What Did the Romanovs Do For Us?

Despite recent post-glasnost efforts by Russian historians to offer a more balanced understanding on the Romanov Dynasty, negative
and one-sided attitudes toward the Romanov dynasty still persist, as noted below in the article by Anna Arutunyan.

After the death this week of Grand Duchess Leonida Georgiyevna, the last Romanov born before the 1917 revolution, historians are once more asking the soul-searching question: “What did the Romanovs do for Russia?”

While Monty Python comedian John Cleese, playing a revolutionary leader in the film “Life of Brian”, was shocked to receive a flurry of positive answers to his rhetorical question: “What have the Romans ever done for us?”, Russian scholars have traditionally been less flattering about the Romanovs’ record.

The dynasty was at the height of its European power after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. Yet barely a century later – after botched attempts at economic, political and military reform – the last tsar, Nikolai II, left behind a largely feudal country lagging far behind its European counterparts.

Ivan’s better half

If the end was far from glorious, the dynasty’s beginnings were more auspicious.

The Romanovs hailed from Anastasia Romanovna, the first wife of Ivan the Terrible, whose death in 1560 is believed to have pushed him over the edge into psychosis.

The family got its chance for power half a century later, when the boyars elected 16-year-old Mikhail Romanov after a period of anarchy known as “The Time of Troubles”.

“They needed to pick someone young, quiet and reliable,” said historical novelist Vladimir Sharov. The boyars felt they could easily manipulate Mikhail, and he ended up ruling in tandem with his more powerful father, Patriarch Filaret.

It was Peter the Great who did many of the things the Romanovs are best remembered for. Besides building St. Petersburg, he also drove the Turks out of Azov, built a fleet and espoused a harsh form of state capitalism and free trade (relying, to a large extent, on slave labour).

Top-down modernisation

But if the Romanovs did quite a lot for their country, they also did a lot to it.

Consistently more European (and, arguably, progressive) than most of their subjects, the Romanovs for three centuries tried to impose a system of top-down modernisation that was unpopular at best and violent at worst.

A prime example of this approach can be seen from an exchange between the arch-conservative Tsar Nikolai I and his secret police chief, Count Alexander Benkendorf, in the aftermath of the 1830 French revolution.

Benkendorf insisted that the Romanovs would not go the way of the Bourbons. “It wasn’t that the weak Bourbons led their people, but that the [French] people dragged them along,” Benkendorf told Nikolai. “Russia is protected from the calamity of revolution because, ever since Peter the Great, the monarchs always stood ahead of the nation.”

The secret to staying in power was not to enlighten the people in the first place, Benkendorf said, “so that the people do not attain the same level of understanding as their monarchs and thus do not attempt to weaken their power.”

Nikolai I, or Nikolai Palkin (‘The Stick’) as he was called in folklore, oversaw a brutal militarisation of society, where hapless peasants were drafted into the army for life and often beaten to death for minor offences.

But Nikolai was also Russia’s “only European”, according to his favourite poet, Alexander Pushkin, whose fondness for his patron was apparently undimmed by his wife, Natalya Goncharova, reputedly having an affair with Nikolai.

The “European” character of the Romanovs was literally true, since frequent intermarriage with European royalty meant that the Romanovs after Catherine the Great carried just a few drops of Russian blood.

The schism with the people arguably began with Peter the Great, who scandalised the boyars with his modernising ways – and his notorious order to ban beards. While the tsars were often eager to conduct reforms, they did not trust their own people to implement them.

“Society was understood to be a passive object to be managed but under no circumstances as a partner to be negotiated with,” wrote Russian historian Semyon Ekshkut. “The government saw dialogue as a danger not only to its own prerogative, but to society itself.”

Instead of institutionalised social dialogue, tsars allowed direct access for a limited number of their subjects. In a modern setting, this practice continues to this day with the live TV call-in shows that Vladimir Putin has hosted, first as president and now as prime minister.

‘The good tsar’

“We can’t say that there was a complete alienation between the monarch and society,” said Sharov, the novelist. “There was a cult around the monarch, and the blame for many things was widely pinned on the satraps that surrounded him.”

“The idea that only the head of state can solve your personal problems is genetically ingrained,” said Dmitry Babich, a political commentator at RIA Novosti.

This accessibility proved fatal for the reforming tsar, Alexander II, who abolished serfdom in 1861. In 1866, Alexander survived his first assassination attempt in St. Petersburg’s Summer Garden. Yet years later, he was still making himself available to disgruntled citizens – and one of them finally succeeded in killing him on a city street in 1881.

All this, of course, created fertile ground for an identity complex. “The tsar was considered in all levels of society as the steward of God on Earth,” said Sharov.

While the tsars often saw themselves as mediators between the aristocracy and the people, they effectively had become bureaucrats-in-chief. Their inability to reconcile their belief in the divine right of kings with timely reform spelled the end of the dynasty, Sharov said.

The Moscow News
27 May, 2010