 This video talks about the anomalies report of Apollo 11. The anomalies reports of all the missions are collections of jokes and absurdities, and the one of Apollo 11 makes no exception. According to these reports, the engineers would have made absolutely no test prior to the missions, and would even have intentionally created situations for problems to happen. |
 There was a decay of pressure of the gaseous nitrogen in the redundant service propulsion engine actuation system. The problem would come from a leakage in a solenoid control valve, and the leakage would come from contamination. |
 A highly suspect cause is a contaminated manifold at the vendor's plant. So they let contaminated elements be used without seriously checking them. Do they ever make controls before the missions? |
 One of the two heater elements in oxygen tank 2 was inoperative. The current readings recorded during the tank pressurization in the launch count down showed that one heater in oxygen tank 2 had failed. The information was not made known to proper channels for disposition prior to the flight, since no specification limits were called out in the test procedure. So the problem was already apparent before the launch, and it was ignored because it had not been implemented in the test procedure? May be they don't even test that the lunar module and the command module are present in the rocket before the flight! The cause of the failure was probably an intermittent contact on a terminal board in the heater circuit; it would already have happened in the past, which means that they should have been attentive to this problem, and they did nothing to prevent it from happening again! |
 An engine of the RCS produced low and erratic thrust because of a continuity problem in one of the coils of the engine valve. |
 It would come from two pins in the terminal board which were loose and caused intermittent continuity to the automatic coils of the engine valve. This type failure had previously been noted on terminal boards manufactured prior to November 1967; this board was manufactured in 1966. So, they knew that this board had been manufactured during a period in which this type of problem was known, and yet they did not seriously check the terminal board to see if it would not happen again? Do they ever make controls before the missions, or are they too lazy to make them? |
 An electroluminescent segment on the numeric display of the entry monitor system velocity counter did not illuminate. The cause could come from misrouted wires which bent them across terminal strips containing sharp wire ends which punctured the insulation and caused shorts to the ground or to +4V, turning the segment off or on, respectively. A rework of the affected circuits took place in the process of soldering crimp joints involved in an Apollo 7 anomaly. An inspection to detect misrouting was conducted at that time, but was limited (because of potting restrictions). So this problem was already previously known, which means that they should have checked the circuits for shorts or cuts, but they neglected to do the tests, because it seems to tire them to do any tests! |
 The switch K1 (circled with red) closes when the oxygen flow rate decreases, which starts a 16 second delay timer; if K1 remains closed, after the 16 second delay, the switch K2 (circled with blue) closes, which both allows to send a current into the electromechanical relay K3 (circled with green) thus triggering a master alarm, and also to reset the timer. Because a filter capacitor was open instead of closed, the switch K1, instead of remaining permanently closed, would have alternately opened and closed (chattered); according to their explanation, the fact that the relay K1 was chattering would have made that the relay K2 would not have reset the 16 second delay counter after the 16 seconds, with the consequence that it would have triggered a second alarm. But this explanation cannot stand, for, if the relay K2 does not close, it sure does not reset the delay counter, but it does not activate the relay K3 either, which means that it does not trigger a master alarm. |
 The propellant isolation valves on quad B of the service module reaction control system closed during command and service module separation from the S-IVB. At shock testing, it was found that shocks of 80g for 10ms to shocks of 100g for 1 millisecond would close the valves. After reduction of the latching forces for the valves, a new test showed that shocks of 54g for 10 ms to shocks of 75g for 1ms would close the valves. But the problem was that the valves closed, so making them close with less force does certainly not solve the problem! |
 An odor was detected in the tunnel by the astronauts when the hatch was first opened. By odor comparison (performed by the crew), it was deduced that the odor would come from the docking hatch ablator. The removal of the outer insulation from the hatch of Apollo 11 resulted in higher ablator temperatures. The question is: Why did they remove this outer insulation? To save money? |
 The oxygen flow measurement would have shown a wrong indication because a heater winding resistance (circled with red) within the flow sensor bridge would have increased from 1000 ohm to 1600 ohm. How is it that this resistance changed? How could they not see in the preflight tests, since they could see it in the postflight tests? |
 Knots would have been incorrectly done on the forward heat shield; the schema shows how they should have been done, and how they were incorrectly done in some cases; they say that this could have prevented the deployment of the forward heat shield separation augmentation parachute. It is absolutely incredible that the tests are down with a such carelessness as not even checking that the knots are correctly done, especially when it could have serious consequences! |
 In the primary water glycol coolant loop, a control valve (circled with red) was allowing to regulate the temperature of the glycol arriving to the primary evaporator: When the radiator output's temperature lowers, the control valve opens to mix more hot glycol with the radiator's output, and conversely, when it becomes hotter, it closes, and it closes completely above a certain temperature of the radiator's output. |
 What happened is that, when the radiator output's temperature raised, the control valve dit not immediately close, there was a lag time, with the consequence that the evaporator outlet would have been hotter than expected for a while; conversely, when the radiator output's temperature lowered, the control valve did not immediately open, with the consequence that the the evaporator outlet would have been colder than expected for a while. In short, the control valve was late at reacting. Later, the control valve reacted normally, and the evaporator outlet was normal. They suspected that the control valve had a problem, so in the postflight tests, they inspected it and they found it might have had a problem. |
 But they say that the problem stopped, and the valve reacted normally, after the crew had cycled the glycol evaporate temperature inlet switch (circled with green); but then it becomes obvious where the problem was coming from: it was coming from the fact that the control valve was not correctly getting the temperature of the evaporator inlet; if the problem had come from the valve itself, it would have persisted even after the crew cycled the evaporator inlet switch! We must conclude that the engineers lack logic...or, much more probably, they have wanted to make a good joke again! |
 Photographic data were obtained of the service module entering the earth's atmosphere and disintegrating near the command module. The crew observed the service module about 5 minutes after separation and indicated the reaction control thrusters were firing and the module was rotating about the X plane. They give this delirious explanation: It would have been possible for the remaining propellants to move axially at frequencies approximately equal to the precessional rate of the service module spin axis about the X body axis causing a resonating movement. This is a totally fantasy explanation, and there is no way that the thrusters could have been firing, as it is obvious they are deactivated before the separation. |
 The crew reported shortly after lunar landing that the mission timer had stopped. The power to the timer was turned off to allow it to cool. Eleven hours later, the timer was restarted and functioned normally for the remainder of the mission. It would come from a cracked solder joint; allowing the cordwood construction to cool down would have allowed the cracked joint to make electric contact, and to allow the timer to operate normally. Question: After the timer was powered on again, why didn't the problem repeat again after a while? Second question: How were the events timed while the timer was off, and, if they could be timed without it, what was its purpose? |
 In the descent propulsion system, the fuel would have been frozen by the helium flowing through the heat exchanger. |
 The solution for the future missions has been to close the solenoid valve (the one circled with red) allowing the flow of helium when introducing the fuel to prevent it from being frozen, and to open it only some time before lift-off. Oh really! Couldn't they test this on earth prior to the mission, so that this problem could already be fixed for Apollo 11? Oh I was forgetting: They never make any test before the missions, it is too tiring (probably they are not enough paid). |
 The measurement of carbon dioxide partial pressure was high and erratic. |
 Water was collected in a drain tank but the drain tank could be unable to absorb the whole water which could then flow through the line colored in red, which would have caused the problem. On next missions, the problematic line has been suppressed and replaced with the line colored in green, which was avoiding this problem. Of course they could not have done that before, as they test nothing prior to the missions. |
 When the steerable antenna was selected after acquisition on revolution 4, difficulty was encountered in maintaining communications. It would be because the initial schema of antenna coverage was not including the thruster plume deflectors, which were added to the lunar module at the launch site! This shows the level of unprofessionalism of the project (but we are accustomed to it). The schema of the S-Band steerable antenna coverage restriction would imply that there is a whole set of combinations of pitch and yaw angles which allow the communication. |
 In fact there is only one combination of the pitch and yaw angles which allows the communication with the earth, the one which orients the antenna toward the earth. |
 They also talk about a problem of multipath reception which would decrease the quality of reception. The signal from the earth and the reflected signal coming from the moon would hinder each other and would cause tracking losses. |
 But it is completely ridiculous, for, when the antenna is oriented toward the earth, it only receives the signal directly coming from the earth, and not the one reflected by the moon... |
 ...and when it is oriented toward the moon it only receives the signal reflected by the moon, and not the one directly coming from the earth. |
 Besides, when you receive a radiowave on earth, it is reflected from different directions, and it does not prevent you from correctly receiving it. Even if it comes from different sources, it is the same identical signal, which is demodulated to obtain the information it contains. |
 There would have been computer alarms during the descent; the computer would have restarted several times for it would have been unable to perform its work in the time attributed to the guidance task. |
 This would come from the fact that the computer was counting radar pulses, and there would have been too many radar pulses at some moments. On the Slew position, the radar could output up to 6400 pulses per second; as there were two radar coupling units, that could make 12800 pulses per second. Each pulse was taking a cycle of 11.7 microsecond to be processed. In short, in each second, the radar signals could steal 12800*11.7=149740 microseconds from the computer, so around 150 milliseconds; that represents 15% of the computer's power which was lost for computation. |
 If the computer was taking more than 1.7 seconds to perform its computation in the guidance task, the time which was lost in counting the radar pulses, which could represent up to 0.3 second in the 2 seconds of the guidance task, could make that the guidance task could not finish its work in time, in which case it could cause the restart of the computer if the problem was repeated several times. |
 But this problem was only coming from the fact that the computer was counting the radar pulses itself; each radar pulse was stealing precious time from the computer. In fact, it is never done this way, neither before Apollo, nor after. The IBM computer of the Saturn rocket had no instruction to count hardware pulses. |
 The correct way is to have the hardware pulses counted by electronic counters, and the computer can read the count of pulses on the electronic counters by using an I/O read instruction; And this instruction was existing in the instruction set of the AGC! If the computer of the LM had managed things correctly, it would not have counted the radar pulses itself, which means that, even if there had been an excess of radar pulses, it would have had no impact on the computation time of the computer, and it could still have finished the guidance task in time. |
I think that I know why the engineers managed things this way. It is because they absolutely wanted the computer to deliver repetitive 1202 alarms, so that it would annoy Armstrong... |
 ... and that would compel him to take the commands of the LM himself, so that he could show us how he could fly the LM like a helicopter... |
 ...over a ground which looks like the one of area 51, but it is totally normal, for the ground of area 51 really looks like the one of the lunar ground... |
 ...as anyone could check, by putting on his cosmonaut suit and flying to the moon with his ULM. |
 Anyway, as the LM was hauled down with a crane, it is not so important if the computer was working erratically... |
 ...As Armstrong and Aldrin were probably using it only to play video games, like an early version of the tennis game. (Why hasn't Armstrong talked to us about these video games when he was interviewed?). |
 The decompression of the cabin prior to extravehicular activity required longer than had been anticipated. This excess of time would come from the use of a bacteria filter, and suppressing it would allow to reduce the time of the decompression. Question: They are on the moon, why would they need a bacteria filter? Bacteria cannot survive on the moon. |
 An electroluminescent segment on the numeric display of the abort guidance system data entry and display assembly was reported inoperative. The inoperative segment (the left top one) makes that it was not possible to distinguish a 3 from a 9. |
 Effectively, you can see that, when a 9 is displayed on the defective digit, it looks like a 3; it means that the 9 is never displayed, and, when a 3 is displayed, it is not possible to say whether it is a 3 or a 9. But it does not mean that the other digits are correctly displayed; some are not, even if they cannot confused with any other digit. |
 This animation shows on the left how the digits should appear, from 0 to 9, and, on the right, how they actually appear with the inoperative segment. It highlights the fact that the inoperative segment makes the defective digit difficult to read, even beyond the fact that a 3 cannot be distinguished from a 9. They say that the crew was still able to use the particular digit though there was some ambiguity in the readout. Oh yes, sure, they still could use the display, though, when a 3 was displayed on the defective digit, they couldn't tell whether it was a 3 or a 9, and they had no other way to know! |
 They say that, in order to ensure proper operation under all conditions, a prelaunch test will activate all segments, and the intensity will be varied through the whole range while the display is observed for faults. Oh really? we could have expected this test to be done before! |
 But we already know they are too lazy to do serious tests before the missions. |
 A voice turnaround (echo) was heard during extravehicular activity. |
 It would come from the voice that the astronauts receive in their earphones which would be heard by their microphone. They say that using the simplex mode would eliminate the echo for the astronauts, but not for the ground which would still have the echo of CAPCOM. |
 While the duplex mode allows the transmission simultaneously in both directions... |
 ...the simplex mode only allows the transmission in one direction at a time. |
In the simplex mode, when the ground talks, the astronauts receive the voice from the ground operator, but their voice is not transmitted meanwhile. Therefore, in the simplex mode, the ground cannot have their own echo, for their voice going from the astronauts' earphones to the microphone is not retransmitted to the ground. So, the fact that the echo would persist for the ground in the simplex mode is a joke. |
 The data storage electronics assembly did not record properly in flight. The reference tone was recorded properly, but the voice signal was very low, and there was a strong background noise. Furthermore there should have been two different timing signals recorded, one of 4.2 khz, and one of 4.6 khz, and only one of them was recorded. It was at least showing that the recorder was functioning correctly. The cause would be two broken wires in the vehicle harness to the recorder. So, they are not even able to protect wires from flexure damage. Once again, the tests prior to the mission have not been correctly done, but it does not come as a surprise, we are used to it. And, if the wire conveying the voice was broken, it should have been completely absent, and not just lowered. |
 The crew reported after completion of extravehicular activity that the knob on the engine arm circuit breaker was broken, and two other circuit breakers were closed. They say that the most probable cause of the damage was an impact of the oxygen purge system during preparation for extravehicular activities, and that such impact was demonstrated in simulations in a lunar module. If they can reproduce it on earth, then why didn't they take action to prevent it from happening? Oh I was forgetting, they never test anything before the missions! |
 The switch used to monitor the quad 2 aft-firing engine exhibited slow response to jet driver commands during most of the mission. The normal switch closing response was 10 to 12 milliseconds based on ground test results, but it would have been 25 to 30 milliseconds following the failure. But anyway, as the guidance period is slow (2s), it does not matter much if the closing response of the switch is increased by some milliseconds. |
 It is even because the engines of the RCS could not be commanded fast enough that they were not able to avoid a notable swaying move in the ascent (visible on the ascent of Apollo 17), when they had to correct the disbalance torque caused by the shift of the center of mass relatively to the thrust of the ascent engine (which could not be swivelled). |
So the fact that the closing response of the switch of a lateral engine was increased by some milliseconds had little impact on the guidance of the lunar module. |
 After the lunar module achieved orbit, water began to enter the commander's suit in spurts at about 1 minute intervals. The commander immediately selected the secondary water separator, and the spurts stopped after 15 to 20 minutes. One more test which has not been made prior to the mission. And, if the problem was coming from the first separator, why didn't it stop sooner after the second separator had been selected? |
 There would have been warning flags for three engine pairs of the RCS. The flags were reset by cycling of the caution warning electronics circuit breaker. |
 There would be an explanation for this: Ten of the sixteen pressure switch outputs are conditioned by ten buffers in one module in the signal conditioner electronics assembly. If either the 28V dc is interrupted or an oscillator providing an ac voltage to the ten buffers momentarily fails, none of the ten buffers will respond to pressure switch closures. The problem is that there is an engine of the pairs which have emitted the warning signals which is not monitored by any of the ten buffers. So the warning should have persisted on this one. They emit the hypothesis that the failure on this one would have cleared itself. Such miracles happen in the universe of Apollo! |
 The cable for the lunar surface television camera retained its coiled shape after being deployed on the lunar surface. So they are not even to provide a cable which does not retain its coiled shape! |
 During preparation for extravehicular activity, the crew experienced considerable difficulty in mating the electrical connectors from the remote control unit to the portable life support system. And of course, they could not have tested it prior to the mission, they preferred to let the astronauts make the test themselves, at the risk of their lives! |
 The force required to close the sample return containers was much higher than expected. Of course, it was much too tiring for the engineers to test the containers before the mission when the astronauts could do the test themselves! |
 Seriously, do you really think that the engineers would have written a such weird anomalies report if the mission was real? |
 If the mission had been real, a such lack of professionalism would inevitably have led to the crash of the lunar module. |
