The Daily Star
Foreign
Relations
Volume
3 Number 634 Fri. June 15, 2001
Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and the Stateless Rohingyas
Imtiaz Ahmed
I have lately been
disturbed by two developments. Firstly, at the very moment when
'realism' has lost its post-Westphalian glories and is suffering
from disrepute, the stateless people continue to be at the mercy of
the state. In the case of the Rohingyas it is even more pathetic for
their refuge across the border brought no change to their
sufferings. On the contrary, as camped and non-camped refugees, they
ended up becoming victims of yet another state power, this time of
Bangladesh. Secondly, when the power of the state has been eroded
considerably, particularly in the wake of misgovernance and
globalization, the state is brought in to resolve the issue of
statelessness. Indeed, the Rohingyas were sent home, amidst
criticism of 'involuntary' repatriation, with the hope that the
government of Myanmar (GOM) after over half-a-century would change
its position and make them all worthy citizens of Myanmar. What we
have is a representation of a dialectic in the constitution of the
state, that is, state as
usurper and state as
salvation, without of course realizing that the former cancels
the latter and vice versa.
It is against this
background that I intend to discuss the Bangladesh-Myanmar relations
and that again, from the standpoint of the stateless Rohingyas. Two
questions, I believe, are pertinent. One, how do stateless people
view the state/s? And two, what impact does the stateless people
have on the state-to-state relationship? Few will dispute that the
discussion requires a sound understanding of the 'stateless,' which
in our case are the Rohingyas.
Who
are the Rohingyas?
The term 'Rohingya' is
not only a construction that
is modern but is also a reality
arising from the organization and reproduction of the modern
national state. I have elsewhere dealt with the origin of the term,
including its relationship with other terms, like the Arakanese and
Rakhine, and I have no intention to repeat that issue here. Instead,
I would like to come straight to the current reproduction of
statelessness of the Rohingyas, a factor that is defining their
status as well as their state of alienation from the rest of the
society. The plight of such people is not too difficult to
comprehend.
With the possible
exception of the pre-military days of early 1960s, the GOM at every
stage of governance and national development has systematically
denied providing the Rohingyas some one or two million people in the
northern state of Arakan or Rakhine near the Myanmar-Bangladesh
border - some kind of recognition, including the right to acquire
citizenship. It may be mentioned that at one point of
post-independence history the Rohingyas claim of separate ethnic
identity was recognized by
the democratic government of Premier U Nu (1948-1958). But
subsequent governments denied this and the issue was completely
stalled following the military takeover of the country in 1962. The
currently practised Citizenship Law of Myanmar, which incidentally
was promulgated in 1982, bears testimony to all this. A quick look
at some of the things arising from the provisions of the said Law
will suffice here.
The entire population of
Myanmar is practically colour-coded!
Actually, following the launching of the 'Operation
Nagamin' (Dragon King) in 1977, which continued for over a
decade, almost the whole of Myanmar's population was registered and
provided with identity cards. These cards are all colour-coded,
mainly for the easy identification of the citizenship status of the
bearer. Those residing lawfully in Myanmar can now be divided into
four colours: Pink, those
who are full citizens; Blue, those
who are associate citizens; Green, those who are naturalized
citizens; and lastly, White for
the foreigners!
The Rohingyas were
quickly told that they do not fall under any of these four colours
and that no such cards would be issued to them. Instead, a year
after the Operation Nagamin began
a huge number of Rohingyas, totaling around 250,000, was forcibly
pushed into Bangladesh. But this was only the first major push in
recent times. Save 10,000 or so 'residual refugees,' all returned to
Myanmar under international supervision by the end of 1979. But
then, some 12 years later in 1991, another big push took place. Of
course, minor pushes went on intermittently, at times with little
knowledge of the authorities in Yangon and Dhaka. Indeed, with all
such pushes, conflict in the Arakan region and also beyond acquired
a new dimension, helping in turn to reproduce the dismal state of
life and living of the stateless Rohingyas and a level of tension
between Bangladesh and Myanmar. This bring us to the question
earlier raised, how do the stateless Rohingyas view the state,
particularly Myanmar and Bangladesh?
The
State and the Stateless
No love relationship can
exist between the stateless Rohingyas and the state of Myanmar.
Domination, exploitation, persecution, deportation, forced labour
and the like are some of the terms that have come to mark the
relationship. Put differently, the relationship between the two
represents coercion than consent, with the state of Myanmar defining
and designing the level of coercion or inversely consent. I will
highlight three issues to make this clear.
Firstly, restrictions
on movement. As stateless, the Rohingyas are barred from moving
from one place to another. In fact, legally can never travel to
Yangon or any other big cities and join the labour market there.
This is a classical case of subjugation, bordering on slavery, where
the state actively participates in keeping the status of the
underprivileged unchanged or static! Voluntary mobility ensures
empowerment but this is something the state of Myanmar is reluctant
to provide the Rohingyas, keeping them otherwise disempowered and in
a state of protracted disillusionment.
Secondly,
restrictions on education. Again, as stateless, the Rohingyas
are barred from higher education, including medical sciences and
engineering. It is not surprising that the Rohingyas in large number
remain ill educated, with the abler lot taking up the profession of
small business and petty trading for reproducing their livelihoods.
The community, therefore, suffers from a systematic brain drain,
with many migrating to the neighbouring countries or even the Middle
East. A combination of the above two restrictions is bound to limit
creative inputs on the part of the Rohingyas to redress their
plight.
Finally, forced
labour. This is something that makes the Rohingyas flee the
Arakan whenever opportunity comes, and this is particularly
prevalent in the dry season when the Myanmar military makes use of
forced labour to build houses, parks, roads and highways, even gas
pipeline. In the wake of international pressure and supervision by
the UNHCR there has been some developments towards the reduction of
forced labour-hours, which used to be around 10-12 hours per day.
But interestingly, what the military has done is only reduce the
practice of forced labour vertically but expand it horizontally.
That is, whereas previously fewer Rohingyas were brought into the
fold of forced labour with longer hours, but now the hours have been
reduced, albeit with more Rohingyas
working as forced labour. In terms of hours, therefore, nothing has
changed.
More issues could be
brought in to describe the plight of the Rohingyas, but the above
should suffice to make us understand that the stateless Rohingyas
expect very little from the state of Myanmar. Under these
circumstances it is quite natural for them to look for
extra-territorial or international support to redress their plight.
Crossing the border and taking refuge in Bangladesh was not
something that was unexpected. But did such crossing into Bangladesh
change their views on the state? I doubt very much. Let me cite my
reasons.
I have already referred
to the issue of 'involuntary' repatriation of the Rohingyas,
although there were allegations of 'forcible' repatriation as well.
Even the UNHCR at one point of time had complained that such
'forcible' repatriation were initiated and directed by the
government of Bangladesh (GOB). But crude and inhuman this may be
the Rohingyas, and this time as refugees, suffered no less from the
Bangladesh state even when it was providing them refuge. Although
welcomed by the local population in the beginning, the Rohingya
refugees were quickly brought under governmental control and policy
measures, mainly with the intention of policing
them. For reasons of brevity, one could divide such policing
into three. We are, of course, concentrating on the remaining 21,117
refugees.
Firstly,
the policy of encampment. Officially, there is a total
restriction on movement of the camp refugees. No refugee can go out
of the camp without the prior approval of camp officials, which is
seldom entertained in writing. Anyone caught red-handed out-visiting
the camp illegally or more particularly without the unspoken
'unofficial blessing' faces harsh treatment, including beating from
the police. As one refugee stated: "I never go out of the camp
without telling the officials or the police. If the police find out
that someone has done so, they beat the person quite a lot. And I
dread those beating by the police!"
Secondly, the
policy of unburdening responsibility. Bangladesh would be
interested to see the continued presence of the UNHCR and the
refugees, not for any humanitarian reason but simply for the sake of
making profit from their presence. In this context,
US Committee for Refugees noted: "Despite Dhaka's claim
that caring for the Rohingya is an economic burden, Bangladesh has
borne little of the cost of caring for the refugees. With the
exception of $2.5 million that Bangladesh spent on relief prior to
the UNHCR involvement, UNHCR, donor governments, and NGOs have paid
for almost all of the relief operation. If anything, the UNHCR
relief operation has led to a net financial gain for the Bangladesh
government and its citizens, as it has increased employment."
But then, corruption adds
to the profit momentum, contributing thereby to the birth of a
series of power blocs (or
interest lobbies), not necessarily at the high policy level but more
importantly at the middle and lower functionary levels, well
disposed to the continued presence of the UNHCR and the refugees.
And the middle and the lower functionaries of both governmental and
non-governmental organizations are powerful enough to create
conditions for putting a halt to unprofitable changes and
reproducing the post-refugee status quo.
Finally, the
policy of repatriation. Despite the unwillingness on the part of
the majority of the refugees to return home for reasons of
insecurity or lack of improvement in the situation in Myanmar, the
UNHCR, with the direct consent of the GOB, repatriated all but
21,117 refugees by April 1997. Since then, however, repatriation has
been put on hold following the failure of the GOM to clear the
reentry of 13,582 refugees out of the remaining total of 21,117.
Only 7,535 got permission but those refused reentry blocked their
repatriation. GOB quickly declared that no refugees would be allowed
to settle in Bangladesh permanently and this position has been
renewed time and again, and is still the current policy of the
government. Put differently, 21,117 camp refugees are reproducing a
life and a future of neither here nor there! Statelessness has
otherwise come to define the Bangladesh-Myanmar relations, indeed,
in ways that is ominous for both. Let me explain.
The Stateless and the
State-to-State Relationship
With little love for
Myanmar and alienated from Bangladesh, the stateless Rohingyas are
bound to become more desperate and militant to safeguard their
interests. The militancy of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization
and/or the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front is well known. Previously
their activities were restricted to Myanmar but with series of
pushes and no respite by way of seeking refuge in Bangladesh, it is
quite likely that they would expand their operations well beyond the
Arakan region and into Bangladesh. In fact, much of the militancy in
refugee camps has been blamed on them. But that is not all.
It is alleged that within
Bangladesh forces sympathetic to the Rohingya cause would not oppose
the militancy of the latter, on the contrary could come forward with
arms and materials to help them fight against the security forces of
both Myanmar and Bangladesh. The list of prospective (militant)
supporters mainly includes the so-called Islamic political groups,
namely the Rabita Al Alam Islami, the Jaamat-e-Islam, supporters of
the Afghan-based Hizbe-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyer, and the like.
In the wake of such support for militancy, it is not difficult to
see that the state-to-state relationship has entered into a new
dimension, not all of which is restricted to the state itself. Two
outcomes are particularly worrisome in this connection.
One is the proliferation
of small arms and added to this, the possible use of the so-called
exotic weapons, namely chemical and biological weapons. Just to
provide one example, when the Mong Tai Army of Golden Triangle drug
lord Khun Sa surrendered to the Yangon authorities it handed over
assault rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers, and even SA-7
surface-to-air missiles. More worrisome is the fact that despite
repeated denials by the GOM, accusations of chemical and biological
weapon use by the Myanmar military against 'ethnic' insurgents have
surfaced from time to time. There is no guarantee that such weapons,
small or exotic, would not be used to promote or contain militancy
in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. And how will the entrapped
'ethnic' groups and in the case of Myanmar an entrapped state fund
such weapons? In large measure the second outcome is the answer.
Myanmar has already
earned a reputation of being a 'narco-state.' In this connection,
the former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright once commented:
"Burma is also the only member of ASEAN where the Government
protects and profits from the drug trade. Burma's top traffickers
have become leading investors in its economy and the leading lights
in its new political order." If this is the scenario, there is
bound to be a sharp increase in illicit drug trafficking,
particularly to neighbouring countries and beyond, with frustrated
groups acting as 'intermediaries' or traffickers in this super
profitable business. There are already reports that the drug
addiction has increased sharply in the Myanmar-Bangladesh border
region, predictably in collusion with the Rohingyas. Indeed, nothing
can be more ominous than the growth of a nexus between arms, drugs
and frustrated groups. What is there to look for in the
Bangladesh-Myanmar relations then?
Conclusion
Let me limit myself to
three areas:
One, there is an urgent
need to reinvent nationality laws, indeed, to the point of providing
work permits and even dual citizenship to those in the border
region. This will effectively take care of the stateless Rohingyas.
Two, reinventing or
reusing the border region and that again, to the point of welcoming
bi-national or joint border development scheme, preferably in the
hands of private entrepreneurs and non-governmental agencies.
And finally, initiating
dialogues between the civil groups, indeed, with the intention of
establishing common educational facilities with two or more
languages, particularly in the border region.
Any concrete step in
anyone of the above would go a long way in restructuring
Bangladesh-Myanmar relations and this surely will be a cause for
celebration on the part of the stateless Rohingyas.
The
author is Professor and Chair, Department of International
Relations, University of Dhaka.
Letters
to the Editor
Volume 3 Number 647 Thu. June 28, 2001
Stateless
Rohingyas
AFK Jilani, Chittagong
I would like to express my
heartfelt thanks to Professor Imtiaz Ahamed for his article on
"Bangladesh-Myanmar Relation and the Stateless Rohingyas"
(June 15).
According to Human Rights
Watch May 2000, (Vol-12, No 2 (c)), the principal cause of the
continuing Rohingya refugee crisis is the Myanmar government's
discriminatory attitude towards this particular ethnic and religious
minority. The ruling junta has turned Myanmar into one of the worst
places for the Muslims to live in. They hate the Muslims and call
them 'Kalas', a word full of sarcasm. They brand Rohingyas as aliens
and never regard them as fellow citizens. As long as Rohingyas in
Arakan continue to be the target of systematic human rights
violations, the refugee crisis will continue.
The Bangladesh government
should allow individuals to seek asylum and should establish a
formal mechanism through UNHCR. UNHCR should produce a set of
criteria in accordance with international refugee legal standards to
assess Rohingya claims to refugee status. The international
community should press the Myanmar government to respect the rights
of Rohingyas.
|