The Lucky Hat : Free Will Exists When Randomness and
Causation Meet Thought
by Scott Chastain
If possession of free will implies that our thoughts and behaviors are
undetermined it follows that free will cannot exist in a universe which is based
upon determined causes. That
suggests we have no moral responsibility towards our own behavior.
Various solutions have been offered to this problem, and I intend to add
a solution of my own and defend it against likely criticisms that could be
brought against it.
Free will can be defined as the ability to make choices between equally
viable options. In any given
situation, a person is at liberty to select one or more of those choices
independent of the environment, personal experience, and genetic disposition.
This seems the intuitive state of affairs concerning minds.
Indeterminism is closely related to free will.
Indeterminism describes the state of any system (such as the human mind)
where events are not related causally to other events.
One thing happening does not necessarily affect other things.
This view has been approached in quantum physics to describe the behavior
of base particles, which seem to defy the laws of cause and effect.
In a totally undetermined system any event is as likely to occur as any
other. All events become
utterly unpredictable. If I pour
out a glass of water the water might disperse unevenly throughout the room,
gather in a puddle on the floor or ceiling, or disappear from view altogether.
It isn’t predictable.
A great example of this in quantum physics is found in the Heisenberg
uncertainty relation. This relation
states that if we determine the exact location of any particle, its velocity and
inertia become arbitrary. The short
end is that you cannot determine both the position and velocity of any particle
at any one time (Prigogine and Stengers 223-224).
Determinism is the belief that all things are connected causally to
related events which proceeded those same things.
Cause and effect. All future
events are “determined” by present events, which themselves are
“determined” by past events. If
I jump off a building I will plummet to the earth.
Determinism
and indeterminism are naturally adversarial.
If something is determined it cannot be undetermined.
If something is undetermined it cannot be determined.
Not both. The mind is a
thing (or series of events?). Being
a thing the mind must be either determined or undetermined.
It cannot be both at once, logically.
There are so many problems with this argument that I do not intend to
devote any substantial time upon it. In
quantum physics indeterminism rules the base particles, yet in classic physics
determinism rules the atomic structure (and everything upwards) from the base
particles. Order comes into being
out of chaos, it seems. If we
examine the big bang theory, we cannot help but notice that matter is not
distributed evenly throughout the universe.
If the cosmos began at a common source, and spread at an even rate, like
determinism declares it must… all matter must be evenly distributed.
The fact that we are alive indicates this isn’t the case.
Matter and energy are not evenly distributed within our own bodies.
Density, kinetics, and variation allow living organisms to exist and
evolve. More than determinism is
working behind the scenes.
Pick a letter or number. What
causal factor was behind your decision? It
seems that none are required for such a random selection.
In this sort of event our thoughts are likened to a lucky hat.
Imagine a hat filled with numbers written on a scrap of paper.
Give the hat a good shake. Reach
in and select one. In this case
every number has an equal probability of being selected as every other number. It is only random luck that allows a certain number to be
selected over any other given number present in the hat.
In like fashion we can select numbers from “the thin air” and think
about them. If we can do it with
numbers or letters, can we do this with more complex thoughts as well?
It would seem evident that we can.
The problem, some may say, is that the lucky hat only appears to
be random. Garnet P. Williams
describes “random” as 1. Every possible value has an equal chance of
selection. 2.
A given observation isn’t likely to recur.
3. Any subsequent
observation is unpredictable. 4.
Any or all of the observations are hard to compute (15).
This randomness however is only an illusion.
Every event that occurs has necessary events leading up to it.
Predictability doesn’t have any effect on whether or not events are
determined. Or does it?
Given that predictability and causal relationships seem to disintegrate
at both the quantum (particle) and cosmic (big bang) level, perhaps there are
two forces at work, randomization and determinism.
Both of these forces working together would allow for the universe to be
sufficiently ordered to sustain living organisms to perceive it and the
diversity required beyond order to allow them to come to exist in the first
place. Consider it like an equation
with multiple solutions; x * y = 12 (where x and y
are positive real numbers). The
solution sets for this equation would be {1,12}, {2,6}, and {3,4} and their
inverses. They are all equally true
and you could choose from all six sets randomly and arrive at a correct
solution. In essence the effect (the
answer of 12 where x and y are positive real numbers) can have at
least 6 causes, all of which are equally true. In our equation we have both order (determinism of six
possible choices and a balancing formula) and chaos (six sets all of which can
be considered the cause). In like
form the universe may have multiple causal forces operating within a determined
matrix. This may also apply to our
mental states and resulting behaviors. All
the scraps in my lucky hat have an equal and undetermined probability of being
selected.
Is this all an illusion or does this solution work? It seems to allow for both free will to exist as well as
determinism. If we accept that this
solution does work, it should solve the problem of whether or not human beings
have moral responsibility. If they
are free to choose their own behavior in any given situation, then it is obvious
that they are responsible for their own behavior.
One problem brought about by Galen Strawson states that we can only be
morally responsible if we choose our current mental state.
It does not seem intuitive that we have chosen our mental state,
therefore making us unaccountable for our actions. (513-514).
Is this a related dilemma? In
this case free will could exist but not having chosen our current mental state
this becomes irrelevant. Can we
ever be responsible for our actions? I
think so.
Often we must face choices from a limited selection.
This co-dependency upon both determinism and randomness limits our
choices (determinism) rather than allowing us free choices from all
possibilities (absolute randomness). In
our lucky hat there are only so many scraps of paper. We are free to select from any of these scraps, and every
scrap chosen is as equally valid as any other.
The limitation on how many scraps are in the hat is irrelevant to this
validity. In like fashion, despite
our mental state being limited by our previous experiences, genetics and other
factors beyond our choice, we are still responsible for what we do.
All our thoughts are equally valid as our own, despite the limitations.
I have decided to quit smoking. Such
a choice was not an easy one to make, as I am quite addicted to cigarettes.
I have an overwhelming desire and physiological push to light up a
cigarette at this moment, however I choose not to do so.
This seems to indicate that I am making a free will choice, as the causal
factors (my addiction) would, by themselves, force me to smoke against any
illusion of will I may possess. Holbach
would undoubtedly suggest that my desire to become more healthy and prolong my
life outweighs my desire to smoke at this moment (463-464). Thus the determining
factors would be the positive expectations concerning what I learned about
better health sans cigarettes combined with negative health experiences I
have had with smoking. However
suffering through the withdrawal symptoms doesn’t seem to validate this
argument. The actual experience of quitting smoking presents me with a
much stronger drive to smoke than to be healthy.
In psychology identical twins (twins from the same zygote) are often used
to determine genetic causes of various psychological and physiological
conditions. I propose a thought
experiment along the same lines. Two
identical twins are born (sharing the same DNA), given the same name and raised
in a uniform environment together, without ever separating them and allowing
them to share in all the same experiences.
It stands to reason that if free will does not exist and our minds
operate completely on determinism, that these two twins would share almost
identical thoughts (with only minor differences due to spatial location).
They would pretty much say and do everything at the same time.
It seems to me to be somewhat against my intuition to assume this would
be the case. I feel that despite
the uniformity in their genes and environment they would have different thoughts
and behaviors. We do know that in
actual identical twin cases, that despite very similar environments, the
twin’s personalities often become quite distinct from one another.
In no case we know of have the identical twins shared the same behaviors
over any notable period of time (longer than a moment or two).
When Robert Kane took up the challenge of free will and determinism he
noticed that a problem arises when we introduce random interaction with thought.
How responsible can we be if our thoughts are rising from a random field,
rather than being determined by our minds?
If a thought is truly random, then the thinker of that thought can not be
held accountable for it. This seems
to, on the surface, destroy my argument.
The problem of random thoughts and accountability only arises for true
libertarians. My argument is not
libertarian, and is more akin to a compatibilist point of view.
I am suggesting that the randomness within our minds occurs within a set
paradigm. This thought matrix
allows certain equal things to be selected.
By the fact that we have memory and can extract neutral data (data that
does not affect the current choice) and draw upon that memory / knowledge to
help with a dilemma. If I touch a hot stove not knowing what a hot stove is, I am
not responsible for the burn that I experience.
On the other hand, I now possess a memory of that hot stove and knowledge
(touching a hot stove hurts!). Now
it has been determined that I have a hot stove in front of me yet again.
I have two equal choices before me:
1. touch the hot stove. 2.
don’t touch the hot stove. My
knowledge indicates that I probably do not want to touch the hot stove,
therefore I abstain. This action
was not determined by the previous experience however. I could have touched the hot stove regardless, experienced
the burn yet again, and this time been responsible for that injury.
Of course this doesn’t really answer whether or not we are in the right
to call our ability to choose and think beyond our experiences and genes as free
will. After all it is at least
partially determined, and perhaps even mostly determined.
However I do believe that it is free enough to at least call it functional
free will. This means that for
all intents and purposes we can control and modify our behavior beyond our
original experiences. We can choose to add experiences or not apply lessons we
already learned. We are
responsible.
This argument is certainly soft determinism.
Free will is an illusion but for all intents and purposes it
exists and the result of it existing (even as an illusion) is that we have moral
responsibility. If I spent my
entire life writing random letters and numbers it is unlikely any grand pattern
would emerge over the years in my writings.
Because I can detect no such pattern, they are functionally random.
Like this functional randomness, I am a functionally free agent.
This is true if for no other reason than we cannot possibly account or
predict every persons every thought and deed.
I think this argument is workable as a back-up only, if a problem should
be found with my co-determinism argument. I
do feel that there is sufficient enough evidence of randomness co-existing with
cause and effect to understand that this allows for free will to exist in its
truest form.
In conclusion, it seems more evident that free will and partial
determinism are both compatible and that there is no true state where all things
are determined or all things are undetermined.
It is a mixture of both that allows for diversity and randomness in the
universe. It allows for a system to
exist in which things are always seeking, but never completely find, true
equilibrium. Once equilibrium is
found, then all motion ceases and we no longer exist (energy becomes static).
Thus this imbalance is based on random and determined interactions.
If the universe was wholly determined, then all its energy would be
evenly distributed, which it is not. Either
we agree upon the big bang theory and claim that free will exists, or we claim
that determinism alone exists and thus abandon all knowledge of the physical
universe. Of course in that model,
we wouldn’t have any other choice!
Works cited:
Holbach, Paul.
“The Illusion of Free Will.” Reason
& Responsibility. Ed.
Joel Feinberg &
Russ Shafer-Landau. Belmont,
Ca.: Wadsworth / Thomas Learning,
2002. 462-67.
Kane, Robert.
“Free Will: Ancient
Dispute, New Themes.” Reason
& Responsibility. Ed.
Joel
Feinberg & Russ Shafer-Landau. Belmont,
Ca.: Wadsworth / Thomas Learning,
2002. 501-
504.
Machina, Kenton.
“Challenges for Compatibilism.”
American Philosophical Quarterly.
31.3 (July
1994):
213-23.
“Part Four : Determinism, Free
Will, and Responsibility.” Reason
& Responsibility. Ed.
Joel
Feinberg & Russ Shafer-Landau. Belmont,
Ca.: Wadsworth / Thomas Learning,
2002. 456-
461.
Prigogne, Ilga, and Isabelle Stengers.
Order Out of Chaos: Man’s
New Dialogue With Nature.
New York: Bantam 1984.
Stace, Walter T.
“The Problem of Free Will.” Reason
& Responsibility. Ed.
Joel Feinberg &
Russ Shafer-Landau. Belmont,
Ca.: Wadsworth / Thomas Learning,
2002. 486-91.
Strawson, Galen.
“The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.”
Reason & Responsibility.
Ed. Joel
Feinberg & Russ Shafer-Landau. Belmont,
Ca.: Wadsworth / Thomas Learning,
2002. 513-
22.
Williams, Garnet P.
Chaos Theory Tamed. Washington
D.C.: Joseph Henry Press 1997.
