Afghanistan After the Taliban?

In keeping with his commitment to teach us about Central Asia through his books, articles, and classes, Professor Bashiri has been a frequent radio commentator on Central Asia both here and abroad, maintained a web site with resources for students and scholars in this area, and has generously offered many public lectures such as the one you are about to hear about Iran, Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics that combine a broad historic perspective from the ancient Persian empire, the middle ages to contemporary issues. This spring, Professor Bashiri offered a series of public lectures about Afghanistan that contextualized the civil war there from the standpoint of both history and present-day geopolitics. This afternoon Professor Bashiri will build on those past lectures and provide a much needed insight into the Afghanistan of the Taliban from the expert perspective of an accomplished Central Asian scholar. This afternoon's talk is entitled "Afghanistan After the Taliban?" It is a great pleasure and honor for me to introduce to you Professor Iraj Bashiri.

[applause]

Thank you Dean Parente for your eloquent, warm introduction. Let me also take this opportunity to thank Director Charles Speaks, Professor Gary Jahn, the Chair of our department, Barbara London, the Associate Administrator of the Institute, and Colleen Barrett. Thanks are due also to Carol, my wife, for her assistance both here and in Central Asia.

Introduction

Early in October, when I was asked to submit a title to our Institute for the following lecture, I suggested two titles: "Mujahids or Terrorists: The Afghan Quagmire" and "Afghanistan After the Taliban?" The latter title was chosen not so much because I was under the impression that the Taliban would be gone by the end of the month, but because the US is resolved to leave them no option but to bow out at some point. The question is: At that point? What should we do to bring a modicum of normalcy to the war-torn land?

Today I want to talk about three different things. Together the topics will cover a time period between the first days of Islam until yesterday. And they would seem to be topics not very much related to each other. But they are. They deal with issues that have plagued Muslim and non-Muslim communities for a long time. They also deal with problems that need resolution not only regarding the unsettled situation in Afghanistan but in a major part of our world comprising the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe.

The first issue that I would like to address has to do with the roots of terrorism in Islamic lands in medieval times. This preliminary foray into history is necessary to acquaint us with a particular mindset that has existed in the Middle East. Although this mindset is not something new over there, it is definitely quite new over here. After a brief discussion of the background of terror in that part of the world, it becomes apparent that the same 11th century pattern is being played out here. More than that, it becomes apparent that terrorists go about their business of scaring the populace by delegating specific tasks to a relatively small circle of devotees.

The second topic of discussion this afternoon is the aftermath of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that led to the rise of both the Mujahidin and the Taliban. The latter were destitute students in Pakistani refugee camps. They did not have the type of power, that is political power, necessary to capture territory, set up a government, and seek international recognition. So what is behind the rise of the Taliban? What is operating there?

The third and last topic has to do with Afghanistan's ethnically mixed population. The country has never enjoyed the type of quiet prosperity that other kingdoms in the region have been blessed with. In Afghanistan, settled and nomadic populations have to draw on the same meager resources for survival . It is natural for mixed populations in contact to develop differences ending up in conflict. I will not dwell on sorting out the settled and nomadic claims to the land but will go onto a discussion of the personalities who aspire to take the reins from the Taliban. At the end, if there is still time, I will introduce a sketch that might be useful for a gradual introduction of the rule of law into war-torn Afghanistan. What I will introduce, however, is idealistic; but sometimes we need to go to ideals in order to satisfy our bare necessities. To me, a quick resolution of the Afghan situation is a necessity.

Esoteric Teachings

As I said, the first topic of the lecture deals with medieval use of assassins to create terror in non-Arab Muslim communities that dominated the Islamic world. A major ingredient in the doctrines that were adhered to for the promotion of terror was esoteric teaching or ta'lim. For an understanding of esoteric teaching, therefore, let us go to the early days of Islam and become acquainted with the history of the Isma'ili branch of the Shi'ite sect of Islam. Then, with the esoteric teachings of the Isma'ilis as a background, we shall examine the life of Hassan-i Sabbah who, in many ways, foreshadows 21^st-century terrorists like Osma bin Laden. The parallels are so striking that one need not draw charts or present comparative tables to prove the point.

In order to see why the Isma'ilis chose to terrorize the Seljuq empire of their time consider the following chart, representing the development of the Shi'ite branch out of the main body of Islam and, ultimately, the Isma'ili branch out of the Shi'ite sect.

As the chart indicates, Allah sends al-Qur'an to the Muslim community of Mecca through the intermediacy of Prophet Muhammad. Right after the death of the Prophet, there is a heated debate as to who should succeed the Prophet. In a normal Arab setting, there would have been little need for such a debate. The succession question would have been settled through consensus. But the deciding body was not a hundred percent Arab. Since the takeover of Yemen by the Sassanians, Iranians had been involved in Arab affairs. Furthermore, by the time of the Prophet's unification of the Arab tribes, many Iranians had joined Islam. Their view of succession was different. They believed that the Prophet had special knowledge, esoteric knowledge that, in the future, could be accessed only through the bloodline of the Prophet. Iranian monarchs had ruled on this principle, known as the divine right of kings, for centuries. Their monarchs, they believed, had always had an open line to the wisdom of Ahura Mazda. The Muslim community, therefore, should, have an open line to the guidance of Allah, they preached.

Here is the question then. As Arabs, using consensus, we could have resolved the situation with little debate. As a mixed community, we have to listen to other arguments before we forge ahead with the consensus we have reached. Eventually this is how the situation was resolved. The larger body of Muslims, who are known as the Sunnis, decided to go with Abu Bakr, a companion of the Prophet, a pious man whom the Prophet had chosen to lead Friday prayers whenever he himself had been unable to lead. As a result, they bypassed Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, who would have been chosen had the bloodline argument been accepted.

After this initial choice all seems to have fallen into place. Two more caliphs were chosen before Ali was given a chance at leading the Muslim community after the Prophet. If Ali had stayed in power long enough to pave the way for the succession of his sons al-Hassan and al-Hussein to the caliphate, Islam would have remained whole, albeit its teachings would be different today. But Ali was assassinated and the followers of the sunna of the Prophet, the majority, took matters into their own hand, putting the caliphate on the course that Abu Bakr and Umar had prepared for it. The Shi'ites (followers) of Ali were left on their own to organize their affairs, mostly clandestinely, under the rule of the descendants of Ali. And that is what the Shi'ites did after the AD 661 split.

This is a brief history leading to the split that today we refer to as the Shi'ite/Sunnite dichotomy. We are, however, only about halfway in our history which seeks an understanding of the Isma'ilis, a branch of the Shi'ite sect. More than that, we want to trace the esoteric knowledge that the early Shi'ites believed could be accessed by the descendant of Saint Ali. Even more importantly, should there be an attempt to restore, as it were, the integrity of the line of succession to the House of Ali, i.e., restore the bloodline and access to esoteric knowledge, what form should that struggle take?

After the murder of Saint Ali, this is the situation. The Shi'ites led by Ali's son, al-Hussein, confront the Sunnites in a famous battle at Karbala (in present-day Iraq) and lost. On the Sunni side, the caliphate continued in the manner that it had been operating before Ali. The Shi'ites, too, codified their own rules and, mostly in hiding for fear of Sunnite reprisals, carried on their affairs. Imams or saints followed each other, each adding his wisdom to the collective knowledge initiated by Allah through the Qur'an and the Prophet. Little happens that would jeopardize the unity of the small community until the 6th Imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq, chooses his son Isma'il to succeed him. When Isma'il passes away prematurely, he appoints his other son, Musa al Kazam. While the main body of the Shi'ites accept Musa Al-Kazam, a minority chooses to remain loyal to Isma'il's son, forming the Isma'ili branch of Shi'ite Islam. Known as the seveners, today we find them in Yemen, Syria, Iran, India, Central Asia, and Pakistan. They follow the dictates of Aqa Khan, the 49^th Imam in Isma'ili line of succession.

The fortune of the Isma'ilis was changed by the rise of the Fatimid dynasty (AD 909-1171) in Egypt, a dynasty that attributed its legitimacy to rule through Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet and the wife of Saint Ali. After building their capital city of Cairo in 969, the Fatimids began a program of expanding the Isma'ili teachings (ta'lim) far and wide, especially into Syria, Persia, and what is today Central Asia. They claimed that the esoteric knowledge known through Al-Kazam, the saints preceding him, Ali, and the Prophet now resides within the house of Isma'il. In addition, they made no secret that they intended to expand their teachings at the expense of the Sunni Arabs and Turks to restore to the House of Ali what had been its legitimate right. They intended to restore to the Islamic community its right to be ruled by rulers who have access to divine knowledge.

One young man who heard the call of the Isma'ilis of Egypt was Hassan-i Sabbah, a native of the city of Ray, a town in the south of present-day Tehran. To complete his knowledge, Hassan traveled to Egypt in 1086 and returned to Iran with definite ideas regarding the promotion of the faith at the expense of the Seljuq Turks. The Seljuq Turks, it should be added, dominated not only Iran of the time but the caliphate in Baghdad as well. Here is Hassan-i Sabbah's main problem: How can a small group of dedicated people affect the world situation so that the teachings of Ali and his descendants would receive the attention they deserved? In addition, how can this same task be accomplished so that infidel Turks would have no choice but to leave the Islamic lands, so that the integrity of Islamic lands could be restored? The task was daunting, but it could be accomplished.

In pursuit of his plan, Hassan-i Sabbah used the succession of Nizar as a reason to break away from Cairo. He then formalized Isma'ili esoteric teachings into a hierarchy of knowledge at the apex of which were Allah and the Prophet, the middle was occupied by the saints, and the lower ranks by Hujjats followed by da'is. Only the latter would be used for the dissemination of knowledge at the community level. Recruits were directed to learn more from higher level da'is and hujjats. It is reported that he also created a "paradise" of sorts in which women, boys, food, and hashish were at the disposal of all those who succeeded in making the grade. Finally, for his headquarters, he chose a place as far from the reach of the Seljuq Sultan as possible, a fortress from which he could rule his shadowy empire but from which he could not be easily extracted.

The Alamut fortification in northwestern Iran has been well-known for the sheer precipices that surround it, as well as for the supply of water and grain that could sustain large numbers of people for a considerable period of time. Hassan-i Sabbah infiltrated the fortress and, within a short time, displaced its keeper. As the lord of Alamut then, he set about establishing his administration, military, training camps, and "paradise". Within a short time after Hassan's appearance in Alamut, it was not unusual to meet a person in the city of Isfahan, for example, a person who would fascinate you with the extent of his knowledge about very ordinary things. The magical properties of the number 7 (recall the Isma'ilis are also known as the seveners) usually began the conversation.

What the individual did not know was that he was being recruited by an Isma'ili da'i who would refer him to higher da'is to further his knowledge. The knowledge he would learn, now we know, consisted among other things of the caliph's infringement on the rights of the descendants of the Prophet, the havoc unleashed by Seljuq Turks in Islamic lands, and the "paradise" that awaits the truly faithful. A paradise that once the individual sets foot in it, he would not want to leave. Indeed, if the individual happened to be the right recruit, he would end up in that hashish-laden paradise, he would be served by beautiful women and boys in such luxury that he could not imagine. Unfortunately, before long that wonderful world was taken away. To return to paradise, he would be told, requires the performance of a task, a task that assures the Hujjat of the recruit's unflinching loyalty. And that task was the murder of a prominent member of the Seljuq administration. The murder of Nisam al-Mulk, the powerful wazir of the realm, is a telling example of the deeds of the recruits of Hassan-i Sabbah.

The English word "assassin" comes from the word "hashshashin" or consumers of hashish. The task that the recruit was to perform was to assassinate a named prominent dignitary of the Seljuq empire, remain with the murdered figure and announce his dastardly deed. Obviously, the people converging from various parts tore the assassin to pieces, an act that, for the assassin, was tantamount to return to paradise without question. After all, the assassin did not want to disappoint either himself, his lord at Alamut, or his mother who knew his son was embarking on a dangerous course to further a worthy cause. This attitude still exists in the Middle East today.

Hassan-i Sabbah was not the type of person who could be dismissed as unhinged, bloodthirsty, or in pursuit of power. Rather, he was a pious and just (he executed his two sons for transgression) person. His activities show that he was cruel, calculating, decisive, as well as extremely devoted to the Isma'ili cause. More than all, he was staunchly anti-Turkish.

Fortresses like Alamut, with similar da'i systems for esoteric teaching, were instituted throughout the land of the Seljuqs. And from these fortresses assassins were sent to towns to kill prominent figures in bright light of the day. Theirs was the kind of terror against which there was no defense. The assassin remained on the scene until he was eliminated. Another terror stemmed from reports received from prominent members of the community who had received assassination notices. In these cases, Hassan's messenger arrived at night when unsuspecting lords were sleeping in their secure homes. In the morning they found a dagger and a note beside the bed. The note read something to the effect that: "I was here tonight, I can be here again tomorrow night!" That is the message of death that traveled throughout the empire and no one could do much about it. Is this not like the terror that has engulfed our community? Is not our Fatimid Egypt, Saudi Arabia? Are we not dealing with a neo-Hassan-i Sabbah in the person of Osama bin Laden? Is not Afghanistan serving bin Laden as an impenetrable Alamut? Is not drug trafficking a major player in the operations of the bin Laden group? Isn't the network that bin Laden has created very much like that of Hassan-i Sabbah only at the level of an international 21^st century operation? Are not the means used by present-day terrorists as diverse as those of the stranglers of Syria, the stabbers of Persia, and others?

The end of the assassins came with the onslaught of the Mongol hordes as they moved more and more into Islamic domains. The last Assassin leader was forced down the mountain by Hulagu Khan, grandson of Chingiz from the House of Tuli Khan.

Our discussion so far shows that esoteric teaching (and that's my point here) created by a small, unimportant group dedicated to a cause, as Hassan-i Sabbah and his recruits were devoted to the cause of the Ismailis, can engulf a community in an atmosphere of fear and bewilderment. After all, many political, social, and psychological factors contribute to the rise of terror in a community. Take for instance nationalism, i.e., forces that threaten a major ethnic group or a group of people who endeavor to create a nation. Any time that they are forced to abandon this notion, they are likely to respond to the threat with the type of force that we talked about, with terrorism. Seljuq Turks, as we said, dominated Islam at that time, and today many say that the west (I'm not talking about the US as such) but the West dominates the Middle East and, indeed the world, in a way that leaves the Muslims no option but to take action in the same way that the charismatic Hassan-i Sabbah did. They feel they must take the matters into their own hand.

[Question from the audience: "What is the nature of the argument that we damaged Islam? How has the West damaged Islam?"

Ideology, Islamic ideology in this case, would be another thing that when infringed upon would provoke strong reactions from the people involved.

Rapid social change, If you just imagine the changes that have taken place since the 1960's in this country, the rapid pace of modernization, westernization, sovietization, and all the other "izations" that have been going on, those are things that are forcing values to be changed. If people are traditionally bound and do not want to give up the values with which they are comfortable, they are not going to stay silent and allow them be discarded. So rapid change is one of the reasons.

Unequal growth in economy. We can see nations in the world that by the mere fact that they have capital add to their wealth daily, and other nations, by the mere reason that they cannot compete, are going down daily. It is natural for the have-nots of the world to raise against the haves and if they cannot do it in a way that is tantamount to the power that exists, then they will have to resort to powers that might be able to equalize. And that is the situation that might arise, that terrorism might eventually be able to supply the power that they lack.

Technology. A major thing. Technology in the West is growing very rapidly, and the East cannot catch up. What can the East do? It can either suffer or it can use the West's technology against itself. It can take Western technology, Western-made airplanes, for example, and use them as a weapon against a system that it cannot cope with. So technology can also have it's own down side as did the others. Rapid westernization, modernization, and globalization are the hallmarks of the 21^st Century. Inability to create a global view of the factors outlined above, i.e., nationalism, ideology, economy, and education, I believe, would lead to nowhere but to an ever more dangerous global society.

Wahhabi Teachings

Now a totally different subject. Afghanistan the way it was and the way it is. Afghanistan is not a homogenous land like everywhere else. Rather than the head of one ethnic group dominating the rest of the population, seven or eight or more chiefs vie for power incessantly. The country is a patchwork that was put together at the end of the 19th century by the British and the Russians. It was the outcome of what is usually referred to as the "Great Game". London on one side and St. Petersburg on the other side were seeking hegemony in what is today Central Asia and Afghanistan. The "First World War" would have happened much earlier, if these super powers had not decided to create a buffer between their empires and cease hostilities. That is how Afghanistan came into existence as a zone of interest. Thus the Afghanistan that came into existence was a divided; its north was under the influence of Russia and its southern Muslims and its south was influenced by Britain from her Indian dominion. That north-south aspect remains in Afghan politics to this day. However, the fact that the north is comprised of mostly settled Tajiks and Uzbeks and the south of primarily nomadic Pushtuns makes matters more complex than they originally were.

In 1919, Afghanistan became independent, later to be ruled by a monarch. In 1973, the monarch, Zahir Shah, was ousted by his cousin. At about the same time, the Soviet Union that had been involved in humanitarian assistance in northern Afghanistan since 1919, decided to add a socio-political dimension to its activities. As a result, a program of Sovietization was introduced into the country that divided an already disunited people even more. For instance, Dari Persian, the language of northern Afghanistan, was given preference over Pushtu, the language of the majority. Furthermore, the ruling class was changed from predominantly Pushtun to a mix with the Tajiks in control. When the Muslim Afghans rose against the Soviets, their revolts were crushed and their Islamic institutions were weakened.

In 1979, as we know, the Red Army rolled into Afghanistan to prevent an expansion of Iranian fundamentalist thinking into Afghanistan. Iran's hypothetical move had the potential of expanding Shi'ite fundamentalism into Central Asia, a factor that could drag the Soviet Union into a Communist/Muslim conflict with Iran. So the Soviets executed a "preventative" measure. That measure, however, proved to be a mistake in the final analysis; and it cost them dearly. The history of the Soviets in Afghanistan need not detain us here. Suffice it to say that their departure in 1989, after ten years of a war that was getting nowhere, created a power vacuum in which two groups fought for dominance. These were actually two old contenders of which one was being abandoned while the other was strengthened. We know them as the Islamic Mujahidin versus the remnants of the Soviet-trained Afghan army headed by Najibullah.

Najibullah was asked by the Soviets to take control and to defend Afghanistan using the leftover Soviet armament. He was also promised Soviet funds but that apparently never materialized. The Mujahidin were helped by the American Central Intelligence Agency, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Each country helping with a different aim. The United States was making sure that there would be no resurgence of Communist rule, Pakistan wanted control of the Pushtun population of Afghanistan to prevent any flare up of the Pushtunistan problem, and Saudi Arabia wanted to expand its brand of religion, Wahhabism, into Afghanistan, Central Asia, and beyond. An understanding of the contributions of the Saudis is of particular importance for us in that it helps us understand the dynamics of the modern terror emanating from the Taliban-supported terrorist groups in Afghanistan.

What the Saudis did was this. They used the innocent children of destitute Afghans in Pakistani refugee camps as a captive audience for their esoteric Wahhabi teachings. The Pakistanis, glad to receive large sums for the upkeep of the camps, helped the process gain momentum. Before long, the foundation of a twenty-first-century version of the network of Hassan-i Sabbah that had plagued the Seljuq lands in the eleventh century was in place. A call for assistance at the international level is all that was needed. That call went out from bin Laden. In response, large groups of Muslims converged on Afghanistan to further the cause of Islam.

In the same way that Isma'ilism is a sect of Shi'ite Islam, Wahhabism is a sect of Sunnite Islam; but it is one of the most strict sects. Many of the ordinary things of life: wearing colorful clothes and jewelry, watching TV, listening to music, consumption of alcohol, even flying a kite, are frowned upon by Wahhabi law. Ironically, the Mujahidin who intended to de-Sovietize Afghan society, were welcomed by the populace. And Najibullah, who was trying to hold on to values that had been gained with the help of the Soviets, was shunned. The U.S., of course, sided with the Mujahidin. In 1992, the Mujahiddin defeated Najibullah and entered Kabul. Najibullah took refuge in the United Nations Mission. Only when the Mujahidin insisted that women should wear the burqa, that men had to grow a beard; whether they could grow a beard or not was their problem, did the Afghan see that extent of their mistake. The Mujahidin then systematically cut women from education, the labor force, and all social functions. They went even beyond that by entering their homes, raping young women and looting property. In short, as a part of their program of de-Sovietization, the Mujahidin threw out all the vestiges of the civilization that had been painstakingly gained by the forefathers out of the window. Needless to say that the harsh treatment doled out by the Mujahidin forced more and more Afghans into Pakistan and more and more children into Pakistani refugee camps where, gradually, the Wahhabi thought was becoming the dominant philosophy.

By 1994, the United States, no longer worried about a resurgence of Communism, gradually left the scene. But Saudi Arabia, having created the niche it wanted, continued to funnel funds in, delivered by young Saudis like Osama bin Laden and general camp instructors. Left alone, Pakistan became worried. What could happen to Pakistan's stability were Afghanistan to expand its Mujahidin's brand of Wahhabi fanaticism? The situation had the potential of destabilizing not only Pakistan, but also the already shaky republics in Central Asia that had only recently emerged, after the fall of the Soviet Union. Something needed to be done to curb the power of the Mujahidin. But what?

The answer to that question, after much deliberation, was to send the Taliban into Afghanistan to displace the Mujahidin and to establish true, albeit moderate, Islamic rule. The type of rule that had been taught in the refugee camps. After all, the Taliban were among the best students of theology that the camps could offer. They could win the situation for both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the two main nations that supported them until shortly after September 11, 2001.

That is how the Taliban, a ragtag band, rose against the Mujahidin from the Pushtun stronghold of Qandahar and, in 1994, captured the strategic city of Herat. For the next two years the Mujahidin and the Taliban fought for the control of the rest of Afghanistan, devastating not only the infrastructure of the country, but also the capital of Kabul.

Eventually, in September 1996, the Taliban won the battle, entered Kabul and, as the first order of business, hanged both Najibullah and his brother in the Kabul public square. The defeated Mujahidin moved to the Panjshir Valley in the Persian-speaking northeast. There they formed the United Front or the Northern Alliance. So, as the history of their atrocities testifies, it would not be inappropriate to classify the Northern Alliance alongside the Taliban, maybe one notch down. When I think about the possibility of the Mujahidin taking control of Afghanistan after the Taliban, I shudder for the common Afghan. What kind of progress would have we made?

Pakistan, however, was not the only beneficiary of a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. A sinister alliance was formed, in 1996, between the Taliban religious leader Mulla Muhammad Omar and the Yemeni-born Saudi millionaire Osma bin Muhammad bin Laden. Based on this "treaty," bin Laden create al-Qaida, or the "base," a network very much the same as the network of Hassan-i Sabbah, albeit a 21^st century version and, of course, at an international level. Al-Qaida has operatives everywhere in the world today with the same lethal power that emanated from Hassan-i Sabbah's Alamut and from Fatimid Cairo. Al-Qaeda bases are found in the United States, Europe, and South America, as well as in Malaysia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Lybia, and Israel. Below are some of the parallels: Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism serve bin Laden in the same way that Egypt and Isma'ilism served Hassan-i Sabbah. Afghanistan for bin Laden and his terrorists has been as safe sound a stronghold as Alamut was for Hassan. The use of narcotics is basic two both sides. This is the situation in Afghanistan as its history and the history of its subjugation to fundamentalist thinking is concerned.

Afghan Ethnicity

Moving now into the ethnic composition of Afghanistan. There are a number of large and small ethnic groups out of which we shall begin our discussion with the four most prominent groups. The Uzbeks of Afghanistan are a spillover from the main body of Uzbeks that today populate the Republic of Uzbekistan to the northwest. They form about 6% of the population or 1.6 million. The Tajiks are to the east of the Uzbeks. The min body of Tajiks, again, is in the Republic of Tajikistan to the northeast. The two Tajik bodies are about the same in number. The Tajiks of Afghanistan are about 25% of the population or, roughly 6.5 million. The Hazaras, a remnant of the Horde of Ghingiz Khan, occupy the central highlands. They are mostly Shi'ite with some sunni'tes living among them. Even though only 19% of the population, or 5 million, the Hazara have played a major role in the recent history of Afghanistan. And they are likely to play a major role in the outcome of the battle for Afghanistan this time around as well. The great contenders for political power in Afghanistan are the Pushtuns in the south. As was the case with the Uzbeks and the Tajiks, the main body of the Pushtuns is outside Afghanistan in Pakistan. That is why the Pakistanis are such a great supporter of the Pushtuns of Afghanistan. In fact, the formation of a nation called Pushtunistan has been plaguing both countries as early as the 1950's. The Pushtuns form 38% of the population or 10 million.

With regard to the further breakdown of Afghan ethnicity it should be born in mind that each of these groups is composed of settlement cluster (in the case of the north) and tribal clusters (in the case of the south). The Pushtun tribal confederation, for instance, is divided into Duranis and Qilzais. And, as the following map by Louis Dupres shows, each tribe consists of a large numbers of lineages, clans, and families.

Any government that is to be put in place to rule the region must be able to respond to the needs of all these settled (north) and nomadic (south) groups. It must understand that these groups are loyal to their leaders and chiefs first and foremost. It is these heads and chiefs that must learn government and must reorganize the affairs of the Afghans. And, ultimately, it is from among this diverse group that Afghan nationalism must take root. With those points in mind, let us now examine the credentials and the capabilities of the individuals who aspire to bring normalcy to Afghanistan.

	King Mohammad Zahir Shah Age: 87 Ethnicity: Pushtun Current location: exiled in Rome He is a member of the Durrani dynasty who ruled Afghanistan between 1933 and 1973 In 1973, he abdicated after his cousin staged a coup; since then he has been living in Italy Zagir Shah has made several unsuccessful attempts in recent years at reconciling the warring Afghan groups Today, he is a United States and Pakistani favorite; a possible rallying point for diverse Afghan interest to converge Two questions remain: Will present-day Afghans behave in the same way that the Afghans of the 1930's to the 1970's behaved? And will the king's cronies be allowed to participate in the new venture?
	Burhanuddin Rabbani Age: 61 Ethnicity: Tajik He is an Islamic scholar and poet who insists on the use of either the title "doctor" or "professor" be attached to his name He is the ex-president of Afghanistan (1992-94), who was driven from Kabul in 1996 by the Taliban He has the distinction to be the first and only non-Pushtun to rule Afghanistan in 250 years He is currently located in exile in Tajikistan Rabbani holds the Afghanistan seat at the United Nations The United Nations, the United States, and most foreign governments recognize his party, the United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, as Afghanistan's only legitimate party As member of the Northern Alliance, Rabbani is favored by Russia and India
	Pir Seyed Ahmad Gailani Age: 67 Ethnicity: Pushtun Current location: Pakistan Gailani is the spiritual head of a minority Sufi Muslim sect in Afghanistan He is a relatively moderate leader and the chief of the United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan Party Over time, he has urged the former king, Mohammad Zahir Shah, to broaden his political base As a Western favorite, Gailani would make a good interim prime minister
	Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Age: Born in the mid-1940's Ethnicity: Pushtun Current location: exiled in Iran He is the ex-prime minister of Afghanistan, a hard-line Islamic hero In Afghan eyes, he is the warlord responsible for destruction of much of the capital city of Kabul in post-Soviet civil war He was overthrown when rival militia leader Burhanuddin Rabbani assumed power Hikmatyar led the Hezb-e-Islami, a fundamentalist faction of the Mujahidin He continues to believes bin Laden may be unjustly accused He is favored by Pakistan and the Pushtuns His administration would retain some of the Taliban Question: Will the Afghans forget his past, as he believes they should?
	Abdurrashid Dostum Age: 47 Ethnicity: Uzbek Current location: Northwest Afghanistan Dostum fought alongside Najibullah until the latter's fall to the Mujahidin Currently, he is the Vice Chairman of United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan As a former Soviet general turned warlord, he was based in the northern city of Mazar-i Sharif before he was ousted by the Taliban A prominent commander of the Northern Alliance, he is known for his brutality during the civil war Dostum is a secularist who openly uses alcohol
	Ismail Khan Age: 54 Ethnicity: Tajik Current location: Afghanistan One of the more famous anti-Soviet Mujahidin Before he was ousted by the Taliban, he was the former governor of the northwestern city of Herat Currently, he is the only general in the Northern Alliance to have gained some ground against Taliban-held territories in his region around Ghur. Isma'il Khan has called on the United States for "military aid" rather than for troops
	Abdul Haq Age: was 43 Ethnicity: Pushtun A Western favorite Current location: recently returned to Pakistan from the United Arab Emirates A lot of hope was pinned on his ability to return Zahir Shah to Afghanistan Once a renowned guerrilla fighter against the Soviets, he had lost his right foot to a land mine His wife and one son were killed by masked intruders in 1999 Abdul Haq Was captured in Taliban territory where he was seeking support for Zahir Shah on October 21, 2001 Was executed on charges of spying for the United States within hours His funeral was on the day preceding this lecture

A Plan for Afghanistan

What the United Nations and the United States can do for Afghanistan, I believe, is first to send a UN/Muslim Peacekeeping force to Afghanistan. This force is of great importance for creating a body in the country that is not partial to any of the forces that we talked about. With that force in place, there is need for the creation of a Reconciliation Committee consisting of both Afghans and non-Afghans, especially from among the Muslim nations neighboring Afghanistan--Central Asia, Pakistan, Iran--as well as China, Europe, and the United States. The task of the Reconciliation Committee would be twofold. It would write up a constitution for Afghanistan and it would form a Loya Jirga, a governing body of 120 to 200 out of all eligible Afghans who aspire to contribute to the rebuilding of Afghanistan. The Loya Jirga is what the Afghans recognize as their parliament. Whenever they sit to discuss affairs, they come to a Loya Jirga. What is new about this Loya Jirga is that rather than Afghans form a Loya Jirga, something that they have failed over and over in forming, an impartial, first Loya Jirga be constituted for them. This Loya Jirga could institute two main branches or bureaus. A Bureau of Provincial Affairs and a Bureau of Tribal Affairs. The Bureau of Provincial Affairs would attend to the affairs of the settled population consisting in the main of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Farsiwans, some Baluch and some Hazaras. The Bureau of Tribal Affairs would take care of the nomadic Aimaq, Ghilzai and Durrani Pushtuns, the nomadic Baluch and Hazara, and the Kyrgyz minority in the far northeast.

Within this system, any discussion that arises at the village, town, and city levels would be taken care of at the Bureau of Provincial Affairs. Similarly, the Bureau of Tribal Affairs would resolves the problems of the nomads at family, clan, and lineage levels. These are petty differences but, as matters stand, result in urban uprisings and tribal conflicts. Problems that remain unresolved at bureaus then would find their way to the Loya Jirga.

The Larger Picture

What could the rest of the world do to help? The Russians could direct their assistance through Tajikistan. They can resolve the Tajik-Afghan border problem as well as help the Tajiks of Afghanistan to become self-sufficient. The United States could help the Uzbeks of Afghanistan through the intermediacy of Uzbekistan. Similarly, Iran could help the Farsiwans, etc. Pakistan has been very keen in helping the Pushtuns. Under this plan, the Pakistanis could close the refugee training camps and repatriate Pushtun refugees. China can help the Kyrgyz.

We should not, however, delude ourselves. Politics at the world level is not simple. Neither is it as benevolent. Kashmir is giving both India and Pakistan a great deal of trouble. What if, rather than dealing with Pakistan and India, the Kashmiris decide to join the fundamentalists of Pushtunistan and the emerging Muslim people of Uighuristan in Xinjiang? What would be the result of such a union on the republics of Central Asia and on India, Pakistan, and Iran?

As you can see, we are walking on dangerous grounds here. A war that has started as a good-will measure to help the Afghans oppressed by the Taliban and to stem the tide of terrorism emanating from Saudi Arabia might escalate into a war in which Muslims from Indonesia to Morocco and westerners from Tajikistan to San Francisco would find a cause to participate in. The task at hand is, therefore, not to allow that happen by bringing a modicum of normalcy to Afghanistan and other turbulent regions and by identifying the international sources of terrorism and nip them in the bud. Thank you!

Questions and Answers:

Question: I think that in order to do what you say, which I think sounds very viable, we still need to address the underlying concern of the Western influence on fundamental Islam and in order to bring in a moderate, I think that's going to be a crucial issue. What do you think? And how could that be addressed, what are the major concerns? How can we address those?

Answer: That is not an easy question to answer. I have been watching the situation for 30 years. We have major problems to resolve. We have the Palestinian Israeli situation to resolve, the Chechnya problem to resolve, the Afghan-Tajik situation to resolve, the Bosnian situation to resolve. These are all emanations of the same problem in various parts of the world. We have to create tenable situations in these places as well as in Afghanistan. Let us not forget that what I said is ideal, and I'm not naive to say that the Taliban would be gone any time soon. Just consider Iraq after Sadam and compare that to Afghanistan after the Taliban. Additionally, we cannot dismiss the Taliban altogether, as Afghans, they still need to be accommodated. And some of them, especially the younger generation that has seen little of the real world, although working as bureaucrats for the Taliban today, can become good servants for any government that might come to power.

Question: Exactly what ethnic background is the Taliban?

Answer: Pushtun

Question: Did I understand you to say that there are no women Taliban?

Answer: That is right. Women are not allowed in high-level administration. There are many women who served as doctors, lawyers, teachers, etc. before the Mujahidin takeover but, today, they are staying at home. They are not in society either as a part of ruling elite or as contributors to the work force.

Question: When were you last in Afghanistan?

Answer: I was not in Afghanistan. At the beginning of this semester, I was in Tajikistan, which is on the northern border of Afghanistan.

Question: What is the relationship between the Taliban and Iran?

Answer: Not good because of a number of factors including the brand of Islam the Taliban promote and the murder of a group of Iranians for which the Taliban have not produced any rationale.

Question: Is there a hierarchy of power, economically, politically related to the number of ethnic groups in Afghanistan? You said that the Pushtun make up the Taliban.

Answer: It depends on who is in power. The Pushtuns have been in power most of the time and the rest have been trying to seize the power from them. The only time there has been a change is when [Burhanuddin] Rabbani, a non-Pushtun Tajik, became the president of the republic for a short while. Whatever tribe is in power has all the perks that go with the job. Besides, family is very important in that part of the world so if you are a Pushtun in a rulership position, you will bring all Pushtuns to your administration and create a Pushtun hierarchy. There has been cleansing of non-Pushtuns to achieve total dominance.

Question: [In] what part has there been cleansing?

Answer: I would say in the northern part, especially the north-northeast. Mostly among the Tajiks of the Northern Alliance.

Question: The US looks like is under increasing pressure to commit ground troops. Is that the wrong path? Should the US and the British get bin Laden? What would be the implications for the war on terrorism if they don't get him?

Answer: Catching bin Laden is very much like catching Hassan-i Sabbah in his fortress in Alamut. I don't think catching Hassan-i Sabbah those days would have helped alleviate the terror of the assassins. They worked within a network independent of Hassan-i Sabbah. Today, too, they can easily work independently. Each part of the network has it's own Hujjat and da'is.

Question: Catching Osama bin Laden would feel good?

Answer: It would feel good but it's not the answer.

Question: The ground war?

Answer: I hope they don't; because everyone--the British, the Soviets, the Russians, all the way to Alexander the Great, have tried to win a ground war in Afghanistan and have failed. My fear is that troops go there and be taken hostage in large numbers in caves where we won't know where they are and what they do. I don't want to even think about that.

[Explanation: by ground war we mean hand-to-hand combat in the manner of the Soviets and the British, not operating behind the lines.]

Question: I thought I understood that Saudi Arabia is doing some of the funding of some of the aspects of this unrest or the current power situation in Afghanistan. What's the Saudi's interest? Are they mad at us or do they want to keep the fighting somewhere else?

Answer: No. They want to keep the fighting somewhere else. The Wahabbi sect that we're talking about is the religious wing sharing power with a more secular ruling class in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, in matters of religion and mass appeal, the Wahhabis are stronger than the Saudi rulership. In the 1990's, the rulership decided to send some of the Wahhabi zealots somewhere else. And that somewhere else happened to be Afghanistan. Besides, as we saw, the reasons for the expansion of Wahhabism are very much the same as the reasons for the expansion of Ismailism under the Fatimids of Egypt.

Question: How effective do you think the CIA has been since Communism?

Answer: I do not have a great deal of information on that.

Question: I understand what you say, but currently the Taliban is getting right up where the Northern Alliance is fighting them and they are begging for the US to help with ground troops. If we don't put ground troops, we'll have to do generalized bombing in the area which means hitting the Northern Alliance, and civilians' families, children. What do you see as right? If we don't put ground troops what should you say to do?

Answer: If I knew, that would be great. I would just telephone and say this is what you should do. There is a lot we don't know--including the question on CIA. In the total decision making, the larger picture that I see is that we need to consider Pakistan's interest, Kashmir, Xinjian, and the Iranian situation. Those are the things that need to be considered before a new ruling body is introduced into Afghanistan. The hope was that that could be done after the initial bombing. After all everyone thought that the Taliban would be gone by then. But since that has not happened, the second part of the plan cannot happen. The Afghan people themselves are a peaceful people, and no doubt they have suffered a great deal already. There are no more meaningful places left to bomb.

What needs to be done? I'm not sure; but I know that the larger picture is the more important picture to consider. We should by no means give Islamic fundamentalism the reason it seeks to network and, eventually, appear as a deluge coming at us from both the southeast and the southwest of Afghanistan.

Question: Have you had or will you have the opportunity to present what you've said here, especially your suggestion on the future, to anybody in our government in Washington?

Answer: No.

Question: Would you like to?

Answer: They are welcome to it. I am looking at the situation not as an Afghan or an American or an Iranian but as one who has studied Afghan society over time. I know how they have ruled themselves before and what their situation was like when everything was working. That life, I believe, can be restored. But it has to be restored from the top, not from the bottom up.

Question: How about Sadam Hussein in Iraq? Should we go after him while we're at it?

Answer: I think if they can prove that he has been involved in the damages that have come to this country not long ago, they should go after him. No question.

Question: What is the relation between bin Laden and the Taliban? Is it ideological or is it just more than pride that they'll not turn over bin Laden?

Answer: On the part of the Afghans, especially the Pushtuns, it is pride. They have to follow the rules of "Pushtunwali," according to which you cannot hand over even a murderer who has sought refuge at your tent. On the part of bin Laden, it is restoration of integrity. Bin Laden thinks that the world of Islam (the same way that Hassan-i Sabbah was thinking) is invaded by infidels and that the cities of Medina and Mecca are no longer in control of Saudi Arabia and of the Arabs as they should be. He sees the existence of foreign troops in his homeland and he sees the bombing of Iraq. For him all of these fall into the same category. His reason, therefore, is not so much pride but evolves something that motivates jihad. And jihad is not for pride; it is for the restoration of the integrity of Islam.

Question: I have a question about the use of the word jihad. I've been told that it means holy war, but to many practicing Muslims it can mean struggle with self.

Answer: The actual meaning of jihad is struggle with the self. That you be a pious Muslim, that you not transgress the rules of Islam, and that you bring into the fold those who transgress. That is the so-called greater meaning of jihad. The lesser meaning is to fight with infidels who infringe upon the integrity of Islam. I should add that there must be much more at stake, substantially, than the political needs of a Saddam, or Khomeini, or bin Laden for Muslims to go to jihad.

Question: Is there a less religious or esoteric word to describe the kind of war that bin Laden and his supporters have declared?

Answer: Yes. It's called terrorism.

[laughter]

Question: Does he [bin Laden] call himself a Shi'ite?

Answer: No. The example I gave was from the Shi'ite branch of Islam. That was to show how a small group might have to resort to terror to fight a larger, more powerful group. Bin Laden is a Wahabbi. Wahhabism is an offshoot of the Hanbali sect of Sunni Islam.

Question: Were you surprised that Iran offered its support to the US, since they've been enemies for so long?

Answer: No. Iran and the US, in the last four or five years, have been trying to mend some of their difficulties and, I think, that's part of that mending of walls.

Associate Dean Parente: If there are no more questions, then thank you for coming.

[Applause]