The Stop

Functionalism is a promising theory developed to account for how mental and physical states interact. I intend to introduce the stop-frame model of functionalism, which basically posits that mental states are "instances" in the entire mental matrix and that conscious experience occurs as an emanation of the mental processes between mental states. I will then deal with the problem of qualia as it relates to functionalism, addressing specifically what I believe are the two biggest stumbling blocks for functionalism: the inverted spectrum problem and the absent qualia problem.

Since René Descartes first introduced the mind-body problem (28), philosophers have been struggling to solve this problem. Of all of the arguments, I think functionalism stands the best chance of reflecting actual reality compared with the other options. What is functionalism? Functionalism is a causal role theory that explains the mind as a series of interconnected states. Inputs received from either the environment or from other mental states cause the input-state to move to another state. Eventually these states may allow for physical behavior to emerge as outputs. In many ways functionalism is the view that the mind is analogous to a type of computer program, and I shall rely on this analogy throughout this paper.

In the psycho-physicalist theory we discover that the mind and the body are separated by a "something" that has come to be called an explanatory gap. The mind is a non-physical thing, and only physical things can cause alterations in other physical things, and vice-versa. If this is the case, how can the mind cause changes in the body, and the body cause changes in the mind? One might infer that this relationship is merely a correlation, with no causal role. While it may be true that all causal relationships are correlations, it seems likely that some correlations are also causal relationships. To deny this is to introduce a significant quantity of coincidences in the world to the degree that I believe it generates a significant complication. This could be denied with the precept of Occam's razor. If for all x and y, it is true that 'If x then y,' then it is as true for psycho-physical relationships that x causes y as it is for physical relationships. While it may be argued that in psycho-physical relationships x doesn't always cause y, what may we conclude? We may conclude that in psychic states there is no singular x that causes y, but rather that a syndrome[1] of events, which can be collectively called x, will always cause y. I mean by this not to imply an eliminative materialistic syndrome of neurons, but rather a syndrome of specific mental states and processes x. If I am thinking about raising my arm, but yet my arm doesn't rise, and all the mechanical parts betwixt my brain and my arm are fully operational, then such a causal relationship might seem to be false, but it isn't false at all! There is a causal relationship. I am simply not in x but rather in a mental syndrome similar to x except that it lacks the variable that actually causes my arm to rise! If I am in that precise state where I think of my arm rising and my arm actually rises, then I am truly in syndrome x and my arm will always rise in that syndrome, all things being equal. To sum this up, there are two mental syndromes wherein I am thinking about my arm rising. In one syndrome my arm doesn't actually rise (z), and in the other it does (x). Whenever I am in mental state syndrome z my arm will not rise, and when I am in mental state syndrome x my arm will always rise. Now for that elusive explanatory gap. McGinn uses a concept he calls "property P" which would be the essential property linking psychic and physic states[2]. He then goes on to argue that P is psychologically closed off to us, as much as the theory of relativity is closed off to the mind of a cow (544). While I could easily argue that cows probably don't have minds, and therefore it is a weak analogy, I don't think I need to bother. I am prepared to deny that any such property P even exists!

There is something true of all processes; they are what occurs between states. There is an explanatory gap between any two states of anything! If we take the process of an egg hatching, for example, there is at least the state in which the egg is unhatched. Through the process of hatching we find ourselves at the other extreme state where the egg is hatched. A hatched egg is not the same thing as the process of an egg hatching, and vice-versa. It is a kind of movement from the first state to the second state. If we examine this closely enough, we will discover there is an explanatory gap here! For brevity let us imagine that there are no intermediary states from egg unhatched to egg hatched. How does it get from the first to the last state? We can reduce this as far as we like, right down to the very behavior of atoms, but the only thing we really have done is introduce an enormous number of explanatory gaps! Consider B → M. The arrow (which means "causes") represents our explanatory gap. Let us use "property P" as a solution (assuming it exists and we can learn of it). B → P → M. Now we have two explanatory gaps! Well this isn't very helpful! We could theoretically invent all kinds of variants of P to throw in there between B and M, but we are only increasing the number of explanatory gaps we have to deal with. So what is an explanatory gap anyway? It is precisely the function itself! This is to say, that when we say "explanatory gap" we are speaking of the process of moving between states. The mapping function is our "→" symbol. What this boils down to is that there are no explanatory gaps anymore. This holds true of all processes.

We are tempted to think of the mind as a special case different from other processes, but really it isn't. Our perspective is the only thing that is different. Computer programs are essentially functional, moving from one state to another. The function of the program, while much simpler than our mental states, is not identical to the function of the microchip running the program. The function of our mental processes is likewise not identical to the function of our brain processes. This is the insight of functionalism.

To illustrate this better I would like to use a stop-frame model. In stop-frame processes, you have a series of frames (pictures) all of which are sequential and similar to one another, but slightly different. If you flip those frames fast enough, they produce the illusion of motion. The space between the frames where one is pulled down and the other pulled up is an explanatory gap, a process. Putnam introduced the notion of a "Turing Machine" that would accept inputs at "state one (S1)" which would determine which state it would then move towards. (S1) if input A then (S2); (105). The mind and brain, like many functional systems, operates on a dynamic model of functions and states, meaning that there is a multiplicity of states that may be existent "in the now" that could respond to input that would then lead to any number of other states that may arise, and any number of states may respond to the same input. The "function" of these processes is represented by the word then. "Then" = "→" = "function" ="explanatory gap." At any given moment in time, in the smallest increment possible, the earth is in position a in space around the Sun. The next moment it will "then" be in position b and "then" c and so forth. As each moment passes to the next moment, there is an explanatory gap. The implications of this are that if there is an explanatory gap in psycho-physical dualism, it also follows that there is such a gap in the entire known Universe from one moment to the next! When viewed this way it doesn't really seem to be much of a problem at all, as we take for granted that motion accounts for these gaps naturally, and if not motion, then some other process.

The primary problem that functionalism faces is qualia. To be more specific, the problem of the inverted spectrum and the problem of absent qualia.

The problem with qualia I believe is that of conception. I think that philosophers have built up the notion of qualia to the extent that our conception of these phenomena take on a solid life of their own. The trouble, I believe, is that we exist within mental processes so that our concept of qualia is exaggerated. Take for example when you look at a cat. What you are "seeing" is an "image" of that cat in your mind. Light reflects off the cat, passes through your optical organs, and is translated into neural signals which then reach the brain and are processed in the occipital lobe. Somehow this is converted to a "visual" image of a cat in your mind. When we open up the brain, however, we find no little picture of a cat! Qualia are absent altogether. This holds true of all sensory input as well as hallucinations and other "stimulations" that have no physical cause external to the body (i.e., afterimages). To answer this problem we must model the relationship between B and M[3]. Let us say there is physical input received by the central nervous system, and this causes BS(1) to move to BS(2). This is expressed by BP(1). Each brain state corresponds with a specific mental state (this is the function of the brain). So for every BS(1) we have MS(1) as well, as an emergent property of that brain state. MS(1) by itself would not be consciousness, but rather like a microchip may be in microchip state 1 and at the same time correspond to program state 1, nothing really "happens" until it moves into microchip state 2. This produces the physiological electrical process we could call microchip process 1 (the physical explanatory gap). We would also move into program state 2 as a result of that function. This would mean that there is likewise a parallel program process 1 (the psychological explanatory gap) that would correlate with the physical process. Each state by itself is useless to us, but when you get enough of these working together fast enough, you get "a running computer program (software)." Likewise, if you get enough brain state shifts, you likewise have mental state shifts, and a syndrome of mental processes. It is in these processes that consciousness arises. I suppose in a primitive way there is a "consciousness" of sort in the computer program processes, to which we are denied experiential access. We can only see the "outputs" on our monitor screens (as with other people as well, we only have access to their outputs). Of course I would not suggest that present day computers are actually conscious in the sense that human beings are conscious, but I would consider the possibility that they might be conscious at a lower level, perhaps like that of a reptile. Qualia exist within the processes that lie between BP and MP themselves (like the software exists within the program processes). You cannot freeze the process and retain the qualia, no more than you could pause a movie and still have the experience of motion. Like the "motion" in the process of movie reels flipping past us continuously with no interruptions, qualia emerges as mental states shift rapidly in the proper succession.

The inverted spectrum problem is rather artificial, as there is good reason to doubt that it is even possible at all. However it is conceivable and ought to be dealt with. The nature of the problem, simply put, is that Bob looks at an object and sees the color red, and says "this object is red." Joe looks at the same object, but sees the color Bob would call "green" and claims it is red. This means that while they have the same functional state they are looking at the same color, experiencing different qualia but producing the same output "red." How can this be the case?

In short, it can't happen. The first answer I have is that no state produces qualia. To put the problem within my own paradigm, how can the exact same syndrome of processes produce different qualia? My answer is they cannot. The syndrome of MP is supervenient[4] on the qualia itself. If you change any aspect of the syndrome of MP you also change the qualia. If we recall my previous example that if you are in syndrome x your arm will always rise while in that syndrome. If your arm is not rising, you are therefore not in syndrome x, but in some other syndrome. That syndrome of mental states and the processes between those states is supervenient on the task of the arm rising. If you alter anything in syndrome x you must receive some other output! It would be logically impossible, therefore, for the exact same syndrome to produce different qualia. If there is an inverted spectrum between Bob and Joe which occurs while they share an identical psychological process, the inversion must always occur in the physiological process. An interesting feature of functionalism is that it is self-modifying as it receives inputs (what we call learning). It is possible that while the BS or the BP are different, the mental syndromes of seeing the color red would have to be identical. As far as Jim knows, it is the same color that Bob is aware of. As the MS in each of them developed in the same way (associating the object being viewed with the word "red") for all intents and purposes to each of them that object is red. The naming-output MS is operating in the same way in each of them in reference to the object, although it would stand to reason that the qualia MP would still have to differ. This may seem like a "fast trick" I am playing on you, but if you remember the entire problem is with the output (report of "red"), which would function the same way in both men. In any event, something must be different in either Bob or Jim for there to be a difference in qualia. The physiological input-receiving-equipment must be different, the physiological process must be different, or something in the mind must be different. An analogy would be two matches with the same sparking agent striking the same surface and both producing flames from which the same amount of light and heat are cast, although if we were to stick our fingers in the two flames, one would burn us but the other would chill us. Such concepts are really absurd. Something must be different in one or more processes in order for different qualia to be experienced.

This is also known as the liberal problem, in that it attributes mental states to processes that cannot experience qualia. Block's model of this problem is that it is conceivable that we could assign every person in China the role of a mental state, and organize them like a functional flow chart similar to that in mental processes. It would be rather odd to think that somehow this collective of individuals would produce a conscious state (137). My stop-frame model of functionalism→ qualia can make short work of this. Imagine that you lined up ten thousand persons and gave them each a large blow-up picture of a movie frame. If each person held up their frame, and then moved away so the next person could stand up and hold their frame, we wouldn't get the perception of motion from this experience at all. In other words, it would no more be a movie than the Chinese people representing mental states would equal consciousness. A large part of all processes which predicts that they will be successful in their useful function is that they are fluid and each state follows in rapid succession. In both the People of China and the Frame Holder models, there are actually a series of extraneous processes that undermine the natural continuity of the working model. In the Frame Holder model we have the additional processes of our workers pulling down the frames, moving out of the way, stepping up into position, and holding up the next frame. This doesn't occur in actual motion picture projectors. In the People of China model we have the additional processes of reading instructions, walking around, and performing some physical action on the other individuals they are required to interact with. This doesn't happen in a brain. Imagine running a video game with the People of China model. Would we ever really get the visual output of a race car or airplane from people "acting out" the programming instructions? One of the explanations about why we haven't got a functional strong A.I. program to run as of yet is that the current computing machines don't have enough complexity and speed of uninterrupted continuity. It is conceivable that one day we will have computers powerful enough to run fully functional mental processes complete with qualia!

In review, we discover that Qualia and communication between the mind and body occur as processes (which actually are the explanatory gaps) between the two. Thoughts exist as processes between mental states, and there are also bio-chemical processes that lie between brain states. All processes are really explanatory gaps, and this is a universal problem, if one chooses to view it as a problem at all. Qualia are not singular things so to speak, but the continuity of the processes between brain and mental states (emergent properties), and that fluidity of processes between states of the right sort are required to allow for consciousness to arise. I think the difficulty people have had in the past with functionalism is that the simplified model of the Turing Machine, while convenient, is not complex enough to adequately account for the dynamic interactions of mind and body. Once we conceive of the entire system that is required, we can see how this model is entirely feasible.

Block, Ned. "Troubles with Functionalism." Problems in Mind. Ed. Crumley, Jack S. III.

McGinn, Colin. "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?." Problems in Mind. Ed. Crumley,

Putnam, Hilary. "The Nature of Mental States." Problems in Mind. Ed. Crumley, Jack S. III.

[1] By syndrome I do not imply abnormality, but rather I refer to a group of events occurring in a dynamic relationship together. In the case of functionalism the syndrome would refer to a series of mental states and processes that are always present when a certain output, be it mental or physical, should occur.

[2] Property P according to McGinn is the causal role or element which attempts to connect the physical to the psychological. McGinn contends such a property is cognitively closed to us in that we do not possess the ability to comprehend the nature of P.

[3] For shorthand purposes, let BS refer to brain states, BP refer to brain processes, MS refer to mental states, and MP refer to mental processes.

[4] "Supervenience" is a model which states that if you have certain properties M they will supervene on certain properties B if and only if a change in M causes a change in B, and vice-versa.