US Military Non-Lethal Weapons
Submitted by MCCLOSL@towers.com
Source: http://www.cdsar.af.mil/apj/mcgowan.html
11-10-97
ACOUSTIC ENERGY PROPERTIES
Infrasonic:
Target effects
-- Mild to severe discomfort
-- Organ functional disturbance
-- Organ disruption
Propagation characteristics
-- Ground or structure penetration
-- Long-range propagation
-- Nondirectional
Sonic: 20 Hz to 20 kHz
Target effects
-- Hearing interference
-- Performance degradation
-- Pain
-- Hearing loss
-- Tissue damage
Propagation characteristics
-- Moderate propagation
-- Moderately directional
Ultrasonic: 20 kHz
Target effects
-- Possible diffuse psychological effects
-- Pain
-- Surface tissue damage
-- Tissue destruction
Propagation characteristics
-- Limited propagation
-- Highly directional
ACOUSTIC WEAPONS GRADUATED EFFECT
Effect on personnel inherently graduated by range and power level Detection
(infrasonic/sonic) at medium to long range Hear/feel presence of energy
Annoyance, irritation, interference with performance Infrasonic/sonic at medium
power Ultrasonic at medium to high power Pain (a) Auditory (sonic/infrasonic)
at medium to high power (b) Other organs (infrasonic/sonic/ultrasonic) at high
power Incapacitation (very high power) Death Potential as area exclusion
devices
Vortex Ring Generator Objective
Integrate concussion, flash, chemical, and impact methods of crowd control into
a single vortex ring delivery system, with the intent of improving nonlethal
effectiveness as well as reducing weight, cost, and logistics associated with
stockpiling different cartridges.
Vortex Ring Generator Description
o Concept of operation
-- Attach muzzle adapter to barrel
-- Add a chemical tank
-- Fire blank flash-bang rounds to generate vortex rings
-- Impact targets by integrated chemical-flash-concussion impulses
o Desired performance
-- Knock down human target with single shot
-- Incapacitate via resonance effects
-- Incapacitate by single shot employing entrained chemical agent
Nonlethal Testing Conclusions/Observations
o Determining target effects on personnel is greatest challenge to testing
community
o Wide variety of potential effects requires evaluation
o Potential for injury or death severely limits human testing
o Animal testing is limited
o Extrapolation of surrogate target test data not consistently reliable
o Antimaterial systems present difficult challenges
o Details of temporary upset mechanisms not readily measurable
o Human presence (integral and collateral) limits testing scenarios
_____________________________________________________________________________
NONLETHAL WEAPONS
Technologies, Legalities, and Potential Policies
Maj Joseph W. Cook, III,
Maj David P. Fiely, Maj Maura T. McGowan
From A.D. 1200 to 1500 a group of mercenaries on the Italian peninsula called
the condottieri waged what has often been regarded as a form of nonlethal
warfare. They were hired by the various mercantile city-states to protect vital
interests. Many of the major engagements between these city-states' condottieri
were almost comical for their lack of casualties.
According to Niccolo Machiavelli, the battle of Zagonara in 1424 was a
"defeat, famous throughout all Italy, [in which] no death occurred except
those of Lodovico degli Obizi and two of his people, who, having fallen from
their horses, were drowned in the mire."1 Several reasons have been
extended for this low lethality. One of the more plausible reasons was the
simple fact that the armor of the day was much superior to most offensive
weaponry. A more personal reason is the fact that the surest way for a
mercenary to lose his source of livelihood was for the condottieri to
obliterate his enemies. As a result, mercenaries rarely sought setpiece
battles, choosing instead to fight relatively minor and extended campaigns.
Engagements between mounted warriors often resembled jousts and those between
infantry often turned into shoving matches.
In the past, nonlethal warfare did not rely on the use of nonlethal weapons;
rather, it was the fortuitous result of the superiority of body armor over
offensive weaponry or the mutual lackadaisical approach of opposing soldiers
and leaders. Today, nonlethal weapons might offer the ability to wage nonlethal
warfare without relying on such fortuitous circumstances. The use of nonlethal
weapons would serve as a means of keeping the level of conflict low and of
dissuading belligerents from resorting to more forceful weapons. Also, the
prospect of resolving conflict with low levels of lethality is especially
exciting to a country that has a warfighting doctrine of minimizing friendly as
well as enemy casualties. Sun Tzu espoused a similar doctrine when he said:
o Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is
inferior to this.
o To capture the enemy's army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a
battalion, a company or a fiveman squad is better than to destroy them.
o For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of
skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.2
Nonlethal weapons are defined as "weapons that are designed to disable
personnel, weapons, supplies, or equipment in such a way that death or severe
permanent disability to personnel are unlikely." However, some proposed
"nonlethal" weapons are not authorized under the international law
governing weapons. Additionally, some nonlethal weapons are not truly nonlethal
in all employment scenarios. Some government organizations such as the National
Institute of Justice prefer the term less than lethal3 to emphasize the point
that "enough marshmallows will kill you if properly placed."4 Others
have coined the phrase "nonlethal weapons of mass destruction" to
emphasize the fact that nonlethal weapons span the spectrum of warfare from
lowintensity conflict through theater conventional warfare and all the way to
strategic global war. Biological or chemical agents that destroy crops without
directly affecting people would still be considered lethal if starvation is the
likely result. A microwave weapon that disables a truck that subsequently
drives off a cliff, killing the driver, would be nonlethal. The same weapon
used against a helicopter in flight would have to be considered lethal.
Some nonlethal technologies may offer new options to our armed forces; others
may prove to be more useful to our enemies because of our advanced society's
many vulnerabilities. For example, a terrorist group with rudimentary knowledge
of our information switches could shut down our stock market with several
wellplaced electromagnetic pulse generators. Regardless of a weapon's potential
worth or our relative vulnerability, however, there is some value in pursuing
these technologies if only to develop appropriate countermeasures and policies.
In this article, we will examine the various nonlethal weapons in three
contexts-potential technologies, legalities, and potential policies.
Proposed Nonlethal Weapons and Their Legality
In 1868, the Russian government issued an invitation to the International
Military Commission "to examine the expediency of forbidding the use of
certain projectiles in time of war between civilized nations." At issue
was the use of certain light explosives or inflammable projectiles. When used
against human beings, the new projectile was no more effective than an ordinary
rifle bullet; however, it caused greater wounds and thus greatly aggravated the
sufferings of the victim. The resulting document, the Declaration of St.
Petersburg, prohibited the use of explosive projectiles under 400 grams of
weight. It was the first international treaty imposing restrictions on the
conduct of war.
Legal Framework
The Declaration of St. Petersburg is a significant document because it develops
a line of reasoning governing the legality of weapons. This reasoning is found
in the preamble to the declaration:
"Considering the progress of civilization should have the effect of
alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war. The only legitimate
object which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the
military forces of the enemy. It is sufficient to disable the greatest possible
number of men, and this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death
inevitable. The use of such weapons would therefore, be contrary to the laws of
humanity."
Although it may appear to be an incongruous concept, the nations of the world
have recognized the need to impose restrictions on the waging of war. War will
necessarily result in death and injury to humans and the destruction of
property; however, in the eyes of the international community, it need not be
an unlimited exercise in cruelty and ruthlessness.5 The necessities of war must
be conciliated with the laws of humanity. The resulting restrictions are
regarded as the international law of armed conflict (LOAC), or the law of war.
These concepts did not originate in
While most cultures saw a need to restrain the horrors of war, it was not until
the nineteenth century that these concepts were codified. The Declaration of
St. Petersburg was followed by the Hague conventions, which codified the
"laws and customs of war on land."6 The Geneva conventions of 1929
and 1949 focused on ameliorating the conditions of civilians, prisoners of war,
and the sick and wounded.7 The latest amendments to the law of armed conflict
are contained in the 1977 Protocol.8 Additionally, a number of treaties address
the legitimacy of specific weapons.9
The legality of a weapon and the legality of the specific use of a weapon are
determined by international law. The sources of international law are
international conventions, international customs, general principles of law, as
well as the writings of publicists.10 International law is part of the domestic
law of the
To examine the legality of nonlethal weapons, it is necessary to understand the
wide array of legal principles and restrictions governing their use.
[I]n considering the use of any weapon, new or old, two questions must be
answered. First, can this weapon legally be use? Second, if the first question
is answered in the affirmative, is the proposed use of this weapon legal?13
We will review the general principles governing the law of armed conflict,
restraints imposed by custom and treaty, and specific bans on weapons in order
to review the legality of some proposed nonlethal weapons.
General Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict
International law does not enumerate those acts that may be committed in the
name of military necessity. Guidance is found in
"Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to
apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the
enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. . . . There
must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the
overcoming of the enemy."14
Military Necessity
The rules of international law must be followed even if it results in the loss
of an advantage. Kriegsraison, the German doctrine of military necessity, was
the belief that the ends justified the means. A matter of urgent necessity
could override the LOAC. This principle was rejected in United States v. Krupp,
when the Nuremberg tribunal held that ...
"to claim that the law of war can be wantonly and at the sole discretion
of any one belligerent be disregarded when he considered his own situation to
be critical means nothing more than to abrogate the laws and customs of war
entirely."15
Humanity
The principle of humanity calls for the mitigation of human suffering.16 As an
example, an enemy soldier should not be subjected to unnecessary suffering. A
wound should be inflicted to heal as painlessly as possible.17 Humanity's
position in the law of armed conflict was also preserved by the "Martens'
Clause," which specified that ...
"the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protections and the
principles of the laws of nations as they result from the usage's established
among civilized persons, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of
the public conscience."18
The Rule of Proportionality
The concept of proportionality calls for a reasonable relationship between the
amount of destruction caused and the military significance of the attack.19 The
principles of humanity and military necessity are applied together.
Proportionality requires that the loss of life and the damage not be
disproportionate to the expected military advantage. "Proportionality
represents a movable fulcrum on which necessity humanity scale may be
balanced."20 The law recognizes that a military activity will result in
some loss of life and property, but the action is illegal if the loss exceeds
the military advantage.
Principles Governing Weapons
International law establishes certain principles governing the prohibition of
weapons. Two such principles are unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate
effects caused by certain weapons.
Unnecessary Suffering
Article 23(e) of the 1907 Hague Convention prohibits the use of "arms,
projectiles or materials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering."21
This concept has been the subject of much concern as there is no precise
definition of unnecessary suffering. As stated in Air Force Pamphlet (AFP)
11031, International Law: The Conduct of Armed Conflict, all weapons cause
suffering.22 The St. Petersburg Declaration speaks in terms of arms that
uselessly aggravate "the sufferings of disabled men or render their death
inevitable."
Indiscriminate Effects
A primary concern of the law of armed conflict is the protection of
noncombatants. A belligerent may not attack a noncombatant and must cancel an
attack on a legitimate military target if the injury to the noncombatant
population would be disproportionate. Belligerents cannot employ a
"blind" weapon, one that cannot discriminate between noncombatants
and combatants.
Restraints Imposed by Custom or Treaty
A weapon that complies with the general principles of the law may not be used
in a manner that is restricted by custom or treaty.
Weapons may be used only against military objectives. An object is considered
to be a military object if its use, nature, location, or purpose make effective
contribution to the military action.23 Some objects are considered dual use
objects. They meet the needs of the civilian population but also effectively
contribute to the enemys military action. These objects may be attacked if
there is a military advantage to be gained by their attack. During Desert
Storm, the coalition forces bombed bridges across the
The attack may only be against lawful combatants. The LOAC prohibits attack
against noncombatants or civilian property. Again, attacks against military
targets may result in injury to protected persons and property. It is the
attackers' responsibility to minimize collateral damage against protected
persons and property. Places such as buildings dedicated to religion, art,
science, charitable purposes, historic monuments, and hospitals are protected
from attack.25 The Hague Convention also prohibits the use of poison,26
treachery, and perfidy.27 Emblems of protection such as the Red Cross must be
respected.28 There are rules governing the use of uniforms and certain
signals.29 Assassination is prohibited.30
Technologies
Man is constantly using technology to devise new weapons that international law
must address. These weapons range from the very deadly to the nonlethal.
Biological Weapons
Biological warfare is defined as "the technique of destruction by
disease."31 Biological agents are living organisms (bacteria, viruses,
fungi, protozoa, and rickettsiae) or the toxins derived from such organisms.
These organisms or toxins can be targeted against animals, plants, or material.
The idea of using bacteria and toxins to harm an enemy is not a new one. During
the fourteenth century, the Tatars catapulted bodies of plague victims into a
Crusader fortress to spread contagion. The Crusaders, weakened by disease, lost
their stronghold.32 Historically, biological weapons have been regarded as so
horrible that they should be prohibited. The objections are based on a number
of grounds.
Bacteriological agents owe their effects to the multiplication of their
organisms within the victim. Their multiplication after dissemination is hard
to control. They are unpredictable in scale and duration.33 They increase the
possibility of epidemics that would indiscriminately strike noncombatants. They
may also indiscriminately attack the disseminator's own troops. The medical
profession, entitled to protection, would suffer at the same rate as the
combatants, decreasing chances of survival for the whole population.34
Bacteriological warfare may be impossible to defend against. This type of
warfare does not destroy property but strikes against personnel, animals, and
crops. Suffering may be prolonged due to the destruction of crops.35 An
important consideration was that toxins are technically poisons, and poisons
have historically been prohibited.
Although it is conceivable that under limited circumstances biological weapons
could be employed in accordance with the generally accepted principles of the
LOAC, they have been banned by international treaties. In 1925, the Geneva
Protocol prohibited the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. In 1975 the
The impact of these two conventions is the clear prohibition of the use and
development of biological weapons. Attempts to employ biological warfare, even
in a nonlethal capacity, would be prohibited under international law. The
drafters of the Biological Convention focused on the development of biological
weapons for hostile purposes.
One of the methods of nonlethal warfare under consideration is the use of
recombinant DNA technology to attack an ethnic population. This would be a
prohibited hostile use of biological agents. In addition, such an action could
be a violation of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.36 The use of biological agents even to cause mild sickness or
destroy a food crop would be unlawful. The criteria for the use of the
biological agent is whether or not it is a hostile use, not whether or not the
use will result in death.
Some bacteriological agents have genuine medical uses, and stockpiling for
these purposes is not objectionable. Accordingly, it would follow that the use
of bioremedians, biological agents that break down material, to clean up oil
spills would be legal under these treaties, but the use of these same agents to
destroy an enemy's fuel supply would be considered hostile intent and therefore
illegal.37
Although the original impetus for the prohibition against biological warfare
was the damage or injury to man, the conventions have been written to prohibit
any hostile use of biological agents, even those which are nonlethal.
Chemical Weapons
The end of the nineteenth century saw the development of chemical weapons on a
significant scale.38 Chemical weapons were frequently used during World War I
in the form of toxic chemicals such as chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gases.
Phosgene has a slow effect on the victim. "The person will have increasing
difficulty in breathing as the lung tissue is slowly destroyed and fills up
with bodily fluids. Death, which is slow in coming, is by asphyxiation."39
Since death was slow in coming, the victims damaged lungs would suffer bacterial
infection that would be the actual cause of death.40 Sulfur mustard gas also
destroys tissue. If the gas contacts skin, the skin is destroyed. If the gas is
inhaled, the lung lining is destroyed.41
The military and the general population were horrified by these weapons, which
had the same treacherous characteristics of poison that had been prohibited by
custom and international treaties. The weapon could not be seen, and defenses
were limited. Its effectiveness was subject to the whims of the wind. Gas was
released to cover an area, and would indiscriminately strike all in the area,
be they combatants or noncombatants. And last, the weapon caused unnecessary
suffering.
The 1925 Gas Protocol was drafted in response to the horrors seen during World
War I. A number of nations reserved the right to retaliate against the use of
chemical weapons with chemical weapons. The United States had several
objections to the Gas Protocol. It believed chemical weapons did not include
chemical riot control agents. The United States has historically argued the
dichotomy of allowing riot control gases by a nations police force against its
own citizens while prohibiting their use against enemy combatants in battle.42
Again, it argued that the use of herbicides and defoliants may be more humane
in some cases than the use of conventional weapons.43 Fifty years later, in
1975, the Senate abandoned these arguments and unanimously ratified the treaty.
In 1975, President Gerald R. Ford issued an executive order renouncing first
use of riot control gases and herbicides except in limited noncombatant
situations.44
The Gas Protocol has been subject to a number of criticisms.45 Following the
United States's lead, the United Nations took efforts to develop comprehensive
arms control of chemical weapons. The Draft Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction46 prohibited the use, development, production, acquiring, or
stockpiling of chemical weapons. It also prohibited the use of riot controls as
a method of warfare.
The Convention defines chemical weapons to include "Toxic chemicals and
their precursors, except when intended for purposes not prohibited under this
convention" (emphasis added). Toxic chemical is defined to mean "any
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death,
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals."
Prohibited toxic chemicals have been listed in schedules contained in the
"Annex of Chemicals":
"Riot Control Agent" means any chemical not listed in a Schedule,
which can produce rapidly in human sensory irritation or disabling physical
effects which disappear within a short time following termination of
exposure."
Article II, Section 9, goes on to define "Purposes Not Prohibited Under
this Convention" to mean:
c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not
dependent on the use of toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare
d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.
Following are some of the chemical antipersonnel nonlethal weapons under
consideration.
Tear/Riot Gases. The domestic law enforcement community possesses and uses riot
gases. However, in a warfare situation, the use of tear gas is currently
strictly limited by an executive order. When the chemical convention is entered
into force, the use of tear gas and other riot controls will be completely
forbidden.
Calmative Agents. These agents, sometimes called sleep agents, can be made more
effective by combining them with dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO), a chemical that
promotes transmission of the calmative through the skin and into the
bloodstream. Calmative agents were allegedly used by the Soviets in
Afghanistan. The reports indicated that the mujahideen would lie down and sleep
until they awoke later in Soviet custody. The reports are discounted because
such a chemical has not proven effective.47 If the chemical that comprises the
calmative agent is not listed on the prohibited chemical schedule, then a
further determination of whether the agent constitutes a prohibited riotcontrol
agent must be made. Under the definition of "riot control agent,"
calmative agents would be prohibited because they cause disabling physical
effects.
Sticky Foam. These polymer agents will hopelessly stick a person to anything.
It can be argued that these weapons amount to prohibited riot control agents
under the convention since they are "chemicals... which can produce
rapidly disabling physical effects."
Markers. These chemical agents come in numerous forms and are currently used in
law enforcement. A covert variety can surreptitiously expose a criminal to an
invisible dye that shows up under special lighting. An overt dye that is
impossible to wash off can be sprayed on a fleeing felon.
Nonlethal chemical agents that attack material are promising and diverse. If
the chemical that comprises the weapon is limited on the schedule of prohibited
chemicals, it may be possible to claim that the weapon is exempt. These
chemicals are "not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of
chemicals as a method of warfare." "Toxic Properties" means
using chemical action on life processes that cause death, temporary incapacitation,
or permanent harm to humans or animals. This category of weapons would include
the following agents.
Combustion Alteration Technology (CAT). CAT agents change the viscosity or
combustion characteristics of fuel to degrade engine performance.
Nearinstantaneous engine failure is possible if the agent is applied in
appropriate quantities.
Smart Metals. These special metals, formed with chemical additives or blended
in a particular form, could be introduced to control certain activities while
allowing legitimate ones. For example, a notional metal designed to perform
satisfactorily in a legitimate chemical plant might be designed to fail or give
off telltale signs to inspectors if the plant is used for more insidious
purposes.
Super Caustics. These super acids can be used against weapons, tires, roads,
roofs, optical systems, or even shoes. They could also be used to deny human
contact and can be stored in a harmless binary form.48
Metal Embrittlement. These agents severely weaken metals by chemically changing
their molecular structure. They are clear, leave imperceptible residue, can
attack almost any metal, and can be applied with a felt tip pen.49
Antitraction Technology. These super lubricants severely reduce traction. They
are specially blended to attack specific targets such as roads, runways, rails,
and the like.50
Polymer Agents. These agents are similar to sticky foams but are designed to
target material instead of personnel. They can foul engines or ventilation
systems and can also deny the use of weapons and facilities.51
Electromagnetic Weapons
Nonlethal electromagnetic weapons span the spectrum from simple to exotic. Many
can be employed (or can have collateral effects) against both personnel and
equipment. Blinding and shocking effects are the most common nonlethal results
of the use of this class of weapons. We will now look at potential nonlethal
applications of certain technologies for which there are presently no specific
prohibitions but which could certainly have LOAC implications.
Electrified Baton, Stun Gun, Taser. These weapons deliver immobilizing,
lowenergy pulsed shocks either at close range (baton and stun gun) or at long
range (taser). They are used by police in criminal enforcement. The taser has
electric currents of high voltage and low amperage that cause the muscles of
the body to contract forcefully.52 The individual experiences spasms.53 The
contractions may fracture bones. If the individual collapses, he may suffer
further injury.54 If an individual is repeatedly shocked, he may be rendered
unconscious. The individual may suffer electrical burns that may be difficult
to treat.55
Highintensity Light. These omnidirectional bombs or flares can flashblind
personnel even in existing intense lighting situations. They can also degrade
sensors and night vision devices.
Lasers. Lowenergy lasers can be directed or aimed at specific targets to blind
personnel or sensors either temporarily or permanently. They can also be used
to make a gun or other weapon too hot to hold. The most advanced blinding
lasers oscillate between numerous colors to make goggles and other
countermeasures ineffective.
One factor in the assessment of the legality of a weapon is discrimination. A
weapon that injures the civilian population or civilian property along with
military personnel and objects, without distinction, is considered
indiscriminate and thus illegal. Electromagnetic weapons, and most specifically
the laser, can "almost always be directed very precisely against specific
targets."56
A second factor of assessment is "unnecessary suffering." Several
electromagnetic weapons, such as the highintensity light and laser, may produce
temporary or permanent blindness. These weapons have been the subject of much
discussion. Sweden has been actively condemning the use of lasers as
antipersonnel weapons on the grounds that they cause unnecessary suffering.
Several sophisticated types of military equipment, such as sensors and optics,
are rendered useless when subjected to laser weapons. These pieces of military
equipment are legitimate targets. Their destruction, however, may result in
injury to personnel. Such injury would be incidental to the primary target of
the weapon.57
The controversy surrounding lasers focuses on the legitimacy of deliberately
blinding human beings. Exposing a pilot's eyes to a laser may result in the
destruction of the entire plane.58 Intentionally blinding an attacking infantry
unit would render them unable to fight. Some scholars, in particular experts
from Switzerland and Sweden, argue that intentionally using a laser to
permanently blind a combatant is a disproportionate injury to the gained
military advantage.59 The essence of their argument is that the Declaration of
St. Petersburg authorized the incapacitation of an opponent only for the
duration of the conflict. "Although it is permitted to kill combatants
under the law of war, and thus to put them permanently out of action, it is not
permitted to use methods or means of warfare exclusively designed to injure
soldiers with injuries lasting not only the duration of the conflict but for
the rest of their lives."60 It is their position that intentional
irreversible permanent blindness by a laser constitutes "unnecessary
suffering."
The United States rejects this position. In a memorandum of law, it noted that
there was no legal obligation to limit wounding so that the opponent would be
temporarily disabled for the period of the hostilities and no longer.61
Additionally, it noted, "Blinding is no stranger to the battle
field." The use of a number of conventional weapons could result in
blindness.62 However, these conventional weapons are more likely to cause
death. It is the United States' position that lasers do not cause unnecessary
suffering but are more humane because the victim is likely to suffer less
injury than that caused by conventional weapons.63
The injuries suffered as a result of electromagnetic weapons are typically less
severe than those injuries resulting from conventional weapons. Although it is
possible that a belligerent may be permanently injured or killed as a result of
the use of these weapons, there is no evidence that the suffering experienced
is greater then that experienced from conventional weapons.
Acoustical Weapons
Nonlethal acoustical weapons also range from the mundane to the extraordinary
as described below.
High-intensity Sound. High-intensity sound sets the ear drum in motion. These
vibrations cause the inner ear to initiate nerve impulses that the brain
registers as sound.64 The inner ear regulates the spatial orientation of the
body. If the ear is subjected to high-intensity sound, the individual may
experience imbalance.65 Low-frequency, high-intensity sound may cause other organs
to resonate, causing a number of physiological results, including death.66
The British use high-intensity sound as a means of riot control in Northern
Ireland. The Curdler is a device that emits a high "shrieking noise at
irregular intervals."67 The sound is emitted at levels lower than the pain
threshold.
The assessment of high-intensity sound as a legal weapon must be reviewed in
terms of "unnecessary suffering." If the acoustical weapon emits
sounds below the pain threshold, then unnecessary suffering is not an issue. If
the sound does inflict pain, the suffering must be balanced against military
necessity. It may be lawful to use high-intensity sound against an attacking
force, although some of the attackers may experience dis-orientation, pain, or
even death. As noted earlier when discussing the legality of blinding soldiers,
it is permissible to injure a combatant even with a wound that may incapacitate
the soldier for a period exceeding the term of the hostilities. Combatants have
been rendered deaf from conventional warfare, or have even been disoriented
from the confusion of the battle. The use of high-intensity sound as a weapon
to disorient, or to cause pain or death, does not constitute unnecessary
suffering.
However, acoustical weapons run the risk of being an indiscriminate weapon. The
release of highintensity sound would impose the same degree of damage on the
noncombatant as the combatant. It may be used only in circumstances in which
the damage to noncombatants is merely incidental in proportion to the necessity
of the military objective.
Infrasound. This is a powerful ultralow frequency (ULF) sonic weapon that can
penetrate buildings and vehicles and can be directional and tunable. As a
weapon infrasound, lowfrequency sound entails the same concerns as
highintensity sound. After being exposed to highintensity infrasound, a subject
suffers from disorientation and reduced ability to perform simple sensorymotor
tasks.68 At elevated levels, experimental animals cease breathing temporarily.69
The principles and findings regarding highintensity sound would apply to
infrasound. The suffering would be no greater than that experienced by
conventional weapons. The suffering must be proportionate to the military
objectives. The sound must be applied so that damage to noncombatants is
incidental in light of the military objective.
Unfortunately, large banks of speakers are required to provide directionality,
and the power demands are enormous.70 Area denial is a very plausible mission for
such a device as the level of pain or damage increases predictably as range
decreases.
Sonic Bullets. These are packets of sonic energy that are propelled toward the
target. The Russians apparently have a portable device that can propel a
10-Hertz (Hz) sonic packet the size of a baseball hundreds of yards. When
employed against humans, the energy can be selected to result in nonlethal or
lethal damage.71 The sonic bullet uses direct sonic energy. If the energy can
be controlled so that it is used only against lawful combatants, the concerns
surrounding acoustical weapons may be reduced or eliminated.
Deference Tones. These are sophisticated arrays that can project a voice or
other sound to a particular location. The resulting sound can only be heard at
that particular location.72 Deference tones, a means of projecting sound, would
not directly cause injury upon the enemy. Its use must be in accordance with
the constraints of the law of armed conflict. For example, if the tone is
generating a sound such as an
Informational Weapons
Recently, a new class of nonlethal weapons has drawn considerable interest in
defense circles as well as in international law. Two types of such weapons are
discussed below.
Voice Synthesis. This is the ability to clone a person's voice and broadcast a
synthesized message to a selected audience. The propaganda value of this
technique in our highly mediadependent world would be enormous. We currently
have the ability to control the broadcasts of foreign radio and television
stations by using orbiting platforms packed with electronic gear.
In considering whether it is legal to clone a persons voice in order to gain a
military advantage, it is important to determine whose voice is being cloned.
In most cases, it would be realistic to expect that the voice cloned would be
that of a political leader or a military officer. The cloned voice might give
orders to the enemy combatant that might prove detrimental to the combatant.
The combatant would most likely be under an obligation to follow these orders.
That obligation, however, is owed to his own chain of command and is not under
the law of armed conflict. Treacherous acts, those which abuse an obligation to
be truthful under the law of armed conflict, are illegal. But if there is no
obligation to be truthful under the law of armed conflict, then the
misinformation amounts to a lawful ruse. Morris Greenspan, a prominent writer
in the field of international law, notes that examples of legitimate ruses are
"making use of the enemy's signals, bugle and trumpet calls, watchwords,
and words of command."73 Giving orders by voice is analogous to giving
orders by bugle calls or signals. Cloning a voice would not violate the law of
armed conflict.
Computer Viruses. The ability to severely disrupt computer operations with
viruses has already been demonstrated by amateur American hackers. A more
sophisticated and professional effort might be that of being able to produce
viruses that can be injected into enemy hardware at long range.
When planning to disrupt computer operations, it is necessary to distinguish
whether the computers are military objectives. If they are civilian property or
their loss would impact only the civilian population, then they are not
legitimate targets. However, if the computers serve a dual use (for both the
civilian population and the military population), they may be considered valid
targets. The next step in the analysis calls for applying the rule of
proportionality to determine if the military advantage outweighs the impact
upon the civilian population.
Potential Policies
In this section we will discuss several possible scenarios for the employment
of nonlethal weapons. These include special operations missions such as
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and peacemaking, as well as
more conventional forms of warfare. We will also examine the potential for
nonlethal weapons to lower or raise the threshold of war and the issue of
escalation.
Special Operations
Special operations forces typically operate in a highly volatile political
environment. They must often minimize the use of force if they intend to
complete the mission without alienating international as well as domestic
political players. Such alienation would make future missions much more difficult.
Hostage Barricade Situation. One counterterrorism scenario that must be
resolved with a maximum degree of control is the hostage barricade situation.
The ideal nonlethal weapon for a hostage barricade situation would be one that
instantaneously and selectively disables the hostage takers. Unfortunately, any
feasible weapon would probably disable the hostages as well. Therefore, any
disabling effect should be controllable so that the hostages could cooperate in
their rescue. At the very least, if the weapon is indiscriminate, the effect
must not permanently injure the hostages. The use of lasers to temporarily
blind personnel could cause permanent blind spots depending on range and weapon
intensity. In the final analysis, however, any nonlethal weapon must be judged
against the normally lethal alternatives. A typical hostage rescue operation
involves a violent plan that results in the death of the hostage takers and the
rescue of the hostages. The weapons employed are concussion grenades, flashbang
devices, and conventional small arms. The tactics involve the so-called
"double tap" - one bullet to the chest and one to the head. Even a
well-executed mission can result in the deaths of one or more hostages. The
primary potential usefulness of nonlethal weapons is the decreased chance of
lethality for the hostages and the possibility of increased safety for the
rescuers.
The worst-case hostage situation would involve an in extremis assault. This
would occur if the terrorists start executing hostages. In most situations, the
result would be an immediate and violent raid by special operations forces to
resolve the situation. The level of violence and lethality acceptable in this
circumstance would increase drastically. Ironically, this might also be the
situation most conducive to the use of nonlethal technologies. If hostages are
already dying, then the advantages of instantaneously incapacitating everyone
are obvious. Some unwanted permanent injuries to hostages who would otherwise
have surely died are probably acceptable. In contrast, injuries to hostages
that occur when rescuers preempt the in extremis situation are inevitably
attributed to the rescuers and may not be acceptable.
Each hostage situation is so unique that one universal course of action cannot
be recommended. Variables include the condition of the hostages, potential
access by rescuers, the capabilities and proven intentions of the terrorists,
the use of deadman triggers, and other factors. The solution seems to be the
development and testing of a repertoire of possible nonlethal technologies that
gives the mission planner more options. Cooperation with domestic law
enforcement in the development of nonlethal weapons could yield synergistic
benefits for the resolution of hostage situations.
Counterinsurgencies. The key to winning a counterinsurgency is winning the
hearts and minds of the affected population. In this scenario, any weapon that
reduces collateral damage to innocent people or property is advantageous.
Insurgents who are interspersed with innocent civilians are especially hard to
target. However, it is not even necessary or even desirable to kill the
insurgent in order to defeat him. Certain nonlethal weapons might offer
solutions to these tactically difficult situations. In Vietnam, for example,
the only options available to a patrol under fire from a "friendly"
village were (1) return fire and risk generating friendly casualties, or (2)
withdraw. Both options have the potential of further alienating a largely
friendly population. The ability to incapacitate the insurgents would enable
troops to sort out the good from the bad without killing anyone. A secondary
advantage of capturing an insurgent rather than killing him is the intelligence
that can be garnered from the prisoner, a critical element in defeating an
insurgency.
Some nonlethal technologies that offer promise in counterinsurgencies include
chemical defoliants and tear gasses, calmative agents, blinding weapons, and
acoustical weapons. Of course, as discussed earlier, the weapon chosen must be
a legal one. Additionally, such practical issues as portability, training, and
effectiveness must also be addressed before relying on such weapons in the
hands of troops facing a mortal enemy. Insurgents might be emboldened and able
to attract more (though less dedicated) followers if they know that death is a
very unlikely prospect. The insurgency could deteriorate into a game in which
the insurgents are incapacitated and captured while counterinsurgents are
killed.
Peacekeeping and Peacemaking. Peacekeeping and peacemaking are rapidly
expanding roles for special operations as well as conventional forces. The use
of minimal lethal force may be desirable in both situations. Nonlethal
technologies may offer some solutions. In Somalia, soldiers confronted with a
hostile crowd often had no options other than to fire upon the crowd. Effective
nonlethal crowd control techniques might have been used.
One potential role for nonlethal weapons in a peacemaking scenario would be the
ability to defeat the "iron sight." For example, in spite of all our
technological successes in countering infrared and electronic threats, we have
not developed a technique to defeat a lone sniper with a rifle, or a radar
precision guided (RPG) or other optically guided weapon. Small numbers of
snipers can wreak havoc on an entire city as they did in Sarajevo. They can
also bring down helicopters as they did in Mogadishu, and they can also destroy
the morale of a normally effective combat force. Lasers might offer an
effective means of point defense and could even be used to counter snipers. For
example, a relatively simple laser device strapped on a helicopter could be
scanned to blind anyone looking in the direction of the aircraft. Likewise, a
laser scanned around a compound or guard shack could blind anyone attempting to
target the site. Indeed, by using the unique optical reflection signature from
the back of the eye, a low power laser could be used to locate anyone
persistently looking at a specific target.74 A human operator (or an automated
system) could then decide whether to target the detected signature with a
higherpowered laser weapon or even a lethal weapon. Disadvantages of this
sophisticated antisniper device include possible indiscriminate targeting,
adjustment of power levels to account for environmental conditions, and the
possibility that the laser itself may provide a more sophisticated enemy with
an emission source that could be targeted.
The role of peacekeeping (as opposed to peacemaking) troops does not generally
involve combat. Many UN observers are required to be unarmed. Perhaps nonlethal
weapons could be used to aid in separating warring factions or as antisniper
devices to protect the peacekeepers.
Conventional Warfare
Nonlethal weapons can also be used in conventional conflicts. Electromagnetic
pulse (
One advantage for using nonlethal technologies in combat is the possibility of
reducing fratricide. Nonlethal weaponry that disables a tank rather than
killing it enables friendly forces the option of "shooting first and
asking questions later." Additionally, nonlethal weapons such as
acoustical and laser devices might offer good point defense options for high
security areas, further reducing the chances of fratricide.
Threshold of War
Raising the threshold of war is a consistent overarching goal of most arms
control negotiations. In light of the fact that many hostile countries possess
weapons of mass destruction, quick escalation from rhetoric to shooting could
prove disastrous. Indeed, conventional weapons in the hands of fairly skilled
armed forces often result in significant casualties. Therefore, a primary
concern in the employment of nonlethal weapons is the possibility that they
might lower the threshold of war. What one country might consider a
"normal" economic sanction, another country might consider an act of
war. Even if such a sanction was not considered an act of war, it could,
nonetheless, provide a path for escalation. National sensitivities and
vulnerabilities are too variable to accurately predict a response to the
employment of a particular nonlethal weapon. For example, if a third world
country brought down our stock exchange and electronic funds transfer system
with a computer virus, we may consider this an act of war. The world community,
however, would probably condemn us if we retaliated with lethal weapons-perhaps
our only option against a less-developed society.
The most tempting use of some nonlethal weapons would be in the area of
clandestine operations. With computer viruses, for example, an attacking
country would almost certainly enjoy plausible (if not total) deniability. In
some cases, the targeted country might never realize they were attacked at all.
For example, a liquid metal embrittlement agent introduced clandestinely in an
industrial plant could cause a catastrophic failure that might be attributed to
normal wear and fatigue. Clandestine operations of this type might muddy the
international waters to the point that nobody knows when or by whom they are
being attacked.
Conclusion
Nonlethal weapons offer new possibilities in warfare, especially in the arena
of special operations. However, it is not an unlimited exercise. Each newly
developed weapon must be designed and used in compliance with international
law. We must then consider the practicalities of the weapon's use. Nonlethal
weapons show promise, but they are not bringing us to a new golden age of
warfare. Carl von Clausewitz lambasted the idea of nonlethal warfare outright
when he remarked,
"Let us not hear of Generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody
slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to
War, but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by degrees from
feelings of humanity, until some one steps in with one that is sharp and lops
off the arm from our body."75
Likewise, Robert E. Lee remarked during the Battle of Fredericksburg, "It
is well war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it."76 The
condottieri largely avoided terrible battles and thus apparently grew fond
enough of war to elevate it to a game. Modern nations might also be tempted to
engage in a game of nonlethal warfare only to see it escalate to something much
more terrible.
Notes
1. Joseph Jay Deiss, Captains of Fortune: Profiles of Six Italian Condottiere
(New York: Crowell, 1967), 28. Contemporary scholars almost universally agree
that Machiavelli's contempt for the mercenaries caused him to exaggerate the
nonlethality of their encounters. Nevertheless, many engagements were indeed
devoid of significant casualties. See also Geoffrey Trease, The Condotteri:
Soldiers of Fortune (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), 18-22.
2 .Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1971), 77.
3. "NIJ Initiative on LessThanLethal Weapons," National Institute of
Justice Research in Brief, March 1993.
4. "NonLethal Weapons Give Peacekeepers Flexibility." Aviation Week
& Space Technology, 7 December 1992, 50.
5. Frits Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War (Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer
Publications, 1991), 12.
6. The Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July
1899 (hereinafter cited as Hague 1899), in Treaty Series (TS) 403 (Washington,
D.C.: US Department of State), and the Regulations Annexed to Hague Convention
No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907
(hereinafter cited as Hague 1907).
7. Following are these conventions, which can be found as noted in Treaties and
Other International Acts Series (TIAS) (Washington, D.C.: US Department of
State, 1956): Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, TIAS 3362.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
and Shipwrecked Members, 12 August 1949, TIAS 3363. Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, TIAS 3363. Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12
August 1949, TIAS 3365.
8. The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 8 June 1977
(hereinafter Protocol I), in Dietrich Schindler, The Laws of Armed Conflict: A
Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents (Rockville, Md.:
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981), The United States has not ratified Protocol I.
9. These include the following agreements: The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 17 June 1925 (hereinafter Gas Protocol), in
United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (
10. Gerhard von Glahn, Law among Nations: An Introduction to Public
International Law (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 17-22.
11. Article VI, Section 2.
12. Von Glahn, 12-23.
13. Maj William J. Neinast, "United States Use of Biological
Warfare," Military Law Review 24 (1964): 17.
14. United States v. List et al., in Trials of War Criminals before the
Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vol. XI, The High Command Case; The Hostage Case
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1950), 1253.
15. United States v. Krupp, Ibid., vol. IX, The Krupp Case, 1433-48.
16. Jean Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims (Rockville,
Md.: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1985), 28-29.
17. Ibid.
18. Hague 1907, Preamble.
19. Judith Gail Gardam, "Proportionality and Force in International Law,"
American Journal of International Law 87 (1993): 391; and Brown, "The
Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian Law of Warfare," Cornell
International Law Journal 10 (1976): 134.
20. G. J. Adler, "Targets in War: Legal Considerations," University
of Houston Law Review 8 (1970): 1, 17-18.
21. Hague 1907.
22. Air Force Pamphlet (
23. Ibid., par. 53(b).
24. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, vol. 1
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992), 9.
25. Hague 1907, art. 27. See also Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 1954.
26. Hague 1907, art. 23 (a).
27. Ibid., art. 23 (b).
28. Ibid., art. 23 (f).
29. Ibid.
30. Assassination is considered a treacherous act. See Patricia Zengel,
"Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict," Military Law Review
134 (1991): 123.
31. W. F. Biddle, Weapons Technology and Arms Control (New York: Praeger,
1972), 281.
32. Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International Law and Armed Conflict
(Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1992), 245.
33. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical
and Biological Warfare: A Study of the Historical, Technical, Military, Legal,
and Political Aspects of CBW, and Possible Disarmament Measures, vol. 4, CB
Disarmament Negotiations (New York: Humanities Press, 1971-1975), 268.
Hereinafter cited as CBW Negotiations.
34. Neinast, 9.
35. CBW Negotiations, 270.
36. Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, 9 December 1948, defines genocide to mean any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethical, racial, or religious group such as: a. killing members of the group;
b. causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c.
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d. imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group; or e. forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group See United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS),
vol. 78 (New York: Secretariat of the United Nations, 1951), 280.
37. Harald Mhuller and Richard Kokoski, The NonProliferation Treaty: Political
and Technical Prospects and Dangers in 1990 (Stockholm: Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, c. 1990).
38. CBW Negotiations, 270.
39. Hugh D. Crone, Banning Chemical Weapons: The Scientific Background (New
York: Cambridge University Press), 18.
40. Ibid.
41.Ibid.
42.CBW Negotiations, 23; and W. Hays Parks, "Classification of Chemical
Biological Warfare," University of Toledo Law Review 13 (1982): 1168.
43.Ibid., 285. The use of herbicides must be in accordance with the 1977
Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD). The convention requires that
parties not engage in modifications being widespread (an area of several
hundred square kilometers), be long lasting (a period of months or
approximately a season or more, or have severe effects (serious or significant
disruption or harm to life, nature, or economy).
44. Executive Order 11,850, Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical
Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, 8 April 1976.
45. The Gas Protocol lacked any verification or enforcement means. Chemical
weapons have been used a number of times, including by the Italians against the
Ethiopians, by the Japanese against the Chinese, and by the Soviets against the
Afghans. Phillip Louis Reizenstein, "Chemical Biological Weapons: Recent
Legal Developments," Brooklyn Journal of International Law 95 (1986): 105.
46. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 156 UN Doc.
CD/500, 8 April 1974.
47.Crone, 80-81.
48.Paul R. Evancoe, "NonLethal Technology Enhances Warriors Punch,"
National Defense, December 1993, 28.
49.Ibid.
50.Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Antipersonnel Weapons
(London: Taylor and Francis, 1978), 203.
53.Ibid.
54.Ibid.
55.Ibid.
56.Bengt Anderberg and Myron L. Wolbarsht, Laser Weapons: The Dawn of a New Military
Age (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), 207.
57.Ibid., 209-12.
58.Ibid.
59.Ibid.
60.Ibid., 211.
61. "Memorandum of Law: The Use of Lasers as Antipersonnel Weapons,"
The Army Lawyer, November 1988, 3.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Antipersonnel Weapons, 203.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., 204.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Evancoe, 28.
71. "NonLethal Weapons Offer New SO/
72. Ibid.
73. Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (Berkeley, Calif.:
University of California Press, 1959), 317-22.
74. This phenomenon can be observed using visible light. Anyone who has
spotlighted a deer or a cat in their headlights has witnessed this
retroreflection in the form of glowing eyes.
75. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin
Books, 1968), 345.
76. Quoted in Douglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee: A Biography, In vol. 2 (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), 462.
______
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author
cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air
University. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government,
Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
Email eotl@west.net
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