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[As background, see: Fine
Analysis of Objects of Cognition: Gelug and Non-Gelug Presentations in
Alternating Order.]
Preface
The Tibetan explanations of the appearance and cognition
of nonexistent phenomena fall broadly into two camps: Gelug and non-Gelug
(Sakya, Nyingma, and Kagyü).
Neither Gelug nor non-Gelug, however, presents a uniform
explanation. Several masters within each camp have explained specific
points slightly differently in their commentaries. Here, as a foundation
for more advanced study, we shall present an overview of the two general
positions regarding the main points. For each point, we shall present the
assertions shared in common and then the two positions in an alternating
fashion.
We shall use the explanations given primarily by the late
eighteenth-century master Akya Yongdzin (A-kya Yongs-‘dzin dByangs-can
dga-ba’i blo-gros) to represent the Gelug position. This explanation
accords with the monastic textbook (yig-cha) tradition of the
sixteenth-century master Jetsün Chökyi-gyeltsen (rJe-btsun Chos-kyi
rgyal-mtshan), followed by Sera Jey (Se-ra Byes) and Ganden
Jangtsey (dGa’-ldan Byang-rtse) Monasteries. To represent the
non-Gelug position, we shall rely primarily on the explanations given by
the fifteenth-century Sakya master Gorampa (Go-ram bSod-nams
seng-ge).
Introduction
Existent phenomena are those that can be validly
cognized. Nonexistent phenomena, such as unicorns and mirages, can be
objects of cognition, but not objects of valid cognition
(tshad-ma). They are objects only of distorted cognition
(log-shes).
Cognitive appearances of nonexistent objects may arise in
both nonconceptual and conceptual cognition. In distorted sensory
nonconceptual cognition, we may see a hallucination of a unicorn in an
empty meadow. In distorted conceptual cognition, we may imagine a unicorn
in a meadow. If the nonexistent objects – unicorns – do not actually
exist, then how can cognitive appearances of them arise?
Appearances of Nonexistent Objects, Such as Unicorns, in
Sensory Nonconceptual Cognition
Gelug
Consider the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition of
seeing a unicorn in a meadow:
-
An external, conventionally existent unicorn acting as
the focal object and objective condition (dmigs-rkyen) of the
hallucination, does not cause the mental aspect that appears (the mental
representation of a unicorn) to arise. This is because there is no such
thing as an external conventionally existent unicorn. The mental aspect
arises due to internal physical or mental causes for hallucination.
Non-Gelug
Consider the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition of
seeing patches of colored shapes that are subsequently conceptualized as a
unicorn in a meadow:
-
There is no focal object, objective condition, or
cognitively taken object of the hallucination, indirectly cognized
(shugs-su shes-pa) by the distorted cognition. This is because
there are no external patches of colored shapes that are subsequently
being conceptualized as a unicorn. The distorted nonconceptual cognition
does not indirectly cognize anything,
Appearances of Nonexistent Objects, Such as Unicorns, in
Conceptual Cognition
Consider the distorted conceptual cognition of imagining
a unicorn in a meadow:
Gelug
-
The conceptualized object (zhen-yul) – an actual
conventionally existent unicorn corresponding to the idea of one (the
appearing object) – does not exist. Thus, an actual unicorn as the
conceptualized object does not appear, even unclearly, through a
transparent mental aspect and semitransparent appearing object.
Non-Gelug
-
As in the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition,
there is no focal object, objective condition, or cognitively taken
object.
-
The appearing object is an opaque mental aspect that
represents a unicorn in a meadow.
-
As in the Chittamatra presentation, the mental aspect
(focal aspect, dmigs-rnam) and the consciousness of it come from
a shared natal source (rdzas) – namely, the same karmic legacy
(sa-bon, karmic seed).
-
Neither the conceptual cognition of a horse in a meadow
nor of a unicorn in a meadow has an external focal object. Nevertheless,
the latter is a distorted invalid cognition because it cannot serve as a
basis for further valid cognition of its involved object (a conventional
unicorn). Namely, it cannot act as a basis for valid sensory
nonconceptual cognition of the conceptualized object (external patches
of colored shapes) that the conceptual cognition synthesizes into its
involved object.
Appearances of What Something Is and of How Something
Exists
Nonconceptual and conceptual cognition each produce
cognitive appearances not only of what their involved objects appear to be
(ji-snyad-pa), but of also how their involved objects appear to
exist (ji-lta-ba).
Conceptual cognition always produces appearances of
commonsense objects as
-
having conventional identities (rang-gi ngo-bo
‘dzin-pa) such as being a commonsense orange (‘jig-rten-la
grags-pa),
-
truly existing (bden-par grub-pa) with that
conventional identity.
Thus, conceptual cognition always produces appearances of
true existence (bden-snang).
Appearances of True Existence According to the
Sautrantika System
An object has true existence if it can be
nonconceptually cognized. Conventional commonsense objects always appear
to have true existence.
Consider the example of the conceptual cognition of a
conventional commonsense orange.
Gelug
The conceptualized object of the conceptual cognition is
a truly existent commonsense orange.
-
A commonsense object, such as an orange, can be validly
seen.
-
Thus, commonsense objects both appear to truly exist
and do truly exist.
Non-Gelug
The conceptualized object of the conceptual cognition is
a truly existent moment of a truly existent spherical patch of orange
color.
-
This moment of sensibilia (bstan-bcos-la
grags-pa) can be validly seen.
-
Thus, moments of sensibilia both appear to truly exist
and do truly exist.
Conventional commonsense objects cannot be validly
seen.
-
Thus, commonsense objects do not truly exist, although
they appear to truly exist.
-
Commonsense objects are not totally nonexistent.
- Commonsense objects, such as an orange, exist conventionally.
- They conventionally exist by means of imputation (rtog-pas
brtags-pa, mental labeling).
Appearances of True Existence According to the
Madhyamaka System
An object has true existence if it exists
independently of imputation. This means independently of being, in terms
of superficial truth (kun-rdzob bden-pa, relative truth,
conventional truth), the referent object (btags-chos, imputed
object, object labeled) of a word, concept, or mental label
(rtags), when validly imputed on a basis for labeling
(gdags-gzhi).
-
In other words, true existence is existence independent
of being what a word, concept, or mental label (rtags)
conventionally refers to.
-
Nothing exists in this impossible manner.
Imputation involves mental fabrication (spros-pa)
by conceptual cognition.
Gelug
Mental fabrication is defined as the addition of
an appearance of a manner of existence to an object beyond what exists.
-
Mental fabrication makes up and projects an appearance
of true existence.
-
It occurs in both conceptual and nonconceptual
cognition.
-
Mental fabrication automatically arises
(lhan-skyes) in each moment of experience, due to the habits of
grasping for true existence (bden-‘dzin-gi bag-chags).
Thus, although metaphysical (spyi-mtshan) and
objective entities (rang-mtshan) both lack true existence, both
appear to be truly existent.
-
Metaphysical entities include all static
(rtag-pa, permanent) phenomena,
-
Objective entities include all nonstatic
(mi-rtag-pa, impermanent) phenomena.
Mental labeling (imputation) and mental fabrication are
not equivalent terms.
-
Mental labeling entails applying a word or
concept for what something is (a conventional commonsense object). It is
merely an imputation on a basis for labeling, such as a collection of
parts, and does not make up anything beyond what exists.
-
Mental fabrication entails making up and
projecting how something deceptively appears to exist
(‘khrul-snang), which goes beyond what is actually the case.
Existence in terms of mental labeling means existing
conventionally as "x" or "y" dependently on being the referent object of
the mental label "x" or "y" (a word or concept), when validly imputed on a
basis for labeling.
Non-Gelug
Mental fabrication is defined as the mental
synthesis of objective entities (rang-mtshan, specifically
characterized phenomena) into metaphysical entities (spyi-mtshan,
generally characterized phenomena) with appearances of true (unimputed)
existence.
-
Objective entities are individual items
(bye-brag) and include moments of sensibilia, moments of sound,
and individual instances of universals (spyi).
-
Metaphysical entities include all universals, including
commonsense objects as collection universals (tshogs-spyi) of
moments of sensibilia from various senses.
-
Mental fabrication occurs only in conceptual cognition.
Although commonsense objects (metaphysical entities)
appear to be truly existent (unimputed, not mentally fabricated), they are
devoid of this manner of existence.
Objective entities (moments of sensibilia or moments of
sound), which appear only in nonconceptual cognition, do not appear to be
truly existent, conventional commonsense objects.
Objective entities are what can be synthesized and
labeled conceptually as commonsense objects.
-
Thus, objective entities lack true existence, in the
sense that they do not exist unimputedly (truly) as conventional
commonsense objects "x" or "y."
-
They can only be synthesized into commonsense objects
"x" or "y" imputedly, by conceptual cognition.
Commonsense objects, such as oranges, as static
metaphysical entities, are incapable of performing functions (don-byed
nus-pa), although they deceptively appear to perform functions, such
as an orange appearing to make our hands sticky. Only objective entities
(sensibilia), such as moments of tactile sensations, perform functions.
-
Here, a moment of a nonsticky tactile sensation (the
conceptualized object of the conceptual cognition of feeling an orange
held in our hand) is followed by a moment of a sticky tactile sensation.
-
The inference (rjes-dpag) that the moment of the
nonsticky sensation performed the function of producing the moment of
the sticky sensation as its effect is a valid inference (despite it
being a conceptual cognition). It is valid because it leads to valid
cognitions of moments of sticky sensations following moments of
nonsticky sensations whenever validly conceptually cognizing the feeling
of an orange in our hand.
Sensibilia have parts, since they are collections of
molecules (‘dus-pa’i rdul-phran). Moreover, their molecules are
collections of particles (rdzas-kyi rdul-phran), and even particles
have directional parts. Further, moments of sensibilia or of sound also
have temporal parts. Neither sensibilia nor moments of them or of sound
exist independently of their parts.
-
Nevertheless, sensibilia and their moments do not have
true existence even as sensibilia "x" or "y" or moment "x" or "y,"
unless such a conventional identity is mentally fabricated conceptually.
-
The conventional identity is mentally fabricated by
synthesizing it from the collection of parts on which the conventional
identity can be labeled.
Thus, both metaphysical and objective entities are devoid
of true existence.
Conceptual Cognition of True Existence as a Nonexistent
Phenomenon
Consider the case of the conceptual cognition of a
conventional commonsense orange according to the Madhyamaka system.
Gelug
The conceptualized object is a truly existent commonsense
orange.
-
What the conceptualized object appears to be – a
commonsense orange – conventionally exists as the superficial truth
about the object. It can be validly imputed on appropriate sensibilia.
- The appearance of a commonsense orange arises in the conceptual
cognition through the fully transparent mental aspect of a commonsense
orange.
-
How the conceptualized object appears to exist – with
true existence – does not exist. The commonsense orange is devoid of
true existence.
- Although the transparent mental aspect assumed by the conceptual
cognition is an aspect of true existence, the aspect does not reveal
actual true existence through it.
- The deceptive appearance of this mode of existence is distorted,
because it is an appearance of something nonexistent, as in imagining
a unicorn.
In imagining a unicorn in a meadow:
-
The focal object is a meadow (which does exist) and the
involved object is a unicorn there (which does not exist). There is no
actual unicorn, however, as the objective condition casting its
reflection on the consciousness.
-
The mental aspect (which does exist) of a unicorn
appears (arises) simply due to external and internal causes for
distortion.
-
The appearing object is an object universal (which does
exist) of unicorn, imputed on the mental aspect.
Similarly, in imagining a commonsense orange as truly
existent,
-
the focal object is the commonsense orange (which does
exist) and the involved object is true existence (which does not exist).
There is no actual true existence as the objective condition casting its
reflection on the consciousness.
-
The mental aspect (which does exist) of true existence
appears (arises) simply due to an internal cause for distortion –
namely, the habit of grasping for true existence.
-
The appearing object is an object universal (which does
exist) of true existence, imputed on the mental aspect.
Thus, the conceptualized object, as a conventionally
existent object, is devoid of existing in the manner of the conceptualized
manner of existence. This absence of an impossible mode of existence is
the voidness (stong-nyid, emptiness) of the conceptualized
object.
Non-Gelug
The conceptualized object in the conceptual cognition of
a conventional commonsense orange is a non-truly existent moment of
non-truly existent sensibilia – a moment of a spherical patch of orange
color. The conceptualized object does not appear in the conceptual
cognition.
The appearing object is an opaque mental representation
(mental aspect) of a truly existent commonsense orange. The involved
object that arises (appears) is an object universal commonsense
orange imputed on the mental representation.
What the appearing object appears to be and how it
appears to exist are both distorted.
-
Actual commonsense objects casting their reflections on
consciousness do not exist. In sensory nonconceptual cognition, only
moments of sensibilia and of sound cast their reflections on
consciousness, not conventional commonsense objects.
-
In the conceptual cognition of a commonsense orange,
only an object universal commonsense orange is represented as the
content of the mental aspect (the appearing object) in terms of what it
appears to be.
-
Similarly, actual true existence casting its reflection
on consciousness does not exist. In sensory nonconceptual cognition,
only non-true existence casts its reflection on consciousness, not true
existence.
-
In the conceptual cognition of true existence, only an
object universal true existence is represented as the content of
the mental aspect (the appearing object) in terms of how it appears to
exist.
Compare the conceptual cognition of true existence and of
non-true existence.
-
The manner of existence (true existence) that is
automatically fabricated as an integral aspect of fabricating a
conventional commonsense orange on the basis of the conceptualized
object does not exist, even as the superficial truth about it.
- Thus, conventional commonsense objects are totally conceptional
phenomena (kun-btags).
- The superficially true manner of existence of commonsense objects
is that although they appear to be truly existent, they are not truly
existent. They are imputedly existent on moments of sensibilia and of
sounds.
-
The superficially true manner of existence of moments
of sensibilia and of sound is that although they appear to be non-truly
existent, their deepest manner of existence is beyond this
conceptualized manner of existence.
-
As in the case of the difference between the conceptual
cognition of a horse and a unicorn, the conceptual cognitions of both
true and non-true existence are distorted. However, the latter can act
as a basis for further valid cognition of its involved object; the
former cannot.
- The involved object of the conceptual cognition of non-true
existence is the object universal non-true existence. This
conceptual cognition can act as a basis for valid sensory
nonconceptual cognition of the conceptualized object (the non-true
existence of moments of external sensibilia) that the conceptual
cognition synthesizes into its involved object.
- The involved object of the conceptual cognition of true existence
is the object universal true existence. This conceptual
cognition cannot act as a basis for valid sensory nonconceptual
cognition of the conceptualized object (the true existence of moments
of external sensibilia) that the conceptual cognition synthesizes into
its involved object. Moments of external sensibilia are devoid of true
existence.
Referent Objects
According to Madhyamaka, mental labeling (ming
‘dogs-pa), which is always conceptual, entails:
-
a label, word, or concept (rtags),
-
a basis for labeling (gdags-gzhi),
-
a referent object (btags-chos, imputed object,
labeled object). The referent object is what a label, word, or
concept refers to.
All three are devoid of true existence.
Consider the case of the verbal conceptual cognition of a
conventional commonsense orange with the term and meaning/object universal
orange.
Gelug
In terms of the mental labeling:
-
The mental label is the term universal "orange"
– a metaphysical entity.
-
The basis for labeling may be a spherical shape of
orange color – an objective entity.
-
The referent object is a commonsense orange – a
nonstatic collection universal as an objective entity.
It is important not to identify the referent object with
either the basis for labeling or the mental label itself.
-
The referent object is not the same as the basis for
labeling. The shapes and colors that appear when seeing or thinking of
an orange are not the actual orange. We do not eat a shape and color
when we eat an orange.
-
The referent object is not the same as the mental
label. An actual orange is not the word or concept orange.
-
An actual orange is what the term universal or word
orange refers to when labeled on the basis of appropriate shapes
and colors.
In terms of the conceptual cognition:
-
The appearing objects are the term and meaning
universals of a truly existent orange.
-
The conceptualized object (involved object, object
existing as cognitively taken) is a truly existent orange. This is what
the idea of an orange implies (zhen, clings to) and corresponds
to.
Thus,
-
What the concept (idea) of an orange refers to
(a non-truly existent commonsense orange, as an objective entity) is not
the same as what the concept of an orange corresponds to (a truly
existent orange, which does not exist at all).
-
In other words, the referent object of a conceptual
cognition is not the same as its conceptualized object.
In short,
-
we see a non-truly existent commonsense orange, which
nevertheless appears to be truly existent.
-
We then conceptualize it as a truly existent
commonsense orange.
-
In conceptual cognition, we mentally fabricate the
conceptualized object (a truly existent orange) and project it onto the
referent object (a non-truly existent orange as an objective entity that
we can see).
Non-Gelug
In terms of the mental labeling:
-
The mental label (object that is the actual signifier)
is the term universal "orange" – a metaphysical entity.
-
The basis for labeling is a mental representation (an
objective entity) of a truly existent conventional orange.
-
The referent object (object actually signified) is the
object universal orange (a collection universal) – equivalent to
a non-truly existent commonsense orange, as a metaphysical entity.
It is important not to identify the referent object with
either the basis for labeling or the mental label itself.
-
The referent object is not the same as the basis for
labeling. The mental representation of a truly existent orange that is
the appearing object when thinking of an orange is not an orange. We do
not eat a mental representation when we eat an orange.
-
The referent object is not the same as the mental
label. A conventional commonsense orange is not the word orange.
-
A commonsense orange is what the term universal or word
orange refers to when labeled on the basis of an appropriate
mental representation.
In terms of the conceptual cognition:
-
The appearing object (involved object, object existing
as cognitively taken) is the mental representation (an objective entity)
of a truly existent orange.
-
The conceptualized object (conceptualized object
signified) is a moment of an external spherical patch of orange color –
an objective entity.
Thus,
-
What the concept (idea) of an orange refers to
(a commonsense orange, as a non-truly existent metaphysical entity) is
not the same as what the concept of an orange corresponds to (a
moment of spherical patch of orange color, as a non-truly existent
objective entity).
-
In other words, the referent object of a conceptual
cognition is not the same as its conceptualized object.
In short,
-
We see a moment of a non-truly existent spherical patch
of orange color, an objective entity that appears to be non-truly
existent as a "this" or a "that." In other words, it does not appear to
be either a truly existent or a non-truly existent commonsense orange.
-
We mentally fabricate the referent object (a non-truly
existent commonsense orange, as a metaphysical entity) from the
conceptualized object (a moment of a non-truly existent spherical patch
of orange color).
-
We conceptually cognize a mental representation of a
truly existent commonsense orange, which we take as the basis for
labeling a commonsense orange.
Appearances of Conventional Objects and of Their Mode
of Existence in Sensory Nonconceptual Cognition
Gelug
Not only conceptual cognition, but also sensory
nonconceptual cognition produces cognitive appearances of true existence.
Thus, visual cognition of a commonsense orange produces appearances of
both a commonsense orange and its true existence.
Visual cognition does not have a conceptualized object.
It does have, however, an involved object, which is also its object
existing as cognitively taken.
-
In reference to what the cognitive appearance appears
to be – an orange – a commonsense orange (the object existing as
cognitively taken) is an existent phenomenon.
-
In reference to how the cognitive appearance appears to
exist – with true existence – true existence (the object existing as
cognitively taken) is a nonexistent phenomenon.
Since how the involved object appears to exist – with
true existence – does not exist, sensory cognition of the deceptive
appearance of this mode of existence is distorted. This is because it is
sensory cognition of an appearance of something nonexistent, as in a
hallucination of a unicorn.
-
In the hallucination of a unicorn in a meadow, the
focal object is a meadow (which does exist) and the involved object is a
unicorn (which does not exist). There is no actual unicorn, however, as
the objective condition casting its reflection on the consciousness. The
mental aspect (which does exist) of a unicorn arises simply due to
external and internal causes for hallucination.
-
Similarly, in the hallucination of the true existence
of a commonsense orange, the focal object is the commonsense orange
(which does exist) and the involved object is true existence (which does
not exist). There is no actual true existence as the objective condition
casting its reflection on the consciousness. The mental aspect (which
does exist) of true existence arises simply due to an internal cause for
distortion – namely, the habit of grasping for true existence.
Non-Gelug
Sensory nonconceptual cognition does not produce
appearances of true existence. It produces appearances of non-true
existence. In other words, its involved objects (moments of sensibilia) do
not appear as "this" or "that" and are not definitely determined
(ascertained) as "this" or "that."
-
Appearances of true existence occur only in conceptual
cognition.
-
When conceptual cognition definitely determines an
appearance as "this" or "that," it ascertains it as truly existently
"this" or "that."
The term appearances of non-true existence
(med-snang) is used in the Nyingma school. The mainstream Sakya and
Karma Kagyü schools use the equivalent term appearances of dependently
arising existence (rten-‘brel snang-ba).
-
In this context, dependently arising means arising
dependently on parts, according to the mainstream Sakya usage.
-
In Karma Kagyü, the term means arising dependently from
unawareness (ignorance), as in the twelve links of dependent arising.
-
For the sake of simplicity, we shall use the Nyingma
term here.
Both appearances of true existence and appearances of
non-true existence are mental fabrications.
-
As one of the four categories true existence,
non-true existence, both, or neither, an object can
be ascertained as non-truly existent only by a conceptual cognition of
its denumerable deepest truth (rnam-grangs-kyi don-dam bden-pa)
(its voidness of true existence).
-
Therefore, the ontological category non-true
existence is a mental fabrication, a metaphysical entity, and a
universal.
The yogic nonconceptual cognition (rnal-‘byor
mngon-sum) of nondenumerable deepest truth (rnam-grangs med-pa’i
don-dam bden-pa) (voidness beyond words and concepts) produces a
purified appearance (dag-pa’i snang-ba) of a mode of existence that
is likewise beyond words and concepts.
-
Nondenumerable deepest truth of inseparable voidness
and appearance, with both voidness and appearance being beyond words and
concepts, cannot be an object of conceptual cognition or of sensory or
mental nonconceptual cognition.
[See: Impure
and Pure Appearances According to Non-Gelug.]
Page Contents
Preface
Introduction
Appearances
of Nonexistent Objects, Such as Unicorns, in Sensory Nonconceptual
Cognition
Gelug
Non-Gelug
Appearances
of Nonexistent Objects, Such as Unicorns, in Conceptual Cognition
Gelug
Non-Gelug
Appearances
of What Something Is and of How Something Exists
Appearances
of True Existence According to the Sautrantika System
Gelug
Non-Gelug
Appearances
of True Existence According to the Madhyamaka System
Gelug
Non-Gelug
Conceptual
Cognition of True Existence as a Nonexistent Phenomenon
Gelug
Non-Gelug
Referent
Objects
Gelug
Non-Gelug
Appearances
of Conventional Objects and of Their Mode of Existence in Sensory
Nonconceptual Cognition
Gelug
Non-Gelug |
