by Louis Lopez
Two people differ in opinion on whether gambling should be legal. Two others differ on whether plants have emotions. Still others differ on whether animals should have any rights. For ages, people have tried to find ways to convince others that their point of view was correct. In trying to analyze the basis for differences of opinion such as these, it becomes clear that opinions are often based on still other opinions. A person wanting to convince another who possesses an opposing viewpoint may well try to challenge the underlying opinions. To further complicate matters, the underlying opinions may rest on still other underlying opinions and beliefs. If the underlying set of beliefs has inconsistencies, the critic may be able to point out to the holder of the opinion that he or she holds an erroneous belief because it rests on faulty underlying opinions.
One problem could be inconsistency--two or more of the supporting opinions could contradict each other. This could betray a confusion in the underlying beliefs and cast serious doubt on the original opinion. Of course, the defender of the opinion could take the position that consistency is not an important consideration and stand by his or her belief. There would, of course, need to be some explanation that could justify ignoring the inconsistency.
On the other hand, the underlying beliefs could be consistent, and any refutation of the original opinion would then have to depend on finding that a single underlying opinion was incorrect. Of course, the opponent is also perfectly free to try to upend the critic's opposing opinion using the same strategy.
Attempts to convince the other side in connection with beliefs are made with varying amounts of success. They can serve to avoid error and promote knowledge and understanding. When differences of opinion involve matters which are more open to simple verification, the process of investigation of a belief is more simple. Examples are (1) a disagreement over the correct street address of a residence, (2) a question over what country the city of Istanbul is located, (3) a question about the boiling temperature of water at an altitude of 3,000 feet. The way to settle a dispute in these types of cases is to simply investigate the situation and determine the true facts. There is more of a problem in cases where the belief is not one that involves an easily scertainable fact but is instead one that involves controversial facts or values. In these cases, it appears necessary to examine a person's other beliefs and values in order to better understand and perhaps refer to the persons's original belief.
In some cases, the consideration of a belief can involve examination of a large set of underlying beliefs. Some of these beliefs can involve wide-ranging beliefs such as those about the cosmos, the world, and human nature. When a set of beliefs ranges that far, it more likely involves what have been called metaphysical beliefs. The word "metaphysical" has been given a number of different meanings. Here a metaphysical belief will be considered as one which is simply general and fundamental.
Most people do not examine their metaphysical beliefs. Often, they regard them as cherished beliefs which need to be guarded and defended closely. Philosophers have put metaphysical beliefs under scrutiny, but even many of them have fallen short of the mark in subjecting their own beliefs to rigorous examination. Plato, for instance, left his celebrated Ideas vague and perplexing. Rene Descartes posited God and used him to explain his certainty but never justified making the reference in the first place.
In the 20th century, a number of philosophers made a concerted effort to examine philosophical ideas. This trend was led by G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, and they were cheerfully followed by the Logical Positivists based in Vienna. The movement came to be known as analytic philosophy. The trend went far in discrediting the vague, speculative philosophy that had gone before, much of it from the 19th century. Much of this philosophy had been inspired by Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
Russell and the Logical Positivists were either scientists or were scientifically inclined. They wanted to put a final end to vague, metaphysical speculation and concentrate on the analysis and refinement of the understanding of basic terms. Rudolf Carnap went farthest in this endeavor, writing books and articles trying to find an ideal language for science, one which would provide the smoothest avenue for scientific investigation. Many of the Positivists were thus not so much interested in trying to reconcile varying metaphysical beliefs, as with trying to preclude their serious consideration. The Positivist verifiability criterion seemed
Although they were able to clarify some of the issues involved in the communication of scientific ideas, these philosophers were not able to come up with an ideal language for science. Too many issues arose involving the philosophy of language itself. Russell came up with a logical atomism by which only the most basic terms would be used to serve as a foundation for other terms. The project did not go very far because it was hard to find what words could serve as the logical atoms. Needless to say, Russell and others did not get around to positing any acceptable metaphysical propositions.
Many of the Logical Positivists--on account of their scientific, positivistic orientation, were not much interested in investigating beliefs beyond those necessary for the scientific enterprise. Any endeavor to consider metaphysical beliefs related ot the meaning of the universe as a whole amounted to a waste of time. After all, this is what the concept of positivism, as formulated its proponent Auguste Comte, was all about. Metaphysics, according to him, had once been a useful endeavor but had been superseded by the scientific approach to knowledge. The role of philosophy was to clarify concepts, particularly linguistic ones, in order to aid the understanding of science.
On the other hand, Russell appeared to return to an interest in metaphysics, at least of the nonmystical kind. His professed approach was to first carefully examine philosophical ideas. With that approach,the small philosophical problems would be solved. Once the smaller problems were solved, philosophers could more comfortably proceed to put it all together and solve the big problems of philosophy. Until the smaller problems were solved, there would be no consideration of the big problems. Russell's student, Ludwig Wittgenstein, believed--at least at one time--that all philosophical problems depended on confusions in language. Once the linguistic conundrums were solved, the philosophical ones would simply melt away. Hence, there was no need to attach the big problems directly. As mentioned before, Russell did not get very far toward solving the little bedrock problems. Wittgenstein's idea that all philosophical problems were at bottom linguistic ones, while given consideration, never gained wide acceptance.
Nevertheless, Russell's idea that philosophy should concentrate solely on the small, individual problems before even considering the big problems gained almost universal acceptance and is still the standard for doing philosophy today. No significant metaphysical systems appeared in the 20th century, with the possible exception of Henri Bergson's vitalism. Even Continental philosophy, which has criticized the overtly minute approach of Anglo-american philosophy, has produced no coherent metaphysical system. Existentialism, it is widely agreed, is hard to even define because there are a number of disparate ideas that seem to fall under the rubric. Continental philosophers have also taken an interest in special areas such as deconstrucion, semiotics, Marxism, and cultural studies, but no system tying all these together has appeared. Martin Heidegger was perhaps the most influential Continental philosopher, and he supposedly eschewed metaphysics, although most of his concerns certainly fall under that label.
While Russell and Moore's attitude toward grand metaphysical systems has had a salutary effect, it has not been entirely beneficial. There is a need for a comprehensive and systematic compendium of widely accepted facts and rational beliefs about the universe, in the manner that certain philosophers in the past have tried to set down. That is to say, in the spirit of past philosophy which has tried to understand things through the phrase "the universe as a whole." This phrase is best interpreted as a search for the meaning or purpose of the universe. It does not involve a study of the universe in all its detail. That is left to the sciences, starting with physics and continuing with chemistry, biology, and all the rest. Cosmology is a science that makes a study of the origins of the universe but also confines its approach to a narrow examination based on the more basic physical sciences--physics, chemistry, astronomy, and geology.
Saying that it is desirable to construct a comprehensive metaphysical system as was done before 1900 need not mean it would have to be written in the same style as was done then. The style of the writings of metaphysicians such as Kant, Hegel, and Johann Fichte contributed greatly to later opposition to all metaphysical writing. The approach was often vague, unsubstantiated, fantastical, and outright illogical. The interdependence of different concepts was sometimes strained since it was done to make the different parts fit tightly when that simply could not be done. A metaphysical system can be one that is (1) clearly written (at least by philosophy standards), (2) is founded on logical arguments, and (3) is based--as much as possible--on well-established facts and well-founded beliefs. A valid metaphysical system need not have an answer to every question, as was once assumed. That assumption was another reason system builders would engage in logic chopping and concept stretching so that it could appear that every question was correctly answered and everything fit together perfectly.
A 21st-century system, however, can honestly confront its limitations. It can go as far as possible to base its doctrines on currently-established fact, but it can also point out instances in wich the available information is not so reliable. In spite of these limitations, it can proceed because it need not prove all of its propositions to a point of certainty. It can instead be satisfied to found it propositions on what is most probably the case with regard to any given issue. It may even at times have to chose one belief over another becaue it si simply the one that is more probable than the other. This approach is in tune with the less authoritarian, more modest attitude that is more common today in society as well as in intellectual circles. People today are more likely to admit that they could be mistaken on a given issue, less likely to feel that once they have taken a stand or the issue that they could never change their mind. A wider intellectual modesty has perhaps come as a result of the continual appearance, for more than a century now, of new scientific and technological breakthroughs that have too often been the cause of embarrassment to those who had assumed that nature was static or that humans were not capable of uncovering it. Examples are earlier doubts about how wide the applications of the internal combustion engine could become or about the extent to which human-made flying machines could be developed.
Today a philosopher can try the best to present theories and doctrines that are grounded on the most solid foundation given the contemporary state of knowledge but still be cognizant that new discoveries can change the parameters that have seemed the most acceptable. Alternate paths can also be discussed and considered and ultimately be accepted as leading to ultimate results. For instance, in the long-standing debate over whether the mind is immaterial or not, it could be discovered that whether it is or not is not all that important toward the ultimate result.
Philosphers also need to rethink their long-standing devotion to certainty given that the quest for it has not proven very fruitful. It has long been an admirable goal of philosophy to try to reach the lvel of certainty in all its assertions. There is no doubt that philosophy should have high standards of rigor and exactitude in its search for the truth. Perhaps it should in a sense be "uncompromising." The word "uncompromising," however, has to be used in a way that takes account of human limitations in gettin at the truth. It may be good to say that one is not going to compromise the truth for the sake of expediency or for the sake of not offending those who would be offended by it. It is another thing to insist that one cannot make a rational, well-founded assessment that a proposition is true unless one is certain of the matter.
Uncertain, yet highly probable, statements are accepted not only in everyday life but even in scientific endeavors, which requre much greater certainty. Atoms and their constituent particles are discussed even though physicists are far from certain in regard to what an atom looks like. Gravity is accepted and measured in spite of many questions about its exact nature and about how it can act at a distance. These and many other propositions and concepts are accepted and used with full awareness that there is no certainty as to their exact nature.
In philosophy, there have been certain assertions that could be made with a high degree of confidence but have still not been made. Instead, these assertions have caused a tremendous amount of consternation in the history of philosophy. The most prominent issue that comes is that of the existence of the external world. Descartes, in the early 1600's, questioned the existence of everything around him as well as himself. He did this for the purpose of setting his knowledge on a foundaton of total certainty. (Augustine had actually been first, in the fourth century, to observe that his awareness of his own thinking made it clear that he existed.) Descartes' simple rationale for believing in the existence of the objects around him was that they were clearly present and that he did not believe that God would allow him to be deceived. This justification for believing in the existence of external objects satisfied many people in addition to Descartes, but there were many others who were not so easily pleased. Descartes' ruminations on the issue did succeed in starting a controversy that is still rumbling today although not with the intensity that it once had. Attempts were made to establish that physical objects did exist as well as the opposing proposition that they did not exist. The controversy has gone on because philosophers have continued to search for certain foundations for belief in physical objects and have not been able to do so. David Hume, one of the philosophers who did the most to cast doubt on certainty about the existence of physical objects, admitted that it was a doubt that could be considered only in philosophical discussion. He surmised that few people, including philosophers, had any doubt that physical objects did exist. The related problem regarding reasons for believing in the existence of other minds is another one that continues to be controversial because of the insistence on certainty. Still another certainty problem is the definition of knowledge.
While the quest for certainty need not be given up completely, there is no reason that philosophy cannot make significant gains on the basis of a simple high level of evidentiary justification for beliefs. We cannot be absolutely certain that the moon exists or that water will always turn into ice. After all, the silvery orb we have been observing on some nights for millenia and have known as the moon could be simply an optical illusion. The flights that were supposedly made to the moon by the United States in 1969 and the early 1970's could have been part of a well-orchestrated conspiracy. There are people who have seriously made this claim.) The conspiracy could have been formed for any one of a number of reasons. It could have been a plan by the U.S. government to intimidate and humiliate the Soviet Union, or it could have been the idea of global secret society in control of both countries which had some unknown reason for perpetrating the hoax. As for the formation of ice, there is no guarantee that just because water has turned to ice for countless millenia that it will do so again tomorrow. Countless other examples like these could be offered of facts for which there is little room for real doubt but which cannot ultimately be known with complete certainty. Nevertheless, there are numberous facts which everyone beleives to be true without any inkling of doubt. Nor are those the type of facts that people might assume simply because they did not take much time to reflect on the matter. An example of this would be the long-popular belief that the earth was flat or the idea that bleeding a person could cure a disease. There are many hard-to-doubt beliefs for wich even cautious, exacting philosophers, after close and thorough analysis, would still find hard to come up with reasons for doubting. Universally-accepted facts such as that objects fall to the ground, water can flow, a sun near the earth exists, lights called stars can be seen above the earth at night, a person will bleed after suffering a severe cut. a person without eyes cannot see.
Many of these facts are found universally through the world and are fundamental to human life as we know it. If we could nto rely on the facts remaining as they are from one day to the next, our lives would be much more difficult. Those facts are reliable and unchanging. In many ways, it is frightening to imagine what would happen if they were much different than what they are at present. Suppose, for instance, that the sun appeared over the eastern horizon only sporadically. Say it reappeared in some cases after only short spans of say four or five hours but at the other extreme it didn't reappear for several days.
There are many facts about the world that we can state without holding any significant doubt. We can then gather these near-certain facts and obtain at lest some idea of how they fit together. From there, we can proceed to analyze other supposed facts which are less certain. We can weigh the reasons for and against accepting this more doubtful group of facts as true. After we have done that, we can go on to inspect and hopefully be able to decide on the truth of succeeding levels of less obvious facts. After completing our analysis, we can see if we can form a coherent, comprehensive picture based on all the facts. It is possible that we would not be able to agree that a single, comprehensive picture or system could be formed, but then perhaps the mass of facts could be seen as forming two or three possible systems. Ultimately, it culd be discovered that no coherent system at all could be formed, that the totality of facts was simply too jumbled to present any "big picture."
Even the discovery of this latter result would be of benefit. It would be an indication that to try to formulate any kind of metaphysical system was a waste of time. It would validate the rejection by many philosophers in the 20th century of all metaphysical schemes. It would perhaps give greater ease of mind to philosophers in proceeding to simply concentrate on the small problems of philosophy. Perhaps most importantly, it would help prevent people from being misled by charlatans who claimed to have discovered a metaphysical system.
On the other hand, a sound metaphysical system could be discovered. It could turn out to be the only legitimate system that could be supported by the facts. Alternatively, it could more modestly be the most acceptable one among other plausible ones. There would be a number of advantages in having one predominant, factually-based metaphysical system. As in the case where no metaphysical system were found legitimate, it would help to discredit falsely-based systems. Any proposed system could be compared, side-by-side with the legitimate one to see where it could have gone wrong. The greatest aid in having a single metaphysical system would hopefully be in the greater intellectual harmony, at least among philosophers and other thinkers. Perhaps, this greater unity could even spread to the population at large. There could be great benefit to society--even the wider society of the world--from everyone reading on the same page. There is much greater social cohesion and harmony when the members of a society share a common outlook and values. This is understandable since there is less friction and less time is spent on trying to understand and reconcile disparate view points. Individuals do not have to accept or adopt mores or laws bsed on the values or ideas of others that are alien or even objectionable to their own way of thinking. Instead, a common ground of values and morals eases the reaching of a consensus on a particular issue, with the only grounds for contention being how to apply commonly held values to the particular situation.
With the recent emphasis on multiculturalism, all this may sound reactionary and provincial, but it need not be so. A metaphysical, and consequently a moral, consensus need not mean that it wuld be reached in an authoritarian or unthinking manner. A consensus would be based only on facts, and most of those facts would be either readily ascertained or at least noncontroversial to reasonable persons. It would not be forced onto society either by a legal system or by a social atmosphere that made it uncomfortable for individuals to disagree such as has happened in past societies, especially before the establishment of democracies. The consensus metaphysical system would have wide assent because it would be based on solid evidence. There would be no need for coercion for it to be accepted. Besides, it would be based on free and open inquiry into the facts that compose the world and not on any preordained agenda to achieve any particular social purpose. Thus, it woud not be in it character to base people's acceptance of it on coercion. There would still be room for dissent in a society that would adopt the system. However, as a practical matter, there would not be many rational dissenters since the truth supporting the system would be obvious.
Inventory of Philosophical Beliefs
There are other good reasons for trying to construct a metaphysical system besides the desire to reach a consensus of belief. One motive would be a desire to see what picture would emerge after examining all the widely-accepted philosophical doctrines together. No doubt there would be disagreement over wich doctrines could be said to be widely accepted. General acceptance need not make a philosophical belief a true one. Nevertheless, even if the accepted beliefs proved later to be false, it would still be beneficial to assess their aggregate effect. Looking at the big picture creaed by the total belief system could actually reveal weaknesses in the individual doctrines.
I mentioned above that Russell and many of those who followed him purposely avoided considering a big picture in order to concentrate on solving the small, but crucial, problems. (Russell, however, also said that it had been his intention when he began to write to write about mathematics and the science, to write about the social sciences, and then to put it all together.) Presumably, the minute hedgehog approach was followed throughout the 20th century. Even the Continental philosophers have concentrated, to a great degree, on social and cultural issues and have not considered a comprehensive picture.
Even if one insists on a piecemeal, gradualistic approach, it would still seem beneficial to take inventory of those beliefs that have been established by stepping back to examine their total effect. That could be done by attempting to build a metaphyscial system on the foundation laid down by all the individual, established beliefs. To fail to do this is like the architect who spends months designing specific rooms and features in a building but never takes any time to consider what the entire edifice is going to look like as a whole. A view of the entire project can reveal defects in the foundation which should be fixed immediately before going any further. Even if no defects are found, it would seem that a periodic inspection of the project could help in the development of the best final production.
This idea of first solving small philosophical problems, e.g. the knowledge problem, the nature of numbers, before assessing the big picture can be called a bottom-up approach. A variation of this piecemeal approach is a subject-by-subject advance. For some time, it has been the practice to divide philosophy into different subject areas and concentrate on studying those areas. For centuries, there have been the traditional areas, of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and logic. In the 20th century, new areas arose such as aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history. Subcategories of these later appeared such as philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of economics, semantics, Christian philosophy, Hindu philosophy. More unusual categories have been formed such as philosophy of sports, philosophy of cinema, philosophy of winemaking.
This study of subject areas fits well with the idea that philosophy is actually analytic philosophy or the analysis of concepts. To do philosophy, according to this view, is to meticulously examine and evaluate either a traditional philosophical issue or a subject that is amenable to philosophical examination. The question then arises: what is it to engage in philosophical? What is it that distinguishes it from the regular study of a subject? After all, physicists and economists engage in close analysis of ideas and concepts involved in their discipline all the time. Continuing examination and reevaluation of general ideas, especially in the light of significant new information, has to be part of the study of the a subject. A physicist reevalutes the concept of force in light of recent information on the role subatomic particles play in the observation of forces. An economist may have to take another look at the effec to monetary policy in light of the changing attitude of the people toward their personal debt.
The difference between the philosophical approach and the regular approach is in the extent of the generality. The approach of philosophy is to examine the over all purpose of a particular subject, its reason for existing, and its methodology--its means of accomplishing its aims. This is consistent with the popular use of phrases, such as "look at it philosophically" or "let's get philosophical." The phrases imply a stepping back to take a general view of a subject or endeavor. The idea of taking this wider view is to look at what one is trying to accomplish and whether the means of acieving the aim are being effective. The philosophical approach is not even simply an overview of the subject to assess its scope or extent. It tries to go deeper than that. It is a look into a purpose for engaging in the endeavor in the first place. Secondly, but very importantly, it looks into methodology in order to assess how well the purpose is being realized.
The question then is, even under a subject approach, why can't the subject to be studied philosophically be the universe as a whole, in other words, all of existence? If it is acceptable to analyze small segments of the universe, why is it not valid allowed to study the nature and purpose of everything as a wole? As mentined before, Russell had ambitions of tying together all the knowledge gained through philosophical analysis. Wilfrid Sellars seemed open to a comprehensive view of philosophy when he defined philosophy as __________________________ . It appears, however, from the interests of most contemporary philosophers--especially the Anglo-Americans--that there is no longer any place in philosophy study for consideration of existence as a whole. One surmises this much from the published books and papers of professional philosophers since 1950.
The philosophical study of existence as a whole (as contrasted with the nonphilosophy study of the universe known as cosmology) needs to be considered seriously by those who insist on approaching philosophy through a subject approach. The same standards of care and rigor can be applied to the comprehensive study of things as can be used in their piecemeal study. This lack of precision is surely what contemporary analytic philosophers fearsince there has been such a long history of fuzziness in connection with metaphysical writing. The comprehensive study can perhaps be an aid in understanding the small areas, but eve if it isn't, there is no reason for preclding the comprehensive study almost completely as has been done. The comprehensive look has at least as much right to consideration as any other study.
Starting with First Principles (The Top-Bottom Approach)
Ultimately, the study of the comprehensive picture follows the long tradition of looking at philosophy as a search for the principle or principles behind nature or existance. Long before Spinoza and Kant, it seems that philosophers were motivated by the idea of finding fundamental principles that would explain the universe. It would have probably been diffucult for the early Greek philosophers to articulate exactly what they were seeking, but it appears they were thinking of a basic principle from which all other facts could flow. Thales was the first philosophy to announce a principle, and it was actually an assertion in physics. They claimed that everything in the world was made of water. In today's scientific parlance, we would say that he was claiming that there was only one element from which everything else had been formed and that element was water. It is not clear that Thales meant only that. He may well have thought that his water idea would explain more than just a physical fact about the world. As in the case of most philosophers after him, he seems to have been searching for some ultimate explanation or meaning of the universe.
Plato seems to have found a general explanatory principle, and it mwas based on his Ideas and particularly on his idea of the Good. Aristotle was interested in finding principles behind the facts of nature (physis) in some of his writings. These writings were later collected by one of his followers and called meta ta physica (after the physics). From this came the word "metaphysics" which implies a study of what is behind the physics or nature. It strives for an explanation of whay things are the way they are. Descartes, who has been called the father of modern p, was also very interested in first philosophy, one of his books being called Meditations on First Philosophy.
At this point, it can be objected that philosophy should not be identified with metaphysics, i.e. that there is a large difference in their subject matter. Hostorically, at least, philosophy has been divided into metaphysics, ethics, and logic. Logic as been a tool to aid in correct thinking, and ethics has shown at least some dependence on metaphysical doctrines. Consequently, metaphysics has taken up a large space of philosophy. (The philosophers who immediately followed Thales also were intent on primarily finding the basic elements of nature, and for that reason, could be considered more scientists than philosophers. The line between the two was not clear, especially in the beginning.)
It was understandable for Thales and philosophers that followed him to try to formulate a principle that might provide a full explanation for the nature of the universe. They had little knowledge of the physical world in comparison with what we know today, but they had observed enough to allow them to make certain assertions about the nature of the universe. The early Greek philosophers may not have announced any definitive scientific laws like the ones we know today. They not have even had a concept of scientific law, but they surely had noticed a number of regularites in nature. One of the most obvious regularities to people at any period of human history are those recurring cycles that are seen throughout a year. Early humans observed these occurrences: there are the morning appearances and evening settings of the sun. Both occur at approximately the same times of the day, but upon closer study, a gradual change in these times is found from one day to the next. Still, there is a regularity in the daily changes so that it is known that the sun will rise and set at the same time on the same day in different years. For instance, on March 22nd of different years, the sun will rise at the same time and will set at the same time. The coldest part of the year will come during the days in which sunrise and sunset are closer to each other (in other words, the days are shorter). The hottest days will coincide with the longest periods of time between sunrise and sunset (the days are longer). Plants will bloom after winter and before summer , i.e. in the spring, and will generally give fruit in the autumn. Objects will always fall to the ground under a force called gravity.
These and other patterns were observed by even those humans living many millenia before the pre-Socratic philosophers, and they felt a desire to find a common source of explanation. The desire was no doubt fueled by a natural curiousity exhibited in a wish to know simply for the sake of knowledge. There must have been an additional desire to find an original phenomenon or cause that had either created everything or at least had set it in motion. This originating phenomenon could give an explanation for the patterns seen by the inhabitants of the earth. The originating phenomenon could be impersonal, but more than likely, primitive people imagined it to be more humanlike, with a mind perhaps. This would explain the patterns seen in nature. It would be easily assumed then--by primitives-- that the patterns had been consciously designed by superiour inventing minds.
The invention of myth then arose from that pervasive human desire to know something about the origins of things. Often the myths may not have made much sense as explanations, but it seems that once a mythical explanation became established not many people questioned it. That is until Thales came along. He apparently was not satisfied with the mythical explanations of his day and thought it more accurate that there was a physical explanation for the nature of things. This was probably due to his tinkering with physical phenomena.
(c) 2001 by Louis Lopez
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