 This video shows that the anomalies report of the mission Apollo 9 is nothing but a collection of jokes. A mission with a such collection of absurd anomalies can only be fake. And all the missions have an abnormal anomalies report, for they all are fake. Now let's see these very special anomalies contained in the mission report of Apollo 9. |
 A problem has been reported that secondary isolation valves would have been in the closed position. It was suggested that they might have been closed because the switch would have been inadvertently momentarily flicked so it would have closed them. But there is a simpler explanation. |
 When the command switch is not closed, the current cannot go to the coil closing a primary isolation valve. |
 And, when the switch is closed, the current can go to the coil closing the valve, and therefore the primary isolation valve closes. |
 But the secondary isolation valve is connected differently; even when the command switch is not closed, the current can go to the coil closing the secondary isolation valve, which means that the secondary isolation valve closes even though the command switch is not closed. |
 The pin of the tenths drum of the scanning telescope would have gone loose, and without this pin, the tenths drum cannot make the units drum properly work. The hole which should have retained the pin was out of tolerance. Of course, the engineers did not make the intensive tests which could have spotted this problem. Why make tests when the astronauts can make them during the travel? And, if the astronauts are not happy, they can always file a complaint. |
 During the flight, the automatic pressure control system in the hydrogen tanks would have failed. Normally, if whichever pressure switch opens, the heaters should be disactivated. But in fact, it is not the case. |
 When both pressure switches are closed, the current follows the path I have colored in pink, which acts on the electromechanical relay so that it closes the auto switches, and therefore it activates the heaters. |
 If only the first pressure switch is opened, the current follows the path I have colored in pink, and it still commands the electromechanic relay so that it closes the auto switches, and so the heaters are activated. |
 If only the second pressure switch is opened, the current follows the path I have colored in pink, and it still commands the electromechanical relay so that it closes the auto switches, and so the heaters are activated too. |
 And, when both pressure switches are opened, the current follows the path I have colored in pink, and now the electromechanical relay is commanded the other way, which means that it opens the auto switches instead, and so the heaters are now disactivated. What does that mean? It means that both pressure switches must be opened to disactivate the heaters, not just one! |
 During the separation of the two vehicles, there would have been some difficulties, and missed attempts, because the unlatching switch would not have been maintained long enough to allow the separation. A new directive would have been added in the Apollo operations handbook to instruct the astronauts to maintain this switch long enough for the separation to succeed. But it is ridiculous, for the electronic interface should itself insure that the release motors are energized sufficiently long for the undocking operation to succeed, without the astronauts having to care about it, and it is easy to do it with a monostable (a monostable can make a pulse longer). In a high profile mission as the moon missions are, we could have expected things to be better automated and not to exclusively rely on the astronauts! |
 For a while there would have been a problem of the uplink commands due to several causes, coming from the ground: - ground station uplink modulation turned off. - ground station decommutator out of lock. - up and down RF signal strengths marginal or too low. The problems would have stopped when the crew cycled the up-telemetry command/reset switch, which would have restored normal operation. But this is completely ridiculous, for the telemetry is sent to the ground, while the problems were with the emission from the ground! So this command/reset switch could certainly have no action on problems coming from the ground, and it is just a good joke from the engineers! |
 There would have been a problem with en entry monitor system, which is a device which scribes with a stylus on a film the flight data; the stylus would have failed to scribe at some moments. They say that, "through the use of special lighting and photographic techniques", photographs of the scroll would have revealed that the stylus would have scribed the good data if it had worked. But how could they know what the good data should have been, since the entry monitor system was the only device recording the flight data? |
 There would have been numerous alarms on the primary gaging system because of the way the measures were done in this system, which pushed the crew to switch to the auxiliary system which was less subject to these alarms for it was using point sensors at discrete levels in the tanks. Question: Why didn't they also use point sensors at discrete levels in the primary system, since this measuring system works better than the one of the primary system, and does not uselessly display continuous alarms? Just for the fun, I suppose! |
 A master alarm would trigger too easily without caution or warning alarms appearing. Normally a warning alarm should appear before a master alarm, for a warning alarm warns that there is about to be a problem, while a master alarm announces that the problem is already here. This is because the master alarm system would be very sensitive and would react to short pulses, while the warning system would only react to a continuous input. As the master alarm is predominant, it should rather be the converse. But is anything logically done in Apollo? |
 The condenser exit temperature would have been too high when the secondary bypass valve would have been set between 4 and 10%, and would have been normal when the secondary bypass valve was set between 8 and 19%. But, when the secondary bypass valve is more opened, it means that more coolant is going through the secondary pipe... |
 ...and you can see that the secondary pipe winds round the condenser exit, which means that, if more cold coolant goes through it, it will more cool down the condenser exit. So, it is not surprising that, when opening more the secondary bypass valve, the condenser exit temperature would be lower! |
 The docking spotlight would not have operated...because the astronauts would have omitted to close the circuit breaker. But asking an electronic circuitry to take care of this was out of question! |
 There would have been problems with the interior floodlights. But testing these floodlights before the mission was totally out of question. All the tests must be done by the astronauts themselves! |
 The computer would not have responded to some manual entries. As the computer is perfect, and cannot make any error, the fault had to come from the astronauts. On a first command, the non response of the computer could be explained by the fact that the astronaut would have ended his command with the PROCEED key instead of the ENTER key; the only problem is that the PROCEED key does not exist on the keyboard. On another command, the non response of the computer could be explained by the fact that the astronaut would have ended his command with the VERB key instead of the ENTER key; the problem is that the astronaut could hardly have typed the VERB key instead of the ENTER key by mistake, for the VERB key is on the other side of the keyboard relatively to the ENTER key. |
 The repressurization of the surge tank would have required an excessive length ot time, but in fact, the surge tank would have been repressurized quicker than indicated, because the indication was wrong, for the decal marking was misaligned with the valve detent position. If the astronauts cannot even rely on the indications shown to them, how can they trust the system? |
 The tracking light would have failed after the lunar module staging. They have realized that this failure could have been avoided if an arc-suppressing capacitor had been added to the light, and that the addition of the capacitor avoided the failure of the tracking light in the next missions. Oh really? So they only make the tests during the missions, and never on earth, on test benches? |
 They say that the lunar module pilot's push-to-talk switches have become inoperative. They say that the problem was probably caused by a discontinuity (broken wire) in the common wire to the parallel push-to-talk switches. They also say that switching to the backup push-to-talk mode bypasses most of the common wiring when the failure may have occurred. The only problem is that the schema shows that the backup mode also uses the common wiring of the push-to-talk switches. There is a clear contradiction here. |
 A warning light would have gone on when the abort system was activated, and it would come from the abort system itself, as the other possible causes were discarded as unlikely to happen. So, imagine that the astronauts have to abort the descent to save their lives when the lunar module really descends to the moon, and that the abort system does not react properly, because it has been unsufficiently tested? |
 The crew reported that the forward hatch was difficult to open, that it had to be pushed downward to be opened. Oh really, shouldn't this have been fixed before the mission? |
 The crew also reported that the forward hatch would not stay open for extravehicular activity, because of the failure of a door stop. One more test which could have been done on earth, and was not done. |
 There would have been an excessive noise in the lunar module cabin. This would come from too noisy cabin fans. The solution to reduce the noise has been to only use a cabin fan. The astronauts have also been provided with ear pieces to better stand the noise. A high profile mission, for sure! |
 When the clear pushbutton is pressed, it turns off the operator error light, but, if the shift discrete signal is still high when the clear pushbutton is released, the operator error light would go on again, according to what they say. |
 The clear signal and the shift discrete signal are inputs to an AND gate, of which the output allows to light the operator error light when it is set to 1. The AND gate outputs a 1 if its both inputs are 1, and 0 otherwise. When the clear pushbutton is pressed, as the AND gate has one of its input set to 0, it outputs a 0, and therefore the operator error light goes off. |
 When the clear input is 1 again, if the shift discrete signal is 1, the AND gate outputs a 1, because its both inputs are 1, and the operator error light goes on; this is what they are implying in their explanation. |
 But in fact it is not directly the clear signal which is an input to the AND gate, but the output of a flip-flop (circled with red) which is set to 0 when the clear signal is set to 0, and remains set to 0 after the clear signal becomes 1 again; the output of the flip-flop only becomes 1 again when the shift discrete is set to 0, but currently the latter is set to 1. That means that the AND gate, which has the output of the flip-flop as one of its inputs, outputs a 0 since the flip-flop currently outputs a 0, which means that the operator error light does not go on, unlike what they said. |
 When the shift discrete signal is set to 0, the flip-flop is resetted, and outputs a 1 again; but, as the shift discrete is currently 0, and is an input to the AND gate, the AND gate still outputs a 0, and the operator error light remains off. It means that the operator error light does not goes on if the shift discrete signal is 1 at the moment that the clear pushbutton is pressed; even if it goes low a moment later after the clear pushbutton has been pressed, the operator error light will not go on. |
 They say that, during the second descent engine firing, the engine would have been rough at about 27% throttle for a few seconds; they explain it by the fact that helium from the propellant tanks would have entered the propellant lines, which could happen under certain conditions of lateral and/or rotational accelerations. The problem is that these conditions of lateral and/or rotational accelerations do not only exist during the first seconds of the firing, but can also exist thereafter; it means that the roughness could have repeated several times. |
 They say that the primary class I regulator would have failed, and that the primary class II regulator would have regulated during the failure, which explains the pressure drop observed on the graph due to the fact that the primary class II regulator would have regulated instead of the primary class I regulator. But this explanation could only stand if the primary class II regulator was regulating at higher pressure than the primary class I regulator. If the primary class II regulator regulates at lower pressure than the primary class I regulator, then it should be the one regulating even when the primary class I regulator is properly working! |
