World War 2 in Zambales, Philippines Mindoro Landng



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MacArthur's Message

On Dec. 30, a secret communication from GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area, P.I. Sec. Detachment from Gen. Douglas MacArthur was relayed to Col. Merrill as follows:

"I have received with much satisfaction the report of your readiness with other officers and substantial forces military and civilian in the Zambales-Bataan area to institute military action, in support of our main operations. My policy in the utilization of available interior strength in Luzon is to treat it in so far as practical as a spontaneous patriotic movement on the part of the people under the leadership, direction and influence of officers and men of the USAFFE of tested reliability operating within areas and towns people of primary personal influence.

I desire for the most part that such movement be employed in the acquisition of reliable - specific information on enemy defensive position with later commitments as required to harassing actions to the extent of existing capabilities. As resources permit me to do so I shall send in arms, ammunitions, signal equipment and other essential supplies to strengthen your position but such action of course must be based upon strategic priorities in the over all situation.

Consider yourself as a direct representative of this Headquarters in the implementation of the above policy until otherwise instructed and dispatch all important intelligence secured from sources available to you through Captain Cabangbang now in direct communication with me. Particular emphasis should be given to receiving information on enemy fortifications, movement and the identification of enemy units."

Major Anderson sends SIA to report to Merrill. B.C. Cabangbang was Captain, AUS Commanding.

The guerrillas all over had been busy ever since receiving MacArthur’s orders to open up. They cut telephone wires to disrupt Japanese communications. They blew up bridges and mined roads; they blocked supplies to frontline troops; smashed patrols, and burned ammunition dumps. Their shining bolos began to turn red. MacArthur estimates that they accomplished the purpose of practically a frontline division.

MacArthur established his general headquarters at Dagupan and pressed forward. It took his troops just 12 days to cover the central plains to Tarlac. The speed of his advance gave the enemy little time to utilize their well-prepared defense positions.

Asked later to comment on the extraordinary initial speed of the operation, MacArthur said: "The rate of progress in this operation was fast and more than fulfilled all hopes and expectations." He forgot to mention that it was the Guerrilla Movements in the mountains who prepared for the sabotage, mopping up operations and intelligence work pinpointing the enemy positions, strength and firepower that hastened their operations.

At 5:00 p.m. of the 19th of January, Col. Merrill codenamed Tomas send a message to Ramon Magsaysay with these contents:

"Message just received calls for our making contact with boat near San Miguel beginning last night.

I am sending Capt. Crane to Capt. Dancel with instructions relative to contact. It is imperative that the 10 Japs at San Miguel be wiped out at once without further delay, as well as all other Japs north of Olongapo. Send a message to Dancel to eliminate those Japs immediately without waiting for darkness and let none escape. Tell him to prepare 6 bancas (outrigger canoe).

We received Gen. Mac Arthur’s message to act on 11 Jan, eight days ago, and I had told him we could capture all of Zambales north of Olongapo in 24 hours. I received another message from Mac Arthur today asking me "What is Jap garrison in San Narciso, San Antonio and San Marcelino? What control do your guerrillas have in this area P." What can I tell him that we have done, not what we will do (manana)?

If the telephone and telegraph lines have not been cut, do so at once in many places removing long sections of wire. (South of San Marcelino to Olongapo). Our Navy shelled Bataan. Best wishes - let’s go!! "

In his telegraph to Gen. Mac Arthur’s command, Col. Merrill reported on 19 January that there were no Japanese Garrisons from San Marcelino to Santa Cruz and that the Guerrillas controlled those areas in spite of their very few firearms. That there were 150 Japanese in Castillejos and less than a hundred in Olongapo. About five thousand Japanese are concentrated on the Zigzag east of Olongapo with some artillery and tanks. Their outpost extends to Olongapo. Five thousand Japs are in wired position across the Bagac Bagac to Pilar, Bataan. At Pilar Road west of Pantingan River. There were 300 Japs in Dinalupihan.

20 January 45, Merrill cabled GHQ SWPA that the Japanese Garrison at Castillejos has been eliminated. The Airfield is being repaired for use of U.S. planes. That it is safe to land when letters UNCLE SUGAR are shown on the field.

The night before, Captain Alfredo Piga, Bansiong Rodriguez and others send a group of women to wine and dine the Japanese on the Airfield. When they were having a party, their group bored holes on the gasoline tanks, rolled them all over the Japanese planes, trucks, and buildings to spread gasoline. They also put dynamites all over the place. Then at a signal, they turned the whole place into a hell, killing all the 150 Japanese on Camp and destroying all the planes there.

On 22 January, Merrill cabled Gen. MacArthur that his Number 3 man Gen. Krueger of the Sixth Army was received on a rendezvous one kilometer north of San Miguel, San Antonio by Capt. George Crane who was on duty there. On 23 Jan. 1945 at 12:40 p.m., Merrill sends a written message to Magsaysay:

"Our troops have reached San Miguel south of Tarlac. The Guerrillas killed the rear guards left by the Japs. Glad to get your news that there was no Japs at present in or near the town, but sorry to hear about the Japs killing the civilians at Balaybay. We should have destroyed the bridges between Subic and the Rifle Range and they would not have been able to return.

The 2 bridges between Subic and the Rifle Range will be completely destroyed without further delay. The bridge at Maloma north of San Felipe should be prepared for instant destruction by burning. Have oil and straw available and if there are more than 100 Japanese in Botolan, burn the bridge at once. Send men to watch the Capas - Alba trail and to run to the bridge at once if a large number of Japs are coming to Botolan.

We must get accurate information from the north at once. Relay to Capt. Crane and to me.

Some supplies have just arrived. Send Chico here or come yourself to help on distribution. Much TNT."

On 25 January 45, Magsaysay wrote back Merrill: "Reports received here from the north by moro sail boat we sent to Sta. Cruz about four days ago state that there are still 200 Japs at the Acoje mines in the mountains with 100 fully armed and with 2 cannons; that the Sta. Cruz bridge was blasted by retreating Japs before the 13th U.S. Army trucks were able to cross said bridge; that there are 5 Japs guarding Bancal bridge ready to blast said bridge the moment American troops approach; that Capt. Capati, C.O. of Squadron "C" has already issued orders to attack those 5 Japs to prevent the destruction of said bridge.

Yesterday afternoon, Lt. Records and I went to the airfield. I showed him the markers we made and he was very much pleased and said that the markers (DANGER - with arrow pointing to the mined area; and U.S. LAND HERE - with arrow pointing to the unmined area) are all very clear and would be very easily seen from above. The unmined area of the airfield, according to him, is big enough even for American bombers. Today Pilot Records will be back in the airfield with some laborers to try to dig out or explode the mines.

Ensign Petritz came to see me last night and he desires, as he is sick with malaria, not to proceed to the place of Capt. Crane to get out by PT boat in case another contact is made. I told him that I would have to get your O.K. first." CHOW (Magsaysay’s code name).

MacArthur cabled Merrill on 25 Jan. 45 saying: "Prepare to receive air drop thirteen thousand pounds critical equipment every morning until mission accomplished. Panels in shape of cross for identification near seven starts CLN."

On the same day Merrill wrote Magsaysay:

More arms coming 6:30 A.M. 26 Jan. Send 100 men with officers to receive stuff. Have men bring their food for 1 day.

The bridges to the south must be destroyed at once because many planes dropping supplies may attract the Japs in Olongapo. Have at least 500 more men ready to receive arms. Men must be willing to leave their homes and FIGHT for several days, maybe a week. Arrange for their food. Have all motor vehicles ready to run at a moments notice. A sample of documents about the drops of arms and rations:

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Manifest

AIRFIELD: DULAG		APO: 543	Date: 27, January '45
CONSIGNOR: 8th A/CARGO RE-SUPPLY SQUADRON				TYPE OF LOAD: P
CONSIGNEE: MERRILL			DESTINATION: LUZON
Bundles	Quantity	Description	Type	Total Net Weight
10	20 boxes	Carbines	P	3000
1	1 box	BAR'S	P	142
	1 box	TSMG Clips	P	130
1	2 boxes	Cal. 50 MG	P	185
1	2 boxes	Tripods, Cal. .50 MG	P	90
1	2boxes	Cal 45 Ammo	P	190
2	4 cases	Cal. .30 MG Ammo	P	420
				4157

Following Partial Load Dropped 23, Jan. '45

1	4 boxes	Composition "C"		176
1	1 box	10 Carbines	P	150
1	2 boxes	Cal. .30 Ammo	P	200
1	1 box	Prima Cord, Blasting Caps,
		Detonators for booby traps		50
1	2 boxes	Radios	P	100
1	3 boxes	TNT	P	150
1	3 boxes	TNT	P	150

*Received 23 Jan. except Radios, 1 extra box carbines:

In a letter, George Crane wrote Merrill (Tomas) on 27th Jan. 45: "Tonight I made contact with two PTs that I had contacted before and Ens. Petritz is on his way. Also sent information and the enclosed in your letter of 26 Jan. 45.

Olsen 9the C.O. of the PT) took the request for information as to when to expect party from the 6th Army. He did not know if PT contact would be maintained nightly. He said this might be the last night or maybe tomorrow night. Yet he admitted he did not know the schedules of other squadrons. (This PT commander is the least agreeable of all I have met and the hardest to get information from. In fact he is the one who gave me the shirt I forgot - yet neither of us mentioned it tonight.) He said he would arrive about 9:30 or 10 A.M.and GHQ will get it in the middle of the afternoon, same day. He called it 12 hours from here 3 A.M. to 3 p.m.

I am sending Pete Start to Castillejos today. Thanks for the news."

On the 28th of Jan 45, Merrill asked Lt. Col. Wright to come as soon as possible and bring with him the PS he have assembled. He asked for men for M.G.s and mortars as well as semi auto arms and to bring what every food they can get. This is urgent -do not delay.

According to Headquarters XI Corps APO 471 G-1 Journal, the events that followed were documented. At 9:00 a.m. on the 21st of Jan. 1945, Col. Cosby visited G-1 and G-3 Sections, 8th Army, reference M-7 Operation and station list. On 1:30 p.m. on 22 Jan., the 8th Army embarked for M-7 Operation.