William Dembski defines intelligent design to be three things: A scientific research program, an intellectual challenge to naturalism, and a "way of understanding divine action." Upon this definition, intelligent design is a philosophical and theological, as well as scientific, endeavor. But Dembski’s actual commitment to the comprehensiveness of intelligent design is not exactly clear. Specifically, I would like to examine Dembski’s claims that intelligent design is theologically minimalist.
On the first page of his most recent book, professor Dembski defines intelligent design to be three things: A scientific research program, an intellectual challenge to naturalism, and a "way of understanding divine action."
1 Upon this definition, intelligent design is a philosophical and theological, as well as scientific, endeavor. But Dembski’s actual commitment to the comprehensiveness of intelligent design is not exactly clear. Specifically, I would like to examine Dembski’s claims that intelligent design is theologically minimalist.One of the characteristic pursuits of intelligent design is trying to understand God’s relationship with the world. Now, compare this with something else Dembski says:
One’s first interest as a scientist working on a theory of design is whether design provides powerful new insights and fruitful avenues of research. The metaphysics underlying such a theory, and in particular the ontological status of the designer, can then be taken up by philosophy and theology. Indeed one’s metaphysics ought to be a matter of indifference to one’s scientific theorizing about design.
In another chapter, Dembski writes:
Intelligent design presupposes neither a creator nor miracles. Intelligent design is theologically minimalist. It detects intelligence without speculating about the nature of the intelligence.
3In the first of these quotations, Dembski states that one’s metaphysics ought to be kept out of one’s science. In the second, he states that intelligent design theory can identify design without speculating about a designer, or even supposing there is a designer at all.
Now, this is truly an odd set of claims. Originally, we are told that intelligent design is a philosophical and theological, as well as scientific, program. But later we’re told that intelligent design doesn’t even require there to be a designer, much less God. We are also told that the scientist ought to avoid matters of metaphysics in general.
For now, let’s call this ontological minimalism. How can a theory which embraces both philosophy and theology claim to be indifferent about metaphysics? Or, more importantly, how is it possible for a theory of design to be indifferent about the ontological status of a designer? Surely this is a mistake. Any theory which maintains something has been designed is ontologically committed to the existence of a designer.
Suppose Dembski is trying to say something to the effect that, although intelligent design definitely involves philosophy and theology, it is primarily a scientific methodology. And, insofar as methodology goes, the scientist should be indifferent to the metaphysical implications of her work. This seems to be what Dembski has in mind when he says: "Taken strictly as a scientific theory, intelligent design refuses to speculate about the nature of [the] designing intelligence."
4 But this raises the question, Is intelligent design strictly a scientific theory? According to our defintion, intelligent design is much more than just a scientific theory.What are we to make of these statements? Perhaps there is something deeper going on here, which has led Dembski to say these odd things. Consider how he responds to the objection that evil counts against a belief that the world has been designed:
Critics who invoke the problem of evil against design have left science behind and entered the waters of philosophy and theology. A torture chamber replete with implements of torture is designed, and the evil of its designer does nothing to undercut the torture chamber’s design. The existence of design is distinct from the morality, aesthetics, goodness, optimality or perfection of design.
Here, Dembski claims that design can be present regardless whether that design is consistent with our ideas of goodness or morality. A torture chamber can nevertheless be well designed. But notice again, Dembski’s move to keep science distinct from philosophy and theology. This seems to be the heart of Dembski’s theological minimalism: The idea that science can demonstrate design without resorting or appealing to theology and metaphysics. Indeed, we are told, intelligent design refuses to speculate about the nature of the designer.
But why would we refuse to speculate? Suppose we happen to stumble upon a crime scene, and find all sorts of evidence that a crime has been committed -- would we refuse to speculate about the nature or ontological status of the criminal? Of course not. We would all agree that, if a crime has been committed, somewhere there is a criminal. And we would immediately begin to search for as many clues as we could find, in order to learn as much as possible about this criminal.
The reason why in this example we have no trouble inferring from a crime scene to a criminal is the fact that all of us believe that criminals (i.e. persons who perpetrate crimes) are real. And perhaps this is why Dembski wants to build a certain theological hedge around his scientific theory: Not everyone shares a prior belief in a cosmic designer. Certainly this is the reason why he makes those odd claims about ontological indifference.
At this point, we are faced with a dilemma. We must decide that intelligent design is only a scientific theory, which is indifferent to philosophy and theology, or, we must embrace intelligent design as a comprehensive worldview, which draws equally upon science, philosophy, and theology. We simply can’t have it both ways. If intelligent design is going to be a critique of naturalism, and a way of understanding God, then we must admit that intelligent design is a comprehensive worldview, and not theologically minimalist.
Solving this dilemma should be one of our top priorities. If intelligent design is only an empirical theory, then it is not itself a proper rival for naturalism, because naturalism is a full-blown worldview that involves philosophical and theological assumptions. If intelligent design is only an empirical theory, then perhaps it challenges evolutionary theory; but there is much more to naturalism than just evolutionary theory. If, however, intelligent design is a full-blown worldview, then it can be a challenge to naturalism, including matters of philosophy and theology.
Now, upon Dembski’s definition, intelligent design should be considered a comprehensive worldview. Professor Behe apparently agrees:
Intelligent design has implications for all humane studies, including philosophy, theology, literary criticism, history, and more. It promises to be a clarifying lens through which to view issues of interest to the public in general.
And science benefits just as well if intelligent design is a full-blown worldview. According to Dembski,
design raises a whole new set of research questions. Once we know that something is designed, we will want to know how it was produced, to what extent the design is optimal and what is its purpose.
So much for theological minimalism. As a comprehensive worldview, nothing will escape the clarifying lens of intelligent design.
On the other hand, however, no longer will Dembski be able to insulate design from philosophical critiques. If intelligent design leads us to wonder about things like optimal design, and purpose, we might be led to ask about the torture chamber as well. Dembski states that the fact of design is distinct from questions about morality and aesthetics; but this rejection is based upon intelligent design taken only as a scientific methodology, not as a worldview. If intelligent design is indeed a worldview, then the door is wide open to questions about evil, purpose, and ultimate reality. Properly speaking, these are issues which only a worldview is fit to address.
Specifically, we should be able to talk straightforwardly about God. If intelligent design theory maintains the world was born of, not chance or necessity, but intelligence, then intelligent design does indeed say quite a bit about God. For the suggestion that the primary cause of the world is an intelligence is no small claim. Not just any old thing counts as an intelligence, a point which professor Dembski has demonstrated very well. Many sorts of creatures are intelligent, of course; but I think it’s fair to say that what intelligent design theory finally mounts up to is a person, or mind. In fact, according to Dembski’s own metaphysical principle of information, which states that information can only come from information, what intelligent design theory really mounts up to is a Prime Thinker, an intelligence than which none greater can be possible, a necessarily complex being.
Now, as Dembski points out, "it is always possible to ask for further explanation. Nevertheless, at some point scientists stop and content themselves with the progress they have made."
8 But this fact cuts both ways. If the intelligent design theorist is permitted to assume the existence of a necessarily complex being in order to prevent an infinite regress of information, then perhaps the naturalist needn’t be so worried about molecular machines.9
SOURCES
1
Dembski, William A. Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology. Downers Grove: InterVaristy Press, 1999. Page 13.2
Dembski, page 260.3
Dembski, page 107.4
Dembski, page 261.5
Dembski, pages 262-63.6
Dembski, page 10.7
Dembski, page 151.8
Dembski, page 255.9
My thanks go to professors Angus Menuge, John Meixner, and John P. Wright for their helpful comments on drafts of this paper.