[As background, see: Introductory Survey of Objects of Cognition.]

1 Basic Distinctions among Cognitive Objects

Preface

The various Indian schools of Buddhist tenets (grub-mtha') differ slightly in their explanations of cognition. The Tibetan traditions take the Sautrantika explanation as a basis and then refine it with the explanations of the more sophisticated tenet systems. Accordingly, we shall look here at some points regarding the Sautrantika system of cognition and supplement them with explanations from other systems when they significantly differ.

Further, various Tibetan masters explain differently many assertions of each of the four Indian schools of tenets. Their explanations fall broadly into two camps: Gelug and non-Gelug (Sakya, Nyingma, and Kagyu).

Here, as a foundation for more advanced study, we shall present an overview of the main points that are asserted in common by both camps and then the uniquely Gelug interpretations.

Neither the Gelug nor the non-Gelug division, however, presents a uniform explanation of cognition theory. Several masters within each camp have explained specific points slightly differently in their commentaries. Here, we shall use the explanations given primarily by the late eighteenth-century master Akya Yongdzin (A-kya Yongs-'dzin dByangs-can dga-ba'i blo-gros) to represent the Gelug position. This explanation accords with the monastic textbook (yig-cha) tradition of the sixteenth-century master Jetsun Chökyi-gyeltsen (rJe-btsun Chos-kyi rgyal-mtshan), followed by Sera Jey (Se-ra Byes) and Ganden Jangtsey (dGa'-ldan Byang-rtse) Monasteries.

Cognitive Objects and Sensibilia

Cognitions (shes-pa) have numerous cognitive objects (yul) - objects known in some cognitive manner. Among them are sensibilia and commonsense objects.

Sensibilia are the forms of physical phenomena (gzugs) that, in one moment, occupy an extended location (yul), and which are cognized by a sensory consciousness. As objects well known in the philosophical treatises (bstan-bcos-la grags-pa), sensibilia are thus the smallest spatial units of physical phenomena that are perceptible by the senses in one moment.

Each "patch" of sensibilia occupies an extended location in the sense that it spatially extends over a collection of "molecules" ('dus-pa'i rdul-phran) specific to its class of cognitive stimulator (skye-mched). Molecules, in turn, are aggregations of substantial particles (rdzas-kyi rdul-phran).

There are four classes of sensibilia:

• sights (patches of colored shapes),
• smells,
• tastes,
• tactile or physical sensations.

Since sounds do not have spatial extension over a collection of molecules of similar class (rigs-mthun), sounds are not included as sensibilia.

Commonsense Objects and Conventional Objects of Experience

What is a commonsense orange? Is it a sight that we see, a fragrance that we smell, a flavor that we taste, or a tactile sensation that we feel when we hold one in our hands? As an object well known in the world ('jig-rten-la grags-pa), a commonsense orange is an item that extends over the locations of all four classes of sensibilia.

Moreover, although, as a nonstatic (mi-rtag-pa, impermanent) object, an orange changes from moment to moment, a commonsense orange does not exist for just an instant: it endures over time.

Commonsense objects are equivalent to conventional objects of experience (tha-snyad spyod-yul) - objects of ordinary experience to which the conventions of words or concepts (rtog-pa) refer. Thus, commonsense objects have conventional identities (rang-gi ngo-bo 'dzin-pa) in that they are distinguishable from each other, such as a specific item being an orange and not a table.

Since certain items, such as a liquid, may be experienced as water by humans, pus by clutching ghosts (hungry ghosts), and nectar by divine beings (gods), the qualification needs to be added that commonsense objects have conventional identities established as valid only in relation to certain groups of beings.

Knowable Phenomena and Comprehensible Objects

Knowable phenomena (shes-bya), also called comprehensible objects (gzhal-bya), are cognitive objects that can be known by valid cognition (tshad-ma). They include all existent objects or phenomena.

More specifically, knowable phenomena include

• objective entities (rang-mtshan, specifically characterized phenomena),
• metaphysical entities (spyi-mtshan, generally characterized phenomena).

Objective Entities and Metaphysical Entities - General Characteristics

In the Sautrantika system, objective entities are truly existent (bden-par grub-pa, real). In this system of tenets, truly existent means knowable to valid nonconceptual cognition (rtog-med).

Note that

• sensory cognition (dbang-shes) is always nonconceptual;
• mental cognition (yid-shes) may be either nonconceptual or conceptual (rtog-bcas);
• conceptual cognition is always mental.

Nonconceptual cognition may also be bare cognition of reflexive awareness (rang-rig mngon-sum) and yogic bare cognition (rnal-'byor mngon-sum).

• Reflexive awareness (rang-rig, self-awareness) accompanies each moment of cognition and takes the cognition that it accompanies as its object, allowing later recollection (dran-shes) of it.
• Yogic bare cognition is of subtle impermanence or of an individual being's lack of existing with an impossible identity (gang-zag-gi bdag-med, identitylessness of a person, selflessness of a person).

For the sake of simplicity, we shall restrict our discussion of nonconceptual cognition here to only its sensory form. Thus, objective entities can be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or physically sensed.

Metaphysical entities are falsely existent (rdzun-par grub-pa, unreal), which means imputedly existent (rtog-pas btags-tsam-gyis grub-pa). In the Sautrantika system, imputedly existent means knowable to the valid conceptual cognition that imputes them on the basis of objective entities. They cannot be known by nonconceptual cognition. In other words, metaphysical entities cannot actually be seen or heard; they can only be thought or imagined. Thus, although metaphysical entities exist, they are not as "real" as objective entities are.

Objective entities are truly existent because they are explicitly apprehensible (dngos-su rtogs-pa) by nonconceptual cognition - in other words, a mental aspect (rnam-pa) resembling them can appear in a nonconceptual cognition of them. The mental aspect that appears is simply a reflection of the object and of what it is.

• This means that objective entities can be cognized without mental construction - meaning without adding anything to the object beyond its being the sum of its parts and its holding its own essential nature as a "this" and not a "that" (rang-gi ngo-bo 'dzin-pa).

• The qualifier explicitly needs to be added because metaphysical entities can be implicitly apprehended (shugs-su rtogs-pa) by nonconceptual cognition.

Metaphysical entities are imputedly existent because they are explicitly apprehensible only to valid conceptual cognition.

Explicit and implicit apprehension of an object will be explained in more detail below.

Objective and Metaphysical Entities - Specific Presentation

Objective entities include all nonstatic phenomena - namely, those phenomena that are capable of performing a function (don-byed nus-pa).

Nonstatic phenomena include:

• forms of physical phenomena (gzugs),
• ways of being aware of something (shes-pa),
• nonconcomitant affecting variables (ldan-min 'du-byed, , nonassociated compositional factors), such as impermanence.
• Impermanence is the nonendurance of an item for a second moment.

Here, we shall deal primarily with forms of physical phenomena. They include:

• commonsense objects, such as oranges and tables,
• their conventional identities as "this" and not "that,"
• the sensibilia that comprise commonsense objects,
• the molecules and moments over which the commonsense objects and their sensibilia extend,
• the moments over which commonsense sounds extend.

The Indian Buddhist master Dharmakirti specified objective entities as those phenomena that are determinate (nges-pa) or unmixed (ma-'dres-pa) in terms of spatial location (yul), temporal location (dus), and essential nature as an individual (ngo-bo).

• Spatially determinate means that the western portion of an object does not exist in the east.
• Temporally determinate means that something that exists in the morning has a definite end, for instance when it ceases to exist in the evening.
• Being individual by essential nature means that something is distinguishable from other objects.

Thus, being unmixed (ma-'dres-pa) means being not mixed up with or indistinguishable from something else. Since these three criteria can apply both to nonstatic and static (rtag-pa, permanent) phenomena, they cannot be intended as a strict definition of objective entities. Dharmakirti used them only as criteria for refuting the non-Buddhist Nyaya view of universals as indivisible entities inhering equally in all their instances.

Metaphysical entities include all static phenomena - phenomena that do not change from moment to moment - namely, those phenomena that are incapable of performing functions.

Static phenomena include:

• the universals orange and table, of which all individual oranges and tables are instances,

• the absence of a vase imputed on a bare tabletop.

Involved Objects and Objects Existing as Cognitively Taken

The involved object ('jug-yul, engaged object, object of application) of a cognition is the main object with which a particular cognition involves itself ('jug-pa, engages, cognitively enters).

The involved object is equivalent to the object existing as cognitively taken ('dzin-stangs-kyi yul).

The involved object in either nonconceptual or conceptual cognition is a commonsense object, for example a table, and those nonstatic features of the table with which the cognition is actually involved.

The nonstatic features may be:

• sensibilia of the table, such as its sight or tactile sensation,
• the impermanence of the table,
• the table as a table,
• the table as an instance of the universal table.

Thus, only objective entities are the involved objects of either nonconceptual or conceptual cognition.

This statement, however, needs qualification.

• Such metaphysical entities as the absence of a vase on the table are also involved objects when implicitly apprehended by a sensory nonconceptual cognition or a conceptual cognition that explicitly apprehends a bare tabletop. Such a metaphysical entity, however, is not the primary involved object of that sensory or conceptual cognition.
• Although such metaphysical entities as the universal table are not the involved objects (either explicitly or implicitly apprehended) of a conceptual cognition that takes a commonsense table as its involved object, nevertheless they are the involved objects of the nonconceptual bare cognition of reflexive awareness that accompanies that conceptual cognition.

2 Distinctions in Terms of Ways of Cognizing

Decisive Determination and Apprehension of an Involved Object

Apprehension (rtogs-pa, understanding) decisively determines (nges-pa, ascertains) its involved object correctly by decisively cutting it from incorrect interpolations that it is "that" (sgro-'dogs bcad-pa). Thus, in correctly identifying its involved object, it induces immediate certainty of that object, such that recollection of the involved object can later occur.

Both valid nonconceptual and valid conceptual cognitions apprehend their involved objects, decisively determining them as "this."

In other words, when we apprehend a commonsense table by either validly seeing or thinking of it, we experience the table (the involved object) as a table and we can correctly remember later that we experienced the table as a table. We do not experience the table as an orange; nor do we validly remember that we experienced the table as an orange.

This assertion follows from the facts that

• both nonconceptual and conceptual cognitions cognize commonsense objects,
• valid cognition experiences commonsense objects as having their valid conventional identities.

In an episode of nonconceptual cognition of an involved object, however, the last moment is a nondetermining cognition of what appears (snang-la ma-nges-pa, inattentive perception). An object still appears, but is no longer decisively determined as "this" and not "that."

Except in the case of arya's total absorption (mnyam-bzhag) on voidness, any single moment of nonconceptual cognition, by itself, is a nondetermining cognition of what appears. This is because a single moment (one sixty-fifth of the time of a finger-snap) is too short for decisively determining what appears. A sequence of moments of nonconceptual cognition is required to establish apprehension and, thus, each moment within the context of the sequence is considered an apprehension.

Decisive determination of an object does not entail cognition of a static universal imputed on the involved object, such as a word or name (sgra) or a significance (don), of which the object is an individual instance. Such imputation occurs exclusively in conceptual cognition of an object.

Thus, when we bump into a table in the dark, although we experience the table as a table, and not as an orange, we may not necessarily think the word table or think that what we experienced is an instance of what the word table means. In other words, we experience the item as a table, but may not necessarily know that it is a table.

Obvious, Obscure, and Extremely Obscure Objects

An involved object is obvious (mngon-gyur-ba) if it can be cognized by valid sensory nonconceptual cognition (dbang-mngon tshad-ma). Obvious objects may be any objective entity, which is synonymous with any nonstatic phenomenon, any functional phenomenon, and any truly existent phenomenon.

An involved object is obscure (lkog-pa) if it can only be cognized by a valid inferential cognition (rjes-dpag tshad-ma) that relies on a line of reasoning (rtags) or on renown (grags). All inferential cognition is conceptual. Obscure objects may be any validly knowable phenomena, which is synonymous with any objective or metaphysical entity, any nonstatic or static phenomenon, any functional or nonfunctional phenomenon, and any truly eixstent or imputedly existent phenomenon.

An involved object is extremely obscure (shin-tu lkog-pa) if it can only be cognized by a valid inferential cognition that relies on conviction (yid-ches). Conviction, here, is that someone is a valid source of information (skyes-bu tshad-ma) and therefore that any information that this person gives is correct. Extremely obscure objects may also be any validly knowable phenomenon.

For example, the presence of smoke (a commonsense object with spatial and temporal extension) rising from the chimney of a house on a mountain is obvious because it can be seen.

The presence of fire in the house on the mountain is obscure: it is not visible. Nevertheless, it can be validly known inferentially by relying on the line of reasoning, "where there is smoke, there is fire."

The name of the person living in the house on the mountain is extremely obscure: it cannot be known through either sensory cognition or reasoning. It can only be known by relying on someone who correctly knows this information or on a valid up-to-date data bank and inferring that if the source of the information is valid, the information must be correct.

The smoke, the fire, and the name of the person are all objective entities. The only difference is that the smoke is obvious, the fire is obscure, and the name of the person is extremely obscure.

Clarity, Awareness, and Mental Activity (Mind)

In cognizing an involved object - whether obvious, obscure, or extremely obscure - a cognition gives rise ('char-ba, shar-ba) to a cognitive appearance (snang-ba) of something simultaneously with cognitively engaging ('jug-pa, cognitively involving itself) with it.

Giving rise to a cognitive appearance of something simultaneously with cognitively engaging with it are, respectively, the defining characteristics of making something cognitively clear (gsal, cognitively revealing something, clarity) and making an awareness of something (rig, awareness).

The mere making of something cognitively clear and the mere making an awareness of something (gsal-rig tsam) are, in turn, the defining characteristics of mental activity (sems, mind).

The word mere indicates that mental activity occurs without a "me" or a "mind" existing as an independent entity, separate from the mental activity, and serving as the agent that is making the activity happen. In fact, in any action, mental or physical, there is no such thing as an agent existing as an unaffected ('dus ma-byas, static, permanent), monolithic (gcig, one), separa y independently of the action, either making the action happen or observing it occur.

Making something cognitively clear does not require it being clear in the sense of it being in focus. The appearance of a blur may also cognitively arise.

Making an awareness of something does not require the awareness being conscious. Nor does it necessarily entail knowing the identity of what becomes cognitively apparent. A cognition may be subconscious (bag-la nyal) and may lack cognitive certainty (nges-pa).

Explicit and Implicit Apprehension

Apprehension of an involved object, in either nonconceptual or conceptual cognition, may be

• explicit apprehension (dngos-su rtogs-pa),
• implicit apprehension (shugs-su rtogs-pa).

In explicit apprehension of an involved object, a cognitive appearance of the involved object itself arises. Only obvious phenomena (nonstatic phenomena, objective entities) may be explicitly apprehended by valid bare nonconceptual cognition.

• This is the case only with unenlightened beings.
• In the case of Buddhas, obscure and extremely obscure objective entities may also be explicitly apprehended nonconceptually by omniscient awareness (rnam-mkhyen).

Any phenomenon - obvious, obscure, or extremely obscure; nonstatic or static; objective or metaphysical - may be explicitly apprehended by valid inferential (conceptual) cognition.

In implicit apprehension of an involved object, only a cognitive appearance of the basis for imputation (gdags-gzhi) of the involved object arises, but not a cognitive appearance of the involved object itself. Only metaphysical entities (static phenomena) may be implicitly apprehended by valid bare nonconceptual cognition.

• In the case of ordinary beings, only some metaphysical entities may be implicitly apprehended by any specific type of valid bare nonconceptual cognition.
• In the case of Buddhas, all metaphysical entities may be implicitly apprehended nonconceptually by omniscient awareness.

Either metaphysical or objective entities may be implicitly apprehended by valid inferential cognition.

Consider the case of visual nonconceptual cognition. When explicitly apprehending the sight of a bare tabletop, for example, the visual cognition simultaneously can implicitly apprehend the absence of a vase on the tabletop.

• Both the tabletop and the absence of the vase are the involved objects of the visual cognition.
• However, only the bare tabletop appears.
• The absence of a vase does not actually appear, but is decisively determined by cutting off interpolations, for instance that there is an absence of an orange there.

3 Objects in Nonconceptual Cognition

Mental Aspects in Nonconceptual Cognition

The cognitive appearance to which nonconceptual or conceptual cognition gives rise is called a mental aspect (rnam-pa). Let us initially restrict our examination to only the mental aspects that arise in nonconceptual cognition. We shall analyze the case of conceptual cognition in a later section.

In sensory nonconceptual cognition, an external object (phyi-don) casts (gtod) a mental aspect of itself on the sensory consciousness that cognizes it.

• An external object is one that exists prior to the cognition of it and functions as the natal source (rdzas) of the mental aspect that arises in its cognition.
• A natal source of something is what produces it, like the potter's wheel for a clay pot or an oven for a baked bread.

The mental aspect may be the mental semblance of a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, or a physical sensation. It is a mental semblance, however, of only the objective entities that the specific sense consciousness can cognize. Visual consciousness, for example, cannot take on the mental aspect of a sound or a taste.

Moreover, in cognizing an external object, a cognition gives rise only to a mental aspect resembling the external object. It does not give rise to the external object itself.

According to the Chittamatra (mind-only) tenet system, there are no such things as external objects. In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the mental aspect that arises comes from the same natal source as the sensory consciousness of it - namely, both come from the same karmic legacy (sa-bon, karmic seed) as their common natal source.

According to the Vaibhashika system, sensory nonconceptual cognition directly contacts and cognizes external objects, without giving rise to a mental aspect resembling them.

The external object that casts an impression on a sensory consciousness of it is a commonsense object as an objective entity.

• Consider the example of sensory nonconceptual cognition of a table, such as seeing a table or feeling a table with our hands. Like a mental impression, the mental aspect of a table that appears in the sensory cognition resembles the external commonsense table in all the nonstatic features that are explicitly apprehensible by the sensory consciousness that assumes that mental aspect.

Sensory nonconceptual cognition can explicitly apprehend only forms of physical phenomena specific to it and nonconcomitant affecting variables, such as impermanence. Although sensory nonconceptual cognition can implicitly apprehend metaphysical entities, such as the absence of a vase, it cannot assume the mental aspect of them.

• For example, in seeing a table, the table casts a mental aspect on the visual consciousness that sees it. The mental aspect resembles not only the form and color of the table, and the table itself, but also its impermanence, because visual consciousness can also "see" the impermanence of a table when it collapses.
• Visual cognition of a collapsing table may decisively determine either the sight of the collapsing table or the impermanence of the table, depending on what it decisively determines concerning its mental aspect. Only what the cognition decisively determines of its mental aspect is the involved object of that cognition.

Level of Transparency of Mental Aspects

Specifically Gelug

The mental aspect cast on a sensory consciousness by an external objective entity is cognitively transparent. In other words, when nonconceptually cognizing the mental aspect of an external objective entity such as a commonsense object, the mental aspect does not veil the commonsense object. Rather, the sensory nonconceptual cognition directly contacts the external commonsense object, albeit through the transparency of a mental aspect.

Thus, in the sensory nonconceptual cognition of a commonsense object, the external commonsense object actually appears through the totally transparent mental aspect cast by it on the consciousness.

Focal Objects and Focal Aspects

The focal object (dmigs-yul) is the object on which a cognition focuses and which serves as the objective condition (dmigs-rkyen) of the cognition. Focal objects exist prior to the cognitions of them and have their own continuums different from those of the cognitions of them. They are the external objective entities that cast mental aspects of themselves on the consciousnesses that cognize them.

According to the Chittamatra system, although sensory nonconceptual cognitions have involved objects, they do not have focal objects. They do not arise from the objective condition of external objects existing independently of mental activity (mind).

• Instead, sensory cognitions have focal aspects (dmigs-rnam), which are the mental aspects that sensory consciousnesses assume in cognizing their involved objects.
• The focal aspect in a sensory cognition arises from (is produced by) the same natal source as the sensory consciousness of it - namely, from the same karmic legacy (sa-bon, karmic seed). It does not arise from (it is not produced by) an external focal object as its natal source.

Only those features of focal objects (commonsense objects) that are decisively determined by sensory nonconceptual cognitions of them are the involved objects of those cognitions.

Appearing Objects and Cognitively Taken Objects in Nonconceptual Cognition

The appearing object (snang-yul) is the direct object (dngos-yul) that arises in a cognition, as if it were directly in front of the consciousness (blo-ngor). It is a mental reflection (gzugs-bsnyen) of a cognitive object.

In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the appearing object (mental reflection) is equivalent to the mental aspect that appears. It is a reflection of an external objective entity.

The appearing object (the fully transparent mental aspect) in sensory nonconceptual cognition is equivalent to the cognition's cognitively taken object (gzung-yul, held object). It is a full transparency of an external commonsense object.

The appearing object here is not necessary equivalent, however, to the cognition's involved object, which may be merely certain nonstatic features of the appearing (cognitively taken) object.

Summary of Sensory Nonconceptual Cognition in Chart Form

4 Objects in Conceptual Cognition

Mental Aspects and Appearing, Involved, Focal, and Cognitively Taken Objects in Conceptual Cognition

Conceptual cognition imputes (mentally labels) a metaphysical entity on the object that the mental aspect it assumes resembles, and mixes and confuses the two. Therefore, conceptual cognition is deceptive cognition ('khrul-shes).

• Of the two items confused with each other, one is the appearing object.
• The other simply appears (snang).

Specifically Gelug

For the sake of simplicity, we shall omit from the Gelug description of conceptual cognition in the remainder of this article the presentation of inferential cognition and other types of conceptual cognition in which a line of reasoning or some other metaphysical entity is explicitly apprehended.

As in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the mental aspect of a conceptual cognition is a fully transparent semblance of the external objective entity (commonsense object) that serves as the focal object of the cognition.

• Thus, both nonconceptual and conceptual cognitions have focal objects.
• In conceptual cognition, however, the focal object does not need to be present at the time and location of the cognition involving it, as in the case of a remembrance of seeing the bare tabletop yesterday.

As in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the nonstatic features of the focal object and of the fully transparent mental aspect resembling it in conceptual cognition are the explicitly apprehended involved objects.

• Such static features (metaphysical entities) as the absence of a vase on the bare tabletop may be implicitly apprehended involved objects of the conceptual cognition of a bare tabletop, in which case the conceptual cognition does not assume the mental aspect of the absence of a vase there.

The fully transparent mental aspect of the external commonsense object that conceptual cognition about that commonsense object assumes is what appears in the conceptual cognition.

The appearing object in a conceptual cognition is a metaphysical entity (a static phenomenon) - namely, an idea (snang-ba, "mental image," concept) about something.

• Ideas about objective entities are static universals imputed on the objective entities - for instance, ideas about commonsense objects imputed on external commonsense objects.
• Ideas about commonsense objects are not only themselves static universals, they are mental reflections of static universals.

Mental reflections (ideas) about commonsense objects are semitransparent.

• Thus, semitransparent mental reflections about commonsense objects, as the appearing objects of conceptual cognitions, are different from the fully transparent mental aspects of the commonsense objects that appear (arise) in the conceptual cognition.

What appears (arises) in a conceptual cognition may be the mental aspect of, for instance, any form of external physical phenomenon - a sight, sound, smell, taste, or physical sensation.

• Such forms do not appear vividly through the fully transparent mental aspect. They appear only in a partially veiled manner, because the appearing object is actually a semitransparent idea imputed on them and with which they are mixed and confused.
• For example, when visualizing an orange, the mental aspect of an external commonsense orange appears and is confused with the idea of the static universal orange that we imagine we are cognizing.

Thus, mental reflections and mental aspects are not equivalent terms.

• Mental aspects are exclusively nonstatic phenomena and their contents are exclusively nonstatic external commonsense objects.
• Mental reflections may be either nonstatic or static, and their contents may be either nonstatic or static.

• In nonconceptual cognition, mental reflections are nonstatic and their contents are nonstatic external commonsense objects. Thus, they are equivalent to the mental aspects of the cognition.
• In conceptual cognition, mental reflections are static ideas and their contents are static ideas.

The appearing objects of conceptual cognitions (static ideas) are also their cognitively taken objects.

• Thus, in both nonconceptual and conceptual cognitions, the appearing objects are equivalent to the cognitively taken objects.
• In sensory nonconceptual cognition, both are external commonsense objects (objective entities).
• In conceptual cognition, both are static ideas (metaphysical entities).

Universals in Reference to Conventional Objects

In the most general terms, a universal (spyi) is a phenomenon shared in common by the individuals (bye-brag) on which it is imputed.

Among universals, we may differentiate:

• universals in reference to conventional objects,
• universals in reference to language.

In reference to conventional objects, there are three main types of universals:

1. collection universals (tshogs-spyi),
2. kind universals (rigs-spyi),
3. object universals (don-spyi).

(1) Collection universals are wholes imputed on spatial, sensorial, and/or temporal parts. Consider the example of "a table." "A table," as a whole item, can be imputed on

• a collection of patches of colored shapes,
• a collection of tactile sensations of variously shaped surfaces,
• a collection of the previous two collections,
• a collection of legs and a flat surface,
• a collection of molecules,
• a collection of moments of any or all of the previous collections.

A whole is a universal because it can be imputed on any of the above collections of parts.

Because collection universals extend over time, they are also called vertical universals (gong-ma'i spyi).

(2) Kind universals are the type of phenomenon that a specific individual item is an instance of, such as "a table" imputed on a specific instance of something having legs and a flat surface.

• Similar items of varying design and individual items of the same design may be instances of the kind universal table.
• In other words, a kind universal specifies the conventional identity of something.

Because kind universals extend over instances of them, they are also called horizontal universals (thad-ka'i spyi).

(3) Object universals are the concepts (ideas) of commonsense objects used when thinking of, imagining (visualizing), or remembering commonsense objects.

A universal is defined as an individual set, category, or whole imputed on a collection of subsets, individual members of a set, individual instances of a category, or individual parts.

There are two ontological types of universals:

1. universals that are functional phenomena (spyi dngos-po-ba),
2. universals that are nonfunctional phenomena (spyi dngos-po-ba ma-yin-pa).

Functional phenomena (dngos-po) are synonymous with nonstatic phenomena. Nonfunctional phenomena (dngos-med) are synonymous with static phenomena.

(1) Let us call universals that are functional phenomena "nonstatic universals" (nonstatic abstractions). They may be cognized either nonconceptually or conceptually. They include:

• collection universals,
• kind universals.

Since collection and kind universals are nonstatic phenomena, they appear in sensory nonconceptual cognition as part of the focal objects (equivalent to the mental aspects, appearing objects, and cognitively taken objects). When ascertained, they may also be the involved objects explicitly apprehended by the sensory nonconceptual cognition of them.

Thus, when we see a collection of parts, we also see the whole that they comprise and the type of phenomenon that the whole is (its conventional identity). For example, when we see the legs and flat surface of a table or the shape and color of a table, these parts simultaneously also appear as a whole item and as a table.

(2) We shall call universals that are nonfunctional phenomena "static universals" (static abstractions). They are cognized only conceptually. They include:

• object universals.

Conceptual Cognition with Object Universals

Object universals are the semitransparent appearing objects in conceptual cognition that appear to be objects, but are merely superimposed on and confused with cognitive appearances of involved objects (external objective entities).

Consider the example of the nonverbal conceptual cognition of a form of physical phenomenon, such as thinking of the sight, smell, taste, or physical sensation of an external commonsense object, such as an orange.

An appearance arises of:

• a specific set of sensibilia of the external commonsense object,
• the nonstatic collection universal of the sensibilia constituting a whole object,
• the nonstatic kind universal of the sense data constituting "this" kind of object, and not "that" kind - an orange, not an apple.

The threefold appearance arises through the totally transparent mental aspect of the specific set of sensibilia, collection universal, and kind universal that the cognition assumes.

The semitransparent appearing object (idea) with which the totally transparent mental aspect is mixed is an object universal, as in the case of imagining or remembering an orange, without associating the word orange with what mentally appears.

• In the case of imagining an orange, an appearance of a specific commonsense orange arises through a transparent mental aspect of that orange and is mixed with the semitransparent object universal oranges in general, which the appearance is taken to represent.

• In the case of remembering a specific commonsense orange, an appearance of that orange arises through a transparent mental aspect of the orange and is mixed with the semitransparent object universal a specific "public" orange. A specific public orange is one that anyone could have seen from any angle when we saw that specific commonsense orange. The appearance of the specific commonsense orange may also be mixed with the semitransparent object universal the specific commonsense orange whether seen, smelled, tasted, or touched.

Universals in Reference to Language

In reference to language, there are two main types of universals:

• term universals (sgra-spyi, audio ideas),
• meaning universals (don-spyi, meaningful ideas).

Term universals are universals adopted as conventions (tha-snyad) in a particular language by the members of a specific society. As words themselves, such as "table," and not the sounds of words (which are kind universals), they are universals also in the sense that they are imputable on sounds made in a variety of voices, pitches, volumes, and pronunciations. Term universals by themselves do not have any meanings associated with them.

Meaning universals are the meanings or significance of sounds or of written representations of sounds. Meanings do not exist inherently within sounds or within their written representations, but are merely conventions coined, assigned to sounds or to their written representations, and used as universals by the members of a specific society. The same sound can mean "to," "too," or "two" in English or "you" in mispronounced French. The same written representation of a sound, for instance "bear," can mean "a large furry mammal" or "to endure something." Moreover, each person in a particular society may assign a slightly different meaning to a specific word, but still use that meaning as a universal when thinking that word.

Meaning universals are logical isolates (ldog-pa, distinguishers). The meaning "x" of a particular communicative sound (word) is what remains upon the logical isolation (elimination) of all "non-x" meanings. This formulation follows from the assertion that a meaning "x" does not exist inherently within a sound.

Further, the logical isolation of a meaning universal is not a deliberate mental procedure that directly excludes all "non-x" meanings. The conceptual process of thinking with logical isolates occurs naturally, based on holding the dualistic view that logically divides all phenomena into "x" and "non-x."

In verbal conceptual cognition, a cognitive appearance of the sound of a conventional word (an objective entity) arises. The idea imputed on it and with which it is mixed may be:

• merely a term universal, as in the case of thinking the word voidness without having any idea of what it means,
• both a term universal and a meaning universal, as in the case of thinking the word voidness together with a meaning associated with the word, even if that meaning is inaccurate.

In preverbal conceptual cognition, an appearance of a form of physical phenomenon, such as a mental sight, sound, smell, taste, or physical sensation, may arise. The idea with which it is mixed is:

• merely a meaning universal, as in the case of a preverbal baby conceiving of someone as its mother when it misses her and cries. Although the baby does not yet know the word mother, it conceives of the meaning of the term universal mother. This meaning universal is fit (rung) to be applied to the term universal mother when the baby learns the word mother.

Conceptual Cognition with Meaning Universals

Specifically Gelug

Consider the example of verbally thinking orange.

An appearance arises of:

• the sounds of the vowels and consonants audible during the sequence of moments required to hear the sound of the entire word orange,
• the nonstatic collection universal of the sounds of the vowels and consonants constituting a whole word,
• the nonstatic kind universal of the sounds of the vowels and consonants constituting the sound of "this" word, and not "that" word - the sound of "orange," not of "arrange."

The threefold appearance arises through the totally transparent mental aspect of the specific set of sounds, collection universal, and kind universal that the cognition assumes.

The semitransparent appearing objects (ideas) imputed on the totally transparent mental aspect that appears and with which the mental aspect is mixed and confused are:

• the term universal orange, as an actual word,
• the meaning universal of what the word orange signifies.

Conceptualized Objects

Conceptualized objects (zhen-yul, conceived objects, implied objects) are, literally, the objects on which concepts or ideas cling. They are phenomena exclusively of conceptual cognition. Nonconceptual cognition does not have conceptualized objects.

Specifically Gelug

Consider further the conceptual cognition that verbally thinks orange, analyzed in the previous section.

If the conceptual cognition apprehends only the sound of the word orange, the external sound of the commonsense word orange is the involved object.

The appearing objects are the semitransparent ideas of the term universal orange and of the meaning universal of what the word orange signifies.

The conceptualized object of the term universal is the external sound of the commonsense word orange (the involved object). The conceptualized object of the meaning universal is the external commonsense orange.

In the case of the conceptual cognition that explicitly apprehends the bare tabletop and implicitly apprehends the absence of a vase there, both the external bare tabletop and the external absence of a vase there are the conceptualized objects.

Summary of Conceptual Cognition in Chart Form

Page Contents

1 Basic Distinctions among Cognitive Objects

Preface

Cognitive Objects and Sensibilia

Commonsense Objects and Conventional Objects of Experience

Knowable Phenomena and Comprehensible Objects

Objective Entities and Metaphysical Entities – General Characteristics

Objective and Metaphysical Entities – Specific Presentation

Involved Objects and Objects Existing as Cognitively Taken

2 Distinctions in Terms of Ways of Cognizing

Decisive Determination and Apprehension of an Involved Object

Obvious, Obscure, and Extremely Obscure Objects

Clarity, Awareness, and Mental Activity (Mind)

Explicit and Implicit Apprehension

3 Objects in Nonconceptual Cognition

Mental Aspects in Nonconceptual Cognition

Level of Transparency of Mental Aspects

Focal Objects and Focal Aspects

Appearing Objects and Cognitively Taken Objects in Nonconceptual Cognition

Summary of Sensory Nonconceptual Cognition in Chart Form

4 Objects in Conceptual Cognition

Mental Aspects and Appearing, Involved, Focal, and Cognitively Taken Objects in Conceptual Cognition

Universals in Reference to Conventional Objects

Conceptual Cognition with Object Universals

Universals in Reference to Language

Conceptual Cognition with Meaning Universals

Conceptualized Objects

Summary of Conceptual Cognition in Chart Form