Site hosted by Build your free website today!
                                                  ISSN: 0898-6827  
      A   A   C   A   R       B   U   L   L   E   T   I   N      
            of the Association for the Advancement of      
                      Central Asian Research      
      Editor: H. B. PAKSOY       Vol. V, No. 1, Spring 1992      
         EDITORIAL ADDRESS: BOX 2321  AMHERST, MA 01004       
                   SHOULD BE SENT TO THE EDITOR.      
                          IN THIS ISSUE      
H. B. Paksoy        NOTE FROM THE EDITOR.      
Kevin Krisciunas    THE LEGACY OF ULUGH BEG (1394-1449).      
Yusuf Ak ura (1876-1935) THREE POLICIES. (Tr.) David S. Thomas.      
News of the Profession      
Book Reviews      
INDIVIDUAL MEMBERSHIP IN AACAR is available to qualified      
individuals through the payment of tax-deductible, annual dues      
covering January 1 - December 31, includes subscription to AACAR      
BULLETIN (issued twice annually: Spring and Fall). Send your      
check or money order (no cash, please) for $25.00 (US funds      
only), made to: Treasurer, AACAR, c/o History Department, Herter      
Hall, UMASS, Amherst, MA 01003.       
AACAR is a publicly supported, tax-exempt organization, as      
defined under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,      
incorporated in the state of Connecticut. Therefore, all      
membership dues, grants, contributions, gifts and donations made      
to AACAR are tax-deductible.      
2      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
AACAR is an affiliate of: American Association for the      
Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS);  Middle East Studies      
Association (MESA). AACAR BULLETIN is indexed by the PERIODICA      
The AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board: Thomas Allsen      
(Trenton State College), Muriel Atkin (George Washington U),      
Peter Golden (Rutgers U), Thomas Noonan (U of Minnesota), Omeljan      
Pritsak (Harvard U) invites the submission of high quality      
manuscripts in the field of Central Asian Studies for      
publication.  AACAR has negotiated contracts with a number of      
publishing houses for the purpose. Contact: Prof. Thomas Allsen,      
Secretary of the AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board, History      
Department, Trenton State College, Trenton, NJ 08650.      
All institutions are encouraged to provide related news items and      
announcements for inclusion in AACAR BULLETIN. ADVERTISEMENTS      
from publishing houses, booksellers, applicable service providers      
will be considered. Please contact the Editor for rates with      
proposed copy.       
When contacting the named organizations and contacts, it will be      
greatly appreciated if the source, AACAR BULLETIN, is mentioned.      
AACAR and AACAR BULLETIN are COPYRIGHTED 1992. All rights      
reserved. No portion of AACAR BULLETIN may be reproduced in any      
manner without permission in writing from the Editor.      
Photocopying information for users in the USA: The Item-Fee Code      
for this publication indicates the authorization to photocopy      
items for internal, client or personal use is granted by the      
copyright holder for libraries and other users registered with      
the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) Transactional Reporting      
Service, provided the stated fee for copying, beyond that      
permitted by Section 107 or 108 of the U. S. Copyright Law, is      
3      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
paid. The appropriate remittance of $5.00 per copy per article is      
paid directly to the Copyright Clearance Center, 27 Congress      
Str., Salem, MA 01970 USA. The Item-Fee Code for AACAR BULLETIN      
is: 0898-6827/91 + $5.00 + .00      
All information reported is believed to be correct at the time of      
publication. AACAR BULLETIN suggests that readers verify the      
events and particulars of an announcement with the named      
organizers and contacts, and regrets that AACAR BULLETIN can      
assume no responsibility for cancellations, dates, amendments,      
postponements or the like. AACAR BULLETIN reserves the right to      
edit any material submitted for space considerations, and      
generally list them in the order of arrival. As customary,      
inclusion of an event or item in an issue does not necessarily      
imply endorsement by AACAR BULLETIN, AACAR or its Officers. All      
opinions expressed are those of their authors.      
AACAR BULLETIN gratefully acknowledges the subvention received      
from the Department of History, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-      
AMHERST toward the publication of this issue.       
We invite you to renew your membership in AACAR. Annual dues are      
$25. Please see above for details.      
                     *          *          *      
                       NOTE FROM THE EDITOR      
With this issue, the AACAR BULLETIN has entered its fifth year.      
Accordingly, under the provisions of the AACAR By-Laws, the term      
of this Editor is completed. Meanwhile the circulation of the      
4      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
AACAR BULLETIN reached two thousand, partially via the electronic      
medium of SOVSET, administered by the Center for Strategic and      
International Studies, Washington DC.       
     AACAR BULLETIN went through its paces. The original mailing      
list was composed entirely of the Founding Editor's personal      
correspondence files accumulated over some fifteen years. Later,      
the contents of the list grew through the inquiries and interest      
of individuals and institutions.      
     Compared to the difficulties experienced by pioneers such as      
Hasan Bey Melikov Zerdabi (1842-1907) and Ismail Bey Gaspirali      
(1854-1914), who founded and edited, respectively, the celebrated      
newspapers Ekinci (1875-1877) and Terc man/Perevodchik (1883-      
1918), our early efforts were nothing to complain about. While      
the above named individuals fought tsarist censors as well as a      
sceptical public and paucity of finances, AACAR BULLETIN had to      
confront corporeality first. But the demand for AACAR BULLETIN      
has been humblingly overwhelming, with each issue printing more      
than the one earlier, and no back issues remaining in stock. As      
libraries wrote us requesting a complete collection, we had to      
satisfy the demand by photocopying. Today, several dozen research      
libraries around the world possess complete runs of the AACAR      
     There remains the pleasant task of offering my sincere      
thanks to the Members of AACAR, Executive Council Members, and      
the Members of its several Committees; SOVSET administrators,      
including Dawn Mann, Alice Young and Sarah Helmstadter; American      
Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Middle East      
Studies Association, their Executive Directors, Drs. Dorothy      
Atkinson and Anne Betteridge, respectively, and the Boards of      
Directors of both organizations, for unanimously extending AACAR      
Affiliate status and privileges; to AACAR BULLETIN contributors,      
book reviewers, publishing houses, book sellers and those who      
sent materials we included in the issues of past and present,      
whose names are preserved in our pages.        
5      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     The issues most of our readers enjoyed would not have been      
possible without the subventions provided: at first by the      
Department of History, CENTRAL CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY, and      
later by the Department of History, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-      
AMHERST toward the publication of these five volumes. We greatly      
appreciate the help and understanding of Department Chairs, in      
chronological order, Professors John Rommel and his successor      
Donald Sanford (and the then Academic Vice-President Richard      
Pattenaude) of CCSU; Roland Sarti and his successor Robert E.      
Jones, of UMASS-Amherst.      
          I trust the AACAR BULLETIN readership will extend its      
welcome to the new editor, who will take over with the next      
                    *           *           *      
                     THE LEGACY OF ULUGH BEG       
                    Kevin Krisciunas, PhD [1]       
                  Joint Astronomy Centre-Hawaii       
Muhammed Taragai Ulugh Beg (1394-1449) was a Turk who ruled the      
province of Transoxiana (Maverannahr), a region situated between      
the River Oxus (Amu Darya) and the River Jaxartes (Syr Darya),      
the principal city of which was Samarkand. Ulugh Beg's      
grandfather was the famous conqueror Timur (1336-1405).  Ulugh      
Beg became the ruler of Transoxiana in 1447 upon the death of his     
father.  But his rule was of short duration.  Two years later he      
was killed by an assassin hired by his son 'Abd al Latif.      
     Were it only for his role as prince, viceroy, and martyr,      
few scholars would know of Ulugh Beg.  But his memory lives on      
because he was an observatory builder, patron of astronomy, and      
6      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
astronomer in his own right.  He was certainly the most important     
observational astronomer of the 15th century.  He was one of the      
first to advocate and build permanently mounted astronomical      
instruments.  His catalogue of 1018 stars (some sources count      
1022) was the only such undertaking carried out between the times     
of Claudius Ptolemy (ca. 170 A.D.) and Tycho Brahe (ca. 1600).       
And, as we shall briefly discuss here, his attitude towards      
scientific endeavors was surprisingly modern.      
     The administration of Transoxiana was the responsibility of      
Ulugh Beg's father for most of Ulugh Beg's life.  The prince had      
the opportunity (and the inclination) to pursue scholarly      
matters.  His interest in astronomy dates from an early age, when     
he visited the remains of the Maragha Observatory, made famous by     
the astronomer Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (1201-74). The principal      
accomplishment at Maragha was the Zij-i ilkhani, or Ilkhanic      
     A principal source of our information about the astronomical      
activity at Samarkand is a letter of one Ghiyath al-Din Jamshid      
al-Kashi (d. 1429), which is available in Turkish and English      
(see Sayili 1960).  This letter, originally in Persian, was      
written in 1421 or 1422.  From it we deduce that serious      
astronomical activity began in Samarkand in 1408-10, and that the      
construction of Ulugh Beg's observatory was begun in 1420.  Among      
the astronomers known to have been active at Samarkand, we know      
only a few by name, but according to al-Kashi there were sixty or      
seventy scholars at the madrasa who were well enough versed in      
mathematics to participate in some capacity in the astronomical      
observations and/or seminars.       
     The observations were carried out systematically from 1420      
to 1437.  While observatories today are expected to carry on      
indefinitely, this was not the case in olden times. Rather,      
observations were carried out, for example, to update tables of      
planetary motions in order to predict their future positions.       
al-Kashi tells us (see Sayili 1960, p.106):      
7      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     As to the inquiry of those who ask why observations are      
     not completed in one year but require ten or fifteen      
     years, the situation is such that there are certain      
     conditions suited to the determination of matters      
     pertaining to the planets, and it is necessary to      
     observe them when these conditions obtain.  It is      
     necessary, e.g., to have two eclipses in both of which      
     the eclipsed parts are equal and to the same side, and      
     both these eclipses have to take place near the same      
     node.  Likewise, another pair of eclipses conforming to      
     other specifications is needed, and still other cases      
     of a similar nature are required.  It is necessary to      
     observe Mercury at a time when it is at its maximum      
     morning elongation and once at its maximum evening      
     elongation, with the addition of certain other      
     conditions, and a similar situation exists for the      
     other planets.       
          Now, all these circumstances do not obtain within      
     a single year, so that observations cannot be made in      
     one year.  It is necessary to wait until the required      
     circumstances obtain and then if there is cloud at the      
     awaited time, the opportunity will be lost and gone for      
     another year or two until the like of it occurs once      
     more.  In this manner there is need for ten or fifteen      
     One might add that because it takes Saturn 29 years to      
return to the same position amongst the stars (that being its      
period of revolution about the Sun), a period of 29 years might      
have been the projected length of the Samarkand program of      
     A number of instruments were used for the observations of      
the planets and for determining the relative positions of the      
stars.[3]  The largest instrument in Samarkand was the so- called      
8      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Fakhri sextant.  It was a 60-degree stone arc mounted on the      
north-south meridian line.  Such an instrument was used to      
determine the transit altitudes of stars (i.e. their maximum      
angular distances above the horizon).  From the most southern and      
northern positions of the Sun, observed over the course of a      
year, one can easily determine the obliquity of the ecliptic      
(i.e. the tilt of the Earth's axis of rotation with respect to      
the plane of its orbit.)  The mean of these extrema, or the      
meridian altitude of the Sun at the moment of the vernal or      
autumnal equinox allows one (by definition) to determine one's      
latitude.[4]  According to Ulugh Beg the obliquity of the      
ecliptic was 23 degrees 30' 17" (differing by only 32" from the      
true value for his time).  His value for the latitude of      
Samarkand was 39 degrees 37' 33".      
     Now, to the reader unaccustomed to astronomical topics,      
these might seem like just numbers, the accuracy of which may      
mean nothing.  The most interesting thing about the Fakhri      
sextant in Samarkand was that its radius was 40 meters! (This is      
very nearly equal to the height of the dome of the 200-inch      
reflector at Palomar Mountain, California.)  The Fakhri sextant      
was by far the largest meridian instrument ever built.  It could      
achieve a resolution of a several seconds of arc -- on the order      
of a six-hundredth of a degree, or the diameter of an American      
penny at a distance of more than half a kilometer.      
     Because the Fakhri sextant was an arc fixed on the meridian,      
it could only be used for determining the declinations of      
celestial bodies.  (This being before the invention of accurate      
clocks, it could not be used for the determinations of relative      
right ascensions.)  Because it was a 60-degree arc, it could not      
be used to observe stars along the full north-south meridian.       
Thus, it could not be used, say, to determine the angular      
separations of pairs of stars, or for observing stars near the      
northern or southern horizons.  Consequently, other observational      
instruments were used at Samarkand, among them parallactical      
9      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
lineals and equinoctial and solstitial armillary spheres.  These      
were made of metal and wood and were on the order of 1 meter in      
size.  Hand held astrolabes are not to be included in this list      
because they were "star finders" and were used for rough time      
determination, rather than for the accurate determination of      
stellar or planetary positions.      
     Typically, two people were required to make individual      
observations at any given time.  At Samarkand it was the practice      
for a larger number of people to discuss the results.  In modern      
terms, this is like peer review, the purpose of which is to      
eliminate sources of error and to ensure the health of the      
observational program.  Ulugh Beg himself       
     has allowed that in scientific questions there should      
     be no agreeing until the matter is thoroughly      
     understood and that people should not pretend to      
     understand in order to be pleasing.  Occasionally, when      
     someone assented to His Majesty's view out of      
     submission to his authority, His Majesty reprimanded      
     him by saying 'you are imputing ignorance to me.'  He      
     also poses a false question, so that if anyone accepts      
     it out of politeness he will reintroduce the matter and      
     put the man to shame.[5]      
     The foreword to Ulugh Beg's Zij contains four parts: 1) the      
chronology, describing various systems of time reckoning; 2)      
practical astronomy (how observations are made and used); 3) the      
apparent motions of the Sun, Moon, and planets, based on a      
geocentric system of the universe; and 4) astrology.       
     Besides the tables of motions of the Sun, Moon, and planets,      
Ulugh Beg's Zij was significant for its catalogue of about 1000      
stars, giving their names and ecliptic coordinates.  In an      
appendix to this paper I give a list of published works that      
contain all or part of Ulugh Beg's Zij.[6]  In Flamsteed's      
Historia Coelestis Britannica (1725) and Baily's 1843 treatise we      
10      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
can directly compare Ulugh Beg's positions with those of Ptolemy,      
Tycho Brahe, and others. With modern stellar positions, proper      
motions, and an accurate treatment of precession, it would be      
interesting to make a statistical analysis of, say, the 100      
brightest stars, to see how these catalogues compare as to      
average accuracy.[7]       
     In The Observatory in Islam Sayili concludes (pp. 391, 393)      
by stating:      
     The observatory as an organized and specialized      
     institution was born in Islam; it went through very      
     important stages of evolution within Islam itself; it      
     passed on in a rather highly developed state to Europe,      
     and this was followed, shortly afterwards, by the      
     creation of modern observatories of Europe, in an      
     unbroken process of evolution superposing upon the      
     traditions borrowed from Eastern Islam...The question      
     is of the case of the Samarqand      
     Observatory because it appears as probably the most      
     important Islamic observatory from the standpoint of      
     influences exerted upon Europe.       
     I can accept the first half of Sayili's perspective. The      
astronomical programs carried out at Baghdad (9th century),      
Cordova (10th century), Cairo (10th to 12th centuries), Toledo      
(11th century), Castile (under the Christian king Alfonso X; 13th      
century), Maragha (13th century), and at Samarkand (15th century)      
were far more extensive than anything carried out by the ancient      
Greeks, with the possible exception of Hipparchus.  The Arabs      
honored learning and kept alive the study of astronomy by      
preserving Ptolemy's Almagest and adding to its mathematical      
formulation.  The Ma'munic, Hakemite, Toledan, Ilkhanic and      
Alphonsine Tables, along with the tables contained in Ulugh Beg's      
Zij have come down to us because scholars knew they were      
11      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
important.  But the influence of the Samarkand Observatory on      
European astronomy was more indirect than direct.  While copies      
of Ulugh Beg's Zij existed in various libraries such as Oxford      
and Paris not long after its composition (see Razvi 1985), it      
only became known in Europe in the mid-17th century, nearly five      
decades after the publication of Tycho Brahe's much more accurate      
data (see appendix to this paper).       
     If the activities in Samarkand influenced European ones, why      
does Ulugh Beg only get cursory mention (on pp. 328 and 347, but      
not in the index) of Dreyer's classic 1890 biography of Tycho      
Brahe?  In Thoren's even more authoritative 1990 biography of      
Tycho there is no mention of Ulugh Beg at all. It was work such      
as Tycho's, not Ulugh Beg's, that led in turn to the efforts at      
Greenwich (founded 1675),  Pulkovo (founded 1839), and the United      
States Naval Observatory (founded 1844), among other      
institutions, and these modern, national, facilities did not need      
or use Ulugh Beg's work as a fundamental component of the      
construction of accurate star catalogues.  Yet, to be fair,      
astronomers and historians have found many uses for ancient and      
medieval observations, such as studies of the spin down rate of      
the Earth, studies of the motion of the Moon and planets, and the      
dating of historical events.  Ulugh Beg's observations being the      
best of their century allow them to stand as a permanent      
observational archive for our benefit.  For example, Shcheglov      
(1977) has recently used information from the modern excavation      
of Ulugh Beg's large meridian instrument for a study of      
continental drift.      
     The most direct influence of the Samarkand Observatory was      
on the construction of the five observatories, or Jantar Mantars,      
built by Maharajah Jai Singh (1686-1743) in India.  Jai Singh was      
a Hindu prince in the court of a Muslim Mogul emperor.  These      
observatories were built at New Delhi, Ujjain, Mathura, Varanasi,      
and Jaipur.  The largest instrument was 27 meters high.  For more      
12      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
information see Kaye (1918), Mayer (1979), Sharma (1987), and      
Bedding (1991).      
     While recognition of Ulugh Beg's contributions to astronomy      
was delayed, an extensive body of information now exists on the      
activity of his observatory in Samarkand.[8]  We now know that at      
the time Ulugh Beg's observatory flourished it was carrying out      
the most advanced observations and analysis being done anywhere.       
In the 1420's and 1430's Samarkand was the astronomical capital      
of the world.  As such it is deserving of further study.      
[1] Member, International Astronomical Union, Commission 41      
(History of Astronomy).       
[2] A zij is an astronomical treatise that usually contains      
tables for calculating the positions of the Sun, Moon, and      
planets.  It might also contain a star catalogue.       
[3] For a discussion of the astronomical instrumentation of the      
Arabs, see Sedillot (1841), Repsold (1908), and Krisciunas (1988,      
chapter 2).  Note that the telescope was only first used for      
astronomical purposes in 1609.      
[4] Strictly speaking, one must also account for atmospheric      
refraction.  For a review of astronomical coordinate systems see      
Krisciunas (1988, chapter 1).      
[5] Sayili (1960, pp. 109-110).       
[6] The appendix is largely based on information found in      
Shcheglov (1968; 1979) and in the National Union Catalog Pre-1956      
Imprints.  I thank Paul Luther for additional information.       
13      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
[7] Vogt (1925) found 22' for the average error of 122 Ptolemaic      
celestial latitudes.  The best of Tycho's stellar positional      
measures are good to 1'.  See Dreyer (1890, pp.387-8), Wesley      
(1978), and Thoren (1990, pp. 287-299, and references therein).       
[8] See Kary-Niiazov (1967) and Sirazhdinov (1979).      
Barthold, W. W., Ulugh Beg und seine Zeit. Abhandlungen fur die      
Kunde des Morganlandes 21, No. 1, 1935.        
Bedding, James, "Playground for the stars: The Jantar Mantars,      
Astronomical Observatories in India," New Scientist, 31 August      
1991, p. 49.        
Dreyer, J. L. E., Tycho Brahe: A Picture of Scientific Life and      
Work in the Sixteenth Century (Gloucester, Mass.:Peter Smith),      
1977 reprint.  (Original edition published by Adam & Charles      
Black, Edinburgh, 1890.)        
Kar[y]-N[i]iazov, T. N., "Ulugh Beg", in Dictionary of Scientific      
Biography 13, pp. 535-537.       
Kary-Niiazov, T. N., Astronomicheskaia shkola Ulugbeka,      
(Tashkent), 1967.       
Kaye, G. R., The Astronomical Observatories of Jai Singh,      
(Janpath, New Delhi: Archaeological Survey of India), reprint of      
1918 edition.       
Krisciunas, Kevin, Astronomical Centers of the World (Cambridge:      
Cambridge Univ. Press), 1988.        
14      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Mayer, Ben, "Touring the Jai Singh Observatories," Sky and      
Telescope 58, No. 1, July 1979, pp. 6-10.        
Razvi, Abbas, "The Observatory at Samarqand (Marsad-e-Ulugh Beg,      
15th C)," Central Asia, No. 17, 1985, pp. 97-150.       
Repsold, Johann A., Zur Geschichte der Astronomischen      
Mess-werkzeuge von Purbach bis Reichenbach (1450 bis 1830)      
(Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann), 1908.  I have a rough (unpublished)      
English translation, which I would be happy to provide anyone, of      
the first six sections of this work, covering the astronomical      
instrumentation of the ancient Greeks, the Arabs, Purbach,      
Regiomontanus, Copernicus, Apian, Wilhelm IV of Hesse-Cassel, and      
Tycho Brahe.        
Sarton, George, Introduction to the History of Science      
(Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins), 1948, vol. 3, pp. 1120,      
Sayili, Aydin, Ulug Bey Ve Semerkanddeki Ilim Faaliyeti Hakkinda      
Giyasuddin-i Kasi'nin Mektubu (Ghiyath al Din al Kashi's Letter      
on Ulugh Bey and the Scientific Activity in Samarqand) (Ankara:      
Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi), 1960.  In note 1, pp. 32-33 of this      
work it is stated that another English translation was published      
by E. S. Kennedy (Orientalia 29, 1960, pp. 191-213), which      
differs in many particulars, and that the Persian text of the      
letter was published twice before that.       
Sayili, Aydin, The Observatory in Islam and its Place in the      
General History of the Observatory (New York: Arno Press), 1981      
reprint.  (Original edition published by T rk Tarih Kurumu      
Basimevi, Ankara, 1960.)       
15      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Sedillot, L. [P. E. A.], Memoire sur les instruments astron. des      
Arabes, Paris, 1841.       
Sharma, V. N., "The Astronomical Efforts of Sawai Jai Singh," in      
G. Swarup [et al.], eds., History of Oriental Astronomy      
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), 1987, pp. 233-240.       
Sh[ch]eglov, V. P., Jan Hevelius: The Star Atlas (Tashkent: "Fan"      
Press), 1968.        
Shcheglov, V. P., "Astronomical azimuths of terrestrial objects      
as indicators of the rotational motions of the continental      
blocks," Soviet Astronomy 21, No. 4, July-August 1977, pp.      
Shcheglov, V. P., "Rasprostranenie <> v      
evropeiskoi pechati," in Sirazhdinov (1979, see below), pp.      
Sirazhdinov, S. KH., ed., Iz istorii nauki epokhi Ulugbeka,      
(Tashkent: Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR), 1979.        
Thoren, Victor E., The Lord of Uraniborg: A Biography of Tycho      
Brahe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),1990.        
Vogt, H., "Versuch einer Wiederherstellung von Hipparchs      
Fixsternverzeichnis," Astronomische Nachrichten, No. 5354-55      
Wesley, Walter, "The accuracy of Tycho Brahe's instruments,"      
Journal for the History of Astronomy 9 (1978), pp.42-53.       
16      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
1648.  John Greaves (1602-1652). Quibus accesserunt, Insigniorum      
aliquot Stellarum Longitudines, et Latitudines, Ex Astronomicis      
Observationibus Ulug Beigi, Tamerlani Magni Nepotis.  Oxoniae.       
Contains latitudes and longitudes of [98] stars.       
1648.  John Greaves (1602-1652). Binae Tabulae Geographicae, una      
Nassir Eddini Persae, altera Vlug Beigi Tatari: Opera et Studio      
J. Gravii. Lugduni, Batavorum.  Geographical tables of the Zij.      
1648.  John Bainbridge (1582-1643). Canicularia.  Una cum      
demonstratione ortus Sirii heliaci, pro parallelo inferioris      
Aegypti.  Auctore Iohanne Gravio.  Quibus accesserunt,      
insigniorum aliquot stellarum longitudines, et latitudines, ex      
astronomicis observationibus Vlug Beigi. Oxoniae, H. Hall. The      
citation in the U. S. Naval Observatory copy states that Greaves      
added the catalogue of 98 Ulugh Beg stars to the Bainbridge      
1650.  John Greaves (1602-1652). Epochae Celebriores, Astronomis,      
Historicis, Chronologis, Chataiorum, Syro-Graecorum Arabum,      
Persarum, Chorasmiorum usitatae (Arabice et Latine): Ex      
traditione Ulugi Beigi; eas primus publicavit, recensuit, et      
Commentarius illustravit Johannes Gravius. Londini, J. Flesher.       
Latin and Persian on opposite pages.  That part of the Zij      
dealing with chronology.       
1652.  John Greaves (1602-1652). Binae Tabulae Geographicae, una      
Nassir Eddini Persae, altera Vlug Beigi Tatari: Opera et Studio      
J. Gravii nunc primum publicatae. Londini, Typis Jacobi Flesher:      
prostant apud Cornelium Bee.  2nd edition of geographical tables.      
17      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
1665.  Thomas Hyde (1636-1703). Tabulae long. ac lat. stellarum      
fixarum, ex observatione Ulugh Beighi, Tamerlanis Magni Nepotis,      
Regionum ultra citraque Gjihun (i. Oxum) Principis potentissimi.       
Ex tribus invicem collatis MSS. Persicis jam primum Luce ac Latio      
donavit, & commentariis illustravit, Thomas Hyde.  In calce libri      
accesserunt Mohammedis Tizini tabulae declinationum & rectarium      
ascensionum.  Additur demum Elenchus Nominum Stellarum. Oxonii:      
Typis Henrici Hall, sumptibus authoris. Tables in Latin and      
Persian for 1018 stars of which about 700 were based exclusively      
on Ulugh Beg and the balance were reduced from Ptolemy in one or      
both coordinates.  Hyde appears to have worked totally      
independent of Greaves.       
1690.  Johannes Hevelius (1611-1687). Prodromus Astronomiae.       
Danzig. Contains a comparison of data in Ulugh Beg's tables with      
other star catalogues known at that time -- those of Ptolemy,      
Tycho Brahe, Giambattista Riccioli, Wilhelm IV (Landgrave of      
Hesse-Cassel), and Hevelius.       
1698-1712. Geographiae veteris scriptores graeci minores. Cum      
interpretatione latina, dissertationibus, ac annotationibus...       
Oxoniae, e Theatro Sheldoniano.  A work containing Ulugh Beg's      
geographical tables.       
1725.  John Flamsteed (1646-1719). Historia Coelestis Britannica.       
London, 3 vols. Includes Ulugh Beg's catalogue, along with those      
of Ptolemy, Tycho Brahe, Wilhelm IV, and Hevelius.        
1767.  Gregory Sharpe. Syntagma dissertationum quas olim auctor      
doctissimus Thomas Hyde, S. T. P. separatim edidit.  Accesserunt      
nonnulla ejusdem opuscula hactenus inedita, &c. &c.  Omnia      
diligenter recognita a Gregorio Sharpe, LL.D. Reg. Maj. a sacris.       
Templi Magistro S.S.R. et A.S. Oxonii. Reprint, with corrections,      
18      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
of Hyde's 1665 work on the Zij, in a 2 vol. collection of Hyde's      
1807.  Duo pinakez geographikoi, d men Nassir 'Eddinou Persou, d      
de  Ouloug Mpei Tatarou.  'Epimeleia kai opoudh Dhmhtriou      
'Alexandridou ... Kata thn en  'Oxonia ekdosin tou sophou      
Grauiou.  'En Biennh thz Austriaz, ek thz tupographiaz 'A.      
Sxmidiou. Ulugh Beg's geographical tables published in Vienna in      
a Greek-language edition.        
1843.  Francis Baily (1774-1844). "The Catalogues of Ptolemy,      
Ulugh Beigh, Tycho Brahe, Halley and Hevelius, Deduced From the      
Best Authorities, With Various Notes and Corrections," Memoires      
of the Royal Astronomical Society 13, pp. 19-28, 79-125, London.       
Reprinted from Thomas Hyde's translation, as edited by Gregory      
Sharpe in 1767.        
1839.  L. P. E. A. Sedillot (1808-1875). Tables astronomiques      
d'Oloug Beg, commentees et publiees avec le texte en regard, Tome      
I, 1 fascicule, Paris.   A very rare work, but referenced in the      
Bibliographie generale de l'astronomie jusqu'en 1880, by J. C.      
Houzeau and A. Lancaster (Brussels, 3 vols. 1887-9; reprinted      
London, 1964).       
1847.   L. P. E. A. Sedillot (1808-1875). Prolegomenes des Tables      
astronomiques d'Oloug Beg, publiees avec Notes et Variantes, et      
precedes d'une Introduction.  Paris: F. Didot.       
1853.   L. P. E. A. Sedillot (1808-1875). Prolegomenes des Tables      
astronomiques d'Oloug Beg, traduction et commentaire.  Paris.       
1917.  Edward Ball Knobel (1841-1930). Ulugh Beg's Catalogue of      
Stars, Revised from all Persian Manuscripts Existing in Great      
19      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Britain, with a Vocabulary of Persian and Arabic Words.       
Washington, D. C.: The Carnegie Institute of Washington.        
                   *           *             *      
                           TARZ-I SIYASET      
                         (THREE POLICIES)      
                     Yusuf Ak ura (1876-1935)      
     Ak ura's    Tarz-i Siyaset (Three Policies) appeared during      
1904 in the newspaper T RK (Nos. 24-34) in Cairo, then under      
British rule. The work was re-printed in 1912 in Istanbul, as a      
pamphlet. In 1976,    Tarz-i Siyaset was re-issued with the late      
E. Z. Karal's introduction, also containing two of the original      
responses to the work: by Ali Kemal and Ahmet Ferit (Tek).[1] Due      
to the prevailing censorship in Istanbul, a number of periodicals      
opposing the rule of Abd lhamid II were being printed in      
Cairo.[2] One such paper of the era was AL-NAHDAH[3] published by      
Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1854-1914)[4], who was related to Ak ura by      
     The issues discussed in Three Policies have occupied the      
thoughts of a large number of individuals belonging to almost all      
persuasions, and the administrative strata of the majority of      
political entities of its time. The perspectives from which      
Ak ura viewed those issues are also very wide, and the      
conclusions he reached essentially foretold what was to become.      
The concerns Ak ura articulated are still valid for most of the      
20      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     A brief biography of Ak ura is provided by David Thomas,      
immediately following the translation proper.[5]      
[1] Yusuf Ak ura,    Tarz-i Siyaset (Ankara: T rk Tarih Kurumu,      
1976). The dedication page states: "In commemmoration of Ak ura's      
100th birth anniversary, one of the first Presidents of the T rk      
Tarih Kurumu [Turkish Historical Society, founded by the order of      
Mustafa Kemal Atat rk in 1925 and maintained by his legacy      
provided in his last will and testament]." The volume contains a      
biography of Ak ura by Karal, and a bibliography of Ak ura's      
[2] To place the events of the era into perspective, see for      
example, Y. H. Bayur, T rk Inkilabi Tarihi (Ankara, 1940-1967)      
Three Vols.; A. B. Kuran, Inkilap Tarihimiz ve J n T rkler      
(Istanbul, 1945); T. Z. Tunaya T rkiyede Siyasi Partiler, 1859-      
1952 (Istanbul, 1952), of which there is now a new and expanded      
edition; Serif Mardin, J n T rklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908      
(Ankara, 1964); A. Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, La      
presse et le mouvement national ches les musulmans de russie      
avant 1920 (Paris, 1964); E. E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks (Beirut,      
1965); Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and      
Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (Oxford, 1969); Sina      
Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi (Ankara, 1970); S. S. Aydemir, Makedonya'dan      
Orta Asya'ya Enver Pasa, Vol. II. (Istanbul, 1976) 2nd Ed.      
(Especially Pp. 443-494); Stanford J & E. K. Shaw, History of the      
Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II (Cambridge University      
Press, 1977); M. S kr  Hanioglu, Bir Siyasal  rg t Olarak      
'Osmanli Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti' ve 'J n T rkl k' 1889-1902      
(Vol I) (Istanbul, 1985); Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the      
21      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Young Turk era (Leiden, 1991). Most contain extensive      
[3] Thomas Kuttner "Russian Jadidism and the Islamic World:      
Ismail Gasprinskii in Cairo, 1908" Cahiers du monde russe et      
sovietique. 16. (1975).       
[4] Edward Lazzerini, "Gaspirali Ismail Bey's Terc man" Central      
Asian Monuments, H. B. Paksoy, Ed. (at press); idem, "Gadidism at      
the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View From Within" Cahiers du      
monde russe et sovietique. 16 (1975); idem "From Bakhchisaray to      
Bukhara in 1893: Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's Journey to Central      
Asia" Central Asian Survey Vol. 3, No. 4 (1984); idem, "Ismail      
Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878-1914"      
(Doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1973); Ismail      
Bey Gasprinskii, Russkoe musul'manstvo: mysli, zametki I      
nablyudeniya (Simferopol, 1881) Society for Central Asian Studies      
(Oxford, 1985) Reprint No. 6; Cafer Seydahmet, Gaspirali Ismail      
Bey (Istanbul, 1934).      
[5] For further details, see David Thomas, "Yusuf Ak ura and the      
Intellectual Origins of    Tarz-i Siyaset" Journal of Turkish      
Studies/T rkl k Bilgisi Arastirmalari Vol. 2 (1978); idem, "The      
Life and Thought of Yusuf Ak ura 1876-1935" (Doctoral      
Dissertation, McGill University, 1976).      
                          THREE POLICIES      
                  Translated by David S. Thomas, PhD.      
                       Rhode Island College      
     It seems to me that since the rise of the desires for      
progress and rehabilitation spread from the West, three principal      
22      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
political doctrines have been conceived and followed in the      
Ottoman dominions. The first is the one which seeks to create an      
Ottoman Nation through assimilating and unifying the various      
nations subject to Ottoman rule. The second seeks to unify      
politically all Muslims living under the governance of the      
Ottoman State because of the fact that the prerogative of the      
Caliphate has been a part of the power of the Ottoman State (this      
is what the Europeans call Pan-Islamism). The third seeks to      
organize a policy of Turkish nationalism (T rk Milliyet-i      
siyasiyesi) based on ethnicity.      
     The first of these principles had an important influence on      
the general political policy of the Ottoman Empire, whereas the      
last appeared only recently in the writings of certain authors.      
     The desire to bring into being an Ottoman nation did not aim      
at a lofty objective nor high hopes. Rather the real purpose was      
to grant and impose the same rights and political duties on the      
Muslim and non-Muslim peoples of the Ottoman dominions, and thus      
to realize perfect equality between them and to grant complete      
freedom of thought and worship. The aim was thus to create an      
Ottoman Nation (Osmanli Milleti) a new nationality united in a      
common country similar to the American nation in the United      
States of America by blending and assimilating to each other the      
above mentioned peoples in spite of the religious and racial      
differences [existing] among them. The ultimate result of all      
these difficult processes was to be the preservation of the "High      
Ottoman State" in her original external form, that is within her      
old boundaries. Although the continuance and strengthening of the      
power of a state whose majority was Muslim and Turkish in its      
major part was beneficial to all Muslims and Turks, this      
political principle would not directly serve them. For this      
reason the Muslims and Turks living outside the Ottoman lands      
23      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
could not be so interested in this policy. The point is that it      
would only be a local and internal matter.      
     The policy of creation of an Ottoman nation arose seriously      
during the reign of Mahmut the Second.(1)  It is well known that      
this ruler said:  "I wish to see the religious differences among      
my subjects only when they enter their mosques, synagogues, and      
churches..."  Around the beginning and the middle of the      
nineteenth century it was natural that this policy was thought      
preferable and practicable for the Ottoman dominions. At that      
time in Europe the idea of nationalism, through the influence of      
the French Revolution, accepted as the basis of nationality the      
French model based on the principle of conscience rather than      
that of descent and ethnicity. Sultan Mahmud and his successors,      
self-deceived by this principle which they could not thoroughly      
comprehend, believed in the possibility of blending, and molding      
the subjects of the state who were of different ethnicities and      
faiths into a united nation, by means of freedom, equality,      
security and fraternity. Some examples which could be observed in      
the history of the integration of nationalities in Europe also      
strengthened their conviction. In fact did not the French      
nationality originate from a compound of German, Celtic, Latin,      
Greek, and other elements? Were there not many Slavic elements      
digested in the German nationality? Is not Switzerland a nation      
despite differences of ethnicity and religion? It is not      
improbable that these Ottoman statesmen, through an inadequate      
understanding of the nature of the policies pursued by the      
Germans and the Italians, who were striving for their political      
unity at that time, presented these movements as evidence to      
support the correctness of their policy.      
     The idea of an Ottoman national unity was observed      
especially during the time of Ali and Fuat Pasha. Napoleon the      
Third, the apostle of creating nations according to the French      
principle of the plebiscite, was the most powerful supporter of      
these Westernized pashas. The French inspired reforms during the      
24      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
time of Sultan Abd laziz and the lyc e at Galatasaray which this      
reform symbolized were all results of the time when this system      
was fashionable.      
     But when Napoleon and the French Empire fell in 1870-1871      
which symbolized the victory of the German interpretation of      
nationality, that of assuming ethnicity as the basis of      
nationality, which, I believe, is closer to reality, the policy      
of Ottoman unity lost its only powerful supporter.      
     It is true that Mithat Pasha was to a degree a follower of      
the two famous ministers mentioned above but his political      
program which was more complex in relation to theirs disappeared      
very quickly. As for the program of present-day Young Ottomans,      
who pretend to follow the work of Mithat, is very vague. I      
believe therefore it would not be a mistake if one assumes that      
the illusion of organizing an Ottoman nation passed away with the      
French Empire and, like it, can never be revived again.      
     When the policy of creating an Ottoman nation failed, the      
policy of Islamism appeared.(2)      
     This idea which the Europeans term Pan-Islamism was recently      
developed out of Young Ottomanism, namely by a group who      
partially adopted a policy of forming an Ottoman nation. The      
point to which many Young Ottoman poets and politicians      
ultimately arrived, having begun first of all with the slogans      
"Homeland" and "Ottomanizm"  --that is Ottomanizm composed of all      
the peoples living in the homelands-- was "Islamism." The most      
influential cause of this metamorphosis was their experience of      
Europe and their closer observation of Western ideas. When they      
were in the East they stuffed their heads with the ideas of      
eighteenth century political philosophy  --one of them was a      
translator of Rousseau--  but they were unable completely to      
comprehend the importance of ethnicity and religion and      
especially they were unable to understand completely that the      
time had passed for creating a new nationality; that the      
interests, if not desires, of the various elements under the rule      
25      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
of the Ottoman state were not in accordance with such a unity and      
blending and hence that the application of the French conception      
of nationality was impossible in the East. When they were in      
foreign countries, however, they saw their own country with      
greater clarity from afar, and they were successful in      
understanding the gradually increasing political importance of      
religion and ethnicity for the East. As a result they realized      
that the desire to create an Ottoman nation was an illusion.      
     Thereupon they became convinced of the necessity to unify      
completely all Muslim peoples using all possible means, starting      
first with those living in the Ottoman dominions and then with      
those living in the remainder of the world, without regard to      
differences of ethnicity, but taking advantage of their common      
faith. In accordance with the rule that "religion and nation are      
one" which every Muslim learns from his earliest years, they      
believed that it was possible to put all Muslims in the form of a      
unified nation in the sense given to a nation in recent times. In      
one respect this would lead to dissolution and separation among      
the peoples of the Ottoman dominions. Muslim and non-Muslim      
Ottoman subjects would now be divided. On the other hand,      
however, this would be the means of uniting all Muslims in an      
even greater unification and assimilation. This policy, in      
comparison to the previous policy, was more extensive, or in      
current terminology, it was world-wide (mondiale). This idea      
which in the beginning was purely theoretical, appearing only in      
the press, gradually began as well to have practical application.      
During the last years of Sultan Abd laziz's reign the word Pan-      
Islamism was frequently heard in diplomatic conversations. The      
establishment of diplomatic relations with certain Muslim rulers      
of Asia were undertaken. After the fall of Mithat Pasha, that is      
after the complete renunciation of the idea officially of      
creating an Ottoman nation, Sultan Abd lhamid the Second strove      
to follow this policy. This ruler, in spite of the fact that he      
was the irreconcilable adversary of the Young Ottomans, was, to a      
26      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
degree, their political disciple. The Young Ottomans, once      
realizing that the non-Muslim subjects did not want to stay      
within the Ottoman Commonwealth, even if they were granted      
complete equality in rights and freedom, had begun to express      
their enmity toward these non-Muslim subjects and towards their      
Christian protectors. The present-day policy of the Padisah      
exhibits a striking resemblance to Young Ottoman ideas after this      
change in their outlook. (3)      
     The present-day ruler tried to substitute the religious      
title of Caliph for the terms Sultan and Padisah. In his general      
policies, religion, i.e. the religion of Islam, held an important      
place. In the curricula of the secular schools the time allotted      
to religious instruction was increased; the basis of education      
was religious. Religiosity and pietism  --even if it were      
external and hypocritical--  became the most important means for      
attracting the protection of the Caliphal favor. The imperial      
residence of Yildiz was filled with hojas, imams, seyyids,      
sheikhs, and sherifs. It became a custom to appoint men with      
turbans to certain civil posts. Preachers were sent among the      
people to inspire firmness in religion, strong loyalty to the      
office of the Caliphate  --to the person who occupied that office      
rather than the office itself--  and hatred against the non-      
Muslim peoples. Everywhere tekkes, zaviyehs, and jamis were built      
and repaired. Hajis won great importance. During the pilgrimage      
season, pilgrims passing through the city of the Caliphate were      
honored by the blessing and favor of the Ruler of the Muslims.      
Their religious allegiance and loyalty of heart to the office of      
the Caliphate was sought. In recent years envoys have been sent      
to the countries of Africa and China thickly populated by      
Muslims. One of the best means of carrying out this policy has      
been the building of the Hamidiye-Hijaz Railway.      
     Yet with this political policy the Ottoman Empire resumed      
the form of a theocratic state that it had tried to abandon in      
the period of the Tanzimat. It now became necessary [for the      
27      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
state] to renounce all freedom, the freedom of conscience,      
thought and political freedom, as well as religious, ethnic,      
political and cultural equality. Consequently, it was necessary      
to say farewell to an European-type constitutional government; to      
accept an increase of the already existing enmities and      
antipathies arising out of the diversity of ethnicities,      
religions and social positions, which ultimately led to an      
increase of revolts and rebellions, as well as to an upsurge in      
Europe of enmity against the Turk. In fact that is just what      
     The idea to bring about a policy of Turkish nationalism      
based on ethnicity is very recent. I do not think this idea      
existed in either the Ottoman Empire up to now nor in other      
former Turkish states. Although L on Cahun, the partisan      
historian of Chinggis and Mongols, has written that this great      
Turkish Khan conquered Asia from end-to-end with the ultimate      
intention to unite all the Turks. I am unable to say anything      
concerning the historical authenticity of this assertion.      
     Furthermore, I have not encountered any trace concerning the      
existence of an idea to unite the Turks during the Tanzimat and      
in the Young Ottoman movements. Probably the late Vefik Pasha,      
when he showed interest in a pure Turkish language by writing his      
Dictionary, was fascinated for a while with this utopian idea. It      
is true, nevertheless, that recently in Istanbul a circle,      
scientific rather than political, has been founded to pursue the      
idea of Turkish nationalism. It seems to me that an increase in      
the relations between the Ottomans and the Germans, and the      
growing acquaintance among Turkish youth of the German language      
and especially the historical and philological studies done by      
the Germans, have been very influential in the formation of this      
circle. In this new group, rather than the light, frivolous, and      
political style characterized by the French tradition, there      
exists a soundly-based science which has been obtained quietly,      
patiently, and in a detailed fashion. The most prominent members      
28      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
of this group are Semseddin Sami, Mehmet Emin, Necip Asim, Velet      
 elebi, and Hasan Tahsin; while Ikdam, up to a point, seems to be      
their organ. The movement is developing rather slowly because the      
present-day government apparently does not look with favor on      
this mode of thinking.(5)      
     I do not know whether followers of this idea exist in places      
other than Istanbul in the Ottoman Empire. Yet Turkism, just like      
Islamism, is a general policy. It is not limited to the borders      
of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently it is necessary to look at      
the other parts of the world inhabited by the Turks.      
     In Russia, where most of the Turks live, I know of the      
existence in a very vague form of the idea of the unity of the      
Turks. The nascent Idil literature is more Turkish than Muslim in      
character. If external pressure had not existed, the regions of      
Turkistan, Yayik and Idil, wherein the great majority of the      
Turks are found, could have provided a more favorable environment      
than the Ottoman dominions for the flourishing of this idea.      
     This idea may also exist among the Caucasian Turks. Although      
the Caucasian Turks have had an intellectual influence on the      
Azerbaijan Turks, I do not know to what degree the Turks of      
Northern Iran have embraced the idea of Turkish unity.      
     In any case the formulation of a policy of nationalism based      
on ethnicity is still in its infancy and not widespread.      
     Now let us investigate which one of these three policies is      
useful and practicable.      
     We said useful, but useful to whom and to what purpose? To      
this question only our natural instincts, in other words our      
sentiments which reason is still unable to analyze and justify,      
can give an answer. "I am an Ottoman, a Muslim, and a Turk.      
Therefore I wish to serve the interests  of the Ottoman state,      
Islam, and all Turks." But are the interests of these three      
29      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
societies, which are political, religious, and ethnic, common?      
That is to say does the strengthening of one imply the      
strengthening of the others?      
     The interests of the Ottoman state are not contrary to the      
interests of Muslims and Turks in general, inasmuch as both      
Muslim and Turkish subjects would become powerful by its gaining      
power, and at the same time other Muslims and Turks [outside]      
will also have support.      
     But the interests of Islam do not completely coincide with      
Ottoman and Turkish interests, because the strengthening of Islam      
would lead in the end to the separation of some non-Muslim      
peoples from the state. The rise of the conflicts between the      
Muslims and the non-Muslims would lead to a partition of the      
present-day Ottoman commonwealth and its weakening.(6)       
     As for the interests of the Turks, they also do not      
completely coincide with the interests of the Ottoman state or      
with Islam, since the division of Islamic society into Turkish      
and non-Turkish parts, will weaken it, with the result that this      
would release discord among the Ottoman Muslim subjects and lead      
to a weakening of the Ottoman Empire.      
     Therefore a person belonging to each of the three societies      
must work for the interests of the Ottoman state. Yet in which      
one of these three policies, which we are discussing, lies the      
interest of the Ottoman state itself? And which one of these is      
practicable in the Ottoman Commonwealth?      
     The creation of an Ottoman Nation is the sole means for      
preserving the Ottoman Empire within its present-day borders.      
Yet, does the real strength of the Ottoman state lie in its      
preservation within its present-day geographical form?      
30      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     In the case of an Ottoman nation, it is believed that a      
composite nation will come into existence from among the various      
religions and ethnic groups based upon liberty and legal      
equality. They [the people] will be united only by the ideas of      
homeland (The Ottoman Dominions) and nation (The Ottoman Nation).      
The conflicts and animosities arising from religious and ethnic      
differences will cease, and in this fashion the Greeks and      
Armenians, like the Arabs will be fused into a unity. The Ottoman      
Turks who are the basic foundation of the Ottoman state will be      
content with the spiritual benefits of attributing the name of      
Osman Bey, their first leader, to their homeland and nation and      
especially by seeing the empire which came into existence through      
the efforts of their ancestors not partitioned any further.      
Perhaps they may even be forced to drop this name altogether      
because in this free state, in which the former conquered peoples      
constitute a majority, the name "Ottoman," which to them is a      
symbol of their former subjugation, may be abolished by their      
     The Ottoman Turks may continue their actual predominance for      
a limited duration of time thanks to their sovereignty exercised      
through past centuries, yet it must be remembered that the      
duration of the force of inertia in the social realm is no more      
than the one observed in the realm of nature.      
     As for the generality of Muslims who live in the Ottoman      
nation, since they will constitute the majority, the complete      
power of rulership in the administration of the state will pass      
into their hands. Consequently, if it is recognized that      
spiritually and materially the Islamic element will derive the      
greatest benefit from this composite society, then we also must      
admit that in this Ottoman nation religious conflicts remain, a      
real equality does not exist and the various elements have not      
truly been merged into one.      
     To say that in the creation of the Ottoman Nation the      
Turkish and Muslim population and their power will not be      
31      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
increased is not to say that the power of the Ottoman state will      
be decreased. Nevertheless our basic question is the power of the      
state. Power will certainly be increased. The people of a state      
organized in a rational, closely-knit fashion, in short, as a      
block, rather than being in the state of continuous disputes and      
conflict (anarchy), will certainly be more powerful.      
     But the basic problem is whether or not the elements      
belonging to different ethnicities and religions which up to now      
have never ceased being in conflict and contention with one      
another can now be united and assimilated?      
     We have seen above that experiments of this nature in the      
past have ended in failures: in order to understand henceforth      
whether or not success is possible, let us survey the causes of      
this failure.      
     1. Muslims, and especially Ottoman Turks, did not themselves      
wish this combination and assimilation. Such a policy would have      
put an end legally to their six hundred year-old sovereignty, and      
they would descend to the level of equality with reayas whom they      
had become accustomed over many years to regard as subjugated      
peoples. As the most immediate and material result of it they      
would be forced to let the reayas enter the government and army      
positions that they had customarily monopolized up to that time.      
In other words, by leaving an occupation looked on as honorable      
by the aristocratic peoples, they themselves would be forced to      
enter into trade and industry which they looked down upon and      
with which they were little acquainted.      
     2. Likewise, the Muslims did not wish this inasmuch as this      
powerful religion which looked after the real interests of its      
followers from a very material and human point of view, did not      
accept complete legal equality of Muslim and non-Muslim: the      
Zimmis were to remain always on a secondary level. As for      
liberty, although it is true from every aspect that Islam, among      
all the religions, has been the most liberal, nevertheless as a      
religion, having its origin in the supernatural, it regards every      
32      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
custom not entirely of its own principles and customs, derived      
[as they are] from absolute truths, as contrary to the true path.      
It would not accept, therefore, merely for the goal of human      
happiness, complete freedom of thought and conscience.      
     3. The non-Muslims, too, did not want it, because all of      
them had their own past, their own independence and their own      
governments in that past which was now being glorified because of      
the revival of national consciousness. Muslims and especially the      
Turks had ended their independence and had destroyed their      
governments. And, under the Ottoman rule, they believed, they had      
experienced injustice and not justice, contempt and not equality,      
misery and not happiness. The Nineteenth century had taught them      
their past, their rights and their nationality on the one hand,      
and had weakened the Ottomans, their masters on the other. And      
some of the fellow subjugated peoples had already won their      
independence. Now their weakened masters are extending their hand      
of brotherhood unwillingly and hesitantly. They wanted them to      
share sovereignty; they wanted to equalize the privileges. These      
invigorated subjects, whose wisdom was now brighter than their      
masters' and who understood that some of the hands extending      
towards them were really sincere, did not fail to recognize the      
role played on the formation of this new policy by the pressure      
of Western powers, who, for their own interests, sought the      
maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The interests      
of some of them were probably with the idea of the Ottoman      
nation, yet they were also prone to exalted emotions rather than      
cool calculations. Thus, literally none of them wanted to form a      
new national unity by letting themselves merge with those whom      
they looked upon as their enemies.      
     4. The greatest enemy of the Ottomans, Russia, as well as      
its satellites, the Balkan states, also did not want it. Russia      
wanted to get possession of the Straits [Bosphorus and      
Dardanelles], Anatolia, and Iraq, Istanbul and the whole of      
Balkans, the Holy Lands, and thus to realize its political,      
33      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
economic, national and religious aims. By occupying the      
Straights, Russia would obtain a large and protected port for its      
naval fleet, freely roam the important trade routes of the      
Mediterranean. From that position, Russia could, at any time,      
ambush the British Naval and commercial fleets, the caravans of      
our time, thereby at will could sever the British lines of      
communication with her wealthiest colony. In short, Russia could      
flank India, which it has coveted for a long time, again, this      
time from the West. By occupying Anatolia, Russia would be in a      
position totally to control the most fertile and productive      
continent on earth. By expanding into Iraq, Russia would complete      
its conquest of Asia, thus tilting the age old competition with      
Britain for the control of the Islamic holy-lands and populations      
in its own favor. As a result, by gaining the Straits and a      
substantial portion of Ottoman Asia, Russia would reap important      
political and economic benefits.      
     By annexing the Balkans to its already wide lands, [Russians      
would] unify the South Slavs, and by planting the Cross on St.      
Sophia, gain control of the lands from which the Russian Orthodox      
religion originated. This would allow the extremely devout      
Russians, to claim with all their hearts, their highest religious      
and emotional objectives.      
     The realization of these aims depended upon a weak, troubled      
and divided Ottoman state. Therefore, Russia could never tolerate      
the rise of an Ottoman nationality.      
     Then, those Serbian and Greek states, which had recently      
gained political life, would want to increase [sic] their      
populations "that have been left under the yoke of the Turks."      
This could only be attained by segregating the Ottoman      
communities. They would have strived towards that [objective].      
     5. The idea was not well received in some sections of      
European public opinion. Some of those who manipulated European      
public opinion were still under the influence of the age-old      
religious quarrel between Christianity and Islam. They were still      
34      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
following the tradition of the Crusades. They wanted to rescue      
the Christians from the Muslim yoke, to clear the infidels out of      
Europe and the lands of the Christians. Some of them, giving a      
more humane and scientific color to their claims, wanted not only      
to rescue the "European nations capable of progress" from the      
yoke of the half-barbarian Turanians who knew nothing but waging      
warfare, but also to push these Asiatics back to the deserts of      
the continent from which they originated. Frequently these two      
theses became mixed and confused with each other so that it was      
not clear which one was derived from the other.      
     We see, therefore, that in spite of the desires of all      
peoples living in the Ottoman lands and in spite  of all external      
obstacles, only a few persons who were at the top of the Ottoman      
government wanted to create an Ottoman nationality simply by      
relying upon the support of certain European governments      
(especially of the France of Napoleon III)! It was an impossible      
task. Even if these men at the top were great geniuses, it would      
not in the least have been possible to overcome so many      
obstacles. In fact, their efforts ended in failure.      
     Those obstacles have not decreased since then. On the      
contrary they have become more numerous. Abd lhamid's policy      
increased the enmity and the gulf between the Muslims and the      
non-Muslims. Additional numbers of non-Muslim peoples were      
getting their independence and this doubled the enthusiasm of the      
others. Russia increased its  power and became more aggressive.      
European public opinion turned more bitterly against the Turks.      
France, the most powerful supporter of the idea of Ottoman      
nationality, lost its greatness and became a follower of Russia.      
In short, both inside and outside, the conditions became more and      
more unfavorable to the scheme. It seems, therefore, that from      
now on to follow the policy of Ottomanism is nothing more than a      
waste of time.       
     Now let us see if the policy of PAn-Islam is beneficial and      
practicable for the Ottoman state.      
35      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     As has ben alluded above, the application of this policy      
would increase the already existing rivalries and animosities      
among the peoples of the Empire and thus would mean the weakening      
of the state. Moreover, the Turks would find themselves separated      
into Muslims and non-Muslims and thus the common affinity based      
on ethnicity would be destroyed by religious conflicts.      
     Against such disadvantages, however, this policy had the      
advantage of unifying all Muslims, and consequently the Turks,      
would create an Islamic Commonwealth more solid and compact than      
the unity of the Ottoman nation. More important than this, it      
would prepare the ground for the rise of a larger unity, based on      
religion, which would be able to survive alongside the great      
powers arising out of Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Slavic, Latin and      
perhaps Sino blocs.      
     The realization of this ultimate aim would undoubtedly take      
a long time. In the beginning it would suffice to strengthen the      
already existing spiritual relations and to set down the outlines      
of future organization. But gradually the outlines will begin to      
take a more clear and definite form, and then it would be      
possible to create a stable spiritual unity extending over the      
greater part of Asia and half of Africa which would serve to      
challenge the above mentioned great and formidable blocks.      
     But is it possible to pursue this policy in the Ottoman      
lands successfully?      
     Islam is one of the religions which puts much importance on      
political and social affairs. One of its tenets may be formulated      
by the saying that "religion and nation are the same." Islam      
abolishes ethnic and national loyalties of those who embrace it.      
It also tends to do away with their language, their past and      
their traditions. Islam is a powerful melting pot in which      
peoples of various ethnicities and beliefs, produces Muslims who      
believe they are a body with the same equal rights. At the rise      
of Islam there was within it a strong orderly political      
36      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
organization. Its constitution was the Koran. Its official      
language was Arabic. It had an elected head and a holy seat.      
     However, the changes observable in other religions can be      
seen in Islam, too. As the result of the influences of ethnicity      
and various events the political unity achieved by religion      
became partly disrupted. A century had not even passed since the      
hijra before the national conflicts between the Arabs and the      
Persians (taking the form of the struggles between the Umayyads      
and Hashemites dynasties) had opened an unbridgeable rift in the      
unity of Islam. It created the great schism between the Sunni and      
Shii Muslims. Later on various other elements like the Turks and      
Berbers appeared in addition to the Arabs and the Persians. In      
spite of the great levelling, assimilating and unifying power of      
Islam, the unity of the official and religious language, too,      
disappeared. Persians claimed equality with Arabic. A time came      
when the power of Islam began to sink to its lowest ebb. Part of      
the Muslim lands and then gradually a great part of them (more      
than three fourths) passed under the domination of the Christian      
states. The unity of Islam became more disrupted. And, in recent      
times, under the impact of Western ideas ethnic and national      
feelings which previously had been subsumed by Islam began to      
show their force.      
     In spite of all these forces which have weakened the power      
of Islam, religious beliefs are still very influential. We can      
safely say that among the Muslims skepticism toward their faith      
and the doctrine of atheism are not yet wide spread. All      
followers of Islam still seem to be faithful, enthusiastic,      
obedient believers, who can face every sacrifice for the sake of      
their religion.      
     Although the new legislations of some Muslim states have      
diverged from the sheria of Islam, these states still pretend to      
maintain the Islamic law as the basis of legislation. Arabic is      
still the only religious language of science and literature among      
the Muslims of certain lands. Many Muslim madrasa, with a few      
37      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
exceptions, still teach in Arabic and follow the same scholastic      
programs. Still many Muslims are saying "Thank God, I am a      
Muslim," before saying "I am a Turk or an Iranian." Still the      
majority of the Muslims of the world recognize the Emperor of the      
Ottoman Turks as their Caliph. Still all Muslims turn their faces      
to Mecca five times a day and rush from all corners of the world,      
enthusiastically facing all kinds of difficulties, to the kabah      
of Allah to kiss the Black Stone. Without hesitating, we can      
repeat, therefore, that Islam still is very powerful. Thus, it      
seems that the internal obstacles against the policy of Pan-Islam      
may more or less easily be overcome.      
The external obstacles, on the other hand, are very powerful. On      
the one hand, all of the Islamic states, with one or two      
exceptions, are under the influence of the Christian states. On      
the other hand, all of the Christian states, with one or two      
exceptions, have among their subjects, Muslims.      
     These states believe that the allegiance of their Muslim      
subjects, even if this allegiance is only in a spiritual sense,      
to a foreign political power is contrary to their interests and      
is something which might prove dangerous in the future.      
Therefore, these states would naturally use every means within      
their power to prevent the realization of a Pan-Islamic unity.      
And, through their influence and might over the Muslim states,      
they are in a position to prevent it. Therefore, they can follow      
and eventually succeed in the materialization of a policy      
contrary to the Pan-Islamic program of the Ottoman government      
which is the strongest Islamic power today.      
      Now, let us survey the benefits of the policy of Pan-      
Turkism (tevhid-i Etrak). By such a policy all Turks living in      
the Ottoman Empire would be perfectly united by both ethnic and      
religious bonds and the other non-Turkish Muslim groups who have      
been already Turkified to a certain extent would be further      
assimilated. Those who have never been assimilated but at the      
38      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
same time have no national feelings would be entirely assimilated      
under such a program.      
     But the main service of such a policy would be to unify all      
the Turks who, being spread over a great portion of Asia and over      
the Eastern parts of Europe, belong to the same language groups,      
the same ethnicity and mostly the same religion. Thus there would      
be created a greater national political unity among the other      
great nations. In this greater national unity the Ottoman state      
as the most powerful, the most progressive and civilized of all      
Turkish societies, would naturally play an important role. There      
would be a Turkish world in between the world of the Caucasian      
and the East Asian ethnicities. Recent events suggest that such a      
division of the world into two great blocs is imminent. In      
between these two blocks the Ottoman state could play a role      
similar to that which is played by Japan among the East Asian      
     But, over these advantages, there are certain disadvantages      
which may lead to the partition of the non-Turkish Muslims from      
the Ottoman Empire. These peoples cannot be assimilated with the      
Turks and therefore this policy would lead to the division of the      
Muslims into Turks and non-Turks and thereby to the      
relinquishment of any serious relations between the Ottoman state      
and the non-Turkish Muslims.      
     Moreover, the internal obstacles against this policy are      
greater in number than those which were unfavorable to the policy      
of Pan-Islam. For one thing, the Turkish nationalistic ideas      
which appeared under the influence of Western ideas is still very      
recent. Turkish nationalism  --the idea of the unification of the      
Turks--  is still a new born child. That strong organization,      
that living and zealous feeling, in short, those primary elements      
which create a solid unity among Muslims do not exist in      
Turkishness (T rkl k). The majority of the Turks today have      
forgotten their past!      
39      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     We must remember, however, that a great majority of the      
present-day Turks who seem to be amenable to unification, are of      
Muslim religion. For that reason, Islam may be an important      
factor in the realization of a Turkish unity. Religion is      
admitted as an important element in various definitions of      
nationality. Islam, however, to play such a role in the      
realization of the Turkish nationality has to face a change so      
that it can admit the existence of the nationalities within      
itself  --a recognition achieved recently in Christianity. And      
such a transformation is almost inevitable. The dominant current      
in our contemporary history is that of the nations. Religions as      
such are increasingly losing their political importance and      
force. Religion is increasingly becoming less and less social and      
more and more personal. Freedom of conscience is replacing unity      
of faith. Religions are renouncing their claims to being the sole      
director of the affairs of the communities and they are becoming      
spiritual forces leading hearts towards salvation. Religion is      
nothing more than a moral bond between the Creator and the      
created. Religions, therefore, if they are to maintain any of      
their social and political importance can do so by becoming a      
helper and even a hand-maiden to the national unities.(7)      
     External obstacles against the realization of the Turkish      
unification, on the other hand, are less strong in comparison      
with those working against Pan-Islamism. Among the Christian      
states only power to work against this policy will be Russia. As      
to the other Christian governments, they may even encourage this      
policy because they will find it against the interests of Russia.      
     The following conclusions seem to emerge from our      
discussion. The policy of Ottoman nationality, though implying      
many advantages for the Ottoman state, seems to be impracticable.      
Other policies aiming at the unification of the Muslims or of the      
Turks, on the other hand, seem to imply advantages and      
disadvantages of almost equal weight. As to the practicability of      
40      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
these two policies, we see likewise that the favorable and the      
unfavorable conditions are equal.      
     Which one, then, should be followed? When I saw the name of      
your paper T rk, an uncommon name to be used [by the Ottomans], I      
hoped to find in your columns an answer to this question which      
used to occupy me continuously and I hoped that this answer would      
be in favor of the policy of Turkism. But, I see that the "Turk"      
whose rights you are defending, the "Turk" whom you are trying to      
enlighten and move is not anyone of that great ethnicity who live      
in the lands of Asia, Africa, and Europe, extending from Central      
Asia to Montenegro, from Timor Peninsula to the Karalar Ili[?],      
but he is just one of the Western Turks who is a subject of the      
Ottoman state. Your paper T rk knows and sees this "Turk" only as      
a Turk living from the Fourteenth century and whose history is      
known only through the eyes of the French historians. You are      
trying to defend the rights of only the "Turk" against the      
pressures of the foreign nations and the non-Muslim and Muslim      
peoples who are subjects of the same [Ottoman] state but who      
belong to a different [non-Turkish] ethnicity. For your paper      
T rk, the military, political and civil history of the Turks is      
nothing  but the history of Murat the First, Mehmet the      
Conqueror, Selim the First, Ibn Kemal, Nef'i, Baki, Evliya  elebi      
and Namik Kemal. It does not and cannot be extended to the names      
of Oghuz, Chinggis, Timur, Ulugh Bey, Farabi, Ibn Sina, Taftazani      
and Navai. Sometimes your opinions seems somewhat close to the      
policy of Pan-Islam and the Caliphate leaving the impression that      
you are supporting the policies of Pan-Islamism and Turkism at      
the same time. You implicitly seem to believe that both groups      
being Muslims have common interests on vital questions. But you      
do not even insist upon this view.(8)      
     In short, the question which is in my thoughts and inviting      
an answer is still unanswered. The question is: of the three      
policies of Islamism and Turkism (T rkl k) which one is the more      
beneficial and practicable for the Ottoman state?      
Yusuf Ak ura      
Village of Zoya, Russia  15 (28) March 1904      
41      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Ak ura's Notes:      
(1) Although it can be claimed that this policy had been followed      
in a natural fashion by certain Ottoman rulers up to the time of      
Selim I, it was not because of imitating Europe. Rather, it      
originated from the needs of the time and from the fact that      
Islam was not yet well established. Consequently it is not      
relevant to our discussion.      
(2) This policy had been followed several centuries before by the      
Ottomans. Bayazit the Lightening, Mehmet the Conqueror, and      
Mehmet Sokollu pursued this idea. The desire to unify  the world      
of Islam is obvious in almost every action of Selim I. These      
periods, however, do not fall within the scope of this article.      
(3) It must not be forgotten that this article was written over      
seven years ago. [Editor's Note to the 1912 re-print].      
(4) My intention must not be misunderstood. There are several      
reasons for the hostility which exists among the diverse peoples      
and the conflicts between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. The      
cause I have mentioned above forms only one of several varied      
(5) If I am not mistaken the government did not permit      
publication of the second volume of the Turkish History [which      
this group prepared].      
42      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
(6) Because the non-Muslim Turks are very few [in number], this      
last danger is not important.      
(7) Examples are: the Orthodox church in Russia, Protestanizm in      
Germany, Anglicanism in England and Catholicism in various      
(8) "Makam-i Celil-i Hilafet" T rk, 18 Kanunevvel 1319 (1903).      
                  About the Life of Yusuf Ak ura      
     Ak ura was born in 1876 in Simbirsk (Ulyanovsk) on the right      
bank of the middle Volga. His father died when he was two; five      
years later he and his mother emigrated to Istanbul where      
henceforth he was to live. He received his early education in the      
schools of the Ottoman Empire and in 1895 he entered the Harbiye      
Mektebi (War College) in Istanbul. Upon graduation he was      
assigned to the Erkan-i Harbiye (General Staff Course), one of      
the most prestigious posts for young and ambitious cadets and one      
of the essential steps up the ladder of the Ottoman military      
hierarchy. Before he completed his training, however, he was      
accused of belonging to a secret society opposed to Abd lhamid      
and was sent into exile at Fezan in the interior of Libya, from      
where, in 1899, he and Ahmet Ferit [Tek], his close friend since      
their days together in the War College, escaped and made their      
way to Paris.      
     Ak ura remained in Paris four years. It was a period which      
exerted a decisive influence on his thinking and which was to      
turn him completely away from a military career and reorient him      
for the remainder of his life toward intellectual and academic      
pursuits. He was given the opportunity to gain first-hand      
experience of European, specifically French culture, and to      
perfect his knowledge of French. At this time he became      
43      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
politically conscious and began to understand the motive forces      
and power of nationalism.      
     In 1903 Ak ura left Paris and returned to his ancestral home      
in the Russian domains where he composed what was to become his      
best known work, THREE TYPES OF POLICIES. In this essay which      
appeared in 1904 in the paper T rk published in Cairo, Ak ura      
advanced a number of arguments which, when taken together, were      
in fact a proposal to the Turks of the Ottoman Empire, urging      
them to recognize their national aspirations, to forget about      
being Ottomans and to adopt a policy of Turkish nationalism as      
the focus of their collective loyalty and identity. For their      
time these ideas were revolutionary. Among the Ottoman Turks they      
were either universally ignored or rejected and it was only      
during the period of the Second Mesrutiyet (Constitutional      
Monarchy) (1908-1918) that these notions were taken seriously and      
elaborated by Ak ura and others into an ideology of Turkish      
     In pursuit of this, Ak ura founded the journal T RK YURDU      
which, from 1911 to 1917, became the foremost publication in the      
Turkish cultural world advancing the cause of nationalism "for      
all the Turks of the world." In it, Ak ura elaborated his own      
comprehensive doctrine of Turkism which was radically different      
from that advanced by G kalp. His ideology of Turkish nationalism      
was distinguished by its definition of the Turkish nation in      
terms of ethnicity, its recognition that the Turks must develop a      
national economy to sustain national consciousness and its      
insistence on reform of all institutions of Turkish society in      
accordance with a program of total Westernization.      
     In the Turkish Republic, Ak ura assumed a position of      
intellectual leadership. He continued to influence the      
ideological evolution of the new Turkish political entity, the      
Turkish Republic, through his position as an influential      
university professor and popular teacher, and through his ideas      
44      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
on the writing of history as well as his historical studies. He      
died in Istanbul in 1935.      
                      *         *         *      
                       Hisao Komatsu, PhD.      
                         Tokai University      
     Perestroika opened the way for the discovery and new      
interpretation of the modern history of Soviet Central Asia. In      
recent Central Asian publications we can find a lot of new facts      
and source materials relating to issues and individuals that were      
absolutely neglected or treated as a taboo subject. In this      
paper, I would like to discuss an interesting document presented      
last year by Uzbek scholars and suggest its interpretation from a      
historical perspective.      
     This document is the program (maramnamasi) and regulations      
(nizamnamasi) of the Turkic Federalist Party (T rk Adam-i      
Markaziyat Firkasi) adopted on August 23, 1917. It was published      
as a lithographed pamphlet in Tashkent in the same year and      
reprinted in the Cyrillic alphabet in the journal Fan ve Turmush      
No. 7 (1990) through the efforts of Ahmadjan Madaminov and Said      
Murad. I regret that I have not yet obtained the original of the      
pamphlet. However, as far as I know, copies of that document      
remained unknown to the rest of the world up to now.      
     To begin with, it is appropriate to provide a glimpse of the      
political circumstances in Turkistan between the February and      
October Revolutions. The February Revolution evoked the      
nationalist movement among the Turkistan population against the      
45      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
colonial Russian rule. The Turkistani political awakening was      
observed in every major city, where a number of newspapers and      
journals were published. In addition to the periodicals, the      
first political organization, the Turkistan Muslim Central      
Council (Turkistan M sl man Merkez-i Shurasi) was established      
mainly by the reformist (jadids) intellectuals in Tashkent in      
April of the same year. However, the leadership was in fact      
divided into two political groups. The first was the Islamic      
Council (Shura-i Islam), that was established by the liberal      
reformists in March 1917. The second was the Ulama Society (Ulama      
Jamiyati), that was formed by the conservative Muslim      
intellectuals in June. In the first phase, there existed between      
them hostility and sharp conflicts as to their doctrines and      
tactics. While the first designed an autonomous republic for      
future Turkistan, the latter stressed autonomy only in the realm      
of Islamic law. The all-Russian Muslim Congress held in Moscow in      
May, indicated the clear contrast among the Turkistan delegates      
with different orientations. However, before long, the political      
situation in Turkistan among other things the Russian negative      
attitude toward the Turkistani population, brought about the      
compromise and union of the two political groups, which was      
completed on the occasion of the Fourth Turkistan Muslim Congress      
convened in Khoqand in November, just after the October      
     Now I would like to examine the above mentioned document.      
First of all, its content. The program consists of a Preamble, or      
Special Remark (Ikhtar-i Mahsus), and of Nine Chapters which are      
entitled as follows: "State and Autonomous Organization;"      
"Nationality Issues;" Religious Issues;" "Human Rights in      
Autonomous Segments;" Economic and Financial Matters;" "Land      
Issues;" "Workers Issues;" "Justice;" and "Educational Affairs."      
     The aim of the Party is shown in the Introduction. It states      
"In order to bring about an autonomous and federative      
administration in Turkistan, there are no other means than to      
46      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
create an effective Federalist Party in Turkistan." Accordingly,      
new Russian state should be based on a federal system. Such major      
national segments as Turkistan, Kirghizistan (Kazakistan),      
Caucasus, Bashkurdistan and others enjoy national and territorial      
autonomy, while other scattered or small nations, for example      
Volga and Crimean Tatars, enjoy national and cultural autonomy      
within Russia. In general, the program plans to establish a      
democratic, secular and, with respect to domestic affairs, an      
independent Republic of Turkistan. For instance, its secular      
aspects appears in the article that states "no religions and      
sects are preferred by the government." However, at the same time      
it should be noted that the aspiration for the Turkic and Islamic      
unity in Russia is obviously expressed. The all-Russian Turkic      
league for national and cultural affairs and the all-Russian      
Muslim Spiritual Board presided by a selected Shayk al-Islam are      
to be created for the control of religious affairs. The program      
also states that a common Turkic written language should be      
learned and used in higher education. Still, this does not mean      
that the program denied linguistic pluralism in multi-ethnic      
Turkistan. A local language or dialect was to be used along with      
the official language in administrative affairs of every province      
and district. And in any elementary and secondary school, a local      
language or dialect spoken by the majority of the population      
should be used in the classrooms.      
     The next question pertains to the identity of the author. At      
the end of the document, we find a list of fourteen co-authors. I      
introduce some of them. Mullah Kamaluddin Qazi Damulla      
Rahmanberdiogli of Khoqand, who was one of the delegates of      
Turkistan Ulama at the all-Russian Muslim Congress in Moscow.      
Their conservative attitude was severely criticized by other      
reformist --and socialist--  minded Turkistan delegates. He and      
some mullahs named on the list are supposed  to be members of the      
Ulama Jamiyeti. Mullah Abidjan Mahmudyar, a merchant of Khoqand      
and Mir Adil Mirza Ahmadogli, a merchant of Skobelev (Margilan),      
47      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
were reformist intellectuals and later entered the cabinet of the      
short-lived Turkistan Autonomous Republic. Munavvar Qari      
Abdurrashidhan Ogli and Mullah Mahmudhoja Bahbudiy were rather      
famous Jadid leaders. However, as to Behbudiy's thought, it may      
be noticed that his early project of autonomous Turkistan      
presented in 1909 is enlarged and incorporated in this Party      
Program. Sadriddinhan Mahdum is one of the most remarkable      
Turkistan nationalists. After the collapse of the Turkistan      
autonomy [under Red Army occupation], he went to Istanbul with      
the purpose of establishing a Turkistan Representative Committee      
in Switzerland. Although he left for Switzerland with K pr l zade      
Mehmet Fuat, having been assisted by Talat Pasha, the      
revolutionary conditions in Eastern Europe prevented him from      
accomplishing his purpose. Later returning to Turkistan, he      
joined the Basmachi Movement. In short, we can find on the list      
the leaders of the two opposite political groups the most eminent      
nationalist leaders in Turkistan. And one more person not to be      
forgotten is Muhammad Amin Afandizada, a Caucasus ulama.      
     The list indicates that the program was drafted by      
Turkistani nationalists themselves. However, it seems not without      
help. Zeki Velidi Togan, who himself participated in the      
Turkistan National Movement, writes as follows:      
     In the summer of 1917, the Turkistan reformist      
     intellectuals were engaged in establishing their own      
     political party in preparation for the coming election      
     of the all-Russian Constituent Assembly. Formerly there      
     was among the Uzbeks the Turan Society for Spreading      
     Education. At first they tried to reorganize it on the      
     Social Democratic principles, but later, under the      
     influence of an Azerbaijani Mehmet Emin Efendizade,      
     they transformed it into the Turkic Federalist Party      
     and published a definitive program. Theirs presented a      
     socialist version of the Azerbaijan Musavat Party's      
48      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     program. They also published newspapers entitled Turan      
     (April-September), and later T rk Ili (September).      
     [T rkistan, P. 362]      
Togan's statement is very instructive for our interpretation.      
When we compare the program with that of the Azerbaijan Musavat      
Party, it turns out that the former is essentially the same as      
the latter except for a few alterations. In both programs not      
only the framework, but also most of the articles are identical.      
This program is considered the result of the cooperative work of      
the Turkistan and Azerbaijan reformists. The work was carried out      
under the effective guidance of Muhammad Amin Efendizade who was      
supposed to be sent by the Musavat Party at the Turkistani's      
request. Objectively speaking, it was inevitable for the      
Turkistani intellectuals who had lacked political experience to      
imitate the Musavat Program. On the other hand, some differences      
are found between the two programs. In general, the Turkistan      
program appears more moderate than the Musavat's. It is supposed      
that the Turkistan reformists had to modify it in some respects      
to persuade their conservative colleagues to form a united      
national front against the Russians. They seem to have      
compromised with the Ulama Jamiyati with respect to such problems      
as expropriation and distribution of large tracts of private      
land, women's rights, and so on. As to those issues we know that      
the delegates of the Turkistan ulama made a strong protest during      
the Moscow Congress. Therefore, we cannot agree with Togan, who      
pointed out that the Turkistan program presented the socialist      
version of the Azerbaijan Musavat Party. On the contrary, some      
radical articles in the Musavat Program, for example workers' and      
women's rights, disappeared in the Turkistan version. The      
reformists' concession to the ulama, who were conservative yet      
influential among the population, appear also in the party organ      
T rk Ili's motto: "Holding on to Islam, we work hard to defend      
autonomous rights."      
49      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     The biggest difference between the two programs may be found      
in the articles relating to land issues. As to this subject, the      
Turkistan Party had its own claims. First, the Turkistan program      
omitted the Musavat principle of expropriation and distribution      
of large tracts of private land. Second, the Turkistan Program      
claimed the recovery of land and villages confiscated by the      
Russians. We know, for instance, the Andijan uprising and the      
Kazakh revolts in Semirechiye in 1916. Third, the Turkistan      
Program states that the whole waqf lands confiscated unlawfully      
should be returned to the rightful owners according to the      
waqfnamas concerned. In short, as to the land issue, the      
Turkistan Party was radically against the previous colonial rule,      
but moderate as to the traditional Muslim land ownership.      
     Unfortunately, we have not sufficient knowledge about the      
Party's real aspects. The Party's organ T rk Ili was at the same      
time the organ of the Turkistan Muslim Central Council, and it is      
supposed that the Party included almost all the members of the      
Islamic council. The very short life  of the T rk Ili suggests      
that the Party could not enjoy great success. On the other hand,      
Nurshirvan Yashev did not hide his disappointment, after      
observing the activities of the Second Turkistan Muslim Congress      
held in September, just after the birth of the Party. However, it      
is undeniable that the Turkic Federalist Party attempted to draw      
the first and systematic political program independent of the      
Russian political parties in Turkistan, and promoted the      
autonomous Turkistan idea among the population even if the sphere      
was limited. And around it, such talented young intellectuals as      
Fitrat began to search for Turkistan national history and      
traditions. When the Musavatists in Azerbaijan decided to adopt      
the Ilkhanid's blue banner as their symbol, Fitrat remembered the      
golden age of the Timurids.      
50      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
[INSERT: three pages containing the regulations of the Turkic      
Federalist Party, in the original, photomechanically reproduced].      
51      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
                      *         *          *      
                         Rene  Pruneau[1]      
     [Presented at the AACAR Sponsored Panel during AAASS annual      
meeting in November 1991].      
     Prior to the August coup in Moscow, Uzbek President Islam      
Karimov was a firm supporter of a renewed union with increased      
sovereignty for the republics. Even in the days following the      
coup, Karimov criticized President Gorbachev's decision to resign      
from the Communist Party and in speeches and statements called      
for its primacy. Since the aborted coup and Karimov's realization      
of what a turning point it was for the Soviet Union, the Uzbek      
President has been working overtime to appeal to nationalists and      
democrats in Uzbekistan. He now calls for an economic and      
security union but complete political independence of the      
     Political unrest in the republic has been growing since the      
aborted coup and the decline of center authority. In response to      
the political discontent, Karimov has allowed two opposition      
parties to be registered and has set Presidential elections and a      
referendum on Uzbekistan's independence for 29 December. So far,      
Karimov is the only candidate for President though other parties      
are trying to get their nominees on the ballot.       
     This paper will show that in fact Islam Karimov is working      
to fill the vacuum that the demise of central authority has left      
in the republics. After first discussing laws and decrees issued      
by Karimov, this paper will then look at his opposition,      
52      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
obstacles to democratization in Uzbekistan, and finally, discuss      
Karimov's prospects for holding on to power.       
     Islam Karimov is 53-years-old and a veteran of Uzbek      
politics.  He is from Samarkand and has held his current post      
since March 1990. Until this fall he had also been First      
Secretary of the Communist Party since 1989.[2] Karimov has      
proven to be a deft politician. With increased openness      
throughout the Soviet Union causing most republic leaders to      
relinquish some of their hold over their populace, Karimov      
remains in control.       
     Karimov and his government issued an independence      
declaration just days after the coupe five months after 94      
percent of the Uzbek population voted for President Gorbachev's      
referendum on the inviolability of the Union[3]--and changed the      
republic name from Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic to the      
Republic of Uzbekistan. Karimov is actively departyizing cultural      
societies, education, and security forces.[4] He has put security      
forces under direct republic control.        
     The Communist Party has broken with the CPSU and renamed      
itself the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan--which is      
headed by Karimov. The new party calls for peaceable revival of      
spiritual and cultural traditions although it condemns calls for      
a state religion or creation of political religious      
organizations.[5] It also calls for development of a sovereign      
and independent Uzbekistan as a democratic state where human      
rights will be scrupulously observed. The party was officially      
registered on 18 November.[6] With the exception of these largely      
cosmetic changes, however, little has changed in the republic.        
     Karimov has orchestrated what appears to be a slight opening      
up of Uzbek culture with the passing of a language law      
underscoring Uzbek preeminence as the republic's language, the      
publication of novels which extol the virtues of Uzbek culture,      
and restoring to Uzbek history books some heroes that the Soviet      
53      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
period had forgotten. On the other hand, however, he continues to      
clamp down on the personal freedoms of the populace.       
     Karimov strictly controls the republic press and no      
unofficial papers or journals are allowed to publish. The      
republic press law which was published in June 1991 claims to      
guarantee the freedom of speech and right of Uzbek citizens to      
express their opinion and that censorship of the mass media is      
not permitted. It goes on to state, however, that appealing for a      
change of the state or public system is an abuse of the      
guaranteed right of freedom of speech. It also says that the use      
of mass media for interference in the personal lives of citizens      
without their consent, or for the infringement of their honor and      
dignity, is banned and prosecuted in conformity with the law. A      
clear warning against criticizing the President or any other      
public official.       
     * One Uzbek opposition paper, Munosabat, attempted to      
publish by registering and publishing in Moscow rather than      
Tashkent. Its distributors in Uzbekistan, however, were arrested      
and the paper eventually closed.[7]        
     * Karimov is denying the populace the freedom to assemble.      
In February 1990, the Supreme Soviet banned mass meetings and      
demonstrations outside of private premises and the Tashkent City      
Soviet Executive Committee has tightened the edict by prohibiting      
groups from meeting in private premises also.[8]  This ban      
continues. In fact, according to leaders of the opposition group      
Birlik, their headquarters in Tashkent has been closed by the      
government and militia forces stand guard outside its entrance to      
keep away would be members.[9]       
     In mid-November a group of about 200 representatives from      
opposition parties who were demonstrating outside of the hotel      
where most republic Supreme Soviet deputies stay, were forcibly      
disbanded by republic OMON after calling for Karimov's      
resignation, the recognition of the Islamic Revival Party, and      
the nationalism of Communist Party property.[10]       
54      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     * The government is denying both foreigners and Uzbek      
citizens the freedom to travel. Karimov has stopped journalists      
from traveling to areas of the republic where tensions are      
running high and even sent some foreign and Russian journalists      
out of the republic. He is also obstructing lawyers from visiting      
political dissidents who have been arrested.[11]       
     * In October 1990 the Supreme Soviet passed a law      
guaranteeing the protection of militia workers. The law states      
that words or even intonation can be interpreted as a threat or      
insult and can be punished by a fine or arrest. Another      
parliamentary decree authorizes the militia to make extensive use      
of rubber truncheons and special methods against protestors.[12]       
     * Another government decree states that state owned      
enterprises will not assist political organizations--thereby      
slowing down the formation of political parties. Opposition      
groups in other republics such as Azerbaijan are able to take        
 control of already existing communist cells in factories and use      
enterprise facilities to hold meetings.[13]       
     * In the last republic elections almost half the candidates      
were elected on a single-candidate basis, most of them Communist      
officials. Harassment of independent candidates took place and in      
dozens of instances contrived pretexts were cited as refusal for      
candidates to be nominated for positions.[14]       
     * The Supreme Soviet also passed a decree outlining measures      
to stabilize the social and political situation in the republic      
which in fact outlaws most political parties.  Furthermore, by      
decree, no parties whose aim is to "change the existing order"      
are allowed. This would apply to almost any opposition party.       
     * On 17 September 1991 Karimov issued a decree banning all      
political activities in the republic government and educational      
establishments. In other republics, and to some degree in      
Uzbekistan, the intelligentsia is the strata where political      
parties and groups first blossom--this includes university      
55      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     * On 1 October of this year the Republic Supreme Soviet      
dismantled the Council of Ministers and set up a cabinet of      
ministers attached to the republic President--Karimov--thus      
enhancing the powers of the President.[16]       
     * On 12 November an Uzbek Supreme Soviet committee decided      
not to revoke the residence permit system.      
     * On 14 November, a letter signed by unknown republic      
Supreme Soviet deputies was publicized in Russian press that      
called for immediate presidential elections and also for the      
strengthening of presidential authority stating that the well-      
being of the republic depends on the trust for the President      
personally. It is likely that Karimov was behind this move as a      
ploy to confuse and divide opposition groups. Furthermore,      
opposition groups probably do not have the infrastructure in      
place to run a successful republic wide presidential race in the      
near-term so such a timetable would be in Karimov's interest.        
     * While the opposition group Birlik has been allowed to       
 register as a political party, the Uzbek Justice Ministry is not      
 allowing the group to nominate a candidate for the presidential      
     Karimov claims that the republic is not yet ready for      
democracy. In an interview in the London Independent published on      
18 September 1991 he claimed that he may be too authoritarian for      
many but he is the barrier against renewed ethnic fighting.       
There could have been another six or seven Fergana's without firm      
action by his government and multiparty democracy must be limited      
because of the danger of ethnic violence. He has also said, "A      
firm hand is needed in today's explosive situation, and the      
people of Uzbekistan will not accept western-style democracy      
because of their history and national character."[18] According      
to Russian press, Karimov has announced that Uzbekistan will      
carry out reforms according to the Chinese model--that is      
economic reform with no political reform.[19]       
56      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     As Moscow Komsomolskaya Pravda points out in an article      
published on 21 September, the idea of Uzbekistan following a      
Chinese model is problematic for two reasons. One, the Uzbek      
leadership must be ready to use force against its populace. They      
are currently only planning a 700 man National Guard--there are      
over 19 million people--and the Russian dominated USSR security      
forces have claimed they do not want to be involved in putting      
down internal republic unrest. The other point that Komsomolskaya      
Pravda makes is that dissent has already taken root in Uzbekistan      
perhaps making it too late to halt political reform.[20]       
     Opposition Organizations:      
     Even under the repressive conditions described above,      
Karimov does have opposition. Some of the opposition is      
unorganized or just emerging such as members of the      
intelligentsia that are discussing the creation of a purely      
national, one-religion state, according to Birlik leaders. Other      
segments of the opposition have been around for several years and      
are more organized. These include: Birlik: Birlik, meaning Unity,      
was founded in 1988 and today has departments in almost all      
rayons and oblasts in Uzbekistan. Its leaders claim to have the      
largest mass organization opposed to Uzbek authorities. They      
claim from 300,000 to a half million members and millions of      
sympathizers[21]--Karimov's new party claims only 300,000      
members.[22] The organization--headquartered in Tashkent--is an      
umbrella group whose membership ranges from moderate opposition      
forces all the way to Muslim fundamentalists.  It proclaimed      
itself a political party at a congress in Tashkent on 28 October      
of this year and the Uzbek Ministry of Justice registered it as      
an official political party on 12 November.  Birlik's program      
includes the demand to restore to Central Asians their true      
history and a democratic secular state on the Turkish model.[23]      
The goal of the organization is the deliverance of Uzbeks and      
other peoples of the republic form social lethargy, indifference      
57      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
and fear and the stimulation of social and political      
assertiveness. Birlik calls itself a social and political      
organization which wishes to extricate Uzbekistan from crisis and      
convert it into an independent democratic republic. The new      
chairman is Abdurakhim Pulatov, a doctor of science who ran a      
scientific institute and was the Birlik movement's co-chairman.       
The other co-chairman was Pulat Akhunov, a teacher and USSR       
Peoples deputy from the Komosomol.       
     Erk: Erk--once a part of the Birlik movement--was the first      
Uzbek opposition officially registered by the Uzbek authorities.       
This came about on 5 September, only after the aborted coup in      
Moscow and appears to have been an attempt to appease      
nationalists and democrats. The party's name means freedom. The      
Party brings together members of the intelligentsia. Its stated      
goal is the struggle for human rights, national revival of      
Uzbekistan, and complete independence. It claims some 5,000      
members. Erk's leader, Mukhamed Salikh, is a member of the Uzbek      
Supreme Soviet and secretary for the Uzbek Writer's Union. The      
party calls for opposition to the Communist Party and full      
democratization of all Uzbek society.[24]       
     The most potentially destabilizing force against Karimov is      
the recently formed republic Supreme Soviet opposition group      
which is calling for immediate Presidential elections. In early      
October Karimov was confronted with unprecedented criticism at      
the republic Supreme Soviet session. Between 100-200 out of 500      
parliament members expressed no confidence in Karimov and      
announced the formation of an opposition headed by Vice President      
Mirsaidov.[25] Meanwhile, Moscow television reported that there      
were simultaneous demonstrations of many thousands of people in      
Andijan and Namangan oblasts demanding the resignation of Karimov      
and a ban on his party. Republic press denied these accusations.      
The recent presidential decree that puts the republic Premier      
under the control of the President as his Vice  President may      
have been a preemptive move on Karimov's part to gaining more      
58      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
control over Mirsaidov's actions. Mirsaidov also has a background      
in economics and came up through the Communist party ranks. He      
spent five years as Tashkent mayor. His commitment to democracy      
is unknown.[26]      
     Other parties and groups which have been around for awhile      
but about which there is little information include the Islamic      
Rebirth Party. This group has been outlawed and many of its      
members jailed. Its size is not known. Members of the popular      
movement, Humaneness and Charity, are part of the group. The      
group also calls for all democratic movements to work together.       
Its leader is Akhmad-Kadi Aktayev.[27] Other parties and groups      
are new or just beginning to flex their muscles. For instance, a      
newly formed wing of Eduard Shevardnadze's Movement for      
Democratic Reform. Its size and strength are not known. Its      
leader is Doctor of Historical Sciences Fayzulla Iskhanov, a      
member of the Republic Academy of Sciences. This party calls for      
the unification of democratic movements and a rule of law      
     There are also organizations made up of ethnic minority      
groups.  The largely Russian Intersoyuz group is no longer a      
major player in the republic but the mainly Tajik Samarkand      
Society is. This is based in Samarkand. The group calls for      
cultural autonomy of Tajiks and other Muslim non-Uzbeks in the      
republic. It also calls for a high-level commission to be      
constituted to investigate the rights of Uzbeks in Tajikistan and      
Tajiks in Uzbekistan. Its members and leaders have been jailed      
and the society banned in Uzbekistan.[29]        
     Arguments Against Democracy in Uzbekistan:      
     As Karimov himself states, one argument against building a      
democracy in Uzbekistan, at least for the near term, is the      
Uzbek's lack of democratic political culture. The region now      
known as Uzbekistan has an ancient history as the cultural,      
spiritual, and--during some periods--governmental center of      
59      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Central Asia. The region, however, has no democratic history,      
instead it was ruled by strong authoritarian leaders.       
     The region's rich spiritual ties to Islam also work against      
the formation of a true democratic state. Islam is a strong force      
in Uzbekistan, though more as a cultural phenomenon than as a      
political one. If an Islamic government were imposed, it is      
unlikely that the ensuing leadership would be democratic. Other      
phenomenon that argue against the building of democracy in      
Uzbekistan are the republic's out of control population growth,      
growing unemployment among male youths, and economic      
deterioration that increase the prospects of political      
instability there. About 50 percent of the republic lives below      
the poverty line and about 50 percent of the republic's      
population is made up of dependents--people who do not work,      
mainly the elderly and children.[30] The few remaining republics      
in the Soviet Union will not be able or willing to fund the      
Central Asians as they had. In return, Uzbekistan and its      
neighbors will have to spend hard currency to obtain badly needed      
infrastructure, health care, and other goods from outside of the      
former Soviet Union. While some of the hard currency will come      
from selling cotton and gold on the open market--this will not      
pay for all the needed goods. The ensuing increase in poverty      
will result in more instability.       
     Karimov has already taken action, however, to win support      
through economic bribery. On 17 November, he issued a decree      
raising the pay 40-50 percent for workers in the education,      
health, culture, social welfare, housing, and public utilities      
sectors. He is also raising student stipends 30 percent. These      
are traditionally key segments of the population where discontent      
     Karimov is fostering one of the more repressive regimes in      
the former Soviet Union. Uzbekistan lags most of the republics in      
reformist legislation that guarantees the rights of individuals.       
60      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Obstacles are constantly put in the way of opposition groups'      
growing so powerful as to be able to take on Karimov. Birlik's      
new standing and the upcoming Presidential elections, while      
positive developments, do not significantly change the equation.       
The recently formed parliamentary opposition group may be able to      
stand in the way of more repressive legislation but it does not      
appear to have the votes needed to overturn the existing      
legislation nor is its commitment to democracy known.   
The Uzbek Presidential elections will be a significant test of      
Karimov's resolve for democratic reform. If he holds fair,      
democratic elections and allows other parties to run candidates      
against him, not only will he be overturning his own policies but       
he will also probably gain support among the populace. Existing      
press laws and Karimov's position as Republic President, however,      
put all other candidates at a disadvantage. It is not likely that      
they will get the exposure, through media time or ability to      

travel and campaign throughout the republic, that they will need      
get their message out. By merely adhering to the current      
repressive laws, Karimov will be able to set himself up to win      
the Presidential election. Karimov's popular election to this      
post will serve to underscore his legitimacy and a poor showing      
by opposition candidates will give Karimov the ammunition he      
needs to further marginalize opposition groups.  Growing      
nationalism, economic deterioration, unemployment, population      
growth, and ecological disaster indicate that instability will      
grow in Uzbekistan. Any leader elected democratically in the next      
few years would have difficulty staying in power under the dire      
circumstances that Uzbekistan faces. Karimov may be able to stay      
in place but only by increasing repression while continuing to      
massage Uzbek nationalist feelings and by continuing to bribe      
those segments of the population that appear to be the most      
anti-Karimov. If he is successful in reforming the economy on the      
Chinese model, social unrest may dissipate for a time but in the      
61      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
longer term it will likely cause such schisms in the republic      
that it will lead to Karimov's ouster.      
    1. This paper reflects the views of the author and not      
necessarily those of the US government.       
    2. Moscow Tass 15 July 1990.       
    3. Izvestiya 14 September 1991       
    4. Komsomolskaya Pravda 27 August 1991.       
    5. Interfax 1 November 1991.       
    6. Tass 18 November 1991.       
    7. Izvestiya 14 September 1991.       
    8. Ibid.       
    9. Komsomolskaya Pravda 27 July 1991.       
   10. Interfax 18 November 1991.       
   11. Interfax 16 July 1991.       
   12. Komsomolskaya Pravda 27 July 1991.       
   13. Izvestiya 14 September 1991.       
   14. Komsomolskaya Pravda 27 July 1991.       
   15. Tashkent Radio 17 September 1991.       
   16. Moscow Tass 1 October 1991.       
   17. Interfax 20 November 1991.       
   18. Komsomolskaya Pravda 27 July 1991.       
   19. Moscow World Service 17 September 1991.       
   20. Komsomolskaya Pravda 21 September 1991.       
   21. Izvestiya 14 July 1991.       
   22. Komsomolskaya Pravda 27 July 1991.       
   23. Moscow Central Television 16 November 1991.       
   24. Moscow Tass International Service 5 September 1991.       
   25. Moscow Central Television First Program 2 October 1991.       
   26. Tass 26 March 1990.       
   27. Interfax 9 July 1991.       
   28. Izvestiya 24 October 1991.       
62      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
   29. Interfax 10 June 1991.       
   30. Moscow Television First Program 24 October 1991.       
   31. Moscow Radio Rosii 17 November 1991.       
                      *         *          *      
                      NEWS OF THE PROFESSION      
     AACAR BULLETIN would like to thank those individuals and      
institutions who kindly furnished the information presented in      
this section.      
     AACAR held its Membership Meeting on 23 November 1991 in      
Miami, in connection with the AAASS annual convention. Members      
directed the AACAR President Prof. Audrey L. Altstadt to conduct      
the elections to the AACAR Nominations Committee and the AACAR      
Elections Committee, nominating the individuals to be placed on      
the ballot. The said Committees, upon election, will perform      
their functions per AACAR By-Laws to replace the two outgoing      
members of the AACAR Executive Council. Accordingly, paid-up      
members were mailed ballots. The returns are announced by the      
President: Nominations Committee: Thomas Noonan (U Minnesota);      
Uli Schamiloglu (U Madison-Wisconsin); Nazif Shahrani (Indiana      
U)(Chair). Elections Committee: Iraj Bashiri (U Minnesota);       
Peter Golden (Rutgers U); H. B. Paksoy (Harvard U-CMES)(Chair).      
     The Members were informed that the term of the Founding      
Editor of the AACAR BULLETIN was completed under the AACAR By-      
Laws. The attendees of the Membership Meeting suggested that the      
members be polled as to a successor, even though there is no such      
provision in the By-Laws. That item was also placed on the ballot      
sent to Members. Having been duly nominated, agreed to serve, and      
obtained the necessary support from his institution, Reuel Hanks      
63      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
(Department of Political Science and Sociology, Kennesaw State      
College) has been appointed as the new Editor of the AACAR      
     During its Annual Meeting, Association for the Advancement      
of Slavic Studies (AAASS) Board of Directors voted unanimously to      
elect AACAR an affiliate of AAASS, and so informed AACAR. AACAR      
would like to thank the AAASS Board of Directors.      
     AACAR also held its sponsored panel, Democratization in      
Central Asia, at the AAASS annual meeting.       
     AACAR will hold its next Membership Meeting in conjunction      
with the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), of which AACAR      
is an affiliate, 28-31 October 1992 in Portland, Oregon. AACAR      
Members are requested to register for the MESA convention.      
     26th Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association      
(MESA) will convene in Portland, Oregon, 28-31 October, 1992. For      
registration information, contact: Secretariat, MESA, University      
of Arizona, 1232 Cherry Ave., Tucson, AZ 85721. Phone: 602/621-      
5850; Fax: 602/321-7752.      
     The 44th Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS)      
will convene in Washington DC, 2-5 April, 1992. For details,      
contact: AAS Secretariat, 1 Lane Hall, University of Michigan,      
Ann Arbor, MI 48109. Phone: 313/665-2490; Fax: 313/665-3801.      
     Second Graduate Conference in Difference and the Turkish      
Language in the Arts: "Poetics of Change" has issued a call for      
papers. "Graduate students and recent PhD.'s are invited to      
submit paper abstracts for a conference to be held at the OHIO      
STATE UNIVERSITY on Saturday and Sunday May 9-10, 1992. Papers      
may analyze literary and social texts which espouse or disparage,      
64      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
conceal or claim title to change, in the Ottoman Empire, Turkish      
Republic, or Turkic Central Asia. Abstracts should specify      
sources, theoretical concerns, and conclusions. Accommodations      
will be provided, and plans to publish the papers are underway."      
Contact: Professor Victoria Holbrook, Director, Graduate      
Conference in Difference, The Ohio State University, JaNELL/256      
Cunz Hall, Columbus, OH 43210. Tel: 614/292-8913.     *          
Permanent International Altaistic Conference (PIAC) will hold its      
35th Meeting in Taipei (Republic of China) September 12-17 1992,      
under the joint sponsorship of the National Taiwan University and      
the Center for Chinese Studies Materials of the United Press News      
Cultural Foundation.  A circular providing details on      
accommodations, registration fees, visa requirements will be sent      
upon request. Contact: Prof. Denis Sinor, Secretary General.      
PIAC, Indiana U, 101 Goodbody Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405. Fax:      
     A circular is received extending an invitation to the      
conference "First Zeki Velidi [Togan] Reading," jointly sponsored      
SCIENCE, to be held in September (n.d.) 1992 at Ufa. The unsigned      
statement reads: "Zeki Velidi... led the national liberation      
movement of Bashkurt people in 1917-1920... a world famous      
orientalist, author of scores of fundamental works on history,      
culture, ethnography, folklore of Turkish peoples' history and      
languages. In 1990, his 100th birth anniversary was widely      
celebrated in Ufa, and a decision was taken to regularly hold      
"Zeki Velidi Reading" on a wide range of problems dealing with      
the famous scholar's heritage. The participants will discuss      
"History and Culture of peoples of Eurasia in Ancient Times,      
Middle Ages and Modern Times." Sections of History, Archeology,      
Historical Ethnography and History of Turkish Language." An      
abstract no more than two pages in length should be sent in      
65      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
duplicate, by 1 April 1992 to: 450074, Ufa 74, Frunze Street,      
University, Historical Faculty, Department of Archeology.     *        
   Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies (RIFIAS), INDIANA      
UNIVERSITY announces "Rockefeller Foundation Residency      
Fellowships aimed at exploring indigenous primary sources on the      
history and civilization of Inner Asia. The Fellowship program is      
intended to support the study of indigenous Inner Asian sources      
by specialists who are equipped with the necessary philological      
and disciplinary skills. The RIFIAS library, in addition to its      
general collections, and current journal subscriptions, also      
houses several special collections. The Tibetan collection,      
housed separately, consists of several hundred volumes of Tibetan      
texts reprinted in India, as well as 350 original Tibetan      
blockprints. The most recently developed special collection, the      
Central Asian Archives, comprises (1) a collection of microfilms      
and photocopies (obtained primarily from Soviet libraries) of      
out-of-print publications dealing with Central Asia (2) a      
collection of microfilms of Persian, Turkic and Arabic      
manuscripts containing historical, biographical and geographic      
works on Islamic Central Asia. This collection currently      
comprises nearly 750 microfilms of manuscripts and over 800      
microfilms and photocopies of published works."  Details may be      
obtained from Professor Yuri Bregel, Director, RIFIAS, Indiana      
University, Goodbody Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405. Phone: 812/855-      
1605.     *     American Friends of Turkey voted to change its      
name to The American-Turkish Friendship Council. The Council      
issued a discussion paper "Issues and Opportunities in Turkish      
Education" by Prof. Howard Reed, Department of History, U of      
Connecticut. Copies may be obtained from: The American-Turkish      
Friendship Council, 1010 Vermont Ave., NW, Suite 1020,      
Washington, DC 20005-4902. Tel: 202/783-0483. Fax: 202/783-0511.      
The Council is also sponsoring an annual Conference and      
Exposition, with panels and lectures, details of which may be      
obtained from the above address. In the past, Profs. Walter Denny      
66      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
of U of Massachusetts-Amherst; Jane A. Scott of Harvard U;      
Stanford Shaw of UCLA; Justin McCarthy of U of Louisville      
presented papers.     *     The 5th International Conference on      
Central Asia, "Democratization in Central Asia," will be held at      
the UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, 10-13 September, 1992.      
Topics include social, economic, political, cultural, literary      
and linguistic changes from 1600-1992. Contact: Prof. Kemal      
Karpat, 4121 Humanities Bldg., U Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI      
     Madeline Zilfi (Department of History, U of Maryland-College      
Park, MD 20742) has been appointed Editor of the Turkish Studies      
Association Bulletin.      *      Uli Schamiloglu (U of      
Wisconsin-Madison) has received a $30,000 grant from the National      
Council for Soviet and East European Research. This will fund the      
first year of a new project entitled "The Invention of National      
Identity and Historical Tradition: The Case of the Muslim Turks      
of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union".     *     Prof. Warren      
Walker, Director of the Archive of Turkish Oral Narrative, TEXAS      
TECH UNIVERSITY writes: "Next time you are in Santa Fe, New      
Mexico, you might be interested in visiting the Turkish Folk Art      
and Culture Exhibit at the Museum of International Folk Art. All      
of the items on display were purchased from living folk artists      
and artisans. The exhibit will remain in place until mid-1993. On      
weekends the exhibit is animated with performances (music, dance,      
storytelling), with demonstrations by artists and craftsmen, with      
slide lectures, and with Turkish folk poetry readings (in      
English)." For further details, contact: Prof. Warren Walker,      
Archive of Turkish Oral Narrative, Library, Texas Tech      
University, Lubbock, TX 79409. Tel: 806/742-1922.      *            
Silk Bridges, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization. Jeff      
T. Cunningham, President, writes: "Silk Bridges was formed to      
conduct cultural exchange projects between the US and Central      
Asia... and is creating an exhibit involving contemporary art      
67      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
from Uzbekistan and related events, for rural and urban audiences      
in the US... which will offer people in the US a fresh      
perspective... The Silk Bridges exhibit tour in 1992-1993 to      
several sites, nationally (Washington DC, New York, Chicago,      
Minneapolis) with the aim of improving awareness across cultural,      
geographical and religious divides... The extraordinary cultural      
diversity of Uzbekistan is attributable to its place for over      
2000 years on the East-West trade routes known as The Silk      
Road..." Contact: Jeff Cunningham, P O Box 1005, Brattleboro, VT      
05302. Tel 802/257-4944; Fax: 802/257-0294.      
     Organized and hosted by the Fondation Nationale des Sciences      
Politiques, Centre d'Edtudes et de Recherches Internationales,      
ou marginalisation?" was held in Paris 28-29 October 1991. A      
summary of transactions will be published in the FNSP/CERI      
journal Cahiers d'Etudes sur la M diterran e orientale et le      
monde turco-iranien. For subscriptions, contact: Semih Vaner,      
FNSP/CERI, 4 rue de Chevreuse, Paris 6e France.     *           
Stiftung Bibliotheca Afghanica has issued: Strategic Surprise:      
The Afghanistan Example by Dr. J rg St ssi-Lauterburg. Copies of      
this work, and other documentation published by the SBA, may be      
obtained from: Paul Bucherer-Dietschi, Director, Stiftung      
Bibliotheca Afghanica, Benzburweg 5, CH-4410 Liestan,      
Switzerland. Tel. 061 921 98 38.     *      Modern China, an      
interdisciplinary quarterly, edited by Philip C. C. Huang (UCLA),      
is issued by SAGE Publications. Vol. 18 No. 1, January 1992      
(Louis Putterman, Guest Editor) contains papers by Louis      
Putterman, Barry Naughton, Gary H. Jefferson & Thomas G. Rawski,      
Flemming Christiansen. Subscriptions: SAGE Periodical Press, 2455      
Teller Road, Newbury Park, CA 91320. Tel: 805/499-0721. FAX:      
808/499-0871.     *      Bulletin of the Asia Institute Vol. 4      
(1990) Aspects of Iranian Culture. In Honor of Richard Nelson      
68      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Frye is available. Vol. 5 (1991) is also issued. Orders: $50 US +      
$5 postage per volume, Iowa State University Press, 2121 S. State      
Ave. Ames, Iowa 50010. Bulletin of the Asia Institute may be      
contacted at: 3287 Bradway Bld. Bloomfield Hills, MI 48301. Tel.      
313/647-7917. Fax: 313/258-1439. Att: Cynthia Fogliatti or Carol      
Altmann Bromberg.     *      Annals of Japan Association for      
Middle East Studies [AJAMES], under the direction of Prof. YUKAWA      
Takeshi, Editor in Chief, is available. For subscriptions,      
contact: Prof. NAGATA Yuzo, ILCAA, Tokyo University of Foreign      
Studies, 4-51-21, Nishigara, Kita-ku, Tokyo, 114, Japan.      
     Worldwide Antiquarian has two new catalogues: Orientalia      
(No. 120); The Middle East (No. 115). Worldwide Antiqiuarian, P O      
Box 391, Cambridge, MA 02141. Phone: 617/876-6220; Fax: 617/876-      
0839.     *      Beyoglu Kitap ilik Ltd. issued a new catalogue      
entitled "Kirkambar."  Beyoglu Kitap ilik Ltd. Galip Dede Cad,      
141/5, T nel 80020, Istanbul, Turkish Republic. Bookshop Phone:      
90/145 49 98; 90/152 30 78; Office Phone: 90/149 06 72. Fax:      
90/149 16 24.     *      ISIS Ltd. is issuing its regular      
catalogues, entitled Books from Turkey. Contact: ISIS Ltd,      
Semsibey Sokak 10, Beylerbeyi-Istanbul 81210, Turkish Republic.      
Phone: 90/321 38 51; 90/321 66 00.       *      Camel Book      
Company Catalogue No. 7 is: Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan & India.      
Camel Book Company, P O Box 1936, Cathedral Station, NY, NY      
10025.     *     The Studio/Johnstone--Fong Inc. Issued List #      
101, containing selections from the library of Alice Boney. The      
Studio, 1600 East Street Road, Kennett Square, PA 19348. Phone:      
215/739-3170. Fax: 215/793-3176.     *      Asian Rare Books Inc.      
issued a new list and has a new address: 175 Fifth Avenue Suite      
2138, NY NY 10010. Phone: 718/259-3732. Fax: 212/529-3511. It      
should be noted that this is a new address.    *     Council on      
Foreign Relations Press has a new catalogue. Council on Foreign      
Relations Press, 58 East 68th Street, NY NY 10021.     *           
Oxus Catalogue Sixteen is: War, Revolution and Diplomacy (Europe,      
69      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Russia, Asia). Catalogue Fourteen is: Asian Travel, History,      
Memoirs. Oxus Oriental Books, 121 Astonville Str, London SW18      
5AQ. Phone: 44/081 870 3854. Fax: 44/081 877 1173.     *          
JOPPA Books Ltd. Continues to issue specialized lists. May '91      
list is: Literature. JOPPA Books Ltd. 29 Milner Drive, Cobham,      
Surrey KT11 2EZ. Phone 44/0932 86 82 69. Fax: 44/0932 86 40 71.       
   *      Yak and Yeti Books issued Catalogue No. 20: The      
Himalayan Region, Central Asia and Tibet. Yak & Yeti Books, P O      
Box 5736, Rockville, MD 20855. Phone: Weekdays (6PM to 10PM;      
Weekends 9AM to 9PM) 301/977-7285.     *     TURQUOISE a book      
club, has issued a new catalog. Contact: 132 East 61st Str. 2nd      
Floor, NY NY 10021. Phone and Fax: 212/759-6424.      
                       *        *        *      
A work's being listed in this section does not preclude      
subsequent review in the AACAR BULLETIN.      
Khairulla Ismatullaev, "AKS de Uzbek Tilinin Urgelinisi" Uzbek      
Tili ve Adabiyati (Tashkent) March-April, 1991.      *      Paul      
Henze, "Turkey and Georgia" [Interview] Yeni Forum (Ankara).      
October 1991.       *      Masayuki YAMAUCHI, The Green Crescent      
Under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia 1919-1922      
(Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia      
and Africa, 1991). No. 42.      *      Christopher Cviic,      
Remaking the Balkans (NY: The Royal Institute of International      
Affairs/Council on Foreign Relations, 1991).     *     James      
Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to      
Sovereignity (Westview Press, 1991).      *      The Soviet      
Nationality Reader: The Crisis in Context, Rachel Denber, Ed.      
(Westview Press, 1991).     *      Audrey L. Altstadt, The      
70      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity Under Russian Rule      
(Stanford, California:  Hoover Institution Press, 1992). Studies      
of Nationalities in the USSR Series.      
                        *       *        *      
                           ADDENDA TO:      
                 AND COURSEWORK IN NORTH AMERICA      
1. INSTITUTION: University of Florida      
SURVEY RESPONDENT:  Paul J. Magnarella, Professor of Anthropology      
ADDRESS/PHONE:  Anthropology Dept, U of Florida, Gainesville FL      
904/392 4453      
Turkish Republic, Turkic peoples of the Middle East and Central      
Political, Economic and Cultural Relations between the Turkish      
Republic and the Soviet Turkic Republics      
2. INSTITUTION:  Oakland University      
SURVEY RESPONDENT:  Linda Benson, Assistant Professor of History      
Department of History, Oakland U, Rochester MI 48309      
Xingjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region (Xingjiang, Chinese Turkistan)      
Modern history; Uygur cultural and political history      
71      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Book length study of China's Uygur nationality, with emphasis on      
the 20th century and development of nationalism among China's      
Turkic peoples.      
History 377: Empire of the Steppes (4 cr.)      
3. INSTITUTION: The University of Texas at Austin      
DEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM:  Department of Oriental and      
African Languages and Literatures      
SURVEY RESPONDENT:  G liz Kuruoglu, Lecturer      
Department of Oriental and African Languages and Literatures      
2601 University Avenue      
Austin TX 78712      
Center for Middle Eastern Studies;      
Center for Slavic and East European Studies      
Reciprocal construction in Turkic languages      
Turkic Peoples of USSR      
Uzbekistan, language and culture      
Azerbaijan, language and culture      
4. The following update to previously published entry is received      
INSTITUTION:  The University of Wisconsin-Madison      
(Kemal Karpat, chair)       
SURVEY RESPONDENT:   Uli Schamiloglu, Assistant Professor       
 Dept. of Slavic Languages        
 720 Van Hise Hall        
72      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
 University of Wisconsin        
 Madison, WI 53706        
 Graduate School, Social Sciences & Humanities        
 228 Bascom Hall, University of Wisconsin-Madison        
 Madison, WI  53706  USA        
 tel. 608-262-2433        
 Dept. of Anthropology        
 5240 Social Science Building, 1180 Observatory Drive        
 tel. 608-262-2866/2867/2868/2869        
 Dept. of Economics        
 7122 Social Science Building, 1180 Observatory Drive        
 tel. 608-262-3559        
 Dept. of Geography        
 M382 Science Hall, 550 North Park Street        
 tel. 608-262-3861        
 Dept. of History        
 3211 Humanities Building, 455 North Park Street        
 tel. 608-263-1962/1800        
 Dept. of Linguistics        
 1168 Van Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drive         
 tel. 608-262-2292        
 Dept. of Political Science        
 110 North Hall, 1050 Bascom Mall        
 tel. 608-263-1878/2414        
 Dept. of Slavic Languages        
73      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
 720 Van Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drive        
 tel. 608-262-3498        
 Dept. of South Asian Studies        
 1244 Van Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drive        
 tel. 608-262-0524        
 Sarah Atis (South Asian Studies)--Turkish language and      
 Mark Bassin (Geography)--Geography of the Soviet Union        
 Mark Beissinger (Political Science)--Soviet domestic and      
 Vincent Fourniau (History)--History of Central Asia        
 Kemal Karpat (History)--Modern Middle East, Ottoman Empire, and      
 Anatoly Khazanov (Anthropology)--Central Asian and Soviet      
 David Knipe (South Asian Studies)--Religions of South Asia        
 David McDonald (History)--History of Imperial Russia        
 Muhammad Memon (South Asian Studies)--Islam, Urdu language and      
 Catherine Poujol (History)--Tajik language and civilization        
 Uli Schamiloglu (Slavic Languages)--Central Asian Turkic      
    history and linguistics         
 John Street (Linguistics)--Classical and pre-classical Mongolian       
 Andr Wink (History)--History of Medieval India and Central Asia       
74      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
 Students are encouraged to enroll in a discipline department.      
The Graduate        
School allows independent Ph.D. programs (though not for the      
M.A.) for        
students admitted into an academic department. Interested      
students may        
contact the Dept. of Slavic Languages regarding a possible      
independent M.A.        
concentration in Central Asian languages. A proposed      
M.A. program in Soviet and East European programs could, if      
approved, also        
accommodate students interested in Central Asian Studies.            
 Topics in Ethnology: Peoples and Cultures of the Asiatic Part of      
    Soviet Union        
 Topics in Ethnology: Peoples and Cultures of the European Part      
of the        
    Soviet Union        
 Problems in Anthropology: Pastoral Nomadism        
 Invasions and Empires: Central Asia from Genghis Khan to Stalin       
 Undergraduate Studies in History of Africa, Asia, or Latin        
    America: Central Asia        
 Seminar in Problems of Islamic History: Central Asia        
    Central Asian Studies:       
 Elementary Kazakh I-II       
 Intensive Uzbek I-II       
75      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
 Civilization of Central Asia        
 Proseminar: Introduction to Turkic Linguistics        
 Proseminar: The Golden Horde & The Rise of the Central Asian      
 Individual Research in Central Asian Studies        
    South Asian Studies:       
 First, Second, Third, Fourth Semester Turkish        
 Readings in Modern Turkish        
 Islam: Religion and Culture        
 Proseminar in Languages and Literatures of South Asia: Turkish      
 Turkish Literature in Translation       
 Introduction to the Mongolian Languages: Classical Mongolian        
 Readings in Classical and Preclassical Mongolian        
                         *      *      *      
                           BOOK REVIEWS      
THE HISTORY OF A MUSLIM SHRINE, 1480-1889. (Princeton: Princeton      
University Press, 1991) XV + 319 Pp. Maps, Glossary,      
Bibliography, Index.      
     This book follows the expansion of the shrine of 'Ali ibn      
Abi Talip and its awqaf in the vicinity of Balkh from their      
establishment by Sultan Husayn Bayqara in 1480 until their      
incorporation into the Afghan state in 1889. The author      
skillfully interweaves several general themes: the condition of      
76      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
the shrine's extensive awqaf, which included a vast irrigation      
system that sustained a large agricultural base, the political      
and administrative activities of the shrine's Ansari managers      
(mutawallis), and the rationale and policies of the various      
political regimes that controlled the region of BAlkh. McChesney      
has in fact also produced a useful chronological history of Balkh      
and the khanly or amirid states of Central Asia for the period      
1480-1889. He points out the clash of the Chinggisid political      
principles of the steppeland with the centralizing tendencies of      
the Irano-Mughal states, provides a clearer history of the region      
by explaining the significance of such terms as amir, khan and      
sultan in their Central Asian context, and argues that under      
Chinggisid principles the waqf enjoyed, like Balkh itself, a      
large degree of autonomy.      
     By focusing on a single massive waqf over a period of four      
centuries the author is able to identify trends or major changes      
in the history of the shrine and to point out the importance of      
this massive waqf to the economy of the region. Although his      
analysis relies heavily on a handful of important documents      
spaced more than a century apart, and upon a wide array of      
Russian and Persian language studies, he manages to draw from      
these materials a detailed description of the political, economic      
and social forces with which the powerful mutawallis of the      
shrine complex had to contend. These documents, decrees of the      
ruling authority, waqf summaries of the Uzbek amirs who benefited      
the shrine, and inventories of waqf documents collected by      
Russian scholars, provide McChesney the opportunity to estimate      
the waqf's size and to describe its administration and functions.      
There are, however, gaps in the author's review.      
     Information about the shrine and its awqaf from its founding      
in 1480 to 1651 is rather scanty. Here McChesney offers only a      
suggestive interpretation of the shrine's relations with the      
various Chinggisid, Uzbek and Mughal leaders who conquered the      
77      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     The manshur of Subhan Quli of 1668-69, followed by a series      
of annexes, provides a wealth of information about the shrine and      
its awqaf from the middle of the 17th century to 1738. Following      
the withdrawal of the forces of Nadir Shah in 1747 the shrine      
experienced a period of virtual autonomy until it was      
incorporated into the expanding Afghan state. The Afghans, who      
benefited the shrine and made its surrounding town, Mazhar-i      
Sharif (the noble shrine), their provincial capital instead of      
Balkh, put an end to Chinggisid practices and the shrine's      
autonomy by extending a centralized state system over the area.      
With 'Abd al-Rahman's decree of 1889 the shrine and its awqaf      
fell under state control and its administrators were transformed      
into government employees. This process had already occurred in      
other Muslim countries as centralizing state bureaucracies gained      
control of religious institutions and revenues previously outside      
close government supervision.      
     McChesney clarifies many technical terms related to waqf      
administration, land tenure and political theory and emphasizes      
the enormous significance of waqf for the social, economic and      
political life of the Muslim community in the vicinity of Balkh.      
His work is a major addition to the growing number of studies on      
the institution of waqf. Throughout the study, however, the      
emphasis is on the small number of Ansari officials who      
administered the waqf and their relations with the different      
political regimes that dominated the region. Little information      
is provided on the educational, devotional or philanthropic      
activities of this great shrine. One gets little sense, for      
instance, of what daily life at the shrine was like. Despite the      
wealth of information contained in the materials he has      
consulted, large gaps remain in his chronology. Surprisingly,      
little is yet known about the shrine in the first half of the      
nineteenth century. A great deal of what McChesney has written on      
the history of the shrine, its administrators and its irrigation      
system remains speculative, as he himself repeatedly admits.      
78      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     This study is nevertheless a model of analysis that throws      
new light on the general topic of waqf. The author has      
successfully demonstrated the difficult task of the shrine's      
administrators to hold the waqf together over a 400 year period,      
defend the prerogatives of the shrine amid the shifting balance      
of power in Central Asia and to maintain the vast irrigation      
system which supported the shrine's huge landholdings. This study      
will also serve as a basic source for the history of Central Asia      
for years to come.      
Daniel Crecelius      
California State University -- Los Angeles      
California:  Hoover Institution Press, 1990); xiv + 410 pp.      
     This latest volume in the Hoover Institution's "Studies of      
Nationalities in the USSR" series is the work of Professor Edward      
Allworth, whose extensive contributions to the study of      
Uzbekistan, and of Soviet Central Asia in general, stretch across      
four decades; he began laboring in this field when it was much      
less crowded than today, and his role in promoting Central Asian      
studies, from a time well before the region drew the scholarly      
and public attention it now enjoys, leaves all students of the      
region in his debt.  With his extensive knowledge of Soviet and      
pr/e-revolutionary Central Asian literature and its      
"practitioners," Allworth is naturally well-suited to analyze and      
distill the cultural experience of "the modern Uzbeks" for a      
much-needed volume on what is arguably the most important Soviet      
(if that label retains any meaning today) nationality of Muslim      
79      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     Unfortunately the present work is a curious combination of      
creative insights and well-honed (if occasionally insufficiently      
substantiated) judgments reflecting his years of experience in      
the field, on the one hand, mixed with outdated approaches,      
omissions, technical lapses, and an "inventive" but ultimately      
lamentable organizational scheme, on the other.  There is much      
that is good in the book, and with a number of caveats I will      
recommend parts of it to my own students; but there is much that      
is questionable, clearly flawed, or downright embarrassing, and      
it is a pity that it is this book, nonetheless, which will no      
doubt be consulted for years to come by non-specialists seeking      
to understand the Uzbeks and Uzbekistan.        
     To be sure, portions of the book were doomed to be quickly      
out of date due to the enormous changes throughout the Soviet      
Union and their belated effects in Central Asia beginning in      
earnest only in 1988; though published in 1990, the volume      
appears to have been substantially completed in early 1987.  The      
author cannot be blamed for accidents of timing, but it is      
nevertheless a pity that the work does not reflect even the      
beginnings of the vigorous and open debates about nearly all      
aspects of Uzbekistan's experience under Russian and Soviet rule      
which prevailed from 1988 well into 1990.        
     Even so, a quite respectable purpose of such a book would be      
to acquaint the general reader with the historical and cultural      
heritage of the Uzbeks; and in pursuit of such an aim, clear      
presentation is essential, and selectivity is clearly      
unavoidable.  On both counts, however, the book is flawed:  its      
structure is often confusing, and its selection of material at      
worst appears haphazard and at best tells the story of only a      
thin layer of the Uzbek people.      
     The book is divided into two major sections.  The first,      
entitled "The Bases of Uzbek Group Identity," contains a thematic      
treatment of aspects of Uzbek and Central Asian history,      
considered as formative elements which produced the Uzbek people      
80      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
and its culture, from the time of the first use of the term      
" zbek" as an ethnonym down to the 18th century.  The second,      
labeled "Conflict between Old and New Modernity," contains 12      
chapters which also appear, from their titles, to follow a      
thematic or topical approach, but which in fact provide an      
essentially chronological discussion of Central Asian and Uzbek      
history through the 19th and 20th centuries.      
     In order to begin on a positive note, let us consider the      
second section first, for not surprisingly, in view of Allworth's      
expertise, it offers the book's brightest spots.  Here again,      
however, organization is a problem:  where we expect in this      
section to find treatments of issues corresponding to the chapter      
titles such as "Education," "Culture and Religion," "Politics,"      
or "Intelligentsia," we find instead an admittedly more      
inventive, but nonetheless misleading approach in which such      
headings implicitly signal major themes of successive periods in      
the 19th and 20th centuries.  Thus chapter 7 ("History") deals in      
fact with 19th century Central Asian historical writing, chapter      
8 ("Education") and 9 ("Culture and Religion") concentrate on the      
cultural developments of the Jadidists, and we follow in      
subsequent chapters the era of politicized Jadidism, the      
revolution, the national delimitation, the decimation of the      
Uzbek intelligentsia, and the revival of attention to remade      
"Uzbek" traditions beginning in the 1950s.      
     In this second section, several chapters stand out as good      
summary treatments of issues handled more thoroughly by others,      
while others offer real, original contributions thanks to      
Allworth's deep knowledge of the Uzbek literary scene.  In the      
first category are chapters 10 and 11 ("Politics" and      
"Homeland"), covering the politicized reformists and the early      
post-revolutionary developments; here one may quarrel with the      
inadequate attention given to the Basmachi resistance, for      
instance, but on the whole we have a reasonably good summary of      
events and trends.        
81      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     In the second category fall chapters 12, 13, and 14      
("Disintegration," "Monuments or Trophies," and "Genealogy").       
The first includes welcome remarks on the Central Asian distrust      
of what Allworth calls "Kazan Tatar tutelage," which provide a      
useful antidote to recently revived voices in "Pan-Turkic" mode      
(now heard more from Turkey than from Tataristan) that amount to      
implicit assertions of "cultural hegemony" over Turkistan; the      
same chapter also highlights the disproportionate pressures      
against the Uzbeks during the 1920s, pressures which are useful      
to recall when comparing Uzbek political attitudes and behavior,      
even today, with those of other Central Asian peoples.  Likewise,      
chapter 13 provides an insightful discussion of the      
colonial-style treatment of Central Asia's cultural heritage in      
both the Tsarist and Soviet periods, while chapter 14 takes up      
the Soviet-era debate on Uzbek ethnogenesis and, as one example      
of the role of Soviet-era historiography of Central Asia in      
constructing a new Uzbek communal identity, focuses on the      
treatment of Timur.      
     With the remaining chapters we are on more "standard" ground      
as Allworth discusses the Uzbek intelligentsia and its evolving      
contributions to the understanding of what "Uzbek" means.       
Despite the value of such a focus -- for in large measure it is      
the Uzbek literary  lite that has asserted the right to      
articulate the Uzbek people's national and cultural aspirations      
-- it is disappointing that Allworth seldom reaches beyond this      
 lite to discuss the social and economic concerns of Uzbek      
villagers, for instance, or problems of younger Central Asians      
outside the educated urban upper class, or other issues less      
prominently evoked by the generation of Uzbek writers with whom      
Allworth shows the greatest familiarity.      
     In the latter regard it is particularly regrettable that      
there is greater attention given to an essentially      
"accommodationist" school of the literary  lite than to the      
younger generation of Uzbek writers, especially poets, who though      
82      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
active through the 1980s have emerged into high-profile positions      
only in the age of glasnost'.  Allworth is to be applauded for      
highlighting the work of Rauf Parfi (pp. 324-325), but he is      
accorded barely one page (as against three for Jamal Kamal, and      
over four for Raim Farhadii, who writes primarily in Russian and      
whom Allworth himself calls a "hybrid" and an "anomaly"); and      
where are Muhammad Solih, Zohir Alam, Khurshid Davron, Usmon      
Azim, Shavkat Rahmon, or other younger writers whose works      
promise so much more to our understanding of "Uzbekness" today?       
In effect Allworth has missed an opportunity to present the      
voices of this new generation of strongly (even stridently)      
nationalistic writers, many of whom are in the forefront of the      
political and cultural dynamism evident from 1988 on but whose      
stature deserved recognition well before this.      
     The most scandalous omission lies in the lack of any mention      
whatsoever of the role of cotton agriculture in Soviet-era Uzbek      
history.  To be sure, Allworth labels his book a "cultural      
history," but to divorce such an overarching fact of Uzbek life      
as cotton monoculture --a target of Uzbek critics in the 1920s      
and 1980s-- from cultural history is to miss much of the story of      
Uzbekistan in the 20th century.  Similarly, we find no discussion      
in the book of the enormous environmental problems with which      
Soviet rule has left Uzbekistan, nor any hint of the emergence of      
those problems as a rallying point for precisely the group --the      
literary  lite-- which usually occupies the author's interest.       
The often groping process whereby the intellectual  lite in      
Uzbekistan has sought, under the "unnatural" constraints imposed      
by Soviet rule, to come to terms with "Uzbekness" undeniably      
offers a fascinating case study in the construction of communal      
identities, but it does not serve the ends of "cultural history"      
to lose interest when the same intellectual  lite grapples with      
more concrete problems of more urgent concern to the rest of the      
Uzbek people.      
83      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     This second section of the book is also flawed by other      
omissions and what would seem to be hackneyed emphases.  We find      
virtually no discussion of any aspect of Uzbek "culture" outside      
literature and theatre; the visual arts and music, for instance,      
are essentially ignored.  There is virtually no discussion, more      
importantly, of the Russian conquest of Central Asia, either in      
the form of a much needed narrative account to provide the reader      
some historical footing, or in the form of a discussion of Soviet      
historiographical treatment of the "unification" of Central Asia      
with the Russian empire; the latter would have been at least as      
illuminating as the discussion of Timur's image.  The 1916      
rebellion in Central Asia is also given short shrift, although      
here we detect something else at work:  Allworth places himself      
squarely on the side of the Jadidists in their critical (or      
silent) stance toward the 1916 revolt (p.160).  This is despite      
the clear weight of evidence that the revolt enjoyed widespread      
popular support and, more significantly, marked a spontaneous (if      
inchoate) reaction to the serious social and economic      
dislocations which affected the bulk of the Central Asian      
population -- but which many Jadidists, in their fascination with      
Russian and western culture, were quite late to appreciate.        
     And indeed a dominant theme throughout Allworth's treatment      
of the Tsarist era is an implicit deprecation of traditional      
Central Asian civilization and a standard but tiresome      
overemphasis of the Jadidist reformers.  Instead of providing      
insight into the patterns of traditional Muslim education or      
religious life or cultural expression --patterns which would go      
far to enhance the reader's understanding of contemporary      
Uzbekistan outside the cities and  lite circles-- we find the      
same exclusive fascination with the indigenous "reformist" voices      
who often disparaged their own traditions in emulation of the      
"west" in the form of Russia.  Reform schools, reformist      
religion, and the emulation of Russian literary genres are all      
discussed at length, even though these trends touched only a      
84      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
small layer of Central Asian society in their own time, and even      
today can help us tell much less than half the story of life in      
Uzbekistan; meanwhile, for example, the style of the traditional      
maktab (which survives to this day, in various guises, in      
villages and cities alike), the enormous strength of "popular"      
religion and its contribution to shaping group identity, and the      
vital oral literary traditions of Uzbekistan are ignored.        
     Allworth is occasionally explicit (and uncritical) in citing      
Tsarist- and Soviet-era assessments of Central Asian civilization      
which portray Central Asia in almost exclusively negative terms,      
but which quite transparently represent standard colonialist      
denigration of a colonized people's culture.  A telling example      
is his citation (pp. 109-110) of a Russian traveler's scornful      
report of a Bukharan mulla who could recite the Muslim Alexander      
tale but "knew virtually nothing about the 'actual' history."       
Allworth seems to miss the irony of criticizing the learned      
Bukharan for belonging to his own cultural tradition with its own      
construction of "actual" history, instead of to the evidently      
"correct" tradition, that of 19th-century Europe.      
     Beyond such explicit cases, however, such an attitude --that      
the only thing positive about Central Asian society came from the      
Russian-influenced reformers-- is implicit in much of the book.       
To be sure, Allworth is hardly alone in his focus on the Jadidist      
 lite; such attitudes are common in much of the writing of many      
who approach Central Asia from the standpoint of Russian and/or      
Soviet studies.  In view of the "shallowness" of much of      
contemporary Central Asian studies, in which superficial      
discussion of part of the 19th century can pass for the      
historical and cultural background sought by specialists on      
contemporary Soviet Central Asia, it unfortunately appears that a      
deeper and more balanced appreciation of Central Asian      
civilization in the 19th century, free of the pre- and      
misconceptions derived knowingly or unknowingly from two layers      
of colonialist scholarship, remains far in the future.      
85      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
     Allworth's perspectives on the 19th century are flawed by      
problems of other types as well, namely simple factual errors and      
omissions.  His dismissal of 19th-century Central Asian      
historical tradition must rest on a lack of familiarity with the      
rich and largely untapped body of historical works produced in      
the khanates of Qoqand, Bukhara, and Khiva; virtually all of this      
remains unpublished and is of difficult access, but it is not      
impossible to have a clearer idea of its scope than is implied in      
Allworth's treatment.  Even in the case of the Khivan material,      
which he discusses at length (pp. 114-118), he seems unaware of      
the scholarly studies on such figures as Mu'nis and Agahi,      
Bayani, and Thana'i, produced outside Tashkent.      
     Such problems are not uncommon in the second section of the      
book, but the first section is rife with these and similar flaws.       
This section, occupying the first 100 pages of the book, is      
divided into six chapters ("Ideas of Community," "Symbols and      
Values of Sovereignty," "Names and Tribes," "Leadership,"      
"Ideology and the Literature of Praise," and "Diplomacy"), each      
of which stands as a separate meditation intended to illuminate      
some aspect of the Uzbek character or of the Uzbek value system.       
Here, as suggested, there are to be found interesting and      
insightful comments and anecdotal illustrations drawn from      
episodes in Central Asian history; but if a non-specialist seeks      
an extended historical narrative to orient himself in the Uzbek      
heritage before the Russian conquest he will not find it here or      
anywhere in this book.  Although there is certainly merit in      
approaching the historical heritage of Central Asia through its      
reverberations and evocations in contemporary Uzbek intellectual      
life, such an approach presumes a familiarity with at least the      
outlines of Central Asian history which is hardly widespread      
among the expected readership of the Hoover Institution's series.      
     Rather, we find for example bits and pieces of the career of      
Abu'l-Khayr Khan, ruler of the nomadic Uzbek confederacy in the      
15th century, scattered through the various chapters and sections      
86      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
of chapters, with the same bits and pieces (e.g. his capture of      
Khorezm) recounted on several occasions for different purposes.       
And poor Sh bani Khan:  he pops up again and again in fragments      
of his life or writings, and several sections in the "Leadership"      
chapter are focused (though that word does not quite apply) on      
him, but we never have a connected treatment of the career of the      
leader of the Uzbek conquest of Central Asia.  Perhaps such a      
treatment would be considered old-fashioned today, and Allworth's      
shuffling of events and people through several chapters may      
represent a fresh organizational approach, but it is hardly      
appropriate for a book intended to introduce a reader more at      
home in the 20th century than in the 16th to the history of the      
Uzbeks or Uzbekistan; indeed, with major and regrettable      
exceptions there is more of a connected, chronological narrative,      
though disguised by the chapter headings, in the second part of      
the book, where most readers are arguably better informed.        
     This first section of the book suffers not only from this      
scattershot approach to Uzbek history, but from a number of      
highly doubtful and in any case poorly argued conclusions and      
factual lapses.  For instance, what is the point (and what is the      
basis!) for blaming Abu'l-Khayr Khan for introducing "Mongol      
vindictiveness" and "nomadic impatience" into "the developing      
Central Asian outlook" (p. 28)?  Are we really still stuck with      
maintaining the contrast, entirely inappropriate in Uzbek-era      
Central Asia, between "mysticism" and the "narrow, fanatical      
rigidity" of the "clergy" (p. 70)?      
     In the latter regard it is disappointing to note that one of      
the weakest aspects in the book is the treatment of religion,      
despite the series editor's promise in the foreword that Allworth      
"offers cogent comments on the role of Islam as a spiritual force      
strengthening the Uzbek ethnic unity . . ."  What we have instead      
is occasional discussion of traditional religious expression in      
literary form, factual errors and omissions (e.g. he equates the      
Qadiriyah with the Jahriyah [p. 73], and he mentions Sh bani      
87      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
Khan's pilgrimage to the shrine of "Khwajai Buzurg," where the      
ruler met "a grandson of Buzurg," hiding the fact that "Khoja-i      
Buzurg" ["the Great Khoja"] is Baha' ad-Din Naqshband), and a      
deplorable lack of attention to the enormous, and often      
definitive, political, social, economic, and cultural roles of      
Islamic figures and institutions in Uzbek-era Central Asia.        
     To be sure, Allworth devotes a chapter in the second part of      
the book to "Culture and Religion," but here again, predictably      
and sadly, it is only the "reformist" aspect of religion in the      
late 19th and early 20th centuries that is given attention; this      
is in accord with the usual western fascination with the      
Jadidists, but does little to illuminate the traditional roots      
either of contemporary Islam in Central Asia or even of the      
patterns of religious life which the liberal Jadidists sought to      
     In particular, in his treatment of the content of Uzbek      
communal identity and Uzbek ethnogenesis, minimal attention is      
given to the prevailing indigenous understanding of Uzbek origins      
as formulated and transmitted before the impact of Russian rule;      
such attention would require us to step back, however, from our      
overemphasis on precisely those elements of "Uzbek" culture most      
infused with Russian and western attitudes.  At a time when it is      
more vital than ever to listen to indigenous Uzbek voices, and at      
a time when it is increasingly difficult to find indigenous      
voices throughout Central Asia untainted by the impact of the      
modern Soviet worldview, it is particularly unfortunate that      
Allworth has missed an opportunity to acquaint the general reader      
with more of what informed the pre-Russian Central Asian      
experience --especially insofar as that experience promises to be      
increasingly invoked in the process of re-constructing Uzbek      
     In short, the book's treatment of the steppe period of Uzbek      
ethnohistory and of the first three centuries of the Uzbek era in      
Central Asia is grossly inadequate; one objects to facts,      
88      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
evaluations, and characterizations on virtually every page, and      
the fact that this section necessarily comes first seriously mars      
the impression the entire book gives.  As "historical background"      
for a work focused exclusively on the life of a contemporary      
Soviet nation it is unsuitable enough; as a section in a book      
promising a study of the Uzbeks "from the 14th century," it is      
for the most part altogether without merit.      
     Finally, as yet another regrettable feature of a book      
intended for a general readership must be mentioned a number of      
technical problems, above all the deplorable transcription      
system, which often serves to make names of prominent people      
unfamiliar at first glance.  If we can forgive the transcription      
of Arabic and Persian names from the 16th century as if their      
bearers were 20th-century Uzbeks, there seems to be no      
justification for "Uzbekifying" the Russian ending "ov"/-"ev" in      
Russianized Uzbek family names, especially when the figures under      
discussion are known already through too many transcribed forms.       
In this case one refrains from the otherwise justifiable      
criticism of the book's "foolish consistency," because in fact      
the element of consistency is lacking.  These problems spill over      
into the bibliography, where in addition to the lack of notation,      
for instance, regarding what language particular works have been      
translated into when listed under an Uzbek and/or Russian title,      
we find an apparent disregard for the nature and status of the      
sources; Allworth cites such works as the MATLA' AS-SA'DAYN from      
the partial modern Uzbek translations rather than from standard      
published texts, and on at least one occasion cites, through a      
reference of Bartol'd's, a manuscript preserved in "Petrograd      
     Such flaws are, however, a relatively minor part of what is      
disturbing about this book.  More serious is the pattern of      
errors and omissions and misleading emphases outlined here only      
in small measure.  The book will undoubtedly be widely used and      
cited; its interpretations and priorities will be adopted in      
89      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
later non-specialist writings, and its transcriptions will creep      
into articles and term papers.  As unfortunate as this may be for      
the goal of advancing Central Asian studies, the real      
disappointment lies in the fact that the book is not the one the      
modern Uzbeks deserve.      
Devin DeWeese      
Department of Uralic and Altaic Studies      
Indiana University      
     Cyril E. Black, Louis Dupree, Elizabeth Endicott-West,      
Daniel C. Matuszewski, Eden Naby, and Arthur N. Waldron. The      
Modernization of Inner Asia. An East Gate Book (Armonk: M.E.      
Sharpe, 1991).       
     The Modernization of Inner Asia, an innovative and unique      
attempt to integrate theories of modernization with the data for      
Inner Asia (for the purpose of this volume a convenient      
geographic designation for the area stretching from Mongolia in      
the east to Iran in the west), appears as the third volume in the      
series Studies on Modernization of the Center of International      
Studies at Princeton University. Two earlier volumes have already      
appeared in the same series on the modernization of Japan and      
Russia (1975) and the modernization of China (1981); a fourth      
volume on the modernization of the Ottoman Empire and its      
Afro-Asian successors has been announced. The present volume is      
the result of the collaboration of a group of scholars, with      
Louis Dupree writing on Afghanistan; Elizabeth Endicott-      
West on Mongolia and Tibet; Daniel C. Matuszewski on the Turkic      
and Iranian regions of Russian and Soviet Central Asia; Eden Naby      
on modern Iran, knowledge and education in Central Asia, and      
modern Sinkiang; and Arthur N. Waldron on Turkic Sinkiang. Cyril      
90      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
E. Black wrote the introduction, conclusions, and interpretive      
sections and edited the text [p. xvi].    
     Modernization is defined as "the process by which societies    
have and are being transformed under the impact of the scientific   
and technological revolution". The three factors which this work      
considers particularly relevant to the concept of modernization      
are "the advancement of knowledge, as reflected mainly in the      
scientific and technological revolution, as the primary source of      
change that distinguishes the modern era from earlier eras; the      
capacity of a society in political, economic, and social terms to      
take advantage of the possibilities for development offered by      
the advancement of knowledge; and the utility of various policies      
that the political leaders of a society may follow in seeking      
both to convert its heritage of values and institutions to modern      
requirements and to borrow selectively from more modern      
societies". Modernity assumes the adoption of universal      
commitments, rational inquiry and behavior, a belief in mastery      
over one's environment as opposed to fatalism, the possibility of      
choice of identity, separation of work from family, a movement      
away from the predominance of age and gender, race giving way to      
common humanity, and government based on participation, consent,      
and public accountability [pp. 17-20]. This work organizes its      
treatment of these issues for the premodern era (-1920s) into      
chapters on the international context, political institutions,      
economies, social structure, and knowledge and education. The      
treatment of the modern era (1920s-1980s) is similarly organized      
into chapters on the international context, political      
development, economic growth, social integration, and advancement      
of knowledge. The concluding third part includes chapters on      
patterns of modernization and Inner Asia and world politics. This      
approach results in a refreshing focus on political, social,      
economic, and cultural data that often remain unconsidered in      
traditional scholarship on this part of the world. Given the      
theme and broad scope of this work, it would have made sense to      
91      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
also include separate coverage of the influential modernizing      
role of the Azeris, Crimean Tatars, and Kazan Tatars.      
     The sections devoted to Iran and to a lesser degree      
Afghanistan offer substantial factual information and analysis      
informed by a significant body of disciplinary research by      
Western and indigenous scholars who have enjoyed relatively free      
access to the data for these areas. What little Western      
disciplinary research exists for Soviet Central Asia, Sinkiang,      
Mongolia, and Tibet, however, has been hampered by limited access      
to quantitative data and to primary and secondary sources written      
in the indigenous languages for these areas. Moreover,      
scholarship in the PRC and the former USSR has usually been based      
on assumptions not shared in the West. As a result, much of the      
fundamental research on a broad range of topics for these same      
areas is yet to be carried out, and the confusion in the      
literature regarding a number of basic facts and concepts has      
carried over into this volume as well.  Considering for a moment      
questions of fact, the statement that ethnicity patterns in      
Mongolia were not influenced by Turkic migrations [p. 12] ignores      
the T rk, Uygur, and other states (6th century C.E.-) centered in      
Mongolia as well as the Turkic origin of many of the Mongol      
tribes of the medieval period. Elsewhere there is the misleading      
statement relating to the years 1851-1914, which should be      
understood as the dates for Ismail bey Gaspirali and not for his      
newspaper Terj man (actually published 1883-1918) [p. 50].      
Turning to conceptual issues, though it is stated that nomadic      
military leaders "helped bring into being states whose primary      
purpose was securing, usually by force or the threat of force,      
some share of the wealth of settled areas" [p. 10], elsewhere in      
the same volume this is dismissed as an "age-old stereotype      
concerning a supposedly eternal nomadic greed for the wealth of      
sedentary neighbors" [p. 64]. At one point it is stated that the      
nomads' "mobile way of life gives them little opportunity for      
handicrafts" [p. 7], though elsewhere it is stated that "nomads      
92      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
also produced rugs and embroidery on rough portable looms as well      
as felt, ropes, and leatherwork for their own use and barter with      
the towns and agricultural settlements" [p. 88]. At one point it      
is considered that conflicts among Mongolian factions over the      
course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the      
reassertion of local sovereignties contributed to the political      
disintegration of Inner Asia [p. 12], while elsewhere it is      
considered that fragmentation from the 16th century on was the      
result of the gunpowder revolution, changing trade patterns, and      
an increasingly conservative religious establishment [p. 64].      
Especially revealing is the confusion over the premodern bases of      
identity. Language is considered one of the bases of premodern      
identity in Mongolia [p. 37], while elsewhere it is stated that      
religion formed a main basis of identity [p. 57]. This can also      
be compared with the statement that for most Mongols of the early      
20th century "political power could be envisaged only in      
religious and imperial terms" [p. 202]. Elsewhere Central Asians      
are considered to have identified themselves "by regional, clan,      
or tribal designations or, alternatively, by simple designation      
as a Muslim" [p. 71] and that the jadid reformists raised the      
issue of language and identity [p. 148]. These various statements      
could reflect differing premodern bases of identity in these      
various societies, but more likely they reflect the differing      
assumptions of modern authors regarding the bases of premodern      
identity. Given such unresolved conceptual issues, it is      
difficult to avoid asking whether the state of scholarship on      
this region offers an adequate basis for a synthetic treatment of      
modernization for all of the modern political units included in      
this volume. The late editor, who was not a specialist on any      
area of Inner Asia, must also accept a share of the      
responsibility for such inconsistencies in this volume.      
     Finally, the section in this work devoted to contemporary      
Central Asia has now taken on historical value as a result of the      
collapse of the USSR. This work states that there is a strong      
93      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
basis for a distinctive Uzbek identity, but that the basis for a      
Kazakh identity is weak. It also considers that "the Uzbeks are      
foremost among the Muslim peoples of this region in pressing for      
their own policies and in taking advantage of the Soviet-imposed      
institutions to pursue their goals", and that the Kirgiz and      
Turkmen republics lack the basis for asserting independent      
policies [pp. 326-327]. Events in the wake of the collapse of the      
USSR may suggest the need to question the validity of the      
assumptions upon which these and other statements in this work      
concerning Central Asia are based.       
Uli Schamiloglu      
University of Wisconsin-Madison       
Lee, Hong  Yung, From  Revolutionary Cadres  to Party Technocrats      
in Socialist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of      
California Press, 1991).  xvi + 437 pp.       
     This is a work of exemplary scholarship: exhaustive and      
meticulous in its research, clear and crisp in style,      
comprehensive in substance, and analytically rich in      
interpretation. An opening theoretical chapter makes a persuasive      
case for the centrality of the cadre (i.e., political official)      
system for understanding Chinese politics and political economy.      
Two chapters then cover the cadre systems of the revolutionary      
and earlier Maoist periods and their legacies. Professor Lee      
makes precisely the right choice in devoting four chapters to the      
Cultural Revolution, a period which remains too little understood      
both in the West and in China too, but which we can be sure      
continues to shape China.  Five chapters then treat the reform      
period, covering cadre rehabilitation and restructuring of the      
bureaucracy and the Communist Party. Two further chapters give      
94      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
historical and contemporary accounts of personnel management and      
the fascinating, dark world of China's system of dossiers. A      
long, meaty analytical conclusion follows, offering in which the      
author offers a perceptive political sociology of the 1989      
events, and also has the courage to make some closely and      
perceptively argued predictions.      
     At bottom this is a work of political sociology as well as      
political science.  An essential concern is the relationship of      
state and society. One of Professor Lee's starting points is "the      
simple premise that the less institutionalized a political      
system, the more likely political elites will bring the ideology,      
experiences and outlook of the social classes from which they      
came into the political process" (387).  Though structuralists      
would argue that institutional arrangements can also be the      
bearers of class interests --a point to which I shall return-- he      
is certainly right that China's low level of political      
institutionalization in both the Maoist and reform periods      
permits class interest to be brought very directly into the state      
through the cadres who staff it. Thus, Maoist China was shaped by      
its cadres' "rural orientation, which stressed subsistence and      
self-sufficiency, moralized politics, distrusted exchange through      
a market mechanism, and knew little about the functional      
prerequisites of modern society" (392). In Professor Lee's      
analysis, then, the Maoist state and political economy is a      
reflection of aspects of Chinese society, rather than a      
totalitarian deus ex machina, charismatic creation, or imperial      
holdover.  (On the last point, he elucidates a number of very      
important differences between the Maoist leadership and its      
imperial predecessor, helping to undercut simplistic notions      
about a Mao Dynasty.  And on the first, he strikes a blow at      
totalitarian theory by offering several fascinating contrasts      
with the state socialisms of Eastern Europe and the USSR.)       
Likewise, the post-Maoist state is beginning to reflect the      
95      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
character of its rising class of technocratic elites, which is      
his major theme.      
     This does not augur well for democracy. In a well textured,      
complex analysis, Professor Lee argues that the technocrats are      
"more prone [than their Maoist predecessors] to bargain and      
compromise". They are capable of developing "a collective style      
of leadership and formal procedural rules in making decisions"      
(407). But "the new Chinese leaders are authoritarian in their      
political outlook" (289); "they are not democrats politically.       
Because of their training, they are averse  to uncertainty and      
the slow process of decision making" (411-412). They were, after      
all, relatively passive in the spring of 1989. Like their Maoist      
predecessors, many of them believe that they know what is best      
for China, though they base their claim on knowledge, rather than      
political virtue as the Maoists did. (Fang Lizhi's almost      
Platonic elitism is a fine example, though Professor Lee's      
generosity of spirit probably spares  Fang specific mention.)       
Yet, the technocrats will have difficulty becoming a political      
elite, because of their long exclusion from politics in the      
Maoist and even the post-Maoist period. This, he argues, is a      
major difference between China and the Soviet Union and Eastern      
Europe, where technocrats were coopted early into the state.      
Another obstacle is the deep roots and resilience of the      
rural-based revolutionary leadership, which showed its power in      
     Moreover, it is to Professor Lee's great credit that he does      
not fall into the common trap of overrating the importance of his      
subject of study. He is acutely cognizant of the continuing power      
of rival social groups and their political leaders. He knows that      
rural leaders support "political Leninism" (412).  He knows that      
even in the spring of 1989 workers "had few interests in common      
with the students and intellectuals" (i.e., the fledgling      
technocrats).  And he knows that these are enormous,      
strategically located, and crucially important groups that cannot      
96      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)      
be written out of the political system or analysis of it.  Toting      
all this up, Professor Lee expects China to move toward a more      
pluralistic one-party dominant system, in which the Communist      
Party "may become like the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party,      
with various factions that hold slightly disparate policy      
preferences but work together within a broad ideological      
consensus" (427). If the technocratic bureaucrats have a      
constructive role to play, it can be as "political managers"      
(426) or "power brokers" (384). But this outcome is far from      
assured, for it assumes some democratization of the Party (426).      
Perhaps more thorny, the repositioning of political elites into      
loci where they can mediate disputes and engage in rational      
allocation of resources also presumes the separation of the state      
from the economy. This has not happened in the first thirteen      
years of reform even in its urban strongholds (not to mention a      
good deal of the countryside in the hinterlands, where the Party      
retains powerful levers of economic regulation and, in the      
crucial sector of rural industry, even entrepreneurship). The      
result has been the crisis of economic overheating and corruption      
which underlay the 1989 blowup and blowout.      
     Thus, Professor Lee's final section is appropriately      
entitled "Uncertain Future". This is no analytical cop-out, for      
he does argue with great analytical acumen (as well as courage!)      
why one outcome (one-party politics dominated but not controlled      
by the new technocratic elites) is more likely than others      
(democratization or renewed Maoism).  Returning to an earlier      
point, I might add that, in the view of the technocrats' own      
social and political weakness, the mode of class determination in      
the new state will be structural and indirect rather than      
personal and direct.  That is, what will be important in the new      
state, and what will be a source of technocratic power, will not      
be who rules, but rather the rules of the games.      
Marc Blecher      
Oberlin College      
97      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)   
              June 6 & 7, 1992   
         Vista Hotel, New York City   
Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA) the national   
representative of Turkish Americans and friends of Turks invites   
you to a unique yearly event "Second Annual Conference on Turks   
Around the World" to be held during ATAA's annual convention on   
June 4-7, 1992, Vista Hotel in New York City.   
If you have been monitoring the ebvents in the Eurasian   
Republics, or studying Turks around the world, or just simply   
want to learn more about them, you should be there. Hear the   
reports on what happened in the past 12 months and what may   
happen in the next 12 months. It is the only scheduled event   
where you can network with academicians, representatives from   
most of the Turkish republics, the US government representatives,  
and Turks in the US.   
To receive registration information, call (202) 483-9090, or   
write to:    
Committee on Turks Around the World,    
1522 Connecticut Avenue NW, 3rd Floor,    
Washington, DC 20036.   
98      AACAR BULLETIN  Vol. V, No. 1  (Spring 1992)   
                    ISLAM and DEMOCRATIZATION 
                         in CENTRAL ASIA 
                      26-27 September 1992 
held at UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-Amherst, on 26-27 September      
1992. The program contains papers by: Audrey L. Altstadt (UMASS-      
Amherst); Muriel Atkin (George Washington U); Dru Gladney (U      
Southern California); H. B. Paksoy (Harvard U-CMES); Uli      
Schamiloglu (U of Wisconsin-Madison); Masayuki Yamauchi (U of      
Tokyo). Commentators will be announced separately. The Second day      
is devoted to outreach for pre-college teachers. Registration for      
attendance is $100, for conference only. Accommodation      
reservations may be made on campus at participant's expense, by      
contacting the Campus Center, UMASS-Amherst, MA 01003. Phone:      
413/549-6000; or at motels in the city of Amherst and immediate      
environs. For registration applications, contact: Prof. Audrey L.      
Altstadt, History Department, Herter Hall, UMASS, Amherst, MA      

This counter has been placed here on 31 March 1999