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Osprey Flight Controls graphics |
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Osprey Conversion Helicopter - Airplane |
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Osprey Propulsion |
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Chopper mode |
Airplane Mode |
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| http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/Forum11/HTML/000289.html | MV22 Osprey Accident Theory | |
| http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/Forum1/HTML/007825.html | "Loss of lift blamed for crash" | |
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Marines declare Osprey Safe |
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Previous Osprey Crashes |
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http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2000/t05092000_t0509asd.html |
USDoD Pronouncement on Osprey Safety (accident detail) |
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Boeing Tilt-Rotor Site |
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23202-2000May7.html |
Washington Post Article |
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V22 Site |
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USMC Press Releases |
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https://www.angelfire.com/me/swissair111memorial/modded/HN0519.html https://www.angelfire.com/me/swissair111memorial/modded/ThatVexingVortexRing.html |
AeroWorld Report Link to Helicopter News Story (19 May 00) Osprey Related Links |
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Addenda
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That JATO solution would give an instantaneous clearance out of the vortex ring condition and (I guess) could be triggered by an FCS control follow-up circuit. Scenario: Aircraft inadvertently enters AsymmVR during approach i.e. 1. roll starts (within set FCS inputted parameters of airspeed, nacelle-tilt, Rate-of-descent and RadAlt height) 2. pilot makes normal instinctive differential-collective input to correct (as if for a gust-dropped wing) 3. FCS detects no roll-restorative response to side-stick applied in the correct sense (i.e. a decrease of some order of magnitude in the rolling moment, but in fact identifies an increase - which confirms that it's AsymmVR) 4. FCS decision is "Uh Oh, this is bad Kharma" and auto-fires "set 1" of emerg JATO (fuselage mounted and deployed together with gear extension ). 5. Aircraft accelerates out of vortex as roll-rate approaches bank of 60° (or thereabouts), regains differential collective controllability and aborts or does further circuit and approach (with "set 2" armed). FCS = PFCS (primary flight control system) AFCS=Auto (both FBW aka fly-by-wire). Flight control laws are all set by software and easily changed. In fact, in order to gather useful empiric evidence of the AsymmVR condition, they would need to have something similar (to JATO) in order to ensure safety. i.e. it would probably be a sine qua non of any realistic trials and testing. When you think about the problems of replicating the condition in a full or quarter-scale tunnel, they are considerable. No tunnel is large enough that you can guarantee that the amount of air entrainment within a "stoked" vortex is representative of the free-flight un-encapsulated open-air circulation. The size of any such JATO kit need be no greater than 2000lbs of thrust for 15 seconds (= about 25kgs weight penalty per rocket, or about 100kgs overall). Perhaps simply having that four-simultaneous capability may also enable them to lower the safety margins in some other areas - to make up for it. It could also be used for emergency overweight STOVL departures (embassy bug-outs). Alternatively an under-fuselage (over-fuselage) centre-line thrusting pair may do the job (and avoid the possibility of asymmetric firings). C130 had six JATO bottles per side but two per side would probably do the trick for the Osprey, two attached to each fuel sponson and firing a set at a time in the AsymmVR scenario. Minus factor include the presence of explosive ordnance (particularly on a carrier), as well as the weight. A properly programmed FCS should preclude any nuisance firings. There may be another vital VR factor at work here. The original XV-15 (upon which they did all the early proof-of-concept work) only had a 90 degree nacelle tilt capability. Later, in both the XV-15 and In the V-22 (all variants AFAIK) they increased this to 95 degrees in order to be able to back it up on the ground or reverse whilst hover-taxiing (an important capability on a crowded flight-deck as well as on a crowded tarmac). It makes sense to me that they may have had the use of that rearwards thrusting capability in order to slow more quickly on the approach in helicopter mode (i.e. it's unlikely to have been "gated out" because they had no way of knowing that it could severely exacerbate any AsymmVR problem). To explain this last point, think of it as being very similar to VIFFing in the Harrier (Vectoring In Forward Flight that the Harrier uses in Air Combat Tactics in order to turn inside an adversary - or for braking on the ground). The only airborne use for it in the V-22 would be to make the plane-to-helo conversion a much later and swifter, more dynamic process (i.e. good for tactical surprise). However,
here's the rub. The use of it would make the Osprey much more likely
to encounter VR, simply because it (VR) would not require a terribly
steep approach angle or high rate of descent if 95 degrees of rotor-disc
tilt was being utilised to kill energy (potential i.e. excess
height or kinetic as in speed). Five degrees may not seem much
but when you're talking about a standard 3 to 8 degree approach angle,
it's a lot. It would be enough, particularly with a tailwind, to ensure
that you were descending in your own "bad air" even at much
higher speeds than you would expect to encounter VR. Normally
they just would not need to use it unless, say, they had a need to
quickly kill excess energy - for instance if, as in the Marana
case, the wingman had overshot his leader and had very little time
to get back in position. The more I think about it, the more that
makes sense. So on four counts it would explain why they'd not
encountered VR earlier in the test & eval program (at all): a. Firstly, as we know, no-one had expected that the Osprey was susceptible to it and so no-one had suggested testing for it. b. Any testing that may have been done earlier (on the original XV-15) would have been reassuring, but being limited to 90 degrees of nacelle-rotor tilt, quite invalid regarding the Osprey. c. It may be that the Osprey is vulnerable to AsymmVR only when 90 degrees tilt is exceeded) - such as when a very rapid correction is needed (as in the Marana aircraft's overshoot of the leader's abeam position). d. Any testing done on the V-22 may have preceded the decision to go to 95 degrees (which was done for ground-handling reasons) At the very least, I'd be asking whether there was any prohibition (or even caution) for use of >90 degrees of nacelle rotor-tilt airborne. Was there any idea as to what implications it could have? I'd guess the answer (through the "smoke and mirrors" reply that you'd get) would be quite revealing. I may be wrong but I suspect that it is neither "locked out" nor "detented" when airborne. I'd guess that neither the PFCS or AFCS software has any inhibitors programmed in either. Whether or not they'd tell you that is debatable. It may all of a sudden be not FOI'able and even a matter of National Security. But it's worth asking these questions. What I'm saying here is that it could simply be yet another case of "unintended consequences". Life and aviation is choc-a-bloc with those hind-sightable instances of human fallibility. |
| Extracts
from Rotor & Wing International August 1991
A frequent claim made for the Osprey is that 80% of the testing has been achieved in only 20% of the flight-test hours thanks to the extensive use of engineering and Flight simulation. Obviously the sort of error claimed to be behind the crash of airframe #5 (11 Jun 1991) lies outside of this test framework. The general view seems to be that the V-22 Team may have successfully navigated their way through this latest ordeal, even though there must now be a number of embarrassing questions to face about quality control (somewhat ironic in an industry which is hitching its future to that somewhat ephemeral TQM (Total Quality Management) Strategy. On the other hand flight-test accidents, incidents and such are part of the story of aviation. It must be a realistic assumption that progress in aviation is made at the expense of certainty. There may very well be other Osprey accidents in the future, and a well constructed flight-test program has no choice but to take this into account. |
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SUMMARY The Osprey Story is looking to become one
of those very unfortunate "missed opportunities". Because
of the lack of wind-tunnel time much of the testing was done utilizing
"Two Golf Charlie" (2GCHAS), an analytical software program
that runs on high-speed computers such as the IBMSP2. The stuff that
couldn't be bypassed was done in a quick visit to a Dutch wind-tunnel. Unfortunately
the data available from hover and tethered tests extrapolated into these
programs won't necessarily disclose the aircraft's susceptibility to such
insidious helicopter ills as Vortex Ring (or in the contra-rotating
Osprey's case the terminally lethal variant destined to become known
as AsymmVR). So it always gets back to "garbage in / garbage out".
The Computer software is only as smart as the engineer programming it.
It cannot discover new phenomena because, for that, you need empiric
data from wind-tunnel or flight-test. Contributing to this situation
was the decision that they had to get to that cream on the cake ASAP
after all the many years of development. I refer to the BELL 609 civil
variant. 600 odd sales over five years are predicted. But one of
the bugbears was the FAA's insistence that the same acoustic limitations
should apply to the Bell 609 as any other airliner using the major civil airports.
So all the available simulator time had to be diverted to that project,
sorting out just how to minimize noise. Quite amazingly they almost
resolved the Osprey's VR problem during that wind-tunnel testing - without
realizing it and without knowing that there was such a problem
. They discovered that a tilt-rotor's noise is all to do with the creation
and break-down of blade vortices. They concluded that the more blades
there were, the less pressure differentials in the vortices. The ideal
balance between engineering possibilities/practicalities and acceptable
noise levels was at five blades.
With five blades the vortices are insignificantly small because of the
greater "solidity" of the rotor disc. Strangely enough a
five-bladed Osprey, for exactly the same reasons, would be nowhere as
susceptible to the VR condition as the three-bladed prop-rotor on the MV-22.
They
were also not to realise the great significance of a minor modification
done to the XV-15 and V-22 Osprey that allowed it to taxi backwards
on the ground (or in the hover). This was simply to increase the nacelle
tilt from 90 degrees to 95. That extra 5 degrees makes all the difference
if a pilot decides to utilise it in order to quickly slow down (as when,
for instance, he's overshot his leader during the formation approach
and must quickly get back into position - as in the Marana crash). The
95 degrees projects the rotor downdraft an extra 5 degrees forward (or
ahead), making it much more likely that an unhappy coincidence of
flight path and downdraft would bring about asymmetric Vortex Ring.
So you could say that hype and a blinkered loyalty to the project caused
the Osprey Team to overlook what may well prove a great challenge to
the Military models and the likely inability to certify the civil
variants. Infatuation with computer technology may be also easily identified
in the accident chain. |