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The Appearance and Cognition of Nonexistent Phenomena: Gelug and Non-Gelug Presentations in Alternating Order    


Alexander Berzin
August 14, 2002

[As background, see: Fine Analysis of Objects of Cognition: Gelug and Non-Gelug Presentations in Alternating Order.]

Preface

The Tibetan explanations of the appearance and cognition of nonexistent phenomena fall broadly into two camps: Gelug and non-Gelug (Sakya, Nyingma, and Kagyü).

Neither Gelug nor non-Gelug, however, presents a uniform explanation. Several masters within each camp have explained specific points slightly differently in their commentaries. Here, as a foundation for more advanced study, we shall present an overview of the two general positions regarding the main points. For each point, we shall present the assertions shared in common and then the two positions in an alternating fashion.

We shall use the explanations given primarily by the late eighteenth-century master Akya Yongdzin (A-kya Yongs-‘dzin dByangs-can dga-ba’i blo-gros) to represent the Gelug position. This explanation accords with the monastic textbook (yig-cha) tradition of the sixteenth-century master Jetsün Chökyi-gyeltsen (rJe-btsun Chos-kyi rgyal-mtshan), followed by Sera Jey (Se-ra Byes) and Ganden Jangtsey (dGa’-ldan Byang-rtse) Monasteries. To represent the non-Gelug position, we shall rely primarily on the explanations given by the fifteenth-century Sakya master Gorampa (Go-ram bSod-nams seng-ge).

Introduction

Existent phenomena are those that can be validly cognized. Nonexistent phenomena, such as unicorns and mirages, can be objects of cognition, but not objects of valid cognition (tshad-ma). They are objects only of distorted cognition (log-shes).

Cognitive appearances of nonexistent objects may arise in both nonconceptual and conceptual cognition. In distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition, we may see a hallucination of a unicorn in an empty meadow. In distorted conceptual cognition, we may imagine a unicorn in a meadow. If the nonexistent objects – unicorns – do not actually exist, then how can cognitive appearances of them arise?

Appearances of Nonexistent Objects, Such as Unicorns, in Sensory Nonconceptual Cognition

Gelug

Consider the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition of seeing a unicorn in a meadow:

  • The empty meadow is the focal object (dmigs-yul).

  • The cognition of a unicorn there takes on a mental aspect (rnam-pa) that represents a unicorn in the meadow. The mental aspect is the appearing (snang-yul) and cognitively taken object (gzung-yul).

    • The fifteenth-century Gelug masters Gyeltsab (rGyal-tshab Dar-ma rin-chen) and the First Dalai Lama Gedündrub (dGe-‘dun grub) agree that the hallucination of a unicorn assumes a mental aspect that represents a unicorn and that this mental representation appears (arises) in the cognition. However, since they assert that distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition has neither an appearing nor a cognitively taken object, they do not identify the mental aspect with either of them.

  • A unicorn is the involved object (‘jug-yul) of the distorted visual cognition.

  • An external, conventionally existent unicorn acting as the focal object and objective condition (dmigs-rkyen) of the hallucination, does not cause the mental aspect that appears (the mental representation of a unicorn) to arise. This is because there is no such thing as an external conventionally existent unicorn. The mental aspect arises due to internal physical or mental causes for hallucination.

  • As a transparent mental representation of a unicorn, the mental aspect that appears does not reveal an actual unicorn through it. It does not reveal anything.

Non-Gelug

Consider the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition of seeing patches of colored shapes that are subsequently conceptualized as a unicorn in a meadow:

  • There is no focal object, objective condition, or cognitively taken object of the hallucination, indirectly cognized (shugs-su shes-pa) by the distorted cognition. This is because there are no external patches of colored shapes that are subsequently being conceptualized as a unicorn. The distorted nonconceptual cognition does not indirectly cognize anything,

  • The distorted cognition takes on a mental aspect that represents external patches of colored shapes that are subsequently conceptualized as a unicorn in a meadow.

  • Although the opaque mental representation is directly cognized (dngos-su shes-pa), the hallucination has no appearing object since nothing has cast its impression on the consciousness. The mental aspect arises due to internal physical or mental causes for hallucination.

  • The representation of the external patches of colored shapes is the involved object of the distorted visual cognition.

Appearances of Nonexistent Objects, Such as Unicorns, in Conceptual Cognition

Consider the distorted conceptual cognition of imagining a unicorn in a meadow:

Gelug

  • An empty meadow is the focal object, as in the nonconceptual hallucination.

  • Also as in the hallucination, the transparent mental aspect that appears (snang-ba) or arises (‘char-ba) is a representation of a unicorn in the meadow and this is the involved object.

  • The appearing object is a semitransparent meaning/object universal (don-spyi, idea) of a unicorn, based perhaps on a composite of the object universals horse and cartoon horn.

  • The conceptualized object (zhen-yul) – an actual conventionally existent unicorn corresponding to the idea of one (the appearing object) – does not exist. Thus, an actual unicorn as the conceptualized object does not appear, even unclearly, through a transparent mental aspect and semitransparent appearing object.

Non-Gelug

  • As in the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition, there is no focal object, objective condition, or cognitively taken object.

  • The appearing object is an opaque mental aspect that represents a unicorn in a meadow.

  • As in the Chittamatra presentation, the mental aspect (focal aspect, dmigs-rnam) and the consciousness of it come from a shared natal source (rdzas) – namely, the same karmic legacy (sa-bon, karmic seed).

  • The appearing object is confused with the object universal (idea) of an actual conventionally existent unicorn imputed on the opaque mental aspect.

  • The object universal is the involved object.

  • The conceptualized object of the cognition – external patches of colored shapes that the conceptual cognition mentally synthesizes into a conventionally existent unicorn – does not exist.

  • Neither the conceptual cognition of a horse in a meadow nor of a unicorn in a meadow has an external focal object. Nevertheless, the latter is a distorted invalid cognition because it cannot serve as a basis for further valid cognition of its involved object (a conventional unicorn). Namely, it cannot act as a basis for valid sensory nonconceptual cognition of the conceptualized object (external patches of colored shapes) that the conceptual cognition synthesizes into its involved object.

Appearances of What Something Is and of How Something Exists

Nonconceptual and conceptual cognition each produce cognitive appearances not only of what their involved objects appear to be (ji-snyad-pa), but of also how their involved objects appear to exist (ji-lta-ba).

Conceptual cognition always produces appearances of commonsense objects as

  • having conventional identities (rang-gi ngo-bo ‘dzin-pa) such as being a commonsense orange (‘jig-rten-la grags-pa),

  • truly existing (bden-par grub-pa) with that conventional identity.

Thus, conceptual cognition always produces appearances of true existence (bden-snang).

Appearances of True Existence According to the Sautrantika System

An object has true existence if it can be nonconceptually cognized. Conventional commonsense objects always appear to have true existence.

Consider the example of the conceptual cognition of a conventional commonsense orange.

Gelug

The conceptualized object of the conceptual cognition is a truly existent commonsense orange.

  • A commonsense object, such as an orange, can be validly seen.

  • Thus, commonsense objects both appear to truly exist and do truly exist.

Non-Gelug

The conceptualized object of the conceptual cognition is a truly existent moment of a truly existent spherical patch of orange color.

  • This moment of sensibilia (bstan-bcos-la grags-pa) can be validly seen.

  • Thus, moments of sensibilia both appear to truly exist and do truly exist.

Conventional commonsense objects cannot be validly seen.

  • Thus, commonsense objects do not truly exist, although they appear to truly exist.

  • Commonsense objects are not totally nonexistent.

    • Commonsense objects, such as an orange, exist conventionally.
    • They conventionally exist by means of imputation (rtog-pas brtags-pa, mental labeling).

Appearances of True Existence According to the Madhyamaka System

An object has true existence if it exists independently of imputation. This means independently of being, in terms of superficial truth (kun-rdzob bden-pa, relative truth, conventional truth), the referent object (btags-chos, imputed object, object labeled) of a word, concept, or mental label (rtags), when validly imputed on a basis for labeling (gdags-gzhi).

  • In other words, true existence is existence independent of being what a word, concept, or mental label (rtags) conventionally refers to.

  • Nothing exists in this impossible manner.

Imputation involves mental fabrication (spros-pa) by conceptual cognition.

Gelug

Mental fabrication is defined as the addition of an appearance of a manner of existence to an object beyond what exists.

  • Mental fabrication makes up and projects an appearance of true existence.

  • It occurs in both conceptual and nonconceptual cognition.

  • Mental fabrication automatically arises (lhan-skyes) in each moment of experience, due to the habits of grasping for true existence (bden-‘dzin-gi bag-chags).

Thus, although metaphysical (spyi-mtshan) and objective entities (rang-mtshan) both lack true existence, both appear to be truly existent.

  • Metaphysical entities include all static (rtag-pa, permanent) phenomena,

  • Objective entities include all nonstatic (mi-rtag-pa, impermanent) phenomena.

Mental labeling (imputation) and mental fabrication are not equivalent terms.

  • Mental labeling entails applying a word or concept for what something is (a conventional commonsense object). It is merely an imputation on a basis for labeling, such as a collection of parts, and does not make up anything beyond what exists.

  • Mental fabrication entails making up and projecting how something deceptively appears to exist (‘khrul-snang), which goes beyond what is actually the case.

Existence in terms of mental labeling means existing conventionally as "x" or "y" dependently on being the referent object of the mental label "x" or "y" (a word or concept), when validly imputed on a basis for labeling.

  • Although the actual process of mental labeling occurs only in conceptual cognition; nevertheless, everything exists in terms of mental labeling, whether conceptually or nonconceptually cognized.

Non-Gelug

Mental fabrication is defined as the mental synthesis of objective entities (rang-mtshan, specifically characterized phenomena) into metaphysical entities (spyi-mtshan, generally characterized phenomena) with appearances of true (unimputed) existence.

  • Objective entities are individual items (bye-brag) and include moments of sensibilia, moments of sound, and individual instances of universals (spyi).

  • Metaphysical entities include all universals, including commonsense objects as collection universals (tshogs-spyi) of moments of sensibilia from various senses.

  • Mental fabrication occurs only in conceptual cognition.

Although commonsense objects (metaphysical entities) appear to be truly existent (unimputed, not mentally fabricated), they are devoid of this manner of existence.

  • This is because metaphysical entities are mentally fabricated.

Objective entities (moments of sensibilia or moments of sound), which appear only in nonconceptual cognition, do not appear to be truly existent, conventional commonsense objects.

  • This is because nonconceptual cognition does not decisively determine (nges-pa, ascertain) its object as "x" or "y."

Objective entities are what can be synthesized and labeled conceptually as commonsense objects.

  • Thus, objective entities lack true existence, in the sense that they do not exist unimputedly (truly) as conventional commonsense objects "x" or "y."

  • They can only be synthesized into commonsense objects "x" or "y" imputedly, by conceptual cognition.

Commonsense objects, such as oranges, as static metaphysical entities, are incapable of performing functions (don-byed nus-pa), although they deceptively appear to perform functions, such as an orange appearing to make our hands sticky. Only objective entities (sensibilia), such as moments of tactile sensations, perform functions.

  • Here, a moment of a nonsticky tactile sensation (the conceptualized object of the conceptual cognition of feeling an orange held in our hand) is followed by a moment of a sticky tactile sensation.

  • The inference (rjes-dpag) that the moment of the nonsticky sensation performed the function of producing the moment of the sticky sensation as its effect is a valid inference (despite it being a conceptual cognition). It is valid because it leads to valid cognitions of moments of sticky sensations following moments of nonsticky sensations whenever validly conceptually cognizing the feeling of an orange in our hand.

Sensibilia have parts, since they are collections of molecules (‘dus-pa’i rdul-phran). Moreover, their molecules are collections of particles (rdzas-kyi rdul-phran), and even particles have directional parts. Further, moments of sensibilia or of sound also have temporal parts. Neither sensibilia nor moments of them or of sound exist independently of their parts.

  • Nevertheless, sensibilia and their moments do not have true existence even as sensibilia "x" or "y" or moment "x" or "y," unless such a conventional identity is mentally fabricated conceptually.

  • The conventional identity is mentally fabricated by synthesizing it from the collection of parts on which the conventional identity can be labeled.

Thus, both metaphysical and objective entities are devoid of true existence.

Conceptual Cognition of True Existence as a Nonexistent Phenomenon

Consider the case of the conceptual cognition of a conventional commonsense orange according to the Madhyamaka system.

Gelug

The conceptualized object is a truly existent commonsense orange.

  • What the conceptualized object appears to be – a commonsense orange – conventionally exists as the superficial truth about the object. It can be validly imputed on appropriate sensibilia.

    • The appearance of a commonsense orange arises in the conceptual cognition through the fully transparent mental aspect of a commonsense orange.

  • How the conceptualized object appears to exist – with true existence – does not exist. The commonsense orange is devoid of true existence.

    • Although the transparent mental aspect assumed by the conceptual cognition is an aspect of true existence, the aspect does not reveal actual true existence through it.
    • The deceptive appearance of this mode of existence is distorted, because it is an appearance of something nonexistent, as in imagining a unicorn.

In imagining a unicorn in a meadow:

  • The focal object is a meadow (which does exist) and the involved object is a unicorn there (which does not exist). There is no actual unicorn, however, as the objective condition casting its reflection on the consciousness.

  • The mental aspect (which does exist) of a unicorn appears (arises) simply due to external and internal causes for distortion.

  • The appearing object is an object universal (which does exist) of unicorn, imputed on the mental aspect.

Similarly, in imagining a commonsense orange as truly existent,

  • the focal object is the commonsense orange (which does exist) and the involved object is true existence (which does not exist). There is no actual true existence as the objective condition casting its reflection on the consciousness.

  • The mental aspect (which does exist) of true existence appears (arises) simply due to an internal cause for distortion – namely, the habit of grasping for true existence.

  • The appearing object is an object universal (which does exist) of true existence, imputed on the mental aspect.

Thus, the conceptualized object, as a conventionally existent object, is devoid of existing in the manner of the conceptualized manner of existence. This absence of an impossible mode of existence is the voidness (stong-nyid, emptiness) of the conceptualized object.

Non-Gelug

The conceptualized object in the conceptual cognition of a conventional commonsense orange is a non-truly existent moment of non-truly existent sensibilia – a moment of a spherical patch of orange color. The conceptualized object does not appear in the conceptual cognition.

The appearing object is an opaque mental representation (mental aspect) of a truly existent commonsense orange. The involved object that arises (appears) is an object universal commonsense orange imputed on the mental representation.

  • What the appearing object appears to be is a conventional commonsense object.

  • The manner of existence with which the appearing object appears to exist is true existence.

What the appearing object appears to be and how it appears to exist are both distorted.

  • Actual commonsense objects casting their reflections on consciousness do not exist. In sensory nonconceptual cognition, only moments of sensibilia and of sound cast their reflections on consciousness, not conventional commonsense objects.

  • In the conceptual cognition of a commonsense orange, only an object universal commonsense orange is represented as the content of the mental aspect (the appearing object) in terms of what it appears to be.

  • Similarly, actual true existence casting its reflection on consciousness does not exist. In sensory nonconceptual cognition, only non-true existence casts its reflection on consciousness, not true existence.

  • In the conceptual cognition of true existence, only an object universal true existence is represented as the content of the mental aspect (the appearing object) in terms of how it appears to exist.

Compare the conceptual cognition of true existence and of non-true existence.

  • What can be mentally fabricated (imputed) on the basis of the conceptualized object – a commonsense orange – conventionally exists as a superficially true object. It can be validly imputed on sensibilia.

  • The manner of existence (true existence) that is automatically fabricated as an integral aspect of fabricating a conventional commonsense orange on the basis of the conceptualized object does not exist, even as the superficial truth about it.

    • Thus, conventional commonsense objects are totally conceptional phenomena (kun-btags).
    • The superficially true manner of existence of commonsense objects is that although they appear to be truly existent, they are not truly existent. They are imputedly existent on moments of sensibilia and of sounds.

  • The superficially true manner of existence of moments of sensibilia and of sound is that although they appear to be non-truly existent, their deepest manner of existence is beyond this conceptualized manner of existence.

  • As in the case of the difference between the conceptual cognition of a horse and a unicorn, the conceptual cognitions of both true and non-true existence are distorted. However, the latter can act as a basis for further valid cognition of its involved object; the former cannot.

    • The involved object of the conceptual cognition of non-true existence is the object universal non-true existence. This conceptual cognition can act as a basis for valid sensory nonconceptual cognition of the conceptualized object (the non-true existence of moments of external sensibilia) that the conceptual cognition synthesizes into its involved object.
    • The involved object of the conceptual cognition of true existence is the object universal true existence. This conceptual cognition cannot act as a basis for valid sensory nonconceptual cognition of the conceptualized object (the true existence of moments of external sensibilia) that the conceptual cognition synthesizes into its involved object. Moments of external sensibilia are devoid of true existence.

Referent Objects

According to Madhyamaka, mental labeling (ming ‘dogs-pa), which is always conceptual, entails:

  • a label, word, or concept (rtags),

  • a basis for labeling (gdags-gzhi),

  • a referent object (btags-chos, imputed object, labeled object). The referent object is what a label, word, or concept refers to.

All three are devoid of true existence.

Consider the case of the verbal conceptual cognition of a conventional commonsense orange with the term and meaning/object universal orange.

Gelug

In terms of the mental labeling:

  • The mental label is the term universal "orange" – a metaphysical entity.

  • The basis for labeling may be a spherical shape of orange color – an objective entity.

  • The referent object is a commonsense orange – a nonstatic collection universal as an objective entity.

It is important not to identify the referent object with either the basis for labeling or the mental label itself.

  • The referent object is not the same as the basis for labeling. The shapes and colors that appear when seeing or thinking of an orange are not the actual orange. We do not eat a shape and color when we eat an orange.

  • The referent object is not the same as the mental label. An actual orange is not the word or concept orange.

  • An actual orange is what the term universal or word orange refers to when labeled on the basis of appropriate shapes and colors.

In terms of the conceptual cognition:

  • The appearing objects are the term and meaning universals of a truly existent orange.

  • The conceptualized object (involved object, object existing as cognitively taken) is a truly existent orange. This is what the idea of an orange implies (zhen, clings to) and corresponds to.

Thus,

  • What the concept (idea) of an orange refers to (a non-truly existent commonsense orange, as an objective entity) is not the same as what the concept of an orange corresponds to (a truly existent orange, which does not exist at all).

  • In other words, the referent object of a conceptual cognition is not the same as its conceptualized object.

In short,

  • we see a non-truly existent commonsense orange, which nevertheless appears to be truly existent.

  • We then conceptualize it as a truly existent commonsense orange.

  • In conceptual cognition, we mentally fabricate the conceptualized object (a truly existent orange) and project it onto the referent object (a non-truly existent orange as an objective entity that we can see).

Non-Gelug

In terms of the mental labeling:

  • The mental label (object that is the actual signifier) is the term universal "orange" – a metaphysical entity.

  • The basis for labeling is a mental representation (an objective entity) of a truly existent conventional orange.

  • The referent object (object actually signified) is the object universal orange (a collection universal) – equivalent to a non-truly existent commonsense orange, as a metaphysical entity.

It is important not to identify the referent object with either the basis for labeling or the mental label itself.

  • The referent object is not the same as the basis for labeling. The mental representation of a truly existent orange that is the appearing object when thinking of an orange is not an orange. We do not eat a mental representation when we eat an orange.

  • The referent object is not the same as the mental label. A conventional commonsense orange is not the word orange.

  • A commonsense orange is what the term universal or word orange refers to when labeled on the basis of an appropriate mental representation.

In terms of the conceptual cognition:

  • The appearing object (involved object, object existing as cognitively taken) is the mental representation (an objective entity) of a truly existent orange.

  • The conceptualized object (conceptualized object signified) is a moment of an external spherical patch of orange color – an objective entity.

Thus,

  • What the concept (idea) of an orange refers to (a commonsense orange, as a non-truly existent metaphysical entity) is not the same as what the concept of an orange corresponds to (a moment of spherical patch of orange color, as a non-truly existent objective entity).

  • In other words, the referent object of a conceptual cognition is not the same as its conceptualized object.

In short,

  • We see a moment of a non-truly existent spherical patch of orange color, an objective entity that appears to be non-truly existent as a "this" or a "that." In other words, it does not appear to be either a truly existent or a non-truly existent commonsense orange.

  • We mentally fabricate the referent object (a non-truly existent commonsense orange, as a metaphysical entity) from the conceptualized object (a moment of a non-truly existent spherical patch of orange color).

  • We conceptually cognize a mental representation of a truly existent commonsense orange, which we take as the basis for labeling a commonsense orange.

Appearances of Conventional Objects and of Their Mode of Existence in Sensory Nonconceptual Cognition

Gelug

Not only conceptual cognition, but also sensory nonconceptual cognition produces cognitive appearances of true existence. Thus, visual cognition of a commonsense orange produces appearances of both a commonsense orange and its true existence.

Visual cognition does not have a conceptualized object. It does have, however, an involved object, which is also its object existing as cognitively taken.

  • In reference to what the cognitive appearance appears to be – an orange – a commonsense orange (the object existing as cognitively taken) is an existent phenomenon.

  • In reference to how the cognitive appearance appears to exist – with true existence – true existence (the object existing as cognitively taken) is a nonexistent phenomenon.

Since how the involved object appears to exist – with true existence – does not exist, sensory cognition of the deceptive appearance of this mode of existence is distorted. This is because it is sensory cognition of an appearance of something nonexistent, as in a hallucination of a unicorn.

  • In the hallucination of a unicorn in a meadow, the focal object is a meadow (which does exist) and the involved object is a unicorn (which does not exist). There is no actual unicorn, however, as the objective condition casting its reflection on the consciousness. The mental aspect (which does exist) of a unicorn arises simply due to external and internal causes for hallucination.

  • Similarly, in the hallucination of the true existence of a commonsense orange, the focal object is the commonsense orange (which does exist) and the involved object is true existence (which does not exist). There is no actual true existence as the objective condition casting its reflection on the consciousness. The mental aspect (which does exist) of true existence arises simply due to an internal cause for distortion – namely, the habit of grasping for true existence.

Non-Gelug

Sensory nonconceptual cognition does not produce appearances of true existence. It produces appearances of non-true existence. In other words, its involved objects (moments of sensibilia) do not appear as "this" or "that" and are not definitely determined (ascertained) as "this" or "that."

  • Appearances of true existence occur only in conceptual cognition.

  • When conceptual cognition definitely determines an appearance as "this" or "that," it ascertains it as truly existently "this" or "that."

The term appearances of non-true existence (med-snang) is used in the Nyingma school. The mainstream Sakya and Karma Kagyü schools use the equivalent term appearances of dependently arising existence (rten-‘brel snang-ba).

  • In this context, dependently arising means arising dependently on parts, according to the mainstream Sakya usage.

  • In Karma Kagyü, the term means arising dependently from unawareness (ignorance), as in the twelve links of dependent arising.

  • For the sake of simplicity, we shall use the Nyingma term here.

Both appearances of true existence and appearances of non-true existence are mental fabrications.

  • As one of the four categories true existence, non-true existence, both, or neither, an object can be ascertained as non-truly existent only by a conceptual cognition of its denumerable deepest truth (rnam-grangs-kyi don-dam bden-pa) (its voidness of true existence).

  • Therefore, the ontological category non-true existence is a mental fabrication, a metaphysical entity, and a universal.

The yogic nonconceptual cognition (rnal-‘byor mngon-sum) of nondenumerable deepest truth (rnam-grangs med-pa’i don-dam bden-pa) (voidness beyond words and concepts) produces a purified appearance (dag-pa’i snang-ba) of a mode of existence that is likewise beyond words and concepts.

  • Nondenumerable deepest truth of inseparable voidness and appearance, with both voidness and appearance being beyond words and concepts, cannot be an object of conceptual cognition or of sensory or mental nonconceptual cognition.

[See: Impure and Pure Appearances According to Non-Gelug.]

 

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Page Contents


Preface

Introduction

Appearances of Nonexistent Objects, Such as Unicorns, in Sensory Nonconceptual Cognition

     Gelug

     Non-Gelug

Appearances of Nonexistent Objects, Such as Unicorns, in Conceptual Cognition

     Gelug

     Non-Gelug

Appearances of What Something Is and of How Something Exists

Appearances of True Existence According to the Sautrantika System

     Gelug

     Non-Gelug

Appearances of True Existence According to the Madhyamaka System

     Gelug

     Non-Gelug

Conceptual Cognition of True Existence as a Nonexistent Phenomenon

     Gelug

     Non-Gelug

Referent Objects

     Gelug

     Non-Gelug

Appearances of Conventional Objects and of Their Mode of Existence in Sensory Nonconceptual Cognition

     Gelug

     Non-Gelug

 

 

 

 

 

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