Arthur Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea (1818) is divided into four books. Each book has numbered sections. Book One describes the world as idea. The world is described as an object of experience and science in that it depends on the principle of sufficient reason. Book Two describes the world as the will, explaining how the will may be manifested in the world. Book Three discusses the Platonic Idea, which is different from intuitive or abstract ideas in that it does not depend on the principle of sufficient reason. Book Four discusses the ethical implications of the affirmation or denial of the will-to-live.
Schopenhauer begins by saying that the world is an idea insofar as it is an object in the mind of a subject. To be a subject is to be a perceiver, and is not to be a perceived object. Insofar as a subject becomes a perceived object, the subject no longer exists. Subject and object are not a continuum, but have an either-or relationship. An object begins where a subject ends.1
According to Schopenhauer, all objects of perception must comply with the fourfold principle of sufficient reason, which has a physical form, a mathematical form, a logical form, and a moral form. The physical form of the principle of sufficient reason is the principle of becoming. The mathematical form of the principle of sufficient reason is the principle of being. The logical form of the principle of sufficient reason is the principle of knowing. The moral form of the principle of sufficient reaosn is the principle of acting.
Schopenhauer explains in his treatise On the Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason (1813) that each form of the fourfold principle of sufficient reason governs a particular class of possible objects for a subject. The principle of becoming governs the the class of complete representations which may constitute the totality of an experience.2 The principle of being governs the class of abstract representations or concepts. The principle of knowing governs the class of a priori intuitions of space and of time. The principle of acting governs the class of objects which consist of only the subjectivity of the will.
The fourfold principle of sufficent reason is a set of rules which governs all objects or events of the phenomenal world. Each of the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason explains a different aspect of the nature of necessity.
Schopenhauer argues that the principle of sufficient reason of becoming (i.e. the law of causality) is that an effect must logically follow from a given cause. The principle of sufficient reason of being (i.e. the law of time and space) is that objects of perception must belong to time and space. The principle of sufficient reason of knowing (i.e. the law of ground) is that a conclusion must logically follow from a given premise. The principle of sufficient reason of acting (i.e. the law of motivation) is that an action must logically follow from a given motive.
Schopenhauer also argues that ideas (i.e. representations) may be either primary or secondary. Primary ideas include perceptions and intuitions. Secondary ideas include concepts and abstract representations. Thus, concepts are "representations of representations."3 All representations are objects of possible experience, and all objects of possible experience are representations.4
According to Schopenhauer, reason is the faculty of producing or comparing concepts, but understanding is the faculty of producing or comparing perceptions. Concepts may only be thought, and cannot be perceived. Only the effects of concepts, and not the concepts themselves, may become objects of possible experience. The effects of concepts include language, action, and science.
Schopenhauder argues that matter and intellect together constitute the world as idea, and that they cannot be separated from each other. He also argues that idealism as a philosophy of existence does not deny the empirical reality of the physical world. Idealism is properly defined as a transcendental, and not as an empirical, philosophy. Transcendental idealism affirms that a transcendental unity of reason and experience is the condition for knowledge. Transcendental idealism thus leaves the empirical reality of the world intact.5
According to Schopenhauer, the world is the will insofar as all ideas of the world manifest the will. The will itself is not governed by the principle of sufficient reason, but all of its representations are governed by the principle of sufficient reason. The will is not itself an idea or representation, but is a thing-in-itself. The will is the underlying reality of the world, in that all objective phenomena depend on it for their being.
Schopenhauer argues that the will itself is never an object for a subject, and that it therefore is objectively unknowable. The will may be known only by means of its appearances or representations, which are governed by the principle of sufficient reason.
Schopenhauer also argues that although the will may be manifested by the actions of particular individuals, the actions of those individuals may be motivated by their own ideas or perceptions. The will does not explain the actions of any individuals, because it does not obey the principle of sufficient reason. The will may be manifested by the actions of particular individuals, regardless of whether or not they have rational motives or aims. Idea as motive is not a necessary condition for the activity of the will.
According to Schopenhauer, an individual or person is a manifestation of the will. An individual is a knowing subject whose will is manifested in the world as representation. An individual may know his or her own will only by its manifestations, and cannot know his or her own will as it exists in-itself. An individual's own actions are manifestations of the will, and must obey the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, an individual is not free to act in whatever way he or she pleases, because all of his or her actions are governed by necessity.
Schopenhauer argues that the world is an idea insofar as it is an object of perception, but that the world is the will insofar as all of our perceptions of the world are acts of conscious or unconscious will. The will is the being-in-itself of the phenomenal world. The world as an idea objectifies the will, but there is no boundary between subject and object in the will itself.
Schopenhauer also argues that the will is irrational, and that its actions are groundless and without logical explanation. The will is comprehensible in terms of its objective manifestations, but its inner nature can never be known.
According to Schopenhauer, the will transcends time and space, which together constitute the principle of sufficient reason of being. Time and space are conditions for manifestations of the will, but the will itself is unconditioned by time or space. The plurality of things in time and space is an objectification of the will.
Schopenhauer explains that the will cannot properly be defined as a necessary cause of its manifestations in the phenomenal world, because it is not governed by the principle of sufficient reason. The relationship between freedom and necessity is also the relationship between the will and its manifestations in time and space.
Schopenhauer also explains that the will cannot properly be defined as an aim or desire to do something, because the will does not have an aim or purpose in its willing. The principle of sufficient reason of acting, which declares that actions must logically follow from some motive, governs only manifestations of the will and not the will itself.
Schopenhauer argues that the will manifests itself in the world of individual things and in the world of individual ideas or concepts. Each individual act of will may require a motive, but the principle of sufficient reason of acting applies only to these acts of will, and not to the will itself. The will is independent of time, space, plurality, causality, reason, or motive.
Schopenhauer also argues that the will cannot properly be described as conscious, because to be conscious is to be conscious of something, and thus consciousness implies a relation between a subject and an object. The will is neither a perceiving subject nor a perceived object.
According to Schopenhauer, the Platonic Idea is the only adequate objectification of the will. The Platonic Idea is the object of art, and thus is knowable as an object of perception. However, subject and object are not separated in the Platonic Idea, which is the most universal kind of Idea as an act of will. The Platonic Idea is an eternal Idea which is independent of the principle of sufficient reason.
Schopenhauerian idealism differs from Platonic idealism as a theory of the nature of ultimate reality. According to Schopenhauer, a table or a chair is an object of perception, and thus is a manifestion of an act of will. The idea of a table or chair is an act of will, and the will is ultimate reality. However, according to Plato, a table or a chair expresses the idea of a table or chair, and the idea of the table or chair is ultimate reality.
Schopenhauer argues that knowledge may be either intuitive or abstract. Intuitive knowledge is derived from primary ideas (i.e. intuitions or perceptions), but abstract knowledge is derived from secondary ideas (i.e. concepts or abstract representations). All knowledge, except for knowledge of Platonic Ideas, depends on the principle of sufficient reason. Objective representations of the will are only knowable insofar as they are governed by the principle of sufficient reason. All knowledge depends on objectification of the will.
Schopenhauer explains that we may know ourselves as willing, but that we cannot know ourselves as knowing. A knowing subject can never become a known object. We may comprehend appearances of the will in ourselves, but we cannot comprehend the will as a thing-in-itself. We may know the will in our own self-consciousness as a consciousness of freedom.
Schopenhauer also explains that art is the direct and adequate objectivity of the will. Art is a way of viewing things independently from the principle of sufficient reason. In contrast, science is a way of viewing things according to the principle of sufficient reason.
According to Schopenhauer, the act of willing arises from a need or desire for something and therefore is a manifestation of deprivation or suffering. The fulfillment of a wish terminates the act of willing. However, no object of desire which is obtained by a subject can provide lasting satisfaction. Thus, the condition which is necessary for knowledge of the Platonic Idea is pure contemplation, the absence of desire, the transcendence of the subject-object relation, and freedom from being confined by individuality.6
Schopenhauer describes the gratification of a wish or desire as a negative condition in that it provides only temporary deliverance from need or suffering. Happiness is negative, in that it never provides lasting satisfaction. Because happiness is never lasting or complete, only the absence of happiness can become the true subject of art.
Schopenhauer also describes the freedom of the will as negative in that it is merely the denial of necessity. The intellect is subservient to the will in that it cannot compel the will to act rationally and can only try to understand the motives and consequences of actions which have already been decided on by the will. The intellect is capable of knowing, but is not capable of willing. On the other hand, the will is the same as its willing, and is not a faculty of knowing.
According to Schopenhauer, the will cannot be guided by the intellect, but the intellect can be guided by the will. The will as a thing-in-itself is inaccessible to rational knowledge, and cannot be explained by the intellect. However, the intellect may be able to understand the motives for acts of willing by attaining knowledge of how particular individuals (or groups of individuals) may be defined by their own acts of willing. Knowledge of empirical phenomena as manifestions of the will may also enable the intellect to understand the motives for acts of willing.
Schopenhauer argues that the will wants everything for itself, and that it manifests itself as a source of egoism. Egoism concentrates the self-interest of each individual in the individuality of his or her own willing. Egoism may conflict with altruism, which reduces the self-centered interest of each individual in the individuality of his or her own willing.
Schopenhauer also argues that the voluntary renunciation of egoism is achieved by a denial of the will-to-live. Morally right action may consist of denying one's own will-to-live, and may consist of not denying the will-to-live which is affirmed by other individuals. Morally right action may also consist of not forcing other individuals to submit to one's own will-to-live, and may consist of not forcing other individuals to deny their own will-to-live. Justice may be achieved when the affirmation of the will-to-live by one individual does not conflict with the will-to-live of any other individual.
According to Schopenhauer, justice is merely the negation of injustice. If an action by one individual does not deny the affirmation of the will-to-live by any other individual, then that action is not morally wrong.
Schopenhauer argues that conscience may consist of our own self-knowledge of how our actions may manifest the reality of the will. Virtue may proceed from intuitive knowledge, but may not proceed from abstract knowledge or from moral dogmas. Abstract knowledge may inform us of our motives, but motives may only explain the direction of the will, and and cannot explain the will itself. Intuitive knowledge of the will may not be expressible in words, but may be expressible by actions.
Schopenhauer also argues that denial or suspension of the will may be seen in asceticism, which may take the form of voluntarily avoiding physical comfort and avoiding sensual pleasure. Self-sacrifice and self-restraint may also be a denial of the will-to-live. Spiritual salvation and redemption from suffering may be achieved by denial of the will-to-live.
Schopenhauer contends that suicide is not a denial of the will-to-live, because it is not a rejection of personal well-being but is only a rejection of suffering. Suicide does not reject life itself, but only rejects the conditions under which life is given. Suicide is a surrender of life, but not of the will-to-live. The individual who commits suicide gives up living, but does not give up willing. In the act of suicide, the will affirms itself, even though it puts an end to its individual manifestation.7
According to Schopenhauer, the will is free to suspend or deny itself. The denial of the will does not produce a state of nothingness. Nothingness is the negation of being, but being belongs to the world as representation, and not to the will as a thing-in-itself. Thus, nothingness is a negation of the world as representation, but is not a negation of the will as a thing-in-itself. Being and nothingness are only appearances of the will. Nothingness must always be relative to the being of something in the world of representation, and thus there can be no absolute nothingness. Since the world as representation depends on the will for its existence, suspension or denial of the will also suspends or denies the existence of the world as representation.8
A weakness of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is its negativity. Ethical conduct is described as negative, and as requiring a denial of the will-to-live. Ethical concern for others is described as being necessarily contradictory to self-interest. Schopenhauer argues that in order to redeem ourselves we must suspend or deny our own willingness to determine our own actions. This viewpoint is a form of self-contradiction which fails to recognize that rational self-concern may be compatible with moral concern for others.
Schopenhauer’s ethical viewpoint is also extremely pessimistic. He argues that ethical optimism is absurd, and that life consists of suffering. The will is the underlying reality of the world, and has no motive or purpose. The human intellect has no power over the will, and cannot guide the will toward any particular mode of moral action.
Schopenhauer concludes The World as Will and Idea by arguing that suffering is caused by unfulfilled or frustrated volition. The only way to overcome suffering is by denial of the will. The will resists its own negation, but if it is completely negated, then the world of representation is also completely negated. Thus, nothing is left of the world after the will has been negated. However, this nothingness of the world of representation can only be in the relation to the being of the world of representation.
1Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume I, translated by E.F.J. Payne (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 5.
2Schopenhauer, in Schopenhauer's Early "Fourfold Root," translated by F.C. White (Aldershot: Avebury, 1997), p. 16.
3Ibid., p. 36.
4Ibid., p. 13.
5Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume II, translated by E.F.J. payne (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 8.
6Ibid., Volume I, pp. 196-7.
7Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, translated by Jill Berman (London: Everyman, 1995), pp. 250-1.
8Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume I, translated by E.F.J. Payne, pp. 409-410.
Sahakian, William S. "Arthur Schopenhauer," in History of Philosophy. New York: Harper & Row (1968), pp. 204-11.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation. Translated by E.F.J. Payne. Volumes I and II. New York: Dover Publications, 1969.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Idea. Translated by Jill Berman. London: Everyman, 1995.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Idea. Translated by R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1896.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. Schopenhauer's Early "Fourfold Root." Translated by F.C. White. Aldershot: Avebury, 1997.
