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2D BRIGADE/101ST TASK FORCE IN VIETNAM
FORTY YEARS AGO THIS WEEK


(April 13 - April 19, 1968)

By LTG (then COL) John H. Cushman

The 1st Cav Division having completed its mission with the Marines at Khe Sanh, from 12 April to 18 April the 2d Brigade redeployed back to its old area of operations and its CP at LZ Sally, where we would resume opcon of the 1/501. On 15 April we lost the 1/502 to the 101st’s 1st Brigade; it would move to FSB Henry south of Hue to assist in an attack by the 101st Airborne and 1st Cavalry Divisions into the A Shau Valley. 1/502 would be gone for two weeks.

The after-action report of the successful 2/501 encirclement at Phuoc Dien of 10-11 April had high-lighted “the need for continuous illumination in cordon operations… During the hours of darkness the trapped NVA made numerous attempts to exfiltrate the cordon area. Illumination enabled movement to be detected, and small unit commanders were able to make rapid adjustments to thwart each attempt.”

As the brigade was moving into its new locations, we had an encirclement opportunity. At 1330 on April 17 the 1/501 received intelligence that two NVA companies were located in two hamlets, one of them called AP My Xa. LTC Prokup immediately moved A/1/501 into a blocking position to the hamlets’ southeast and moved D/1/501 by combat assault into a blocking position to the hamlets’ northeast. Later in the afternoon C/1/501 and the battalion recon platoon moved by combat assault to the hamlets’ north. B/1/501 was pulled off security at the An Lo bridge to combat assault into position at 1900 to the hamlets’ west. But when night fell we had not completed an encircle-ment; the hamlets’ southern sector was open. And we were out of rifle companies; the 1/502 had left and 2/501 was still moving.

The next day, as soon as A/2/501 arrived by truck from Utah Beach, I moved it by combat assault into a position to the hamlets’ south, opcon to the 1/501. Enemy were still in the hamlets and we used a lot of firepower, even tear gas, in the attack. We lost one man killed and 13 wounded. The enemy lost 40 NVA killed and we gathered 40 individual weapons, but we took no prisoners. From an agent report 2d Bde S2 believed that in the two hamlets there had been 200 enemy, in two companies of the 7th Battalion, 90 NVA Regiment. We had missed an opportunity to surround them.

Although we later listed this operation as a “cordon,” our companies had not “locked arms” around the enemy with no gaps whatever, and had not lined themselves up in two-man foxholes placed no more then 10 meters apart. Along with continuous illumination, this had been our recipe for success in the cordon of the 2/501 the week before.

After this experience I decided that, most of all, my brigade’s exploitation of an opportunity for encirclement called for intense yet controlled energy on my part, not necessarily in the encirclement’s detailed tactical direction (although I may occasionally have to be quite specific with my encirclement battalion commander) but in the gathering and direction of resources – helicopters, firepower, and reinforcing units, including RF/PF forces from wherever they could be found – and in my driving motivation of all concerned to insure that the loop was tightly closed around the enemy before dark, when we could turn on the lights, with all the advantages being ours

Another opportunity would arise the following week, this time with complete success.