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The Validity and Accuracy of Cognition of the Two TruthsBerlin, Germany, February 22, 2002 1. GELUG-PRASANGIKA EXPLANATION Cognition of an Object For example, in cognizing an orange, mental activity simultaneously produces the sight of an orange and sees it. What we actually cognize is a visual image of an orange a sight (gzugs); although in order not to contradict convention (tha-snyad), we would need to assert that we also see the orange. Cognition of an orange, however, does not create the orange. Producing a cognitive object and cognitively engaging with it are two aspects of the same mental activity, two ways of describing the same phenomenon. It is not that production of a sight comes first and then, a moment later, the seeing of it occurs. [For a more detailed discussion, click here for Objects of Cognition.] The Two Truths
Correspondingly, mental activity (mind) has two aspects, each of which is valid for cognizing only one truth about a phenomenon. They are the aspects:
Sautrantika Forerunner The Mahayana traditions Chittamatra and Madhyamaka present the two truths as two aspects of any phenomenon. The Hinayana schools Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, and Theravada present them as two different classes of phenomena. [For a discussion of The Terms
Hinayana and Mahayana, click here.]
[For a detailed discussion of The Two Truths in Sautrantika and Vaibhashika, click here.] [For a detailed discussion of Concomitant and Nonconcomitant Affecting Variables, click here.] Since Sautrantika asserts that objective entities exist unimputedly, whereas metaphysical ones exist merely imputedly, the two true phenomena are knowable in valid bare cognition (mngon-sum tshad-ma) by two different aspects of the cognition:
For a valid cognition to give rise to a cognitive appearance of a metaphysical entity, it needs to be conceptual, as in the case of valid inferential cognition (rjes-dpag tshad-ma). Thus, the two true phenomena are directly apprehensible by distinct valid ways of knowing:
[For a more detailed discussion,
click here for Relationships with Objects.]
Consider the case of a visual object.
For an item to be truly existent means for it to have a truly existent conventional identity (tha-snyad-du yod-pai bdag) as this or that. A truly existent conventional identity is one established by the power of an objective defining characteristic (rang-mtshan) findable inherently on the side of an item. Such an objective defining characteristic would allow for an accurate mental labeling (yang-dag-par ming dogs-pa) of the item as this or that, because it would be what makes the basis having it (mtshan-gzhi) a proper basis for labeling (gdags-gzhi) this or that. Although mental activity can give rise to an appearance of a mode of existence that resembles true existence, actual true existence cannot appear because there is no such thing. The items absolute absence (med-dgag) of true existence is its voidness (stong-pa-nyid, emptiness). For something to be absolutely devoid of being truly existent means for it to have a non-truly existent conventional identity as this or that. A non-truly existent conventional identity is one established by the power of mental labeling alone, and not in conjunction with the power of an objective defining characteristic findable inherently on the side of an item. Impure and Pure Superficial Truths
Deepest Truth An items absolute absence of a truly existent conventional identity does not mean that it has no conventional identity at all. Items have non-truly existent conventional identities as this or that. Otherwise, the absurd conclusion would follow that everything is the same item and you are me. Simultaneous Cognition of the Two Truths Similarly, we can cognize the superficial and deepest truths about something simultaneously, but only by the appropriate aspects of mental activity valid for cognizing each. Thus, mental activity valid for cognizing superficial truths about an item what it appears to be and how it appears to exist is not valid for cognizing its deepest truth how it actually exists, and vice versa. This statement is true whether the mental activity is cognition of impure or pure superficial truths and, within the latter category, whether the mental activity is conceptual or nonconceptual. Conceptual and Nonconceptual Cognition Nonconceptual cognition is bare cognition, without such a medium. It may be either sensory or mental. Sensory cognition is exclusively nonconceptual. Conceptual cognition and both sensory and mental nonconceptual cognition of an item give rise to and cognize only impure appearances of it. Both may be equally valid for cognizing impure superficial truths. The sight and the smell of an orange are not mutually exclusive phenomena (gal-ba) and thus one moment of mental activity can cognize both simultaneously. The presence and absolute absence of true existence, however, are mutually exclusive. One moment of mental activity cannot cognize both at the same time. Therefore, because the impure appearance of an item is with an appearance of seemingly true existence, such an appearance occludes (khegs) or blocks simultaneous cognition of its deepest truth, its absolute absence of true existence. In other words, cognition of impure superficial truths and of deepest truths cannot occur simultaneously. Clear-light mental activity (od-gsal), a topic discussed exclusively in anuttarayoga tantra, is the subtlest level of mental activity. Clear-light cognition of something gives rise to and cognizes only a pure appearance of it. It is the only level of mental activity that can do so. Because the pure appearance of an item is with an absolute absence of true existence, such an appearance can be cognized simultaneously with its deepest truth. Thus, clear-light cognition and only clear-light cognition is valid for cognizing the superficial and deepest truths about something simultaneously. In other words, cognition of deepest truths can occur simultaneously only with cognition of pure superficial truths. [For a more advanced discussion, click here for The Union of Method and Wisdom in Sutra and Tantra, Gelug Sutra.] Accurate and Distorted Cognition of Superficial Truths
Thus, accurate valid cognitions of the impure and pure appearances of something are the same with respect to the conventional identity of the item as this or that. They are equally valid and accurate regarding what the item appears to be. They differ only with respect to how the item appears to exist with its conventional identity as this or that. Deceptive Cognition of Superficial Truths [For a discussion of appearing and implied objects, click here for Objects of Cognition.] Sensory and mental nonconceptual cognition also give rise to impure superficial truths appearances of true existence (bden-snang). However, they do not have manifest grasping for true existence. Thus, they are not deceptive cognitions from the point of view of mistaking the appearing mode of existence to be the actual mode of existence. 2. NON-GELUG MADHAYMAKA EXPLANATION Two Phases of Cognition of Superficial Truths In other words, when cognizing the superficial truths of this item, we see it as a white rectangle and conceptualize it as a white rectangular piece of paper. Each of the two phases of cognition of superficial truth may be accurate or distorted. Gelug asserts that the item appears as a white rectangle and as a white rectangular piece of paper both to conceptual and nonconceptual cognition of it. Contrast between Non-Gelug and Gelug Regarding Grasping
for True Existence Gelug agrees that an appearance of seemingly true existence is as a seemingly truly existent this or that. However, Gelug does not allow for the appearance of a shape and color to cognitively arise without the two also appearing to be a seemingly truly existent shape and color. The appearance of a white rectangle, even in sensory nonconceptual cognition of one, is still the appearance of a this. Here, the this is a white rectangle. In short, for non-Gelug,
For Gelug,
[For a more advanced discussion of Types of Appearances According to Non-Gelug, click here.] Contrast between Non-Gelug and Gelug Regarding the Accuracy
of Cognition of Superficial Truths Therefore, conceptual cognition of superficial truth may be accurate within its own sphere, but is inaccurate when compared to nonconceptual cognition. This is the case in terms of both
In Gelug, on the other hand, conceptual and nonconceptual cognition of superficial truth can have the same accuracy regarding the appearance of what something is and the appearance of how something exists. Consequently, non-Gelug stresses reliance on nonconceptual cognition more strongly than does Gelug. Nevertheless, both Gelug and non-Gelug agree that conceptual cognition is more deceptive than nonconceptual cognition is, because only conceptual cognition is affected by manifest grasping for true existence. Denumerable and Nondenumerable Deepest Truths
[For further detail about Affirmations, Nullifications, and Denumerable and Nondenumerable Truths, click here.] [For further detail about self and other-voidness, click here for The Theory of Tantra: Why Tantra Is More Efficient than Sutra, Non-Gelug Variations Concerning General Tantra.] Valid Cognition of Denumerable and Nondenumerable Deepest
Truth Nondenumerable deepest truth is validly known only by valid nonconceptual cognition of deepest truth. Valid sensory and mental nonconceptual cognitions are cognitions of only superficial truths. They cannot cognize denumerable deepest truths. Only yogic and clear-light nonconceptual cognition can cognize nondenumerable deepest truths. Thus, conceptual and nonconceptual valid cognition of deepest truth cognize different objects. This non-Gelug assertion contrasts sharply with the Gelug position. According to Gelug, conceptual and nonconceptual valid cognition of deepest truth cognize the same object the absolute absence of true existence. The Deceptiveness of Cognition of Denumerable Deepest
Truths and of Superficial Truths Valid cognition of denumerable deepest truth is also deceptive from another point of view. It is necessarily a conceptual cognition and, although it does not produce an appearance of seemingly true existence, it produces an appearance of an absolute absence of true existence. In effect, it produces an appearance of the conceptual category not-true existence. Moreover, although this valid conceptual cognition lacks grasping for true existence, it has grasping for not-true existence. Valid cognition of a superficial truth about something is also always deceptive because it cognizes only a superficial appearance of something and makes that appearance seem to exist on its own, separately from its actual mode of existence. This is the case both for
Thus, according to the non-Gelug definitions, valid cognition of the superficial truth of something is always deceptive. Whether conceptual or nonconceptual, whether accurate or distorted, it is always the cognition of the impure appearance of something. [For a more advanced discussion of Divisions, Causes, and Elimination of Unpurified Appearance-Making According to Non-Gelug, click here.] The Nondeceptiveness of Cognition of Nondenumerable
Deepest Truth Thus, for non-Gelug, valid cognition of the ultimate appearance of something is by a valid cognition of a deepest truth. It is not valid cognition of a superficial truth. Superficial truth is exclusively impure. The cognition of pure appearances occurs exclusively with valid cognition of nondenumerable deepest truth. Contrast between Non-Gelug and Gelug Concerning the
Two Truths
For Gelug,
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