Mengzi

Mengzi (The Book of Mencius) is a collection of dialogues by Mengzi (Mencius, 371-289 BCE), who was a major influence on the development of classical Confucianism. He was born in the kingdom of Zou (Tsou) in eastern China during the Warring States Period (480-222 BCE). He studied under a disciple of Zisi (Zhu Ssu), the grandson of Kongfuzi (Confucius), and when he had completed his study, he traveled to several feudal kingdoms in order to offer his services as a professional adviser. He was unable to persuade any ruler to implement his ideas on political and social reform, and he later retired from public life in order to continue teaching and writing.

Mengzi is one of the Four Books of classical Confucianism, the others being The Analects (Lun Yu), The Great Learning (Da Xue), and The Doctrine of the Mean (Zhong Yong). The text is divided into seven books, each of which is divided into two parts. The parts of each book are divided into numbered chapters.

Mengzi describes benevolence and righteousness as the two most important principles of moral conduct. Benevolence (ren) is the heart (xin) or internal source of moral conduct, while righteousness (yi) is the proper path for moral conduct. Benevolence is the most fundamental aspect of our nature as human beings, while righteousness is the path which we must follow in order to fulfill our nature as human beings.

Mengzi argues that benevolence motivates us to love others, and that righteousness motivates us to fulfill our moral duties to others. Benevolence and righteouness enable us to follow the Way. If we act benevolently and righteously, then we can follow the Way. If we follow the Way of Heaven, then we can discover the goodness of which we are capable as moral beings. The Way is for each of us to be true to ourselves and to each other. If we are true to our sense of compassion for, and obligation to, others, then we can follow the Way, and we can each fulfill our proper destiny.

According to Mengzi, there is no greater joy than to find that we have been true to ourselves and to others.1 If we are true to ourselves and to others, then we will know how to treat each other benevolently and righteously. If we treat each other benevolently and righteously, then we will know the goodness that belongs to human nature. To know the goodness that belongs to human nature is to know the Way.

Mengzi argues that benevolence and righteousness are more rational motives for human action than the desire for profit or for personal gain. Benevolence and righteousness may promote social harmony, but the desire for profit (li) or for personal gain may promote social conflict.

Mengzi also argues that to persuade people to act benevolently and righteously is to guide them by imposing nothing on them that is against their natural tendency. To guide human beings toward goodness is like guiding a stream of water to flow downward. Just as the natural tendency of water is to flow downward, so the natural tendency of human beings is be benevolent and good. Just as there is no water which does not tend to flow downward, so there is no human being who is not capable of becoming good.

According to Mengzi, all human beings are by nature good, or at least are capable of becoming good. However, Mengzi may be susceptible to the criticism that he does not adequately distinguish between being good and being capable of becoming good. Mengzi argues that to be good is the same as to be capable of becoming good (Book V, Part A, Ch. 6). Thus, if a person is truly evil, then that person may not be capable of becoming good. To be evil may be either to lose the capability to become good or may be to lose the capability to demonstrate the good qualities that are at the heart of human nature.

Mengzi may also be susceptible to the criticism that in declaring that the natural tendency of human beings is to be good, he does not clearly distinguish between whether most human beings tend to be good or whether all human beings tend to be good. If some human beings do not tend to be good, then it may be open to question whether or not they are still capable of becoming good.

Mengzi argues that it is human nature to act benevolently toward others. Those who do not act benevolently toward others are not motivated by instincts which are internal to human nature. To be devoid of benevolence is to be enslaved by heartless instincts and is no longer to be a moral being.

Mengzi offers as proof for his claim that human nature is good the argument that no one is devoid of sensitivity to the suffering or misfortunes of others. To be a human being is to have the ability to be concerned about the well-being of others. For example, if a man sees a child who is in danger of falling into a well, then that man will almost certainly try to rescue the child (II, A, Ch. 6).

According to Mengzi, the ability to feel compassion, the ability to feel shame, the ability to be courteous and respectful, and the ability to know the difference between right and wrong are criteria for what it means to be a truly moral being. The sense of compassion is the beginning of benevolence (ren), the sense of shame is the beginning of righteousness (yi), the sense of respect is the beginning of propriety (li), and the sense of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom (zhi). These are the Four Beginnings which lead to attainment of the Four Constant Virtues (ren, yi, li, and zhi).

Mengzi teaches that the Four Constant Virtues are internal and not external to human nature, and that they are the original nature of all human beings. To be good is to allow the original nature of oneself to express itself. Benevolence is a motive for helping others and for not harming others. Righteousness is a motive for complying with moral duty. Propriety is a motive for honoring one’s parents and for respecting one’s elders. Wisdom is a motive for promoting social justice and harmony.

According to Mengzi, if we find the goodness that is within ourselves, then we can also find the Way. If we find the Way within ourselves, then we can draw on it deeply, and if we draw on it deeply, then we can find it wherever we turn.2

Mengzi argues that the human will commands the qi (ch'i, vital energy) of the human body. The material force or vital energy of the human body may expand or contract, depending on whether right or wrong actions are performed. Right actions may cause the vital energy of the human body to expand, but wrong actions may cause the vital energy of the human body to contract. Each person's vital energy may expand or contract, depending on whether he or she performs right or wrong actions. If a person allows his or her vital energy to expand through righteous action, then his or her vital energy may eventually become limitless and "flood-like." This "flood-like qi" (hao ran zhi qi) is a vast source of moral goodness which may enable each person to follow the path of righteousness and to find the Way (II, A, Ch. 2).3

Mengzi criticizes the philosopher Gaozi (Kau Tzu, c.420-c.320 BCE) for viewing righteousness as an external rather than internal property of moral conduct (II, A, Ch. 2). According to Mengzi, righteous actions are motivated by righteous intentions, which come from within a person's mind or heart. Mengzi also criticizes Gaozi's theory that human nature is neither good nor bad (VI, A, Ch. 2).

Mengzi criticizes the philosopher Mozi (Mo Tzu, c.470-c.391 BCE) for arguing that benevolence should be extended equally and impartially to all human beings. Mengzi contends that the moral duty to love one's own parents is greater than the moral duty to love any other persons. Mengzi thus argues that Mozi’s doctrine of universal love is a denial of the moral duty to show a proper degree of love and respect for one’s own parents (III, B, Ch. 9).

Mengzi argues that the most basic moral duty is the duty to show love to one’s own parents. If a person does not comply with the moral duty to obey, serve, protect, and honor his or her own parents, then that person will not be able to comply with other kinds of moral duty.

Mengzi also argues that there is not a single degree of benevolence which is proper for all relationships, and that different degrees of benevolence may be proper for different kinds of relationships. There may be a proper degree of benevolence for each kind of personal or social relationship, such as the relationship between ruler and subject, between father and son, or between older brother and younger brother.

Mengzi criticizes the philosopher Yang Zhu (Yang Chu, 440-c.360 BCE) for arguing that each person should be concerned only with his or her own self-interest. Mengzi contends that this doctrine is a denial of the moral duty that belongs to each kind of personal or social relationship, such as that between ruler and subject or that between parent and child.

Mengzi expresses his admiration for Kongfuzi’s emphasis on benevolence as a principle of moral conduct. For Mengzi, Kongfuzi (Confucius, 551-479 BCE) is a perfect example of righteousness and wisdom. Kongfuzi is the sage and practical thinker who never gets tired of learning and who never grows weary of teaching.

Mengzi’s political philosophy reflects the same emphasis on the importance of benevolence and righteousness that is seen in his moral philosophy. According to Mengzi, principles of moral duty apply to the relationship between ruler and subject, just as they apply to the relationship between father and son. A ruler has a moral duty to protect the security and promote the well-being of his subjects, and in return the subjects have a moral duty to respect and obey their ruler. Harmony and understanding between ruler and subject may occur when they comply with their moral duties to each other.

Mengzi argues that a good ruler exhibits the Four Constant Virtues (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom). Benevolent actions will bring honor to a ruler, while malevolent actions will bring disgrace to a ruler. If a ruler acts benevolently toward his subjects, then they will act benevolently toward him. If a ruler does not act benevolently toward his subjects, then they will not act benevolently toward him.

According to Mengzi, a ruler who fails to promote the well-being or protect the security of his subjects should accept responsibility for his own actions and should not make excuses for his mistakes by blaming them on external circumstances. A ruler should examine his own conduct if he is unsuccessful in fulfilling his duties as a ruler (IV, A, Ch. 4).

Mengzi also advises that if a ruler finds that a tax or legal duty is morally wrong, then the ruler should not hesitate to abolish that tax or legal duty. A ruler should not permit an unjust tax or legal duty to be sustained unnecessarily (III, B, Ch. 8).

Mengzi argues that if a ruler is wise and good, then that ruler will establish a just and benevolent government. A benevolent government will try to help the subjects of the ruler to provide for their own basic needs. A benevolent government will also try to help those subjects who are unable to provide for their own basic needs. A ruler who truly wants to help his subjects will appoint ministers who also truly want to help the subjects of his kingdom. Thus, the establishment of a just and benevolent government will promote the development of a more harmonious and orderly society.


FOOTNOTES

1Mencius, translated by D.C. Lau (London: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 182.
2Ibid., p. 130.
3Ibid., p. 77.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chang, Carsun. "Mencius," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Paul Edwards. New York: Crowell, Collier and MacMillan, 1967.

Fung, Yu-lan. "The Idealistic Wing of Confucianism: Mencius," in A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. New York: The MacMillan Company (1978), pp. 68-79.

Mencius. Translated by D.C. Lau. London: Penguin Books, 1970.

Wu, Joseph S. "Mencius," in Great Thinkers of the Eastern World. Edited by Ian P. McGreal. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995.

Copyright© Alex Scott 2004

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