Vietnam 2003 - Dennis Coyne & Paul Davis - Photo Gallery- February 25 - March 15, 2003

Pleiku, Kontum, & Dak To

The Central Highlands are beautiful and provide a mild climate for the residents.  Logging has depleted much of the triple canopy forests, but provided a source of revenue to the economy.  Farming and coffee growing are very successful there and provide a source of revenue to the world market for Vietnam.  All three cities have experienced population explosions since the end of the war in 1975.  Pleiku is the largest and has a thriving market place for local commerce.

We noted that sports is of interest there.  A professional soccer team from the Long An (south) was playing the local team while we were there.  Interest was high.

At the Pleiku hotel, we met members of the Sons and Daughters In Touch (fathers killed in Vietnam)  tour that was visiting battle sites in the Highlands.  When their tour guide discovered that we were vets, he requested that we meet with them before we left for Kontum and Dak To that day.  It was an emotional meeting for all of us and we were glad for the chance encounter.

If you are interested in a little history, read on.  If not, go to the pictures.

These towns were the geographic names that became the center of defensive operations for the Central Highlands provided by the 4th Infantry Division.  The 4th arrived in country 25 September 1966 and made its way to west to Pleiku and created the division base -  Camp Enari  - just south of the city and next to Dragon Mountain.  The 3 Brigades and their battalions established many fire bases through out the area to defend the Highlands from the NVA.  The 4th had the largest area of operation of all the divisions and therefore functioned primarily as a blocking force for the many entry points off the Ho Chi Minh trail from Cambodia and Laos.

Dak To and Hill 875 were the front page story in Nov. 67 for the 4th Division.  The Ia Drang Valley battle (south & west of Pleiku)  between Lt. Col Hal Moore's 1st Bn, 7th Cav (1st Cavalry Division) and elements of the 66th and 33rd NVA regiments led by Sr. Lt Col Nguyen Huu An, Deputy Commander, B-3 Front (NVA/PAVN), Central Highlands,  was the story November 1965.  The importance of the Ia Drang battle was the flawed strategy that the US adopted as a result - attrition.  The losses suffered by the NVA were staggering - about 15 NVA to 1 US killed. (for more about this - click  here for the Mang Yang Pass). The US thought process was that the Vietnamese could not sustain those losses and win.  The Vietnamese had a different opinion.  What they took from the battle was the "belt buckle" strategy.  If they could get close enough to the enemy (grab them by the belt buckle) and inflict casualties despite the air superiority of helicopters and other aircraft, they could endure the losses and prolong the war indefinitely.  They were correct.