Josiah Royce’s The World and the Individual is based on the Gifford Lectures which he delivered at the University of Aberdeen in 1899 and 1900. The lectures are collected in two volumes, as the First Series and Second Series. The First Series is entitled “The Four Historical Conceptions of Being,” and is based on the lectures which were delivered between January 11 and February 1, 1899. The Second Series is entitled “Nature, Man, and the Moral Order,” and is based on the lectures which were delivered in January, 1900.

The First Series of lectures is concerned with defining a consistent theory of the nature of Being, and with defining the reality belonging to the world and to the individual. The Second Series is concerned with applying the theory of Being to the understanding of physical and social reality, and with defining the place of the self in Being.

The First Series includes ten lectures: Lecture I: “Introduction: The Religious Problems and the Theory of Being,” Lecture II: “Realism and Mysticism in the History of Thought,” Lecture III: “The Independent Beings: A Critical Examination of Realism,” Lecture IV: “The Unity of Being, and the Mystical Interpretation,” Lecture V: “The Outcome of Mysticism, and the World of Modern Critical Rationalism,” Lecture VI: “Validity and Experience,” Lecture VII: “The Internal and External Meaning of Ideas,” Lecture VIII: “The Fourth Conception of Being,” Lecture IX: “Universality and Unity,” Lecture X: Individuality and Freedom.”

The First Series also includes a Supplementary Essay: “The One, the Many, and the Infinite,” which describes the theory of Being in F.H. Bradley’s philosophy of Absolute Idealism.

The Second Series consists of ten lectures: Lecture I: “The Recognition of Facts,” Lecture II: “The Linkage of Facts,” Lecture III: “The Temporal and the Eternal,” Lecture IV: “Physical and Social Reality,” Lecture V: “The Interpretation of Nature,” Lecture VI: “The Human Self,” Lecture VII: “The Place of the Self in Nature,” Lecture VIII: “The Moral Order,” Lecture IX: “The Struggle with Evil,” Lecture X: “The Union of God and Man.”

Royce begins by defining an idea as an act of will. An idea is an expression of a purpose in the mind of the subject. The purpose expressed by an idea is the internal meaning of the idea.

The way in which an idea refers to an outer fact or object is its external meaning. The external meaning of an idea is true if the idea successfully corresponds to the world of facts. The external meaning of an idea is false if the idea does not successfully correspond to the world of facts.

The nature of Being is defined by how the internal meaning of ideas is related to their external meaning. If an idea is to have some external meaning, then there must be some unity between its internal and external meaning. The external meaning is determined by the internal meaning of the idea.

Thought as a mode of Being includes the world of inner meanings, the acts of will which produce ideas and which develop ideas according to facts. Thought involves an activity of modifying ideas in order to adjust them to facts.

Royce describes Four Historical Conceptions of Being. The First Conception of Being is Realism. The Second Conception of Being is Mysticism. The Third Conception of Being is Critical Rationalism. The Fourth Conception of Being is Idealism.

According to Realism, reality is independent of any idea or experience by which it is known. The reality of an object is independent of any idea which may refer to the object. Moreover, the reality of an idea is independent of any object to which the idea refers. Thus, even if it is assumed that an idea of an object is caused by the object, this does not imply that the object or the idea are real, because their reality is not established by their causal connection. The reality of any object or idea is independent of any relation which the object or idea may have to other objects or ideas.

Realism has been divided by the controversy as to whether reality consists of one independently real Being or whether reality consists of many independently real Beings. Royce explains that if the idea of an object and the object itself each have their own independent reality, then there must be more than one independent reality. On the other hand, if objects and ideas are independently real, then change can occur in one independently real being without any change in another independently real being. This reveals a contradiction which is present in Realism, Royce says. If change can occur in the real world without any change in our idea of reality, then the theory of Realism, which is an idea of reality, may not reflect reality.

As a consequence of this contradiction in the theory of Realism, the Realist cannot empirically verify the reality of any form of Being, because Realism asserts that reality is independent of experience.

Royce says that Mysticism is the Second Conception of Being. According to Mysticism, the knower can experience the unity of the known Being. When the unity of Being is known, the knower can become one with Absolute Being. The knower is no longer separated from the known.

Royce argues that in Mysticism the concept of independent Being is self-contradictory. If Being is independent of knowledge, then it is unknowable and indefinable. According to Mysticism, the reality of any idea is defined by how the idea refers to Absolute Being. Any idea of an object receives its reality from the way in which it refers to Absolute Being. If the knower becomes one with the known, then any idea which the knower has of the known refers back to the knower. Royce argues that this makes Being equivalent to Nothing, and that Mysticism defines Nothing.

Critical Rationalism is described by Royce as the Third Conception of Being. This Conception of Being includes the theory that Validity is the same as Reality.¹ The truth belonging to any idea is what defines its reality. Being is what determines whether ideas are valid or invalid. The validity of any idea is defined by the existence of the fact referred to by the idea.

However, truth or validity may be an aspect of Being without completing defining the nature of Being.² Royce argues that the truth or validity of any idea is found by determining how closely the idea corresponds to its individual object.

The object of an idea may be determined by the idea’s internal meaning. On the other hand, the truth of an idea may be determined by the idea’s external meaning (i.e. by how closely the idea corresponds to its individual object). Thus, truth may be defined as a correspondence between an idea and the object to which the idea refers. Error may be defined as a lack of correspondence between an idea and the object to which the idea refers.

Royce explains that if truth is determined by whether an idea corresponds to an object, then the object is already assumed to exist. The reality of an object cannot therefore be proved by the truth or validity of the idea which refers to the object. This is a contradiction which is present in Critical Rationalism, says Royce, because reality cannot be defined as truth or validity.

The individual does not merely accept the world as an object of perception. Royce says that every idea which the individual has of the world is an act of will. Ideas that are vague or indeterminate are incompletely developed acts of will. Ideas that are more clearly defined or individualized are more fully developed acts of will.

Reality is the object of true ideas. Reality expresses in a form that is ultimately individual the meaning of every true idea.³ To be real is to be individual. Thus, Royce says that Idealism is the only Conception of Being which does not contradict itself. Idealism is a philosophy which affirms that reality is the complete and final objectification of individual ideas.

Royce notes that the truth of an idea is not determined simply by an idea’s external meaning (i.e. how the idea corresponds to its individual object). The truth of an idea also depends upon the idea’s internal meaning (how the idea selects its object, and what mode of correspondence the idea selects for its relation to the object). Thus, the truth of an idea reflects the idea as an act of will.

Being cannot be independent of meaning. Everything that has Being expresses the meaning of a true idea. Being is a fulfillment of an act of will.

The world of facts is an expression of the will. Facts may be perceived as limiting the freedom of the will, but as also enabling the will to fulfill itself better than if the reality of facts were unknown.

Facts are the individual objects of true ideas. Facts have external meaning, but are also objects of individual ideas which have internal meaning. Thus, Idealism directs philosophical inquiry from a study of the World as Fact to a reflection upon the World as Idea.⁴

Royce distinguishes between two forms of consciousness: appreciative (or volitional) and descriptive (or theoretical). These two forms of consciousness are important for our understanding of the physical and social world. Thus, the realm of Being includes a World of Appreciation and a World of Description.

The World of Appreciation is a World of Values and of Self-Expression. The World of Description is a World of Objects of Possible Attention. The physical world can be interpreted as a World of Description. The social world can be interpreted as a World of Appreciation.

The physical world may be regarded as an objective order, or as a system of discoverable phenomena. The social world may be regarded as a world where many individuals express themselves, and where individuals may express their own will similarly or differently. The facts of the physical world may be regarded as objects of possible attention. The facts of the social world may be regarded as forms of self-expression.

Royce says that the ultimate facts are the facts of the World of Appreciation.⁵ The facts of the World of Appreciation form a Well-Ordered Series. A Well-Ordered Series is a series in which every fact is logically followed by another fact. This is in contrast to the series of facts in the World of Description, where a sequence of facts may not be well-ordered.

Time is both perceptual and conceptual, says Royce. Time has meaning only in terms of the will. Indeed, time is a form of the will, in that it is an idea of the real world.⁶ Time is a property of the real world, in that it is a process of change by which internal meaning is unified with external meaning.

In Royce’s view, the self, like any other fact, is a meaning within the Absolute. The Absolute is a unity of ideas expressing Being. But the self is also more than a fact, it is an ideal. It is the fulfillment of an ethical idea.

The self cannot be a substance existing independently of any knowledge that refers to it. This concept of the self is an aspect of the contradiction seen in the theory of Realism. When this contradictory concept of the self is revised to be consistent with Idealism, the concept of the self becomes an ethical concept. The individual self has meaning within the Absolute Self, and according to Royce, the Absolute Self is God.

The individual self finds fulfillment in Absolute Being. Every self has an individual meaning. Thus, the recognition of the true individuality of the self is an important principle of Royce’s Idealism.

Royce’s Absolute Idealism affirms that the Internal and External Meaning of any idea are unified in the Whole Meaning. The Whole Meaning is identified with the Universe, with the Absolute, and with God.⁷ The Whole Meaning of any idea reveals the unity of Absolute Being.

Royce’s Absolute Idealism also affirms that the world is an expression of Absolute Will. Thus, the realm of Being is a unity of the One and the Many, the universal and the particular, the world and the individual.⁸

Royce’s concept of the world as an expression of will is similar in some aspects to Schopenhauer's concept of the world as a representation of the will. However, Royce sees the will as rational, while Schopenhauer sees the will as not governed by reason.

Royce also differs from Schopenhauer in his view of the nature of ultimate reality. For Royce, the world in its reality is the ultimate expression of the will, while for Schopenhauer the will itself is ultimate reality.

Royce differs from Schopenhauer in that Royce is not a pessimist. Schopenhauer says that the individual can overcome suffering only by denial of the will, while Royce says that the individual can find fulfillment in the unity of Absolute Will.

While Schopenhauer views the will as ultimate reality, and the individual as a limited appearance of the will, Royce views reality as a fulfillment in individual form of the purpose expressed by the will.

Royce’s Absolute Idealism also has important differences from that of F.H. Bradley. For Bradley, the self is appearance and not reality. The Absolute is not a self, and is without selfhood. For Royce, the self is an individual within the Absolute Self, and the Absolute must have selfhood.

Royce says that Bradley’s Absolute cannot be aware of itself, because this would mean being aware of itself as appearance, and not as a reality. Royce says that this is an aspect of inconsistency in Bradley’s philosophy.

Royce also describes Bradley’s Absolute as a self-representative system. A self-representative system represents itself together with the other elements that it represents. Royce argues that Bradley’s Absolute brings the whole world of Appearance into a unity of Absolute Reality. Thus, Bradley’s Absolute must have selfhood.

¹Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, First Series: “The Four Historical Conceptions of Being” (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1900), p. 204.
² Ibid., p. 251.
³ Ibid., p. 386.
⁴ Ibid., p. 17.
⁵ Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, Second Series: “Nature, Man, and the Moral Order” (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1901), p. 464.
⁶ Ibid., p. 133.
⁷ Ibid., p. 271.
⁸ Ibid., p. 187.

Royce, Josiah. The World and the Individual. First Series: “The Four Historical Conceptions of Being.” New York: The MacMillan Company, 1900.

Royce, Josiah. The World and the Individual. Second Series: “Nature, Man, and the Moral Order.” New York: The MacMillan Company, 1901.