directly under Uzbek rule showed that over 50% of the Tajiks had been registered as Uzbek.

The tactics used in gathering the 1926 census, as we have already said, included the intimidation of the citizens of Samarqand and Bukhara and other regions in Uzbekistan where Tajiks lived threat of exile to Eastern Bukhara, i.e., to the territory of the ASSRT, and other such evil acts.

The authors of the letter had still more exact and objective evidence, according to which the composition of the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and the other peoples; indeed, the demography of Central Asia, would assume a different form. According to a military census of the former Bukhara Republic, the Tajiks formed 70% of the population, i.e., 2,100,000. The Uzbeks formed 25%, i.e., 750,000.\(^{118}\)

According to the same source, the number of the Tajiks of the Republic of Turkistan was as follows: former Ferghana region—450,000;

\(^{115}\) Ibid.
\(^{116}\) Ibid.
\(^{117}\) Ibid., Jl. 12.
\(^{118}\) Ibid.
Samarqand—750,000; in the other regions of the Republic of Turkistan—1,300,000.  

Similarly, according to the same documents, the number of the Tajiks of Bukhara and Turkistan combined was 3,400,000, a number that is larger than the numbers for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan combined.  

It is necessary to state this and there is no room for doubt. The land requested by the Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan, before and after the formation of the Tajik SSR, was an integral part of Tajikistan. The history of those parts encompasses both the nationality factor and the economic and cultural factors, it is a product of Tajik skills and psychology. Unlike the tribal people, the Tajiks farmed, developed orchards and vineyards, cultivated cotton, raised silk worms, and promoted the arts. Besides, the addition of these regions contributed to the economic and cultural development of the republic and secured its stability. Conversely, remaining in Uzbekistan was not to the benefit of the Tajiks, especially where the threat of assimilation existed as a barrier against self-determination.  

Finally, as the letter indicates, the unbreakable union of the Tajiks of the rural districts of Central Asia and the establishment of a unified government for them will expand socialist thought among a large population in Tajikistan's vicinity; countries like Afghanistan, Northern India, Iran, and Western China.”

Recent events, worldwide and in the Soviet Union, indicate that socialist ideas failed to penetrate both the East and the West. Instead, the malformation of these ideas within the first world socialist state itself resulted in fragmentation and stagnation.  

Similarly, we observe that after the divisions and the establishment of the ASSRT, a struggle began between the Tajik political and governmental officials and Tajik people of some of the regions that had illegally been included in Uzbekistan to extricate Tajikistan from Uzbekistan and to establish an independent republic.  

The struggle for changing Tajikistan from an Autonomous Republic to a Union Republic continued. It should be stated that the project was being moved forward by those who, from the start, i.e., from the time of the implementation of the divisions, had identified their position and sided with the establishment of an independent Tajik republic. Among those individuals we can name Nusratulla Makhsum and Shirinsha Shatemur. These two individuals were distinct from Abdulla Rahimbaev, Chinar Imamov, Abdurrahim Hajibaev, and others who were satisfied with receiving an autonomous region for the Tajiks. In later years, many of those individuals realized their mistakes, confessed, and participated in the movement for the establishment of Tajikistan SSR. The great con-

---

119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., л. 13.
121 ПА ТФ ИМЛ: Ф. 1, Оп. 1, Д. 801, Л. 14.
tributions of Abdulqadir Muhiddinov and Abdurrahim Hajibaev, who carried the entire burden of the divisions on their shoulders, must be appreciated. Before submission, all the economic, political, cultural, demographic, and other principles were drawn up by the committee founded and guided by A. Muhiddinov and A. Hajibaev. In later years, their past actions created grounds for them, and for other comrades, to be accused of regionalism and be purged. There exists documentary evidence now that Nusratulla Makhsum, Abdulqadir Muhiddinov, Shirinsha Shatimur, and Abdurrahim Hajibaev were sacrificed for safeguarding Tajik interests in the resolution of the nationality issue. This and future generations must pay tribute to them. The names of these truthful and loyal guardians must not be forgotten.

For a just resolution of the territorial conflicts between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan SSR other alternatives to the return of the land were also suggested. For instance, Abdulqadir Muhiddinov suggested the creation of a Central Asian federation into which Tajikistan could enter as a unit. But, at the same time, one thing frightened him: Were the federation to geographically encompass the pre-division (1924) regions, it would include four republics—Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In that case, Uzbekistan would have an opportunity to treat all the republics along the same line as it had treated Tajikistan, because Uzbekistan's land mass and economic strength outweighed the power of the other three republics combined. Therefore, to decrease the power of Uzbekistan so that there is a degree of equality among the republics of the federation, A. Muhiddinov suggested that Tajik territories in the north and west of the ASSRT (Samarqand, Bukhara, part of Ferghana, Khujand, and the Surkhan Dariya rural district) be taken away from Uzbekistan. This would create the needed equality among the future members of the federation.122

A. Muhiddinov actively participated in bringing about a just solution for the territorial claim and for reestablishing the historical truth. His reports and articles that have survived indicate the depth of his knowledge of Tajik history. They also point to his untiring efforts for uniting all Tajiki-speaking peoples in an independent republic of their own.

In one of his reports to the Central Asian Bureau of the Communist Party of the Union he wrote, "The Commission dealing with the territorial division between Uzbekistan SSR and the ASSRT, in its September 8, (1929—R.M.) meeting did not allow the inclusion of Surkhan Dariya in Tajikistan. Similarly, Tajikistan's request for Termez, a trade center with mostly European inhabitants, to be included in its territory was rejected.

This Commission registered a unanimous vote for Surkhan Dariya to remain in Uzbekistan.

During the discussion of the problem we, the Tajik representatives, expressed our dissatisfaction with the resolution and filed our suggestions separately. A copy of our suggestions is attached to this letter. With this

122 ЦГА Таджикской ССР. Ф. 1, Оп. 1, Д. 843, Л. 18.
letter, we expressly request the Central Asian Bureau to reexamine the resolutions and take into consideration the views of Comrade Belov and Comrade Karp, impartial experts who have studied the Surkhan Dariya situation carefully."\(^{123}\)

The documents prepared by the committee of experts state that on historical and economic grounds, and from the point of view of national composition, Surkhan Dariya and Termez belong to Tajikistan SSR. A. Muhiddinov demands that from an economic point of view, Termez should be turned over to Tajikistan. At the same time, the Uzbeks use economic imperatives as the base of their arguments for keeping Samarkand and Bukhara within Uzbekistan, even though both cities are inhabited by Tajiks.

The result of the discussions and the bilateral territorial demands of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan SSR, which lasted from summer to September 1929, and which were carried out under the direction of the head of the Economic Soviet of Central Asia, Makiv, with the participation of the representatives of the above-mentioned republics are summed up in "The Political Reasons for the Assimilation of Tajiks into Uzbek Society."

In the meeting, the Uzbek representative stated that, on the matter of resolving the question of the separation of Tajikistan from Uzbekistan SSR to form Tajikistan SSR, he would accept only the 1926 census because that census was accepted by the Central Bureau of Statistics and was, therefore, all-Union.\(^{124}\) A. Hajibaev, on the other hand, presenting incontrovertible evidence, stated that the leaders of the Republic of Uzbekistan have infringed upon the economic and cultural rights of the Tajiks of both the ASSRT and the Uzbekistan SSR. Regarding the 1926 census, he stated that that information as far as it dealt with the Tajiks, was manipulated and flawed; in fact, it was a pack of lies. I shall prove that at the time the census was taken, the census takers had deliberately recorded smaller numbers for the Tajiks. A. Hajibaev regarded the following statement a necessity, "I state and prove my statement that the 1926 census taken in Uzbekistan is fallacious. The Soviet and Party Uzbek officials themselves are in agreement with this statement."\(^{125}\)

The head of the commission, Makiv, added, "Until the beginning of the national divisions, the language of instruction in all Tajik schools was Uzbek. The Tajiks were persuaded to register themselves as Uzbek. The intensity of the persuasion was such that not only the general public, but the Tajik officials in the Party registered themselves as Uzbek."\(^{126}\)

In addition to the official documents presented by the government of Tajikistan and A. Hajibaev's speech of June 26, 1929 to the Commission, Makiv said, "I believe that if the Soviet officials knew that the 1926 census, distinguishing separate nationalities, had been taken under these

\(^{123}\) ЦГА Таджикской ССР. Ф. 35, Оп. 2, Д. 199, Л. 79.
\(^{124}\) Ibid., Л. 27.
\(^{125}\) ЦГА Таджикской ССР. Ф. 35, Оп. 2, Д. 199, Л. 3.
\(^{126}\) Ibid., Л. 4.
conditions, they would not have approved it. They would even have brought those who had doctored the data to justice.  

In his introductory remarks, Makiv spoke about Pan-Turkism which had developed deep roots in Central Asia under the guise of Pan-Islamism. Having been poisoned by Pan-Turkism for a considerable length of time, the Pan-Turksists had developed a special hatred for the peoples of the other races.

After WW1 and the fall of the Ottomans, the aim of Pan-Turkism was the creation of an Islamic empire ruled by caliphs. The Pan-Turksists wanted to create an independent and unified Turkic state that would encompass all the Turks from Russia's Tataristan to the border of Afghanistan and from Constantinople to the Wall of China and Eastern Turkistan.

As it was explained above, the pan-Turkist movement in Central Asia reached its zenith after 1917, when Turkish Prisoners of War, i.e., soldiers and officers who did not wish to return home, found a new home in Turkistan and Bukhara. Here they met with the jadids, who had Pan-Turkist leanings, and promoted Pan-Turkism. The number of officers and generals who after their defeat in the war, were afraid to return to Turkey because of the new government in Turkey was on the rise. For instance, the ex-Turkish Minister, General Kazimbek, accompanied the German delegation from Afghanistan to Central Asia. At the same time, along with the Pan-Turksists of India, Barakatulla and others also arrived. Other Turkish generals, Halim Pasha and Jamal Pasha came from Berlin. They were accompanied by Tatar Pan-Turksists and anti-revolutionary elements. The Tatar and Bashkird Pan-Turksists accompanied them to Central Asia.

With the Pan-Turksists of Central Asia, they fortified the social aspect of the anti-revolutionary movement in the rest of Central Asia. This was the reason the anti-Soviet efforts lasted longer in this region. They had organized a special anti-Soviet front complete with its Pan-Turkist motto: "All the Muslims and Turks Unite!" To reach their goal, they were trying to create a unified Turkish people (only the Tajiks were not included). The most dangerous and worrisome aspect of this movement was that, using all means available, it was penetrating the Soviet and Party organs of government in Central Asia.

On the eve of the national-administrative divisions, when the Basmachis and other major anti-revolutionary forces were defeated and, when the hopes, both inside and outside the Pan-Turksists, to create a Turkistan government in Central Asia by means of military force were dashed, they chose an alternate approach. Instead of Pan-Turkism, they installed a program of forcing the Tajiks to become Uzbeks. This shows, in essence, that Uzbekization and Pan-Turkism were the same.

The persuasion methods of the Uzbeks, after the national-administrative divisions appeared in the following forms:

\[127\] Ibd., JI. 27.
1) It was announced that in Uzbekistan there is room only for the Uzbek. Those who call themselves Tajik should go to Tajikistan.

2) Those who choose to stay in Uzbekistan must accept the official Uzbeki language. Therefore, the language of instruction was Uzbeki.

3) Research workers, especially teachers, who showed signs of nationalism, were released from their duty and placed in positions in which language did not play a role. This was done mostly in Samarqand, Bukhara, and Khujand.

4) When people were sent to Tajikistan on official business, a rumor was initiated that the person had been exiled to Tajikistan due to his affiliations or for his having identified himself as a Tajik."\(^{128}\)

All of this created the impression that Tajikistan had replaced the pre-Revolutionary Siberia. The Tajiks who came to Uzbekistan to work identified themselves as Uzbek. The 1926 census was taken under these circumstances and the process of forcing peoples' hand was, more often than not, carried out in the open.

If we study the data gathered before 1926, we find that the number of Tajiks in Samarqand was 59,901 in 1915. The 1917 census shows 47,758 Tajiks and 3,301 Uzbeks. This information is from a book of records published by the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, in 1926, about "The People of Samarqand."\(^{129}\)

According to the 1926 census, the population of Samarqand was 43,304 of which 10,716 were Tajik. Similar deviations were observed in the census taken for all the cities and districts where the Tajiks lived in 1926. The results of the 1926 census for Uzbekistan were quite the opposite of what they had been in the previous censuses. Hajibaev's report to the commission proved the degree of inaccuracy of that census. In the resolution of the commission, we read, "Therefore, the city of Samarqand and the Tajik-inhabited areas, more exactly, the village cluster of Andijan, Bagh-i Baland, Kauchinan-i Payan, Jum'abazar, Kushtan Ghali, Matrid Khumar, Khushruy, Khaja Ahrar, Akhalich, and some other places inhabited by the Tajiks should join Tajikistan as part of its Panjkent region."\(^{130}\)

The resolution also indicated that for the Uzbek-inhabited villages of this region, provisions should be made for an Uzbek Soviet to oversee their educational and economic needs.

At the same time, the Commission considered the fact that the inclusion of Samarqand into Tajikistan did not disturb the economic situation. After all, before the national-administrative divisions, the Panjkent district was a part of the Samarqand region. In fact, the inclusion of Samarqand would fortify the economic life of Panjkent. Besides, Samarqand is one of

\(^{128}\) Ibid.

\(^{129}\) Ibid., Л. 29.

\(^{130}\) ЦГА Таджикской ССР. Ф. 35, Оп. 2, Д. 199, Л. 29-30.
the cultural centers; Dushanbe can be an administrative center, but it cannot play the role of a cultural center for Tajikistan for a long-period of time. In addition to its role as a mainstay of the economy of the republic, Samarqand can become a major cultural center for the republic. For Tajikistan, it can play the same role that Tashkent plays for Central Asia as a whole.\textsuperscript{131}

It can be deduced from archival materials of the Commission about the separation of Tajikistan from Uzbekistan that the situation for the people of Bukhara, which became part of the Uzbek SSR in 1924, and for the city of Bukhara itself, was not satisfactory. About the intense influence of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in the People's Soviet of Bukhara before and after the revolution, the Committee wrote, "In Bukhara and its environs there live the Tajiks and people whose language is Tajiki (Persians and Arabs). In spite of this, until 1927, we did not have any Tajik schools. The 1926 census has registered the majority of the population as Uzbek, whereas the language of the Bukhara Revolution was Tajiki. Tajiki was the official language. Only after the 4th Kurultai of the Party we introduced a series of district rules which indicated the language of instruction should be Tajiki. Bukhara is known throughout the East as the city of the Tajiks; the language of the people as well as their literature and culture are Tajik. The fact that the 1926 census recognizes Bukhara as an Uzbek city and makes the language of instruction Uzbeki is a mere political mistake related to the nationality issue."\textsuperscript{132}

To prove that the process of forcing Tajiks of Bukhara to become Uzbeks went on, A. Muhiddinov produces a number of documents showing the composition of the people of Bukhara. In response to the Commission's question about the percentage of Bukharan Tajiks, he says that the question should be asked in reverse, i.e., what percentage is Uzbek? That is to say if, for instance, we assume that old Bukhara has a population of tens of thousands, from among them 15-20 individuals are Uzbek. The percentage then can be calculated from that."\textsuperscript{133}

Tajikistan's request regarding Uzbekistan's returning the district of Surkhan Dariya, especially the regions of Sar-i Asiya, Baisun, Pusht-i Hissar, and part of Dihnau was fully supported by Makiv and the Tajik delegation. For the Tajik claims against Uzbekistan to be proven and the groundless claims of the Uzbek representative, Imamov, stating that that region, especially Baisun, cannot join Tajikistan, the Commission asked the Uzbek representative to avail himself of a study of the Uzbek materials (version 1-1926), presented to the 5th Central Executive Committee of Uzbekistan SSR and the census for Uzbekistan SSR and the ASSRT place list (version 8, published by Central Bureau of Statistics of Uzbekistan

\textsuperscript{131} ЦГА Таджикской ССР. Ф. 35, Оп. 2, Д. 199, Л. 32.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
A comparison of these materials and the 1926 materials shows a great deal of discrepancy.

On the obverse, regarding the regional divisions (page 154), the following is written about the Baisun region, "The population of the region is 42,856 (with 7,723 in villages). From these, 3,598 are in the cities of Baisun and Darband, which form 98% of the region. This is equal to 12 individuals in every square verst. The national composition is 57.8% Tajik and 42.2% Uzbek."

According to the results of the 1926 census, the demographic composition of the Baisun region is very different. It is as if the inhabitants of the Tajik villages of the region, and Baisun itself, have become Uzbek. While the materials presented to the Commission indicate that the regions of Durban, Duab, Pasurkhi, Sairab, Tashpulad, Urtu, Magai, Khaos, Shurab, and Baisun were populated by Tajik-speaking people. In addition, even in the regions where Uzbeks predominated, there were other nationalities, including Tajiks. The trade centers and the markets were in the Tajik districts. In terms of percentage, too, the number of Tajiks in Baisun and environs was 66% of the total population.

It is stated in the same materials that, "We see the same situation in the Sar-i Asiya region. Out of the twenty-one local soviets, twelve are Tajik soviets: Tashtabai, Duab, Kund-i Juvaiz, Kshtut, Nilu, Tuichi, Khandiz, Khufar, Kharvart, Shahurd, Uzun, and Main. In addition, our statistics indicate that of the total, Tajiks are 70% of the population. There is no doubt that the 1926 census is fallacious.

From an economic point of view, not only the Surkhan Dariya region, but some of the other regions of Bukhara had close economic relations with the Hissar Valley, which is populated by the Tajiks. And even after the building of the Termez-Dushanbe railway, compared to Uzbekistan, the national composition is still more Tajik. Furthermore, there is a special affinity to Tajikistan that is visible even at the present time, because the majority of the population of the region is Tajik.

In order for the Uzbek representatives to believe the well-documented assertions of the Tajik Commission, they were told to travel in the region and assess the situation for themselves (even though they were aware of their wrongdoing without actually traveling there—R.M.). The Tajik representatives, with their incontrovertible evidence, rejected the 1926 census completely. The Uzbeks then rejected all the data that, prior to the 1926 census, they themselves had provided to the Center about the composition of the area to be returned to the Tajiks without giving any reason for their rejection. And they persisted that the results of the 1926 census be accepted. In short, they were adamantly opposed to giving the territory to the Tajiks. Besides, they claimed that even though the lan-

---

134 A Russian linear measure equal to 0.663 miles or 1.067 kilometers (ed.).
135 ЦГА Таджикской ССР. Ф. 35, Оп. 2, Д. 199, Л. 33.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
guage of the inhabitants of Samarqand and Bukhara is Tajiki, the people themselves are racially Uzbek."\(^\text{138}\)

After listening to these ridiculous remarks, the Head of the Commission said, "If the Uzbek representatives had examined the literature that is published on the subject in Russian, English, Chinese, Arabic, and other languages, they would know that throughout their history in Central Asia, the Turks have not been city dwellers but that they have ruled over the cities.

Regarding the people who, until the national-administrative divisions were known as *Sarts*, and who are referred to today as Uzbeks, there is also considerable literature. They are a mixture of Tajiks and Turks who live in Tashkent, some in Khiva, and the rest in Ferghana.

If the government of Tajikistan had tried to define nationality not in terms of language, in the way that the Uzbeks are doing, but rather on the basis of culture, that would have been against the Soviet way. Similarly, if the Uzbek representative tried to prove that the inhabitants of Samarqand and Bukhara are Uzbek, he would be undertaking a difficult task. But it is easy to prove that the Uzbeks are Tajik *Sarts*. For this, it is incumbent upon the Uzbek representative to read *Iran*, published by the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, *The History of the Civilization of Turkistan* by V. V. Barthold, and *Tajikistan*, a collection of articles published in 1925. He then would believe in the veracity of my statement."\(^\text{139}\)

But the Tajik demands regarding the inclusion of Surkhan Dariya into Tajikistan SSR, in 1929, i.e., on the eve of the establishment of the republic, were not met satisfactorily. Discussion of the issue continued after the final decision on the boundaries of Tajikistan SSR.

In 1930, the Commission appointed by the Director of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union relegated the assessment of the influence of the Tajik-Uzbek border to the Central Executive Committee of Tajikistan SSR, in consultation with the high-level organs of the central government. The problem was to be discussed in the meeting of the Head of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union on January 23, 1930. But the Uzbek government requested that the discussion be postponed until February 3, 1930. The request was accepted. At that time the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union informed both parties that a definitive resolution on the issue will be reached on February 3, 1930. When on February 3, 1930, the dispute between Tajikistan SSR and Uzbekistan was discussed, the following resolution was made:

1) That Tajikistan's request for inclusion of Samarqand and Bukhara in its territory is denied;

2) The Surkhan Dariya district along with its present territorial holdings should be separated from Uzbekistan SSR and given to

\(^{138}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{139}\text{ЦГА Таджикской ССР. Ф. 35, Оп. 2, Д. 199, Л. 34-35.}\)
Tajikistan SSR. This act should be carried out within two months.\textsuperscript{140}

In the sixth point of this resolution it was stated that the Committee empowered by the Head of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union should complete its work and disband. The task of the Committee should be considered completed on November 26, 1926.\textsuperscript{141}

Ten days later, on February 13, 1930, the meeting of the Head of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union was held to listen to the request of the Central Executive Committee of Uzbekistan SSR regarding the review of the February 3, 1930 decision in favor of Tajikistan on the question of the Surkhan Dariya rural district. This meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR resolved that, "the transfer of the Surkhan Dariya region to Tajikistan should be stopped." The reasons for the nullification of the February 3, 1930 resolutions do not appear in the minutes of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union. Perhaps the reason was the necessity of Uzbekistan SSR's having a border with foreign lands. This was one of the main points in the formation of the Union republics. The only place that could provide Uzbekistan with a foreign neighbor was the city of Termez in the Surkhan Dariya rural district. We cannot find any other reason. With this, the territorial dispute between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan at the governmental level, came to an end. In 1929, the regions to the north of present-day Tajikistan were added. The other cities and regions of the Tajiks remained in Uzbekistan SSR.

Undoubtedly, the repressive acts of the 1930's affected the territorial demands among the republics adversely. This is the time when the highly visible Tajik politicians—Nusratulla Makhsum, Abdulqadir Muhiddinov, Abdurrahim Hajiibaev, Shirinsha Shatimur, and others, i.e., those who had opposed the national-administrative divisions of 1924, were murdered.

The resolution of the national problems through a show of force not only resulted in the separate people being deprived of their rights, but it also created the very calamity with which the present generation is afflicted.

Today, they say that the past mistakes regarding the national and territorial issues must be resolved in discussion sessions; and, with the same breath they add, "Changing the boundaries at the present is tantamount to skinning a republic alive." Neither is anyone willing to say what boundaries are being discussed. No one wants to face the fact that it is impossible to destroy territorial integrity without creating conflict and bloodshed. Life forces us to restore the territorial integrity that due to carelessness and recent border changes has been destroyed. Can we easily transplant parts

\textsuperscript{140} Centralnyi gosudarstvenyi arkhiv Oktiabrskoi revolutsii SSSR (Central Governmental Archives of the October Revolution in the USSR, (hence ЦГАОР). Ф. 3316, Оп. 13, Д. 120. part 2, Л. 113-114.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
of one body to another? Even if such a person finds hands and feet and becomes happy, is not his life still threatened by gangrene?

Thus is the real bitter history of the Tajik people in recent times. Before long, the ominous consequences of this history will emerge and we will observe the shortcomings of the system. We will see that the individual cannot find a piece of land to feed himself, build himself a house in which to live, that the individual cannot move to industry and make progress. Russia and the Russian people remain Tajikistan's only hope for today and tomorrow.

**Summary**

In our multi-national country, the relationship among the peoples has played, and will continue to play, a major role. Indeed, these relations which affect the political, socio-economic, and cultural aspects of our lives can become stumbling blocks in the way of our progress as much as they can become its prime movers.

Although the plans on which the new national relations were established during the socialist era were essentially sound, they were adversely affected by the negative processes prevalent in our society at the various stages of its development. For this reason, it is necessary to analyze the socialist era today and identify the causes of the negative impact on nationality relations. This would assist us in understanding the sources and modes of development, recognize our past mistakes, and evaluate our gains and losses. Until we understand the dynamics of our past actions, it will be impossible to understand our current position.

The Tajiks, the founders of the Samanid superpower of the 9th and 10th centuries, were denied self-government for the next nine centuries. They were included as "people" in various power structures. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, we find them partially incorporated in the general governorship of Russian Turkistan and, partly, in the Emirate of Bukhara. Still another part was incorporated in the kingdom of Afghanistan. The fragmentation of the Tajik people (as was the case with the other peoples of Central Asia) threatened their very historical identity.

In this context, the 1924 national-administrative divisions of Central Asia along ethnic and nationality lines were of world-wide historical significance. The very idea of allocating rulership on the basis of ethnic and national identity was a progressive idea. But today, as we evaluate the development of those progressive ideas, we have to confess that they met
with deviations, disinformation, and sabotage—they were diverted from their original track. Indeed, the careless and hasty national-administrative divisions threw the Tajiks to the farthest corners of the Kuhistan region of Central Asia and deprived them of their historical and cultural centers.

The decisions that affected Tajikistan, from the early days of the Soviet government, both in Turkistan and in the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara, under the guise of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism were guided by a chauvinistic attitude. Local and party leaders openly supported Pan-Islamist and Pan-Turkist moves against the Tajiks. A group of national-secessionists even promoted the idea of a unified "Turkish" people in Turkistan and demanded the creation of a "Turkish" government and a "Turkish" Communist Party. As a result, many of the documents of the time are "silent" about the existence of the Tajiks, even though numerically the Tajiks were the second largest ethnic group in Central Asia.

The Pan-Turkists were especially critical of the Tajik language which they considered to be out-moded, dead, and a relic of the court systems of the past. They implied that the Tajiks should distance themselves from their past and become Uzbeks. The roots of this discriminatory policy against the Tajiks and the Tajiki language and culture rested deep in the higher organs of the Soviet government.

Of course, the original national principle outlined by Lenin required the achievement of autonomy through a free, public, and knowledgeable self-determination process, i.e., through voting. But this principle was ignored entirely when it came to the division of the land and the peoples of Central Asia. In addition, the commission threatened some communists with dismissal from the Party if they failed to cooperate in getting their planned allocations through. In short, this process placed the right to decide the fate of the peoples of the region in the hands of a group of ten.

The meetings of the national-administrative divisions led by the Pan-Turkist elements were centered entirely on the creation of an autonomous Tajikistan. Only at the very end it was revealed that the strategy had changed to the creation of an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Thus, in 1924, the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan was established, even though, before 1924, the progressive representatives of the Tajik people had proved, without a doubt, that from the point of view of population and territorial unity Tajikistan deserved to be an independent Soviet republic.

The inclusion, for five years, of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan incurred great losses to the economic and cultural progress of the Tajik nation. The Soviet Union as a whole generously aided Tajikistan as one of its backward regions, but little or none of that aid reached the Tajiks. Infringing upon the rights of the Tajiks—now an appendix to Uzbekistan—the Uzbeks used the Central funds as they saw fit for their own purposes. In other words, rather than spending the money for the purpose that the
Center had allocated it, i.e., Tajikistan, it was used by Uzbekistan to develop its own backward regions.

Furthermore, as a result of the same divisions, the most ancient centers of the Tajiks, the cities of Samarqand, Bukhara, and Khujand were made integral parts of Uzbekistan. The national-administrative divisions, in other words, increased the civilizational status of Uzbekistan at the expense of the economic and cultural well-being of Tajikistan.

In 1929, as a result of the expressed demands of the people of Ferghan, the north was included among the territories allocated to the Tajiks. This addition then allowed the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan to become the Independent Republic of Tajikistan.

We believe that this long delay in the creation of the independent Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan was not called for. We further believe that those who promoted the chauvinistic "Great Uzbek" attitude and those who purposefully misinterpreted Lenin's words on the subject of the creation of the nationalities were responsible for this.

Pan-Turkism, with its coercive activities to assimilate the ethnic groups, especially the Tajiks, into a Turkic nation continued even during the time that the Tajiks had their own independent state.

After the establishment of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan within Uzbekistan SSR, the Tajiks were forced to identify themselves as Uzbeks in their passports. Hundreds of letters complaining about socialist and communist members' infringements on the rights of the people and about injustices concerning the choice of national identity remained dormant in the archives. Social injustice and national disinformation are inseparable. The best example of this is the era of stagnation which, in Uzbekistan, is referred to as the "Sharaf Rashidovich Era." It was at this particular time that the activities of the Pan-Turkists were revived and the process of the Uzbekization of the Tajiks reached new heights.

The 1980's efforts, which originally were devised to revive Pan-Turkism, failed to justify the activities of the Pan-Turkists. There were, of course, some progressive strands in their efforts but, in general, these efforts served more to condemn Pan-Turkism than to either revive it or justify it. A number of authors are trying independently to incorporate the realities of our time—instruction of national history, creation of new national groups, bringing together peoples who share the same language—into a Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist ideal and use that as the basis for the unification of the peoples of the region.

Until recently, especially during the stagnation period, our nation, including Tajikistan, was reported to have experienced a series of victories in the areas of national and international relations. Of course, it is undeniable that the Tajik people, which was pulled out of feudalism and placed on the road to socialist progress, has achieved a high degree of victory. But research and thorough scientific analysis and investigations during this era of reconstruction have taught us to look at the processes of
disinformation and our other shortcomings from a different perspective. During the years prior to the Second World War many important and substantial economic changes took place in Tajikistan. The Russians and the other brother nations' peoples contributed to the connection of the capital of the newly formed republic—Dushanbe—to the trunk line of the Soviet railroads. And the foundation for textile factories and other modern plants were put in place. In reality, the Vakhsh irrigation system became the cause of friendship of our people as, together, we changed the dead Vakhsh lands into the blooming fields they are today.

But, in spite of the rapid progress of the nation as a whole in economic and cultural developments, in 1940, Tajikistan was treated as a source of raw materials by the western and central parts of the country. And even though, after World War II Tajikistan became an agro-industrial zone, the distance between it and the nation was in no way reduced; in fact, there was an increase. National statistics dealing with population, population increase, provision of medical facilities, pre-school educational establishments, and other factors place Tajikistan, if not at the very bottom of the list of the republics, definitely at the second to the last position.

The lack of uniformity in the field of economics and the lack of homogeneity in the structure of other fields are all in evidence because the formation of the peoples administration had been completed before the war. Tajikistan made great contributions to the independence of the Soviet Union in cotton production. At the same time, making the raising of cotton the mainstay of agriculture and succumbing to the dictates of monoculture instead of diversified use of land resulted in overuse and the subsequent deterioration of the fields. Rather than developing the economy as a complex system, to gain extra labor points, they developed it along the most simple line. Today, more than 90% of the products resulting from cotton are produced outside the republic. This has been and will continue to be a great loss to the republic.

The republic's socio-economic growth rate is low and is likely to reach even lower. The reason for this decline, which is now visible in all aspects of society, is the republic's demography compared to the general demography of the nation as a whole, in Tajikistan, the number of city dwellers is the least: 35% while that of the villagers is the most: 65% (this number for the country as a whole is 38%).

Before the war, during the building of the socialist state, while the national cadres were being trained for manning the factories and plants, in Tajikistan, the local cadres were being trained for construction, roads, light industry, and food processing. Workers for such essential fields, as heavy industry were invited into the republic from the other republics. This affected the professionalism and the expertise of the Tajik workers in a very negative way.

In the administration of Tajikistan, the rate of the skill of the local workers and the white-collar workers, i.e., Uzbeks and Tajiks, corresponded to the rate of the population. In 1987, in the administration of
Tajikistan, the number of workers and white-collar workers was 856.30 thousand. But if we were to analyze this number according to fields, the situation would be very different. The workers from among the original inhabitants would occupy about half of the industrial jobs (until 1977) or about 48.1%; but in glassware production 65.2%, in food production 63.3%; in light industry 51.1%. In fields that are technologically oriented and fields which require exact skills, the rates are much lower than the republic average: in chemical industry the Uzbeks and Tajiks constitute 20.2%; in machine building and metallurgy 28.1%; and in mining 38.9%.

In the process of the building of the socialist state, the Tajiks suffered enormously in terms of losing their intellectuals and being distanced from their rich heritage. This is not to mention the Tajik brain drain that satisfies Uzbek needs. The public repressions that occurred during the late 1920's and early 1930's virtually eliminated the Tajik gene-pools that had come into existence as a result of efforts during the years before and immediately after the Revolution. The years of the great changes and serious deformations affected not only the social and economic aspects, but the very soul of the republic. All mosques were closed. Those who closed them did not even consider that some of those mosques were relics of the past. Many mosques were summarily destroyed.

While this expansive assault on the religion was taking its toll, in order to change the Uzbeks' and the Tajiks' Arabic script in which the Qur'an is written into Latin, they denounced it as an indicator of worship of God. Individuals who owned books in the Arabic script were put in prison or otherwise punished. Thousands, even tens of thousands of manuscripts and lithographs on literature, science, philosophy, law, physics, chemistry, mathematics, and technological works in general were destroyed, depriving present and future generations of their benefit. The learned men, carriers of the heritage of their people, were singled out as "Arabists" and placed in concentration camps. Due to their advanced age, they never left those camps. Those acts liquidated the spiritual base on which the Tajiks today could draw to sustain their culture. Those who had even the slightest potential of transferring the past heritage to the new generations were physically eliminated.

During the years of public repression (latter part of the 1930's), where infringing upon the rights and privileges of individuals was the rule, many of the scientific workers of Tajikistan were singled out as "bourgeois nationalists" and were eliminated for "gravitating towards nationalism." Their crime on the national scene was that they had exposed Pan-Turkist policies and had intended to restore the rights of the Tajiks to their ancient heritage.

Often in relation to the ancient heritage of this or that people there were some excesses. The causes of that were often either "seeking supremacy and pride" or carrying the banner of the so-called pseudo-internationalism. In either case, the outcome was clear: robbing people of their national treasures, pride, and rights. The efforts of some representa-
tives in "presenting their nation as older and culturally richer" at the expense of their neighbors have now become a common phenomenon. At times, during the celebrations honoring Ibn-i Sina, Biruni, Khwarazmi, Nizami, Farabi, and others heated discussions took place among the Central Asians. D. Kunaev, Sh. Rashidov, and their "scientific consultants" tried to turn these celebrations into nationality conflicts among the peoples of the region.

We recall, for instance, that during the celebration of the 1000th anniversary of Abu Ali Ibn-i Sina, the distinguished son of the Tajik people, many efforts were made to cast doubt as to his Tajik identity. The discussions became so heated that it was expressly suggested that the attribute "distinguished son of the Tajik people" be replaced with "Central Asian scientist." And it so happened that the Tajiks accepted the statement of R. N. Nishanov, on the eve of the 19th Party Conference to the reporter from Izvestia about the current misconceptions: "If we speak about respect to our brothers in our multi-national country, then why did we consider Ibn-i Sina one of our own, while we know that, in reality he is a Tajik sage. We consider him ours, because he belongs to our brothers; in that case, does he not belong to us"142

Unfortunately, this policy of casting doubt about our nation's identity still continues. The best evidence of this is the identification of greats like Samarqandi, Bukharai, Termezi, and others, who rather than being identified by their nationality are being identified by the territory in which they were born. The identity thus created, of course, must be subjected to the fluctuations in the governmental and administrative dynamics of the intervening eras.

A process is thus on the way that promotes the concept that under the rules of internationalism, the learned men of Central Asia, rather than to a particular people, belong to all the peoples of the region.

If, at the present, it is not possible to solve the problems related to national territories, a time must be set at which all the people who live outside their recognized territory can gather, enhance their languages, enjoy their traditions, and participate in the organs of their government. It is recommended that the experience of the formation of the national and cultural festivals at the local centers, where there are concentrations of extra-territorial populations, be continued.

In Tajikistan, all the necessary conditions for a successful development of the languages and cultures of the Uzbeks, Kyrgyzes, Turkmens, and other nationalities living in the republic have been provided and will continue to be provided. To this end, a great deal of effort is being expended on the formation of national territories and local and village soviets in places where such populations are in a majority.

We hope that the administrators of Uzbekistan will follow a similar policy vis-à-vis the over 900,000 (according to Uzbekistan's own peren-

142 Izvestia, April 22, 1988.
nially incorrect statistics) descendants of Samarcandi and Bukhari citizens whose children had been registered as Uzbek by force. It is high time that those who were registered Uzbek by force be informed about the historical background of their changed ethnicity. They should be allowed to present their documents and choose their desired affiliation without being persecuted by the census officials.

By being sensitive to the needs of the local people and by casting a hard look at the national interests, we can prevent local conflicts among them and solidify their bonds of friendship.

To sum up: We believe that when the ideal expressed in class struggle was put into practice, it resulted in the death of millions of living souls. Put differently, often under the guise of "justice," genocide was committed on a grand scale. We first encounter this kind of treatment when we analyze the civil war in the region. The merciless system of hostage taking during the era of the Red Terror, at the time of the establishment of Soviet rule in Central Asia, resulted in the massacre of the local population which was conveniently singled out as Basmachi. The Red Army summarily killed the inhabitants of whatever village in which the opposition forces stayed. This kind of barbaric policy brings into focus not only the relationship between the local inhabitants and the Soviet government but also between the people and their local representatives. Even today, this attitude is a major factor in the disturbances across ethnic boundaries. The difference is that today, in order to liquidate local resistance, the government is likely to use military force. We have witnessed examples of this in Alma-Ata, Dushanbe, Baku, Yerevan, Vilnius, and Rega. It is for this very reason that it makes sense to form local or national armies in some republics, even though such forces are likely to aggravate rather than calm the situation.

But by far the most dangerous reason for the initiation of conflicts among the peoples is the national-administrative divisions imposed by the Center, divisions that included losses for almost all the peoples of the USSR. The peoples' problem began with Moscow's demarcation lines which opted for a political solution rather than persist in a search for meaningful boundaries.

It is significant to mention that the adverse aspects of the relations between the Center and the independent republics affected the autonomous republics as well. Unfortunately, the fear of the conservative politicians of the Bolshevik Party (mostly killed during the years of the great terror of the 1930's). About the emergence of "little chauvinism" against the local people but at the national level was realized.

There are many examples: the conflicts among the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabagh, Georgians and the Abkhasians in Abkhazistan, and the Georgians and Ossetians in southern Ossetia. As we know, these petty conflicts turned into bloody wars among the contending peoples. The bloodshed continues in Trans-Caucasia and hundreds are killed. The roots of these calamities are buried in the obstinacy of the
Center which, at the time of the demarcation of the boundaries and the installation of the governmental structure for these areas ignored the historical, national, religious, and cultural dynamics of the regions and their peoples. For instance, Nagorno-Karabagh was given to Armenia in 1920; it was taken away in 1923 and returned to Azerbaijan. While making these decisions, the people of Nagorno-Karabagh were not consulted. It was during those years that, planned or otherwise, the seeds of conflict between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis were sown.

As for Abkhazia, its status as a governmental unit was diminished by the Center. This, of course, affected Abkhazia’s independence adversely. In the beginning a Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia was formed and, along with the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia formed a federation. But later its independent Soviet status was replaced with autonomous.

The Ossetians were divided between two autonomous structures. In addition, even the autonomous parts were unequal (a Soviet Socialist Republic in Russia and an autonomous unit in Georgia). Efforts to elevate their government resulted in bloodshed, to the dissolution of the autonomy of Ossetia by the parliament of Georgia and, finally, to armed conflict between the Ossetians and the Georgians.

But the clearest example of this type of imposition of territorial demarcation by the Center is evidenced in Central Asia. If in the Caucasus the governments were being assigned to separate peoples (no matter how limited), in Central Asia the policy of "divide and conquer" was brought into full play.

By 1924, the national-administrative divisions of Central Asia were already completed, without public approval. Even the officials of the Central Committee of the Communist party (Bolshevik) were selected from among those sympathetic to the cause of the Pan-Turkists. The Pan-Turkist ideas passed easily from theory to practice. This discriminatory process was used against the Tajiks whose very identity was questioned by the Pan-Turkists. When the Pan-Turkists realized that they could not "silence" the oldest nation of Central Asia, they decided to give the Tajiks the most useless lands in the mountainous region, depriving them of their centers of economy, culture, and history. It is especially noteworthy, that to implement the directives, the Center openly condoned the falsification of the 1920 and 1926 censuses. This fact is proven by comparing the census taken in Tajikistan in 1897 and again in 1920.143

The level of discrimination against the Tajiki language by the Uzbek chauvinists reached a stage where, in the 1920's and 1930's, they fined those who spoke in Tajiki. Thousands of Tajiks were forced, by governmental direction, to enter Uzbek for their ethnic affiliation in their passports. All the public institutions of higher learning and cultural centers of the Tajiks were closed. Without a doubt, these are some of the factors that create hostility between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks.

143 See, ЦГАОР. Ф. 1318, Оп. И, Д. 229, Л. 68-69.
For the time of the demarcation of the boundaries of the republics, the policy of "divide and conquer" was applied to all the peoples of the region. The whole world was disturbed by the meaningless war between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyzes on the question of Osh in Kyrgyzstan. If the assignment of authority to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had followed a sober policy, such calamities would not have resulted. Archival sources reveal in full that the territorial divisions of Central Asia were made controversial on purpose so that the region remains a hotbed of conflict and that its republics cannot provide security for their people without recourse to the Center. For decades, all the lands of Central Asia (including Kazakhstan) were closely supervised. Even today the region is pregnant with more inter-ethnic conflicts.

At the present, the following courses for resolving the crisis show themselves: 1) drastic change in the composition of the Union; 2) creation of a confederation; and 3) establishment of a dictatorship.

A more dangerous thing for democracy is a coming together of the Russian-speaking people of many republics and the defeated communist leaders. We have already discussed the struggle of the Russians in the context of the language law. I believe that this situation resulted from a number of misconceptions by the Russians. They consider themselves above the native people, they find learning the native languages beneath themselves, and they refuse to distance themselves from the Russian culture by adopting new ways. Instead, they want the people of the republics to adopt Russian ways and live according to the dictates of the Russian culture.

In conclusion, it should be stated that regardless of the turn that our republic might take, we must learn the historic truth about ourselves. All empires that are founded on repression fall, sooner or later.

A new era will dawn in the history of the people of Tajikistan when, on September 9, 1991, after the announcement of independence by the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, the republic of Tajikistan is inaugurated. History will tell what the future will bring.
Appendix

The State Central Archives of Tajikistan
Fund 35, List 2, Dossier 199
Makiv: Yesterday, Comrade Islamov and Comrade Hajibaev said some very intriguing things. Comrade Islamov expressed his claim on Kangi Badam. Based on that, Comrade Hajibaev expressed his claim on Khujand; even though Khujand has not been, and is not, in dispute. He is also asking for the Qurqanteppe region. Their minimum demands are that, at least, they should be granted autonomy. However, we observe that they are also demanding Syr Dariya, Samarqand, Bukhara and, later, Khujand. We must ask Hajibaev if they are prepared to give autonomy to Qurqanteppe, i.e., if they are ready to create unity by attaching Qurqanteppe directly to the center. After all, that region was a part of the Emirate of Bukhara for several centuries.

Bukhara is a controversial issue. Bukhara must be given to us. We talked about Rishtan and the separate rural districts and said because the actions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan are not to our benefit, at the present we don't have the right to ask for it. For this reason we give up Rishtan.

Here are our conclusions. I would like very much to discuss the question that was brought up yesterday, but could not be discussed because of time and insufficient material. Today, they have brought the materials. These materials will show where the Tajiks are a majority so that the Uzbek representative will cease his ridiculous remarks. We do not intend to toy with this commission. After considering the economic and political factors, we must determine the boundaries today.

With regard to the Qashqa Dariya rural district, the regional committee informed me that the number of Tajiks there is high. The committee also agreed that this region should be given to us. These are the demands that we outlined yesterday.

Islamov: I would like to draw your attention to an important issue. Here are the materials that pertain to this case and on which we intend to base our discussions of the national and political ramifications of the land dispute between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. These materials pertain to the 1926 census. This census is authentic, is recognized by the Union, and has been used to settle our land disputes with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It should not be slandered. It has been recognized by in the Central Bureau of Statistics and thus must be recognized by the administrators of Central Asia. According to our knowledge, based on a census taken by European students (not by Uzbeks), the number of Uzbeks in Qashqa Dariya is more than the number of Tajiks. I think we can consider this objectively. In addition, in Tajikistan, too, this census was taken under the supervision of Tajik officials, but it seems that one cannot argue with them. Having said
this, I request that these materials be taken into consideration so that we can move to the substantial issues.

Makiv: I should say that Surkhan Dariya is the substantial issue here. There is no misunderstanding about the other areas. We have already talked about Khujand. There is no need to repeat all that. The Uzbeks themselves have accepted the need for its being separated. Therefore, we will discuss the boundaries that we outlined yesterday, i.e., the river which shares a border with Tajikistan. Let us also include Termez.

Islamov: I request that the 1926 census, without being slandered, be used as the basis for the discussions.

Hajibaev: I shall prove that the 1926 census is fallacious. All the administrations of Central Asia, including the Uzbeks themselves, have refuted it.

Islamov: Regarding Khujand, of course, if we put politics aside, there is no way of reaching a solution based on the nationality question alone. Let us use the region as an example. There the Tajiks form 58.9% of the population (12,746 men and women). The Uzbeks are 40.3% (8,725 men and women). The economy of this region is totally related to that of Ferghana and no one can dispute that. A similar situation obtains in Isfara and Kan-i Badam as well. In general. ... in both regions the Tajiks are in the majority (in Isfara, the Tajiks are 87%, the Uzbeks 9.9%). In Kan-i Badam, in the villages, 39% are Uzbek, in the cities 71%. The irrigation center is now in Khujand. The irrigation route (the cotton fields of Khujand) and the Bish-Ariq route are joined only to that. This water administering unit, however, is located in Uzbekistan. The water administration is simpler this way. Were two independent republics to come into being, water distribution would become a complex issue.

All the economic problems will be solved in Quqand. Sometime ago there was talk about uniting Isfara, Kan-i Badam, and Ferghana. The question of the Khujand rural district is essentially resolved. There is no need to dwell on that any more.

Now let us speak about Nau. If the Commission thinks that it should be separated from Khujand, then its national composition must be ascertained. The population of Nau is Uzbek and we should ignore the economic factor.

The Qurqanteppe question. The census shows the population to be mostly Turks.

The national composition of Qurqanteppe is as follows: 54.9% Uzbek; 11.9% Turkmen; 1.4% Kazakh; and 15.6% Tajik. This is the same data that Hajibaev used except he said that the Tajik population was 45,000. This must be clarified, especially under the current circumstances. If correct data is presented, we will accept.

In the Kulab region, especially in the south, the population is Uzbek (45%). Are we allowed to separate it as a minor autonomous national unit? This is a small problem. The rest is quite clear.
Hajibaev: We request the following be added for the record: For the following reason, the rural district of Khujand should not be included in the Commission's discussions. According to the resolutions of both the Uzbek and Tajik Soviet administrations, the Khujand rural district is given to Tajikistan. Comrade Islamov did not have the right to bring this issue to the floor. Without the mandate of the Central Executive Committee of Uzbekistan, he has no right to raise the issue. What we heard was Comrade Islamov's personal protest, not that of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Islamov: I request that all Party regulations be observed with respect to the problems of Tajikistan. Personalities should not be made an issue. I have the right to demand a clear execution of the law; as the representative of the Republic of Uzbekistan, I request that this point be entered into the record.

Hajibaev: I state officially that both the Central Committee of Uzbekistan and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of Central Asia support my position. I also state, as a member of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan, that there has been no resolution on the Khujand rural district. For this reason, Comrade Islamov is not in a position to make any demands. I do not wish to respond to these protests. I want to say, however, that the Khujand district is to be divided; its economic products in Isfara, Kan-i Badam, and Shahi consist of orchards and its irrigation system is public. The Bish-Ariq region uses the water for only two months. Comrade Islamov says that the Khujand rural district is economically related to Ferghana as are Jalalabad and Uzgin. Yet the Soviet administration established Kyrgyzstan. I believe that his arguments cannot be used as a basis for discussion.

As far as I am concerned, the Khujand question is resolved. If the Central Committee of Uzbekistan so resolves, the Baisun region of Surkhan Dariya should be added. The population of Baisun is 35,253 of which 27,038 are Tajiks; and the population of Sar-i Asiya is 30,280 of which 18,555 are Tajiks. In Dihnau, the population is 51,861, with 32,710 Tajiks. Generally, Termez is a city of the Turkmens, Uzbeks, and Russians. We claim it, because it is the trade center for the majority of the Tajik people. But why do we, rather than the Uzbeks, want this Uzbek city? We demand it because it is the trade center of all the Tajik people.

In Termez, for instance, there is water transportation with navigation on the Panj and the Vakhsh. We have planned a Jelikul-Dushanbe highway. The government has allocated a great deal of money for the Termez-Dushanbe railroad. Next year the road from Qurqanteppe will be completed.

We should add that the Republic of Uzbekistan, in the guise of the Commissariat of the Peoples of Uzbekistan, did its best to postpone the building of the railroad, but we built it and now the Tajik workers are operating it. The road will reach Dushanbe by the first of September. The Samsana-Termez road is also finished.
In 1924, the government of Tajikistan used its own gold reserves to the tune of 500,000 sums for this purpose. The government of Uzbekistan still has not reimbursed that money. This proves that the government of Uzbekistan does not want Tajikistan to make progress.

In reality, Surkhan Dariya is a part of Eastern Bukhara. The Amir's summer quarters was in Dushanbe and, after the destruction of Gharategin, Surkhan Dariya became a real administrative unit. Officially, it was part of the Emirate of Bukhara, but economically, it was absolutely dependent of Ferghana. No one can dispute that.

In Isfara and Kan-i Badam, too, the number of the Tajiks is large (in Isfara there are 87% Tajik, 9.9 % Uzbeks; in Kan-i Badam region, the number of Uzbeks in the villages is 39%, in the cities, 71%.

With respect to the national policies of Uzbekistan and the Kurultai of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan, the Central Asian Bureau and the Commissariat of Economics reprimanded Uzbekistan for its treatment of the Tajiks. Uzbekistan did not provide the required means for the development of Tajikistan. Tajikistan remained as it was. We are raising the status of Tajikistan using our own energy.

I want to respond to the Qurqanteppe issue. According to the 1926 data, the inhabitants of this region are Uzbek. If we consult the 1926 record regarding Tajikistan, we will see that the Tajik population of Qurqanteppe is 1,275 and that the Uzbek population is 8,705.

But later (in 1927) the national composition is established: 18,000 Uzbeks and 5,000 Tajiks. It is obvious to the comrades that the Republic of Tajikistan, under the guidance of the Party, has accomplished a great deal. At the present, the national composition (without the emigrants) is as follows: 30,624 Tajiks and 2,000 Uzbeks. This is the number released by the Central Bureau of Statistics. There is no law above that law.

I say this again that in education, economics, and service the Uzbeks of Tajikistan, compared to the Tajiks themselves, are treated three times better. The Party Kurultai and two plenums of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee have regarded this act of Uzbekistan against the Tajiks a destruction of the policies of the Party.

At the same time, it should be stated that the separation of Tajikistan is not only a Union problem but an international one. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of the USSR intended to revolutionize the workers of the East by giving Tajikistan its independence. For this very reason Bukhara is a part of Tajikistan. Its separation is politically unwise. In addition, Termez is inhabited by the Turkmens and the Russians. Similarly, Baisun and Sar-i Asiya, too, should be given to Tajikistan.

Now I want to say a few words about the materials themselves. Everyone knows that the Republic of Bukhara was not the Republic of Uzbekistan. The Emirate of Bukhara was an Iranian government with its capital at Bukhara. There is a census here that was taken by the military-geography division. This census shows the population of Bukhara to be
Of that 2,100,000 are Tajik and 750,000 Uzbek. These materials are not published by the Tajik government. They are published by the military division of the city of Samarqand. There are other nationalities in Bukhara that speak Tajiki. We must discuss these materials with sincerity. There are military-topographical data. These are objective materials prepared by the general staff of Russia. It is necessary that these materials be taken into consideration and that this territory ... be recognized as our territory.

The second problem related to Bukhara is political. From ancient times, Bukhara has been recognized as a sacred city, a cultural center of the Iranian race. You can find literature on Bukhara in Bombay, London, and the West. That literature proves that this is our territory and must be returned to us.

Another problem relates to Samarqand. These materials are signed by Krasnov who died in Turkmenistan. He is not our representative. As a representative of the Central Bureau of Statistics he is very familiar with Central Asia. In fact, from this point of view, he is unique.

We consider the rural district of Samarqand to be an integral part of Tajikistan. It is possible to visualize it that way. Samarqand is only 70 kilometers from our border and, according to the 1920 census, its population is 143,000 with the following national composition: 39,700 Tajiks and 15,480 Uzbeks. A number of Khujand volosts are included in the Samarqand rural district. According to the data presented above, the Samarqand rural district should be ours. It belongs to us both from the national and the historical points of view. Consider Tamerlane's book, a copy of which is in London and another copy in Bombay. In his personal diary, Tamerlane (Teymur-i Lang—R.M.) writes that historically Samarqand is the city of the Tajiks; Samarqand is an integral part of the Tajik peoples' heritage. Confessing his wrong actions against the Tajiks, he tells his heirs that his mistakes should be corrected and that Samarqand should remain a Tajik city.

Comrade Islamov tries to prove that the Tajiks are not administrators and that the Uzbeks are doing a good job of administration for them. But this is far from the truth. We must say with all due respect that the Republic of Uzbekistan did nothing to help the Tajiks. We ourselves, the Tajiks, with the assistance of the Party and the Union of Soviets took a large step forward. We reestablished the administration that was destroyed by the Basmachis; the Republic of Uzbekistan did not assist us in this matter. All this is proof that the Republic of Tajikistan can rule itself and the new territories. These regions should be given to us. We shall find the cadres there and the Republic of Tajikistan will become strong economically and politically. Here they can protest and say that due to large distances, we will not be able to administer these territories. I will provide some examples. Kazakhstan goes all over Russia and Siberia to administer its territory. Are we less than them? Who wants to prove that
we will not be able to administer Samarqand and Bukhara? That is why we are persistent in our demand.

Islamov: He has outlined the problem for discussion. But why Samarqand and Bukhara? The discussion is about Surkhan Dariya. Why is Comrade Hajibaev rejecting these important data that have been already accepted. Compare the data with the original, i.e., with what the Tajiks are quarreling with us about. Our data, too, should be taken into account. The task was undertaken before the divisions. The data were compared and published by the Central Bureau of Statistics in 1925. They are clear. Hajibaev himself has signed them.

According to the 1926 census, Surkhan Dariya has a population of ... Of this 15645.71, 8 are Uzbek and 38340.18, 0 are Tajik. This shows that the majority of the population of Surkhan Dariya is Uzbek. The real Tajiks live in Kuhistan; in these regions only the Uzbeks live (this is clearly shown by the data). It is not possible to soil these data. Regarding this problem, Hajibaev has not proven any thing to the commission...

At the present, we are reconstructing 78% of the village administration. The five-year plan assists us and we are doing all this at a Union level, irrespective of Tajik or Uzbek. Uniting Surkhan Dariya with Tajikistan lacks both an economical and a national rationale. We express our protest vehemently and regard this to be our clear and proven right.

When discussing Samarqand and Bukhara yesterday, Comrade Hajibaev said that if Nau was turned over to them, they would not claim Kanti Badam and would give up Surkhan Dariya.

The Bukhara problem is solved and, furthermore, it is not a serious problem for me. Both the regional committee and I clearly see this problem.

The 1926 census is a public record. The materials are accepted by the Union officials and ... it is a head count, i.e., they come to your house and you say whether you are a Russian, Uzbek, or Tajik and you sign your statement. You are educated people and throughout the process you saw how you were identified.

Now I want to talk about my credentials. Please state that you consider yourself a representative. You and I were chosen very recently to represent the Party.

Hajibaev: The Central Committee Secretary said that you were not given such a directive.

Islamov: I am the responsible representative of the Republic of Uzbekistan. As it is, the Samarqand and Bukhara problem stands resolved.

As for the Kulab and Qurqanteppe regions; this problem, I believe, can be solved easily if official documents were produced. In that case we will not claim them.

---

144 The figures are missing from the original documents.
145 These are renditions of the actual figures in the archival documents.
About Nau, I should say that the Tajik representatives are exaggerating; they are putting too much emphasis on Nau and Khujand. Like the Isfara and Kan-i Badam problem, which were related to Quqand, this problem must be solved economically. At the present we call it an unresolved issue to be reviewed in the future. That's all I have to say.

Makiv (director): I believe that we have heard enough from both sides of the argument. Yesterday we looked briefly at the issue to give everyone a chance to think about it so that we could resolve it today.

It seems, however, that there is no political or economical solution for this problem in sight. Of course, our Tajik comrades spoke a great deal about the past, but not much was said about the present so that we could resolve the problem of changing Tajikistan into an independent republic quickly. For this reason, you, the members of the Party, should have evaluated this situation subjectively. As the trusted representatives of your peoples, you should not have allowed any of this. We have been mandated to find a definite solution by identifying common grounds and by taking all the documents presented into consideration. In general, the question of Tajikistan's separation is not a present-day question. The problem is complex; it needs a full year to investigate its technical aspects before any more discussions. On the other hand, given the documents at hand, the question is academic. In this regard, we have Party directives. ... Hajibaev is being greedy. There was no earlier discussion of this issue. I think the issue should come to a resolution today. Time is not waiting for us. People don't have time; they have other things to attend to. The technical aspect of this question could have been solved using our materials and thoughts.

But, in spite of all the data, it is very clear now that, this question must be solved by fiat. ... Comrade Islamov, you have not been given a directive to persist on every issue.

Here they speak about the history of the emergence of Bukhara. Of what use is history to us? What do we need Tamerlane for? We don't need these. We must pay attention to the dictates of life and the Party. Obviously, we need to form a technical committee. We need to put an economist on that Committee and solve the problem according to the 1926 data and what is in the minutes (stenograma). ... we are very far from the resolution of this problem. ...

Here are my final thoughts on this:

About Bukhara, comrades, it is not a problem that needs our attention. What good would Bukhara do for the Tajiks? I believe that Bukhara is the wrong thing for the Tajiks. Let us not spend our time on it.
The Chairman of the Committee for the
Study of Bukhara

We are sent by the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Bukhara to study and define the national composition of Bukhara. We have worked here for two months and will work here for one more month. What I have to say might be useful for the solution of your problem. Our study will be completed next month; we intend to hand all the data over to you at that time. Thus far we have made an incomplete study of Bukhara and are studying Ghijduvan and Parkand.

Comrade Islamov said, 'Under no condition will we give up Bukhara...' This is completely wrong. Why? Because the materials available to the commission. . . prove that the majority of the inhabitants of Bukhara, especially in the city of Bukhara and its village satellites, are Tajiks.

. . . The Party Committee of the Bukhara Rural District resolved that all instruction in the villages should be in Tajiki. When the student can understand the lesson, he also understands that he lives in a Tajik, rather than a Russian, village. No one knows Uzbeki there. Everyone speaks Tajiki and interacts with others in Tajiki. The child throws a rock and shouts in clear Tajiki language. Their life style and work habits indicate that they are Tajik.

Now we come to the question. . . of the political importance. . . of the materials at hand. Why is everybody pretending that Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism are not on the rise in Bukhara? Why is the Committee in charge of the division granting Bukhara to Uzbekistan? Are the people there all Uzbeks? Research indicates that the city and its surrounding villages are populated by Tajiks.

Makiv: My recommendation is that we meet here tomorrow and, using the materials presented, find a technical solution for this problem. The real issue at hand is the rural district of Surkhan Dariya.

Hajibaev: I don't think a technical committee can resolve this issue in one day especially when additional materials will not be available before July 30.

Islamov: I think this is provisionally acceptable. There is no reason to rush into the discussion. Rather, we should consider all the data in Uzbekistan and its museum. Furthermore, we shall present more objective materials in support of our case. It is necessary that we bring data from Samarqand and its museum. Here, most of the materials are gathered in a museum. When all these additional materials are collected, we shall begin the discussion.

Hajibaev: How about the 31st?

Makiv: 31st it is. Let the materials provided by the Tajik representative remain here with the committee. It is also necessary that the representatives of the republics be present at the meeting of the technical committee so that, later on, they do not question the outcome. It is neces-
sary that the 1926 census be accepted and used. The rest is, characteristi-
cally, temporary.

Hajibaev: I think that the Tajik representative is opposed to the use of the 1926 census, he bases his argument on the censuses taken between 1917 and the national-territorial divisions. We believe that no one has the right to reject the materials that were gathered before the boundary demarcation. These are all objective data, published by Zelinskii and sanctioned by the Central Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Tajikistan.

Makiv: Then, we will proceed as follows. The representatives of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan should come to an agreement with our economic expert as to the use of the materials.

Who is against the 31st for a meeting date?

None. It is accepted.
Meeting of the Tajikistan-Uzbekistan Boundary Commission

August 7, 1929

Makiv: Comrades, there are a number of necessary steps... that ... the Executive Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan has put aside... One such issue is the rural district of Khujand; it should be considered resolved.

Islamov: We have many secondary issues that need to be resolved in the course of the inclusion of Khujand into Tajikistan. These issues, however, will have to find their solution later. Otherwise, the resolution of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan, regarding Khujand, is at hand. Its discussion is postponed until a decision is reached on the small issues.

Makiv: What is the situation with the Khujand rural district?

Islamov: A definite resolution has been made regarding the giving of the Khujand rural district to Tajikistan. It is better to solve all the small problems in the context of the total separation of Tajikistan. Now let us see if we can agree that that is the right thing. We need to read Comrade Karp's report, become familiar with all the materials, study their logic and, based on that, give an opinion.

Hajibaev: We consider the problem of the Khujand rural district to be solved... In this we follow the Central Committee of Uzbekistan which considers it resolved without need for proof. This information is to be sent on the 12th of July to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union. We will enter this question only if the Central Committee of Uzbekistan makes certain changes. My assessment is that there is no reason to dwell on the Khujand rural district and that opposition within the Commission should not be heightened. I think it is impossible to reopen and reexamine this case.

Islamov: Comrade Makiv, I would like to say something regarding ... Comrade Hajibaev's statement. You heard that Comrade Hajibaev said that he is registered as an Uzbek. But we found that his identification card introduces him as a Tajik who also knows Russian and Uzbeki. This is demagoguery and antagonism.

Hajibaev: I am ready to respond to the identification issue. He is wrong. We corrected this form not only for me but for many others. I protest against the antagonistic arguments of Comrade Islamov. You have registered the city of Samarqand as an Uzbek city on purpose. This action testifies to your true intentions.

146 Certain language (represented by three dots here) is left out of the minutes of the meeting.
Makiv: If we begin to criticize each other and become involved in personal issues, we shall never be able to address the main issue. Where governmental issues are being discussed, personal issues must be put aside.

Islamov: I believe that we should resolve the problems according to the agenda. In as much as we asked Comrade Karp to study the problem, it is logical to read his report and make a decision on the basis of his assessment.

Makiv: We have much information about the Khujand rural district. The majority is Tajik. No one ... can add any new information to this. The only question about Khujand, therefore, is whether Nau should be separated. If this is the issue, then tell me straight: should it, or should it not be separated? But, don't change your decision now. Repeat what you said before.

Islamov: During the Khujand discussion we all agreed on separating it and adding it to Tajikistan. The Khujand rural district was controversial... Besides, Nau could have joined Tashkent with which it has economic affinity. The Tajiks have not asked for it either. Economically speaking, Nau is a separate district. At the present, Nau is added to Tashkent because of economic and irrigation-related concerns. All this, although small potatoes, is necessary for determining the boundary. There always remain small problems to be solved.

If Nau were located between Urateppe and Khujand, we could solve the problem by making it an independent district. Also we are not opposed to Nau's remaining in the Khujand rural district, if that is the correct solution.

Comrade Karp writes that, following our report, Kan-i Badam should receive satisfactory attention with regard to nationality. But he looks at the problem only from the nationality point of view. From the point of view of irrigation, he forms a party Commission. We have to assess the degree of usefulness of this. We must implement the same in the Nau situation; we must set the border in the Kan-i Badam region. This will bring the nationality issue to the fore and will point to a possible way of resolving the problem. We must make all the points clear and in agreement.

Makiv: This is how we tackle the problem. You are all communists. Let the people of these regions who are mostly Tajik solve the problem. They have asked for it; the majority has spoken.

Islamov: In Kan-i Badam, the Tajiks are 59% and the Uzbeks 39%. From the nationality point of view, therefore, we cannot say that the population is Tajik. Besides, if we consider the population of the city, the picture will be very different.

Makiv: Here is the data that I possess. In Kan-i Badam, the number of Tajiks is 93% and in Isfara 99%. If this does not worry the Uzbeks, why should it worry you? They must be allowed their right. Because it is theirs... we shall resolve the tendencies as we proceed. About Nau, how-
ever, I should add that it is somewhat different; because the population of Nau is Uzbek. For this reason, we shall postpone the Nau situation. But in places where the population is primarily Tajik, we shall consider the problem solved.

Islamov: Comrade Makiv. You must consider your own benefit regarding Kan-i Badam. In Kan-i Badam, you use the nationality criterion. Let's use that criterion for Nau as well. We intend to take economies, irrigation, and the other factors into consideration. The situation should be resolved in a way that areas where Tajiks dominate go to Tajikistan and areas where Uzbeks dominate go to Uzbekistan.

Makiv: In any event, I like to make this problem clear. In general, we have the resolution of the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee regarding the separation of Khujand and its annexation to Tajikistan. If we consider peoples' economic inclinations, then Kan-i Badam and Isfara tend to join Quqand. If we follow this and separate the Uzbeks and give them to Tashkent, then what remains of Khujand?

Hajibaev: Let Comrade Islamov respond to this. If Isfara and Kan-i Badam belonged to Quqand economically, why then were they given to Khujand? What was the reason? You recall that in 1924, when the committee of the Central Asia Bureau, headed by Comrades Rahimov and Faizullah Khojaev were passing through Quqand, all the people of Isfara and Kan-i Badam, over 60,000, gathered in the train station, stopped the train, and requested that they be taken away from Quqand because economically they did not belong to Quqand.

Marazov: This problem was resolved fully in 1924. At that time, it was necessary to form a Tajik rural district in Khujand. These two regions—Kan-i Badam and Isfara—were separated on the nationality criterion rather than economic interests. But the question of water came up here. The Party Commission can solve that problem.

Makiv: I want to clarify some of the technicalities related to the term "irrigation network." If for any reason, an irrigation network falls between two republics, usually either a Party Commission is formed in the networks, or the situation is treated as an international system to be administered by an office. This situation, in no way, has any bearing on our operation.

Hajibaev: I return to my earlier statement. We have the resolution of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan. The Central Committee of Uzbekistan has considered both the national and the economic aspects of the situation. Rather than reiterating this problem, we must implement the resolutions that have already been accepted. I, as the representative of the regional committee, must speak about the resolution of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan. The Khujand issue was solved a long time ago. It is our territory. What can be said about the water problem? There are many international systems. There are 20 international systems in Kyrgyzstan and Ferghana. Similar systems exist in Turkmenistan and
Tajikistan. They are found in Zarafshan and Surkhan Dariya as well. The question is why should we be probing an issue that we know sets off the nationality issue... Isfara and Kan-i Badam are simple, orchard districts. The population had asked in 1924 to be included in the Khujand rural district. They stopped the train... and revoked the Commission's resolution. This simply shows that the Central Committee of Uzbekistan acted correctly when it allowed Khujand to be included in Tajikistan. This, in fact, was a corrective measure by Uzbekistan.

Muhiddinov: At the time of the establishment of the Khujand rural district the representative of Tajikistan was not allowed to participate as a representative of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan. This rural district was created by the Party officials of Uzbekistan. At the time of the establishment of this district the officials of both the Party and Soviets looked at only the economic and political aspects... Besides, the inhabitants, too, were all Tajik. Now that the rural district is being separated, all these arrangements must be changed, i.e., the Party members of Uzbekistan based their decision on inadequate arguments. If, at that time, those were not sound reasons for the inclusion into Uzbekistan, today they are even less so. For this reason, I believe that it is necessary that Khujand, with its current boundaries, be included in Tajikistan.

Hajibaev: I have found the newspaper in which Comrade Akhunbabaev's statement is published (reads from the paper). What do you want, now? Are you going to go to the people and say you don't have rights when the people themselves want their rights?

Makiv: We must conclude the discussion of this issue. From the discussions, we can conclude that we must rely on the resolution of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan. We must separate the Khujand rural district and, along with its present boundaries, include it in Tajikistan.

Hajibaev: We accept the resolution of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan.

Makiv: We cannot accept that. We should only consider the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan.

Islamov: If that is the case, I shall hand in my protest in writing.

Makiv: We should write that we are satisfied with the resolution of the Commission and that we must be given the right to solve the problems of some of the regions. The other question that, according to the agenda, we must solve is the Tajiks' claim to Samarqand.

Hajibaev: We registered our claim as early as January 1, 1929. Yet... the Commission started its consideration with the claims of the Uzbek. I think the claims of the Tajiks, too, must be heard.

Makiv: Another problem is the Surkhan Dariya issue. According to the census, of course, the majority of the population of this area is Uzbek. But it is not necessary to relate the question to nationality here. Let us solve the problem using Islamov's suggested method. When all the
characteristics of this rural district are taken into account, especially its economic inclination, Termez is the real connection point. I suggest that the Surkhan Dariya River, along with the city of Termez, be turned over to Tajikistan. We have talked a great deal about the economy of this region; Comrade Karp's assessment, too, supports our previous thoughts. It proves that the economy of Termez was related to that of Dushanbe and that the situation has remained unchanged.

Islamov: I insist that this problem should be resolved in relation to interests. Comrade Karp, as usual, has based his study on historical data. That procedure is incorrect. The aim of the divisions is to de-emphasize the nationality factor. It is important to consider the present-day needs of the nation, rather than its history. Comrade Karp says that many different people have passed through Central Asia... We do not contest that. But of what use is this 500- or 1000-year history? Study of history is good, I grant that... But, I repeat, that history... cannot provide us with the type of knowledge that is necessary for the resolution of our current problems. The information provided by Comrade Nissar Muhammad is untested and, for this reason, should not be taken into consideration. We must accept the 1926 census which agrees with the 1920 Central Asian census. We must consider both this and the situation in the country to solve the problem.

Comrade Karp says that Termez is an educational center; but is it not separated from Tajikistan by high mountains? Besides, the railroad passes through Uzbekistan; Termez is the economic point of the other regions. Furthermore, the railroad is administered by the People's Commissariat of the Railroads, not the Tajiks.

Taking the following information into account:

- Sar-i Asiya: 60.8% Uzbek, 37.1% Tajik
- Baisun: 62.6% Uzbek, 37.7% Tajik
- Dihnau: 89.9% Uzbek, 92% Tajik
- Mirabad: 82.9% Uzbek, 6.6% Tajik
- Pusht-i Hissar: 50% Uzbek, 6.6% Tajik

we conclude that the Tajiks' claim is groundless and that Termez should remain in Uzbekistan.

Hajibaev: Here are our demands: Give us Dihnau, because, without a doubt, it belongs to us. Its Uzbek population is altogether 26%. In Sar-i Asiya, the Uzbeks are 31.8%. (These later materials, including the 1926 census, we think, should not be considered because they are fallacious.) The national composition of Sar-i Asiya is as follows: Uzbeks 31.1%, Tajiks 63.2%, Turks 3.4%, Arabs 0.4%, Turkmens 0.3%, and other 0.9%. Similarly the majority of the inhabitants of Sar-i Asiya are Tajiks (63.2%).

147 The number of the Tajiks is left out.
We also claim Baisun with the following national composition: Uzbeks 3.3%, Tajiks 67.6%, Kipchaks 3.1%.

Similarly, in Dihnau, the national composition is: Uzbeks 35.3%, Tajiks 54.2%, Turkmens/Mongols 8.3%, Arabs 1.6%, and other 0.6%. These materials show that the majority population of these regions is Tajik and that region 4 is, undoubtedly, Pusht-i Hissar. The Termez region is three to one Uzbek, while the number of Tajiks is not considerable. But since Pusht-i Hissar is the trading point of the Tajiks, we claim the region. In as much as Tajikistan's populated cities can remain in Uzbekistan, the Russian-populated Termez can be a part of Tajikistan.

From an economic point of view, Baisun, Sar-i Asiya, and Dihnau belong to Dushanbe. For this, and for their irrigation, they should be given to us. Now, I shall turn to the substance of the 1926 census. According to the 1926 census, the village of Pata-Shak is an Uzbek village. But, in reality, the inhabitants are Tajik. The village of Shum is also registered as Uzbek, but there, too, the population is actually Tajik. The same is true of the Babaighan village. This shows that, approximately 60% of the Tajiks are registered as Uzbek. In Samarqand, according to the 1926 census, there are 43,306 Uzbek villages (Khajagi) and 9,616 Tajik villages. At the same time, the 1915 census gives the Tajik population of Samarqand as 59,901, while the 1917 census gives only 3,301 (Tajiks—R.M.), proof that they have registered all the Tajiks as Uzbeks.

In Bukhara, too, they are all registered as Uzbek. Further proof that the 1926 census is completely wrong. We think that only the materials before the divisions make sense. If the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of the Soviet Union would use those materials as its base of discussion, the dispute between the Uzbeks and Tajiks could be resolved.

Makiv: You Uzbeks do not consider the fact that in order to create an independent Republic of Tajikistan, it is necessary to form an economic base for it. You must contribute to this by giving up Surkhan Dariya. Of course, if we consider the population count, again the Tajiks lose. But we must consider those economic aspects that would be beneficial to them.

Islamov: The data that Comrade Hajibaev uses is historical data. We don't need to consider that type of data when resolving this problem. But the 1926 data compares with the materials examined in the Economics Committee of Central Asia.

Example:

Baisun
Their record: 58.5% Uzbek, 41.5% Tajik
Our record: 62.2% Uzbek, 37% Tajik

We will make it clear here.

Sari-i Asiya
Their record: 67% Uzbek
Our record: 60.8% Uzbek

Here, too, we will make it clear.

Regarding Shirabad, 75.6% in our record and 60.8% in their record. There is a small mistake here. I don't understand the claims of the Tajik representative at all. Before, they were asking for a part of Dihnau, now they are asking for all of Dihnau. They are not consistent in their demands.

Shakirov: I work in Surkhan Dariya. It has been obvious for a while what parts will be included in Tajikistan. We believe that this problem will find both a Party and a political solution. For this reason, the Surkhan Dariya workers were patient. Therefore, I would like Comrades Makiv and Hajibaev explain to us how they are going to solve this problem. Politically?

I have been working in Surkhan Dariya for two years and I have not seen any document regarding Surkhan Dariya either in the materials related to Eastern Bukhara or since the divisions. It is necessary that the most recent materials be used.

Now, regarding the situation of Surkhan Dariya, how do you know that 19% of the population is Uzbek? In the Dihnau region, 33 of the village soviets are Uzbek, the rest are Tajik. It is necessary to pay attention to their baseless claim. Their numbers must be verified. In Dihnau the situation is not the way they explain it. Their numbers are low. At the present, I am the leader of 35 village soviets; only five are Tajik.

It is necessary that the problem be resolved politically.

The statement that economically Baisun leans towards the Tajiks is also baseless. The distance between Baisun and Dihnau is 90 versts. Baisun leans towards Guzar (40 versts).

In the environs of Dihnau, I have never observed any trade between the farmers and the Tajiks. This is incorrect and is idle talk.

Comrade Hajibaev speaks about Dihnau, Sar-i Asiya, Baisun, Pusht-i Hissar and, later, about the railroad. But what about Jarqurqan? This is a large region between Dihnau and Surkhan Dariya, located in Pusht-i Hissar. He does not discuss this region. Comrade Karp, too, is silent on this issue.

The Way They Deceive the Tajiks
While traveling in Bukhara, I saw something that I must write about. If I don't, my conscience will bother me for the rest of my life.

I was drinking tea in one of the teahouses when a group of high school students came in. When they saw the Voice of the Tajik newspaper in my hand, they were surprised that a Tajik newspaper should be published in Uzbekistan. Later when they read some of the items in it, they said to each other: "By reading this newspaper we know a lot more than we did, don't we?"

Because they spoke in Tajiki to each other, they were obviously Tajik. But to make sure, I asked them, "Are you Tajik or Uzbek?"

"We are Tajik and we don't know a word of Uzbeki," they said. "We have been studying in high school for a year, but still have not learned Uzbeki. For this reason, we don't understand most of the instruction. But our teachers, who have studied in Turkey, say that we are Uzbeks and that we should identify ourselves as Uzbeks, because this is the Republic of Uzbekistan."

After they learned from me that the teacher was biased and that in Samarqand, the capital of Uzbekistan, the Tajiks were instructed in their own language, that a Tajiki newspaper is published, and that according to Soviet law and the communist ideology, all people are entitled to speak in their own language and be instructed in it, they decided to write the Bukhara Education Office and request for a change of the curriculum from Uzbeki to Tajiki.

They said that 95% of the high school students were Tajik and only 5% were Uzbek. Now, we should be fair. These are children who have been born to Tajik parents, who speak to their parents, relatives, neighbors, and friends in Tajiki, and who do not know a word of Uzbeki. What law and what pedagogical institution would see them fit for receiving instruction in Uzbeki?

Why do teachers spread lies like this and threaten the Tajik students to learn Uzbeki?

I declare that Uzbeki for Tajik students is like French for Russian students. For proof of this I asked the students "What does the Uzbeki word "qash" mean?" They said that they didn't know. But when I pointed to my eye and asked the same. They said we call this abru (eyebrow) and mozhe (eyelid).

Why don't those who force the Tajiks to become Uzbek force the Russians, Armenians, Jews, and the other nationalities to become Uzbek? If the law says that the language of instruction is Uzbeki, why is this law enforced for the poor Tajiks only? Show me Russians, Armenians, Jews, or Poles who have been forced to call themselves Uzbek and who speak Uzbeki.

These Turkophiles want to capitalize on the ignorance of the Tajiks. But the Turkophiles should know that those days are over. The Tajiks are aware of their heritage and know their rights. Before long, the Tajiks of Bukhara, too, will wake up and demand their rights. Before long all the
Tajiks of Bukhara will raise their voice and say, "We are Tajiks and we should be instructed in Tajiki."

Those who promote Pan-Turkism should know that such crazy and unnatural acts will not help them reach their objective. They should know that a large nation of two million, which has lived in this land of the Turanians for three or four thousand years, a people that has thousands of volumes in literature, that has scholars, ancient relics, and art cannot be easily obliterated.

We hope that the soviets of Tajikistan and the Soviet of Minority Peoples will put an end to these unnatural acts.

*Voice of the Tajik*
No. 74, 1926

Rustic.

**Notice**

On October 20, 1926, in the village of Aq-Masjid of the Mahalla *volost*, there happened an incident about which I, Sa'di Maqsudzada, a teacher of Aq-Masjid school, made a report to the Director of the Soviet of National Minorities, Comrade Nissar Muhammad.

On October 20, 1926, the election of the members for Aq-Masjid, at the *volost* level took place. Before the meeting the secretary who is also the librarian, was asked to register the representatives. In the beginning, the majority identified themselves as Tajiks and the secretary registered them as such. Then a person by the name of Ataullaev came and saw that the majority have been registered as Tajiks. He asked the secretary, who was a Tatar, in Uzbeki, "Why are you registering them as Tajiks? There are no Tajiks in the Mahalla *volost*. They are all Uzbeks."

"But I am a Tajik," I protested. "How can I register myself as Uzbek?"

"Only you are Tajik. There are no other Tajiks," he answered.

Then it dawned on the people: "Didn't we say we should register ourselves as Tajiks? We were right."

Those who had identified themselves as Tajiks, became remorseful. After Ataullaev left, some of those who had been registered as Tajiks were registered again as Uzbeks. I asked the secretary, "Why do you register people who identify themselves as Tajik, Uzbek?" The secretary answered, "What can I do? It is an order."

The reality is that the entire population of Aq-Masjid and those representatives coming from the villages are Tajik. Ataullaev, too, is a member of the Party. He should know the Party regulations with regard to the nationality question.

Other than myself, there are witnesses to this incident. The fact of the population's being Tajik is as evident as the sun.
I report this so that, during Soviet times, the Tajiks' rights are not infringed upon.

(Sa'di Maqsudzada).

Please make sure that Ataullaev does not know the identity of the person providing this information. I am dead scared of him.

Witness, Nasim Salimi
27-10-1926

Another Incident

In this volost, opposite the school in which instruction started on October 1; because the students are Tajik, instruction is in Tajiki. However, one day, our neighbor, a doctor, came to the school and said, "This is Uzbekistan. Why are you teaching in Tajiki?" He created a scene and made everyone's life very difficult.

When I, myself, went to him for a check up, he asked my name and nationality, and put me down as an Uzbek, even though I had said I was Tajik. He told the children, "Do not study in Tajiki. This is Uzbekistan. Study in Uzbeki."

We thought that people were free to use their own language. We further thought that only instruction in the native tongue will speed up our attainment of socialism. But he accused us of dividing Uzbekistan into three parts. Then we asked him, "Why are you not studying in Uzbek? Why is your instruction in Russian?" He said, "We are temporary. We shall leave in the same manner that we came."

It would be nice if the doctor understood politics. Who needs such density?

Salim Maqsudzada
Witnesses: Nasim Salimi

Fiyoderov, doctor practitioner
27-10-1926
The Statement of the Inhabitants of the Village of Qamishi of the Qashqa Dariya Region, Received in Bukhara through the Communist Division of Iran

We would like to bring to your attention that we are the inhabitants of Qamishi, consisting of 300 villages (Khajagi), who speak in Perso-Tajiki. There are also 500 Arab villages that speak Perso-Tajiki. When the language of the Bukhara administration was Farsi, we were informed about all the actions of our government. After the Revolution, Uzbeki became the official language. We have no notion of the current events and the changes, because we have no access to newspapers, or publications in general. Before the establishment of the Republic of Uzbekistan no one tried to open a school for us or advance our level of education. We want to learn; but, against our will, they force us to learn Uzbeki. We are a community of Iranian and Arab people. We don't know Uzbeki and our children (to the last one) do not know Uzbeki. We are, therefore, requesting from the Communist Division of Iran to open Perso-Tajiki schools for us and see to it that we can read Perso-Tajiki newspapers; they intend to teach us Uzbeki and waste our time. Please save us from this and open a Perso-Tajiki school in our village and send a teacher. Help educate our people.

Three signatures.

These three are the signatures of the representatives who carry our statement so that you solve the problem and make us happy. All our people are farmers and shepherds and we are not benefiting from education. Hear our cry for help.

Thirty signatures (Versified: Committee on National Minorities)

We Must Continually Evaluate Ourselves

We Tajiks of Uzbekistan see that even though we have not made a lot of progress, we have made advances in some areas. For example, two years ago the Tajiks were not comfortable identifying themselves as Tajiks, but today they are proud of their nationality.

Even though we Tajiks are four times the population of Luxembourg, we do not have a newspaper of our own. At the present, we have two or three temporary publications, intermediary school, and art schools (with
500 students). We also have elementary schools, fifteen preparatory textbooks, teacher-training courses, autonomous rayons, branches of the Communist

The representatives of the farmers participate in regional affairs. Freed from inner anxieties, the government of the workers and farmers participate in the Party and the Soviet meetings and improve the process. At the same time, they also expand work opportunities for other people and, in the process, liberate the backward workers and farmers of the villages, regions, and towns.

But even if successful in some, we Tajiks still have shortcomings. For instance, in comparison to the several newspapers of the Uzbeks, we have only one, which is published every week or every ten days. For a time, it was not published at all. When it is published, it is crippled by national problems.

Let us discuss the state of the school during the academic year. Our newspaper keeps us informed about the school situation and its shortcomings. The situation at the teacher-training school is so bad that two students have died. I shall not repeat the atrocities inflicted upon the artists. All these have been covered by our newspaper.

Now we have to prepare for next year to avoid last year’s difficulties. One of the difficulties is that our teachers' college does not have a director. Our current teaching staff, too, is not willing to return to teaching.

Because they are Tajiks, most of our students cannot find jobs during the vacation. In order to find a job, some are forced to identify themselves as Uzbek, and speak in Uzbeki to the employer, in spite of their Tajik identity. In the elementary schools, because the national branches support the teaching of the national languages, the Tajik teachers are obliged to teach in Tajiki against the wishes of their superiors. For this reason, the leaders who come from the regional center, transfer the Tajik teachers away from the population centers. This has happened in many offices.

The Uzbek government has published two books for improving the education of Tajik farmers, but due to their high prices (three sums), no one can afford them. On the contrary, they have published 150 different books in Uzbeki for the farmers. At least 30 of these should have been published in Tajiki for the Tajiks of Uzbekistan. Unfortunately they, too, are ignored. Only the local courses, in spite of difficulties, continue.

Very often conflicts irrupt among the farmers of the independent regions. As for the responsible governmental employees, they neither attach importance to nor support the newspapers; they mill around aimlessly among the 3136 members of the juftgaran without filing any reports.

According to the program set forth by the National Executive Committee, the Tajiks should be served directly after the Uzbeks; but, whether they are treated fairly, i.e., whether they receive the paper or not is not known.

As for the sections, according to the advice of Comrade Lenin, they work night and day. Our ancestors have left us their motto: "one cannot
rise to the roof in one leap," and there is a truth in that. But experience shows that such treatment and obstruction are not perceived at high levels and that those levels cannot remedy the problems as the lower levels do. Again experience shows that people at the top always help their own nationals. Those who take care of the minority nationalities cannot do a good job, because they have to deal with a million (out of three million). In order for the shortcomings to be taken care of, an office that takes care of the affairs of minorities is needed.

The organization should be modeled on that of the Turkistan government when each nation had a branch dealing with its affairs. For instance, there was an Uzbek branch, a Kazakh branch (if I am not wrong, it was headed by Qasim Khaja), both responsible to the Central Executive Committee. These branches eliminated the shortcomings arising from nationality problems. These are the types of solutions that might help the Tajik workers and farmers make progress in their work.

_The Voice of Tajik_
No. 86
1926

**Information**

To the Head of the Soviet of National Minorities

I believe because the majority of our students are Tajik, our school is basically a Tajik school. Only 10% identify themselves as Uzbek. Even those do not know Uzbeki. Taking this fact into consideration, I wrote the People's Education Division for permission to carry out instruction in Tajiki. The Division did not reply. Not allowing such injustice to mar the lives of our students, I began instruction in Tajiki. For this we received 100 copies of the *Alifba*. But Comrade Abduljabbar Narziqulov, the Director of the Socialist Instruction Division of the People's Culture, protested. He threatened that if we distributed the *Alifba* and began instruction in Tajiki, he would have us arrested.

I shall provide you with information on all of this.
Director, School No. 3, Jalaliddinzada

The handwriting is verified against the original
(secretary)

From the Tajiki-speaking inhabitants of the village of Arghun,
N. Karmina

cc: Central Committee of the Party
National Minorities Division
Request

We, the farmers and the poor of Arghun have come to serve the Soviet government. We worked from 1920 to 1924 with sincerity. But from the end of 1924, we were regularly dismissed from work because we represented the national minorities. To whatever division we went, we were shunned.

In the Karmina region, Soviet officials do not pay any attention to us as representatives of national minorities and we are not represented in any of the Soviet structures. By not being informed of the elections, they have deprived us of our right to vote. We found out only today that Uzbekistan, at its center, has a division that deals with the problems of the minorities. We request from the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet of National Minorities to help us place our representatives in the Karmina organizations. Please add a good word for us to the Central government so that they pay attention to us.

Inhabitants of the Arghun Valleys
72 signatures

An article entitled: "The Way They Deceive the Tajiks" was published in No. 75 of Voice of the Tajik. Our comrade is right in emphasizing this fact and he is telling the truth.

Until the publication of that article, we thought that the people of Bukhara are Tajiks and that, according to the motto of the Communist Party, "every people uses its own language for instruction." But after the publication of this article...we understood that, unfortunately, until the present, these poor people have not had any schools. This is astonishing. If this is the case, then what is to be done to the motto of the Communist party? How can we force children who have spoken Tajiki from birth and who do not know Uzbeki to learn in Uzbeki?

I was involved in a language-related incident and I would like to talk about it. When I was in Bukhara, I came across some friends. ... As we talked, one of them saw two books at the side of a sleeping friend. He brought one of the books and suggested that someone read something in it. One of the four comrades took the book and began reading a story. But no matter how hard he tried, he could not read even one word. We didn't know whether he was trying to read poetry or prose. I asked what book it was and why he was reading like that. He responded that he is from Bukhara and everyone knows that the people of Bukhara do not know Uzbeki. He put that book away and took the other one. When he opened that book, he smiled. I asked what wonderful thing was in the book that made him smile. He said, "You criticized my incorrect reading. Now see how I read Sa'id Shirazi's book, i.e., a Persian book." He then read...clearly and without a mistake. This proves that they did not know
Uzbeki. We have to open our eyes and execute the decrees of the Communist Party. Even if they learn Uzbeki and read the newspapers, would they also learn Uzbek culture? We must implement the motto of the Communist Party so that instruction in the schools is in the native tongue...so that poor Tajiks learn their culture and become knowledgeable about the decrees and laws of the proletariat government.

Regional Director, People's Cultural Division
Inspector, People's Cultural Division
Rastgah

I certify that the copy reflects the content of the original
Zarafshan Region
5 July, 1926; no. 163

The Regional Cultural Division responds to your letter No. 725, regarding the opening of Tajiki schools in the village of Arghun. Since all the population of Arghun is Uzbek and there are no Tajiki speakers, if you wish to discuss schools, it must be about Uzbeki, not Tajiki, schools.

Director, Karmina Inspector (Usmanov)
Verified. Secretary, Soviet of National Minorities,
Gregoreva
Soviet of National Minorities

Request

We, the inhabitants of the village of Qamishi in the Surkhan Dariya region are poor farmers. Altogether 500 villages (khajagi), we are all Tajik and Fars people and we do not have a school. The Volost Executive Committee wants to open a Turkish school, but since we are all Farsi (Tajiki) speakers, and according to the directive of the Communist Party every people can freely speak in its language, we request from the Soviet of National Minorities that a Tajiki school be opened in our village. We hope that this problem can be solved speedily.

Altogether fifteen signatures
1925. Secretary, Soviet of National Minorities
Gregoreva—verified

Copy

Letter by Comrade Muhiddinov
Are the People of Bukhara and Its Environs Tajik or Uzbek?
After the implementation of the national-administrative divisions of Central Asia, the question of "Whether the People of Bukhara are Tajik or Uzbek" came to the fore and is, gradually, gaining prominence. We can say, without a doubt, that the Party and the Soviet government will soon recognize the significance of this problem—as a part of the nationality problem—and will direct their efforts towards its resolution. Because the present situation is intolerable, in this article we intend to provide information on the history and the current status of this problem and bring it to the attention of those concerned with its resolution.

Thirteen centuries have elapsed since the Arabs overtook Bukhara. The history of events thereafter is recorded. These records prove that at the time of the Arab takeover, the Sughdians were the ancestors of the inhabitants of Bukhara, i.e., the ancestors of the Tajiks. Narshakhi's Ta'rikh-i Bukhara as the first and the most ancient historical document dealing with the victory of the Arabs attests to this.\(^{148}\)

Qutaiba Ibn-i Muslim built a mosque in Bukhara in A.H. 94 where previously a pagan sanctuary stood. Then he ordered that every Friday, the people of Bukhara should gather there and pray; and every Friday, the town crier announced, "Everyone in Bukhara who attends the Friday prayer will receive two dirhams. In the early stages, because they did not know Arabic, the people of Bukhara, read the Qur'an in Farsi. During the prayers, at the time of bowing, from behind the rows someone shouted 'bow!' and at the time of prostration shouted, 'Prostrate yourselves!'"

Even though Bukhara is the center of the one-thousand-year-long literature of the Persian-speaking peoples, its population is not exclusively Tajik. Besides, because during their takeover the Arabs burned all the books that were written in the Persian language, very little of the literature produced by the Persians remains.\(^{149}\)

After the Arab invasion, the first great Perso-Tajik dynasty to be established in Central Asia was the dynasty of the House of Saman.\(^{150}\) During the rule of the Samanids, Persian literature was revived and promoted. The works of Rudaki, Firdowsi, and the other ancient sages and men of letter also were written during the rule of the Samanids of Bukhara.

After the demise of the Samanid dynasty, although the rulership passed from one Turkish hand into another, Bukhara continued to be recognized as the center of literature and culture. The language of instruction, authorship, and conversation among the people of Bukhara continued to

---

\(^{148}\) Narshakhi, Abubakr Muhammad Ibni Ja'far-i Bukhari (889-959) wrote in Arabic. His major work is Ta'rikh-i Bukhara or Ta'rikh-i Narshakhi, which was written in Amir Hamid Abu Muhammad Nuh Ibni-i Nasr-i Samani. Narshakhi's work has been edited and published several times. For further details see Dihkhuda's Lughatname, Letter N, Fascicule 3, 1965 (ed.).

\(^{149}\) We can consider the sections of the Avesta that are written in Zand and the parts that appear in the writings of Islamic thinkers as exceptions.

\(^{150}\) Continuation of the rule of the Samanids from AH 260.
be Persian. The details of this summary can be found in Kirmani and Ambari's *Ta'rikh-i Bukhara* and Barthold's *Turkistan Down to the Mongol Invasion*.

During the first century of the rule of the Manghits, the dynasty that was overthrown by the Bukhara Revolution in 1920, the language of the court was Turkish, because most of the courtiers were representatives of Turkish *uluses* and tribes. But all the directives of the Amir, reports, and *vasiqahs* were written in Persian. The language of the city and its environs was Persian. In the elementary schools and the theological seminaries, the language of instruction was Persian. All authorship was in Persian. Conversely, there is not even one book written in Turkish that had been published in Bukhara during the last one thousand years.

Following the Chaqatai styles of Navoi or Fuzuli, some of the poets of Bukhara, on a whim, have tried to compose poetry in Turkish, but they have not been successful. The people of Bukhara, too, whether at home or work, have always spoken and continue to speak Tajiki. The women of Bukhara, without an exception, do not know Uzbeki.

Before the Bukhara Revolution, the Amir's officials who served in areas inhabited by Uzbeks and some of the traders who had commercial relations with the Uzbeks, learned some Uzbeki. And there are five or six families who are racially Turkish and speak Turkish, in the Durman district of Bukhara. They are from the Durman tribe and are referred to as Surmani. The rest of the population of the city is Tajik and has remained Tajik.

From the *tumans* of Bukhara, only the Qaraqul *tuman* is mostly Turkish. In the *tumans* of Vghanza, Ghijduvan, and Vabkent half, or sometimes more than half, are Tajik. Their native language and the language of trade among them is Tajik.

But after the Revolution, the language issue took a totally different turn.

II

From the establishment of the Republic of Bukhara (September 1920), Uzbeki became the official language of the Bukhara Soviet. This pertained not only to the city of Bukhara, but included Eastern Bukhara as well. Even though the absolute majority of the people of Eastern Bukhara did not know Uzbeki, Turkish became the official language and the language of instruction. After the national-administrative divisions in Central Asia and the establishment of the Republic of Tajikistan, this mistake was corrected and Tajiki became the official language and the language of instruction.

What motivated this drastic change in the language of Bukhara? Why did the government choose Uzbeki as the official language for the Uzbeks
and the Tajiks? What was the rationale for the Soviet of Bukhara to try very hard to eliminate the Tajiki language and make Uzbeki the language of the Uzbeks and non-Uzbeks?

The answer lies in Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, the ideology that directed the activities of the leaders of the Soviet Republic of Bukhara.

At the beginning of the establishment of (the Republic of) Bukhara, events were influenced by three groups:

1) The Turkish prisoners of WWI
2) The Ferghana and Tashkent Uzbeks, most of whom were supporters of the ideology of the Jadids of Bukhara.
3) We, the Jadids of Bukhara who, for some time, had received Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic instruction in Central Asia. For a while, we were heavily influenced by the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic ways of thinking.

The Pan-Turkists argued that the Uzbeks, Kyrgyzs, Kazakhs, Turkmens, and others who share the Mongol blood and who are divided today into independent nations are, in reality, members of the same large family. They also argued that the Tajiki-speaking people of Bukhara, are, in reality, Turks who have been heavily influenced by the literature and culture of the Iranians to the point that they have lost their original language. They must be returned to the Turkish fold to create one Turkish nation. Influenced by this ideology and determined to realize these objectives, we had become the real enemies of the Tajiki language. While our activities against the Tajiks bordered on treason, we were ardent supporters of Turkish unity and the Turkish language.

During the last years of the Republic of Bukhara, we were no longer as involved in the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic ideologies as before. Instead, we were concerned with the language problems of the Tajiks and the opening of schools for them in their native language.

Meanwhile the national-administrative divisions of Central Asia took place and Bukhara was included in Uzbekistan. Finally, Uzbekistan became heir to all the mistakes, deliberate or otherwise, and political treasons committed by the Republic of Bukhara and its Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist past.

III

Those political mistakes and treasonous acts which Uzbekistan inherited from the Republic of Bukhara, were not corrected by Uzbekistan, they were further strengthened. Today, it is a "sin" for the people of Bukhara and environs to call themselves Tajik. The 1926 census identifies
everyone, except the Iranians, as Uzbek. According to those statistics, the Tajiks of Bukhara have registered themselves as "Uzbeks."

In Bukhara, a number of Tajiks have identified themselves as Perso-Tajik. Who are these? Is this language different from the language of the other people of Bukhara? Are their customs different? No. How about their race and their past history? No. They, too, like the other people of Bukhara speak Persian. The difference is that they are Muslims who follow the Imam Ja'far Sadiq. The followers of this sect are known as the Shi'a. The other people of Bukhara are Muslims who follow Imam Abu Hanifa. They are known as the Sunni. Our statisticians have registered the Uzbeks as Sunni and the Perso-Tajiks as Shi'a.

But since when has religion been related to defining nationality? Ask the Bureau of Statistics of Uzbekistan! And as I said, they consider the Tajik people of Bukhara to be Uzbek and they use Uzbeki to teach in their schools. The official language of the village soviets and the language of the executive of the Bukhara Okrug also is Uzbeki. The reasons that the supporters of this line of thought give in their own defense are the following:

1) The people of Bukhara and environs are Uzbek and speak Uzbeki. This is an absolute lie, believed only by those who hide the truth.

2) In ancient times, the people of Bukhara and its environs had been Uzbek. They have become speakers of Tajiki under the influence of the literature and culture of the Persians. We shall return them to their original language and nationality.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government refuse to examine this puzzle.

3) If we can successfully change the Tajik people of Bukhara to Uzbeks, that will be a success story. This will not only set an example, but will also be a service.

Neither the Party nor the Soviet government has set itself this task.

4) Even if the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist ideologies have lost their momentum, in their place a new type of nationalism—Uzbekism—has emerged. Uzbekism requires that we change the Tajiks of Bukhara into Uzbeks. This follows the Uzbek ideology exactly. But this is not the ideology of the Uzbek leaders. The Party and the Soviet government cannot push this ideology forward.

And this process of Uzbekization is taking place at a time when the government, through the Communist and Soviet rule, has been in force for eleven years. We should not forget that this is also the time when in the
entire Soviet Union, including Central Asia, the just ordinances devised by Lenin are in force.

The general Tajik-speaking population of Bukhara and environs as yet has not reached the maturity to raise its voice. This is, to a degree, our fault; for we have not communicated the message of the Party to them. Of those who hold positions, some have accepted a new variety of Pan-Turkism. Therefore, they choose silence and, for the most part, do not see this problem to be useful for their own purposes.

We confess to our political treason and past mistakes and find it necessary that they be corrected: Alas that those who criticize us for this shortcoming and slap our faces do not help the issue; they only strengthen the error and the treason.

It is necessary for the Party to solve this important, political problem.


*Soviet Tajikistan*

January 26, 1988

---

**In Opposition to the Sabotage of National Politics**

The nationality and the linguistic problems in Samarqand and its environs have not been solved. Along with the daily economic progress of our nation and the expansion of our village administration, many other issues like elevation of the peoples' cultural level, preparation of cadres, combating illiteracy, expansion of women's rights, and the cultural revolution are also making advances.

Progress in the resolution of the problems of diverse people must concern itself with the diversity of their native languages. But the fact that the questions of nationality and language have not been resolved in Samarqand and its environs is a great obstacle in the way of our progress.

Daily setbacks in our progress toward nationality relations are created by those Tajik intellectuals who were affected first by Pan-Islamism and, later, by Pan-Turkism. Everyone knows that before the Revolution there were two ideas: Pan-Turkism (or the creation of a unified Turkish government) and Pan-Islamism (or the creation of a Turkish rule under the auspices of a Turkish caliph or a sultan). After the Revolution, these same intellectuals occupied key positions in the cultural organizations and in Soviet officialdom.
After the establishment of the Republic of Turkistan, a series of other issues which include the elevation of the cultural level of people, opening of schools, and the training of teachers took center stage. It is obvious that putting these theories into practice was not easy. This situation was not specific to Samarqand but to the entire Turkistan. At the conclusion of WWI, Turkish Prisoners of War came to Turkistan and, together with our jadids, monopolized the education field.

The Tajik jadids, too, began to work under the guidance of their Turkish teachers. They gathered the Tajik students in groups and, in the course of several sessions, exposed them to the following platform: "The inhabitants of Turkistan: Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyzes are not separate people. They all belong to the same Turkish nation. As for the Tajiks, they emerged from the Turks but have become Tajiks under the influence of the Iranians. Therefore, the Tajiks are Turks."

Under the influence of such teachings, Tajik youths and intellectuals, considering themselves the offspring of a united Turkish people, began the promotion of this ideology in the schools and among the public. For instance, Akbar Shamansurov, who once was the director of the Samarqand Party Organization, sought all possible avenues for destroying the Tajiki language. He even made those who spoke Tajiki pay a fine. The members of the Pan-Turkist group of "Chaqatai," which had been organized by the Uzbeks at that time, had declared war against Tajiki and had become one of its most ardent enemies. Therefore, at that time, school children, cadets, and the "Chaqatais" sang famous Turkish anthems in the streets. The following three excerpts from the newspapers of the time prove that the media, too, was influenced by the Pan-Turkists.

"In the Land of the Tajiks" was published in Turkistan, in January 1924. Here is what it says, "The use of this language (i.e., Tajiki—Sh.J.), has the meaning of departure from life, because life and the progression of history are opposed to it. Acceptance of this language is tantamount to accepting a wrong and useless means of communication."

After such a learned argument, the author continues, "That is why it is necessary for the Tajiks who live in cities and villages to learn Uzbeki and not stay with any special (Tajiki) language."

The author of the article explains the situation for the Tajiks who are away from the cities. "Now we come to those Tajiks who live in separate villages and regions far from the cities. Although at the present they do not have any connection with the Uzbeks, we believe that if they stay in touch with the Uzbeks for two or three years, they would become like the urban Tajiks—they will achieve what Fate has allotted for them."

The process outlined above is not a social process; it has developed as a result of Pan-Turkist activities. This process lasted a long time. And, for a long time, the Tajik Pan-Turkists supported it and made every effort to fortify it. One of the Tajik Pan-Turkists writes in The New Way (novyj Put), published in Khujand (No. 14, 1924), as follows, "I think, if we un-
dertake the process of Tajikification (they do not confess to this—Sh. J.),
or if we claim to do that, our culture will retrogress."

In Zarafshan, No. 182, September 1924, in the article entitled: "About
the Tajik Problem," after the clarification of the fact that the Tajiks are a
branch of the Uzbeks, we read, "There is no denying that urban Tajiks
(Samarqand and Khujand) are related to the Uzbeks, are mostly of Uzbek
extraction and, therefore, cannot form an independent government of the
type created by the Uzbeks.

In the opinion of the author, these Tajiks have been influenced by
Iranian literature. Historical evidence shows that, in reality, they were
Turkish tribes, who after the rule of the Iranians over the Turks, became
Iranianized."

The author believes that the citizens themselves wish to be Uzbek.
"The inhabitants of Samarqand and Bukhara would not have protested, if
the supporters of the Tajiki movement had not talked to them. They would
not know the difference."

The author, even though unhappy about the creation of Tajikistan
SSR, accepts it. Out of the fear that the Tajiks of Uzbekistan might revolt,
he writes, "I believe that instead of racking our brains as to whether the
residents of Samarqand and Khujand are Uzbek or Tajik, and instead of
creating reasons that do not really exist, we should bring the Tajiks of the
Pamirs within the fold; their distance from us, like the citizens of the
above-mentioned cities, is detrimental to them."

The national-administrative divisions started in Central Asia under
these circumstances. The Turkologists evaluated the process this way:
"The Bolsheviks introduced this to weaken the Turks. The future of these
divisions is dim." Saddened by the establishment of Tajikistan, they pre-
tend that, "Tajikistan cannot have any importance. After all its pride is in
its high mountains."

The Uzbek intellectuals did not stay away from the problems of the
Tajiks. They clarified their position by creating the "Great Idea" (Uzbek
chauvinism) and prepared themselves for anti-Tajik activities. Those who
were afraid to speak openly about this, spoke in the far-off regions to
specific people. On the eve of the national-administrative divisions, the
famous Uzbek chauvinist Shakirjan Rahimi came to Tajikistan. Sometime
ago he had been the Director of the Socialist Education of the People's
Committee on Culture. Excited, he established a confederation here and
announced, "Whoever teaches in Tajiki, will be exiled mercilessly to the
Kuhistan. His place will be given to Uzbek teachers. The teachers of
Samarqand are prime examples of this."

After the completion of the divisions and the establishment of the
ASRT the situation changed. Tajik teachers who called themselves Uzbek
were teaching Tajik students who did not understand Uzbek in Uzbeki.
Faced with difficulty, they requested that in some schools they be allowed
to carry out instruction in Tajiki. But they could not force their request.
The forced assimilation of the Tajiks created many problems. People protested. As a result they evaluated the instruction in Samarqand and concluded that instruction in Uzbeki was incorrect. From 1926-1927, instruction began in Tajiki in the majority of Samarqand schools, and the language problem was resolved. The youth now openly identified themselves as Tajik. But, in spite of this, there were people in the Soviet apparatus who, under the guise of "internationalism," entered Samarqand to implement the Uzbekization of the Tajiks. In fact, they made the struggle more intense. Turkish pride, grab for power, high status, and a desire for fame united them. In opportune circumstances, they did not distinguish their treasonous politics from the nationality policies of the Party. Consequently, they put the Tajiks under a great deal of pressure and the Party to shame.

But the Party and Soviet officials, even the Communist division, did not take any steps to stop this. These political mistakes continued to happen and, to a great extent, influenced our party leaders. Not understanding the policies of the party, they all were soon misguided.

There are a number of reasons for this.

In the meeting to report the city's accounts, which took place in the 3rd-Tajiki school where 1,000 people had gathered, it was suggested that the meeting be held in Tajiki. But, even though half the audience was Tajiks who did not understand Uzbeki, a certain Abdulla Umarbaev said, "This is the capital of Uzbekistan. It is not possible to hold a Tajiki meeting. The Tajiks should go to Tajikistan." Umarbaev himself is a Tajik. The reporter (he, too, is a Tajik), Sattarov, member of the Main Party, who does not know Tajiki, gave his report in Uzbeki. As a result, of the 1,000 who had come to the meeting only 100 remained. The others left the hall.

This incident had happened in Haiderabad.

There, too, the Tajik Abdulrafiq Irashivi, member of the Party and ex-member of the City Committee, behaved in quite the same way with regard to the Tajik question. Rajab Ghaftarov, the ex-secretary of the rayon Party committee is a Tajik. He speaks Tajiki at home. His parents don't understand a word of Uzbeki. He himself has difficulty speaking Uzbeki. Yet, in a large meeting, he got up and said, "Certain Tajiks say that some Tajiks are becoming Uzbeks. Let them. Let us all do it." He thought that it would be much easier if we all became Uzbek than to have to constantly distinguish the Uzbeks from the Tajiks. In a large meeting it had been suggested that, in as much as the people of Samarqand are all Tajiks, and the language of instruction is Tajiki, the People's Soviet, too, should be elected from among the Tajiks. The former okrug secretary, V. Rahimov, opposed this, saying, "No responsible person would say that the people of Samarqand are Tajik. For several centuries Samarqand and Bukhara have been the economic and cultural centers of Uzbek rulers. These cities, however, have been related to Iran economically and culturally and because Persian is a subtle language, it has influenced their minds and replaced their mother tongue. For this reason it would be wrong to
call the majority of the people of Samarqand Tajiks. From this we can conclude that if the people of Samarqand and Bukhara have become Tajiks, 'at the point of a sword,' if necessary, we must force them back to being Uzbek.

What difference is there, one wonders, between this ideology and the Pan-Turkist ideology outlined above?

Last February, in addition to V. Rahimov, Shakirov (of the okrug propaganda committee), Ghaffarov, and some other official participated in a similar meeting. In the meeting, Shakirov reported on the expediting of the implementation of the rights of women. Even though the discussions were extensive, not a word was said about the rights of Tajik women. The following resolution was suggested, "The majority of the women of Samarqand are Tajik. Therefore, half the women in the club must be Tajik. There must be one employee who knows Tajiki, and the language of interaction must be Tajiki. An expert in Tajiki must be appointed to the women's section and activists must be chosen from among the Tajik women."

Was there any anti-Soviet thought in the above statement? Yet many opposed it. Ghaffarov spoke against it.

We know our limits; therefore, this suggestion is not acceptable. The Comrade rose to support his initial statement, but the audience, under the influence of Ghaffarov, shouted, "Let the Tajiks go to Tajikistan," and "Tajikistan must serve the Tajiks." When people like Shakirov, Rahimov, and Ghaffarov fill the key positions, an anti-party spirit sets in. This is the core problem. It is not necessary to seek hidden motives for the prolongation of the Tajik issue and the public outcry over it. If the leadership wishes to stay away, it can always use the "lower echelon" to shout, "The Tajiks should go to Tajikistan." No one dares oppose that.

During the 1926 census taking, similar rumors were floating about, "It is necessary that they identify themselves as Uzbek. They say that if someone identifies himself as Tajik, they would confiscate his land and send him to Tajikistan."

The above-mentioned comrades had created this situation to frighten people to register themselves as Uzbek. This situation affected our task adversely. What did the people call itself before the revolution, until 1920? In order to find that information we shall turn to the 1917 and 1920 mateirals of the Bureau of Statistics, published in 1925. And we cite only Samarqand and its okrug?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37,820 Tajiks</td>
<td>50.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,094 Russians</td>
<td>24.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,210 Iranians</td>
<td>15.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,208 local Jews</td>
<td>9.69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In three Samarqand districts (in the Dargham-i Bala district) the national composition is as follows:
In the Shahyalla volost:
- 7,913 Tajiks 65.17%
- 4,229 Uzbeks 34.83%

In the Siyab volost:
- 5,952 Tajiks 65.65%
- 3,639 Uzbeks 34.37%

In the Khaja Ahrar volost:
- 7,913 Tajiks 65.17%
- 4,229 Uzbeks 34.37%

In general, in the city and its environs, the population is 111,487 including 65,824 (57.32%) Tajiks and 12,512 (10.88%) Uzbeks; 18,094 (15.77%) Russians; 11,210 (9.4%) Iranians and 7,208 (6.45%) local Jews.

In addition, the Tajiks lived in the villages of the former Samarqand uezd: 1,103 in Arabkhana; 312 in the Bukhara village; 1,167 in Panjshanbe-Siab; 707 in Yarimtuq; 7,855 in Kamargaran; and 217 in Aqsai.

The population of the city of Urgut is 7,855 (5,486 are Tajiks). In general, the Tajik population of the former Samarqand uezd was 76,700. If we considered the nine years between 1920 and 1929, the Tajik population would have passed 100,000. But according to the most recent census, that population has decreased to 10,700.

So many Tajiks could not have died in the course of six years. Rather, not being able to withstand the Pan-Turkists' pressure, they changed their identity to Uzbek. But since language does not easily accept change, they remained Tajik. While everywhere they were identified as Uzbek, the Tajiks did not know Uzbeki. At the present time, the nationality question is the most pressing and important issue before the Party. For this reason, the time has come to fight the Turkic elements and purge the Party and the soviets of them. The Party decrees regarding the establishment of special national soviets for national minorities, i.e., the ones that have majorities in their districts, have passed. These directives should be followed 100% so that we can correct some of the political errors of the past.

**Tajiks and Uzbeks**

In Central Asia, there are many different peoples each with its own language, culture, history, and special lifestyle. Under such very complex conditions, it would be very difficult to solve the nationality problem without a full understanding of the issues involved. The quality of our work can be judged accordingly.

In a number of regions of Uzbekistan, even in Samarqand, the cultural interests of the local national minorities are not taken into consideration. Besides, there are a number of requests that are related to assistance to na-
tional minorities. In Tashkent, when need arose for a school for several Jewish children, they came to a practical conclusion: they were given a bathhouse to remodel and use as their school.

It has been revealed recently that the Turks had established certain quotas in one of the national republics of Central Asia. Fortunately, their plan did not succeed. Strangely enough, the order for the establishment of the quotas was signed by the People's Commissariat of Education.

This problem had been investigated by the Central Asian branch of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. After reviewing the shortcomings, everyone expected the Bureau to propose some decisive solution and end the infringement upon our rights. But, unfortunately, the situation did not improve; indeed, we find ourselves being dragged from one episode to another.

In the meeting of the soviet of the Bukhara rural districts, held a month ago, from among 210 representatives only seven were Tajiks, two Arabs, and no Jews. Here we add three explanatory notes: 1) two districts of Bukhara (Shafirkan and Sultanabad) are inhabited by Jews; 2) Bukhara is the homeland of the so-called "Jews of Bukhara"; and 3) according to the official census, the number of the Tajik inhabitants of Bukhara is 12,240. They all have the right to vote. In addition, the question of whether the Tajiks are a majority in Bukhara is a very thought-provoking subject.

Last month, an article was published in the *Za Parti* journal (organ of the Bureau of the Central Committee of Central Asia). In this article, entitled, "Are the People of the City of Bukhara and its Environs Tajik or Uzbek?" the author, Comrade Muhiddinov, documented that the Tajiks, and not the Uzbeks, have lived in Bukhara from ancient times. He also showed that the urban population of Bukhara does not understand Uzbek. The artificial Uzbekization of the Tajiks had started eight years ago, i.e., since the establishment of the People's Republic of Bukhara. Comrade Muhiddinov demands that this criminal act be immediately stopped. The editor of the journal adds the following, "We confess that the desired method for neutralizing the nationality conflicts is exposing them." As can be seen, the issue that Comrade Muhiddinov outlines is an important issue.

Now, you yourself be the judge of the national composition of the Bukhara conference. Some members were specifically positioned to protest, create political situations and, in general, undermine our basic claims. This was a necessary step because, out of the 210 representatives only 9 were "middle class" (miana hal). The task, therefore, was not undertaken either by Central Committee of Uzbekistan, or the Central Executive Committee, or by the media. And I should add that they all were present.

I participated in the Bukhara meeting. One particular moment in the meeting is etched in my memory. When the opposition was introducing and discussing each candidate in the Central Executive Committee of the
rural district and the question of national composition came to the fore, a worker shouted:

- Our division solved this problem. We suggested a representative of the local nationalities.
- Whom?
- A Hungarian. He is a very active young man.

They could find room for a Hungarian in the Central Executive Committee of Bukhara, but they would not allow the Tajiks' participation.

Comrade Muhiddinov Cries for Help

The Europeans are very unconcerned about learning our language and the nuances of our culture. They know very little about the ethnic relations that create the fabric of nationality in these regions. An initial criticism of the Europeans, therefore, is in order because, in the difficult conditions of Central Asia, the Europeans could not only have communicated the policies of the Party, but they could have actively helped their comrades apply them.

You recall the quota for the inclusion of the national minorities in the educational institutions. The European official, the Commissar for the Nationalities, a communist, saw these documents, but failed to help his comrades. After all, the fault was not his.

There is a lack of political activism here. An activism that was condemned by the Party itself. The basic remedies for cleansing Uzbekization, therefore, must include the rehabilitation of the Europeans who implement the wishes of the Party regarding the nationality issue. They should not remain aloof as if the affairs of Central Asia are not their concern.

The Uzbeks (I am speaking about some, not all) are, at the present, going through the malady of Pan-Turkism. After the Bukhara Revolution, and during the early years of the Republic of Bukhara, almost all the intellectuals of Bukhara (the jadids) were afflicted by this malady.

The Pan-Turkists state that the Uzbeks, Kyrgyzes, and Turkmens all share a Turkic root. Therefore, they all should become part of a free and unified Turkic nation. As for the Tajiks, they say, even though they speak Persian, historically, they are Uzbeks. They must be transformed into Turks again… For a long time, the intellectuals kept this ideology to themselves, until the time for activating their goal arrived. When the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara was established, they quickly closed all the Tajik schools and made Uzbeki the official language of Bukhara.

Although in recent years most of the intellectuals have given up their Pan-Turkist ideas for cooperation with the Soviet government, to a degree, these political mistakes are still in existence. This new spirit can be seen in some Uzbek intellectuals, and Party members who cannot easily
distance themselves from Pan-Turkism. Many others are, with a great deal of difficulty, putting the illness behind them. Some, of course, have freed themselves altogether. One of them, the former jadid Comrade Muhiddinov, writes the following exciting words in Za Partia, "We who had started this criminal act (i.e., the act of calling Tajiks Uzbeks—A. A.) confess our mistakes and wish to put things right."

Who is Comrade Muhiddinov addressing? Is he talking to his former colleagues? No. Not to them alone. He is talking to the Uzbek leadership and the members of the Party, including those who witnessed the actions of their colleagues but refused to get involved. Comrade Muhiddinov is crying for help.

Reproduction
from Pravda Vostoka
No. 16, July 18, 1926

A Voice from the Basement

The cries of Qulikhan Asimzada, a teacher from Khujand, was silenced in a sea of paper created by the People's Commissariat for Education. Qulikhan's protests were directed at the highest levels of the Republic's government. Qulikhan Asimzada states, "After the completion of the specialization course for teachers, I returned to my place of work in Khujand and wanted to begin my instruction, using the Tajiki language. To do so I requested permission from the People's Education Soviet. But the Commissar for Education opposed me. When we (the teachers) decided to form a unified front (in one school) so that we could teach in Tajiki, the Commissar for Education assigned us to different schools. He forced us to teach in Uzbeki. As for me, until the very end, in spite of a lack of books, I continued to teach in Tajiki. The Commissar of Education threatened me and also transferred me to an Uzbeki school. The Uzbek teacher was sent to the school from which I had been transferred. If this kind of relationship continues, I intend to give up teaching.

The following incident happened in addition to the threats of the Commissar of Education. When the inspector for the Samarqand region, Ataullaev, came to organize a teachers' conference, he protested against me and called our school "a Tajiki school."

I am writing this request with the hope that you will find a way to change the language of instruction back to Tajiki and that Tajiki textbooks are made available. Otherwise, I request to be dismissed from service.

The archives of the Soviet of National Minorities also hold the heartrending complaint of the Director of the Local No. 5. In his protest, Comrade Jalaluddinzada obediently and sincerely writes, "In my opinion our school should be a Tajik school because the majority of the students
are Tajik; only ten percent are Uzbek. Furthermore, the truth is that even this ten percent does not know Uzbeki. Taking all of this into consideration, we requested permission from the People's Education Soviet to teach in Tajiki. But the Commissar did not respond to our request. Not wishing to be unjust to the students, we began instruction in Tajiki. We also requested that the National Committee of Tajikistan give us one hundred copies of the Alifba to distribute among the students. But Comrade Abduljabbar Narziqulov, the Director of the Socialist Instruction of the People's Culture Division, did not allow it. He threatened that if we distributed the Alifba and began instruction in Tajiki, he would have us arrested."

These documents are cited not because of their grandeur but because of their simplicity. Neither are they the only ones. There are many more eloquent documents from the schools of old Bukhara, Samarqand, Khujand, and the Ferghana region testifying to the same.

In the folders and sealed files of the Soviet of National Minorities, there are some even more telling documents about secret activities in relation to schools. Even these are copies. There are black files that are sewn up. Open those and they reveal the level of patriotism that the language issue touched as the Tajiks defended their culture and heritage. Here are some samples.

In its own publications, the Central Statistics Commissar gives the number of Tajiks of Uzbekistan to be 406,872. In his work, "Nacional-sno-gosudarstvennoe razme'evanie Serednej Azii," Comrade Zelinskii writes that the national minorities form 23% of the population of Uzbekistan. 23% of the population is about 1,300,300. They, too, have a right to the freedoms brought by the October Revolution. Did the schools enjoy these rights and freedoms? The bulk of the documents show that, as far as the Tajiks are concerned, they did not enjoy the promised freedom. If anything, they experienced the reverse. They enabled us to assert, with a clear voice, that the Tajiks of Uzbekistan could not teach their children in their own native language and that they even did not have schools. We can say that at the district and regional levels, the Tajiki language is "illegal." Teachers who could not be forced to conform were harassed verbally and procedurally by the People's Education Commissar. They were transferred from one school to another and were threatened with loss of their jobs, and even prospects of other jobs unless they accepted to teach in Uzbeki.

In addition, in schools where all the students were Tajik, the Tajik teacher was obliged to teach the class in Uzbeki then, quickly translate the lesson into Tajiki. This is horrifying. When one reads these accounts and realizes that they underlie the awesome events of the past months, the situation becomes even more compelling.

Without a doubt, this is the fault of district and regional leaders and that these are more accidental than systematic. The question, however, is why should there be so many accidental happenings?
At its own time, the unstable situation of the schools in relation to the nationality issue concerned the high levels of the government. In fact, during the past year they had discussed the issue in a special session and a resolution had been reached that required the Commissar of People's Education of Uzbekistan SSR to undertake definite steps. That resolution is in my hand.

A year ago, the Commissariat of People's Education was ordered to establish committees to evaluate the No. 1 schools, put the students in language groups and, where the situation required, facilitate instruction in their mother tongue. The Commissar of People's Education did not follow that order.

The Commissariat of Education was directed in 1925-26 to expand the top rated schools. Nothing of the sort happened. Only in the Zarafshan region, under pressure from the people and with a great deal of trouble, were 16 Tajiki schools opened. If it were not to rid themselves of the claim of the people of Bukhara, this, too, would not have happened.

The Commissariat of People's Education had been ordered to open a college of agriculture in Samarqand or Khujand. The question was not even discussed in the meetings of the Commissariat of Education. The Center for Educational Policies had been directed to include the Advanced Party School in the 1925-26 system. But no such school exists. The Center for Educational Policies had promised to separate three schools from among the existing schools, but did not follow through. The Commissar of Education was directed to pay special attention to the publication of books for national minorities.

The results are very disappointing. Of the three Tajiki manuscripts, by the end of the year, only two had been published, the third is still unpublished. Someone had voided the contract in favor of local-European books. Books for the instruction of Uigur are still in the warehouse waiting delivery. The Commissariat of Education does not allocate money for purchasing them. The Commissar of Education had been told to assist the teacher training school and to prepare the ground for more humane conditions. But the teacher-training school has received nothing. Housing for the teacher-training college is worse than the housing for criminal elements. The institute operates in two shifts. Dinner is served in the bedroom. Students prepare their lessons in the same room. In other words, the classrooms serve as bedrooms as well.

Is it possible to discuss procedures, the Dalton-plan, and progressive instructional methods when the teacher-training student is plagued with lice, insufficient change of undergarments, lack of textbooks, and the like? These were the living conditions of the male Tajik teacher-training students, a situation much worse than the one in which the landlord's pig finds itself. The landlord does not allow the waste to accumulate in the sty; while, in the teacher-training school no one takes care of the waste.

The women's education technicum does not have instructional space of its own. The instruction is carried out "elsewhere," as a second shift.
On May 25, 1925, the National Control for the Supervision of the Farmers and Workers became familiar with the work of the People's Education Commissariat. They met, routinely read over the reports, and made the following resolution, "The People's Education Division should pay special attention to the needs of the national-minority schools. By the beginning of the academic year, the People's Education Division must see to it that the majority groups are determined and that instruction is provided in appropriate native languages."

A year later, May 5, 1926, and thereafter, the the National Control for the Supervision of the Farmers and Workers listened to the reports and decided to rely on the previous solution, "There has not been the slightest improvement since 25 May, 1925. In fact, the situation has deteriorated. Of what benefit are the reams of resolutions gathered in the office of the Commissar for People's Local Education Division? All we have are directives like: "Special attention should be paid to the schools for national-minority students, the unhealthy conditions of national minorities should be taken into consideration, and this and that must be carried out by the Commissariat of Education."

These directives do not touch peoples' lives, neither does the situation change. The loathsome criminal acts of the colonializing Uzbeks, about which Comrade Nazarov spoke in the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan are the same as the Russian colonial attitude. Both of them belittle the national minorities by depriving them of control over their educational system, legislation of governmental policies of their own, and the like. Not even one district or regional Soviet official has been questioned about all the atrocities.

Neither the overt inaction nor a complete disregard of reports and orders affected the standing of the Commissariat of Education.

Our strength lies in that we confess to our mistakes. After all, by accepting responsibility, and sincerely confessing to wrongdoing, half the crime is compensated for. But in our nature, there still lies the shame of a culprit and the fear that truth may be revealed.

A false sense of shame played a large role here. This very false sense of shame caused people not to raise their voice in the colonial meetings of the Commissariat of Education. All broke loose on the individual who became bold and spoke up on such issues.

Even events that had become public knowledge and which could no longer be pushed aside were not given serious consideration. The fear of reprisal for construcive criticism, serious criticism, work orders, and false shame for confessing to one's mistakes are responsible for bringing about the critical situation in the management of schools.

Is it not time to push aside this artificial curtain and expose this tragic situation? In any case, it is necessary to evaluate the work of the National Minorities Education by researching its activities and by becoming intimately knowledgeable of its actions. Enough false shame. If we continue the status quo, the illness will become even more threatening.
Protocol

Meeting of the Committee regarding the separation of Tajikistan

Director: MAKIV
Participants:
- Tajikistan Director: MUHIDDINOV
- Uzbekistan-Director: IRISMATOV
- Director: MAKIV

Reports heard

Resolution accepted
The report of Comrade Karp regarding nationality and economics of Surkhan Dariya

I. The Committee, based on the 1924-1926 materials, etc., regarding the regions and rural districts claimed by the ASSRT, their national composition, and their economic inclination toward Tajikistan issues the following resolutions:

1) The transfer of the Khujand rural district by Uzbekistan SSR to Tajikistan SSR completes the land claims of both republics on each other.

2) All subsequent boundary disputes should be settled by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

3) The mandate of the Commission regarding land claims should be considered completed. The claim of the ASSRT regarding Surkhan Dariya should be denied.

Director (Makiv)
Secretary

About the third point, we have our own opinion. We shall forward it to you separately.

Muhiddinov, Nissar Muhammedov

To the Central Asian Bureau
Central Committee of the CP of the USSR same place

The commission dealing with the division of land between Uzbekistan SSR and the Autonomous SSR of Tajikistan met on September 8 and, in a unanimous vote, rejected the inclusion of the region of Surkhan Dariya, the majority of population of which is Tajik, in Tajikistan. Similarly, Tajikistan's second claim regarding the inclusion of Termez as a center of commerce and freight transfer was rejected, even though the population of
Termez is European. The Commission expressed its opinion regarding the retention of Surkhan Dariya as a whole in Uzbekistan SSR.

With this letter we are requesting that the Central Asian Bureau review the Commission's resolution and the opinions of the impartial experts, Comrades Belov and Karp. They have studied the national composition of Surkhan Dariya thoroughly and have expressed their thoughts.

Muhiddinov

The original inhabitants of the country are the Tajiks. The conquerors of the Tajiks are the Uzbeks.

Like in the other regions of Uzbekistan SSR, the defeated Tajiks were pushed into the mountains of Baisun and Sar-i Asiya.

The Uzbeks defeated the Tajiks but they did not proceed to become land owners themselves; rather they collected taxes from the people and participated in government. Later, however, they took over the culture of those they conquered and became agriculturists. They confiscated the vineyards and the lands on the shores of the rivers.

According to reports by the people as well as the accounts of ancient Greek historians, Surkhan Dariya was once a lush valley. A similar rural administration can be established there again, within the next few decades if, rather than flooded by migrant workers, it is administered according to a well-thought-out program supported by the Soviet government.

According to medieval Arab geographers, Termez consisted of fortifications, Friday mosques, bazaars, and residences. It was an important port with a considerable population. The bazaars and a large part of the town were made of bricks. It received plenty of water from Surkhan Dariya and had many orchards and woods. According to some accounts, it also had a floating bridge which connected both banks with Aral-Kaiqambar.

During the Fall of 1220, after a ten-day siege, Chingiz Khan conquered Termez, destroyed the town, and massacred the population. After the Mongol onslaught, Termez was re-established, but this time at a distance from the river. According to Rio Gonzales de Klavijo, who had seen it at the beginning of the fifteenth century, Termez was a large, populous town with many orchards and rivers. Could it be that the new Termez is the same town that is known to the people of the region as Gulgul, the remains of which are near the old Termez?

According to the people of the region Gulgul had been so large that its noise could have been heard from a distance of a hundred versts. In time, however, as a result of wars and uprisings, it was destroyed. Today only its ruins are evident.

According to reports, Surkhan Dariya was so crowded that people could go from Dihnau to Termez walking over the roofs. Mongol attacks and local uprisings destroyed all these towns, leaving ruins where life thrived and cultures flourished. During our century, the Hissar Valley, which was the political center of Surkhan at that time, was a special land. It became a part of the Emirate of Bukhara only after Bukhara became
strong. As part of this process, the hereditary rulers were replaced by Uzbek beks" 151

According to information in this same book, the Uzbeks who form a part of the population of the Hissar Valley, came to this region from Urateppe and Jizzakh, after the Russians took over those lands.

Excerpt

From the protocol of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, USSR
February 3, 1930

Reports heard: # 7

About changing the boundary between Uzbekistan SSR and Tajikistan SSR (the suggestion of the Central Executive Committee of Tajikistan SSR and the Commission of the Presidium of the Central Economic Committee of the USSR, No. 24, file 15 and No. 2, file 19).

Dossier No. 342.24/II

It was resolved that:

1) The request of the Central Executive Committee of Tajikistan SSR about the inclusion of Samarqand and Bukhara in that republic should be denied.

2) The rural district of Surkhan Dariya as it is constituted at the present in the Uzbekistan SSR should be transferred to Tajikistan SSR, within two months.

3) The following should be considered:
   A) Due to the separation of Tajikistan SSR from Uzbekistan SSR, it is resolved that the promotion of the rural, social, and cultural development among the basic population of these republics be carried out and the nature of the services to the national minorities be clarified.
   B) That measures be used to improve the services to the national minorities of Uzbekistan SSR and Tajikistan SSR and to unite these people around the soviet of workers, serfs, the poor serfs, and the not-so-poor, in an effort to mount a definite assault against the capitalistic elements in the cities and villages. Those improvements should expedite a successful execution of the general policy of the Soviet government. It should also be understood that the important claims of the national minorities of Uzbekistan SSR and Tajikistan

151 See Masalskii, Kishvar-i Turkistan, 1913, p. 374.
SSR should be met and that they should be allowed to deal with their own educational and governmental problems.

a) The national-administrative divisions in areas where large numbers of national minorities live should be completed before the forthcoming elections.

b) The Soviet officials should devise and exact rules whereby national minorities are attracted to the soviets and the administrative divisions of the Soviet government. Permanent appointment of workers, serfs, and the poor as representatives to the government offices and republican posts should be considered necessary.

C) The attraction of national minorities to the construction of co-operative kolkhozes and industrial productions should be intensified. Civil service activities among the national minorities should be revived, schools and political-enlightenment organizations should be established and social services should be increased.

D) National minorities should be provided with public-political literature and teaching instructions.

E) During 1930-1931 the activities of all the service organizations, in territorial-administrative units, soviets, courts of justice, schools, and cooperatives, should be translated to the language of the national minorities.

4) For the purpose of employing the national minorities, the Central Executive Committees of Uzbekistan SSR and Tajikistan SSR should be directed to prepare necessary cadres for governmental and socio-cultural positions from among the national minorities.

5) In order to provide systematic leadership and supervision of decrees among the national minorities at these levels, the Central Executive Committees of Uzbekistan SSR and Tajikistan SSR must form commissions (at the Presidium level of their respective Central Executive Committees) to work among the national minorities. The national minorities must be attracted to those commissions and should be elected at the rural district and regional levels.

6) The task of the Commission, established by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, on November 26, 1926, should be considered completed.

Secretary, CEC of the USSR
A. Epikidze
Verified (signature)
Report To the Commission in Charge of Resolving the Land Dispute between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

October 29, 1929, Moscow

by Nissar Muhammadov

To complete the materials submitted by the representatives of Tajikistan regarding the land claims of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to the Commission, I would like to add some documents about the rural districts of Zarafshan, Surkhon Dariya, Qashqa Dariya, Bukhara, Samarqand, and Tashkent. I want to include additional information from separate documents in order to determine the national identity of some of the local people and whether or not they are Tajiks.

a) Addendum No. I, to the report I submitted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan about the transformation of the schools of the rural districts of Samarqand and Bukhara, at the end of November, 1926.

Those familiar with the history of Central Asia know that the most ancient inhabitants of Turkistan had been the Parthians, the Bakhtars, and the Sakas who came from the eastern regions of Central Asia. They were from the Iranian tribes and, like the Pars tribe of Iran, enjoyed their own government and literature and influenced their neighboring tribes a great deal. Later on, during the time of Alexander of Macedon, we discover the Sughdians (an Iranian race) who lived in the Zarafshan region. They built cities even though their urban centers were not very large. Markand, or present-day Samarqand, was one of these cities. After that Zoroastrians, who are an integral part of the Iranians, appeared here (see Barthold, "History of Turkistan," 1922).

The following account is also written by Barthold and supports the same idea, but was written later, in 1925. It says, "The present-day inhabitants of Turkistan are from among the Iranian tribes. Here, we shall discuss the complex questions of the homeland of the Iranians, the expansion of their territorial domain in ancient times, and the continuous shrinking of these domains during the medieval ages. Suffice it to say that during the 1500 years, from the 6th century before Christ, there were only two Iranian peoples: the Iranian-Sughdians and the Bakhtars.

In this way, until the 6th century, Turkistan had been connected with cultured Iranian tribes and only in the 6th century (AD 563-567) the Turks attacked and established a tribal empire. At this time, nomadic Iranians were driven from Central Asia. Thereafter, the settled tribes influenced the nomadic tribes, teaching them their literature.

The name Tajik, which had been applied to ancient Iranians, appeared after the Iranian invasion of 7th and 8th centuries AD. In the beginning,
the Turks applied the term Tajik to the Arabs; later, they applied it to all the Muslims and their culture among whom there were Arabs, but more than that Iranians. Therefore, for the Turks, the Tajiki language came to be known as Farsi. When the Turks finally distinguished the Iranian element from the Arabic, they called the Iranians Tajiks. These Iranians are the ancient ancestors of present-day Tajiks who, over time, have lost their cultural identity under the influence of Turkish tribes which ruled in this region until the second part of the nineteenth century, i.e., until the takeover of the region by the Russians. Otherwise, until that time, without the Tajiks, the Turks were nothing. There is a saying recorded by the Turkologist Mahmud Kashqari which states, 'What is a Turk without a Tat (Tajik)? A head without a hat.' (Barthold—"Tajiki" p. 102).

But after the Russian takeover, even up to the present time, i.e., the 10th year after the October Revolution, the language and culture of the Tajiks have made little progress. We shall quote the words of Academic Barthold regarding the treatment of the Tajiks by the government from the 1880s to 1920:

When about that same time it became necessary to publish materials in local languages, in a supplement to "Turkestanskie vedomosti> along with the Chaqatai and Kyrgyzi languages, Tajiki was also used for publication.

Later on, regarding publishing the supplement in Turkish languages, he talks about (Sarti) and Kyrgyzi dialects:

The supplement was published in two languages, four times a month, two times in the Kyrgyzi language and two times in the Sarti language. From 1883, a small newspaper was published in Sarti alone. When the constitution of Turkistan was adopted in 1920, only the Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Turkmens were recognized as local inhabitants while the oldest inhabitants of the country, the Tajiks, were ignored. The future will show to what degree the 1924 divisions contributed to the revival of the Tajiks." (p. 111)

It turned out that Barthold was right and the future happened to be that same year, the year when the Party and Soviet organizations were able to resolve a number of issues quickly, issues like changing the language of instruction in schools where the majority were Tajiks to Tajiki and when the decree of the constitution of RSFSR regarding self-determination of the population was applied to Uzbekistan.

b) In Ritter's work, Iran, translated by Khanikov, p. 396, we read, "They (the Tajiks) have the unfortunate appearance of a people who, as a result of many invasions, have been scattered, finding homes in mountain heights, islands, and seashores. They have been kept away from their glorious past and thrown into this life of misery where we find them."
c) In the collection entitled "Tajikistan" (Tashkent, 1925) there is an article by A. Siminov: "Material'nye pamqtniki arijskoj kul'tury" (p. 113).

The Tajiks formed the majority of the peoples we now recognize as the inhabitants of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan. As is evident, they are the heirs to the most ancient Aryan culture of Asia related to the Iranian groups of the great Aryan tribes. As a result of their many misfortunes they have deposited their material remains in many places on the Iranian plateau. Even if the Aryan population of all these places were eliminated, the remainder of its inhabitants inform us of the great civilization which had spread far and wide, away from the present center of the Tajiks. We observe a clear indication of this in the present-day Autonomous Republic and in the former Turkistan region (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Karakyrrgyzstan, and Karakalpakistan). There is a great archeological treasure in this land yet to be unearthed and studied. Present-day Tajikistan encompasses only a portion of the Central Asian archeological remains of the Tajiks' past. Since this is a part of the whole under the present conditions of the nation, it would be impossible to study it without extending the studies to encompass the neighboring republics.

"The excellent gold and silver treasures that were discovered in 1877 on the bank of the Amu River near the Taxt-i Qubad Pass, or otherwise near Qubadian (which is in the valley of the Kafirnihan River, 70 versts north of Amu Dariya) is one of the most important discoveries of ancient relics by the British. Undoubtedly, the continuous excavations in Kayqubad regarding the pre-Islamic era will yield very important results" (page 114).

d) The collection of articles entitled "Tajikistan" includes an article about Tajik ethnography (page 151), in it Andriev states, "the Tajiks belong to the large Iranian group of the Aryan branch of the Indo-European family of people." Some ethnographers do not distinguish the Tajiks from the Eastern Fars people, one of the most populated Persian-speaking groups which can be geographically divided into three branches. According to Denikir, if we consider the present boundaries of Fars and draw a straight line from Astarabad to Yazd, the Tajiks will be to the east and the Ajams to the west (between Tehran and Isfahan) and the Fars (between Isfahan and the Persian Gulf) in the south.

To summarize, the Tajiks are the most ancient peoples of Central Asia. Even after the invasion of the foreigners, which eliminated the Iranian element or otherwise tried to assimilate it into itself in a large region, or forced it to flee to the mountains, the Tajiks survived and still occupy a considerable tract of land in Central Asia. The northern settlements of the Tajiks are in the region of the Chatqal River (headwaters of the Chatqal River are in the Tashkent district). Biskon at 42˚ is the northern-most Tajik settlement of that time. About half a degree south, on the slopes of the same mountain system, the northern-most settlements remain in
Ferghana surrounded by Turks as well as the not-so-large groups of Tajiks of the Tashkent district. In the eastern-most region of Tajik lands, which has separated itself from the body and gone ahead somewhat, are the independent villages on the slopes of the Himalayan mountains where these mountains join their eastern companions. Defining the spread of the Tajiks south is somewhat more difficult. The land inhabited exclusively by the Tajiks is in the south of the Turkistan mountains and the neighboring Altai mountain to the headwaters of the Amu River (Panj River) and in other areas in Afghanistan and eastern Badakhshan which include the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush and its valleys.

As mentioned above, the Tajiks are the oldest inhabitants of Central Asia. At some point, the Iranian element, known in Central Asia as the Tajiks, controlled this region along with northern Afghanistan, the Caspian region, Khwarazm, the regions of Bukhara, the east and west of the so-called Chinese Turkistan, and the Iranian plateau. The culture of the Tajiks' ancestors played a major role in the world as testified to by Laufer who said, "We know that at some point the Iranian peoples occupied limitless lands which included Chinese Turkistan through which they had established trade, especially with the Chinese and the Turks. The Iranians were the great middlemen connecting the West to the East. They brought the heritage of the Greeks to Central Asia and the East and carried the plants and objects of art from China to the Mediterranean. Their activities had historical and world-wide significance to a degree that without access to Chinese documents we would not be able to write the true history of this period.

The wave of attacks and their subsequent resettlement in Central Asia adversely affected the Iranians, forcing them to either assimilate into the invaders or flee into the highlands for protection. These were places that, unlike the river valleys, were not desired by the invaders.

The very reason that present-day Tajiks' occupy the most difficult terrain, away from the good pastures, is that their best lands and most profitable occupations had been usurped by the invaders. That which remains continues to be desired by the same invaders.

The most trustworthy and definite source that speaks about the various aspects of the history of the Tajiks is this very map of present-day Tajik settlements. A cursory look at the map of the former Syr Dariya region, Ferghana, and Samarqand, is sufficient to show the sparse conditions in which the Tajiks of today survive. They have lived in these conditions since the Mongol invasion in places like the Chirchik River in the north which was called by its original Tajik name of Parak. The Mongols crossed into devastated Banakat where the Angren River (its Tajik name is Ahangaran) joins the Syr Dariya. According to the historian Juvaini, 50,000 Tajiks were recruited to be sent against Khujand… and many other places like that. Even Tashkent and its environs were not spared. The many old names of the rivers and mountains and the names of localities
and building structures of various types bespeak the past culture of the Tajiks.

The regions inhabited by Tajiks in the north-eastern valleys include Khavas (near the central station where the Tashkent-Samarqand railroad meets the Ferghana branch, formerly known as Ursatevskaya), as well as the city of Khujand and its environs. There are some aged people who recall the ancestors of the Tajiks in Bishkent (a large village on the way to Tashkent and Khujand) but no Tajiks live there today.

Behind these outposts, mainly in the south, there are people in various places who speak in Turkish dialects. The Tajik villages of Uratopepe, in the region of Ferghana, sometimes by themselves and often in groups, are mostly located on mountain slopes. This long stretch of road which goes from east to west is inhabited primarily by Tajiks and stretches to the south (south of the Turkistan range). The population remains scattered to this day. They are the remnants of Iranian people who, in the past, populated the valleys in the same way that we find them in great numbers in mountains today.

Looking at this land we can say perhaps, that there has been a war lasting hundreds of years, a war that still continues as the assimilation of the Tajiks continues. This is the result of that. The whole stretch of Iranian lands, in the sense of language preservation has been swept aside in an astonishing way. In the river valleys, they remain only in the strong cultural centers like Samarqand and Bukhara. Farther away, in the south-east, perhaps due to less pressure by the attackers, they have survived in villages similar to those on the slopes of the mountains in present-day Ferghana and Urateppe. Now we can consider the last period when Iranian Turkistan and Bukhara were directly related to Khurasan and Merv. The Iranian outpost at Merv was not lost until the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries. Then it was destroyed by the Amir of Bukhara, Ma'sum, who divided its population between Samarqand and Bukhara, clearing the way for its take-over by the Turkmens (the Sariqs in 1790-91 and the Teke in 1834). The relationship between the Iranians of Turkistan and Bukhara with Fars, which had already been weakened by religious strife, was now severed by geography as well” (page 156).

As the author indicates the Tajiks populated the same lands where they had lived in pre-Mongol times, places like the Chirchik River Valley. The same scene is repeated in the Zarafshan Valley. Among the major centers of Tajik habitation are the Samarqand Valley, and the Khujand region. Their habitation stretches from west to east to places where human habitation is almost impossible, including Ferghana, and the surrounding mountains. They moved from the Jizzakh Valley to Nurata where we still find them today. From the Bukhara plain, they spread to the east where they still live in a number of the rural districts of Surkhon Dariya and Qashqa Dariya. Although no original Tajiks live in those villages, to this day, we find Tajiki names.
All this indicates that the Tajiks are natives to Central Asia, especially in the rural districts of Tashkent, Samarqand, Surkhan Dariya, and Bukhara. To fully clarify this question, we shall quote the following:

e) Tajiks form approximately 7% of the population of the Russian regions of Turkistan. They are the direct descendants of the Aryan inhabitants of the country. They came here from Iran and occupied the southern tier of Central Asia from pre-historic times. Over the centuries, they have withstood many attacks, wars, and bloody uprisings, of which the atrocities of the Tatars and the Mongols are the worst. Many of them were assimilated into the invading forces and many others, under the pressure of the invaders, fled to the mountains of Turkistan and live under most difficult conditions. Nevertheless, they managed to preserve many of their original traits.152

f) From Baitik's The People of Turkistan. The estimated number of the Tajiks in the Ferghana region is 450,000. The number of Tajiks in the Samarqand region is 750,000, and the number of Tajiks elsewhere is estimated as 100,000. Altogether, the number of Tajiks is 1,300,000.

The inhabitants of Bukhara are those who live in the central mountains of Russian Turkistan, i.e., the remnants of their ancient tribes of the Tajiks and Uzbeks. Their appearance, life style, and habits, are not different from the Tajiks and Uzbeks of Russian Turkistan. The total population of Bukhara is 3,000,000. Of this approximately 70% is Tajik (about 2,100,000); nearly 25% is Uzbek (about 750,000); and the remaining 5% are people of other nationalities including the Jews of Bukhara, ancient tribes, and Russians...

Without exception, the Tajiks are a settled people, working as farmers, orchard and vineyard attendants, and livestock breeders. In the cities, in addition to livestock breeding, they trade in livestock as well. They live throughout Bukhara in districts where they can irrigate and plant. They constitute the basic population of Bukhara.

As mentioned above, the Tajiks are Iranian by race, speak Farsi, and are Sunni Muslims. They are the inhabitants of Bukhara.

g) Report of the Tajik Education Association to Barthold. The article by Palivanov about the appearance of the name Tashkent (p. 396). I believe that the first element of the name "Tashkent," at some point, has included the ethnic name (or a developed form of the meaning of the first ethnicity) (for further information see below) Taj or Tad(i) the very elements with which the name of the Tajiks is indicated.

My argument is based on the view of Academic Barthold ("Essay on the History of Tajiki," Chapter 2) who determines the history of this word in its Central Asian context as follows:

1) The structure of the old sound of the root in the form of "taj" with the artificial sound "taj-"(i);

2) Its original meaning (in the form of the name of the Arabic tribe of "tai," to be applied to Arabs in general as the conquerors; and

3) the evolution of this meaning in the context of Central Asia ("Arabs—conquering Muslims," "Iranians" including the local Iranian linguistic group, i.e., the Tajiks.

In relation to this material, it is noteworthy to mention with regard to the rural district of Surkhan Dariya that in some places all the inhabitants are Tajik and that the Tajiki names of the villages remain to this day. This is an indisputable fact. Those who need more information on this are referred to the article by Professor Malitskii, entitled, "The Districts of Tashkent."

"The all Russian Census materials," Tashkent, 1924, 4th printing," "The Inhabitants of the Villages of Ferghana."

The Tajiks, an Iranian people and kin to the Iranians, have lived in Turkistan from ancient times. Their descendants occupied the territory consisting of the regions of Ferghana, Samarqand, and the southeastern lands of the Syr Dariya. A portion of them were Turkicized, but the rest retained their language. But not recently… Because now they are found in some of the cities of the Samarqand region, in some parts of Ferghana, and in the river valleys of the mountainous Syr, Amu, and Zarafshan rivers, where they are pushed by the victors. The original Aryan image is retained by the Tajiks of the highlands of Samarqand, Eastern Bukhara, and Western Pamir.

4) A record of the activities of the People's Soviet Commissariat and the Economic Soviet of the Turkistan Republic until the first of October 1922. "The general local population are the Aryan Tajiks who have been driven to the highlands by the Turks. From ancient times, they have been agriculturists inhabiting the river valleys of the Amu, Syr, and Zarafshan rivers.

We can apply the name Tajik to the following towns: Samarqand, Panjkent, Urateppe, Khujand, and the region of Samarqand.

All this historical information indicates that the Tajiks were the settled inhabitants of Central Asia within the boundaries of the present-day republics of Central Asia.

Because in many places the Tajik population is no longer large, i.e., constitutes a small percentage of the population, it would be impossible to include them in Tajikistan. But in such areas as the rural districts of Samarqand, Bukhara, and Surkh Dariya, where the majority of the population is Tajik, their language is Tajiki, and, indeed, the literary language of the rest of the Tajiks, inclusion is necessary. It is necessary that the above-mentioned areas be included in Tajikistan SSR. The issue of the inclusion of Surkh Dariya into Tajikistan is political. Because the language of Afghanistan since ancient times has been Tajiki (Persian), and this language is the language of instruction, the inclusion of Surkh Dariya provides the base for establishing cultural relations with Afghanistan.
The statement of the Central Asian representative of the Gosplan to the Central Asian Commission, regarding the economic relations of Surkhan Dariya must also be taken into account.

"The economic ties of Surkhan Dariya with the separate regions of Uzbekistan and the other regions of Central Asia are weak, not to mention even the markets of the Union and of the world. Based on the reasons culled from the writings of many authors we now can make a general statement to the effect that the Surkhan Dariya district is a closed, complex region.

I believe that such arguments would have been accepted before the building of the Dushanbe railroad by individuals uninformed about the real reasons. We should recall that before the national-administrative divisions, Surkhan Dariya was a part of Eastern Bukhara which included the Bekdom of Hissar. Now, after the building of the railroad, the rural district of Surkhan Dariya is definitely a part of Eastern Bukhara which has become, economically and administratively, related to Tajikistan SSR.

There is no dispute concerning the rural districts of Samarqand and Bukhara, especially those parts that can be included in Tajikistan SSR. Their inclusion will fortify Tajikistan's economy. We can justify this thought by pointing out that, even today the governmental, scientific, and pedagogical literatures of the region are centered in Samarqand and produced with the help of the Tajiks of the region. In addition, every year, the People's Commissariat for Education recruits its teachers and scientific workers from among the Tajik teachers from Samarqand and Bukhara. Until this year, the special advanced courses for Tajik teachers were taught in Samarqand.

Now, I would like to turn to the 1926 materials regarding the national-administrative divisions, and the language issue and state why those data should not be taken into consideration.

Until the beginning of the First World War, in the countries of the East—Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Turkistan there appeared a movement known as Pan-Islamism. The main aim of the Pan-Islamists was the creation of an Islamic Empire ruled by a caliph (institution of a Turkish government), a government that would overthrow the rule of the Europeans. At the same time, while outwardly the intention of the Turkish countries was the unification of all the Muslim countries and the revival of the office of the caliph, inwardly Turkey and the countries with Turkish population, from Tataristan to the border of Afghanistan and from Constantinople to the Wall of China and Eastern Turkistan intended to create an independent and unified Turkic state.

In 1917, when the Revolution began in Russia, many freed Turkish prisoners of war gathered in Turkistan and, along with the jadids of Bukhara and Turkistan, began a movement that gained strength, especially with the direct support of neighboring Muslim lands like Afghanistan and India. The movement was joined by a number of other officers and generals who, for one reason or another, could not return to their
homeland of Turkey. For instance, the ex-Turkish Minister, General Kazimbek. The representatives of Germany in Kabul, along with Indian Pan-Islamists like Barakatulla and others also arrived. Other Turkish generals, Halim Pasha, Jamal Pasha, Enver Pasha, and others came from Berlin. They were accompanied by some Tatar Pan-Islamist elements. The Tatar anti-revolutionary elements gathered in Central Asia and, recognizing the importance of the moment, joined the anti-revolutionary elements of Russia.

As a result of this development, both Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism were recognized as anti-Soviet movements. This was because Pan-Islamic elements that had entered the Soviet government were supporting the Basmachis. Related to this, an effort got under way throughout Turkistan to change the language of instruction to Turkish. In the schools they used to teach Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist poems. However, a situation came about that intended to rally all the peoples of Central Asia around one nationality, Turkic.

On the eve of the national-administrative divisions, when the Basmachis and other major anti-revolutionary forces were defeated, and when the hopes of the Pan-Turkists were dashed, the Pan-Turkists became Pan-Uzbeks under the auspices of the Soviet revolution. As a result, all instruction in the schools of Turkistan was carried out through the medium of Uzbeki. The Tajiks were persuaded to identify themselves as Uzbeks. The influence of this persuasion was so intense that even some Tajik members of the soviets and the Party identified themselves as Uzbek and, indeed, served in leadership positions.

The chauvinistic persuasion methods of the Uzbeks, after the national-administrative divisions appeared in the following forms:

1) They said that in Uzbekistan there is room only for the Uzbeks. Those who call themselves Tajik will be sent to Tajikistan.
2) Those who wish to remain in Uzbekistan must accept Uzbeki as the official language. Therefore, the language of instruction is Uzbeki.
3) If research workers showed signs of nationalism, especially teachers, they were released from their duty and placed in positions in which language did not play a role. This was done mostly in Samarqand, Bukhara, and Khujand.
4) When officials were sent to Tajikistan on business, a rumor was circulated that the person was being exiled to Tajikistan due to his affiliation with Tajiks, or for having identified himself as a Tajik.

All of this created the impression that Tajikistan had become what the pre-Revolutionary Siberia used to be. The Tajiks who came to Uzbekistan to work identified themselves as Uzbek. As a result, we can see that at the time of the 1926 census, under the chauvinistic persuasion of the Uzbeks, the Tajiks identified themselves as Uzbeks. Another fact that is impossible to deny is that the Turkish and Uzbek Pan-Turkist and Pan-Uzbek intellectuals were not the only force pushing these ideologies. Tajik intellectuals not only promoted the movement, but after assimilation, they
became the spokespersons for it. Some of them, who had penetrated the Soviet and Party organizations, went so far as to state that no Tajiks live outside the boundary of the Tajik republic. They stated that there was no need for opening Tajik schools for Tajiks who lived in Uzbekistan. Additionally, they announced that no Tajiks lived within the rural districts of Samarqand and Bukhara.

Economics was the other reason for the Tajiks' willingness to change their identity to Uzbek. After the divisions, the region had become a hotbed of Basmachi activities; it also had been severed from all its cultural centers. No one desired to move to such a place, even though the Soviet and Party officials were trying very hard to assign cadres for the region. Because of this, in fact, many Tajik members of the Soviet and Party organizations identified themselves as Uzbeks so that they were not sent by the Soviet and Party organizations to Tajikistan. This, of course, affected the general public that also was trying to hide its identity.

If we consider the results of the 1915 census, we encounter the following: the 1915 Tajik population of Samarqand is 59,901; in 1917 that population is reduced to 4,475 and the Uzbek population is 3,301. This information is taken from The Population of the Samarqand Region, 1926, Academy of Sciences and Census of the Peoples of Turkistan, 1925, Academy of Sciences.

The 1926 census shows 10,263 Uzbek village administrations with a population of 43,304 and 1,290 Tajik village administrations with 10,716 inhabitants.

A review of the 1926 census indicates that some of the rural administrative units that were identified as Tajik by the 1920 census became Uzbek units by 1926. This is illustrated clearly by the soviets of Khaja Ahrar, Khishrav, Khaimar, and others (see, chart one).

The Soviet and Party resolution regarding this issue is at hand. It states that Samarqand and its environs should be divided into 9 to 11 districts.

The Tajik representatives believe that the city of Samarqand and its Tajik-speaking people must be included in Tajikistan and that Panjkent be included as an administrative unit.

When the Samarqand rural district joins Tajikistan, several Uzbek districts will also accompany it. Uzbek village soviets must be formed to meet the educational and economical needs of these people. About Bukhara and its environs suffice it to say that its population consists of Tajiks and other people (Iranians and Arabs) whose native language is Tajiki. Throughout the East, Old Bukhara is known as the city of the Tajiks and as their cultural and literary center. But even though the entire population speaks Tajiki, the 1926 census records it as an Uzbek city.153

For further evidence, I turn to a letter from Bukhara that was received by the former head of the People's Commissariat, Comrade Muhiddinov.

---

153 See Narodnoe Khazijastvo Srednej Azii (Central Asian Peoples Agriculture), 1924, No. 1, for evidence.
The author of the letter describes the demography of Bukhara and its environs. In response to the question about the percentage of the Bukharans who are Tajik, he provides the following clever remark, "The question should be asked in reverse," he exclaims. "Rather than asking what percentage of the population of Bukhara is Tajik, you should ask what percentage of the population of Bukhara is Uzbek?" By this reversal the author means that if the population of Bukhara is tens of thousands, only ten to fifteen individuals will be Uzbek. The percentage, according to the author, can be calculated, using those numbers.

Similar fallacious presentations are found in the other rural districts of Central Asia as well.