US
says Aung San Suu Kyi release
must be "unconditional"
The United States said Tuesday it would welcome
the release of Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi but said her
freedom must be "unconditional" amid reports the country's
military government would soon end her 18 months of house arrest.
"We would welcome the release
of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners inside Burma
(Myanmar),"
said Julie Reside, a State Department spokeswoman.
"It is important that
the release be unconditional, that Aung San Suu Kyi be afforded full
freedom
of movement and association," she said. "We hope the reports
out of Rangoon
(Yangon) indicate the Burmese regime is serious about political reform
and national reconciliation."
Earlier Tuesday in Yangon, a Myanmar government
source said preparations were underway for Aung San Suu Kyi to be
released
from house arrest and
that the move could occur "within a day or two."
"If released from house detention, she will be able to go any
place she likes as before," said the source who declined to
elaborate.
United Nations
envoy to Myanmar Razali Ismail, who made a four-day visit to Myanmar
last
week, hinted in Kuala Lumpur earlier that Aung San Suu Kyi's release
could
be imminent.
The house arrest restrictions on the dissident were
imposed
in September 2000 after she attempted to defy the ban and travel to
the northern city
of Mandalay.
Diplomats and analysts believe a release this
week would signal that she and the junta forged an agreement on she
will
be permitted to operate as leader of the opposition National League
for Democracy (NLD).
Myanmar observers spent Tuesday watching closely for
signs of a release,particularly as major announcements are typically
made
ahead of
important holidays, like Wednesday's May Day celebrations.
A high-ranking Myanmar junta official made a rare visit to Aung San
Suu Kyi's lakeside home Tuesday morning, heightening speculation she
would soon be freed.
Brigadier-General Than Tun, the official liaison
officer between
the
opposition leader and the regime, spent 10 minutes at the University
Drive residence, in his first visit for several months.
Source: Agence France Presse , April 30,2002.
TOP
Suu Kyi To Be
Released Soon
By Aung Zaw (Irrawaddy News Magazine)
Expectations are high in Rangoon that opposition
leader Aung San Suu Kyi
may be released very soon, according to well-informed sources in the
Burmese capital. But they added that Suu Kyi’s release after 18
months under de facto house arrest could pose new problems, both for
her and for the regime that has repeatedly restricted her
freedom.
"She has to be very careful,"
said one Burmese observer in Rangoon. "Her release won’t be
unconditional.
There will be agreements between her and her captors," he added.
At the same time as she is avoiding a confrontation
with the regime,
however,Suu Kyi’s supporters will be expecting her to make some sort
of statement on the progress of her talks with the ruling military
regime.
"There are
high expectations from her party, from the Burmese people,and from the
international community," remarked Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese
political analyst living in exile.
It is unlikely that Suu Kyi will reveal anything about
the substance of her secret talks with the regime unless the generals
agree.
"It would be good if Aung San Suu Kyi and the government can
officially
announce the
timeframe for substantive dialogue," added Aung Naing Oo.
Meanwhile, in Rangoon, diplomats and journalists for
international wire
services are waiting in front of Suu Kyi’s house in anticipation of
her imminent release. They have sought confirmation of rumors that the
release could come today, but say that officials remain tight-lipped.
One veteran
journalist in Rangoon suggested that Suu Kyi has softened her stance
on economic sanctions since holding a secret meeting with Sr-Gen Than
Shwe in January. According to the Asian Wall Street Journal,Gen David
Abel,minister for the Prime Minister’s Office, confirmed that the
meeting took place. "After that meeting there has been a lot of
optimism from all quarters
that there could be a breakthrough," Abel was reported as saying.
The generals
in attendance were especially heartened
by Suu Kyi’s expressions of concern about the country’s
deteriorating
economic situation, which they took as signaling a willingness to end
her calls for sanctions.
During a recent meeting with a visiting EU Troika
delegation, Suu Kyi
was reportedly very careful about answering questions about economic
sanctions,according to a well-informed source.
"I think when she is released this time, she is
going to be passive,"
predicted
one observer who is close to the situation. That will not go down well
with some activists who want to see radical changes and impose
stronger
sanctions against the military dictatorship.
After her release, Suu Kyi’s focus will be on the
release of political
prisoners, rebuilding her National League for Democracy (NLD) party,
and
working on the confidence-building process, predicted one veteran
analyst in Rangoon.
Some observers warned that even if she is released, Suu Kyi is likely
to remain under constant scrutiny from the generals, who fear that she
may resume calls for more international pressure.
When she was released from house arrest in 1995, Suu
Kyi urged
international
donors to continue with their economic sanctions until the regime made
more substantive concessions. The United States subsequently imposed a
ban on new investment in 1997.
The generals don’t want that to happen
again. If it does, it could
derail the on-going confidence-building process,
warned some Burmese observers.
According to some Western diplomats, a
more likely scenario this time is that Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders
might
agree to the resumption of limited humanitarian assistance to Burma,
while
continuing to demand
further political reforms.
For its part, the junta may be hoping that the
resumption of aid will
help
ease internal tensions over hardliners’ opposition to dealing with
the NLD. Top leaders reportedly told visiting foreign delegates
recently that they want to see if Suu Kyi will keep her promise not to
oppose aid so that they can "sell" the talks to military
officers who are reluctant to deal with the opposition.
Despite the doubts, some in Rangoon are sanguine about
the prospects for
further progress. "I think the climate is good for the national
reconciliation
process," remarked one Burmese observer.
But skepticism about the generals’ motives persists.
"By releasing Suu
Kyi, they will win praise, but there are no promises that they will go
any further to achieve genuine national reconciliation," said one
political analyst in Rangoon.
"This government is always cautious—they go
step by
step," said another observer. "They will wait to see how
others react.
If the reactions are good, they will take further steps."
As always in
Burmese politics, patience may be the wisest counsel. "It will be
a very,
very slow process," said one long-time observer. "Don’t
expect anything
dramatic."
Source: The Irrawaddy, April 30,2002.
TOP
Whatever
Happened to the ABSDF?
By David O'Hanlon
Do the firebrands of ’88
still have a future? Once the glamor kids of
the
Burmese revolution, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF)
were the foremost of all the ’88-generation groupings. Now reduced
in size,wracked by division and facing a financial crisis, one might
be forgiven
for thinking they are a spent force. Is that the case, or is a quiet
revival
going on?
The ABSDF has always been
caught in a cleft stick, stuck between the
ethnic forces who felt that they did not shoot enough and the NGO
community
that at times seems to regard any attempt to maintain discipline and
security
as a human-rights violation.
Formed in 1988 as a direct
response to the bloody military crackdown
of that year, the ABSDF was clearly the most militant arm of Burma’s
student movement. The name was an obvious echo of the All Burma
Federation of Student
Unions (ABFSU) that had led the demonstrations and had come up against
the brick wall of repression. But the act of forming a revolutionary
army
out of student dissidents harkened back to general Aung San and his
Thirty Comrades (ironically including Ne Win) when they
formed the Burma Independence Army (BIA). So self-conscious was the
imitation that at least one early
officer training course candidates
paraded in Japanese-style forage caps
as sported by Aung San on the old 45-kyat note. (This was perhaps
tactless
when one considers that the Karen insurgency was initially arguably a
reaction
against BIA
brutality.)
The ABSDF has always been
considered from the get-go as a Burman
organization,
although its members have always insisted that the first two initials
stand
for All Burma and not All Burman and that their ranks contain a
stunning
array of ethnic diversity. Burmese has always been the unquestioned
lingua
franca of the organization and it has a very acute sense of having
emerged
out of Burma’s nationalistic revolutionary tradition. This is a
rather
crucial point to understand about the ABSDF.
When the student protests
collapsed in the face of military brutality,
they had a ready-made revolutionary
template to work from set out by Aung San himself. This has always
been
for the ABSDF a tremendous source of legitimatization, a fact that has
been overlooked by their enemies,
allies and many outside observers.
The students were not the
first to attempt to link urban politics with
the rural ethnic insurgencies. They had a lot of historical baggage to
overcome, including the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and U Nu’s
disastrous
People’s Democracy Party (PDP). The Karen National Union (KNU) in
particular,
having been in the past incredibly security conscious, were suddenly
faced
with a deluge of newcomers. Pragmatism overcame suspicion and the
students
were trained, armed and sent into battle. Although inferior to their
allies
in field craft, they were
quick learners and acquitted themselves well to the surprise of all.
Inevitably, high casualties
were sustained during
this period, at least in part due to the KNU’s obsession with static
defense
and their readiness to use ABSDF units because of their steadiness
under fire.
Despite this, however,
cooperation between the ABSDF and allies such as
the KNU and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) is extremely
close. The ABSDF has always had to act as guests of the ethnic forces
and thus every operation and virtually every training course is
undertaken
jointly. Admittedly this in contrast to the sometimes strained
relations
between the students and ethnic people in refugee camps in Thailand.
Local
field commanders, however, share a very clearly defined common foe and
have had a long time to get to know each other.Their joint columns
provide
a great deal of relief to Karen and Karenni Internally Displaced
Persons.
The ABSDF’s unity
problems can be traced back to around 1991-2 when the
nationally known student leader Moe Thee Zun split with the main body
and maintained a parallel organization with himself as chairman until
the ABSDF
finally reunified in 1997. The causes of the split are obscure and
most
observers attributed it to a personality conflict between Moe Thee Zun
and the then-chairman, Dr Naing Aung. However, in Dr Naing Aung’s
charge
that his opponents were "politically underdeveloped" it is
possible in hindsight to read the lines of division. The phrase exudes
contempt for the armed-struggle-orientated Moe Thee Zun faction whilst
assuming that
politics and armed struggle are mutually exclusive.
This is an odd position for
the leader of a guerilla army to have taken,
to say the least. Some in the KNU blame him for the then-KNU President
Bo Mya’s "policialization" and subsequent loss of will to
fight. This they maintain is the real reason—rather than the
emergence of the rival Democratic Karen Buddhist Army—for the fall
of Manerplaw. It is not surprising that
Dr Naing Aung opted to attempt to gently massage the organization away
from armed struggle over a long period of time lest he alienate his
own
supporters. As time progressed, fewer and fewer
resources were allocated to the frontline, until some grassroots
members
came to accuse their own organization of starving them out. At the
same
time the pacifist assumptions
in Dr Naing Aung’s politics became more and more explicit.
Ultimately,
though, when matters came to a head he failed to take the ABSDF where
he
wanted to.
Around this time the ABSDF
was also active in Mon and Kachin States and
it was in the latter that they experienced their greatest internal
bloodletting
when 16 members were shot for espionage. The then-chairman of the
ABSDF
Dr Naing Aung rushed to Kachin State to negotiate with then-Kachin
Independence
Organization (KIO) leader Brang Seng to smooth out relations. This was
a task Dr Naing Aung and other ABSDF leaders have repeatedly had to
perform over the years.
Although Dr Naing Aung
confirmed the rightness of the
executions, a new policy was announced that amounted to a moratorium
on
the death penalty.
Since that time executions have been rare, but one ordered by former
General Secretary Myo Win prompted Burma Issues to describe him as
"The Butcher". The ABSDF has however always been caught in a
cleft stick, stuck between the ethnic forces who felt that they did
not shoot enough and the NGO community that at times seems to regard
any attempt to maintain discipline and security as a human-rights
violation.
The ABSDF’s insistence
on regarding itself as an active revolutionary
army and not as a refugee
group has always meant a rocky relationship
with the NGO community. In
1997, Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) officially ceased assistance.
Last
year the International Rescue Committee (IRC) officially cut off
funding,
citing "a recent ABSDF memo
that states it is rearming." In point of fact no such memo was
issued,
as the ABSDF has never disarmed. To be fair, though,the previous ABSDF
leadership under Dr Naing Aung had gone out of its way to give the
impression that it was giving up armed struggle.
The fall of the KNU’s
base at Manerplaw and the nearby student HQ at
Dawn
Gwin was perhaps the turning point for many in the ABSDF. Deprived of
their beloved base that had boasted a fully equipped recording studio,
ping-pong tables and even a guesthouse, the ABSDF was in disarray.
This was not so true of the frontline soldiers, who accepted
everything with great stoicism,
but the HQ staff was clearly distressed.
Perched on the side of a
jungle-clad hill near Mae Hong Son, they were
faced with the prospect of a revolution that not only was going to be
a lot longer than they bargained for in ’88 but that might actually
involve personal discomfort.
After the fall of Manerplaw,
the passive resistance ideas of Gene Sharp
where actively pushed by the leadership as a viable altern ative to
armed
struggle. The absence of a quick conventional military victory was
taken to mean that sustained guerrilla warfare was a failure despite
the obvious cost to the regime of maintaining such a huge standing
army in the field.
The trickle of ABSDF
members opting to resign and become
refugees became a flood.
Inevitably the HQ staff usually consisted of Burmans who had completed
or nearly completed their degrees and thus had access to overseas
scholarships and office jobs in Thailand. In contrast, the frontline
soldiers were usually
of mixed ethnicity, and often had not finished high school. No serious
attempt was made to recruit replacements and the
ABSDF rapidly decreased in numbers whilst the average age of members
increased. The accusation that the ABSDF recruited child soldiers is
simply palpably untrue, as for years they almost didn’t recruit at
all.
From 1995 the discrepancy
between the living standards of some of those
staffing offices in Thailand and those in the field widened to an
extreme.
By 1997 soldiers came back from the frontline looking like walking
scarecrows
dressed in rags clutching rusty old rifles held together with nails
and
rubber bands which they didn’t have enough rounds for anyway. In
stark
contrast, central committee members started to sport cell phones,
personal
laptop computers and motorbikes as standard accessories.
One of the most
disheartening aspects of the student experience has been
how the profoundly undemocratic yet ancient patron-client system was
reproduced in the camps as an almost mirror image of the military
regime. Access to everything from rations to education was determined
by one’s allegiances.
In the family refugee camps
a can of condensed milk
was a luxury item that could be used to influence. This became
especially true after the move to Ban Sala refugee camp.
Unease erupted into open
dissent in 1997 when the Thai authorities
insisted
that the population of the ABSDF camp at Weigyi had to move to Ban
Sala
refugee camp, ostensibly for security reasons. Although the wishes of
the
authorities would ultimately have to be complied with, grassroots
members
were perturbed by the eagerness with which their leaders put the Thai
case.
This convinced many that
the Central
Committee did not have their best interests at heart and that their
ultimate goal was the complete demilitarization of the ABSDF.
These suspicions were
confirmed when the ABSDF’sEnglish-language Dawn magazine announced a
policy of prioritizing political activity over military.
While stopping short of officially announcing disarmament it was
clearly intended to give the impression that the groups was moving in
that direction.
In response, a grassroots
resistance crystallized
around the need to persevere with the armed struggle if for no other
reasons than self-defense and the need to preserve solidarity with the
ethnic forces.
Dr Naing Aung’s argument
was that demilitarization was essential in
order
to preserve NGO support. Despite the obvious questions of national
sovereignty
this argument raised, it appeared to be assumed by Dr Naing Aung that
preserving
this support was a top priority that was universally shared by all. In
this he appeared to have underestimated the radicalizing effect of
life
in a refugee camp for the rank and file.
He also announced plans to
form
yet another Burmese political party and claimed that he had been
promised
large amounts of money from the US, which would start flowing as soon
as
the party was established.
His old rival Moe Thee Zun
was scathing about these plans, pointing out
that Burma already had an ’88-generation party—his party, the
Democratic
Party for a New Society (DPNS). However, his PP21 ("People Power
in the
21st Century") operation, based largely on the passive resistance
ideas of Gene Sharp, ended in disappointment in the 9-9-99 campaign.
Despite
this, Moe Thee Zun was thrown into de facto leadership of the ABSDF
following
Dr Naing Aung’s disgrace on the grounds of a very technical
violation of ABSDF’s marriage regulations until a new chairman, Ko
Than Kay, and a new central committee was elected in 2001.
By this stage Moe Thee Zun
was once again in exile in the US. Dr Naing
Aung and his followers, who included most of the previous central
committee,
left to form the Network for Democracy and Development (NDD).What
added acrimony to the departure was the insistence of the NDD that the
ABSDF abdicate all political activity to them and the ensuing squabble
over the
ABSDF’s assets.
Interestingly the majority
of those who joined the NDD were Burman
whilst those remaining with the ABSDF are mostly native Burmese
speakers of mixed ethnicity. If anything this Burmanization has
radicalized the remaining ABSDF members way beyond any of their ethnic
allies. The struggle for their identity is that much more precarious.
Whereas the previous leadership, being mostly Burmans, were after the
first rush of blood to the head died down, never really comfortable
with armed struggle. Now they are looking
for rapprochement and rehabilitation and are keen on some form of
face-saving compromise that, if not
democratic, they can at least label a democratization
"process". In contrast, the current leadership is completely
alienated from the Rangoon regime in a way that cannot be overstated.
This new leadership has had
to deal with the dual tasks of getting a
handle
on their new jobs and coping with a funding crisis. Their
response has
been to look for support from political non-relief NGOs and from the
Burmese
community in exile, especially former members. The latter arguably
constitute
a natural constituency and a solid support base for the ABSDF
different
from that of their allies. They are part of
the great diaspora of Burma’s
middle class whose frustration at their lack of opportunity and
political impotence has been expressed in
oppositional politics and migration. The
ABSDF, being very much a child
of the established middle classes (and the even more volatile aspirant
middle classes), are an expression of both these trends.
Significantly the new
chairman, Ko Than Kay, has recently returned from
a tour of North America and Japan while foreign affairs representative
Ko Sonny has been to Australia. Time will tell whether they will be
able to match the levels of funding the ABSDF enjoyed in the past or
whether they’ll even be able to come on stream fast enough to keep
the organization operational. If it does then this more diversified
income would be not only less vulnerable, it would also be more
appropriate.
Already the ABSDF is
noticeably less apologetic and more straightforward
about the armed
struggle.
Even before these changes, however, unit commanders were circumventing
the central committee in order to supply their troops. Morale amongst
the frontline soldiers picked up markedly as new recruits were
enlisted
and
food and supplies have started to flow again. New uniforms were
especially
welcomed, underlining how strongly they regard themselves as soldiers
and members of a legitimate military organization. In contrast,life in
the family refugee camp at Ban Sala remains grim. Boredom, drug abuse,
alcoholism
and domestic violence are widespread. The school run by the ABSDF,
although
not without its problems, is practically the only bright spot in the
camp.
The ABSDF may have regained
their focus just in time, as events may
conspire to thrust them into national prominence. For all their
failings, the ethnic
forces are essential to any lasting peace in Burma.
Aware of this, many
leading figures are beginning to call for their
inclusion in the proposed
dialogue between the ruling junta and the
democratic opposition and are
casting around for bridges to the ethnic communities. Unsurprisingly
not
many exist. However, Kanbawza Win in The Era Journal recently
mentioned
the ABSDF and commended their example. We could well be advised to
keep
an eye on the fighting peacock.
David O’Hanlon is an
Australian relief worker based in Thailand. He has
worked with Burmese exile groups, including the ABSDF, since 1993.
Source: The Irrawaddy, April
25,2002.
TOP
Clash
in Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh 70 persons injured
By our
Special Correspondent
Cox’s Bazar: A total of 70 persons including 8
police
personnel and 10 Rohingya refugees have been injured in a clash that
broke
out between
locals and the police in Kutupalong Rohingya refugee camp about
15 km
south of Cox’s Bazar yesterday (24. 4. 2002).
The incident occurred when an unruly mob entered into
the Kutupalong
Rohingya
refugee camp and demanded toll from UNHCR officials. As the UNHCR
officials
denied to pay them any toll the mob, mainly youths, started ransacking
and destroying refugee huts. Police personnel were called to enforce
law
and order in the camp. However, the mob clashed with the police. In
the
ensuing melee 8 policemen, 10 Rohingya refugees and 52 local youths
have
been injured. The situation has been brought
under control after about an hour. Some seriously injured persons have
been shifted to nearby Rabeta hospital for treatment.
An inquiry has been ordered by Cox’s Bazar district
authority to find
out the causes of the incident and to take appropriate
action against the culprits. No arrests have been made so far.
Source: Arakan News Agency, April 25,2002.
TOP
Formal
college education faces setbacks in Burma
Sittwe: The State Peace and Development Council junta
of Burma have lately changed the policy of entrance to universities
and colleges so
that the newly matriculated students with higher marks will be
permitted to pursue their higher education through the correspondence
course, according to our correspondent quoting an unnamed university
teacher in Sittwe, the capital of Arakan (Rakhine) State in the
western part of Burma.
Since the popular uprising in 1988 that left the
formal education sector in doldrums
in its wake, the ruling Burmese junta has time and again kept the
educational
institutions shut for unease in the campus that might trigger bigger
demonstrations
and anti-junta movement. When the educational institutions were
finally
opened in the middle of the 90s,the junta kept the student hostels
shut
for fear of renewed demonstrations and students’ movement. Moreover
the sessions in colleges
and universities got jammed and examinations had to be taken through
crash courses en mass. The closure sine die of educational
institutions
in 1996 after the unease in the campus and student uprising in the
Yangon (Rangoon) University worsened the already deteriorating
situation in the education sector, necessitating for examinations en
mass for all
the students in their final years of graduation so that whoever sat
for
the exams had to be given auto-promotions en mass without proper
evaluation
of the papers.
At present whoever wants to pursue higher education
has
to stay as a paying guest among the private households in the college
towns.
With the
increase in the price of daily necessities, the cost of food and
lodging
has gone beyond what an average student could afford, which has
compelled most of the students to resort to the distance learning
method popularly known as correspondence course.
The higher demand for the correspondence
course has raised new concerns for the educational authorities and to
tackle
the situation, new rules have been enacted so that for pursuing the
correspondence
course the
students are now required to get at least 50% marks in each of the
subjects they are examined. For the regular daytime courses students
with poorer marks are allowed to enroll for graduation.
Besides, the classes in colleges and universities are
seldom taken
regularly
due to inadequate number and questionable skill of the
teachers, making
the students shy away from attending the classes
regularly.
Another cause for the increased demand for the
correspondence course is
that, as most of the students have to work for earning money for their
educational expenses due to reduced circumstances of their parents,
they cannot take the normal daytime courses.
There have been a number of engineering and medical
colleges opened
solely for the members of the armed forces families which offer high
level of education while the general people have been left with
substandard education
run by unskilled and unfit teachers causing large-scale discontent
among
the public, according to a concerned guardian of a daytime student
Source: Narinjara news, April 18,2002.
TOP
Ne
Win's Relatives Moved to Prison
By AYE AYE WIN, Associated Press
Writer
YANGON, Myanmar (AP) - Four relatives of Myanmar's
former dictator
have
been moved to a prison pending their trial for treason, an official
with the country's military government said Thursday.
The four suspects — a son-in-law and three grandsons of former
dictator
Ne Win — are accused of plotting a coup. They had been held at a
military
compound, but now have been moved to Insein prison in Yangon, a senior
intelligence official told The Associated Press.
The official refused to say when the four men were moved or when the
trial would begin.
"The relatives of Ne Win are kept at Insein prison like all other
accused,"
he said. He spoke on condition he was not identified further.
Aye Zaw Win, the husband of Ne Win's daughter, Sandar
Win, and their
three sons, were arrested March 7 at a Yangon restaurant on charges of
plotting to overthrow Myanmar's military government.
Since then, authorities have put the 91-year-old Ne
Win and Sandar Win
under de facto house arrest, placing barbed wire barricades around
their
residential compound in Yangon.
The deputy chief of military intelligence, Brig. Gen.
Kyaw Win, said
earlier
this month that all four would be tried for high treason and
that thorough
investigations were under way to build up the case.
High treason carries a maximum penalty of death.
The government has said the accused were trying to recruit military
units to kidnap the junta leaders and force them to swear allegiance
to Ne Win.
Ne Win came to power in a 1962 coup and stepped down
in 1988 in the face
of pro-democracy demonstrations quashed by the military.
Ne Win was once a hero of the independence movement in Myanmar,
formerly
known as Burma, but he became an authoritarian ruler who led his
once-prosperous
nation to economic ruin with policies that mixed socialist and
Buddhist
doctrines.
Ne Win was rumored to retain behind-the-scenes
influence after being
replaced by the current group of generals who have also been
criticized for failing to respect human rights and democracy. The
junta refuses to recognize the
results of the 1990 general elections won by pro-democracy leader Aung
San Suu Kyi's party.
Source: Associate Press, April 18,2002.
TOP
Several
Rohingya families fleeing to Bangladesh
By our Special Correspondent
Taungbro (at Burma Bangladesh border): Several
Rohingya
families
belonging to Longdun village tract, Ngakura, Upper Pruma, Lower
Pruma,
Amtola, Battola and other villages, all located in the northern
areas of
Maungdaw township in the Arakan state of Burma, have been fleeing to
Bangladesh
since last few weeks.
This correspondent met the families of Abdullah,
Obaidullah, Zabuillah
and Sayed Hussain from Lower Pruma at Gundhum, just across the border
in the Bangladesh side opposite Taungbro, the family of Noor Ali son
of Mohammed Bakshu of Ngakura at Neela, about 30 miles south of
Cox’s Bazar and the families of Azizur Rahman, Ali Ahmed and Kalamia
and 9 other families from Hatimara village under Longdun village tract
at Ukia, some 15 miles south of Cox’s Bazar in the last week of
March. Over 200 Rohingya refugees have reportedly entered Bangladesh
during last few
weeks.
The fleeing Rohingyas have taken shelter in several
Bangladesh border
villages where local people sympathize them. This correspondent
interviewed several
new arrivals who complained that the Burmese military junta and border
security force known as Na Sa Ka have made their lives miserable and
suffocating
compelling them to leave their homes. The refugees blamed the Na Sa Ka
and junta officials of violating their womenfolk, imposing humiliating
restriction on marriage of couples
and molesting girls who apply for marriage permission, subjecting them
to restriction on movement, arbitrary arrests and extortion, forcible
eviction from their homes after demolishing them etc. etc.
Bangladesh authorities have so far not responded with
arrest or
deportation
of the new arrivals. However since they are not allowed to register in
refugee camps run by UNHCR, they are afraid Bangladesh police might
detain
them at any moment. They have appealed to Human rights organizations
of
Bangladesh through this correspondent to extend all possible
humanitarian
assistance for their livelihood and safety.
Source: Arakan News Agency, April 16,2002.
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Confiscation
of land for Burmese Junta's model villages
Mungdaw: The Burmese State Peace and Development
Council junta have been
confiscating privately owned land in the border townships of Maungdaw,
Rathedaung and Buthidaung of Arakan (Rakhine) State, in the western
part of Burma, according to our correspondent.
On 1st April 02, Mayaka Township Peace and Development
Council Chairman
of Maungdaw, Captain Hla Paw and his group called at U Thein Tun, the
leader of Payrung model village and took him to the east of the
village.
There they surveyed 135 acres of hilly area owned by local
neighbouring
villagers.Afterwards the group confiscated the land and distributed it
among the residents of Payrung model village.
The confiscated area of land will be distributed after
the traditional
Thaung-gran New Year festival that ends on 17th April by casting lots
among the mostly Burman residents of the model village.
There are now more than thirty such model villages in the three
townships which are occupied mostly by settlers brought in from Burma
proper. The residents of the villages are released hardcore criminals,
HIV patients, drug addicts, and retired military personnel.
The establishment of Na-a-fa model villages in the
area has raised a lot of concern among the inhabitants of the
townships
since they now face rise in crime rates and spread of HIV among the
local
population. Besides wholesale settlement of Burman population is also
a threat to the ethnic balance of the area.
Source: Narinjara news, April 16,2002.
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Myanmar
junta canceling import-export licenses for foreign firms
BY SARAH STEWART
Yangon: The Myanmar junta has
moved to close down foreign trading firms, cancelling their import and
export licences in a decision that has alarmed the foreign business
community
here, sources said Wednesday.
Myanmar's deputy chief of military intelligence
Kyaw Win said earlier this week that the government would not be
issuing
licences to foreign companies other than for the import of
construction
and industrial material.
"Beginning from the first of March this year,
foreign companies, foreign trading companies particularly, will not be
allowed to import or export anything," he told reporters.
Major-General
Kyaw Win said he presumed the decision was designed to "give
domestic firms
a competitive edge".
Diplomats in Yangon said Wednesday some companies
holding licences due to expire at the end of the year were now having
their
permits summarily
cancelled.
"They weren't in a great panic until now
as their licences were in place. But now existing licences are being
cancelled...
and the business community is getting very concerned," one Asian
diplomat
told AFP.
"And there are rumours that they may not give visa extensions to
foreigners working for these companies."
The move is expected to hit the trading sector hard, affecting
companies
from across the world who bring in mostly pharmaceuticals, electronics
and beauty products, and export
Myanmar-grown commodities.
"It's a question of economic nationalism. They
are saying that the money should stay in Myanmar and with Myanmar
trading companies," the diplomat
said.
"But these companies have thousands of
Myanmar employees and if they
pack and leave there will be a lot of unemployment."
The unease and confusion has been compounded by the
fact the junta has
made no official notification of the decision.
"There's been no announcement
made so we don't know how far they will go," the diplomat
said.Myanmar's economy is an extremely poor state, thanks to stiff
sanctions from the international community as well as mismanagement by
the military government.
The kyat currency is now hovering at 800 to the dollar after slipping
to
a record low of 820 after the regime last month said it had foiled a
coup attempt by relatives of former dictator Ne Win.
Source: Agence France Presse, April 3,2002.
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Islamic
Extremism Is Rising, In Bangladesh, as in Pakistan
By BERTIL LINTNER (Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL)
DHAKA, Bangladesh -- A revolution is under way in
Bangladesh that spells
trouble for Southeast Asia and beyond if left unchallenged. Islamic
fundamentalism,
religious intolerance, militant Muslim groups with links to
international
terrorists, a powerful military with ties to the militants, Islamic
schools
churning out radical students, middle-class apathy, poverty and
lawlessness
-- all are working to transform the nation.
Sound familiar? Just like Pakistan, its former overlord, this nation
of 130 million people -- the third-most populous in the Muslim world
-- is slowly abandoning its tradition of moderate Islam. The
government seems powerless, and unwilling, to stem the tide, which
includes attacks on moderate Muslims and the dwindling Hindu
population.
The instability has grown severe enough to concern the
country's foreign
donors, who decided during an annual meeting in Paris last month to
tie future development aid to an improvement in law and order. But the
U.S. and its allies seem to have paid scant attention to the
deeper,long-term danger as they expand the war on terrorism from
Central Asia to Southeast
Asia.
"There are some extremists here, but they belong
to fringe groups and
are not part of the mainstream," says a Western envoy in Dhaka.
A sign of the shifting tide came in October, when the conservative
Bangladesh
Nationalist Party won a general election, defeating the secular,
left-leaning
Awami League partly by allying with the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami.
With 17 seats in the 300-member parliament, Jamaat -- which opposed
independence
from Pakistan in 1971
-- now has its first voice in government, as well as two key
portfolios,
agriculture and social welfare.
Though Jamaat has tempered its calls for rigorous
implementation of
Islamic
law, it clearly opposes the U.S.-led war on terrorism. In
October it launched
a fund to help the "innocent victims of America's
war," though it stopped
seeking donations when the Afghanistan's Taliban regime was ousted in
November.
While Jamaat is moving cautiously toward its goal of
an Islamic state,
its elevation to government has encouraged other Islamic
fundamentalists,
ranging from rabble-rousing cleric Maulana Ubaidul Haq to the dozen or
so groups often referred to as the Bangladeshi Taliban. They include
the shadowy Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami, which is believed to have been
founded
as an offshoot of a Pakistani group in 1992 with money and support
from suspected terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden. Western
intelligence officials believe a certain Fazlul Rahman, who signed
Mr.bin Laden's Feb. 23, 1998,
declaration of holy war on the U.S. on behalf
of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh, is an associate of the
now-independent group.
Moreover, the radicals' ranks are being swelled by
graduates from the
estimated 64,000 madrassas, religious schools that have mushroomed in
the past decade
and are described by a retired high-ranking civilservant as a
"potential
political time bomb." As in Pakistan, many of the madrassas --
which focus
on religious instruction and are beyond government control -- are
funded
by proselytizing Saudi charities. Just as Pakistan's madrassas
cultivated Afghanistan's Taliban leadership,
some analysts fear Bangladesh's will also become exporters of Islamic
revolution.
For now, what's most at risk is Bangladesh's tradition
as a secular
society.
Attacks on Hindus, who generally support the staunchly secular Awami
League,
are increasing. "The intimidation of the minorities, which had
begun before
the election, became worse afterward," said the Society for
Environment
and Human Development, a local nongovernmental organization, in a
report
on October's vote. Amnesty International concurred, indicating that
members of the BNP-led coalition were
responsible.
One region of particular concern is the country's lawless southeast, a
stronghold of Jamaat, its youth wing Islami Chhatra Shibir and other
more
extreme groups, such as Harkat. The area is also home to more than
100,000
Muslim refugees known as Rohingyas, from Burma . Many of them are
restless young people who have difficulty finding employment in
secular institutions.
In that, they resemble madrassa graduates that
prominent Bangladeshi journalist Salahuddin Babar says are ripe for
radicalization: "Certain quarters grab
this opportunity to brainwash
them, and make them into religious fanatics
rather than modern Muslims."
Source:The Wall Street Journal,April 2,2002.
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Sandar
Win,the brains behind Myanmar's former 'first family'
Yangon:
Sandar Win, the favored daughter of former dictator Ne Win, is
portrayed
by Myanmar's military leaders and independent analysts as the brains
behind
what was once the nation's most powerful family.
A medical doctor aged
in her 50s, she was reputed to preside over a clan that parlayed its
patriarch's
influence into a significant business empire encompassing hotels,
medical
services and telecommunications.
Their downfall last month, accused of
plotting a coup against the
current military regime, shocked observers
in Yangon who had seen them as untouchable despite the waning
influence
of Ne Win as he moved into his nineties. Since the arrest of her
husband
and three sons, in a raid on a restaurant where they were allegedly
discussing
the coup, Sandar
Win and her father have been held at their sprawling lakeside
residence,behind a heavy guard.
But on Tuesday the junta said that along
with her husband and children she would face charges of high treason,
which
carry the death penalty.
"When the time comes for us to take Khin Sandar
Win into custody, we'll do that without delay. We believe she is the
key
player in the scenario for the coup which has now backfired," a
senior
official said. For many years Sandar Win served as a go-between
linking
her father with the generals in the current military regime, passing
on
requests for
assistance and arranging meetings with the "Old Man", as he
is known.
Sandar Win was known to be extremely ambitious and believed to have
been
attempting to carve out a high public profile for herself in what some
said was part of a plan to become a future political leader.
Reputed to be sharp but calm in character, she is the closest family
member
to Ne Win as the rest of the relatives are largely estranged.
There was
even speculation that there might eventually be an all-female
struggle for power in Myanmar, between Sandar Win and pro-democracy
leader Aung San Suu Kyi who is herself now under house arrest in
Yangon.
Since Ne Win's retirement in 1988, his protege Lieutenant-General Khin
Nyunt, the powerful chief of military intelligence, had been seen as
the family's guardian.
But in recent times even he tired of their dodgy business dealings and
outrageous behaviour.
Last year Khin Nyunt said he was "washing his
hands" of one of the sons, Kyaw Ne Win, a notorious hooligan
whose "Scorpion"
gang roamed Yangon with impunity in black vehicles stripped of their
licence plates.
In Yangon there have been few tears shed over the
stunning moves
against
the Ne Win family. Sandar Win earned particular dislike for what many
saw as a significant role in the bloody suppression of a 1998
uprising.
The military regime has not yet indicated what it will do about the
complicated web of businesses built up by Sandar Win and her husband,
although unconfirmed
reports have said their accounts have been frozen.
But the junta said the family's growing discontent over the lack of
privileges being extended to them by the government had sparked the
coup attempt.
Source: Agence France Presse, April 2,2002.
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Chinese
Yunnan Airways Opens Air Link with Myanmar
YANGON -- The Yunnan Airways of China formally
opened an international air route on Monday linking Kunming and
Mandalay, Myanmar's
second largest city Monday.
Myanmar Minister of Transport Major-General Hla Myint
Swe said the
opening
of the air route will facilitate personnel exchange between
Myanmar and
China and promote the development of tourism.
General Manager of the Yunnan Airways Luo Chaogeng
said the air route
serves
as an overhead bridge between the peoples of China and Myanmar and
will
enhance the economic, trade and tourism cooperation between them.
Kunming-Mandalay air route is the first international one with regular
flight opened by foreign airlines linking Myanmar's second largest
city.
The Mandalay international airport occupies a land
area of 10, 131
hectares
with a runway of 4,200 meters in length and 60 meters in width and can
accommodate large aircraft such as Boeing 747.
The airport, which costs 150 million U.S. dollars plus 6.496 billion
Kyats (about 18.56 million dollars), was formally commissioned into
service on
September 17, 2000.
Source: Xinhua News Agency, April 1,2002.
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Aid
agency urges better conditions for Myanmar refugees in Bangladesh.
DHAKA - Myanmar refugees huddled in two Bangladesh
camps for a decade are battling hunger, disease and poor security, a
director
of aid agency Medicins sans Frontiers (MSF) said on Monday.
The U.N High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) should try to send them
home as soon as possible and also improve living conditions in the
camps, Kenny Gluck,
MSF's operational director, told reporters in Dhaka.
"The 21,000 Myanmar
Muslim refugees, called Rohingyas, have been
suffering from malnutrition, they do not have enough water nor food to
maintain their health, or safety
in the camps, and the U.N. body should take good care of them,"
he said.
More than 250,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh's
southeastern Cox's
Bazar district from Myanmar 's western Arakan province in early
1992,trying to escape alleged military persecution, including killings
and rape. Nearly 230,000 have returned home under the supervision of
UNHCR. The repatriation process stopped in the middle of 1997.The MSF
has been offering medical
assistance to the Myanmar refugees ever since they arrived in
Bangladesh.
"The refugees have been staying in the camps in
miserable conditions.
They are given inadequate food and medical care, not being allowed to
go out of the camps and not permitted to work for their
survival," Gluck said.
"Living conditions of the refugees and safety and security in the
camps need to be improved," he said, adding that "the
refugees need to be viewed not as a burden or residual caseload, but
as human beings, with hopes, voices and rights."
Bangladeshi officials said the delay in repatriation
of the Rohingyas was due to lack of willingness on Myanmar 's part to
take
them back.
"Many of the Rohingyas are economic refugees and Bangladesh, one
of the world's poorest countries, cannot shoulder their burden,"
one official in Cox's Bazar said on Monday.
He said Bangladesh was doing its best to support the refugees
"purely on
humanitarian consideration."
Source: The Burma net on line news, Reuters, April
1,2002.
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Burma Booted from
Asean
By Tony Broadmoor
In a shocking blow to Burma's international
reputation, the Association
of South East Asian Nations (Asean) voted Burma out of the group
yesterday after Asean member countries expressed their growing
discontent with the
country's ruling military leaders, according to an Asean statement
released
today.
Burma was dismissed from Asean after an emergency
closed door Asean
Ministerial
Meeting was held over the weekend in the Brunei capital of Darussalam.
Representatives from all ten Asean countries attended the meeting and
according
to today's statement voted unanimously to revoke Burma's status as an
Asean
member country.
"Until the regime can prove that it no longer conducts business
with international
drug syndicates and has ceased using forced labor within the country,
they
will be barred from all Asean functions," said Asean Sec-Gen HE
Rodolfo
Severino Jr in a telephone interview with The Irrawaddy.
The chairman
of Burma's ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Sr Gen
Than
Shwe, refused to speak with Irrawaddy reporters today in Rangoon but
said
through a regime spokesman that, "Burma does not need Asean near
as much
as Asean needs Burma." The Asean statement cited the regime's
long list
of human rights abuses as well as the junta's refusal to recognize the
1990 election where the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD)
won a landslide victory
as reasons for their dismissal.The statement said Burma would be
allowed to reapply for Asean membership when "the regime could
show that
they are serious about implementing the necessary adjustment policies
within the country". The statement did not define what those
policies are. Burma was admitted into Asean in July 1997 after calls
from human rights
groups and the NLD to block their entrance went unanswered. Asean
is
comprised of ten SE Asian nations including Thailand, Malaysia,
Cambodia,
the Philippines and Indonesia.
Irrawaddy Magazine
Reactions to April Fools'( April 2, 2002 )
Dear All,
Like many other news media organizations around the
world, on Monday we
published an April Fool's story ["Burma Booted from Asean",
April 1,
2002]
on our website. Since then, we have received many e-mail messages.
We were
very glad to see that our readers took notice and expressed
their strong
interest in our coverage of Burmese affairs. Like similar items that
appeared
in many other publications, this story was intended as a sincere
attempt
to bring a little levity to an otherwise very serious enterprise.
Beyond
this, we hoped that this report would serve as a reminder to many
Asean
leaders and policymakers in the region. Many politicians and activists
in Asean countries who were opposed to Burma's entry into the grouping
have quietly discussed expelling Burma or
suspending its Asean membership.
In any case, we take your feedback and comments
seriously and once
again, we would like to assure our readers that we remain committed to
providing
reliable and credible information and news to our readers. In spite of
the hardships and struggles we continue to endure, we are Burmese who
live
with a sense of humor.
Sincerely yours,
Irrawaddy Publishing Group
Source: The Irrawaddy, April 1,2002.
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Reading
the tea leaves in Myanmar
The venerable science of Kremlinology is flourishing
in Myanmar. The country's ruling elite is a clubby and secretive
group, and the exercise of power and influence is shrouded in mystery;
reliable information is hard to come by. No wonder then that the last
few weeks have been busy ones for Myanmar watchers. Rumors of a failed
coup planned by relatives of former strongman Gen. Ne Win have
provided fodder for intense speculation about a shift in politics. It
is too early to know, but there is speculation that the ground is
being prepared for talks with
the opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Ms. Aung San Suu
Kyi.
Gen. Ne Win seized power
in Myanmar, then known as Burma, in 1962, and ruled the country for 26
years. The capricious general forced a twisted brand of socialism on
the
country,which entrenched him, his family and their cronies in power
and enriched them. It also virtually bankrupted one of Asia's richest
countries. He stepped down in 1988, but has long been suspected of
wielding considerable
influence behind the scenes. Pro-democracy protests forced the general
from office. The army crushed
the dissent, but only after thousands of protesters were killed. Then,
confident that it enjoyed popular support, the military,still running
the government, agreed to hold elections in 1990. To its surprise, the
winner was the National League for Democracy (NLD), run by Ms. Suu Kyi.
The ruling junta refused to hand over power, claiming
that only the
military's strong hand could hold the country together. Ms. Suu Kyi
and many other NLD leaders and members were imprisoned or exiled. Ms.
Suu Kyi has been released, but now lives under a form of house arrest.
The government, still dominated by generals, periodically makes
overtures toward Ms. Suu Kyi and the NLD, but it appears more
interested in dividing the opposition than in opening a real dialogue
or loosening its grip on power. The international community - chiefly
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Myanmar is a
member - has tried to push the generals to compromise, but those
efforts have borne little
fruit.
Nevertheless,
there have been tantalizing hints of progress. The regime
has gradually released some 250 political prisoners, although human
rights groups estimate
that nearly five times that number remain
imprisoned. The NLD has been
allowed to reopen offices and hold small meetings, although they are
reportedly closely monitored by the military. Significantly, the
government has also
agreed to mediation by a U.N. representative, Mr. Razali Ismail. His
continuing efforts offer the most persuasive evidence of some movement
within the government.
Three weeks ago, the country's military rulers claimed
to
have blocked a coup attempt by Gen. Ne Win's relatives and backers.
According to the government, the plotters were to seize power on Armed
Forces Day,the anniversary of the launch of nationwide resistance
against occupying Japanese in 1945. Mr. Ne Win's son-in-law, three
grandsons and three
high-ranking officers were arrested, more than 100 others were
interrogated and the former strongman and his daughter were confined
at home. The police
chief, the air force chief, two regional commanders and the chief
of the army medical service have been fired and the purge is likely to
continue.
While it is unlikely that a coup was in the works, a
split within the
leadership
is possible and, if true,could have important implications.
It is possible
that the junta is laying the groundwork for a policy shift. If so, the
coup rumors would be a means for blaming Mr. Ne Win for the current
impasse.
That hypothesis is supported by an Armed Forces
Day speech delivered by junta leader Gen. Than Shwe, which for the
first
time blamed Ne Win's regime for creating the chaos of 1988. He also
said the government was changing
Myanmar's political and economic system to adapt to changing times.
There
are other explanations for the arrests. There is rumored to be a split
in the top leadership between Mr. Ne Win's favored successor and other
members of the junta. If true, then the coup rumors would hint at
a power struggle within the leadership rather than a real dispute over
engagement
with the opposition. The test of the government's intentions will
occur when Mr. Razali returns to Myanmar. He was scheduled to visit in
March, but the government requested he postpone his trip until later
in April.
By then the government should have restored stability
and developed a plan
for substantive and serious dialogue with Ms. Suu Kyi. Even then,
however, the regime will require scrutiny and steady
pressure. Dialogue is not the
same as power sharing. Myanmar's
long-suffering citizens deserve to have
their 1990 verdict honored. No matter how one reads the tea leaves,
there
is little indication that the government is willing to go that far.
Source: The Japan Times, March 30,2002.
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